FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 113542. February 24, 1998.]

CAURDANETAAN PIECE WORKERS UNION, represented by JUANITO P. COSTALES, JR.
in his capacity as union president, petitioner, vs. UNDERSECRETARY BIENVENIDO E.
LAGUESMA and CORFARM GRAINS, INC., respondents.
[G.R. No. 114911. February 24, 1998.]
CAURDANETAAN PIECE WORKERS ASSOCIATION as represented by JUANITO P.
COSTALES, JR., president, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
CORFARM GRAINS, INC. and/or TEODY C. RAPISORA and HERMINIO RABANG,
respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.
REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; WHERE THE LABOR
OFFICERS' FINDINGS ARE CONTRARY TO THOSE OF THE MED-ARBITER, THE COURT, IN
THE EXERCISE OF ITS EQUITY JURISDICTION, MAY WADE INTO AND REEVALUATE SUCH
FACTUAL FINDINGS; CASE AT BAR. In certiorari proceedings under Rule 65, this Court does
not, as a rule, evaluate the sufficiency of evidence upon which the labor officials based their
determinations. The inquiry is essentially limited to whether they acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. However, this doctrine is not absolute. Where the
labor officer's findings are contrary to those of the med-arbiter, the Court in the exercise of its
equity jurisdiction may wade into and reevaluate such findings, which we now embark on in
the case.
2.
LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE
RELATIONSHIP; FOUR-FOLD TEST; JURIDICAL VINCULUM PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR.
To determine the existence of an employer-employee relation, this Court has consistently applied
the "four-fold test" which has the following elements: (1) the power to hire, (2) the payment of
wages. (3) the power to dismiss, and (4) the power to control the last being the most important
element. Our examination of the case records indubitably shows the presence of an employeremployee relationship. Relying on the evidence adduced by the petitioners, Respondent
Laguesma himself affirmed the presence of such connection. As we have ruled in an earlier case,
the question of whether an employer-employee relationship exists in a certain situation has
bedevilled the courts. Businessmen, with the aid of lawyers, have tried to avoid or sidestep such
relationship, because that juridical vinculum engenders obligations connected with workmen's
compensation, social security, medicare, minimum wage, termination pay and unionism. All too
familiarly, Respondent Corfarm sought refuge from these obligations. However, the records of
this case clearly support the existence of the juridical vinculum.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; PRO-FORMA AND IDENTICAL AFFIDAVITS EXECUTED BY SOME
EMPLOYEES ADMITTING LACK OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP DO NOT
AFFECT PETITIONER'S CAUSE; CASE AT BAR. The alleged admissions cannot be taken
against petitioner's cause. First, the contents of the admissions are highly suspect. The records
reveal that the "admissions" of Juanito Costales, Jr., Carlito Costales and Juanito Medenilla were
in the form of affidavits of adhesion which were identical in content, differentiated only by the
typewritten names and the signatures of the workers. Second, only three of the workers executed

such affidavits. Clearly, the admissions in such affidavits cannot work against petitioner union's
cause. Such pro forma and identical affidavits do not prove lack of employer-employee
relationship against all members of petitioner. Third, the employer-employee relationship is clearly
proven by substantial evidence. Corfarm sorely failed to show that petitioner's members were
independent contractors. We rule that no particular form of proof is required to prove the existence
of an employer-employee relationship. Any competent and relevant evidence may show the
relationship. If only documentary evidence would be required to demonstrate that relationship, no
scheming employer would ever be brought before the bar of justice. Fourth, and in any event, the
alleged admissions of the three workers that they worked with other rice mills do not work against
them. Assuming arguendo that they did work with other rice mills, this was required by the
imperative of meeting their basic needs.
4.
ID.; ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS; NOT VIOLATED WHERE A PERSON IS
GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD, BUT CHOOSES NOT TO GIVE HIS SIDE; CASE
AT BAR. Private respondent had been duly informed of the pendency of the illegal dismissal
case, but it choose not to participate therein without any known justifiable cause. The labor arbiter
sent notices of hearing or arbitration to the parties, requiring them to submit position papers at
1:30 p.m. on November 14, 1992. Respondent Corfarm did not attend the hearing. According to
Respondent NLRC, there was no proof that Respondent Corfarm received such notice. In any
case, petitioner filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint on December 23, 1992. Again,
another notice for hearing or arbitration on January 7, 1993 was sent to the parties. This was
received by petitioner's counsel as evidenced by the registry return receipt duly signed by private
respondent's counsel, Atty. Alfonso Bince, Jr. It was only on January 28, 1993, however, that Atty.
Bince entered his appearance as counsel for Respondent Corfarm. On May 10, 1993. Corfarm
was again given a new period of ten (10) days within which to submit its position paper and
documentary evidence; "otherwise, [the labor arbiter] will be constrained to resolve this case
based on available evidence on record." As evidenced by a registry return receipt, a copy of said
directive was received by respondent's counsel on May 25, 1993. Still and all, Corfarm failed to
file its position paper. Clearly, private respondent was given an opportunity to present its
evidence, but it failed or refused to avail itself of this opportunity without any legal reason. Due
process is not violated where a person is given the opportunity to be heard, but chooses not to
give his side of the case.
5.
ID.; ID.; APPEAL TO THE NLRC; REMANDING OF THE APPEALED CASE OR AN
ISSUE TO LABOR ARBITER FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IS UNNECESSARY,
CONSIDERING THAT NLRC IS AUTHORIZED TO DECIDE CASES BASED ON THE
RECORDS BEFORE IT. Contrary to the conclusions of the NLRC and the arguments of private
respondent, the findings of the labor arbiter on the question of illegal dismissal were based on
credible, competent and substantial evidence. It must be stressed that labor laws mandate the
speedy administration of justice, with least attention to technicalities but without sacrificing the
fundamental requisites of due process. In this light, the NLRC, like the labor arbiter, is authorized
to decide cases based on the position papers and other documents submitted, without resorting
to the technical rules of evidence. Verily, Respondent NLRC noted several documentary evidence
sufficient to arrive at a just decision. Indeed, the evidence on record clearly supports the
conclusion of the labor arbiter that the petitioners were employees of respondent, and that they
were illegally dismissed. Why Respondent NLRC refused to rule directly on the appeal escapes
us. Thus remand of a case or an issue to the labor arbiter for further proceedings is unnecessary,
considering that the NLRC was in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it

