EI DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456 (1924)

264 U.S.
456
44 S.Ct. 364
68 L.Ed. 788
E. L. DU PONT DE NEMOURS & CO.

v.
DAVIS, Director General of Railroads.
No. 517.
Argued March 14, 1924.
Decided. April 7, 1924.
Messrs. C. H. Browder, of Chicago, Ill., and C. A. Cunningham and Z. B.

Harrison, both of Blytheville, Ark., for petitioner.
[Argument of Counsel from page 457 intentionally omitted]
Mr. A. A. McLaughlin, of Washington, D. C., for respondent.
[Argument of Counsel from page 458 intentionally omitted]
Mr. Justice SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an action to recover demurrage charges accrued at Little Rock, Ark.,

during May, June, and July, 1918, on certain shipments of cotton linters. The
defendant, petitioner here, demurred to the complaint on the grounds: (a) That
the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitation; and (b) that plaintiff
was without authority to bring the action. The District Court sustained the
demurrer, but was reversed by the Court of Appeals. 287 Fed. 522.
There is nothing in the second point, and we dispose of it at once. The

contention is that the authority to maintain the action is vested in the Director
General of Railroads, originally designated under the Federal Control Act
(Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, 3115 3/4 a-3115 3/4 p), and
continued by the President under sections 202 and 211 of Transportation Act
1920, c. 91, 41 Stat. 459, 469 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, 10071 1/4 b,
10071 1/4 e), and not in Davis, as Agent, appointed under section 206 of the
latter act (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, 10071 1/4 cc). Apt allegations,
however, are found in the body of the complaint to bring the plaintiff, Davis,
within the provisions of sections 202 and 211. At most, the words 'as agent' are
surplusage, and it is impossible that defendant could have been prejudiced by
their use. Act Feb. 26, 1919, c. 48, 40 Stat. 1181 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919,
1246).
3
The action was brought more than three years after the cause of action accrued.
The statute relied upon as a bar is section 424, Transportation Act 1920, 41
Stat. 491, 492 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, 8584), being a new paragraph
added to section 16 of the Interstate Commerce Act by way of amendment. The
pertinent words are:
'(3) All actions at law by carriers subject to this act for recovery of their
charges, or any part thereof, shall be begun within three years from the time the
cause of action accrues, and not after.'
It is insisted that the United Statesor the Director General, representing the
United Statesis included in the provision as a carrier subject to the act. Our
opinion is otherwise. The act consists of five titles. Title 2 is devoted
exclusively to the subject of the termination of federal control, which it is
declared shall take place at 12:01 a. m., March 1, 1920the act becoming
effective February 28, 1920. Title 3 deals only with the subject of disputes
between carriers and their employees and subordinate officials, creates Railroad
Boards of Labor Adjustment and a Railroad Labor Board, and vests them with
appropriate powers. Title 4 consists entirely of amendments to the Interstate
Commerce Act, and includes section 424, here relied upon. While these three
titles are concerned with related subjects, they are entirely distinct one from
another Title 2, which is complete in itself, among other things, provides, in
section 200 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, 10071 1/4 aa), that after the
termination of federal control the President shall have no power to use or
operate the railroads or systems of transportation, or to control or supervise the
carriers or their business affairs; and directs him (section 202), to adjust, settle,
liquidate, and wind up all matters and all questions and disputes, of whatsoever
nature, arising out of or incident to federal control as soon as practicable after
the termination thereof. The only provision prescribing a period of limitation
definitely in respect of such matters, is found in section 206(a), and it relates
only to actions, suits and proceedings brought against an agent to be designated
by the President for that purpose, and fixes as the period of limitation that now
prescribed by state or federal statutes, but not later than two years from the
passage of the act. In this title, thus specifically devoted to the subject of
winding up matters arising out of federal control, nothing is to be found which
suggests any limitation of time within which actions, suits or proceedings shall
be brought to enforce liabilities arising out of federal control, in favor of the

