Electoral Processes and Political Parties: A. Electoral Processes Objectives of The Founding Fathers
Electoral Processes and Political Parties: A. Electoral Processes Objectives of The Founding Fathers
Electoral Processes and Political Parties: A. Electoral Processes Objectives of The Founding Fathers
A. Electoral Processes
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
Attempts at reforms
4.7
4.8
4.9
4.10
4.11
4.12
Criminalisation
4.13
4.14
4.15
4.16
4.17
Delimitation of constituencies
4.18
Defections
4.19
4.20
Problems of Instability
4.21
4.22
4.23
4.24
Office of profit
B. Political Parties
4.25
4.26
4.27
4.28
4.29
4.30
4.31
Recognition of parties
4.32
4.33
4.34
Scourge of criminalisation
4.35
4.36
Election returns
4.37
4.38
Leadership conventions
CHAPTER 4
A. Electoral Processes
democracy as the polity most suited to India's ethos, background and needs. They
envisaged equal participation of all the adult citizens in the democratic process without
any discrimination. Selection of representatives of the people through universal adult
franchise and free and fair elections was for them an act of faith. Universal adult
franchise was a bold and ambitious political experiment and a symbol of the abiding
faith that the founders reposed in the great masses of the country and in their innate
wisdom.
Provisions of the Constitution
4.2
To achieve these objectives, article 326 of the Constitution enfranchises for all
the adult citizens (not less than 18 years of age) and empowers them to vote at the
elections to the Lok Sabha and the State Assemblies. Article 324 vests the
superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls and conduct
of elections in an independent Election Commission. Under articles 243K and 243ZA
elections to local bodies Panchayats and Municipalities are the responsibility of
State Election Commissions.
Magnitude of the Task
4.3
A general election to Lok Sabha is a gigantic exercise. It has been said that
holding general elections in India is equal to holding them for Europe, United States,
Canada and Australia all put together. Statistically, the number of voters in India is in
excess of 600 million (60 crores). The number of polling booths all over the country
adds up to about 900,000 (9 lakhs). To manage these polling booths about five million
election personnel and an additional two million security personnel have to be
mobilized. Taking State and local elections into account, the figures become more
staggering. Today, India is unique in having upwards of about 3.2 million (32 lakhs)
directly elected representatives of the people spread over various tiers of governance.
Successes and Failures
4.4
During the last half-a-century, there have been thirteen general elections to Lok
Sabha and a much larger number to various State Legislative Assemblies. We can take
legitimate pride in that these have been successful and generally acknowledged to be
free and fair. But, the experience has also brought to fore many distortions, some very
serious, generating a deep concern in many quarters. There are constant references to
the unhealthy role of money power, muscle power and mafia power and to
criminalisation, corruption, communalism and casteism.
Identifying the Problem Areas
4.5
More specifically, the Commission has found that the main problem areas may
be identified to be as follows:
Increasing cost of elections leading to unethical, illegal and even mafia provided
electoral funding, corruption, criminalisation and black money generation in
various forms.
With the constituents/electors being the same for all directly elected
representatives from the lowest Panchayat level to the Lok Sabha level, there are
competing role expectations and conflict of perceptions e.g. the constituents
expect even members of the Union Parliament to attend to their purely local
problems.
With the electorate having no role in the selection of candidates and with majority
of candidates being elected by minority of votes under the first-past-the-post
system, the representative character of the representatives itself becomes
doubtful and their representational legitimacy is seriously eroded. In many
cases, more votes are cast against the winning candidates than for them. One of
the significant probable causes may be the mismatch between the majoritarian or
first-past-the-post system and the multiplicity of parties and large number of
independents.
Divisive and disruptive tendencies including the misuse of religion and caste in
the process of political mobilization of group identities on non-ideological lines.
Fake and non-serious candidates who create major practical difficulties and are
also used indirectly to subvert the electoral process.
Last but not the least, loss of systemic legitimacy due to decay in the standards
of political morality and decline in the spirit of service and sacrifice in public life.