and particularly where the ends of justice would be served thereby. Remanding the case would
needlessly delay the resolution of the case which has been pending since 1992. As already
observed, the evidence on record clearly supports the findings of the labor arbiter.
6.
ID.; ID.; TERMINATION OF EMPLOYEES; ILLEGAL DISMISSAL; BACKWAGES;
COMPUTED FROM THE DATE OF DISMISSAL UP TO THE DATE OF ACTUAL
REINSTATEMENT WITHOUT ANY DEDUCTIONS OR CONDITIONS. Back wages are to be
computed from the date of dismissal up to the date of actual reinstatement without any deductions
or conditions. This is in consonance with Fernandez, et al. vs. National Labor Relations
Commission: . . . Accordingly, the award to petitioners of backwages for three years should be
modified in accordance with Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 6715, by giving
them full backwages without conditions and limitations, the dismissals having occurred after the
effectivity of the amendatory law on March 21, 1989. Thus, the Court held in Bustamante: "The
clear legislative intent of the amendment in Rep. Act No. 6715 is to give more benefits to workers
than was previously given them under the Mercury Drug rule or "the deduction of earnings
elsewhere" rule. Thus, a closer adherence to the legislative policy behind Rep. Act No. 6715
points to "full backwages" as meaning exactly that i.e., without deducting from backwages the
earnings derived elsewhere by the concerned employee during the period of his illegal dismissal.'
7.
ID.; ID.; CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT; AWARD OF THIRTEENTH MONTH PAY.
SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE AND UNDERPAID WAGES SHOULD BE COMPUTED FOR
EACH YEAR OF SERVICE FROM THE TIME EACH EMPLOYEE WAS HIRED UP TO THE
DATE OF HIS ACTUAL, REINSTATEMENT; CASE AT BAR. In view of recent jurisprudence,
we are correcting some items in the labor arbiter's decision. The thirteenth month pay awarded
should be computed for each year of service from the time each employee was hired up to the
date of his actual reinstatement. The same computation applies to the award of the service
incentive leave and underpaid wages. Each employee is to be paid the remaining underpaid
wages from the date of his or her hiring in accordance with the then prevailing wage legislations.
Likewise, a refund of P12 shall be computed for each day of service of each employee, to be
reckoned from the date such employee was hired.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
The Court reiterates some fundamental labor doctrines: (1) this Court may review factual
determinations where the findings of the med-arbiter conflict with those of the undersecretary of
labor; (2) an employer-employee relationship may be established by substantial evidence; (3)
procedural due process is satisfied by the grant of an opportunity to be heard and an actual
adversarial-type trial is not required; (4) the NLRC commits grave abuse of discretion when it
remands a case to the labor arbiter in spite of ample pieces of evidence on record which are
sufficient to decide the case directly; and (5) where illegal dismissal is proven, the workers are
entitled to back wages and other similar benefits without deductions or conditions. cda
Statement of the Case
These doctrines are used by the Court in resolving these consolidated petitions for certiorari under
Rule 65, challenging the resolutions of Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma and the National
Labor Relations Commission.

First Case
In GR. No. 113542, hereafter referred to as the First Case, Petitioner Caurdanetaan Piece
Workers Union/Association (CPWU) prays for the nullification and reversal of Undersecretary
Laguesma's Order dated January 4, 1994 in OS-MA-A-8-119-93 (RO100-9207-RU-001), which
granted Respondent Corfarm's motion for reconsideration and dismissed petitioner's prayer for
certification election. The dispositive portion of the assailed Order reads as follows: 1
"WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is hereby set aside and a new one issued dismissing the
petition for certification election for lack of merit."
In his earlier Order dated September 7, 1993, Laguesma affirmed Med-Arbiter Sinamar E. Limos'
order of March 18, 1993 which disposed as follows: 2
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the above-entitled petition is hereby
granted. Consequently, the motion to dismiss filed by Corfarm Grains, Inc. is denied.
Let a certification election be conducted among the rank-and-file employees of Corfarm Grains,
Inc., within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, with the following choices:
1.

Caurdanetaan Piece Workers Union;

2.

No Union

A pre-election conference is hereby set on March 29, 1993 at 2:00 o' clock in the afternoon at the
DOLE, Dagupan District Office, Mayombo District, Dagupan City to thresh out the mechanics of
the Certification Election. Employer Corfarm Grains, Inc. is hereby directed to present its
employment records for the period covering January to June 1992 evidencing payment of salaries
of its employees.
Let the parties be notified accordingly."
Aggrieved by Respondent Laguesma's subsequent Order dated January 27, 1994 3 denying its
motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed this recourse before this Court.
Second Case
In GR. No. 114911, hereafter referred to as the Second Case, petitioner assails the Resolution
promulgated on February 16, 1994 in NLRC CA No. L-001109 4 by the National Labor Relations
Commission (Respondent NLRC), 5 the dispositive portion of which reads: 6
"WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 14 September 1993 is hereby SET
ASIDE. Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the Arbitration Branch of origin for
immediate appropriate proceedings."
The labor arbiter's decision that was reversed by Respondent NLRC disposed as follows: 7
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1.

Declaring individual complainants' dismissal illegal;

2.

Declaring respondent guilty of unfair labor practice;

3.

Ordering respondent to pay the 92 8 8a complainants the following:

a)

13th month pay limited to three years in the amount of P4,788.00 each;

b)

service incentive leave pay in the amount of P855.00 each for three years;

c)
underpaid wages covering the period June 1989 to June 1992 which amount to
P47,040.00 each;
d)
backwages reckoned from June 1992, the date of dismissal[,] to September 1993, the
date of promulgation of the decision or a period of 14 months, in the amount of P22,344.00 each;
e)
and

refund of P12.00/day deduction limited to three years which amounts to P12,096 each;

f)

to pay the complainants P1,000.00 each as damages.

4.

