Economics 101A (Lecture 26, Revised) : Stefano Dellavigna
Economics 101A (Lecture 26, Revised) : Stefano Dellavigna
Economics 101A (Lecture 26, Revised) : Stefano Dellavigna
Stefano DellaVigna
December 4, 2003
Outline
1. Barter
2. Walrasian Equilibrium
3. Example
5. Unsolicited advice
Barter
Consumers can trade goods 1 and 2
Allocation
of barter if:
1
1
2
2
(x1 , x2 ), (x1 , x2 ) can be outcome
Individual rationality.
i) u ( i , i ) for all i
,
x
ui(xi
i 1 2
1
2
1
1
2
2
Pareto Eciency. There is no allocation (
x1, x
2), (
x1, x
2 )
such that
i) for all i
xi1, x
i2) ui(xi
,
x
ui(
1
2
Walrasian Equilibrium
Prices p1, p2
Consumer 1 faces a budget set:
1
1
1
1
p1( 1x1)+p2 1 x2 p1 1 1 +p2 2 2
or
Walrasian Equilibrium.
is a Walrasian Equilibrium if:
i
i
i
i
(x1 , x2 ) = arg max ui (x1, x2
xi1,xi2
s.t. p1xi1 + p2xi2 p1i1 + p2 i2
Markets clear:
2
1
2
x1
j + xj j + j for all j.
Graphical depiction in Edbeworth box. Set of optimal points as prices p1 and p2 vary.
Draw oer curve for consumer 1 (equivalent of demand curve in partial equilibrium):
1
(x1
1 (p1, p2, ( 1, 2)) , x2 (p1, p2, ( 1, 2)))
Example
Consumer 1 has Leontie preferences:
.5 .5
2
x22
u(x1,x2) = x1
Demands of consumer 2:
x2
1 =
and
x2
2 =
.5 p111 + p212
p1
.5 p111 + p212
p2
p
= .5 11 + 2 12
p
p1 1
= .5
1 + 12
p2
!
!
This implies
11 + (p2/p1) 12
+ .5
1 + (p2/p1)
p
11 + 2 12 = 11 + 21
p1
Is this testable?
Save Tomorrow?
SMT Plan:
No increase in savings today
Advantages:
No current increase
Option out
The facts:
1998: mid-size company, 315 eligible employees
you guys are saving too little!
79 employees: increase savings now
162 employees: no increase now, will try SMT
158 employees: remain in SMT plan for two years
Advice
2. Trust yourself