ISSUES & TRENDS

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James R. Okey, Section Editor

The Scientific Attitude and Science

Education: A Critical Reappraisal
COLIN GAULD
School of Education, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia

The Nature of the Scientific Attitude in Science Education

For more than 60 years science educators have included the development of the scientific attitude among the general aims of science education. Some writers label this
attitude as scientific-mindedness (Burnett, 1944), the habit of scientific thinking
(Noll, 1933a) or the spirit of science (Educational Policies Commission, 1966) and
it is most often characterized by a list of component attitudes (scientific attitudes)
such as objectivity, open-mindedness, scepticism, and a willingness to suspend judgment
if there is insufficient evidence.
Many writers have pointed out that knowledge about scientific facts and skill in the
use of scientific methods are of little value if there is no inclination to use them. The
scientific attitude represents the motivation which converts this knowledge and skill into
action and refers to a willingness to use scientific procedures and methods. It may best
be described as an attitude to ideas and information and to particular ways of evaluating
them, a formulation which distinguishes it from an attitude to science or scientists
on the one hand and from an ability to carry out scientific procedures on the other
(Gauld & Hukins, 1980).
Major statements of the goals of science education in the USA have consistently
stressed the importance of developing scientific attitudes in students (see, for example,
Whipple, 1932; Henry, 1947; Henry, 1960; Educational Policies Commission, 1966;
N.S.T.A.,1971) and curriculum projects around the world include this among their aims
(Gauld & Hukins, 1980). In an analysis of 1,547 aims culled from the science education
literature Fraser (1977) found that almost half of these could be categorized as aims
related to the development of the scientific attitude. However, there is a great deal of
evidence that little emphasis is placed on this aim in the classroom, apparently because
Science Education 66(1): 109-121 (1982)
0 1982 John Wiley & Sons, lnc.

CCC 0036-8326/82/010l09-13$01.30

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methods for teaching and testing attitudes may not be widely available rather than because of a general dissatisfaction with the aim itself.
The scientific attitude as it appears in the science education literature embodies the
adoption of a particular approach to solving problems, to assessing ideas and information
or to making decisions. Using this approach evidence is collected and evaluated objectively
so that the idiosyncratic prejudices of the one making the judgment do not intrude. No
source of relevant information is rejected before it is fully evaluated and all available
evidence is carefully weighed before the decision is made. If the evidence is considered
to be insufficient then judgment is suspended until there is enough information to enable
a decision to be made. No idea, conclusion, decision or solution is accepted just because
a particular person makes a claim but it is treated sceptically and critically until its
soundness can be judged according to the weight of evidence which is relevant to it. A
person who is willing to follow such a procedure (and who regularly does so) it said by
science educators to be motivated by the scientific attitude.
It is clear that, in the minds of many writers, evidence means empirical evidence
(Downing, 1928; Noll, 1933a; Ward, 1933; Henry, 1947, pp. 168- 171; Lampkin, 1951 ;
Educational Policies Commission, 1966, p. 19; Diederich, 1967; Collette, 1973, pp. 14-1 5,
20; Sund and Trowbridge, 1973, pp. 5-7) and the discussion usually implies that empirical
evidence is the only type of evidence which needs to be considered in making scientific
decisions. The ultimate test in science is how the conclusion fits with the facts. Thus a
person who is motivated by the scientific attitude as it is generally conceived by science
educators is someone who makes decisions solely on the basis of the weight of empirical
evidence and this view of the scientific attitude will be labelled here as empiricist.
Lampkin (1 95 l), Feigl (1 955) and Kurtz (1 976) have clearly shown how such a conception is closely related to a particular view of knowledge in general and of science in
particular-a philosophical perspective which has also been labelled empiricist.
The empiricist attitude in science education takes one of two forms depending on the
type of decision which is presumed to follow from a consideration of the empirical evidence
relevant to a theory. In the verificationist version, empirical evidence is used to uerifv
or prove the truth of a proposition or hypothesis (Downing, 1928; Ward, 1933; Lampkin,
1951;Van Deventer, 1960, p 104; Diederich, 1967). Diederich (1 967) includes a desire
for experimental verification as a component of the scientific attitude, while Lampkin
(1 95 1 ) defines the component labelled scepticism as an unwillingness to accept
statements which are not supported by evidence defined as verification of predictions.
Ward (1933) sees science as the body of experience and theory that can be verified by
all observers alike and, for Kurz (1 976) a belief is true if, and only if, it has been confirmed, directly or indirectly, by reference to observable evidence.
However, the realization that logically the truth of a universal proposition cannot be
finally proven by appealing to a finite number of items of confirming data has led some
writers to adopt a falsificationist version of the empiricist attitude. Empirical evidence
allows one to state unambiguously, not when a theory is true, but when it is false.
A single new scientific fact disagreeing with the theory completely invalidates the theory.
The willingness to give up an old established theory as soon as it is proved to be definitely
inconsistent with a single fact is the attitude of Science; no branch of knowledge without
this attitude can be called a science (Podolsky, 1965).