To reinstate the complainants to their former position[s] immediately.

All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit."

In a Resolution promulgated on March 28, 1994, Respondent NLRC denied petitioner's motion
for reconsideration. 9
The Facts
In his Consolidated Memorandum, the solicitor general recited the following pertinent facts, which
we find amply supported by the records: 10
"Petitioner union has ninety-two (92) members who worked as 'cargador' at the warehouse and
ricemills of private respondent [referring to Respondent Corfarm] at Umingan, Pangasinan since
1982. As cargadores, they loaded, unloaded and piled sacks of palay from the warehouse to the
cargo trucks and those brought by cargo trucks for delivery to different places. They were paid by
private respondent on a piece rate basis. When private respondent denied some benefits to these
cargadores, the latter organized petitioner union. Upon learning of its formation, private
respondent barred its members from working with them and replaced [them] with non-members
of the union sometime in the middle of 1992.
On July 9, 1992, petitioner filed [a petition] for certification election before the Regional Office No.
I of the Department of Labor and Employment, San Fernando, La Union docketed as RO1009207-RU-001.
While this petition for certification election was pending, petitioner also filed on November 16,
1992, a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, refund of illegal deductions, payment
of wage differentials, various pecuniary benefits provided by laws, damages, legal interest,
reinstatement and attorney's fees, against private respondent before the Regional Arbitration
Branch No. 1 of Dagupan City, docketed as NLRC RAB Case No. 01-117-0184-92.
On November 24, 1992, Labor Arbiter Ricardo Olairez in NLRC Case No. Sub-Rab 01-117-018492, directed the parties to submit position paper on or before December 14, 1992, and to appear
for hearing on the said date. Only the complainant petitioner submitted its position paper on
December 3, 1992.

Likewise in the scheduled hearing on December 14, 1992, private respondent did not appear[;]
thus Labor Arbiter Olairez allowed the president of petitioner union Juanito Costales to testify and
present its evidence ex-parte.
On December 16 1992, another notice was sent to the parties to appear on [the] January 7, 1993
hearing by Labor Arbiter Emiliano de Asis.
Before the scheduled hearing on January 7, 1993, complainant petitioner filed a motion to amend
complaint and to admit amended complaint. It also filed the following:
1.

Affidavit of Juanito Costales, Jr., dated November 24, 1992;

2.
Joint affidavit of Ricardo Aban, Armando Casing, Benjamin Corpuz, Danny Margadejas,
Fidel Fortunato, Henry de los Reyes, Anthony de Luna, Warlito Arguilles, Dominador Aguda,
Marcelino Cayuda, Jr., Jaime Costales and Juanito Mendenilla dated December 30, 1992;
3.

Joint affidavit of Juanito Costales and Armando Casing dated January 7, 1993;

4.

Affidavit signed by individual union members.

On March 18, 1993, Med-Arbiter Sinamar E. Limos issued an Order granting the petition for
certification election earlier filed.
Meanwhile, Labor Arbiter Rolando D. Gambito in the illegal dismissal case issued the May 20,
1993 Order, the dispositive portion [of] which reads:
'WHEREFORE, respondents are hereby ordered to submit their position paper, together with their
documentary evidence, if any, within TEN (10) days from receipt of the order, otherwise we will
be constrained to resolve this case based on available evidence on record.'
On September 7, 1993, public respondent Laguesma issued a Resolution denying the appeal
filed by private respondent against the order of Med-Arbiter Limos granting the petition for
certification election.
Acting on said denial, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted in
an Order dated January 4, 1994 by public respondent Laguesma dismissing the petition for
certification election for lack of employer-employee relationship.
Petitioner in turn filed a motion for reconsideration of the January 4, 1994, Order but it was denied
by public respondent Laguesma in his January 27, 1994 Order which reaffirmed the dismissal of
petition for certification election.
Thus, the union filed its first petition for certiorari assailing the Orders of January 4 and 27, 1994
of public respondent Laguesma dismissing the petition for certification election. The said petition
is captioned as 'Caurdanetaan Piece Workers Union, petitioner, vs. Hon. Bienvenido Laguesma,
et al., respondents,' docketed as G.R. No. 113542 and raffled to the Second Division of this
Honorable Court."
On September 14, 1993, Labor Arbiter Rolando D. Gambito issued his decision finding the
dismissal of petitioner's members illegal. On appeal by both parties, Respondent NLRC as
earlier stated set aside the appealed decision and remanded the case to the labor arbiter for
further proceedings. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was later denied.

The solicitor general, who was supposed to represent both public respondents, joined petitioner
and filed a "Manifestation and Motion (In Lieu of Comment)" dated July 25, 1994, praying that the
petition in the First Case "be granted and that judgment be rendered annulling" 11 the assailed
Orders of Respondent Laguesma. The Republic's counsel likewise filed another "Manifestation
and Motion (In Lieu of Comment)" dated October 4, 1994 in the Second Case, praying that
"judgment be rendered annulling the resolution of Public Respondent NLRC dated February 16,
1994 and March 28, 1994 and order[ing] public respondent to proceed with the case instead of
remanding the same to the labor arbiter of origin." 12
In a Resolution dated March 29, 1995, 13 this Court ordered the consolidation of the two cases.
14
Public Respondents' Rulings
In the First Case
Public Respondent Laguesma premised the dismissal of the petition for certification election on
the absence of an employer-employee relationship between petitioner's members and private
respondent. Professing reliance on the control test in determining employer-employee
relationship, his Order dated January 4, 1994 15 explained:
"It is settled in this jurisdiction that the most important factor in determining the existence of
employer-employee relationship is the control test or the question of whether or not the supposed
employer exercises control over the means and methods by which the work is to be done. In the
instant case, it is not disputed that movant does not exercise any degree of control over how the
loading or unloading of cavans of palays to or from the trucks, to or from the rice mills. Movant's
only concern is that said cavans of palay are loaded/unloaded. Absent therefore, the power to
control not only the end to be achieved but also the means to be used in reaching such end, no
employer-employee relationship could be said to have been established. We also noted that some
of petitioner's members including its president, Juanito Costales, Jr., admitted in separate sworn
statements that they offer and actually perform loading and unloading work for various rice mills
in Pangasinan and that the performance of said work depends on the availability of work in said
mills. They also categorically stated that there is no employer-employee relationship between
petitioner and movant. To our mind, said declarations being made against interest deserve much
evidentiary weight. Considering therefore, the foregoing, we have no alternative but to dismiss
the petition for lack of employer-employee relationship."
In the Second Case
On the other hand, Respondent NLRC ordered the remand of the case to the arbitration branch
for further proceedings because "the issues at hand need further threshing out." Stressing the
principle that allegations must be proved by "competent and credible evidence," it held: 16
"There is no question that under the Rules of the Commission, complaints may be resolved on
the basis of the Position Papers submitted by the parties and that the parties may be deemed to
have waived their right to present evidence after they have been given an opportunity to do so.
These procedural rules, however should be read in conjunction with the time[-]honored principle
that allegations must be proved and established by competent and credible evidence. In other
words, mere allegations would not suffice despite the absence of evidence to the contrary.