Attempts at Reforms
4.6
The question of bringing about comprehensive changes in the election laws and
electoral processes has been receiving the attention at various levels right from the time
of the first general election. The most recent official exercises in this regard have been:
(1) The Goswami Committee on Electoral Reforms (1990)
(2) The Indrajit Gupta Committee on State Funding of Elections (1998)
(3) The Law Commissions report on Reform of the Electoral Laws (1999).
(4) The Election Commission's comments on the recommendations of the above
three and its own proposals based on experience of ground realities.
4.7.3 The Commission reached the conclusion that while some far reaching
reforms in the electoral processes were necessary, no major constitutional
amendment was called for. The necessary correctives could be achieved by
ordinary legislation modifying the existing laws or, in many cases, merely by
subordinate legislation and executive action. The Commission is happy to note that
some of the suggestions mentioned in the consultation papers released by it are already
under implementation.
Electoral Rolls and Voter ID
4.8.1 The electoral process begins with the preparation of electoral rolls. If the rolls are
incomplete or defective, the whole electoral process is vitiated. Any serious attempt at
electoral reform, therefore, must first tackle the question of faulty electoral rolls. At
present, the Election Commission (EC) is responsible for preparing the electoral rolls for
assembly and parliamentary constituencies. The State Election Commissions are
responsible for electoral rolls for local body elections. In some States, the EC and
State Election Commissions (SECs) have agreed to coordinate the preparation of
electoral rolls.
4.8.2 Given the technology today, an automated and well designed online system
broken down to district level can be created without much hassle. The database would
be centrally computerized by the EC and each voter/ adult citizen would have a unique
bar-coded ID number. This ID number would be for life and in the long run the best bet
against any impersonation. In course of time, possession of such an ID card should be
made mandatory for all elections. It might even be possible to have hand held devices
which would eliminate any invalid card automatically. This would improve public
access to this, now hard to get, information and serve the objective of contributing to
cleaning up the electoral process and curbing impersonation and rigging. Also, it would
add to creating widespread trust in the fairness of our electoral process thereby
providing it a high degree of institutional legitimacy.
4.8.3 The Commission recommends a foolproof method of preparing the
electoral roll right at the Panchayat level constituency of a voter and
supplementing it by a foolproof voter ID card which may in fact also serve as a
multi-purpose citizenship card for all adults. A single exercise should be enough
for preparing common electoral rolls and ID cards. The task could be entrusted
to a qualified professional agency under the supervision of the EC and in
coordination with the SECs. The rolls should be updated constantly and
periodically posted on the web site of the Election Commission and CD ROMs
should be available to all political parties or anyone interested. Prior to elections,
these rolls should be printed and publicly displayed at the post offices in each
constituency, as well as at the panchayats or relevant constituency HQs. These
should be allowed to be inspected on payment of a nominal fee by
anyone. Facilities should also be provided to the members of the public at the
post offices for submitting their applications for modification of the electoral
rolls.
and in bye-elections. Any doubts about this technology were amply removed during the
deliberations of the Goswami Committee. Not only were the EVMs satisfactorily
demonstrated to all politician members, several electronic experts of the Government of
India also testified that the machines could be used at all our elections without any
misgivings. The advantages of EVMs in preventing large-scale rigging are quite
apparent as the machine locks up and will permit only one hit every so many
seconds. Wherever these EVMs have been used in urban and in rural areas, there
have been no complaints of large scale rigging. This also makes counting easy and
non-contestable and theoretically the results could be available within a very short time
if the system wanted to make prompt announcement of the winning candidates.
The
Commission
recommends
the
introduction
of
EVMs
in
all
constituencies all over the country for all elections as rapidly as possible.
