White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940)
White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940)
White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940)
530
60 S.Ct. 1032
84 L.Ed. 1342
WHITE
v.
STATE OF TEXAS.
No. 87.
Petitioner was convicted of rape and sentenced to death in the District Court of
Montgomery County, Texas. The State's appellate criminal court of last resort
affirmed and denied rehearing.1 We declined to grant certiorari to review the
State court's action. February 29, 1940, petitioner sought rehearing of his
petition for certiorari, alleging that his conviction and sentence resulted from
proceedings in which the State had utilized an alleged confession in violation of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. March 25, 1940, we
granted certiorari, and reversed the judgment of the state court 309 U.S. 631, 60
S.Ct. 706, 84 L.Ed. 989, upon authority of Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716, and Canty v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629, 60 S.Ct. 612,
84 L.Ed. 988. The case is before us now on the State's petition for rehearing.2
From the first offer of the alleged confession in evidence at the trial, petitioner
has challenged the State's right to utilize it consistently with rights guaranteed
him by the Federal Constitution.3 In affirming the conviction and sentence of
death, the court below necessarily determined that use of the confession did not
constitute a denial of that due process which the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees.
3
The State suggests that there is evidence that petitioner denied ever having
made or signed the confession which purported to be signed by his mark.
Therefore, it insists that petitioner is barred from urging that the prosecution's
use of the confession could have deprived him of due process at his trial. But
regardless of petitioner's testimony on this question, the State insisted and
offered testimony to establish that the confession was signed by him and upon
this evidence the confession was submitted to the jury for the purpose of
obtaining his conviction. Since, therefore, the confession was presented by the
State to the jury as that of petitioner, we must determine whether the record
shows that, if signed at all, the confession was obtained and used in such
manner that petitioner's trial fell short of that procedural due process guaranteed
by the Constitution.
Petitioner is an illiterate farmhand who was engaged, at the time of his arrest,
upon a plantation about ten miles from Livingston, Texas. On the day
following the crime with which he has been charged, he was called from the
field in which he was picking cotton and was taken to the house of the brotherin-law of the prosecutrix, the victim of the crime, where fifteen or sixteen
negroes of the vicinity were at the time in custody without warrants or the
filing of charges. Taken to the county court house, and thence to the Polk
County jail, petitioner was kept there six or seven days. According to his
testimony, armed Texas Rangers on several successive nights took him
handcuffed from the jail 'up in the woods somewhere', whipped him, asked him
each time about a confession and warned him not to speak to any one about the
nightly trips tot he woods. During the period of his arrest up to and including
the signing of the alleged confession, petitioner had no lawyer, no charges were
filed against him and he was out of touch with friends or relatives.
There were denials that petitioner was ever physically mistreated or abused. But
the Rangers and a local peace officer, identified by petitioner as the officers
who took him on the night trips to the woods and there whipped him, did not
specifically deny that he was taken out of jail, at night, and interrogated in the
woods. This local peace officer wasn't sure 'how many times' the prisoner was
removed from jail, and one Ranger re-stated his testimony given at the first trial
that he 'took him out so many times' the exact number could not be recalled.
The prisoner was taken out of jail, driven 'out on the road' and then 'out off of
the road', as this Ranger testified, in order that the officers could talk to him and
because the jail was crowded. In jail, the Sheriff put petitioner by himself and
'kept watching him and talking to him.'
'Due process of law, preserved for all by our Constitution, commands that no
such practice as that disclosed by this record shall send any accused to his
death.' 4
Petition denied.
128 S.W.2d 51. A prior conviction was reversed. 135 Tex.Cr.R. 210, 117
S.W.2d 450.
Petitioner's original petition for certiorari was denied November 13, 1939. On
February 29, 1940, after our decision in the Chambers case, petitioner filed a
petition for rehearing of his original petition, assigning the additional ground
that his conviction was attributable to the use by the State of a confession
obtained by coercion and intimidation. March 2, 1940, the Attorney General of
Texas was notified of the pendency of the petition for rehearing and he has
informed the Clerk of this Court that he notified the State's Appellate Criminal
Attorney. Information of pendency of the petition for rehearing of the petition
for certiorari was also communicated to the Montgomery County District Court
Clerk, the District Attorney, the Governor and the State Board of Pardons and
Paroles. The State's petition for rehearing of our judgment of March 25, 1940,
reversing the State court's judgment, alleged that the State had not received
adequate notice and sought further opportunity to present the State's views. We
therefore heard oral arguments upon the State's petition for rehearing.
In addition to alleging that the confession relied on by the State was coerced
and involuntary, both petitioner's amended motion for a new trial and his bill of
exceptions to the court below set out that he 'was not permitted to talk to an
attorney to advise him but was kept incommunicado, was not permitted to use a
telephone, was kept in the woods by Rangers a great portion of the time and
was denied every right that even this defendant is entitled to under the
Constitution of Texas and the Constitution of the United States.'
4
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716; Canty v.
Alabama, 309 U.S. 629, 60 S.Ct. 612, 84 L.Ed. 988.