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Reasons for the Development of the Scientific Attitude in Students

For many science educators the importance of the scientific attitude is so obvious that
no argument is required to support its inclusion among those things which a school science
course should aim to develop in students. This idea is also reinforced by the fact that there
has been little, if any, argument against its inclusion among the aims of science education.
However, while it may be obvious that the scientific attitude is important in the professional lives of scientists and that students learning about science should also become aware
of the motive power which impels scientists in their work, it is not a simple matter to move
on to the conclusion that school students, many of whom do not intend to become scientists, should actually be encouraged to adopt this attitude for themselves.
Two types of argument are offered by those who do provide reasons for taking this final
step. In the first, it is argued that an effective way of learning about the nature of scientific
activity is for the student to act out the role of a scientist in the classroom.
Every child-not just those who manifest interest or high motivation-must be viewed as a young
scientist by the teacher of science . . . (he or she) must experience the mode and the excitement
and the frustration of the scientist. (Link, 1967).

The student who enters this role most fully will be the one who adopts for himself the
attitude which also motivates the scientist (Nay and Crocker, 1970).
In the second type of justification it is argued that not only does the adoption of the
scientific attitude for themselves help students to understand the nature of science and
the activities of scientists better but scientific attitudes represent desirable personal attributes for all people. The tendency to be accurate, intellectually honest, open-minded,
objective, and to demand reliable empirical evidence before making decisions may be
most clearly seen in the problem solving activity of scientists (so this argument goes) but
they also represent predispositions appropriate for solving problems in everyday life as
well. Under the influence of such attitudes as these, it is claimed that problems will be
approached in a manner which is more likely to lead to successful solutions (see, for example, No11 1933b). For the Educational Policies Commission (1966) possession of the
scientific attitude is not only the mark of a scientifically-minded person, but also the sign
of a rational one. These benefits of a scientific education are primarily for the individual
but a number of writers have claimed additional benefits for the society.
As we consider the future responsibilities of citizens, we will probably agree that helping children
to become more co-operative, more responsible, more open-minded, and, at the same time, more
critical-minded is certainly worth the effort. (Henry, 1947, p. 87).

By adopting scientific attitudes and transferring these to situations in everyday life,

students can be expected to be more tolerant of other points of view and to be more successful in living and working alongside other people. According to the Educational Policies
Commission science can provide power, prestige, standard of living, education, and
health but the spirit of science promises two less tangible but equally profound benefits:
increased individuality and increased brotherhood of men ( 1 966, p. 11).
Behind both these arguments is the assumption that scientists really are motivated
by the scientific attitude as it is presented by science educators (Offner, 1937, Haney,
1964; Diederich, 1967). In other words, in solving scientific problems, scientists adopt

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an empiricist attitude in which empirical data, gathered objectively is the final judge of
truth, if not in accepting as true those hypotheses which are supported by the evidence,
then certainly in rejecting as false those which conflict with it; an attitude in which the
ideas of other scientists are received in an open-minded manner and given full, impartial
but critical consideration.
Scientists and the Scientific Attitude: Research Evidence

