de La Camara v. Enage

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 041
11/11/15, 11:44 PM
Nos. L-32951-2. September 17, 1971.

RICARDO DE LA CAMARA, petitioner, vs. HON.MANUEL
LOPEZ ENAGE, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City (Branch II),
respondents.
Constitutional law; Bail; Observance of the constitutional
mandate that excessive bail shall not be required.The fact that the
case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal from
setting forth in language clear and unmistakable, the obligation of
fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal
command of the Constitution that excessive bail shall not be
required.
Same; Right to bail; Purpose of bail; Denial of right to one
charged with a capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong.
Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with
capital offenses when the evidence of guilt is strong. Such a right
flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused
who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he
would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Thereby a regime of liberty is honored in the
observance and not in the breach. It is not beyond the realm of
probability, however, that a person charged with a crime, especially
so where his defense is weak, would just simply make himself
scarce and thus frustrate the hearing of his case. A bail is intended
as a guarantee that such an intent would be thwarted. It is, in the
language of Cooley, a mode short of confinement which would, with
reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of the accused for the
subsequent trial. Nor is there anything unreasonable in denying
this right to one charged with a capital offense when evidence of
guilt is strong, as the likelihood is, rather than await the outcome of
the proceeding against him with a death sentence, an ever-present
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threat, the temptation to flee the jurisdiction would be too great to

be resisted.
Same; Same; Prohibition against excessive bail; Reason.
Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory
by requiring a sum that is excessive. So the Constitu2
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De la Camara vs. Enage
tion commands. It is understandable why. If there were no such

prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless. It would have
been more forthright if no mention of such a guarantee were found
in the fundamental law. It is not to be lost sight of that the United
States Constitution limits itself to a prohibition against excessive
bail. As construed in the latest American decision, the sole
permissible function of money bail is to assure the accuseds
presence at trial, and declared that bail set at a higher figure than
an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is
excessive under the Eighth Amendment.
Same; Excessive bail; Case at bar.Nothing can be clearer,
therefore, than that the challenged order of August 10, 1970 fixing
the amount of P1,195,200.00 as the bail that should be posted by
petitioner, the sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging
multiple murder, there being fourteen victims, and the sum of
P355,200.00 for the other offense of multiple frustrated murder,
there being twelve victims, is clearly violative of this constitutional
provision. Under the circumstances, there being only two offenses
charged, the amount required as bail could not possibly exceed
P50,000.00 for the information for murder and P25,000.00 for the
other information for frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in
this case that the Department of Justice did recommend the total
sum of P40,-000.00 for the two offenses.
Same; Bail; Guidelines in the fixing of bail; Discretion of court
to rule on the question of bail.There is an attempt on the part of
respondent Judge to justify what, on its face, appears to be
indefensible by the alleged reliance on Villaseor vs. Abao, 21
SCRA 312. The guidelines in the fixing of bail was there
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summarized, in the opinion of Justice Sanchez, as follows: (1)

ability of the accused to give bail; (2) nature of the offense; (3)
penalty for the offense charged; (4) character and reputation of the
accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and strength of the
evidence; (7) probability of the accused appearing in trial; (8)
forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether the accused was a fugitive
from justice when arrested; and (10) if the accused is under bond for
appearance at trial in other cases. Respondent Judge, however, did
ignore this decisive consideration appearing at the end of the above
opinion: Discretion, indeed, is with the court called upon to rule on
the question of bail. We must stress, however, that where conditions
imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal
thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we will
not hesi3
VOL. 41, SEPTEMBER 17, 1971

tate to exercise our supervisory powers to provide the required
remedy.
Same; Same; When excessive bail could only mean that
provisional liberty would be beyond reach.No attempt at
rationalization can therefore give a color of validity to the
challenged order. There is grim irony in an accused being told that
he has a right to bail but at the same time being required to post
such an exorbitant sum. What aggravates the situation is that the
lower court judge would apparently yield to the command of the
fundamental law. In reality, such as sanctimonious avowal of
respect for a mandate of the Constitution was on a purely verbal
level. There is reason to believe that any person in the position of
petitioner would under the circumstances be unable to resist
thoughts of escaping from confinement, reduced as he must have
been to a state of desperation. In the same breath that he was told
he could be bailed out, the excessive amount required could only
mean that provisional liberty would be beyond his reach. It would
have been more forthright if he were informed categorically that
such a right could not be availed of. There would have been no
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disappointment of expectations then. It does call to mind these

