ARTHUR and LEONORA STILGROVE, Complainants, versus Clerk of Court

ERIBERTO R. SABAS and Sheriff III ERNESTO SIMPLICIANO, Respondents., A.M.

No. P-06-2257 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 01-1212-P], 2008 March 28, 2nd
Division

Tinga, J.:
In a Resolution[1] issued on 29 November 2006, the Court resolved the
administrative complaint against respondents Eriberto Sabas, retired[2] clerk
of court and ex officio sheriff of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), 4th Judicial
Region, Puerto Princesa City, and Ernesto Simpliciano, now deceased,[3]
former deputy sheriff of the same court, finding Sabas guilty of grave abuse
of authority and conduct unbecoming a court personnel while dismissing the
complaint against Simpliciano. Sabas Motion for Reconsideration[4] was
partially granted in a Resolution dated 29 May 2007 thereby clarifying the
penalty imposable upon him. The dispositive part of the latter resolution
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Eriberto Sabas, former Clerk
of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Municipal Trial Court of Puerto Princesa
City, Palawan, is found GUILTY of Grave Abuse of Authority and Conduct
Unbecoming of a Court Personnel, and accordingly FINED in an amount
equivalent to his salary for six (6) months plus the amount corresponding to
fifteen (15) days of leave credits, deductible from his retirement pay.
The charges of grave abuse of authority and conduct unbecoming a court
officer against Ernesto Simpliciano, former Deputy Sheriff of the Municipal
Trial Court of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
The charge of violation of Sections 3(a), 3(e) and 4(b) of Republic Act No.
3019 against Eriberto Sabas and Ernesto Simpliciano is REFERRED to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa City for
investigation, report and recommendation on respondents administrative
liability within sixty (60) days from receipt of the record.
SO ORDERED.

The matter is again before us on account of the completion of the

investigation conducted by Perfecto E. Pe, Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Puerto Princesa City, the results of which are contained in his
Report and Recommendation[5] dated 24 August 2007.
The necessary factual background is supplied by the narration of facts in the
Courts 29 November 2006 Resolution, which we again adopt:
In 1994, Geronimo Gacot filed a detainer suit (subsequently amended into an
action for recovery of possession of a parcel of land) against Joaquin Montero
and Emilio Batul with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Puerto Princesa City.
The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 1311, involved Lot No. 18553, the lot
adjacent to the land occupied and possessed by the spouses Stilgrove.
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 1311, Lot No. 18553 was sold to
Cresencia de los Santos, who was able to secure Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 162460 in her name. Eventually, the MTC rendered a decision in favor of
Gacot, who had, upon his death, been already substituted by his heirs,
represented by Francisca Gacot-Latube.
The decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 1311 was affirmed on appeal by
Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan on 8
January 2001.
xxxx
A writ of execution was subsequently issued and served on the defendants in
Civil Case No. 1311. Instead of complying with the order for them to vacate
the premises subject of the litigation within three (3) working days, the
defendants remained on the land and even built new structures on Lot No.
18553. Thus, Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan issued a Special Order for
Demolition on 30 April 2001, which commanded the Ex-Officio Sheriff and/or
Deputy Sheriff:
x x x to cause the demolition of all structures including fences built or
erected by defendants or any other persons claiming rights under such
defendants within the premises forming part of plaintiffs property. The
demolition shall immediately be carried out after giving them a reasonable
period of up to 10 [ten] days from receipt of this Order to voluntarily
demolish any structure they built within the premises.

On 18 May 2001, respondents Sabas, being then the Clerk of Court and ExOfficio Sheriff of the MTC, and Simpliciano, then the Deputy Sheriff of the
same court, with a demolition team, proceeded to execute the demolition
order. The demolition team proceeded to demolish the houses of defendants
Joaquin Montero and Emilio Batul. Upon being asked by Arthur Stilgrove,
respondent Sabas confirmed that the demolition will include a portion of Lot
No. 18556 which was then occupied and possessed by the former. Arthur
Stilgrove thereafter demanded that the demolition team desist from carrying
out the demolition. Notwithstanding Stilgroves protestations, the demolition
continued to include a fence and a portion of Stilgroves house which was
built on Lot No. 18556. Thereafter, on 21 May 2001, respondent Sabas
executed a Return of Service.
The two respondents demolition of the fence and one-half of the house of
the complainant spouses as well as respondent Sabass shouting at
complainant Arthur Stilgrove the words: Return to (his) country, for (he) is
not welcome here!, prompted the complainants to file this administrative
case against respondents. As mentioned at the outset, another complaint
was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and docketed as OMB-1-010668-H (for violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) and Section 4(b) of Republic Act
No. 3019), entitled Arthur Stilgrove, et. al v. Eriberto Sabas, et. al.
In their Joint Comment dated 10 September 2001, respondents prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint and raised the defense that they demolished
the fence and one-half of the house of the complainants by virtue of the
Special Order for Demolition issued by Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan in Civil
Case No. 1311. Respondents alleged that the markers that were placed along
the boundary line of Lot No. 18553 were placed at the surveyors own
initiative based on a relocation survey conducted by a licensed geodetic
engineer. Respondents also maintained that the Stilgroves were mere
trespassers or squatters with respect to a 10-meter wide encroachment
made on Lot No. 18553 by Lot No. 18556 as determined by the same
relocation survey, and as such were bound by the judgment in Civil Case No.
1311.[6]
The Court in its aforequoted 29 May 2007 Resolution referred the case to
Judge Pe for further investigation of respondents alleged violations of
Section 3(a), 3(e) and 4(b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (hereinafter referred to as Sections 3(a), 3(e) or
4(b) for brevity). This was done because the complaint on these grounds was
not acted upon either by the investigating judge or the Office of the Court