In science education over the past sixty years a great deal of effort has been devoted
to identifying the nature of the scientific attitude and most of this work has been based
on detailed analyses of the writings of scientists, philosophers of science, and science
educators (Curtis, 1926; Noll, 1933a; Davis, 1935; Crowell, 1937; Ebel, 1938; Lampkin,
1938; Vitrogan, 1967, 1969; Nay and Crocker, 1970; Cohen, 1971). In a number of cases,
the results of these analyses were submitted to panels of scientists or science teachers
to obtain estimates of the relative value of each component of the scientific attitude arising
from the analyses. The primary source material for these investigations was the writings
of philosophers of science who looked at science from an empiricist perspective and it
is easy to understand why the conception of the scientific attitude which emerged also
possessed an empiricist emphasis. It is interesting to observe that, in spite of the obvious
value placed on empirical evidence by science educators who write about the scientific
attitude, almost no interest has been shown in whether scientists do, in fact, possess the
affective characteristics attributed to them on the basis of such analyses of the literature.
It is difficult to find any reference in science education literature to studies of the psychology of scientists, of sociological research into the nature of the ethos of science, of
recent historical case studies of the activities of scientists, or of alternatives to the empiricist model of science which seems to lie behind the science educators conception of
the scientific attitude. For the past thirty years, relevant information from these areas
has been accumulating and will be reviewed in the following sections.
The Psychology of the Scientist
In the early 195Os, Roe carried out extensive psychological studies of eminent physical
and biological scientists, anthropologists and psychologists. She reported some of her
conclusions from these investigations in the following way:
Characterizations of scientists almost always emphasize the objectivity of their work and describe
their cold, detached, impassive, unconcerned observation of phenomena which have no emotional
meaning for them. This could hardly be further from the truth . . . . The creative scientist whatever
his field, is very deeply involved emotionally and personally in his work. . . . I think many scientists
are genuinely unaware of the extent, or even of the fact, of this personal involvement, and themselves
accept the myth of impersonal objectivity (Roe, 1961).

Eidusons study of the psychological world of the scientist also led her to conclude that
scientists themselves misrepresent the diversity of personal characteristics which exist
within their occuptional group and so perpetuate some of the fixed and stereotypednotions that exist about a scientist (1962, p. 250; see also pp. 124, 153, 154, 255).
The more recent work of Mahoney (1976, 1979) in this area was directed towards
examining the extent to which scientists possess the characteristics-objectivity, ra-

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tionality, open-mindedness, superior intelligence, integrity, a n d communality-that t h e

writings of scientists and science educators attributed to them. H i s description of t h e
real scientist departs considerably from the picture presented in t h e science education
literature. He arrived at the following conclusions:

