CASE NO.

6 OF 50
ANTONIO M. SERRANO
VS.
GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC.
FACTS:
Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow
Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months, as Chief Officer. On
the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract upon
the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end of April
1998.Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer. Upon complaint filed by
Serrano before the Labor Arbiter , the dismissal was declared illegal.On appeal, the NLRC modified the
Labor Arbiter decision based on the provision of RA 8042. Serrano filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of the last clause in the 5th paragraph of
Section 10 of RA 8042 for violating the non-impairment clause.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on non-impairment of
contracts.
HELD:
The answer is in the negative.\The subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that
it impinges on the impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the
State to regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs,
with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may
be employed. However, the subject clauses violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18,
Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT

Facts:
RA 9369 is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 and House Bill No. 5352 passed by the Senate on 7

December 2006 and the House of Representatives on 19 December 2006.On 23 January 2007, less than
four months before the 14 May 2007 local elections.

On 7 May 2007, petitioner, a duly accredited multi-sectoral organization, filed this petition for prohibition
alleging that RA 9369 violated Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution. Petitioner also assails the
constitutionality of Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 of RA 9369.According to petitioner, these provisions are of
questionable application and doubtful validity for failing to comply with the provisions of the
Constitution.

Issue:
WON Section 34 OF RA 9369 violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on non-impairment of
contracts

Ruling:
The petition is denied .RA 9369 is constitutional. The Office of the Solicitor General argues that
petitioner erroneously invoked the non-impairment clause because this only applies to previously
perfected contracts. In this case, there is no perfected contact and, therefore, no obligation will be
impaired. Both the COMELEC and the OSG argue that the law is a proper exercise of police power and it
will prevail over a contract. The OSG further argues that the assurance that the poll watchers will receive
fair and equitable compensation promotes the general welfare. The OSG also states that this was a
reasonable regulation considering that the dominant majority and minority parties will secure a copy of
the election returns and are given the right to assign poll watchers inside the polling precincts.
SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR 164815

February 22, 2008

FACTS:
Petitioner Valeroso was charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under PD
No. 1866. On May 6, 1998 trial court found petitioner guilty as charged and sentenced him
to suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum plus fine. RA 8294 amended PD
1866 on July 6, 1997, during the pendency of the case with the trial court, took effect.
Petitioner moved to reconsider but his motion was denied. He appealed to the Court of
Appeals. On May 4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed the RTC disposition. SC affirmed
Court of Appeals decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not retroactive application of the law is valid.
HELD:
YES. RA 8294 amended PD 1866 on July 6, 1997, during the pendency of the case with the
trial court. The law looks forward, never backward (prospectivity).Lex prospicit, non

respicit. A new law has a prospective, not retroactive, effect. However, penal laws that favor
a guilty person, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive effect.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

FACTS:
On April 4, 2001, Information for plunder was filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent Estrada, among other accused. A
separate Information for illegal use of alias, was likewise filed against him for using JOSE VELARDE in several transactions
and use and employ the said alias Jose Velarde which Is neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing
documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities. Estrada alleged R.A. No. 9160 the Anti-Money

Laundering Ac, which prohibits the opening of accounts under fictitious names is an ex post facto
law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the application of R.A. No. 9160 in this case is an ex post facto law.
HELD:

Yes, the Supreme Court stated that Anti-Money Laundering Act, which was enacted after Estradas
alleged use of an alias in opening the trust account, cannot be applied to Estrada. An indictment
against Estrada using this relatively recent law cannot be maintained without violating the
constitutional prohibition on the enactment and use of ex post facto laws. R.A. No. 9160, as a law of
recent vintage in relation to the indictment against Estrada, cannot be a source or an influencing
factor in his indictment. The enactment of R.A. No.9160, on the other hand, is a significant
development only because it clearly manifests that prior to its enactment, numbered accounts or
anonymous accounts were permitted banking transactions, whether they be allowed by law or by a
mere banking regulation.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. ANTONIO M. EUGENIO