Administrator in the previous proceedings. Hence, an investigation ensued,

the results of which are now the focus of the instant resolution.
During the initial hearing for the second investigation, complainants and
respondents jointly manifested that the evidence submitted in the preceding
administrative case would be used in the evaluation of the instant case. Both
parties opted to submit their respective position papers after which, the
investigation was terminated.
Complainants Position Paper[7] accuses respondents of having violated R.A.
No. 3019 for allowing themselves to be influenced and induced by De Los
Santos and Gacot-Latube.
Respondents Position Paper[8] alleges that the execution of the writ of
demolition was made on the basis of the boundary monuments indicated in
the relocation survey plan. Since a portion of complainants property was
erected on the land forming part of the surveyed property, it was therefore
included in the demolition. Respondents claim that in order to be liable under
Sections 3(a) and (e), the act of the accused must be done in bad faith,
which is not attendant in this case.
In his Report and Recommendation, the investigating judge absolved Sabas
from violation of Section 3(a), finding that there was no evidence pointing
Sabas to have persuaded or induced or influenced other public officer to
perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulation or allowed
himself to be persuaded, induced or influenced to commit such violation or
offense.
As for Sabass liability under Section 3(e), the investigating judge
exculpated him therefrom, citing Zoomzat, Inc. v. People of the Philippines,
[9] and held that to be liable for the offense under this provision, the
offender must be officers and employees of offices of government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions. Since Sabas was an ex officio sheriff of the Municipal Trial Court
by virtue of his being a clerk of court whose functions do not include the
granting of licenses, permits or concessions, he could not be held liable
under the aforementioned provision.

Lastly, as regards Sabas alleged offense under Section 4(b) which provides
that [i]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any
public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof, the
investigating judge likewise found no basis to hold Sabas liable because
Sabas was actually the one who demolished the property and did not induce
nor cause any public official to commit the offense.
The Report and Recommendation contained no discussion on Simplicianos
liability. As earlier stated, the Court notes that respondent Simpliciano is
already deceased. While it is true that respondents cessation from office by
death does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative case against him
as long as the complaint was filed before the respondents death,[10] it has
been the Courts finding that, aside from Simplicianos mere presence at the
time of the demolition, he did not participate in the actual demolition of
complainants fence and house.[11] Complainants failed to present sufficient
evidence to prove Simplicianos liability for the acts complained of. For this
reason, the Court likewise clears Simpliciano of any liability for the alleged
offenses involved in the second administrative investigation subject of this
Resolution.
Now, we turn to the merits of the complaint with respect to respondent
Sabas.
As can be gleaned from the tenor of complainants position paper,
respondents are charged with violation of Section 3(a) and (e) and Section
4(b) of R.A. No. 3019 for allowing themselves to be influenced and induced
to do the prohibited acts under said provisions.
Section 3(a) states:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers . In addition to acts or omissions
of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officers and are hereby declared to
be unlawful.
(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an
act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by
competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the

latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit

such violation or offense.
Sabas did not induce any public officer to perform an act violating rules and
regulations. Neither was there evidence that Sabas allowed himself to be
influenced or induced to commit the act which became the root cause of
this administrative case. Sabas, on his own volition, committed the acts
complained of. Consequently, there is no reason to find him administratively
liable under the said provision.
Section 4(b) declares as unlawful for any person to knowingly induce or
cause any public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 of
the same law. As it is already the Courts finding that there was no proof of
the alleged inducement to or by respondents, no liability can likewise arise
under this provision.
Section 3(e) declares as unlawful the act of:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices of government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
As aforementioned, the investigating judge interpreted the last sentence of
Section 3(e) as applying only to those officers and employees of government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions. For this reason, Sabas was not held liable under the provision.
The investigating judge cites Zoomzat, Inc. v. People of the Philippines[12]
to support this position.
Admittedly, the Court made a statement in Zoomzat that for one to be held
liable under Section 3(e), he must be an officer or employee of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or
other concessions.[13] The earlier case of Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan,[14]
however, squarely addressed the issue on the proper interpretation of
Section 3(e). In Mejorada, the Court explained that the last sentence of

