Case: 1:09-cv-06506 Document #: 7 Filed: 11/18/09 Page 1 of 12 PageID #:31

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
LOREINA C. BROWN
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF CHICAGO, Chicago Police Officer
ADRIAN VIVANCO, #17269, Chicago Police
Officer G. HABIAK, #9921, Chicago Police
Officer R. JOHNSON, #17034,
Defendants.

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No. 09 C 6506

Judge Milton I. Shadur

Magistrate Jeffrey E. Cole

Jury Demand

CORRECTED FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

JURISDICTION
1. The jurisdiction of the court is invoked pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
1983; the judicial code, 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1343(a); the Constitution of the United States; and
pendent jurisdiction as provided under 28 U.S.C. 1367(a).
PARTIES
2. Plaintiff Loreina C. Brown is an African American resident of the City of Chicago,
Illinois.
3. Defendant Chicago Police Officers Adrian Vivanco, G. Habiak and R. Johnson were,
at the time of this occurrence, duly appointed Chicago Police officers. Defendants Vivanco,
Habiak and Johnson engaged in the conduct complained of while they were on duty and in the
course and scope of their employment with the City of Chicago.
4. At all times material to this complaint, defendant police officers Vivanco, Habiak and

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Johnson were acting under color of state law, ordinance, and/or regulation. Each is sued in his
individual capacity.
5. Defendant City of Chicago is a municipal corporation, duly incorporated under the
laws of the State of Illinois, is the employer and principal of the defendant police officers, and is
responsible for the policies, practices and customs of its Police Department, City Council, Office
of Professional Standards, and Police Board.
FACTS
6. On October 19, 2008, Plaintiff Loreina Brown was seated in a parked car with her
boyfriend Darrell Guy at 8137 S. Emerald Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.
7. Defendants Vivanco, Habiak and Johnson approached Mr. Guy and Plaintiff in the car
and demanded Mr. Guy, who was seated in the drivers side of the vehicle, to exit.
8. Mr. Guy complied with the defendant officers request, exited the vehicle, and was
taken behind the vehicle and searched by defendant Johnson.
9. While Mr. Guy was being searched, defendant Vivanco demanded Plaintiff to exit the
car.
10. Plaintiff questioned why she needed to the exit the car, but she proceeded to do so
and was removing items from her lap in order to exit the car.
11. While Plaintiff was in the process of getting out of her car, defendant Vivanco tightly
grabbed her arm causing her pain.
12. Plaintiff asked defendant Vivanco why he was grabbing her arm so hard.
13. In response to this question, defendant Vivanco punched her in the right eye causing
her to fall to the ground in pain.
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14. Defendants Vivanco and Habiak hit Plaintiff while she was curled up on the ground.
15. Defendant Johnson was standing nearby as this happened, and despite having the
opportunity and duty to intervene, failed to protect the Plaintiff.
16. Defendant Habiak then put his knee in Plaintiffs back and pulled her arms behind
her back causing her pain.
17. Defendants Vivanco and Habiak handcuffed Plaintiff behind her back, stood her up
and bent her over a vehicle where she was subjected to a search by a female officer who arrived
on the scene.
18. Plaintiff was transported to the 6th District of the Chicago Police Department where
she was given medical treatment by paramedics for injuries to the right side of her face.
19. Plaintiff was then transported to the 5th District, but the lockup keepers refused to
accept her at the facility due to her injuries and she was then transported to Roseland Hospital for
medical treatment.
20. Plaintiff was transported back to the 5th District where she was held until she released
on an I-bond.
21. Plaintiff was ultimately detained in police custody for approximately twelve hours.
22. The individual defendants officers falsely and maliciously charged Plaintiff with two
counts of Resisting or Obstructing a Peace Officer in violation of 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a), Battery in
violation of 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a) and Possession of Cannabis in violation of 720 ILCS 555/4-a of
the Illinois Criminal Code.
23. The individual defendants officers made out false and incomplete official reports and
gave a false and incomplete version of the events to their superiors claiming Plaintiff physically
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attacked and resisted them, then fell on her face, in order to cover up their own misconduct,
which included their excessive force and harassment of Plaintiff.
24. As a result of the false charges filed by the individual defendant officers, Plaintiff
was compelled to retain an attorney, attend numerous court dates requiring her to miss work and
defend herself at trial.
25. After all of the parties testified in the criminal proceeding, Plaintiff was acquitted of
all charges and the criminal case was terminated in her favor on April 24, 2009.
26. As a direct and proximate result of these individual defendant officers actions,
Plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer, inter alia, bodily injury, pain, suffering, severe mental
distress, fear, anguish, humiliation, loss of liberty, and medical and legal expenses.
COUNT I
[42 U.S.C. 1983 Claim for Excessive Force/Failure to Intervene]
27. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 26.
28. The acts of defendants Vivanco, Habiak and Johnson grabbing, punching and striking
Plaintiff and/or in failing to prevent said abuse violated Plaintiffs rights under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution to be secure in her person, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, and her right to due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and thus violated 42 U.S.C. 1983.
29. The actions of defendants Vivanco, Habiak and Johnson were the direct and
proximate cause of the violations of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights, her injuries, mental
suffering, anguish and humiliation, loss of personal freedom, and expenses, as set forth more
fully above.