Booth Capturing and Rigging
4.10
4.12.1 The entry of criminals in politics is a matter of great concern. The Vohra
Committee appointed by the Government had stated in strong terms that the nexus
between crime syndicates and political personalities was very deep. According to the
Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) report to the Vohra Committee: "all over India,
crime syndicates have become a law unto themselves. .. Even in the smaller towns
and rural areas, muscle-men have become the order of the day. Hired assassins have
become part of these organizations. The nexus between the criminal gangs, police,
bureaucracy and politicians has come out clearly in various parts of the country." The
Committee quoted other agencies to state that the Mafia network is "virtually running a
parallel government, pushing the State apparatus into irrelevance." The report also
says "in certain States like Bihar, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh, these gangs enjoy the
patronage of local politicians cutting across party lines and the protection of the
functionaries. Some political leaders become the leaders of these gangs/armed senas
and over the years get themselves elected to local bodies, State assemblies and
national parliament."
4.12.2 There were grave incongruities in the existing provisions of sub-sections (1), (2)
and (3) of Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (RPA 1951),
illustrating the case of a rapist, convicted and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment,
being disqualified only for six years under sub-section (1) and while not able to vote,
being free to contest elections even while serving the last four years of his sentence in
prison.
any
candidate
violates
this
provision,
he
should
be
4.12.5 A potential candidate against whom the police have framed charges may
take the matter to the Special Court. This court should be obliged to enquire into
and take a decision in a strictly time bound manner. Basically, this court may
decide whether there is indeed a prima facie case justifying the framing of
charges.
4.12.6 The Special Courts should be constituted at the level of High Courts and
their decisions should be appealable to the Supreme Court only (in similar way as
the decisions of the National Environment Tribunal). The Special Courts should
decide the cases within a period of six months. For deciding the cases, these
Courts should take evidence through Commissioners.
4.12.7 As per the provisions contained in sub-section (4) of section 8 of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951, the disqualification referred to in sub-sections
(1) and (2) of that section shall not take effect for a period of three months from the date
of conviction if the person convicted is a member of Parliament or the Legislature of a
State. However, if within the said three months an appeal or application for revision is
brought in respect of the conviction or sentence, the disqualification will not operate until
that appeal or application is disposed of by the court.
The Commission feels that the benefit of this provision should be available
only for the continuance in office by a sitting Member of Parliament or a State
Legislature. The Commission recommends that the aforesaid provision should
suitably be amended providing that this benefit shall not be available for the
purpose of his contesting fresh elections.
4.12.8 The Commission feels that the proposed provision laying down that a
person charged with an offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend
to five years or more should be disqualified from contesting elections after the
expiry of a period of one year from the date the charges were framed in a court of
law should equally be applicable to sitting members of Parliament and State
Legislatures as to any other such person.
Corrupt Practices and Election Petitions
4.13.1 Section 8A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (RPA) provides for
disqualification on ground of corrupt practices. The current practice is that once the
High Court hands out the judgement on an election petition holding the candidate guilty
of corrupt practices, the case goes to the Secretary of the concerned State Legislature
or the Secretary General Lok Sabha or Rajya Sabha, as the case may be. It is then
forwarded to the President who in turn forwards it to the EC. Only then does the EC get
jurisdiction to tender its opinion to the President based on which the disqualification
order is issued.
The Commission recommends that in matters of disqualification on
grounds of corrupt practices, the President should determine the period of
disqualification under Section 8A on the direct opinion of the EC and avoid the
delay currently experienced. This can be done by resorting to the position
prevailing before the 1975 amendment to RPA, 1951.
4.13.2 Election petitions at present are considered by the High Court. The High Court
is expected to give judgement on all election petitions within 6 months, but in actual
practice, it takes much longer and often the petitions remain pending for years and in
the meantime even the full term of the House expires. (For data on disposal of Election
Petitions, see Consultation Paper, Table under para 15.2) In the opinion of many
activists and eminent persons, all election-related petitions should be heard by a
separate judicial set up and these petitions should be decided within a time bound
period within 6 to 12 weeks by dedicated benches of special courts.
