Ang Tiong V Ting

Lessons Applicable: General Indorser (Negotiable Instrurments)
Laws Applicable: Section 63 of the Negotiable Instruments Law

FACTS:
August 15, 1960: Lorenzo Ting issued Philippine Bank of Communications check K81618, w/ sum of P4,000, payable to "cash or bearer"
o With Felipe Ang's signature (indorsement in blank) at the back thereof, the
instrument was received by the Ang Tiong who presented it to the drawee
bank for payment but it was dishonored
o Ting made a written demand to both Ting and Ang to no avail
March 6, 1962: Municipal Court of Manila favored Tiong against Ting and Ang
CA: ordered Ang to pay with interest
Ang contends that he is an accomodating indorser
ISSUE: W/N Ang is an accomodating indorser and not a general indorser a

HELD: NO. Affirmed
Section 63 of the Negotiable Instruments Law: a person placing his signature upon an
instrument otherwise than as maker, drawer or acceptor = a general indorser,
unless he clearly indicates plaintiff appropriate words his intention to be bound in
some other capacity
o warrants:
(a) that the instrument is genuine and in all respects what it purports to
be;
(b) that he has a good title to it;
(c) that all prior parties have capacity to contract; and
(d) that the instrument is at the time of his indorsement valid and
subsisting
Even on the assumption that the appellant is a mere accommodation party, as he

professes to be, he is by the clear mandate of section 29 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law, "liable on the instrument to a holder for value, notwithstanding that such holder
at the time of taking the instrument knew him to be only an accommodation party."
o It is not a valid defense that the accommodation party did not receive any
valuable consideration when he executed the instrument.
o Nor is it correct to say that the holder for value is not a holder in due course
merely because at the time he acquired the instrument, he knew that the
indorser was only an accommodation party.
assuming him to be an accommodation indorser, may obtain security from the maker
to protect himself against the danger of insolvency of the latter, cannot in any manner
affect his liability to the Tiong, as the said remedy is a matter of concern exclusively
between accommodation indorser and accommodated party.
o The liability of the appellant remains primary and unconditional.
lawphil.net
G.R. No. L-26767