words of Justice Jackson, a promise to the ear to be broken to the
hope, a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a paupers
will. It is no wonder that the resulting frustration left resentment
and bitterness in its wake.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and

prohibition.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Demosthenes Mediante, Puro Velez, Francisco Fabe,
Federico del Puerto and Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for
petitioner.
Hon. Manuel Lopez Enage in his own behalf.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:
An order of respondent Judge Manuel Lopez Enage, fixing
the bail of petitioner, Ricardo de la Camara, in the sum of
P1,195,200.00 is assailed in this petition for certio4

1
ing excessive bail. The merit of the petition on its face is

thus apparent. Nonetheless, the relief sought setting aside
the above order by reducing the amount of bail to
P40,000.00 cannot be granted, as in the meanwhile,
petitioner had escaped from the provincial jail, thus
rendering this case moot and academic. It is deemed
advisable, however, for the guidance of lower court judges,
to set forth anew the controlling and authoritative
doctrines that should be observed in fixing the amount of
the bail sought in order that full respect be accorded to
such a constitutional right.
The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner, Ricardo de la
Camara, Municipal Mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental,
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was arrested an November 7, 1968 and detained at the

Provincial Jail of Agusan, for his alleged participation in
the killing of fourteen and the wounding of twelve other
laborers of the Tirador Logging Co., at Nato, Esperanza,
Agusan del Sur, on August 21, 1968. Thereafter, on
November 25, 1968, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed
with the Court of2 First Instance a case for multiple3
frustrated murder and another for multiple murder
against petitioner, his co-accused Nambinalot Tagunan and
Fortunato Galgo, resulting from the aforesaid occurrence.
Then on January 14, 1969, came an application for bail
filed by petitioner with the lower court, premised on the
assertion that there was no evidence to link him with such
fatal incident of August 21, 1968. He likewise maintained
his innocence. Respondent Judge started the trial of
petitioner on February 24, 1969, the prosecution resting its
case on July 10, 1969. As of the time of the filing of the
petition, the defense had not presented its evidence.
_______________
1
The Constitution provides: All persons shall before conviction be
bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses

when evidence of guilt is strong. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 16.
2
Criminal Case No. 3563.
Criminal Case No. 3564.

5

Respondent Judge, on August 10, 1970, issued an order
granting petitioners application for bail, admitting that
there was a failure on the part of the prosecution to prove
that petitioner would flee even if he had the opportunity,
but fixed the amount of the bail bond at the excessive
amount of P1,195,200.00, the sum of P840,000.00 for the
information charging multiple murder and P355,200.00 for
the offense of multiple frustrated murder. Then came the
allegation that on August 12, 1970, the Secretary of
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Justice, Vicente Abad Santos, upon being informed of such

order, sent a telegram to respondent Judge stating that the
bond required is excessive and suggesting that a
P40,000.00 bond, either in cash or property, would be
reasonable. There was likewise a motion for
reconsideration to reduce the amount. Respondent Judge
however remained adamant. Hence this petition.
The answer filed by respondent Judge on March 5, 1971
set forth the circumstances concerning the issuance of the
above order and the other incidents of the case, which, to
his mind, would disprove any charge that he was guilty of
grave abuse of discretion. It stressed, moreover, that the
challenged order would find support in circulars of the
Department of Justice given sanction by this Court. He
sought the dismissal of the petition for lack of merit.
In the hearing of the case set for March 31, 1971, there
was no appearance for both the petitioner and respondents
with the former, upon written motion, being given thirty
days within which to submit a memorandum in lieu of oral
argument, respondent Judge in turn having the same
period from receipt thereof to file his reply. Such a
memorandum was duly submitted by petitioner on April 6,
1971.
Instead of a reply, respondent Judge submitted, on May
26, 1971, a supplemental answer wherein he alleged that
petitioner escaped from the provincial jail on April 28, 1971
and had since then remained at large. There was a
reiteration then of the dismissal of this petition for lack
6

of merit, to which petitioner countered in a pleading dated

June 7, 1971, and filed with this Court the next day with
this plea: The undersigned counsel, therefore, vehemently
interpose opposition, on behalf of petitioner, to respondents
prayer for dismissal of the present petition for lack of
merit. For, the issue in this case is not alone the fate of
petitioner Ricardo de la Camara. The issue in the present
petition that calls for the resolution of this Honorable
Page 6 of 14
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Tribunal is the fate of countless other Ricardo de la