4.14.1 One of the most critical problems in the matter of electoral reforms is the hard
reality that for contesting an election one needs large amounts of money. The limits of
expenditure prescribed are meaningless and almost never adhered to. As a result, it
becomes difficult for the good and the honest to enter legislatures. It also creates a high
degree of compulsion for corruption in the political arena. This has progressively
polluted the entire system. Corruption, because it erodes performance, becomes one of
the leading reasons for non-performance and compromised governance in the
country. The sources of some of the election funds are believed to be unaccounted
criminal money in return for protection, unaccounted funds from business groups who
expect a high return on this investment, kickbacks or commissions on contracts etc. No
matter how we look at it, citizens are directly affected because apart from compromised
governance, the huge money spent on elections pushes up the cost of everything in the
country. It also leads to unbridled corruption and the consequences of wide spread
corruption are even more serious than many imagine. Electoral compulsions for funds
become the foundation of the whole super structure of corruption.
4.14.2 The present provisions of law have a significant loophole in the shape of
Explanation 1 to section 77(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, under
which the amounts spent by persons other than the candidate and his agent
themselves, are not counted in his election expenses. This means that there can be
never any violation of the expenditure limits. All extra expenditure, even when known
and proven, can be shown to have been spent by the party or by any friends and it
remains outside of the enforceable limits. In view of the increasing cost of the election
campaigns, it is desirable that the existing ceiling on election expenses for the
various legislative bodies be suitably raised to a reasonable level reflecting the
increasing costs. However, this ceiling should be fixed by the Election
Commission from time to time and should include all the expenses by the
candidate as well as by his political party or his friends and his well-wishers and
any other expenses incurred in any political activity on behalf of the candidate by
an individual or a corporate entity. Such a provision should be the part of a
legislation regulating political funding in India. The Commission recommends
that Explanation 1 to section 77(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951
should be deleted.
4.14.3 Transparency in the context of election means both the sources of finance as
well as their utilization as are listed out in an audited statement. If the candidates are
required to list the sources of their income, this can be checked back by the income tax
authorities.
4.15.2 Wall writings, display of cut-outs, hoardings and banners, hoisting of flags
(except at party offices, public meetings and other specified places), use of more than a
specified
number
of
vehicles
for
election
campaign
and
for
processions,
4.16.4 It
has
been
suggested
from
several
quarters
that
this
principle
of
representativeness will be fulfilled if the elected representatives win on the basis of 50%
plus one vote. If, in the first round, no body gets over 50% of the votes polled, then
according to this view, there should be a run-off contest held the very next day or soon
thereafter between the top two candidates so that one of them will necessarily win on
the basis of 50% plus one votes polled. Several representations from various
organizations favoured this option to achieve the objective of better representative
democracy. The Chief Election Commissioner is reported to have confirmed that the
task of run-off elections can be managed. Actually, the run-off vote is analogous to a repoll. There is no revision of electoral rolls, no fresh nominations, no fresh campaigning
or the like. The Commission is of the view that there are substantial advantages of
following thepolicy of 50% plus one vote. On the one hand, it resolves the problem of
inadequate representation. On the other, it also makes it in the self-interest of various
political parties themselves to widen their appeal to a wider electorate. It can help push
political rhetoric in a direction of mobilizing language might take on comparative
universal tone as opposed to sectoral tones of the present day. With the need to be
more broad-based in their appeal, issues that have to do with good governance rather
than with cleavages and narrow identities might start to surface in the country.
4.16.5 Despite the suggested merits of this system, the Commission refrains from
making a positive recommendation for its acceptance straightaway, as the Commission
cannot put out of consideration certain apprehensions expressed by several sections,
particularly, in regard to the implications of a repoll. The pros and cons of the proposal
need and merit a closer and more careful evaluation.
