Atm With An Eye
Atm With An Eye
1. INTRODUCTION
The rise of technology in India has brought into force many types of equipment that
aim at more customer satisfaction. ATM is one such machine which made money
transactions easy for customers to bank. The other side of this improvement is the
enhancement of the culprits probability to get his unauthentic share. Traditionally,
security is handled by requiring the combination of a physical access card and a PIN
or other password in order to access a customers account. This model invites
fraudulent attempts through stolen cards, badly-chosen or automatically assigned
PINs, cards with little or no encryption schemes, employees with access to nonencrypted customer account information and other points of failure.
Our paper proposes an automatic teller machine security model that would
combine a physical access card, a PIN, and electronic facial recognition. By forcing
the ATM to match a live image of a customers face with an image stored in a bank
database that is associated with the account number, the damage to be caused by
stolen cards and PINs is effectively neutralized. Only when the PIN matches the
account and the live image and stored image match would a user be considered fully
verified. A system can examine just the eyes, or the eyes nose and mouth, or ears,
nose, mouth and eyebrows, and so on.
In this paper , we will also look into an automatic teller
machine security model providing the customers a cordless,
password-free way to get their money out of an ATM. Just step up to
the camera while your eye is scanned. The iris -- the colored part of
the eye the camera will be checking -- is unique to every person,
more so than fingerprints.
(BRIG ECE)
2. ATM SYSTEMS
Our ATM system would only attempt to match two (and later, a
few) discrete images, searching through a large database of
possible matching candidates would be unnecessary. The process
would effectively become an exercise in pattern matching, which
would not require a great deal of time. With appropriate lighting and
robust learning software, slight variations could be accounted for in
most cases. Further, a positive visual match would cause the live
image to be stored in the database so that future transactions would
have a broader base from which to compare if the original account
image fails to provide a match thereby decreasing false negatives.
When a match is made with the PIN but not the images, the
bank could limit transactions in a manner agreed upon by the
customer when the account was opened, and could store the image
of the user for later examination by bank officials. In regards to bank
employees gaining access to customer PINs for use in fraudulent
transactions, this system would likewise reduce that threat to
exposure to the low limit imposed by the bank and agreed to by the
customer on visually unverifiable transactions.
In the case of credit card use at ATMs, such a verification
system would not currently be feasible without creating an overhaul
for the entire credit card issuing industry, but it is possible that
positive results (read: significant fraud reduction) achieved by this
system might motivate such an overhaul.
The last consideration is that consumers may be wary of the privacy
concerns raised by maintaining images of customers in a bank
database, encrypted or otherwise, due to possible hacking attempts
or employee misuse. However, one could argue that having the
image compromised by a third party would have far less dire
consequences than the account information itself. Furthermore,
since nearly all ATMs videotape customers engaging in transactions,
it is no broad leap to realize that banks already build an archive of
their customer images, even if they are not necessarily grouped
with account information itself.
(BRIG ECE)
CPU
Magnetic or chip card Reader
Pin pad
Secure Crypto processors
Function key and buttons
Display
Record Printer
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4. FACIAL RECOGNITION
The main issues faced in developing such a model are keeping
the time elapsed in the verification process to a negligible amount,
allowing for an appropriate level of variation in a customers face
when compared to the database image, and that credit cards which
can be used at ATMs to withdraw funds are generally issued by
institutions that do not have in-person contact with the customer,
and hence no opportunity to acquire a photo.
Because the system would only attempt to match two (and
later, a few) discrete images, searching through a large database of
possible matching candidates would be unnecessary. The process
would effectively become an exercise in pattern matching, which
would not require a great deal of time. With appropriate lighting and
robust learning software, slight variations could be accounted for in
most cases. Further, a positive visual match would cause the live
image to be stored in the database so that future transactions would
have a broader base from which to compare if the original account
image fails to provide a match thereby decreasing false negatives.
When a match is made with the PIN but not the images, the
bank could limit transactions in a manner agreed upon by the
customer when the account was opened, and could store the image
of the user for later examination by bank officials. In regards to bank
employees gaining access to customer PINs for use in fraudulent
transactions, this system would likewise reduce that threat to
exposure to the low limit imposed by the bank and agreed to by the
customer on visually unverifiable transactions.
In the case of credit card use at ATMs, such a verification
system would not currently be feasible without creating an overhaul
for the entire credit card issuing industry, but it is possible that
(BRIG ECE)
(BRIG ECE)
(BRIG ECE)
5. OUR METHODLOGY
The first and most important step of this project will be to
locate a powerful open-source facial recognition program that uses
local feature analysis and that is targeted at facial verification. This
program should be compilable on multiple systems, including Linux
and Windows variants, and should be customizable to the extent of
allowing for variations in processing power of the machines onto
which it would be deployed.We will then need to familiarize
ourselves with the internal workings of the program so that we can
(BRIG ECE)
6. IRIS RECOGNITION
Inspite of all these security features, a new technology has
been developed. Bank United of Texas became the first in the United
States to offer iris recognition technology at automatic teller
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The iris -- the colored part of the eye the camera will be
checking -- is unique to every person, more so than fingerprints.
And, for the customers who can't remember their personal
identification number or password and scratch it on the back of their
cards or somewhere that a potential thief can find, no more fear of
having an account cleaned out if the card is lost or stolen.
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The first thing the camera will check is whether the eye is
pulsating. If we don't see blood flowing through your eye, you're
either dead or it's a picture
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SECURITY
such as malls, grocery stores, and restaurants. The other side of this
improvement is the enhancement of the culprits probability to get
his unauthentic share. ATMs are
Early ATM security focused
on making the ATMs invulnerable to physical attack; they were
effectively safes with dispenser mechanisms. ATMs are placed not
only near banks, but also in locations a quick and convenient way to
get cash. They are also public and visible, so it pays to be careful
when you're making transactions. Follow these general tips for your
personal safety.
Stay alert.
If an ATM is housed in an enclosed area, shut the entry door
completely behind you. If you drive up to an ATM, keep your car
doors locked and an eye on your surroundings. If you feel uneasy or
sense something may be wrong while you're at an ATM, particularly
at night or when you're alone, leave the area.
Keep you PIN confidential.
Memorize your Personal Identification Number (PIN); don't write it on
your card or leave it in your wallet or purse. Keep your number to
yourself. Never provide your PIN over the telephone, even if a caller
identifies himself as a bank employee or police officer. Neither
person would call you to obtain your number.
Conduct transactions in private.
Stay squarely in front of the ATM when completing your transaction
so people waiting behind you won't have an opportunity to see your
PIN being entered or to view any account information. Similarly, fill
out your deposit/withdrawal slips privately.
Dont flash your cash.
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10.CONCLUSION
We thus develop an ATM model that is more reliable in
providing security by using facial recognition software. By keeping
the time elapsed in the verification process to a negligible amount
we even try to maintain the efficiency of this ATM system to a
greater degree. One could argue that having the image
compromised by a third party would have far less dire consequences
than the account information itself. Furthermore, since nearly all
ATMs videotape customers engaging in transactions, it is no broad
leap to realize that banks already build an archive of their customer
images, even if they are not necessarily grouped with account
information.
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