United States.
6
Turning now to title 4, amending the Interstate Commerce Act, the declaration
at the beginning is that its provisions 'shall apply to common carriers' engaged
in various enumerated kinds of transportation. Section 400, p. 474 (Comp. St.
Ann. Supp. 1923, 8563). There is to be found in this title no provision
specifically relating to the period of federal control or dealing with the question
of liability to or of the government in respect of any matter arising during such
control. If Congress had intended to fix a period of limitation applicable to
actions, suits or proceedings brought in behalf of the United States in respect of
liabilities arising out of federal control, we should naturally expect to find it in
title 2, where such matters are exclusively dealt with; and not in title 4, which
deals with common carriers entirely apart from such control. It may not have
been unusual in common speech, to describe the Director General as a carrier
while he was operating the railroads; but it is clear that he was not intended to
be included by that term as it is generally employed in acts of Congress. Federal
Control Act, c. 25, 40 Stat. 451, repeatedly recognizes a distinction between the
Presidentincluding, of course, the Director Generaland the carriers. The
first section (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, 3115 3/4 a) itself
limits the meaning of the word 'carriers' to railroads and systems of
transportation, which as carriers had been taken over by the President.
Accurately speaking, the Director General was not a carrier, but an operator of
carriers. The distinction to which we have referred, constantly appears in the
provisions of the act, as, for example:
'The President may nevertheless pay to any carrier while under federal control
an annual amount,' etc. Section 2 (section 3115 3/4 b).
'On the application of the President or of any carrier,' etc. Section 3 (section
3115 3/4 c).
'Carriers while under federal control shall be subject to all laws and liabilities as
common carriers,' etc. Section 10 (section 3115 3/4 j).
10
'Actions at law or suits in equity may be brought by and against said carriers,'
etc. Section 10.
11
'Moneys and other property derived from the operation of the carriers during
federal control are hereby declared to be the property of the United States.'
Section 12 (section 3115 3/4 l).
12
In taking over and operating the railroad systems of the country, the United
States did so in its sovereign capacity, as a war measure, 'under a right in the
nature of eminent domain,' North Carolina R. R. Co. v. Lee, 260 U. S. 16, 43
Sup. Ct. 2, 67 L. Ed. 104; Missouri Pacific R. R. Co. v. Ault, 256 U. S. 554, 41
Sup. Ct. 593, 65 L. Ed. 1087; Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, 250 U.
S. 135, 39 Sup. Ct. 502, 63 L. Ed. 897; In re Tidewater Coal Exchange (C. C.
A.) 280 Fed. 648, 649; and it may not be held to have waived any sovereign
right or privilege unless plainly so provided. Moneys and other property
derived from the operation of the carriers during federal control, as we have
seen, are the property of the United States. Section 12, 40 Stat. 457. An action
by the Director General to recover upon a liability arising out of such control is
an action on behalf of the United States in its governmental capacity, Ches. &
Del. Canal Co. v. United States, 250 U. S. 123, 126, 39 Sup. Ct. 407, 63 L. Ed.
889; In re Tidewater Coal Exchange, supra; and, therefore, is subject to no time
limitation, in the absence of congressional enactment clearly imposing it.
United States v. Nashville, etc., Ry. Co., 118 U. S. 120, 125, 6 Sup. Ct. 1006,
30 L. Ed. 81; United States v. Whited & Wheless, 246 U. S. 552, 561, 38 Sup.
Ct. 367, 62 L. Ed. 879. Statutes of limitation sought to be applied to bar rights
of the government, must receive a strict construction in favor of the
government. United States v. Whited & Wheless, supra.
13
The foregoing analysis of the acts of Congress viewed in the light of the
principles just stated, demonstrates that section 424 has no application to an
action of the kind here involved, but applies to common carriers apart from
their operation under federal control, and we so hold.
14
Affirmed.

EI DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456 (1924)

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264 U.S.

E. L. DU PONT DE NEMOURS & CO.

Messrs. C. H. Browder, of Chicago, Ill., and C. A. Cunningham and Z. B.

This is an action to recover demurrage charges accrued at Little Rock, Ark.,

There is nothing in the second point, and we dispose of it at once. The

be brought to enforce liabilities arising out of federal control, in favor of the

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