Delimitation of Constituencies
4.17
Since 1971, the number of seats in the Lok-Sabha allocated to different States
4.18.1 The question of defections has now haunted the Indian polity for over three
decades. This was sought to be eliminated by the Tenth Schedule but all that has
happened is that while individual defections have become rare, en bloc defections are
permitted, promoted and amply rewarded. Despite the Tenth Schedule, or because of it,
countless defections have taken place without incurring any disqualification. In fact, on
an average more defections per year took place after the Anti-defection Law as laid
down in the Tenth Schedule came into force than ever earlier. What has been even
more disconcerting is that some of the Speakers have tended to act in a partisan
manner and without a proper appreciation - deliberate or otherwise - of the provisions of
the Tenth Schedule. Almost everyone dealing with this subject agrees that defections
flout people's mandate and cannot and should not be permitted, neither singly nor in a
group. The fact is that most candidates get elected on the basis of the party that has
given them a ticket. Defections allow these candidates to theoretically go to the pole
opposite of this party, which is not the basis on which people elected them. Simply
because there is no accountability vis--vis the people, such a practice continues
unabated. Defections encourage corruption at the highest levels. Defectors usually are
rewarded with political positions and other such perquisites so openly that it really
makes a mockery of our democracy.
4.18.2 The Commission recommends that the provisions of the Tenth Schedule of
the Constitution should be amended specifically to provide that all persons
defecting - whether individually or in groups - from the party or the alliance of
parties, on whose ticket they had been elected, must resign from their
parliamentary or assembly seats and must contest fresh elections. In other
words, they should lose their membership and the protection under the provision
of split, etc. should be scrapped. The defectors should also be debarred to hold
any public office of a minister or any other remunerative political post for at least
the duration of the remaining term of the existing legislature or until, the next
fresh elections whichever is earlier. The vote cast by a defector to topple a
government should be treated as invalid. The Commission further recommends
that the power to decide on questions as to disqualification on ground of
defection should vest in the Election Commission instead of in the Chairman or
Speaker of the House concerned.
Oversized Council of Ministers
4.19. The practice of having oversized Council of Ministers must be prohibited
by law. A ceiling on the number of Ministers in any State or the Union
government be fixed at the maximum of 10% of the total strength of the popular
house of the legislature. In this connection, reference is also invited to clause 4
of article 239AA of the Constitution, which limits the size of the Council of the
Ministers to not more than 10% of the total number of members in the Legislative
Assembly of the National Capital Territory of Delhi.
Also, the practice of creating a number of political offices with the position,
perks and privileges of a minister should also be discouraged and at all events
their number should be limited to 2 per cent of the total strength of the lower
house.
Problems of Instability
4.20.1 The last few decades have seen a great deal of political instability in
India. During ten years, there were seven governments at the Union level. Being
minority governments, these were unable to provide stable administration and stable
policies. The reasons are not far to find. We adopted the Westminster model of FPTP
system of elections but forgot that it works mainly in communion with a two party system
or a limited number of parties. The political system and the politicization of caste and
communal identities have proved to be very divisive of society and disruptive of the
national ethos. It has become increasingly difficult to get a workable majority to form a
government and make a success of coalition arrangements.
4.20.2 This has had very negative repercussions on the quality of governance because
to cobble up a workable majority to form government, compromises had to be made and
ideology or notions of quality of governance sometimes might have taken a back
seat. The consequences are severe. Law and order suffers because control
mechanisms break down or become very loose. It becomes difficult to take strong
measures to curb corruption and provide clean and quality governance. In the end, it is
the citizen who is the victim of all the misgovernance.
4.20.3 Out of 1900 independent candidates who contested the general election in 1998,
only 6(0.65%) succeeded, 885(47%) lost their deposits. Likewise out of the 10635
candidates, who contested the 1996 Lok-Sabha elections, only 9(0.08%) won and
10,603(99.7%) lost their deposits. It is also known that most of these so-called
independent candidates are in fact dummy candidates or defectors from their parties on
being denied party tickets. These candidates only vitiate the sanctity of the electoral
process and involve waste of resources. This was carried to ridiculous limits when a
Lok Sabha constituency in Andhra Pradesh (Nalgonda, in 1996) had 480
contestants. Similarly there have been assembly constituencies reaching over 1000
candidates.