[[Section] 3](e) is intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and

employees of [offices] or government corporations which, under the ordinary
concept of public officers, may not come within the term, adding that [i]t
is a strained construction of the provision to read it as applying exclusively to
public officers charged with the duty of granting license or permits or other
concessions.[15]
Mejorada was decided by the Court en banc. Following the constitutional
mandate that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a
decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except
by the Court sitting en banc,[16] the case of Zoomzat cannot reverse the
pronouncement in Mejorada, the former case having been decided by a
Division of the Court.
More importantly, the ultimate and undisputed anchor of the decision
in Zoomzat is that the respondents cannot be validly charged under Section
3(e) since the ordinance they enacted is void for being ultra vires, the
authority to grant franchise to operate cable television being lodged in the
National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) and not with the
Sangguniang Panlungsod. To quote the pertinent passages of the Court in
Zoomzat:
Executive Order No. 205 clearly provides that only the NTC could grant
certificates of authority to cable television operators and issue the necessary
implementing rules and regulations. Likewise, Executive Order No. 436,
vests with the NTC the regulation and supervision of cable television industry
in the Philippines.
xxxx
It is undisputed that respondents were not employees of NTC. Instead, they
were charged in their official capacity as members of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Gingoog City. As such, they cannot be charged with violation
of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 for enacting Ordinance No. 19 which granted
Spacelink a franchise to operate a cable television.
xxxx

Indeed, under the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code, the
local government unit can regulate the operation of cable television but only
when it encroaches on public properties, such as the use of public streets,
rights of ways, the founding of structures, and the parceling of large regions.
Beyond these parameters, its acts, such as the grant of the franchise to
Spacelink, would be ultra vires.
Plainly, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Gingoog City overstepped the
bounds of its authority when it usurped the powers of the NTC with the
enactment of Ordinance No. 19. Being a void legislative act, Ordinance No.
19 did not confer any right nor vest any privilege to Spacelink. As such,
petitioner could not claim to have been prejudiced or suffered injury thereby.
Incidentally, petitioners claim of undue injury becomes even more baseless
with the finding that Spacelink did not commence to operate despite the
grant to it of a franchise under Ordinance No. 19.[17]
Thus, according to Zoomzat, when the Sangguniang Panlungsod usurped the
powers of the NTC in enacting an ordinance granting a franchise to a cable
operator, it did not confer any privilege on the grantee and therefore the
complainant in the case was neither prejudiced nor did he suffer from any
injury. Consequently, the Court ruled that the withdrawal of the information
against the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod was correct.
Case law[18] enumerates the elements of Section 3(e), to wit:
(1) The accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy
with the former;
(2) The said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the
performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or her public
positions;
(3) That he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government
or a private party;
(4) Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage
or preference to such parties; and

(5) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
In Santiago v. Garchitorena,[19] the Court held that there are two alternative
ways whereby Section 3(e) may be committed. These are by giving undue
injury to any party including the government or by causing any private party
any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. Sabas did cause undue
injury to complainants. What is to be determined still is whether Sabas acted
with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or with gross inexcusable
negligence.
Manifest partiality has been characterized as "a clear, notorious or plain
inclination or predilection to favor one side rather than the other."[20]
Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the
accused to do wrong or cause damage.[21] Gross inexcusable negligence
has been defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight
care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to
consequences in so far as other persons may be affected.[22] It is the
omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail
to take on their own property.[23] In cases involving public officials, there is
gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.[24]
The sheriffs duty to execute a judgment is ministerial. He need not look
outside the plain meaning of the writ of execution. And when a sheriff is
faced with an ambiguous execution order, prudence and reasonableness
dictate that he seek clarification from a judge.[25] However, Sabas took it
upon himself to execute the order even if it entails the destruction of a
property belonging to a person not a party to the case. By doing so, the
sheriff went beyond the terms of the demolition order as it only ordered the
demolition to apply only to defendants x x x as well as all persons claiming
rights under them x x x. To reiterate our pronouncement in the previous
administrative case, it is of no moment whether Sabas executed the writ in
good faith because he is chargeable with the knowledge of what is the
proper action to observe in case there are questions in the writ which need
to be clarified and to which he is bound to comply.[26]
It is observed, however, that Sabas acts were not sufficiently proven as acts
of ill will against complainants, but are apparently due to his overzealousness
in the performance of his functions, albeit done in a discourteous manner.
Sabas executed the order on the firm belief that his act was correct and in
accordance with law. From these considerations, the negligence displayed by