In subject case, complainants-appellants' allegations that they are laborers of respondentsappellants receiving P45.00 per day's work of eight hours (p. 2, Amended Position Paper dated
December 14, 1992, p. 31 Records; p. 2 Amended Complaint dated 16 December 1992, p. 70,
Records) appears to be in conflict with their earlier assertions that they are paid on the basis of
the number of cavans of palay moved, piled, hauled and unloaded from trucks or haulers
multiplied by P0.12 [per] sack or cavan.' And for the day's earning 'respondents used to be obliged
to pay P57.00 per day's earning ' (p. 2, Position Paper dated 24 November 1992; p. 17,
Records).
Similarly attached to the records is a narrative report of [the] DOLE inspector where it was
mentioned that Juanito Costales, Jr., is the owner of Carcado Contracting Services and is not an
employee of Corefarm [sic] Grains (Narrative Report dated August 4, 1992, p. 10 Records).
Another reason why subject case should be remanded to the Labor Arbiter below is the fact that
the personality of complainant union has been raised in issue before the proper forum and
adverse decision on the matter will definitely affect the whole proceedings.
Furthermore, records show that an Amended Complaint was filed on December 23, 1992. This
amended complaint made no mention of the affidavits of Juanito Costales, Jr. and the 92 other
workers which documents were filed in January 1993. Likewise, the amended complaint contains
but a general statement that the 92 workers of Corefarm [sic] Grains have been employed since
1982 which was adopted by the Labor Arbiter below in his decision notwithstanding the fact that
a number of these workers started working with respondent after 1982. Some of whom worked
with the company in 1990 (Joint Affidavit dated 7 January 1993, pp. 96-98, Records).
Notwithstanding this fact, the Labor Arbiter in the decision under consideration allowed refund of
alleged deduction for a period of three years. In the same manner, payment of salary differential
was also granted.
Indeed the issues at hand need further threshing out. Under the Rules, the Labor Arbiter is
authorized to thresh out issues (sec. 4, Rule V). As it is, we are not convinced by the conclusions
of the Labor Arbiter.
The ends of justice would better be served if all parties are granted further opportunity to ventilate
their respective positions."
The Issues
In its Consolidated Memorandum dated September 19, 1995 filed before us, petitioner raises the
following "grounds" in support of its petition: 17
"1.
Grave abuse of discretion or acting in excess of jurisdiction, which is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction on the part of public respondent in setting aside the labor arbiter's decision and in
remanding this case to the office of origin for further proceedings is not necessary when in fact
the mandatory requirements of due process have been observed by the labor arbiter in rendering
decision on the case;
2.
Remand of the case to office of origin for further proceedings on matters already passed
upon properly by the labor arbiter is contrary to the rule of speedy labor justice and the [sic] social
justice and to afford protection to labor policy of the Philippine Constitution, which is a command
that should not be disregarded by the courts in resolving labor cases;

3.
Remand of the case to the labor arbiter would only prolong social unrest and the suffering
of injurious effects of illegal dismissal by the 92 illegally dismissed workers[;] hence, said remand
of the case without justification constitutes an oppressive act committed by public respondent."
Simply put, the issues are as follows:
1.
Whether Respondent Laguesma acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
dismissal of the petition for certification election.
2.
Whether Respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in remanding the illegal
dismissal case to the labor arbiter for further proceedings.
The present controversy hinges on whether an employer-employee relationship between the
CPWU members and Respondent Corfarm has been established by substantial evidence.
The Court's Ruling
The two petitions are meritorious.
Main Issue : Employer-Employee Relationship
First Case : Certification Election
Petitioner contends that Respondent Laguesma committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the petition for certification election by relying on private respondent's bare allegation,
in its motion for reconsideration, of lack of employer-employee relationship. 18 According to
petitioner, Respondent Laguesma cannot reverse his Decision in the absence of a concomitant
change in his factual findings. 19 Petitioner insists that all its members were employees of private
respondent, viz.: 20
"The 92 workers, who are all union members of petitioner herein, have been rendering actual
manual services as 'cargadores' in the warehouse and rice mills of private respondent, performing
activities usually related to or desirable by [sic] the business or trade of private respondent who
is engaged in the buy and sell of palay as well as warehousing of said commodity and milling the
same for sale to customers in the form of milled rice. The 92 workers have performed their
activities for the last ten (10) years prior to their having been illegally dismissed from employment
on June 18, 1992 or thereabouts."
Petitioner adds that many of its members received Christmas bonuses from private respondent.
21
On the other hand, Respondent Corfarm describes the contentions of petitioner as
"off-tangent, if not irrelevant.
First, the authority of the DOLE Secretary to decide appeals in representation cases is undeniable
(see e.g., Sections 9 and 10 of Rule V, Book V, of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Labor Code; also Art. 259, appeal from certification election orders, labor code). Second,
petitioner completely misses the point that the granting and denial of a motion for reconsideration
involves the exercise of discretion. As submitted by the Public Respondent in its Comment,
'among the ends to which a Motion for Reconsideration is addressed, one is precisely to convince
the court that its ruling is erroneous and improper, contrary to law or the evidence', . . ." (Emphasis
found in the original.)