The
Commission
recommends
that
independent
candidates
be
discouraged and only those who have a track record of having won any local
election or who are nominated by at least twenty elected members of Panchayats,
Municipalities or other local bodies spread out in majority of electoral districts in
their constituency should be allowed to contest for Assembly or Parliament.
4.20.4 In order to check the proliferation of the number of independent candidates and
the malpractices that enter into the election process because of the influx of the
independent candidates, the existing security deposits in respect of independent
candidates may be doubled. Further, it should be doubled progressively every
year for those independents who fail to win and still keep contesting elections. If
any independent candidate has failed to get at least five percent of the total
number of votes cast in his constituency, he/she should not be allowed to contest
as independent candidate for the same office again at least for 6 years.
4.20.5 An independent candidate who loses election three times consecutively for
the
same
office
as
such
candidate
should
be
permanently
debarred
4.24.2 The Commission received suggestions to the effect that the Constitution may be
suitably amended with a view to provide necessary power in the Election Commission to
identify/provide from time to time the offices which shall be deemed to be offices of profit
under the Government of India or the Government of any State.
B. Political Parties
Background and Objectives
4.25
4.26.1 Although political parties were not mentioned in the Constitution until the fiftysecond constitutional amendment of 1985, the existence of some well-organised
political parties was presumed as these were already functioning. The Constitution only
guaranteed freedom of association as a fundamental right. Section 29A of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951 provides for registration with the Election
Commission of associations and bodies of individual citizens of India as political
parties. The Tenth Schedule to the Constitution which was added by the Constitution
(52nd Amendment) Act, 1985 mentions political parties only for the specific purpose of
considering disqualification of a person for membership of either House of Parliament or
of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State on the ground of defection
from his political party. With that exception, even today, there is no law governing the
formation, registration, functioning or regulation of political parties.
4.26.2 The Election Commission accords recognition to political parties as national or
state parties in accordance with the norms laid down in the Election Symbols
(Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968. This is for the very limited purpose of
allocation of symbols. The number of parties recognised as national parties has been
varying from 14 to 4 owing to continuous review of the status based on their
performance at the polls.
The Present Scenario
4.27.1 The evolution of party system after independence is a picture of transformation
from one-party dominant system to a complex of multi-party system in which strong
trends of fragmentation, factionalism and regionalism coupled with the desire to form
alliances for seeking a share in power are increasingly occurring. This trend culminated
in 'hung' Houses after last few general elections. Another significant development
affecting the party system is the emergence of coalition politics.
4.27.2 In recent years, there has been sharp increase in political mobilization of the
electorate on the basis of social cleavages based on ascriptive identities, in particular of
religion and caste. Casteism, communalism and personality domination have been the
main planks around which the fragmentation of political parties has taken
place. Political parties have invariably exploited these sentiments for gaining support of
the voters. These developments have necessitated a need for a review of the working
of the political parties and their role and performance in the scheme of Indian polity and
Constitution.
Studies and Reports
4.28
Having regard to the prevailing political scenario in the country and the hard fact
that no electoral reforms can be effective without reforms in the political party system,
the Commission identified the following as some of the areas of immediate concern:-
Problems of party funding - need for a legislation to regulate party funds distribution and spending of party funds during non-election and election times.
To what extent and in what way party system could be reformed so as to pave
the way for the establishment of stable governments based on the concept of two
party system or dual party alliance system.
4.30.2 The proposed legislation should provide for compulsory registration for every
political party or pre-poll alliance. It should lay down conditions for the constitution of a
political party or alliance and for registration, recognition and de-registration and
derecognition.
4.30.3 The Commission recommends that every political party or alliance
should, in its Memoranda of Association, Rules and Regulations provide for its
doors being open to all citizens irrespective of any distinctions of caste,
community or the like. It should swear allegiance to the provisions of the
Constitution and to the sovereignty and integrity of the nation, regular elections
at
an
interval
of
three
years
at
its
various
levels
of
the
party,
the votes polled plus 2 members in the Legislative Assembly. The alternative criteria
for recognition is at least 3% of the seats in the Lower House. At the national level such
a recognition would require 6% of the votes polled in at least 4 States plus 4 members
in the Lok Sabha, or alternatively at least 2% of membership of the Lok Sabha drawn
from at least 3 States.