Sabas was not of such nature and degree as to be considered brazen,

flagrant, and palpable.
Although Sabas is still liable for neglect in the performance of official duties,
it is not of the kind punishable under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
In De la Victoria v. Mongaya,[27] the Court made a similar assessment on
the degree of a respondents liability, which, although admittedly negligent,
the negligence was not of a grave degree warranting the severe penalty of
dismissal. The Court found respondent guilty of simple neglect of duty and
imposed the penalty of suspension for one (1) month.[28] We resolve, that
the same penalty is appropriate for Sabas. However, in view of Sabass
retirement on 17 September 2001,[29] the Court resolves to impose instead
a fine equivalent to his salary for one month, deductible from his retirement
pay.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds Eriberto Sabas, former
Clerk of Court and Ex Officio Sheriff of the Municipal Trial Court of Puerto
Princesa City, Palawan, GUILTY of simple neglect of duty and accordingly
imposes on him a FINE in an amount equivalent to his salary for one month,
to be deducted from his retirement pay.
The charges of violation of Sections 3(a), (e) and 4(b) of Republic Act No.
3019, also known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against
Ernesto Simpliciano, former Deputy Sheriff of the Municipal Trial Court of
Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
[1]Temporary Rollo, pp. 6-27.
[2]Respondent Eriberto Sabas retired on 17 September 2001; Stilgrove v.
Sabas, A.M. No. P-06-2257, 29 November 2006, 508 SCRA 383.
[3]Simpliciano died on 13 January 2002; supra note 2.
[4]Temporary Rollo, pp. 1-4.
[5]Captioned as an Order.
[6]Temporary Rollo, pp. 8-12.
[7]Dated 2 May 2007, rollo, p. 556a.
[8]Dated 12 April 2007, id. at 529.
[9]G.R. No. 135535, 14 February 2005, 451 SCRA 226.
[10]Cabaero v. Judge Caon, 417 Phil. 754, 757 (2001), citing Tuliao v.
Ramos, 348 Phil. 404 (1998) and others.

[11]Supra note 2.
[12]Supra note 9.
[13]Id. at 231.
[14]Nos. L-51065-72, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA 399. This was later reiterated
in Cruz v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 134493, 16 August 2005, 467 SCRA 52.
[15]Supra note 14 at 405.
[16]Art. VIII, Sec. 4(3).
[17]Supra note 9 at 231-232.
[18]Garcia-Rueda v. Amor, 417 Phil. 786, 792 (2001), citing Garcia v.
Ombudsman, 325 SCRA 667, 667-670 (2000). See also General Bank and
Trust Company (GBTC) v. Ombudsman, 381 Phil. 119, 127 (2000), citing
Ingco v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112584, 23 May 1997, 272 SCRA 563, 574.
[19]G.R. No. 109266, 2 December 1993, 228 SCRA 214, 222, reiterated in
Bautista v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 136082, 12 May 2000, 332 SCRA 126.
[20]Reyes v. Atienza, G.R. No. 152243, 23 September 2005, 470 SCRA 670,
683, citing Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 69983, 14 May 1990, 185
SCRA 346.
[21]Supra note 20, citing Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan, id. Citing also Mendiola
v. People, G.R. Nos. 89983-84, 6 March 1992, 207 SCRA 85. While one need
not agree with all his acts or stated reasons therefore or the wisdom thereof,
one cannot say that they were so obviously and palpably sham justifications
for merely arbitrary and capricious acts as to warrant a finding of evident
bad faith.

[22]Id. citing Fernando v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 96182-83, 19 August

1992, 212 SCRA 680.
[23]Fernando v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 96182, 19 August 1992, 212 SCRA
680, 698, citing Alejandro v. People, 170 SCRA 400.
[24]A.M. No. P-00-1436, De la Victoria v. Mongaya, 404 Phil. 609, 620
(2001).
[25]Santos v. Gonzales-Muoz, 436 Phil 22, 33 (2002).
[26]Supra note 2.
[27]404 Phil. 609 (2001).
[28]Civil Service Commission, Resolution No. 991936 (Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service), Rule IV, Section 52.B., par. 1.
[29]Supra note 2.
ARTHUR and LEONORA STILGROVE, Complainants, versus Clerk of Court
ERIBERTO R. SABAS and Sheriff III ERNESTO SIMPLICIANO, Respondents.,
A.M. No. P-06-2257 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 01-1212-P], 2008 Mar 28, 2nd
Division