I. Superior intelligence is neither a prerequisite nor a correlate of scientific contribution;

2. The scientist is often saliently illogical in his work, particularly when he is defending a preferred view or attacking a rival one;
3. In his experimental research, he is often selective, expedient, and not immune to distorting
the data;
4. The scientist is probably the most passionate of professionals; his theoretical and personal
biases often color his alleged openness to the data;
5. H e is often dogmatically tenacious in his opinions, even when the contrary evidence is overwhelming;
6. He is not the paragon of humility or disinterest but is, instead, often a selfish, ambitious and
petulant defender of personal recognition and territoriality;
7. The scientist often behaves in ways which are diametrically opposite to communal sharing
of knowledge-he is frequently secretive and occasionally suppresses data for personal reasons;
and
8. Far from being a suspender of judgment the scientist is often an impetuous truth spinner
who rushes to hypotheses and theories long before the data would warrant (Mahoney, 1976,
P. 6).
Mahoneys portrait of the real scientist is of someone who displays both objectivity
and emotionality, open-mindedness and tenacity, depending on the context. He speculates
(and t h e t r u t h of his speculation is borne out by t h e work of others) t h a t it is t h e less
eminent scientist who comes closest to possessing t h e qualities of the empiricist ideal
(1 979). Among a sample of forty-two scientists who were actively involved in research
related to data obtained through the Apollo moon missions, Mitroff and Mason (1974)
found a similar range of personality traits as t h a t referred t o by other investigators.
The single dimension which most served to differentiate between the scientists was that of speculativeness or willingness to extrapolate beyond the available data. At one end of the spectrum
where the extreme speculative scientists who in the words of the respondents wouldnt hesitate
to build a whole theory of the solar system based on no data at all; on the other extreme were the
data-bound scientists who wouldnt be able to save their own hide if a fire was burning next to
them because theyd never have enough data to prove the fire was really there. On every subsequent
dimension on which these two types of scientists were compared they stood in extreme contrast
to one another. One of the most significant things about these differences is that the more outstanding a scientist was, as judged by his peers, the more he lay near the speculative end of the scale.
Conversely, the more mundane, typical, or run-of-the-mill scientists fell toward the
data-bound end of the scale . . . .
At the same time the more speculative scientists are also the kinds of scientists who are more likely
to become rigidly committed to their ideas once they have produced them. Contrary to popular
misconception, it is the lesser not the greater scientist, who is more likely to have an open
mind. The greater the scientist the more likely he is to develop a line and to push it for all it is worth
. . . . In a word, the greater the scientist, the more likely he is to belie the myth of the disinterested,
uncommitted scientist. (1974; see also Hill, 1974).
T h e r e is one notable discrepancy between t h e observations of Roe and Eiduson on the
one hand and Mitroff on the other. While the former investigators found that the scientists

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they interviewed accepted the empiricist stereotype, every one of the scientists interviewed on [Mitroffs] first round of interviews indicated that they thought the notion
of the objective, emotionally disinterested scientist naive (Mitroff, I974b). It may be
that, when discussing the work they actually do, scientists are more aware of the inappropriateness of the empiricist stereotype than when they are talking about science in
general (see Mitroff, 1974a, pp. 107-131).

The Ethos of Science

I n an article on the ethos of science, originally published in 1942, Merton described
the ethos of science as that emotionally toned complex of values and norms which is
held to be binding on the man of science. Control over the scientists behavior is imposed
through these norms by sanctions and rewards and are in varying degrees internalized
by the scientist (Merton, 1968, p. 605).
Merton identified universalism, organized scepticism, communism, and
disinterestedness as four norms through which he claimed institutional control was
exerted over the behavior of scientists. To these Barber (1952, pp. 84-94) added rationality and emotional neutrality and Storer described the six norms as follows:
Unioersalism: This norm . . . . refers both to the assumption that physical laws are everywhere
the same and to the principle that the truth and value of a scientific statement is independent of
the characteristics of its author . . . .
Organized Scepticism: This norm (embodies) the principle that each scientist should be held individually responsible for making sure that previous research by others on which he bases his work
is valid . . . .
Communism, or Communality: This norm directs the scientist to share his findings with other
scientists freely and without favor. . . .
Disinterestedness: This norm. . . . makes it illicit for the scientist to profit personally in any way
from his research . . . .
Rationality: (This is) a faith in the moral virtue of reason . . . . It may be interpreted also as the
assumption that necessary to the achievement of the goals of science are (1) empirical test rather
than tradition and ( 2 ) a critical approach to all empirical phenomena rather than acceptance of
certain phenomena as exempt from scrutiny. . . .
Emotional Neutrality: (This norm) enjoins the scientist to avoid so much emotional involvement
in his work that he cannot adopt a new approach or reject an old answer when his findings suggest
that this is necessary, or that he intentionally distorts his findings in order to support a particular
hypothesis (1966, pp. 78-80).

Storer adds that it is relatively easy to show that this combination of norms is admirably suited to ensure the optimal progress of science; ideally, only when scientists behavior is guided by these norms is it possible to keep scientists in touch with the frontiers
of knowledge (1966, pp. 82, 83). An examination of Storers description of the norms
of science show that it is an expression in sociological terms of the empiricist conception
of the scientific attitude found in science education.
Later research by Merton (1 963, 1969) suggested that in addition to working under
the control of norms such as those above, the scientist seemed also to be influenced by
a set of what have been called counter-norms. These represent pressure from the scientific institution to act legitimately (that is, in the interests of science) in the opposite
direction to that specified by the original norms (see also Rothman, 1972).