545 SCRA 384 (2008)

FACTS:
A series of investigation concerning the award of the NAIA 3 contracts to PIATCO were undertaken by the
Ombudsman and the compliance and Investigation Staff (CIS) of Anti-Money Laundering Council. The
CIS conducted an intelligence database search on the financial transactions of certain individuals. The
search revealed that Alvarez maintained 8 bank accounts with 6 different banks. Special Prosecutor of the
Ombudsman wrote a letter requesting AMLC to investigate the accounts of Alvarez et al, which AMLC
likewise heeded. Again, AMLC filed an application, this time with RTC Manila, to inquire into and/or

examine 13 accounts and 2 related webs of accounts allegedly having been used to facilitate corruption in
NAIA 3 Project. RTC stayed the order but soon after, reinstated the same. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Anti Money Laundering Act ( AMLA) as means of inquiring into the records of
transaction prior to its passage would be violative of the ex post facto clause.

HELD:
Yes. the Anti Money Laundering Act ( AMLA) as means of inquiring into the records of transaction prior to
its passage would be violative of the ex post facto clause. The transaction already in place when AMLA
was passed are indeed exempt from scrutiny through a bank inquiry order, but it cannot yield any
interpretation that records of transactions undertaken after the enactment of the AMLA are similarly
exempt.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. SIMEON. FERRER

Facts:
Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA 1700 or the AntiSubversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion
against the following: 1.)Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers,
subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others,
for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow
the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men,
Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of
the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any
forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by
being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness.

Issue: Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law.

Held:
The Court holds the validity Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957. A bill of attainder is solely a
legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial
determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a
bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) the statute specifies persons,
groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. In the case at bar,
the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to

the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The
Acts focus is on the conduct not person.

FLORENTINA A. LOZANO vs. THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ

Facts:
Petitioners were charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Check Law).
They moved seasonably to quash the information on the ground that the acts charged did
not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by
the respondent trial courts, except in one case, wherein the trial court declared the law
unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected thus appealed.

Issue: Whether or not BP 22 is violative of the constitutional provision on nonimprisonment due to debt

Held:
The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The gravamen of the offense
punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is
dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an
obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to
pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making
of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the
public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an
offense against property, but an offense against public order.

SEGIFREDO L. ACLARACION, petitioner,

64 SCRA 131

May 26 1975

Facts:
Petitioner was assigned as a temporary stenographer in the Gapan branch of the CFI Nueva
Ecija. After he had ceased to be a court stenographer, the
required him to
transcribe his stenographic notes in two cases decided by Gapan Court which had been
appealed. Because of his failure to comply with the resolutions of the Court of Appeals, he

was declared in contempt of the court. Arrested and incarcerated until he could submit a
complete transcript of his noted in the said cases. Petitioner contends that to compel him to
transcribe his stenographic notes after he ceased to be a court stenographer would
transgress the rule against involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a
punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted . Hence, he
filed his petition in forma pauperis.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners right against involuntary servitude was violated.

Held:
No. Involuntary Servitude denotes a condition of enforced, compulsory service of
one to another or the condition of one who is compelled by force, coercion, or
imprisonment and against his will, to labor for another,whether he is paid or not. That
situation does not obtain in this case. The traditional mode of exercising the court's
coercive power is to hold the recalcitrant or negligent stenographer in contempt of
court if he does not comply with the order for the transcription of his notes and imprison him
until he obeys the order (Sec. 7, Rule 71, Rules of Court). Another sanction to compel the
transcription is to hold in abeyance the transfer, promotion, resignation or clearance of a
stenographer until he completes the transcription of his notes. This is provided for in Circular
No. 63 of the Secretary of Justice. In the instant case, Aclaracion transcribed his notes
in the Muncal and Paderes cases while he was an employee of the Insurance
Commission. During the time that he made the transcription, he received his salary as such
employee.