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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands substantial actual or compensatory damages against

defendants Vivanco, Habiak and Johnson and because they acted maliciously, wantonly, or
oppressively, punitive damages, plus the costs of this action, plus attorneys fees and such other
and additional relief as this Court deems equitable and just.
COUNT II
[42 U.S.C. 1983 Claim for False Arrest and Detention]
30. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 26.
31. The actions of defendants Vivanco, Habiak and Johnson in falsely arresting,
detaining and causing Plaintiff to be searched on October 18, 2008, without probable cause,
violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, and thus
violated 42 U.S.C. 1983.
32. The actions of defendants Vivanco, Habiak and Johnson were the direct and
proximate cause of the violations of Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights, injuries, mental
suffering, anguish, humiliation, loss of personal freedom, and expenses, as set forth more fully
above.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, Plaintiff demands substantial actual or
compensatory damages, and because defendants Vivanco, Habiak and Johnson acted maliciously,
wantonly, or oppressively, punitive damages, plus the costs of this action, plus attorneys fees
and such other and additional costs.
COUNT III
[42 U.S.C. 1983 Monell Policy Claim Against Defendant City of Chicago]

33. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 32.

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34. The actions of defendants Vivanco, Habiak and Johnson, as alleged above, were done
pursuant to one or more interrelated de facto policies, practices and/or customs of the City of
Chicago, its police department, its Police Board, its O.P.S., I.A.D. and I.P.R.A., its Personnel
Division, and/or its Superintendents of police.
35. At all times material to this complaint the defendant City and its police department,
police Superintendents, O.P.S., I.A.D. and I.P.R.A., Personnel Division and/or Police Board had
interrelated de facto policies, practices, and customs which included, inter alia, a) the failure to
properly hire, train, supervise, discipline, transfer, monitor, counsel and otherwise control police
officers who commit acts of excessive force; and/or b) the police code of silence; and/or c)
encouragement of wrongful arrests, prosecutions, and imprisonments.
36. The policy, practice, and custom of a police code of silence results in police officers
refusing to report instances of police misconduct of which they are aware, despite their obligation
under police regulations to do so, and also includes police officers either remaining silent or
giving false and misleading information during official investigations in order to protect
themselves or fellow officers from internal discipline, civil liability, or criminal charges, and to
perjure themselves in criminal cases where they and their fellow officers have used excessive
force and coercively or otherwise unconstitutionally interrogated a suspect, arrestee or witness, or
falsely arrested, imprisoned and prosecuted a criminal defendant.
37. The fact that the aforementioned code of silence exists, and that its adverse impact is
allowed to occur through the actions and inactions of high ranking police officials including
police Superintendents and O.P.S. Directors, is also evidenced by the fact that while former
Superintendent Martin, former O.P.S. Director Fogel, Mayor Richard M. Daley and former
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O.P.S. Director Shines have all acknowledged publicly that they are aware of the existence of the
custom and practice of a police code of silence, they have not acted to eliminate the code or to
counteract its impact on police discipline, the use of excessive force, fabrication of evidence and
false arrests and prosecutions.
38. The de facto policies, practices and customs of failing to hire, train, supervise,
monitor, discipline, counsel and control, police misconduct, the code of silence and the
encouragement of false arrests and prosecutions are interrelated and exacerbate the effects of
each other, to, in the words of former O.P.S. Director Fogel, "institutionalize police lying" and
"immunize police officers from discipline.
39. Additionally, that the unconstitutional actions of the defendants were part of a