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One purpose of Mitroffs study of moon scientists was to investigate the extent to which
norms and their counter-norms exercised control over scientists in their professional work.
About forty eminent scientists who were directly interested in moon rock samples collected
on the Apollo missions were interviewed four times over a span of 3/2 years between
Apollo 11 and Apollo 16. In addition, they were asked to respond to a number of tests
and questionnaires. Extensive data were gathered which demonstrated the operation
of both conventional norms and counter-norms within this group of scientists and Mitroff
produced an expanded list as a basis for further study (1974a, p. 79; 1974b).
This lack of acceptance of the simple empiricist stereotype was found in an earlier study
in which West (1960) carried out a survey of the scientific values of fifty-seven academic
scientists at a midwestern university. He found that there was a wide variation in the
strength of adherence to the classical ideology of science and that there was little relationship between this and the extent of productive research.
Mulkay (1976,1979) has argued that neither the norms nor the counter-norms referred
to above are the strong determiners of behavior that Merton and Mitroff consider them
to be, since it is not the private behavior but the public presentation of results which determines the allocation of rewards in science. For him the so-called norms and counternorms constitute an informal, moral vocabulary which scientists can use flexibly to
categorize professional actions differently in various social contexts and, presumably,
in accordance with varying social interests (1 976; see also Barnes and Dolby, 1970).
This vocabulary points specifically to problem areas in scientific practice including those
related to objectivity-subjectivity, rationality-irrationality, and impartiality-commitment,
but it contains no solutions to these problems. For example, a focus on the need for objectivity may be used to counteract an opponent who is judged to have been unduly
subjective, while an appeal to the subjective aspects of science may be used where claims
for objectivity appear to be excessive.
Historical Case Studies
Information about the scientific attitude is often conveyed and reinforced in an educational setting by appealing to the work of scientists in the past. In particular, support
for the empiricist conception of this attitude is derived from the way scientists in the past
apparently constructed theories and made decisions about their validity solely on the basis
of experiments. It is claimed, for example, that the Michelson-Morley experiment simultaneously dealt the death blow to the Lorentz electron theory and led to the birth
of Einsteins special theory of relativity; or that Millikans oil-drop experiment once and
for all settled dispute about the indivisibility of the electron charge.
In his history of the Michelson-Morley-Miller experiments before and after 1905,
Swenson (1970) has shown that, following the 1887 version of the experiment, a number
of explanations for the null result were still available which did not require the rejection
of the concept of the aether. Because of this fact, modifications of the original experiment
were carried out over the next forty-five or fifty years to attempt to demonstrate conclusively the presence or absence of an aether drift. In 1925, Miller announced that he
had obtained an aether drift velocity of about 200 meters per second but, instead of
causing Einsteins theory to be rejected, this result was effectively ignored for the next
thirty years, in spite of Millers acknowledged competence. In 1954, Shankland suggested
that the result may have been due to lack of adequate temperature control.