Corfarm insists that the challenged Order of Respondent Laguesma dated January 4, 1994 rests
on "solid findings of fact" which should be accorded respect and finality. 22 It attacks the
petitioner's allegation that it has "92" workers who worked as "cargador" at its warehouses
as "gratuitous and not supported by any evidence . . . [because] as late as this time of day in the
litigation of this case, who exactly are those 92 workers cannot be known from the records." 23
(Emphasis in original.)
Private respondent further argues that RJL Martinez Fishing Corp. vs. NLRC, 24 cited by the
solicitor general, has a factual situation different from the case at bar. "Waiting time," unlike that
in RJL Martinez Fishing Corp., does not obtain here. 25 Likewise allegedly inapplicable are the
rulings in Villavilla vs. Court of Appeals 26 and in Brotherhood Labor Unity Movement vs. Zamora.
27
Respondent Corfarm denies that it had the power of control, rationalizing that petitioner's
members "were 'street-hired' workers engaged from time to time to do loading and unloading work
. . .[;] [t]here [was] no superintendent-in-charge . . . to give orders . . .[;] [and] there [were] no gate
passes issued, nor tools, equipment and paraphernalia issued by Corfarm for loading/unloading
. . ." 28 It attributes error to the solicitor general's reliance on Article 280 29 of the Labor Code.
Citing Brent School, Inc. vs. Zamora, 30 private respondent asserts that a literal application of
such article will result in "absurdity," where petitioner's members will be regular employees not
only of respondents but also of several other rice mills, where they were allegedly also under
service. Finally, Corfarm submits that the OSG's position is negated by the fact that "petitioner's
members contracted for loading and unloading services with respondent company when such
work was available and when they felt like it . . ." 31
We rule for petitioners. Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court mandates that in cases filed
before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, like the Department of Labor, a fact may be
established by substantial evidence, i.e. "that amount of evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion." 32 Also fundamental is the rule granting not only
respect but even finality to factual findings of the Department of Labor, if supported by substantial
evidence. Such findings are binding upon this Court, unless petitioner is able to show that the
secretary of labor (or the undersecretary acting in his place) has arbitrarily disregarded or
misapprehended evidence before him to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion if
such evidence were properly appreciated. This is rooted in the principle that this Court is not a
trier of facts, and that the determinations made by administrative bodies on matters falling within
their respective fields of specialization or expertise are accorded respect. 33 Also well-settled is
the doctrine that the existence of an employer-employee relationship is ultimately a question of
fact and that the findings thereon by the labor authorities shall be accorded not only respect but
even finality when supported by substantial evidence. 34 Finally, in certiorari proceedings under
Rule 65, this Court does not, as a rule, evaluate the sufficiency of evidence upon which the labor
officials based their determinations. The inquiry is essentially limited to whether they acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. 35 However, this doctrine is not
absolute. Where the labor officer's findings are contrary to those of the med-arbiter, the Court
in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may wade into and reevaluate such findings, 36 which
we now embark on in this case. 37
To determine the existence of an employer-employee relation, this Court has consistently applied
the "four-fold" test which has the following elements: (1) the power to hire, (2) the payment of

wages, (3) the power to dismiss, and (4) the power to control the last being the most important
element. 38
Our examination of the case records indubitably shows the presence of an employer-employee
relationship. Relying on the evidence adduced by the petitioners, Respondent Laguesma himself
affirmed the presence of such connection. Thus, in his Order dated September 7, 1993, he
astutely held: 39
"Anent the first issue, we find the annexes submitted by the respondent company not enough to
prove that herein petitioner is indeed an independent contractor. The existence of an independent
contractor relationship is generally established by the following criteria. The contractor is carrying
on an independent business; [the] nature and extent of the work; the skill required; the term and
duration of the relationship; the right to assign the performance of a specified piece of work; the
control and supervision over the workers; payment of the contractor's workers; the control and
the supervision over the workers; the control of the premises; the duty to supply the premises,
tools, appliances, materials and laborers, and the. mode, manner and terms of payment.
[Brotherhood Labor Unity Movement of the Philippines vs. Zamora, 147 SCRA 49 (198) [sic] ].
llcd
None of the above criteria exists in the case at bar. The absence of a written contract which
specifies the performance of a specified piece of work, the nature and extent of the work and the
term and duration of the relationship between herein petitioner and respondent company belies
the latters [sic] allegation that the former is indeed and [sic] independent contractor.
Also, respondent failed to show by clear and convincing proof that herein respondent has the
substantial capital or investment to qualify as an independent contractor under the law. The
premises, tools, equipments [sic] and paraphernalia are all supplied by respondent company. It
is only the manpower or labor force which the alleged contractor supplies, suggesting the
existence of a 'labor only' contracting scheme which is prohibited by law. Further, if herein
petitioner is indeed an independent contractor, it should have offered its services to other
companies and not to work [sic] exclusively for the respondent company. It is therefore, clear that
the alleged J.P. Costales, Jr. Cargador Services cannot be considered as an independent
contractor as defined by law."
In his subsequent order, Respondent Laguesma inexplicably reversed his above ruling and held
that there was no employer-employee relationship on the ground that Respondent Corfarm
exercised no power of control over the alleged employees.
It may be asked, why the sudden change of mind on the part of Respondent Laguesma? No
additional pieces of evidence were adduced and no existing ones were identified by Laguesma
to support such strange reversal. The unblemished fact is that private respondent was the
recruiter and employer of petitioner's members.
Shoppers Gain Supermart vs. NLRC 40 provides the standard to determine whether a worker is
an independent contractor:
"The applicable law is not Article 280 of the Labor Code which is cited by petitioners, but Art. 106,
which provides:

'Art. 106.
Contractor or subcontractor. Whenever an employer enters into a contract with
another person for the performance of the former's work, the employees of the contractor and of
the latter's subcontractor, if any, shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
xxx

xxx

xxx

There is 'labor-only' contracting where the person supplying workers to an employer does not
have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work
premises, among others, and the workers recruited and placed by such persons are performing
activities which are directly related to the principal business of such employer. In such cases, the
person or intermediary shall be considered merely as an agent of the employer who shall be
responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed
by him.' (emphasis supplied)
In accordance with the above provision, petitioner corporation is deemed the direct employer of
the private respondents and thus liable for all benefits to which such workers are entitled, like
wages, separation benefits and so forth. There is no denying the fact that private respondents'
work as merchandisers, cashiers, baggers, check-out personnel, sales ladies, warehousemen
and so forth were directly related, necessary and vital to the day-to-day operations of the
supermarket; their jobs involved normal and regular functions in the ordinary business of the
petitioner corporation. Given the nature of their functions and responsibilities, it is improbable that
petitioner did not exercise direct control over their work. Moreover, there is no evidence as in
fact, petitioners do not even allege that aside from supplying the manpower, the labor agencies
have 'substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work
premises, among others.' "
It is undeniable that petitioner's members worked as cargadores for private respondent. They
loaded, unloaded and piled sacks of palay from the warehouses to the cargo trucks and from the
cargo trucks to the buyers. This work is directly related, necessary and vital to the operations of
Corfarm. Moreover, Corfarm did not even allege, much less prove, that petitioner's members have
"substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, [and] work
premises, among others." Furthermore, said respondent did not contradict petitioner's allegation
that it paid wages directly to these workers without the intervention of any third-party independent
contractor. It also wielded the power of dismissal over petitioners; in fact, its exercise of this power
was the progenitor of the Second Case. Clearly, the workers are not independent contractors.
Applying Article 280 41 of the Labor Code, we hold that the CPWU members were regular
employees of private respondent. Their tasks were essential in the usual business of private
respondent.
As we have ruled in an earlier case, the question of whether an employer-employee relationship
exists in a certain situation has bedevilled the courts. Businessmen, with the aid of lawyers, have
tried to avoid or sidestep such relationship, because that juridical vinculum engenders obligations
connected with workmen's compensation, social security, medicare, minimum wage, termination
pay and unionism. 42 All too familiarly, Respondent Corfarm sought refuge from these obligations.
However, the records of this case clearly support the existence of the juridical vinculum.
RJL Martinez Fishing Corporation, 43 cited by the solicitor general, is relevant because
petitioner's members were also made to wait for "loading and unloading" of cavans of palay to

and from the storage areas and to and from the milling areas. 44 This waiting time does not
denigrate the regular employment of petitioner's members. As ruled in that case: 45
". . . Besides, the continuity of employment is not the determining factor, but rather whether the
work of the laborer is part of the regular business or occupation of the employer.( fn: Article 281,
Labor Code, as amended; Philippine Fishing Boat Officers and Engineer[s] Union vs. Court of
Industrial Relations, 112 SCRA 159 (1982). We are thus in accord with the findings of respondent
NLRC in this regard.
Although it may be that private respondents alternated their employment on different vessels
when they were not assigned to petitioner's boats, that did not affect their employee status. The
evidence also establishes that petitioners had a fleet of fishing vessels with about 65 ship
captains, and as private respondents contended, when they finished with one vessel they were
instructed to wait for the next. As respondent NLRC had found:
We further find that the employer-employee relationship between the parties herein is not coterminus with each loading and unloading job. As earlier shown, respondents are engaged in the
business of fishing. For this purpose, they have a fleet of fishing vessels. Under this situation,
respondents' activity of catching fish is a continuous process and could hardly be considered as
seasonal in nature. So that the activities performed by herein complainants, i.e. unloading the
catch of tuna fish from respondents' vessels and then loading the same to refrigerated vans, are
necessary or desirable in the business of respondents. This circumstance makes the employment
of complainants a regular one, in the sense that it does not depend on any specific project or
seasonal activity. ( fn: NLRC Decision, p. 94, Rollo.)"
Alleged Admission of Lack of
Employer-Employee Relationship
Respondent Corfarm argues that "some of petitioner's members including its president, Juanito
P. Costales, Jr.[,] admitted that they work for various rice mills in Pangasinan and that there is no
employer-employee relations between them and private respondents." It adds that the solicitor
general, by arguing that there was an employer-employee relationship, attempts to "substitute
[his] judgment [with] that of public respondent undersecretary . . . who found such admissions
against self-interest on the part of petitioner's members . . . 46
These arguments are negligible. The alleged admissions cannot be taken against petitioner's
cause. First, the contents of the admissions are highly suspect. The records reveal that the
"admissions" of Juanito Costales, Jr., 47 Carlito Costales 48 and Juanito Medenilla 49 were in the
form of affidavits 50 of adhesion which were identical in content, differentiated only by the
typewritten names and the signatures of the workers. Second, only three of the workers executed
such affidavits. Clearly, the admissions in such affidavits cannot work against petitioner union's
cause. Such pro forma and identical affidavits do not prove lack of employer-employee
relationship against all members of petitioner. Third, the employer-employee relationship is clearly
proven by substantial evidence. Corfarm sorely failed to show that petitioner's members were
independent contractors. We rule that no particular form of proof is required to prove the existence
of an employer-employee relationship. Any competent and relevant evidence may show the
relationship. If only documentary evidence would be required to demonstrate that relationship, no
scheming employer would ever be brought before the bar of justice. 51 Fourth, and in any event,
the alleged admissions of the three workers that they worked with other rice mills do not work

against them. Assuming arguendo that they did work with other rice mills, this was required by
the imperative of meeting their basic needs. 52
The employer-employee relationship having been duly established, the holding of a certification
election necessarily follows. It bears stressing that there should be no unnecessary obstacle to
the holding of such election, 53 for it is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented. 54 We
have held that, in the absence of a legal impediment, the holding of a certification election is the
most democratic method of determining the employees' choice of their bargaining representative.
It is the best means to settle controversies and disputes involving union representation. Indeed,
it is the keystone of industrial democracy. 55
Second Case : Illegal Dismissal
Petitioner assails the NLRC for setting aside the labor arbiter's decision and remanding the case
for further proceedings. Petitioner argues that the order of remand "will only prolong the agony of
the 92 union members and their families for living or existing without jobs and earnings to give
them support." Further, petitioner contends: 56
"The Labor Arbiter had rendered a decision (Annex 'D', Petition) on September 14, 1993 in favor
of petitioner based on the available records of the case after giving more than ample opportunities
to private respondents herein to submit their position paper and other pleadings alleging their
evidences [sic] against the causes of action of petitioner alleged in the complaint for illegal
dismissal, unfair labor practice, non-payment of various benefits granted by existing laws during
their employment, illegal deductions or diminution of their underpaid daily wages, non-payment
of wage increases and other causes of action pleaded by the complainant or herein petitioner.
In short, Labor Arbiter Rolando Gambito rendered his decision based on the records of the case
including evidence available on record and after observing due process of law."
To support his opposition against the remand of the case, petitioner recites the chronological
events of the case, viz.: 57
"In the case at bar, private respondents were notified earlier in the latter part of 1992 regarding
the pendency of the complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, damages, etc., but said
respondents did not appear during the initial hearing of the case [before] Labor Arbiter Ricardo
Olairez, then the Arbiter handling the case. The case was re-set for hearing at some other dates.
On April 22, 1993, Atty. Alfonso C. Bince, Jr. appeared as counsel for respondents at Dagupan
City. Atty. Bince committed to the Labor Arbiter that the former will file the position paper for his
clients (Corfarm Grains, Inc., et al.) within ten (10) days from April 22, 1993, but still private
respondents' Position Paper was not filed.
On May 20, 1993, Labor Arbiter Rolando Gambito, who took over the case for illegal dismissal,
etc. filed by petitioner, issued an order to private respondents directing the latter (respondents) to
submit their Position Paper together with THEIR DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS, if any, within 10
days from receipt of the order. Still, private respondents' counsel failed to submit private
respondent's Position Paper relative to the petitioner's complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor
practice, etc. which is involved in G.R. No. 114911 pending action by this Honorable Court.
Thus, the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision on the case in favor of petitioner and/or the 92
illegally dismissed workers based on the position paper filed by the latter and available records of
the case." (Emphasis in original.)

On the other hand, Respondent Corfarm submits that the labor arbiter's decision should be set
aside not only for "lack of competent and credible evidence" but also for lack of "procedural due
process." Corfarm further contends that in spite of the pendency of its motions to cross-examine
petitioner's witnesses and to suspend proceedings, the labor arbiter ordered the submission of its
position paper and documentary evidence within ten (10) days. 58 Respondent Corfarm insists:
59
"Indeed, although proceedings before a Labor Arbiter are supposed to be non-litigious and the
technicalities in the courts of law need not be strictly applied, the proceedings should nevertheless
be 'subject to the requirements of due process' as provided in Section 7, Rule 7 of the NLRC
Rules of Procedure. (See also Phil. Telegraph and Telephone Corp. vs. NLRC, 183 SCRA 451)."
We agree with petitioner. Private respondent was not denied procedural due process, and the
labor arbiter's decision was based on competent, credible and substantial evidence.
Procedural Due Process Observed
Private respondent had been duly informed of the pendency of the illegal dismissal case, but it
chose not to participate therein without any known justifiable cause. The labor arbiter sent notices
of hearing or arbitration to the parties, requiring them to submit position papers at 1:30 p.m. on
November 14, 1992. 60 Respondent Corfarm did not attend the hearing. According to Respondent
NLRC, there was no proof that Respondent Corfarm received such notice. In any case, petitioner
filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint on December 23, 1992. Again, another notice for
hearing or arbitration on January 7, 1993 was sent to the parties. 61 This was received by
petitioner's counsel as evidenced by the registry return receipt duly signed by private respondent's
counsel, Atty. Alfonso Bince, Jr. It was only on January 28, 1993, however, that Atty. Bince
entered his appearance as counsel for Respondent Corfarm. 62 On May 10, 1993, Corfarm was
again given a new period of ten (10) days within which to submit its position paper and
documentary evidence; "otherwise, [the labor arbiter] will be constrained to resolve this case
based on available evidence on record." 63 As evidenced by a registry return receipt, a copy of
said directive was received by respondent's counsel on May 25, 1993. Still and all, Corfarm failed
to file its position paper. Clearly, private respondent was given an opportunity to present its
evidence, but it failed or refused to avail itself of this opportunity without any legal reason. Due
process is not violated where a person is given the opportunity to be heard, but chooses not to
give his side of the case. 64
Labor Arbiter's Decision Based
on Credible, Competent and Substantial Evidence Cdpr
Contrary to the conclusions of the NLRC and the arguments of private respondent, the findings
of the labor arbiter on the question of illegal dismissal were based on credible, competent and
substantial evidence.
It is to be borne in mind that proceedings before labor agencies merely require the parties to
submit their respective affidavits and position papers. Adversarial trial is addressed to the sound
discretion of the labor arbiter. To establish a cause of action, only substantial evidence is
necessary; i.e., such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.
65 As ruled in Manalo vs. Roldan-Confesor: 66

"Clear and convincing proof is '. . . more than mere preponderance, but not to extent of such
certainty as is required beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases . . .' ( fn: Black's Law
Dictionary, 5th Ed., p. 227, citing Fred C. Walker Agency, Inc. v. Lucas, 215 Va. 535, 211 S.E. 2d
88, 92) while substantial evidence '. . . consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may
be somewhat less than a preponderance . . .' ( fn: Ibid., p. 1281, citing Marker v. Finch, D.C. Del.,
322 F. Supp. 905, 910) Consequently, in the hierarchy of evidentiary values, We find proof beyond
reasonable doubt at the highest level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, preponderance
of evidence, and substantial evidence, in that order."
Evidence to determine the validity of petitioner's claims, which the labor arbiter relied upon, was
available to Respondent NLRC. These pieces of evidence are in the case records, as aptly
pointed out by the solicitor general: 67
"[Regarding] the quoted second sentence of public respondent NLRC's Resolution that
allegations must be proved and established by competent evidence, and that mere allegations
would not suffice despite the absence of evidence to the contrary, suffice it to say that there is
ample evidence on record to support the Labor Arbiter's decision, to wit: 1) Narrative report of
DOLE inspector Crisanto Rey Dingle noting some violation of underpayment of minimum wage
and underpayment of 13th month pay (page 10, record); 2) affidavit of union officers and individual
union members, stating their various claims (page 80-195, Record). Despite such evidence and
an opportunity afforded to private respondent to present its evidence and position paper as borne
out by the notice of hearing issued by Labor Arbiter Olairez dated November 14, 1992, with advice
to the parties to submit their position paper (p. 14 Record) and the Order issued by Labor Arbiter
Gambito dated May 20, 1993; requiring private respondents to submit their position paper,
together with their documentary evidence (p. 247, record), private respondent failed to submit its
position paper and countervailing evidence which should have met squarely the allegations and
evidence adduced by the petitioner. Thus, in the absence of private respondent's position paper
and countervailing evidence, the Labor Arbiter cannot be faulted in deciding the case based on
the available evidence on record."
It must be stressed that labor laws mandate the speedy administration of justice, with least
attention to technicalities but without sacrificing the fundamental requisites of due process. In this
light, the NLRC, like the labor arbiter, is authorized to decide cases based on the position papers
and other documents submitted, without resorting to the technical rules of evidence. 68 Verily,
Respondent NLRC noted several documentary evidence sufficient to arrive at a just decision.
Indeed, the evidence on record clearly supports the conclusion of the labor arbiter that the
petitioners were employees of respondent, and that they were illegally dismissed. 69
The NLRC points to conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence on record. We are not
convinced. These alleged inconsistencies are too flimsy and too tenuous to preclude a just
decision. The finding that Juanito Costales, Jr. was an employee of respondent was allegedly
inconsistent with his admission that he was the "owner of Carcado Contracting Services." As
earlier observed, the inconsistency is irrelevant. Juan Costales, Jr. was an employee of Corfarm.
Owning this alleged outfit is not inconsistent with such employment. The NLRC also questioned
the amount of the employees' compensation. In one instance, the workers stated that they were
"receiving P45.00 per day's work of eight hours." In another, they claimed that they were paid
P0.12 per sack or cavan. These allegedly differ from their allegation that "Corfarm used to be
obliged to pay P57.00 per day's earning." The alleged inconsistencies are more apparent than
real. Records reveal that the P57 was the promised compensation; however, there was an

unauthorized deduction of P12; thus, the amount of P45 per day. 70 The claim of "P0.12 per sack
or cavan" is the basic computation of how workers or haulers earn their wage for the day. 71 In
any event, the alleged inconsistencies do not affect or diminish the established fact that
petitioner's members were regular employees who were illegally dismissed.
Why Respondent NLRC refused to rule directly on the appeal escapes us. The remand of a case
or an issue to the labor arbiter for further proceedings is unnecessary, considering that the NLRC
was in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it and particularly where the
ends of justice would be served thereby. 72 Remanding the case would needlessly delay the
resolution of the case which has been pending since 1992. 73 As already observed, the evidence
on record clearly supports the findings of the labor arbiter.
Pursuant to the doctrine that this Court has a duty to settle, whenever possible, the entire
controversy in a single proceeding, leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation,
we now resolve all issues. 74
It is axiomatic that in illegal dismissal cases, the employer always has the burden of proof, 75 and
his failure to discharge this duty results in a finding that the dismissal was unjustified. 76 Having
defaulted from filing its position paper, Respondent Corfarm is deemed to have waived its right to
present evidence and counter the allegations of petitioner's members.
In the same light, we sustain the labor arbiter's holding in respect of unfair labor practice. 77 As
ruled by Labor Arbiter Rolando D. Gambito: 78
"The last issue: Instead of sitting down with the individual complainants or the union officers to
discuss their demands, respondents resorted to mass lay-off of all the members of the union and
replaced them with outsiders. This is clearly a case of union busting which Art. 248 of the Labor
Code prohibits. Art. 248 provides that 'It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the
following unfair labor practice (a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise
of their right to self-organization; (b) . . . (c) To contract out service or functions being performed
by union members when such will interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of
their rights to self-organization.' "
In view of recent jurisprudence, 79 we are correcting some items in the labor arbiter's decision.
The thirteenth month pay awarded should be computed for each year of service from the time
each employee was hired up to the date of his actual reinstatement. The same computation
applies to the award of the service incentive leave 80 and underpaid wages. Each employee is to
be paid the remaining underpaid wages from the date of his or her hiring in accordance with the
then prevailing wage legislations. Likewise, a refund of P12 shall be computed for each day of
service of each employee, to be reckoned from the date such employee was hired. The damages
awarded should be sustained because the employer acted in bad faith. 81 Backwages are to be
computed from the date of dismissal up to the date of actual reinstatement without any deductions
or conditions. This is in consonance with Fernandez, et al. vs. National Labor Relations
Commission: 82
". . . Accordingly, the award to petitioners of backwages for three years should be modified in
accordance with Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 6715, by giving them full
backwages without conditions and limitations, the dismissals having occurred after the effectivity
of the amendatory law on March 21, 1989. Thus, the Court held in Bustamante: dctai

'The clear legislative intent of the amendment in Rep. Act No. 6715 is to give more benefits to
workers than was previously given them under the Mercury Drug rule or the "deduction of earnings
elsewhere" rule. Thus, a closer adherence to the legislative policy behind Rep. Act No. 6715
points to "full backwages" as meaning exactly that, i.e., without deducting from backwages the
earnings derived elsewhere by the concerned employee during the period of his illegal dismissal."
'
WHEREFORE, both petitions are GRANTED. In G.R. No. 113542, Respondent Laguesma's
Orders dated January 4, 1994 and January 27, 1994 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE; whereas
his Order dated September 7, 1993 is REINSTATED. In G.R. No. 114911, Respondent NLRC's
Resolutions promulgated on February 16, 1994 and March 28, 1994 are likewise REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. The Labor Arbiter's decision dated September 14, 1993 is reinstated with
MODIFICATIONS as set out in this Decision. Respondent NLRC is ORDERED to COMPUTE the
monetary benefits awarded in accordance with this Decision and to submit its compliance thereon
within thirty days from notice of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.