Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010)
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010)
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010)
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
PADILLA v. KENTUCKY
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY
No. 08651.
PADILLA v. KENTUCKY
Syllabus
(b) Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, applies to Padillas
claim. Before deciding whether to plead guilty, a defendant is enti
tled to the effective assistance of competent counsel. McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 771. The Supreme Court of Kentucky re
jected Padillas ineffectiveness claim on the ground that the advice he
sought about deportation concerned only collateral matters. How
ever, this Court has never distinguished between direct and collat
eral consequences in defining the scope of constitutionally reason
able professional assistance required under Strickland, 466 U. S., at
689. The question whether that distinction is appropriate need not
be considered in this case because of the unique nature of deporta
tion. Although removal proceedings are civil, deportation is inti
mately related to the criminal process, which makes it uniquely diffi
cult to classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence. Because
that distinction is thus ill-suited to evaluating a Strickland claim
concerning the specific risk of deportation, advice regarding deporta
tion is not categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amend
ment right to counsel. Pp. 79.
(c) To satisfy Stricklands two-prong inquiry, counsels representa
tion must fall below an objective standard of reasonableness, 466
U. S., at 688, and there must be a reasonable probability that, but
for counsels unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different, id., at 694. The first, constitutional deficiency,
is necessarily linked to the legal communitys practice and expecta
tions. Id., at 688. The weight of prevailing professional norms sup
ports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding the de
portation risk. And this Court has recognized the importance to the
client of [p]reserving the . . . right to remain in the United States
and preserving the possibility of discretionary relief from deporta
tion. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 323. Thus, this is not a hard case
in which to find deficiency: The consequences of Padillas plea could
easily be determined from reading the removal statute, his deporta
tion was presumptively mandatory, and his counsels advice was in
correct. There will, however, undoubtedly be numerous situations in
which the deportation consequences of a plea are unclear. In those
cases, a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise a
noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry adverse
immigration consequences. But when the deportation consequence is
truly clear, as it was here, the duty to give correct advice is equally
clear. Accepting Padillas allegations as true, he has sufficiently al
leged constitutional deficiency to satisfy Stricklands first prong.
Whether he can satisfy the second prong, prejudice, is left for the
Kentucky courts to consider in the first instance. Pp. 912.
(d) The Solicitor Generals proposed rulethat Strickland should
Syllabus
be applied to Padillas claim only to the extent that he has alleged af
firmative misadviceis unpersuasive. And though this Court must
be careful about recognizing new grounds for attacking the validity of
guilty pleas, the 25 years since Strickland was first applied to inef
fective-assistance claims at the plea stage have shown that pleas are
less frequently the subject of collateral challenges than convictions
after a trial. Also, informed consideration of possible deportation can
benefit both the State and noncitizen defendants, who may be able to
reach agreements that better satisfy the interests of both parties.
This decision will not open the floodgates to challenges of convictions
obtained through plea bargains. Cf. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U. S. 52,
58. Pp. 1216.
253 S. W. 3d 482, reversed and remanded.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY,
GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed an opin
ion concurring in the judgment, in which ROBERTS, C. J., joined.
SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined.
No. 08651
_________________
KENTUCKY
1 Padillas crime, like virtually every drug offense except for only the
most insignificant marijuana offenses, is a deportable offense under 8
U. S. C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).
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II
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(La. 2/26/02), 810 So. 2d 1106; Commonwealth v. Frometa, 520 Pa. 552,
555 A. 2d 92 (1989).
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concurring in judgment).
We have given serious consideration to the concerns
that the Solicitor General, respondent, and amici have
stressed regarding the importance of protecting the final
ity of convictions obtained through guilty pleas. We con
fronted a similar floodgates concern in Hill, see id., at
58, but nevertheless applied Strickland to a claim that
counsel had failed to advise the client regarding his parole
eligibility before he pleaded guilty.12
A flood did not follow in that decisions wake. Sur
mounting Stricklands high bar is never an easy task.