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Holtons research (1969), and the work of others, has also shown that the Michelson-Morley experiment had little or no effect on the origin of the theory of relativity in
Einsteins mind. Einstein was apparently prompted more by the essential requirement
of finding symmetry and universality in the operations of nature (Holton, 1969) than
by substanially empirical considerations. The myth which describes a direct link between
the 1887 version of the Michelson-Morley experiment and Einsteins conception of the
theory of relativity is, for Holton, an example of the effect of experimenticism which
is best recognized by the unquestioned priority assigned to experiments and experimental
data in the analysis of how scientists do their own work and how their work is incorporated
into the public enterprise of science. (1 969).
The later study by Holton of Millikans laboratory notebooks for the years 191 1 and
19 12, illuminates another aspect of the experimenticist notion of science. The results
published in Millikans 1913 paper so clearly support Millikans view of the indivisibility
of the electron charge that, at least in this case, it seems obvious that the oil-drop experiment conclusively decided the point at issue between Millikan and Ehrenhaft. Millikan announced there that the largest departure from the mean value found anywhere
in the table [of values of e, determined for fifty-eight droplets] amounts to 0.5 percent
(quoted in Holton, 1978, p. 61). However, Millikans notebooks show that results for
many more droplets were eliminated even as they were being obtained. Millikan evaluated his data and assigned qualitative indications on their prospective use, guided by
both a theory about the nature of the electric charge and a sense of the quality or weight
of the particular run (p. 70). In order to account for Millikans behavior in the laboratory,
Holton introduces the notion of suspension of disbelief to describe the procedure of
holding in abeyance final judgments concerning the validity of apparent falsifications
of a promising hypothesis (p. 71) especially during the early stages of theory construction
or testing. It may also be possible to explain inconsistencies in Mendels published work
in a similar way (Fisher, 1936).
Millikans example demonstrates one possible response to data which conflict with
expectations at the stage of scientific work prior to publication. However, even after results
are published, a scientist whose theory is apparently falsified by the evidence can handle
the situation in a number of different ways in order to retain his theory. He can deny the
validity of the data and suggest possible reasons why it should be ignored; he can accept
the data but give reasons why it has no serious implications for the theory; or he can accept
both the data and the implications for the theory but argue that when all the problems
have eventually been cleared up the theory will be vindicated (Mahoney, 1976, 1979;
Popper, 1968, p. 50, Kuhn, 1970). The treatment of Millers 1925 results for the aether
drift velocity is one example of the third approach to data which apparently falsifies a
theory. In another example, clear deviations in the orbit of the planet Uranus from that
expected on the basis of Newtons theory of gravitation did not lead to the rejection of
the theory. Instead they were eventually found to be caused by an originally unexpected
factor-the existence of the planet Neptune-which had no part to play in the theory
itself. For many years, similar deviations in the orbit of Mercury were not counted against
the theory because it was felt that they would eventually be explained when a further,
as yet unobserved planet was found. Barbers survey (1961) of the extent to which scientists resist the introduction of new ideas also demonstrates the strength of opposition
to falsifying evidence.

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If, as the above (and many other) examples demonstrate, experimental evidence does
not conclusively speak for or against a particular theory one is led to adopt a non-empiricist
position similar to that of Einstein who, though unwilling to accept the possibility of
confirmation of a theory by verification of its prediction, . . . . in practice also held to
the falsification principle only sceptically (weakly) when the theory purportedly falsified
by experimental test had in his views certain other merits compared with its rivals
(Holton, 1978, p, 98).

Alternative Models of Science

The above evidence concerning the behavior of scientists and, in particular, their use
of experimental data in coming to conclusions about theories is at odds both with the
conception of the scientific attitude possessed by science educators and with an empiricist
philosophy of science to which this attitude seems to be related (Feigl, 1955; Kurtz, 1976).
If the orthodox view of the scientific attitude is to be modified in a way which will
accommodate the evidence presented above, it will also be necessary to change the model
of science apparently adopted by science educators working in this area. Since about 1960,
an increasing range of nonempiricist philosophies of science has become available from
Kuhns model of paradigm conflict (1 962) to the anarchistic view of Feyerabend (1 970).
There is also evidence that strictly empiricist philosophies have been modified in the light
of the mounting evidence against them (see, for example, Scheffler, 1967).
These developments in the philosophy of science are well known and will not be further
discussed here. However, both Holton and Mitroff, whose research has been presented
above, have offered further suggestions about views of science which they consider to
be consistent with the results of their work.
In 1952, Holton introduced the distinction between public and private science
(1952, pp. 234-256). The way in which arguments and evidence are publicly presented
(public science) and not the way in which they were originally conceived, clarified,
and tested (private science) is used by others to judge the scientific value of the work
of a scientist. The technical format of a scientific paper is such that references to personal
characteristics of the author are rigorously excluded. Holton suggested that the empiricist
stereotype of the scientist as detached and impartial is one which arises from this edited,
public image and not from a study of scientists themselves as they engage in private
science. His own work in the history of science has provided considerable evidence that,
in the private work of a scientist, the range of appropriate personal characteristics is almost
unlimited. It certainly includes those which have been incorporated into the empiricist
scientific attitude together with their opposites as outlined by Mitroff (1 974a, p. 79;
1974b). If the distinction between public and private science is a valid one, it means
that the attitudes toward scientists held by science educators and science students can
be expected to have little, if any, necessary connection with the personal characteristics
of scientists.
Mitroffs research raised for him the problem that if, as seems to be the case, the best
scientists are those who tenaciously hold on to their theories almost in spite of the evidence
against them, how can science be considered to be objective even in the public domain?
In order to solve this problem, he appealed to a dialectical or adversary notion of science
(1 972; 1974a, pp. 21 9-250). In his view, a theory is most likely to get a fair hearing if
there are individuals passionately committed to its validity and who do all they can to