widespread municipal policy, practice and custom is further established by the involvement in,
and ratification of, these acts by municipal supervisors and policymakers, including, but not
limited to, Mayor Richard Daley and Chicago Police Department Superintendents, as well as by a
wide range of other police officials, officers, and divisions of the Department, including its
Internal Affairs Division, the Detective Division, and the Public Affairs Section. This
involvement, and ratification is further demonstrated, inter alia, by the public statements of these
policymaking officials, and the Departments total failure to investigate the unconstitutional
conduct of the defendants, or to discipline them, in this and/or other cases, for their
unconstitutional conduct.
40. The aforementioned policies, practices and/or customs of failing to hire, supervise,
discipline, monitor, transfer, counsel, and control, police misconduct, the police code of silence,
and the encouragement of false arrests, imprisonments, prosecutions, and convictions, separately
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and together, proximately caused injury to the Plaintiff in this case, inter alia, because defendants
had good reason to believe that their misconduct would not be revealed or reported by fellow
officers or their supervisors, that their denials would go unchallenged by these supervisors and
fellow officers, from the police Superintendents, Police Board, and Directors of O.P.S. on down,
and that they were effectively immune from disciplinary action, thereby protecting them from the
consequences of their unconstitutional conduct.
41. But for the belief that each of them would be protected, both by fellow officers and
by the department, from serious career consequences, defendants Vivanco, Habiak and Johnson
would not have engaged in the conduct that resulted in the injuries to the Plaintiff. Specifically,
defendant Vivanco has repeatedly been accused of engaging in acts of excessive force. Upon
information and belief, he has not been promptly and adequately disciplined for such egregious
misconduct.
42. Said interrelated policies, practices and customs, as set forth above, both individually
and together, were maintained and implemented with deliberate indifference, and encouraged the
defendants to commit the aforesaid acts against Plaintiff and therefore acted as the moving force
and were, separately and together, direct and proximate causes of said constitutional violations,
and injuries to Plaintiff.
43. Additionally, said failure to properly hire, train, supervise, discipline, monitor,
control, counsel, and transfer defendants Vivanco, Habiak and Johnson, was also done with
deliberate indifference and likewise acted as a direct and proximate cause of the injuries to
Plaintiff.
44. These policies, practices and customs encouraged, inter alia, police misconduct,
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including, but not limited to, excessive force, the fabrication of evidence, the intimidation of
witnesses, and the making of false statements and reports, and were, separately and together, the
moving force and a direct and proximate cause of the unconstitutional acts and perjury
committed by defendants Vivanco, Habiak and Johnson, in this case and the injuries sustained by
Plaintiff.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against defendant City of Chicago for
substantial compensatory damages, plus costs and attorneys fees and whatever additional relief
this Court finds equitable and just.
COUNT IV
[Pendent State Law Claim for False Arrest and Imprisonment]
45. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 26.
46. The arrest, detention and imprisonment of Plaintiff, without probable cause,
individually, jointly, and in conspiracy by defendants Vivanco, Habiak and Johnson constituted
the torts of false arrest and imprisonment under Illinois law.
47. Defendants actions in arresting and imprisoning Plaintiff were willful and wanton.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands substantial actual or compensatory damages against
defendants Vivanco, Habiak and Johnson, punitive damages, and such other and additional relief
as this Court deems just and equitable.
COUNT V
[Pendent State Law Claim for Assault and Battery]
48. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 26.