Camaras who may be awaiting the clear-cut definition and
declaration of4 the power of trial courts in regard to the
fixing of bail.
While under the circumstances a ruling on the merits of
the petition for certiorari is not warranted, still, as set
forth at the opening of this opinion, the fact that this case
is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal
from setting forth in language clear and unmistakable, the
obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the
unequivocal command of the Constitution that excessive
bail shall not be required.
1. Before conviction, every person is bailable except if
charged5 with capital offenses when the evidence of guilt is
strong. Such a right flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused who should not be
subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be
entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Thereby a regime of liberty is honored in
the observance and not in the breach. It is not beyond the
realm of probability, however, that a person charged with a
crime, especially so where his defense is weak, would just
simply make himself scarce and thus frustrate the hearing
of his case. A bail is intended as a guarantee that such an
intent would be thwarted. It is, in the language of Cooley, a
mode short of confinement which would, with reasonable
certainty, insure the attendance of the ac_______________
4
Reply, par. III, pp. 3-4.
Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 16, Constitution.

7

6
cused for the subsequent trial. Nor is there anything

unreasonable in denying this right to one charged with a
capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong, as the
likelihood is, rather than await the outcome of the
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proceeding against him with a death sentence, an everpresent threat, temptation to flee the jurisdiction would be
too great to be resisted.
_______________
6
According to Cooley: If there were any mode short of confinement
which would, with reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of the

accused to answer the accusation, it would not be justifiable to inflict
upon him that indignity, when the effect is to subject him, in a greater or
less degree, to the punishment of a guilty person, while as yet it is not
determined that he has committed any crime. If the punishment on
conviction cannot exceed in severity the forfeiture of a large sum of
money, then it is reasonable to suppose that such a sum of money, or an
agreement by responsible parties to pay it to the government in case the
accused should fail to appear, would be sufficient security for his
attendance; and therefore, at the common law, it was customary to take
security of this character in all cases of misdemeanor; one or more
friends of the accused undertaking for his appearance for trial, and
agreeing that a certain sum of money should be levied of their goods and
chattels, lands and tenements, if he made default. But in the case of
felonies, the privilege of giving bail before trial was not a matter of right;
and in this country, although the criminal code is much more merciful
than it formerly was in England, and in some cases the allowance of bail
is almost a matter of course, there are others in which it is discretionary
with the magistrate to allow it or not and where it will sometimes be
refused if the evidence of guilt is strong or the presumption great.
Capital offenses are not generally regarded as bailable; at least, after
indictment, or when the party is charged by the finding of a coroners
jury; and this upon the supposition that one who may be subjected to the
terrible punishment that would follow a conviction, would not for any
mere pecuniary considerations remain to abide the judgment. And where
the death penalty is abolished and imprisonment for life substituted, it is
believed that the rule would be the same notwithstanding this change,
the bail would still be denied in the case of the highest offenses, except
under very peculiar circumstances. In the case of other felonies it is not
usual to refuse bail, and in some of the State constitutions it has been
deemed important to make it a matter of right in all cases except on
capital charges when the proof is evident or the presumption great. I
Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations, 643-644 (1927).
8
Page 8 of 14
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2. Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be

rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. So
the Constitution commands. It is understandable why. If
there were no such prohibition, the right to bail becomes
meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no
mention of such a guarantee were found in the
fundamental law. It is not to be lost sight of that the United
States Constitution
limits itself to a prohibition against
7
excessive bail. As construed in the latest American
decision, the sole permissible function of money bail is to
assure the accuseds presence at trial, and declared that
bail set at a higher figure than an amount reasonably
calculated to fulfill this
purpose is excessive under the
8
Eighth Amendment.
Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the
challenged order of August 10, 1970 fixing the amount of
P1,-195,200.00 as the bail that should be posted by
petitioner, the sum of P840,000.00 for the information
charging multiple murder, there being fourteen victims,
and the sum of P355,200.00 for the other offense of
multiple frustrated murder, there being twelve victims, is
clearly violative of this constitutional provision. Under the
circumstances, there being only two offenses charged, the
amount required as bail could not possibly exceed
P50,000.00 for the information for murder and P25,000.00
for the other information for frustrated murder. Nor should
it be ignored in this case that the Department of Justice did
recommend the total sum of P40,000.00 for the two
offenses.
3. There is an attempt on the part of respondent Judge
to justify what, on its face, appears to be 9 indefensible by
the alleged reliance on Villaseor v. Abao. The guidelines
in the fixing of bail was there summarized, in the opinion
of Justice Sanchez, as follows: (1) ability of
_______________
7
According to the United States Constitution: Excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
Page 9 of 14
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punishments inflicted. Eighth Amendment.

8
Stack v. Boyle, 342 US 1, 5 (1951).
L-23599, September 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 312.

9

the accused to give bail; (2) nature of the offense; (3)
penalty for the offense charged; (4) character and
reputation of the accused; (5) health of the accused; (6)
character and strength of the evidence; (7) probability of
the accused appearing in trial; (8) forfeiture of other bonds;
(9) whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when
arrested; and (10) if the accused10 is under bond for
appearance at trial in other cases. Respondent Judge,
however, did ignore this decisive consideration appearing
at the end of the above opinion: Discretion, indeed, is with
the court called upon to rule on the question of bail. We
must stress, however, that where conditions imposed upon
a defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal thereof
and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we will
not hesitate to exercise
our supervisory powers to provide
11
the required remedy.
No attempt at rationalization can therefore give a color
of validity to the challenged order. There is grim irony in
an accused being told that he has a right to bail but at the
same time being required to post such an exorbitant sum.
What aggravates the situation is that the lower court judge
would apparently yield to the command of the fundamental
law. In reality, such a sanctimonious avowal of respect for a
mandate of the Constitution was an a purely verbal level.
There is reason to believe that any person in the position of
petitioner would under the circumstances be unable to
resist thoughts of escaping from confinement, reduced as
he must have been to a state of desperation. In the same
breath that he was told he could be bailed out, the
excessive amount required could only mean that
provisional liberty would be beyond his reach. It would
have been more forthright if he were informed categorically
that such a right could not be availed of. There would have
Page 10 of 14
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been no disappointment of expectations then. It does call to

mind these words of Justice Jackson, a promise to
_______________
10
Ibid, p. 317.
11
Ibid, p. 321.
10
10

the ear to be broken to the hope, a teasing

illusion like a
12
munificent bequest in a paupers will. It is no wonder
that the resulting frustration left resentment and
bitterness in its wake. Petitioners subsequent escape
cannot be condoned. That is why he is not entitled to the
relief prayed for. What respondent Judge did, however,
does call for repudiation from this Court.
Nor is there any justification then for imputing his
inability to fix a lesser amount by virtue of an alleged
reliance on a decision of this Tribunal. Even if one were
charitably inclined, the mildest characterization of such a
result is that there was a clear misreading of the Abao
opinion when such a meaning was ascribed to it. No
doctrine refinement may elicit approval if to do so would be
to reduce the right to bail to a barren form of words. Not
only is the order complained of absolutely bereft of support
in law, but it flies in the face of common sense. It is not too
much to say that it is at war with the command of reason.
With petitioner, however, having escaped from the
provincial jail, no ruling can be had on his plea to nullify
the above order.
WHEREFORE, this case is dismissed for being moot and
academic. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., concurs in the result.
Makasiar, J., did not take part.
Page 11 of 14
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Case dismissed.
Notes.(a) When to raise question of excessiveness of
bail.The question whether the bail exacted from one
charged with crime is excessive is not presented by an
appeal from his conviction. It should be raised or pre_______________
12
Jackson, J., con., Edwards v. California, 314 US 160, 186 (1941).