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produce evidence and arguments in its favor. Those most likely to come up with evidence
and arguments against the theory are those who disagree with it or who are committed
to an alternative view. The interaction between these two groups of passionately committed individuals helps to bring to light as much relevant evidence as possible for assessment by the relevant community of scientists without it being necessary for either
group to show complete objectivity, open-mindedness, impartiality, or emotional neutrality. The similarity between this way of \ iewing science and the way truth is sought
in a courtroom is obvious as are the parallels with Kuhns notion of paradigm conflict
( 1 962). Of course the degree of commitment which scientists adopt towards a particular
theory varies from individual to individual and the situation is not so clearly defined as
may be suggested by the above discussion. But, while the empiricist stereotype allows
for little variation among the personal attributes of scientists, the views of Holton and
Mitroff appear to make more sense of their actual behavior.
Conclusions

Arguments for including the development of the scientific attitude in students among
the main goals of science education rest firmly on the assumption that this attitude is
demonstrated in the professional behavior of successful scientists. The conception of the
scientific attitude which appears in the science education literature sees the scientist as
some one who makes decisions solely on the basis of empirical evidence and who at all
times prevents his personal interests from intruding into these decisions. The evidence
presented demonstrates clearly that this view, which seems to have been derived primarily
from the writings of scientists and philosophers of science before about 1960, is completely
untenable and may, at best, be associated with the less successful scientist.
The lack of attention which has been given by the science educators who carry out
research into the scientific attitude to the evidence presented here from the psychology,
sociology, history and philosophy of science, may be just another example of how commitment to one view (in this case, an empiricist view of science) can lead one to ignore
contrary evidence. The proliferation, since 1960, of nonempiricist philosophies of science,
has had little obvious influence on how the scientific attitude is conceived by science
educators. Even Klopfers recent extensive and detailed outline of the structure of the
affective domain in relation to science education ( 1 976) retains many features of the
empiricist stereotype with little acknowledgement that contrary evidence has been taken
into account. One purpose of this paper has been to present the evidence against the
empiricist conception of the scientific attitude.
A conclusion that could be drawn from the material and arguments presented here
is that development of the scientific attitude in students should be eliminated as one of
the major goals of science education, and this certainly follows for the attitude as it has
been formulated by science educators for the past 60 years. Teaching that scientists
possess these characteristics is bad enough but it is abhorrent that science educators should
actually attempt to mold children in the same false image. On the other hand, very few
writers explain what they mean by open-mindedness, objectivity, or scepticism, and little
indication is given of how evidence is weighed or of how one decides when there is sufficient evidence to make a decision. It is possible that, if such terms were clarified and the
way in which they relate to scientific practice were more carefully discussed in the light

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of the material presented here, one could retain a reformulated and more acceptable
version of the scientific attitude.
This second alternative requires considerably more discussion than has taken place
up to the present. If any conception of the scientific attitude is to be retained in science
education it is no longer sufficient to build unquestioningly on the consensus of science
educators. Too much relevant information has been ignored. If further work takes place
which clarifies, in the light of the above evidence, the role which the development of the
scientific attitude should play in science education then the second purpose of this paper
will have been achieved.
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Received 9 March 1981

Accepted 20 July 198 1