49. The acts of defendants Vivanco, Habiak and Johnson as set forth above constituted
assault and battery under the laws of the State of Illinois. Further, such acts directly and
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proximately caused Plaintiffs injuries, pain and suffering, and severe emotional distress as
alleged above.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff seeks substantial compensatory damages against defendants
Vivanco, Habiak and Johnson. Additionally, because defendants Vivanco, Habiak and Johnson
acted maliciously, wilfully, wantonly, or oppressively, Plaintiff demands punitive damages from
defendant Vivanco, Habiak and Johnson. Plaintiff also demands costs and whatever additional
relief this Court deems equitable and just.
COUNT VI
[Pendent State Law Claim for Malicious Prosecution]
50. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 26.
51. The acts of defendants Vivanco, Habiak and Johnson in creating a false story, and
falsely arresting Plaintiff without probable cause, thereby causing her to lose her liberty, to be
criminally prosecuted without probable cause, and to suffer emotional distress, constituted the
tort of malicious prosecution under the laws of the State of Illinois.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands substantial actual or compensatory damages against
defendants Vivanco, Habiak and Johnson and, because they acted maliciously, wilfully,
wantonly, or oppressively, punitive damages, plus the costs of this action and such other and
additional relief as this Court deems equitable and just.
COUNT VII
[Pendent State Law Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress]
52. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 52.
53. The conduct and actions of defendants Vivanco, Habiak and Johnson, as set forth
above, were extreme and outrageous, were done intentionally, wilfully and wantonly, and/or
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knowing there was a high probability that their conduct would cause Plaintiff severe emotional
distress as set forth above.
54. As a direct and proximate result of defendants Vivanco, Habiak and Johnsons
extreme and outrageous conduct, Plaintiff was injured and experienced severe emotional distress
constituting intentional infliction of emotional distress under Illinois State law.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands substantial actual or compensatory damages against
defendants Vivanco, Habiak and Johnson and such other and additional relief as this Court
deems just.
COUNT VIII
[Claim for Respondeat Superior Against Defendant City of Chicago]
55. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 26 and 45 through 54.
56. Defendants Vivanco, Habiak and Johnson were, at all times material to this
complaint, employees and agents of the defendant City of Chicago, were acting within the scope
of their employment, and their acts which violated state law are directly chargeable to the
defendant City of Chicago under state law pursuant to respondeat superior.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demand judgment for substantial compensatory damages against
the City of Chicago, plus the costs of this action and whatever additional relief this Court deems
equitable and just.
COUNT IX
[745 ILCS 10/9-102 Claim Against Defendant City of Chicago]
57. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 56.
58. Defendant City of Chicago was the employer of defendants Vivanco, Habiak and
Johnson at all times relevant to this complaint.
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59. Defendants Vivanco, Habiak and Johnson committed the acts alleged above under
color of law and in the scope of their employment as employees of the City of Chicago.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, pursuant to 745 ILCS 10/9-102, demands judgment against the
Defendant City of Chicago in the amount awarded to the Plaintiff against any and all defendants
as damages, attorneys fees, costs and interest, and/or for any settlement entered into between the
Plaintiff and any defendant and for whatever additional relief this Court deems equitable and just.

Respectfully submitted,
Dated: November 18, 2009
/s/ Joey L. Mogul
JOEY L. MOGUL
G. FLINT TAYLOR
PEOPLES LAW OFFICE
1180 N. Milwaukee
Chicago, IL 60642
773/235-0070
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Plaintiff demands trial by jury

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