The rules and by-laws of the parties seeking registration should include
provisions for:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
a code of conduct (which each political party should evolve for itself),
(f)
(g)
Scourge of Criminalisation
4.34
4.35.1 The problem of political funding is a complex one and there are no panaceas.
Political parties need hefty contributions from companies and from other less desirable
sources. The greater the contribution, the greater the risk of dependence, corruption
and lack of probity in public life. The demand for transparency must be conceived as a
democratic value in itself, a tool designed to avoid any wrongful influences of money in
politics. If laws are intended to be effective with regard to transparency, they should be
general in nature and enforced with respect to everyone, and not just political parties or
candidates, but also to the donors as well. Otherwise, alternate or indirect ways to
evade control will be devised. In fact, while it is essential to strengthen regulation and
the mechanisms and capabilities of supervision and controlling entities, all this only
addresses part of the problem. Quite often, funding and commitments do not reach the
parties, but rather go directly to the candidate and his/her inner circle of
supporters. This is truer today in the context of the image and credibility crisis that party
organisations have been undergoing, and the emergence of regional leaders due to the
regionalisation process. This usually tends to make transactions between donors and
beneficiaries become even more secretive. Hence, the senior leaders or party
members may often not be aware of private contributions (many of them dubious in
origin and in quite large sums). Consequently, any proposals for reforms concerning
political funding should revolve, among other things, around the following four main
objectives:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
4.35.2 At present, different Acts regulate the flow of funds to political parties both from
internal as well as external sources. The Commission recommends that a
comprehensive legislation providing for regulation of contributions to the
political parties and towards election expenses should be enacted by
consolidating such laws. The new law should aim at bringing transparency into
political funding. It should permit corporate donations within higher prescribed
limits and keep them transparent. It should make all legal and transparent
donations upto a specified limit tax exempt and treat this tax loss to the state as
its contribution to state funding of elections. For example, tax exemptions could be
limited to say Rs.25,000 for individuals and Rs.10,00,000 for companies provided that
the contributions are made to party funds and not to individuals. In the case of
corporate contributions, the Board of Directors may approve up to say Rs.10,00,000
and anything over this amount may be approved by the shareholders. Political funding
should be a separate head in the accounts and annual reports of the company. This will
ensure transparency. This will be in addition to the existing conditions laid down in the
Companies Act, 1956 for making donations to political parties.
4.35.3 The law should contain provisions for making both donors and donees of
political funds accountable. The Government should encourage the corporate
bodies and agencies to establish an electoral trust which should be able to
finance political parties on an equitable basis at the time of elections.
4.35.4 Audited political party accounts like the accounts of a public limited
company should be published yearly with full disclosures under predetermined
account heads.
Election Returns
4.36
The proposed law should provide for immediate de-recognition of the party
Political parties should in their rules and regulations provide for establishing
some institutional mechanism for planning, thinking and research on crucial socioeconomic issues facing the nation and educational cells for socializing their party cadres
and preparing them for responsibilities of governance.
Leadership Conventions
4.38
Parties
should
seriously
consider
adopting
the
leadership
convention
system. This would have the advantage first, of making the leadership election process
more open, democratic and federal. Second, the people will know in advance of the
prospective Prime ministerial candidates. Third, it would introduce a nationally
aggregative mechanism in major parties and curb the tendency of regionalisation and
fragmentation. If the national convention is found too expensive, a series of staggered
State conventions may be held by major parties with their respective slates of
candidates (common for all the States in one party). This will go a long way in making
parties aggregative and thus more functional in a parliamentary federal system of
governance.
[1]
See also the Consultation Papers on Review of the Working of Political Parties specially in
relation to Elections and Reform Options and Review of Election Law, Processes and Reform Options
released by the Commission in Volume II (Book 1).
[1] See Volume II (Book 1) of the Report.