See, e.g., 466 U. S., at 689 (Judicial scrutiny of counsels
performance must be highly deferential); id., at 693
(observing that [a]ttorney errors . . . are as likely to be
utterly harmless in a particular case as they are to be
prejudicial). Moreover, to obtain relief on this type of
claim, a petitioner must convince the court that a decision
to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under
the circumstances. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U. S.
470, 480, 486 (2000). There is no reason to doubt that
lower courtsnow quite experienced with applying Strick
landcan effectively and efficiently use its framework to
15
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PADILLA v. KENTUCKY
Opinion of the Court
15 To this end, we find it significant that the plea form currently used
in Kentucky courts provides notice of possible immigration conse
17
V
It is our responsibility under the Constitution to ensure
that no criminal defendantwhether a citizen or notis
left to the mercies of incompetent counsel. Richardson,
397 U. S., at 771. To satisfy this responsibility, we now
hold that counsel must inform her client whether his plea
carries a risk of deportation. Our longstanding Sixth
Amendment precedents, the seriousness of deportation as
a consequence of a criminal plea, and the concomitant
impact of deportation on families living lawfully in this
country demand no less.
Taking as true the basis for his motion for postconvic
tion relief, we have little difficulty concluding that Padilla
has sufficiently alleged that his counsel was constitution
ally deficient. Whether Padilla is entitled to relief will
depend on whether he can demonstrate prejudice as a
result thereof, a question we do not reach because it was
not passed on below. See Verizon Communications Inc. v.
FCC, 535 U. S. 467, 530 (2002).
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Opinion of the Court
No. 08651
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KENTUCKY
PADILLA v. KENTUCKY
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
I
Under Strickland, an attorney provides ineffective
assistance if the attorneys representation does not meet
reasonable professional standards. 466 U. S., at 688.
Until today, the longstanding and unanimous position of
the federal courts was that reasonable defense counsel
generally need only advise a client about the direct conse
quences of a criminal conviction. See, e.g., United States v.
Gonzalez, 202 F. 3d 20, 28 (CA1 2000) (ineffective
assistance-of-counsel claim fails if based on an attorneys
failure to advise a client of his pleas immigration conse
quences); United States v. Banda, 1 F. 3d 354, 355 (CA5
1993) (holding that an attorneys failure to advise a client
that deportation is a possible consequence of a guilty plea
does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel); see
generally Chin & Holmes, Effective Assistance of Counsel
and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 Cornell L. Rev.
697, 699 (2002) (hereinafter Chin & Holmes) (noting that
virtually all jurisdictionsincluding eleven federal
circuits, more than thirty states, and the District of Co
lumbiahold that defense counsel need not discuss with
their clients the collateral consequences of a conviction,
including deportation). While the line between direct
and collateral consequences is not always clear, see ante,
at 7, n. 8, the collateral-consequences rule expresses an
important truth: Criminal defense attorneys have exper
tise regarding the conduct of criminal proceedings. They
are not expected to possessand very often do not pos
sessexpertise in other areas of the law, and it is unreal
istic to expect them to provide expert advice on matters
that lie outside their area of training and experience.
This case happens to involve removal, but criminal
convictions can carry a wide variety of consequences other
than conviction and sentencing, including civil commit
ment, civil forfeiture, the loss of the right to vote, disquali
fication from public benefits, ineligibility to possess fire
PADILLA v. KENTUCKY
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
PADILLA v. KENTUCKY
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
1 Citizens
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ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
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3 See
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No. 08651
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KENTUCKY
PADILLA v. KENTUCKY
SCALIA, J., dissenting
PADILLA v. KENTUCKY
SCALIA, J., dissenting
1I
do not mean to suggest that the Due Process Clause would surely
provide relief. We have indicated that awareness of direct conse
quences suffices for the validity of a guilty plea. See Brady, 397 U. S.,
at 755 (internal quotation marks omitted). And the required colloquy
between a federal district court and a defendant required by Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b) (formerly Rule 11(c)), which we have
said approximates the due process requirements for a valid plea, see
Libretti v. United States, 516 U. S. 29, 4950 (1995), does not mention