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26767
February 22, 1968
ANG TIONG, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LORENZO TING, doing business under the name and style of PRUNES PRESERVED
MFG., and FELIPE ANG, defendants.
FELIPE ANG, defendant-appellant.
Chipeco & Alcaraz, Jr. for plaintiff-appellee.
Ang, Atienza & Tabora for defendant-appellant.
CASTRO, J.:
On August 15, 1960 Lorenzo Ting issued Philippine Bank of Communications check
K-81618, for the sum of P4,000, payable to "cash or bearer". With Felipe Ang's signature
(indorsement in blank) at the back thereof, the instrument was received by the plaintiff Ang
Tiong who thereafter presented it to the drawee bank for payment. The bank dishonored it.
The plaintiff then made written demands on both Lorenzo Ting and Felipe Ang that they
make good the amount represented by the check. These demands went unheeded; so he filed
in the municipal court of Manila an action for collection of the sum of P4,000, plus P500
attorney's fees. On March 6, 1962 the municipal court adjudged for the plaintiff against the
two defendants.
Only Felipe Ang appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila (civil case 50018),
which rendered judgment on July 31, 1962, amended by an order dated August 9, 1962,
directing him to pay to the plaintiff "the sum of P4,000, with interest at the legal rate from the
date of the filing of the complaint, a further sum of P400 as attorney's fees, and costs."
Felipe Ang then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which certified it to this
Court because the issues raised are purely of law.
The appellant imputes to the court a quo three errors, namely, (1) that it refused to
apply article 2071 of the new Civil Code to the case at bar; (2) that it adjudged him a general
indorser under the Negotiable Instruments Law (Act 2031); and (3) that it held that he
"cannot obtain his release from the contract of suretyship or obtain security to protect himself
against any proceedings on the part of the creditor and against the danger of insolvency of the
principal debtor," because he is "jointly and severally liable on the instrument."
This, appeal is absolutely without merit.
1. The genuineness and due execution of the instrument are not controverted. That the
appellee is a holder thereof for value is admitted.
Having arisen from a bank check which is indisputably a negotiable instrument, the
present case is, therefore, in so far as the indorsee is concerned vis-a-vis the indorser,
governed solely plaintiff the Negotiable Instruments Law (see secs. 1 and 185). Article 2071
of the new Civil Code, invoked by the appellant, the pertinent portion of which states, "The
guarantor, even before been paid, may proceed against the principal debtor; (1) when he is
sued for the payment; . . . the action of the guarantor is to obtain release from the guaranty, to
demand a security that shall protect him from any proceedings by the creditor . . .," is here
completely irrelevant and can have no application whatsoever.
We are in agreement with the trial judge that nothing in the check in question indicates
that the appellant is not a general indorser within the purview of section 63 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law which makes "a person placing his signature upon an instrument otherwise
than as maker, drawer or acceptor" a general indorser, "unless he clearly indicates
plaintiff appropriate words his intention to be bound in some other capacity," which he
did not do. And section 66 ordains that "every indorser who indorses without qualification,
warrants to all subsequent holders in due course" (a) that the instrument is genuine and in all
respects what it purports to be; (b) that he has a good title to it; (c) that all prior parties have
capacity to contract; and (d) that the instrument is at the time of his indorsement valid and
subsisting. In addition, "he engages that on due presentment, it shall be accepted or paid, or
both, as the case may be, and that if it be dishonored, he will pay the amount thereof to the
holder." 1
2. Even on the assumption that the appellant is a mere accommodation party, as he
professes to be, he is nevertheless, by the clear mandate of section 29 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, yet "liable on the instrument to a holder for value, notwithstanding that
such holder at the time of taking the instrument knew him to be only an accommodation
party." To paraphrase, the accommodation party is liable to a holder for value as if the
contract was not for accommodation. It is not a valid defense that the accommodation party
did not receive any valuable consideration when he executed the instrument. Nor is it correct
to say that the holder for value is not a holder in due course merely because at the time he
acquired the instrument, he knew that the indorser was only an accommodation party. 2
3. That the appellant, again assuming him to be an accommodation indorser, may
obtain security from the maker to protect himself against the danger of insolvency of the
latter, cannot in any manner affect his liability to the appellee, as the said remedy is a matter
of concern exclusively between accommodation indorser and accommodated party. So that
the fact that the appellant stands only as a surety in relation to the maker, granting this to be
true for the sake of argument, is immaterial to the claim of the appellee, and does not a whit
diminish nor defeat the rights of the latter who is a holder for value. The liability of the
appellant remains primary and unconditional. To sanction the appellant's theory is to give
unwarranted legal recognition to the patent absurdity of a situation where an indorser, when
sued on an instrument by a holder in due course and for value, can escape liability on his
indorsement by the convenient expedient of interposing the defense that he is a mere
accomodation indorser.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is affirmed in toto, at appellant's cost.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles
and Fernando, JJ., concur.1wph1.t
Footnotes
1
See also Beutel's Brannan Negotiable Instruments Law, 7th ed., pp. 927, 956;
Alvendia, The Negotiable Instruments Law, pp. 119-120; Stuart del Rosario,
Treatise on Negotiable Instruments, 1961 ed., p. 189.
2
Beutel's, id. pp. 568-569; Stuart del Rosario, id., pp. 165, 242-243; Alvendia,
id., pp. 55, 57-58; National Bank vs. Maza, et al., 48 Phil. 210.
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Ang Tiong V Ting

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Lessons Applicable: General Indorser (Negotiable Instrurments)

Laws Applicable: Section 63 of the Negotiable Instruments Law

CA: ordered Ang to pay with interest

Ang contends that he is an accomodating indorser

ISSUE: W/N Ang is an accomodating indorser and not a general indorser a

(b) that he has a good title to it;

(c) that all prior parties have capacity to contract; and

Even on the assumption that the appellant is a mere accommodation party, as he

G.R. No. L-26767

February 22, 1968

ANG TIONG, plaintiff-appellee,

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