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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS


FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-4043

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,


Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
SHANNON CAVE,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Roanoke. James C. Turk, Senior District
Judge. (7:03-cr-00157-jct)

Submitted:

September 27, 2006

Decided:

October 27, 2006

Before NIEMEYER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior


Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Onzlee Ware, WARE & HILL, L.L.P., Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant.
John L. Brownlee, United States Attorney, R. Andrew Bassford,
Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.


See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:
Shannon

Cave

appeals

his

conviction

by

jury

for

possession with intent to distribute more than fifty grams of


cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) (2000).
district court sentenced Cave to life imprisonment.

The

On appeal,

Caves attorney filed a formal brief, raising two grounds of error.


Cave then filed a pro se motion to strike the formal brief and a
motion for leave to file a pro se supplemental brief.

We have

considered

pro

the

claims

supplemental brief.

in

the

formal

brief

and

the

se

Finding no merit to the claims, we affirm.

First, Cave challenges the sufficiency of the evidence


against him.

A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the

evidence faces a heavy burden.

See United States v. Beidler, 110

F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1997).

In reviewing a sufficiency

challenge, [t]he verdict of a jury must be sustained if there is


substantial

evidence,

taking

the

view

most

favorable

to

the

Government, to support it. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60,


80 (1942).

This court ha[s] defined substantial evidence, in

the context of a criminal action, as that evidence which a


reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient
to support a conclusion of a defendants guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.

United States v. Newsome, 322 F.3d 328, 333 (4th Cir.

2003) (quoting United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir.
1996)).

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Cave claims the evidence was insufficient because the


evidence does not show he had knowledge that a box he dropped from
a window contained cocaine, or that he intended to distribute the
cocaine.

However, taken in the light most favorable to the

Government, there was ample evidence to convict Cave.

This court

will uphold the jurys verdict if there is substantial evidence to


support it, and will reverse only in those rare cases where the
prosecutions

failure

is

clear.

Beidler,

110

F.3d

(quoting Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17 (1978)).

at

1067

Trooper

Brannock saw Cave drop the box later determined to contain cocaine
base out of a bathroom window.

Sherwood Barksdale, a prisoner

subsequently incarcerated with Cave, testified that Cave admitted


that he transported the cocaine base to the residence and had
dropped it out the bathroom window.

Finally, a Government expert

testified that the amount and packaging of the cocaine base in the
box was consistent with distribution and inconsistent with personal
use.

We find that viewing all the evidence together, there was

more than sufficient evidence for a reasonable finder of fact to


conclude that Cave was guilty.
Cave also argues the district court erred when it denied
his motion for a new trial based on the perjured testimony of
fellow prisoner Jesse Hairston. Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal
Rules

of

Criminal

Procedure,

district

court

may

grant

defendants motion for a new trial if the interest of justice so

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requires.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a).

A district court should

exercise its discretion to grant a new trial sparingly, and . . .


should do so only when the evidence weighs heavily against the
verdict.

United States v. Perry, 335 F.3d 316, 320 (4th Cir.

2003) (quoting United States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 237 (4th Cir.
1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).

This court reviews the

denial of a Rule 33 motion for abuse of discretion.

United States

v. Adam, 70 F.3d 776, 779 (4th Cir. 1995).


Cave contends that he has met the standard for a new
trial under the Larrison rule.

See Larrison v. United States, 24

F.2d 82, 87-88 (7th Cir. 1928), overruled by United States v.


Mitrione,

357

F.3d

probability test).

712

(7th

Cir.

2004)

(adopting

reasonable

According to that standard--which has been the

test employed in this Circuit--the district court may grant a new


trial following the recantation of a government witness testimony
if the court is reasonably well satisfied that:

(1) the

testimony given by a material witness is false, (2) without it


the jury might have reached a different conclusion, and (3) the
party seeking the new trial was taken by surprise when the false
testimony was given and was unable to meet it or did not know of
its falsity until after the trial.

United States v. Wallace, 528

F.2d 863, 866 (4th Cir. 1976) (quoting Larrison, 24 F.2d at 87-88).
See also United States v. Lofton, 233 F.3d 313, 318 (4th Cir.
2000).

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We

find

that

the

district

court

did

not

abuse

its

discretion in denying Caves motion for a new trial because Cave


cannot

satisfy

the

second

prong

under

Larrison.

Hairstons

testimony was simply cumulative of the testimony given by inmate


Barksdale.

Even without Hairstons testimony, the uncontroverted

evidence is that Trooper Brannock saw Cave drop the box of cocaine
base from the bathroom window, and Cave admitted his conduct to
Barksdale.
In his pro se supplemental brief, Cave alleges that the
trial court erred by failing to inquire into his prior convictions
as required by 21 U.S.C. 851 (2000).

Cave contends that the

district court incorrectly added one point to his criminal history


score by adding one point for his state conviction for conspiracy
to possess with intent to distribute marijuana in the fourth
degree.

Cave contends that this prior conviction does not qualify

as a felony drug offense.

Cave argues that he would have

corrected the courts alleged error had the court asked him about
the prior conviction at the sentencing hearing.

Finally, Cave

argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the
issue at trial.
Because Cave raises the 851 issue for the first time on
appeal, it is reviewed for plain error.

The procedure set forth in

851(b) provides the defendant with a full and fair opportunity


to establish that he is not the previously convicted individual or

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that the conviction is an inappropriate basis for enhancement.


United States v. Ellis, 326 F.3d 593, 599 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting
United States v. Campbell, 980 F.2d 245, 252 (4th Cir. 1992)).
Even if the district court does not act in strict compliance with
851, on plain error review, Cave must prove that the error
actually affected the outcome of the proceedings.

Ellis, 326

F.3d at 599 (quoting United States v. Hastings, 134 F.3d 235, 240
(4th Cir. 1998)).
We find Cave fails to demonstrate any error committed by
the district court that affected the outcome of the sentencing
proceeding.

Prior to the sentencing, Cave received notice of the

precise conviction that would form the basis for his enhancement.
The court asked defense counsel whether he and Cave had read the
presentence report and whether there were any objections to it.
Counsel answered that they had discussed it and there were no
objections.

In addition, we have reviewed the district courts

criminal history calculation and find the court did not err.

As a

result, Cave cannot demonstrate prejudice with respect to the 851


claim

or

an

ineffective

assistance

of

counsel

claim.

See

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).


For these reasons, we deny Caves motion to strike the
formal brief filed by his attorney, grant Caves motion to file a
pro

se

supplemental

sentence.

brief,

and

affirm

Caves

conviction

and

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

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legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before


the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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