11
11

sented at the time of the application for bail (People vs.
Lara, 75 Phil. 786).
(b) Rulings on excessiveness of bail.In Bandoy vs.
Judge of the First Instance, 14 Phil. 620, it was held that
The obligations imposed upon the bondsmen cannot be
greater nor of a different character than that imposed by
law. To permit the imposition of other obligations x x x for
the purpose of securing (defendants) liberty, than those
provided for by law might result in the imposition of
conditions which would absolutely prevent and render it
impossible for the defendant to secure his liberty during
the trial, notwithstanding the fact that he is entitled to his
liberty as a matter of right. Such a doctrine might result in
the imposition of excessive bail which is prohibited by law.
In Villaseor vs. Abao, L-23599, September 29, 1967,
21 SCRA 312, where the crime charged was direct assault
upon an agent of a person in authority with murder, a
capital offense, the petitioner argued that, he being a mere
government employee earning but a monthly salary of
P210 and the sole breadwinner of a family of five, the
P60,000.-00-bond fixed by the respondent judge
transgressed the constitutional injunction against
requiring excessive bail. Rejecting the claim of the
defendant-petitioner, the Court held that the inability of a
defendant to secure bail in a certain amount does not by
itself make the amount excissive. For, where an accused
Page 12 of 14
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has no means of his own, no one to bail him out, or none to

turn to for premium payments, any amount fixed, no
matter how small would fall into the category of excessive
bail; and he would be entitled to be discharged on his own
recognizance. In bail fixing, according to the Court, the
principal factor considered, to the determination of which
most other factors are directed, is the probability of the
appearance of the accused, or of his flight to avoid
punishment. As such the possible penalty that may be
meted is an important factor. Here, petitioner is charged
with a capital offense, (and a complex one, which calls for
the imposition of the max12
12

Associated Labor Union vs. Cruz
imum penalty). Then, Circular 47 dated July 5, 1946 of the

Department of Justice, reiterated in Circular 48 of July 18,
1963, directed prosecuting attorneys to recommend bail at
the rate of P2,000.00 per year of imprisonment,
corresponding to the medium period of the penalty
prescribed for the offense charged, unless circumstances
warrant a higher penalty. The reasonableness of this
circular has already received this Courts imprimatur in
one case (Edao vs. Cea, L-6821, May 10, 1954). We are
unprepared to downgrade this method of computation,
what with a compound of reduced peso value and the
aggravated crime climate.
We see no discernible abuse of discretion, given the
facts and the law, when respondent judge feed petitioners
bail at P60,000.00.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 041

Nos. L-32951-2. September 17, 1971.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 041

threat, the temptation to flee the jurisdiction would be too great to

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

tion commands. It is understandable why. If there were no such

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 041

summarized, in the opinion of Justice Sanchez, as follows: (1)

VOL. 41, SEPTEMBER 17, 1971

De la Camara vs. Enage

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 041

disappointment of expectations then. It does call to mind these

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ing excessive bail. The merit of the petition on its face is

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 041

was arrested an November 7, 1968 and detained at the

The Constitution provides: All persons shall before conviction be

bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses

Criminal Case No. 3563.

Criminal Case No. 3564.

VOL. 41, SEPTEMBER 17, 1971

De la Camara vs. Enage

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 041

Justice, Vicente Abad Santos, upon being informed of such

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

of merit, to which petitioner countered in a pleading dated

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 041

Tribunal is the fate of countless other Ricardo de la

Reply, par. III, pp. 3-4.

Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 16, Constitution.

VOL. 41, SEPTEMBER 17, 1971

De la Camara vs. Enage

cused for the subsequent trial. Nor is there anything

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 041

According to Cooley: If there were any mode short of confinement

which would, with reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of the

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 041

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

2. Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be

According to the United States Constitution: Excessive bail shall

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 041

punishments inflicted. Eighth Amendment.

Stack v. Boyle, 342 US 1, 5 (1951).

L-23599, September 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 312.

VOL. 41, SEPTEMBER 17, 1971

De la Camara vs. Enage

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 041

been no disappointment of expectations then. It does call to

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

the ear to be broken to the hope, a teasing

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 041

Jackson, J., con., Edwards v. California, 314 US 160, 186 (1941).

VOL. 41, SEPTEMBER 17, 1971

De la Camara vs. Enage

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 041

has no means of his own, no one to bail him out, or none to

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED