Atp 57 (B)
Atp 57 (B)
Atp 57 (B)
THE SUBMARINE
SEARCH AND
RESCUE MANUAL
ATP-57(B)
ATP-57(B)
THE SUBMARINE
SEARCH AND
RESCUE MANUAL
MARCH 2009
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Record of Reservations
1-6 TURKEY
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Record of Reservations
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RECORD OF CHANGES
Identification of By Whom Entered
NATO Effective
Change, Reg No. (if Date Entered (Signature; Rank, Grade or
Date
Any), and Date Rate; Name of Command)
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RECORD OF CHANGES
Identification of By Whom Entered
NATO Effective
Change, Reg No. (if Date Entered (Signature; Rank, Grade or
Date
Any), and Date Rate; Name of Command)
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Table of Contents
page
No.
Preface
0001 Purpose 1
0002 Scope 1
PART I
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3A01 Check off list ALFA: SSRA, Operation SUBLOOK Search phase . . . . . . I-3-A-1
3A02 Check off list BRAVO: SSRA, Operation SUBMISS Search phase . . . . . I-3-A-3
3A03 Check off list CHARLIE: OSC, Search phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-3-A-5
3A04 Check off list DELTA: Individual Units of the Search Force . . . . . . . . . . . I-3-A-7
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0603 The medical component of the Submarine Escape and Rescue Assistance Team
(SMERAT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-6-3
0604 Senior Medical Officer to SMERAT (SMO(S)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-6-4
0605 The senior casualty clinician (SCC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-6-4
0606 Medical Headquarters (MHQ) and the Medical Administration Officer (MAO) I-6-5
SECTION VI – Escape
SECTION VII – Survival hazards on the surface after Surface Abandonment or Escape
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SECTION X – Triage
SECTION XII – Transfer of casualties from escape and rescue ships to further medical
care
6B01 Check off list Hotel: Medical brief for recovery boats crews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-6-B-1
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GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-Glossary-1
ANNEX A - Abbreviations/Acronyms used in SUBSAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-A-1
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List of Illustrations
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List of Table
Page
No.
Part I
CHAPTER 1
ANNEX A
Table 1A-1 Summary of SMER applicable STANAGs. .....................................................I-1-A-1
CHAPTER 3
Table 3-1 Submarine SAR terminology. ...............................................................................I-3-4
Table 3-2 List of distinguishing signals used during SUBSAR Operations. ......................I-3-17
Table 3-3 Pyrotechnic Light Signals ...................................................................................I-3-24
CHAPTER 4
Table 4-1 SSRA decision making flowchart. ........................................................................I-4-1
CHAPTER 6
Table 6-1 Life expectancy times for immersion temperatures without SEIE. ....................I-6-27
Table 6-2 Allocation of treatment area by triage category. ................................................I-6-40
Table 6-3 Medical and recompression triage and treatment grid. .......................................I-6-41
ANNEX H
Table 6H-1 Master casualty state board. .............................................................................I-6-H-1
ANNEX I
Table 6I-1 Area casualty state board. .................................................................................. I-6-I-1
ANNEX M
Table 6M-1 Pressure unit conversion table. ........................................................................I-6-M-1
PART II
CHAPTER 3
Table II-3-1 Effects of high carbon dioxide concentrations. .................................................. II-3-2
Table II-3-2 Effect of low oxygen concentration. ................................................................... II-3-3
Table II-3-3 Submarine Rescue Oxygen Decompression Table ………………………….. II-3-20
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Table II-3-4 System Operator/Tender Oxygen Breathing Times (minutes) …………….… II-3-24
Table II-3-5 Required Oxygen Time ………………………………………………………. II-3-25
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PREFACE
1. ATP-57, The Submarine Search and Rescue Manual, contains principles and procedures that have
evolved as a result of experience and exercises and is used to implement Submarine Search and Rescue
(SUBSAR) Operations based on commonality and interoperability of Rescue Elements and Submarines all
around the world.
2. The Publication supplements the general principles and procedures set forth in the ATP-10
(SEARCH AND RESCUE), and in the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue
(IAMSAR) Manual, published jointly by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
ATP-57 and above mentioned documents, form the basic library for SUBSAR Operations 1.
3. The procedures and information for the Search, the coordination of Multinational Submarine
Rescue Elements during their mobilization to the scene of action, the Escape and Rescue phase of a
SUBSAR Operation, and the medical aspects for SUBSAR Operations are explained in separate chapters.
0001 Purpose
The purpose of the Submarine Search and Rescue Manual (ATP-57) is to provide guidance,
instructions, information and procedures governing the different phases of a SUBSAR Operation and the
command, control and manoeuvring of units during their mobilization to the scene of action, throughout
the Escape, Intervention and Rescue stages.
0002 Scope
This manual deals with information related to Submarine Escape and Rescue (SMER) and
addresses the techniques and procedures for SUBSAR Operations, on which further expansion of the
doctrine may be based. It also provides specialized information needed by authorities engaged in saving
lives at sea from a Distressed Submarine (DISSUB).
The manual provides the instructions and procedures required by Headquarters and/or
Commanders to issue orders to fulfil their responsibilities and enables subordinates to understand and
comply with them.. It also gives details of specific duties associated with the Mobilization of SMER
Resources, and with the execution of associated tasks.
This manual is intended to serve as a guide to worldwide Operational Commands and Commanders
that may be assigned responsibility during SUBSAR Operations, and in particular to the On Scene
Commander (OSC) and to the Coordinator of Rescue Forces (CRF).
1
See Note at page 2
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The International Submarine Escape and Rescue Liaison Office (ISMERLO) is the coordination
hub which, from the very beginning of a SUBSAR Operation, is responsible for facilitating the rescue
response to such an event (www.ismerlo.org).
This manual does not deal with the onboard aspects of submarine escape, but does deal with the recovery
of escapees once on the surface.
Note:
As indicated in footnote of ATP-10 (D), Page 3-B-1 Turkey does not accept relative zones in the map, until an
agreement is reached. Turkey recognizes her maritime SAR areas as declared in IMO.
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PART I
CHAPTER 1
Introduction to
SUBSAR operations
The general philosophy for Submarine Search and Rescue (SUBSAR) Operations is to provide a
reasonable level of assurance for the more likely Submarine accident situations and some, at least, for the
less likely, using those elements which are considered the most appropriate in response to the incident
worldwide.
While rescue is the preferred method of saving lives after a submarine accident, escape is also
possible even though it presents greater risks to the individual. Salvage of the whole submarine is
unlikely to be used as a means of saving life as it would probably take too long to accomplish even under
favourable circumstances. Some salvage related activities may, however, contribute towards escape or
rescue.
The following Documents record the principles, techniques and procedures for SUBSAR
Operations on which further expansion of the guidance may be based:
1. The International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) Manual,
published jointly by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO).
The primary focus of the three volumes of this Manual is to assist nations in meeting their own search and
rescue (SAR) needs, and the obligations they accepted under the Convention on International Civil
Aviation, the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (Hamburg 1979) and the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).
2. ATP-10 SEARCH AND RESCUE, which provides doctrine, instructions, and procedures
governing the command, control, and manoeuvring of NATO units in Search and Rescue Operations
during peace time. The SAR Panel of the NATO MC Air Standardization Board (MCASB) Air Support
Operations Working Group has the overall responsibility for this Publication, which includes a specific
chapter dedicated to the Search and Localization of a Submarine in distress. 2
3. ATP-57 (The Submarine Search and Rescue Manual) provides guidance, instructions,
information and procedures governing the command, control, mobilization and employment of SMER
2
See Note at page 2.
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Resources during the SUBSAR Operations. This manual is also under the MCMSB SMERWG
responsibility.
1. General.
This article briefly describes the different concepts, Authorities, phases and guidance used during
SUBSAR Operations.
It is a SAR principle that the appropriate authority may call upon one or more Rescue Coordination
Centre (RCC) to assist the operation. A SUBSAR operation does not normally come under the
responsibility of a RCC, due to the specific characteristics of a DISSUB, but the relevant RCC must be
duly informed of all activities that will be taking place during any phases of a SUBSAR Operation.
Annex 1A contains a summary of applicable NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAGs)
related to SMER issues, which may be named through this document.
2. The Alert.
Indication that a submarine has sunk or is in distress may come from a variety of sources, ranging
from merchant ships observing an untoward incident, through warships operating with the submarine, to
the Submarine Operating Authority (SUBOPAUTH) realising that the submarine has failed to report as
detailed in her orders, or any unit receiving distress signals from the submarine.
A Submarine Search and Rescue (SUBSAR) Operation can be divided into a number of phases the
first of which begins when the alert of a DISSUB is raised. The principal phases are:
Chapter 5 describes instructions and procedures for the Escape and Rescue phase. This phase may
last a number of days dependent upon DISSUB status, weather and sea-state conditions and rescue
element capabilities. Although the preference is to rescue the Submarine’s crew, an escape may be
conducted before or during the rescue, depending on the evolvement of the conditions in the DISSUB.
The CRF should only advise escape if waiting to be rescued would increase the hazard to the DISSUB
personnel.
Transition between the phases is rarely well defined, and because of the change of operational
focus, OSC must provide a comprehensive brief to the CRF. During the Escape and Rescue phase, the
OSC will provide the appropriate support to the CRF, utilizing those Forces and resources at his disposal.
Once the Alert is established, activation of SMER resources should start as soon as possible. All
mobilization will take place in accordance with either the requests of the DISSUB’s NA, or the initiative
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of those Nations intending to support. This could involve the mobilization of more than one rescue
element.
While the search is proceeding, the Submarine Search and Rescue Authority (SSRA) will normally
coordinate the call-out, embarkation and deployment of the Recovery and Rescue Forces in accordance
with the wishes of the NA. The SSRA should alert ISMERLO in order to obtain information about the
availability of Rescue Elements across the world.
Detailed information about the Search and Localization phase can be found at chapter 3.
Chapter 4 describes instructions and procedures to be carried out during the mobilization of the
SMER resources.
The DISSUB National Authority (NA) should provide a DLT to support the OSC and CRF. This
team should include submarine officers, medical officers (specialized in underwater and hyperbaric
medicine), design authorities, Submarine Escape and Rescue specialists, translators and media advisors.
The DLT must have available all applicable technical details of the DISSUB, to adequately advise
the OSC and CRF.
The DLT will also identify any requirements for additional manpower during extended operations.
Advice on local facilities may also be required from the port area closest to the DISSUB location or used
for forward support.
Rescue is the preferred method but escape is equally possible, depending on onboard conditions.
Crew may indeed be forced to escape before the arrival of any surface assistance or Rescue Elements, in
which case the Search Force may come upon escapees already on the surface and in need of treatment.
0106 Intervention
Intervention is the use of external resources to increase survivability. This can be surface or
subsurface, and is likely to involve specialist assets for survey, debris clearance and transponder field
preparation on and around the DISSUB. During the waiting time between location and rescue, but also
during the rescue itself, it may be necessary to maintain conditions on the DISSUB by ELSS) either "wet
re-supply using pressure tight pods posted into the escape tower by IROV, ADS or Divers, or "dry" by a
Submarine Rescue Vehicle (SRV) or Chamber (SRC). Some classes of submarine can accept an air
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supply connection and maintain a breathable atmosphere thereby (Ventilation). Chapter 3 deals with
Intervention.
If conditions aboard the DISSUB allow, personnel will wait to be rescued. This operation may take
several days to stage during which intervention operations may prepare for the arrival of Rescue Elements.
This could involve survey, debris removal, tracking preparation, re-supply of Emergency Life Support
Stores (ELSS) and, if appropriate Element and interfaces are available, the control of the DISSUB
atmosphere.
Rescue operations should commence once appropriate Rescue Elements arrive at the scene.
Note: No two situations will ever be the same. While not very likely, it is possible that lives will be
saved by both Escape and Rescue from the same DISSUB.
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ANNEX 1A
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PART I
CHAPTER 2
The DISSUB
0201 Introduction
This chapter provides information and guidance for Surface Forces and other Submarine Escape
and Rescue resources participating in a SUBSAR operation.
The purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of conditions that may exist in a DISSUB, as
well as circumstances and facts that will affect the conduct of the intervention and/or rescue. The chapter
also details the information available to the Commander or “Senior Survivor”, in order to evaluate the
situation.
Information about emergency equipment carried aboard can be found in the National Section of
this publication or will be provided by the DLT.
Submarines are designed to be neutrally buoyant when their main ballast tanks are full of water.
This allows them to dive and operate safely. Even if all electrical and propulsive power is lost a
submarine crew should be able to blow water out of the main ballast tanks, and other compensating tanks,
to give the submarine positive buoyancy to get it to the surface. However, if a large quantity of water
floods into the pressure hull of a submarine, after a catastrophic accident or due failure of a sea water
system which cannot be isolated, a point will be reached during the flooding when no action taken by the
submarine crew can compensate for the increased mass of the submarine and it will sink to the bottom.
The DISSUB crew may be exposed to several hazards that limit survivability and directly affect the
stay-time prior to escape and/or rescue. The most critical factors are:
- uncontrolled flooding,
- pressure rise,
- toxic atmosphere,
- temperature,
- loss of life support capability.
Where such catastrophic factors do not apply, the stay-time until surface support arrives for escape
or rescue will depend on previously mentioned conditions.
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It must be noted that if the pressure rises following the incident, the chances of carrying out a safe
escape are reduced and that a big proportion of the escapees could suffer from Decompression Illness
(DCI). These important factors will affect the crew stay-time on board a DISSUB.
It is likely that a percentage of the DISSUB personnel will suffer from injuries caused by the
accident itself or from exposure to the above conditions.
Diving and submarine medical experts are needed to make initial diagnoses of escapees and
rescuees, and treat exposure to the above conditions.
Detailed information and advice on physiological and medical issues are given in chapter 6.
Conditions in the submarine will depend on the severity of the accident that has caused the sinking
and the crew’s ability to stabilize the situation. Any submarine flooding will result in some internal
pressure rise; it is therefore imperative to keep it as near to atmospheric as possible because increased
pressure, as well as temperature, atmosphere contamination and the availability of food, will adversely
affect crew’s performance and reduce their chance of survival.
It can be safely assumed that it is virtually impossible for a submarine to bring itself to the surface
should any one of her main compartments be flooded. For there to be any personnel in the DISSUB
following an accident at least one of the escape bulkheads must be intact. In the "worst" case all those who
have survived the accident will be in one of the escape compartments. The compartment may be partially
flooded and/or may have an internal pressure above 1.0 bar (absolute). Each of these possibilities will
present different problems to the DISSUB personnel and to the recovery and rescue forces.
The decision on how and when to escape is the sole responsibility of the "Senior Survivor",
although as much advice as possible should be provided by surface forces. Ideally escape should take
place after search and recovery forces have located the DISSUB and are standing by on the surface to
provide assistance. However, conditions in the DISSUB may force the Senior Survivor to start the escape
before the arrival of surface forces that may arrive at the datum and find men in the water.
Factors affecting the time of escape will include conditions of current and tidal stream, light,
weather, and the proximity of surface forces as well as the pressure and atmosphere condition in the
DISSUB. Escape will not normally be delayed beyond the limits of pressure or atmosphere sustainability,
in order to await rescue, unless the Senior Survivor considers that circumstances justify such a delay, or
the depth of the DISSUB is such that successful escape is clearly out of the question. A partial escape to
lower the burden on remaining atmosphere control equipment is also to be considered.
2. Scenarios
Scenario within the DISSUB can be conveniently divided into the following categories:
a. Dry unpressurized. In this scenario, rescue is the preferred method of saving lives. In the event
that the submarine is not located, or some other adverse event or condition exists, escape may be
necessary.
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b. Dry pressurized. In this scenario, the major problem for the DISSUB crew is to decide whether
to escape or not. In general terms if the pressure rises, an increased likelihood of decompression
sickness will occur during escape.
c. Wet unpressurized. Ambient temperatures will fall more rapidly than in the dry unpressurized
compartment and hypothermia will be a major problem.
d. Wet pressurized. All the factors in the dry pressurized compartment apply, except that the rate
of fall in ambient temperature will be significantly greater. Hypothermia may again be a major
problem.
1. Escape compartments and equipment. Most nations' submarine escape and rescue policy is
based on the concept that, following an accident, if any portion of the submarine is left untouched, it must
be one of or either the forward and aft compartments. For this reason these compartments, or a pressure
tight room between compartments, are designated Escape Compartments and most SMER equipment and
materiel is concentrated in them. In one-compartment submarines, with no internal pressure tight
bulkheads, the whole pressure hull represents a single Escape Compartment.
SMER equipment and gear inside escape compartments could consist of some or all of the
following:
b. Submerged Signal Ejector and stores i.e. smoke candles, grenades and communications buoys.
g. Thermometer.
i. An escape tower with a common rescue seat (see STANAG 1297) around its upper hatch. Small
submarines may not have escape towers in which case only compartment escape is possible.
j. Hood Inflation System (HIS) to provide a supply of air to escapees whilst flooding up in the
escape tower immediately prior to escape and/or a built in breathing system (BIBS) to provide air
for compartment escape.
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k. Sufficient submarine escape immersion suits (SEIS) or hooded life jackets for everyone on
board with a small percentage surplus. (see paragraph 3. below for details on these elements).
n. Some submarines can release a life raft, which remains tethered to the DISSUB. The escapees
climb into it on reaching the surface.
The General lay-out and escape equipment fitted on board the different submarines can be found in
every Nation’s data contained in Section II, as well as in the rescue coordination pages of the ISMERLO
web page (www.ismerlo.org).
The crew will take every step to reduce their consumption of oxygen (O2 ) and production of
carbon dioxide (CO2 ) in order to prolong the survival time aboard. The posting of Emergency Life
Support Stores (ELSS) using pressure tight pods would further increase the waiting time. Nevertheless,
morale will be low and every effort must be made by surface forces to keep spirits on board the DISSUB
high, by keeping them well informed of the efforts being made on their behalf.
POD-Posting are carried out by descending pressure tight pods (by a ROV, SRV, ADS or a Diver),
from the surface, through an Escape Tower, to the DISSUB. Some submarines have specific devices to
receive PODs; other submarines may use the torpedo tubes or the escape trunks for it.
A suit that aids escape from a submarine, which meets the requirements of STANAG 1321.
The submarine personnel will utilize individual escape suit, life jacket or surface abandonment suit
which may have an integral life raft to provide thermal protection and buoyancy for personnel survival on
the surface.
For communications with the Submarine, see also chapter 5 and ATP-10 chapter 8. National data
concerning communications and ways for the submarine to announce her position are found in Part II.
1. Main Underwater Telephone (UWT). If possible, the DISSUB’s crew will use the UWT as a
primary source for communicating with the Search and Localization Forces (including the SPAG), as well
as with the Escape and Rescue Forces. It is a National responsibility to provide an update to the SMER
community with the technical data (e.g, frequencies both radio and UWT), as well as other embarked
equipment. These data can be found at Annex B of this publication, or at the coordination pages in the
ISMERLO web site (www.ismerlo.org).
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2. Emergency UWT. Some submarines are equipped with an emergency UWT, usually located at the
Escape compartments. These sets generally operate at 8 KHz and are power independent. Their primary
purpose is for communication between the DISSUB’s personnel and the surface forces once the submarine
has been located.
In addition some sets, typically sonar locator beacons, are able to transmit on additional frequencies
(details can be found at Annex B) to assist Search Forces in location or to enable Submarine Rescue
Vehicles to vector themselves on top of the DISSUB (Especially in case of very poor visibility
conditions).
3. Submarine indicator buoys. Some submarines are fitted with indicator buoys. They can be
released from inside the escape compartments or the compartments adjacent to them. They are usually
tethered to the submarine.
The buoys consist of an inflatable collar to support a radio unit that transmits on international
distress frequencies, (121.5, 243 or 406 MHz). They can be fitted with a flashing light. Because they
have a low margin of buoyancy they are not easily visible in any appreciable sea state except at short
range; it is also possible that they may not be seen in a strong tideway.
Some Indicator buoys transmit a unique 3-figure serial number. National Authorities hold up to
date lists of the indicator buoy numbers of all their submarines. Some nations, although allocated
indicator buoy numbers, have buoys which have no means of transmitting the allocated number.
Some buoys also transmit on the COSPASS/SARSAT frequencies. These buoys, named SEPIRB
(Submarine Emergency Position Indicator Radio Buoy), are normally floating. They transmit a string
containing a certain number of data such as the position coordinates (typically fixed once the buoy gets
activated), the time and an ID string identifying the single submarine. The information is received and
automatically routed to the COSPAS/SARSAT ashore station, automatically decoded by national
authority owning the submarine and in some cases automatically sent directly to the Subopauth for
subsequent actions.
4. Messenger buoys.
Submarines fitted for rescue by SRC may have a so called “messenger” buoy by each rescue seat.
The buoy is released from the escape compartment and carries a thin wire to the surface. This wire is used
to winch the SRC down onto the seat. Messenger buoys do not carry radio units.
5. Other communications buoys. Other communication buoys which could be used by the
submarine for Escape and Rescue purposes are:
a. Submarine Launched One-way Tactical buoy (SLOT Buoy). These buoys are similar to
JEZEBEL sonobuoys and can be released from the submarine signal Ejector at depths down to 300
mts or more. A short voice/CW message recorded on tape is transmitted on a pre-set VHF channel.
Frequencies available are numbers 25, 27, 29 and 31 of the normal JEZEBEL channels.
b. Expendable Communications Buoys (ECB). They can be released from the Submarine Signal
Ejector (SSE) and, in the emergency mode, transmit a pre-recorded message on 121,5 MHz, 243.0
MHz or 406.0 MHz.
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More exhaustive and educational information about typical configuration and equipments available
aboard of a DISSUB, can be found at Annex C
1. The decision on how and when to escape is the sole responsibility of the "Senior Survivor"
a. Rescue. A SRV or a SRC mates with the DISSUB and equalizes the pressure between them.
Thereafter hatches separating them are opened and personnel are transferred, from the DISSUB to
the SRV or SRC and thence to a MOSHIP or a place of safety.
Some Rescue Elements are capable of TUP operations enabling therapeutic decompression of
personnel who have been exposed to raised pressure.
Due to their complicated logistic requirements Rescue Elements may take several days to get to the
scene of an accident. For this reasons most submarine operating nations continue to fit appropriate
escape systems.
b. Escape. There are two methods of escape known as Tower Escape and Rush Escape:
(1) Tower Escape. One or more men in turn, dressed with an escape and survival suit, climb
into an escape tower. Once the lower hatch has been shut the tower is rapidly flooded and
pressurized while the escapee is kept supplied with air to breath and his suit is inflated to give it
positive buoyancy. Once the pressure between the tower and the outside water column is
equalized, the upper hatch opens and the escapee makes a rapid ascent to the surface.
(2) Compartment or rush escape. Some submarines, particularly those with a single
compartment pressure hull, rely on compartment escape. The system requires the whole
compartment being flooded, pressurized and equalised, at which point an escape hatch can be
opened and each man in rapid succession makes an ascent to the surface. Some submarines
fitted with the tower escape system can revert to the rush escape method, which is similar to the
compartment escape except that it is only used if accident has caused the escape compartment
to flood uncontrollably or the escape tower to be unserviceable. The major disadvantage of this
system is that in water deeper than 30 m (100 Ft) the number of casualties caused by prolonged
time under pressure will increase with depth. The likely maximum depth from which such an
escape can be performed is 70 m (230 Ft), with a survival rate of only a few escapees.
c. Submarine Escape Capsules. A small number of submarines are fitted with an escape capsule
which the whole (or a proportion) of the crew can climb into. Once released from the DISSUB,
the capsule floats to the surface.
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Once on the sea bed the options available to the crew will depend o nthe depth in which the submarine has
sunk:
1. Below submarine collapse depth. The submarine will implode and there will be no survivors;
2. Less than submarine collapse depth but deeper than maximum escape depth. Rescue may be
conducted dependent upon:
a. DISSUB being fitted with a NATO STANAG 1297 mating seat (submarine details in Part II
National data)
b. DISSUB being shallower than maximum mating depth of available rescue submersibles
(capabilities of rescue submersibles in Part II Chapter 1).
c. Air purification capacity onboard the DISSUB being capable of maintaining air purity within
safe limits whilst awaiting arrival of rescue forces which could take several days. This period
could be extended by posting Emergency Life Support Stores (ELLS) in pressure tight pods
through and Escape Tower, but this is limited to the depth capability of the escape tower.
d. Internal bulkheads being able to withstand the sea pressure.
3. Less than maximum escape depth. Rescue is still the safest means of recovering the crew of the
DISSUB. However if conditions in the submarine are deteriorating and the cre cannot risk waiting for
rescue forces to arrive they may have to take the decision, based on instructions onboard the submarine, to
make an escape. Advice on making this decision can be given by escape and rescue experts on the surface
but in the final analysis it remains the senior survivor’s decision.
Rescue has the advantage that the DISSUB’s crew are transferred, to the MOSHIP without being exposed
to an increased pressure. In certain circumstances, it is possible to transfer men, who have been
“saturated” at pressure, to a facility for slow decompression to atmospheric pressure. Not all rescue
systems are capable of achieving this and surface decompression t4echniques may have to be used with
their inherent risks.
The major and only disadvantage of using rescue submersibles is that it may take several days for the
submersibles and their mother ships (or VOOs) to get to the scene of the accident. For this reason most
submarine operating nations, particularly those whose submarines spend a large proportion of their
operating cycle in water in which escape would be possible, continue to fit appropriate escape systems.
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PART I
CHAPTER 3
0301 Introduction
1. Guidance for Use. This chapter contains information to enable operational commanders to
assemble the forces and equipment needed to search and locate a Distressed Submarine (DISSUB), and
establish communication with her. Guidance is also given to units engaged in the search for the DISSUB
and in particular to the On Scene Commander (OSC). In Submarine Search and Rescue (SUBSAR)
Operations, the Search and Localisation Phase begins transition to the rescue phase when either the
submarine or escapees from her crew are located. When this occurs, SUBSAR operations should transition
to ATP-57 as soon as possible for the recovery of escapees and rescue of survivors. The treatment of
pressure related injuries suffered by the DISSUB’s crew are covered in ATP-57 Chapter 6.
a. Standardise SUBSAR operational procedures for the Search and Localisation of a DISSUB.
b. Provide basic information to all those who may be confronted with a submarine rescue
scenario, either a distressed submarine on the surface or on the seabed
c. Serve as a guide for all operational commanders responsible for SUBSAR operations.
3. Aim. The aim of the SUBSAR organisation is to save lives by ensuring the earliest possible
localisation of the DISSUB and the recovery of her crew. Due to the relatively limited amount of
equipment immediately available to cope with a submarine disaster, offers of assistance are likely to be
received from many nations and much of them will be needed to ensure that as many lives as possible are
saved. Naturally this will complicate the problems of assembling and coordinating all suitable units and
equipment to the scene of the accident.
Therefore while SAR is in principle a national responsibility, it is for the sake of simplicity and
speed of response that the SUBSAR organisation will be the same in war as in peace, whether it be in a
NATO exercise/operation or not. This is achieved by providing a procedure for the prompt alerting of
forces to take part in the search while Rescue Elements mobilise toward the scene of action and other
vessels prepare more specifically for the rescue or the recovery and treatment of survivors.
The procedure for the prompt alerting and search is applicable to any SUBSAR operation whether
the DISSUB is assigned to NATO or not. Immediate establishment of an alert on the ISMERLO web site
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should be considered as soon as it is suspected that a submarine is distressed on the seabed or on the
surface.
0302 Definitions
Definitions contained in this article, are those specific SAR terms exclusively used during
SUBSAR Operations. They supplement other SAR terms and definitions contained in different related
documents.
1. Check Arrival Report. A signal transmitted by a submarine immediately upon its arrival in port.
This signal may be required by the Submarine Operational Authority (SUBOPAUTH).
2. Surfacing signal. A signal transmitted by a submarine to indicate the completion of a dived period
as covered by a Diving signal. Alternatively it concludes a passage or a leg of a passage as required by the
SUBNOTE and thereby cancels any extant Diving Signal or concludes any preceding series of Subchecks
Reports
3. Authorities. The following are the specific Authorities and Command and Control (C2)
definitions for a SUBSAR operation:
a. National Authority (NA). The State or Command Authority that has sovereignty over the
DISSUB.
b. Alerting Authority (AA). Typically the Commander (SUBOPAUTH) who has operational
control of the DISSUB is responsible for initiating the Submarine Safety Communications Check
(COMCHECK) procedure, as well as the Operation SUBLOOK/SUBMISS/SUBSUNK procedures
(see Annex 3B). The SUBOPAUTH is the Naval Authority responsible for the safe routeing of a
submarine under his Operational Control (OPCON).
c. Submarine Search and Rescue Authority (SSRA). The Naval Authority designated by the
National Authority (OPCOM) responsible for the planning and conduct of Submarine search,
escape and rescue operations.
The SSRA may be a national or NATO Maritime Component Commander or appointed maritime
commander, depending upon the requirements of the NA or the Authority which establishes the
submarine OPCON. The SSRA will operate in coordination with the relevant RCC.
The DISSUB’s NA should seek prior agreements with concerned national or NATO
Commands. The SSRA is to be nominated either in an (EX)OPORD or in the relevant tasking
documents. The responsibilities of the SSRA may be passed to or from the relevant
National/NATO Authorities.
d. Support Authority (SA). Any authority that provides assistance to the NA and/or SSRA.
e. On Scene Commander (OSC). The Commander of the military unit which first reaches the
vicinity of an accident or datum is to act as OSC until relieved or confirmed by SSRA..
In the event that the first unit on the scene is an aircraft, the aircraft Commander will retain control
of SAR operations until the arrival of a surface unit Commander, which then will assume the duties
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of OSC. In all other cases, in order to maintain continuity of Command, the Officer who
subsequently may arrive on the scene is not to assume Command by reason of seniority unless or
until:
f. Coordinator Rescue Forces (CRF). Designated by the SSRA. The Officer with responsibility
for coordinating and controlling the recovery of escapees and/or the rescue of the crew from the
DISSUB.
During multinational rescue responses takes advice of the Rescue Element Commanders or
National Rescue Coordinators (if assigned) to develop and task the Rescue Element Commanders
(REC) to execute the rescue plan.
The CRF may or may not be subordinated to the OSC; in case it is not subordinated, the CRF will
take the lead on the rescue operations and the OSC will support the CRF as far as it is needed,
sanitizing the area and providing help with available resources. Anyway, close coordination
between CRF and OSC is paramount for the success of the rescue operation.
g. National Rescue Coordinator (NRC). Subordinate to the CRF within the Rescue operation.
Frequently provided during multinational operations by a nation providing rescue elements. (Could
likely be a CRF if responding to his own nations disabled submarine.) Would provide the CRF
advice and recommendations on the best utilization of his/her nations assigned rescue capabilities.
h. Rescue Element Commander (REC). Subordinate to the CRF within the Rescue operation. In
Command of the Rescue Element (rescue or intervention or both) with responsibility for conducting
either the rescue of the crew, the recovery of the escapees or the intervention as indicated and
directed by the CRF. Responsible to his/her own National Authority for the operation of assigned
systems. During multinational operations provides the CRF advice and recommendations on the
best utilization of his/her assigned rescue capabilities.
When an NRC is assigned would follow national procedures with respect to command and
control relationship with the CRF.
4. Submarine Escape and Rescue Specialists. During SMER operations, the headquarters of
the SSRA should be provided with the following specialists (liaison officers):
Prior to the DISSUB location (Search and Localisation phase), as well as on the scene of action
(during the Rescue Phase), experts mentioned above should also be provided to the OSC and/or to the
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CRF. Diving and underwater medical specialists might be sent to any recompression therapy centre which
could help during the operation.
ISMERLO has been established at Allied Submarine Command in Norfolk, VA. This office provides a
worldwide coordination capability and monitors the availability of Escape and Rescue Elements which
may assist any nation facing a submarine disaster. The capability is built from a small group of people,
civilian and/or military, provided by different nations to work in the area of SMER. As a global response
organisation, focused on humanitarian objectives to contribute on saving lives at sea, the ISMERLO is
encouraged to pursue the involvement of all submarine-operating nations.
Definitions and terms shown in table 3 -1 below are used during SUBSAR Operations. Although
some terms belong to the Rescue Phase, hence belong to ATP-57 procedures, they have also been listed on
this table only for information purposes.
TERM DEFINITION
CHECK ARRIVAL A signal transmitted by a submarine immediately upon its arrival in port. The
REPORT signal may be required by the SUBOPAUTH
The signal originated by SUBOPAUTH when the safety of a submarine is in
COMCHECK
doubt.
Coordinator Rescue The Officer with responsibility for coordinating and controlling the recovery of
Forces (CRF) escapees and/or the rescue of the crew from the DISSUB
Last known position of DISSUB. Used as the starting point for all search plans.
Datum
It will be updated and marked when true position is known.
As it is stated in AAP-6, a DISSUB is a distressed submarine on the seabed
Distressed unable to surface. For the purpose of alert and possible mobilization of
Submarine submarine Escape and Rescue Elements, the Submarine Escape and Rescue
(DISSUB) community also calls DISSUB to a surfaced submarine needing assistance due to
a diving/safety emergency.
A signal transmitted by a submarine before it dives, indicating the date and time
Diving Signal
of dive, date and time of completion, position and reason for diving.
Emergency Life Items of stores for use by the personnel in the DISSUB to enable them to survive
Support Stores whilst awaiting rescue. Stores include such items as CO2 absorbent, O2 candles
(ELSS) and medical stores for emergency treatment of casualties.
Any method by which a man leaves a DISSUB and makes his way to the surface
Escape without direct assistance from outside Rescue Elements. A man who makes an
escape is known as an 'escapee’.
Escape Gear Ship Any ship nominated by the SSRA to carry medical stores and equipment to
(EGS) facilitate the recovery and treatment of escapees on reaching the surface.
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TERM DEFINITION
A communications buoy which can be launched by a DISSUB from a
Submarine
Submerged Signal Ejector (SSE). When on the surface it operates on a
Expendable
predetermined UHF frequency and when released in the emergency mode
Communications
transmits an emergency DF beacon which can be detected by satellites or other
Buoy (ECB)
receivers.
International Submarine Escape & Rescue Liaison Office (ISMERLO).
Multinational coordinating office for Submarine Escape and Rescue related
ISMERLO
issues. The office provides coordination through its web site management
system on Internet at www.ismerlo.org
A ship used to carry a Submarine Rescue Element to the scene of the submarine
MOSHIP
accident.
The Moving Haven (MHN) is the normal method by which submarines are
routed. The standard MHN is an area 20 Nautical Miles (NM) ahead, 30 NM
Moving Havens behind, and 5 NM on either side of the submarine’s planned position. The MHN
(MHN) should be reduced in size in restricted waters. In peacetime, the shape of an
MHN may be varied to suit the operational requirements. The size of the MHN
is stated in the SUBNOTE.
Responsible for the conduct of the search with the assets allocated by the SSRA.
On Scene The OSC will also carry out the peripheral activities required, among them force
Commander (OSC) protection, after the DISSUB has been located leaving the CRF free to
concentrate on saving lives.
Small radio transmitters in a container capable of withstanding pressure
Personal Locator equivalent to the maximum escape depth of the DISSUB. PLBs are worn by
Beacons (PLB) escapers (though not normally carried by all) and when switched on transmit an
emergency DF beacon. Most recent models are Satellite based.
The Codeword of an exercise which may be executed to test any or all of the
procedures and practices required in a submarine disaster. SMASHEX may
exercise specific parts of the SUBLOOK/SUBMISS/SUBSUNK sequence as
follows:
SMASHEX
- SMASHEX ZERO equates to COMCHECK
- SMASHEX ONE equates to SUBLOOK
- SMASHEX TWO equates to SUBMISS
- SMASHEX THREE equates to SUBSUNK
The signal transmitted by a submarine at specified intervals to ensure the
SUBOPAUTH of her continued safety. No other signal received from a
submarine may replace a SUBCHECK REPORT. Non-receipt of other
SUBCHECK Report
anticipated signals should not normally give rise to undue concern although in
such circumstances it may be appropriate to initiate a SUBMARINE SAFETY
COMCHECK.
The Codeword of the procedures initiated by the SUBOPAUTH when the safety
SUBLOOK (Format of a submarine is in doubt, or when a Surfacing Signal, Check Arrival Report or
at Annex 3B) SUBCHECK Report from a submarine under his operational control becomes
one hour overdue.
Submarine Escape A team of Submarine Escape and Rescue experts augmented by medical
and Rescue specialists who are available to provide advice and assistance to the SSRA, OSC
Assistance Team and CRF.
(SMERAT)
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TERM DEFINITION
A communications buoy that can be launched by a DISSUB from a Submerged
Submarine Launched Signal Ejector. When on the surface they operate on one of a number of
One-way Tactical predetermined VHF frequencies (compatible with `Jezebel’ Passive Sonobuoy
(SLOT) Buoy monitoring channels). Although normally used to pass operational data, the buoy
could be also used by a Submarine in Distress (DISSUB).
A bell that can mate with the NATO common rescue seat but in addition has to
Submarine Rescue
be fitted with special securing arrangements. Capable of rescuing up to 6
Chamber
personnel at a time.
Submarine Rescue Any submersible craft which may be used for the recovery of personnel from a
Vehicle (SRV) DISSUB. For full details, see ATP 57.
SUBMISS is the Codeword used for an operation that will be executed in order
to initiate a fully coordinated search for a submarine that is believed to be
missing. The SUBOPAUTH will normally originate a signal with this codeword
SUBMISS (Format
when a Surfacing signal, SUBCHECK Report or a Check Arrival Report of a
at Annex 3B)
submarine is 6 hours overdue, or for one-compartment submarines 3 hours
overdue. These periods are not mandatory and will depend on the situation or
national policy.
As stated in AAP-6, a SUBNOTE is a message report originated by a submarine
operating authority providing operational and movement instructions for
Submarine Notice
submarines in peace and war, including transit and patrol area information. The
(SUBNOTE)
SUBNOTE accurately defines the route that the centre of the Submarine MHN
will follow.
SUBSUNK is the Codeword used for an operation that will be executed in order
to initiate a fully co-ordinated search for a submarine that is known to have sunk.
SUBSUNK (Format
The codeword is also used by any authority or unit to signal when having
Annex 3B)
positive information that a submarine has sunk (eg, when submarine has been
located).
Submarine Parachute A team of escape and rescue experts, augmented by medical specialists,
Assistance Group available at short notice to parachute into the water to rescue survivors and give
(SPAG) first aid medical treatment before the arrival of surface rescue ships.
A signal transmitted by a submarine to indicate the completion of a dived period
Surfacing Signal
as covered by a Diving Signal or SUBNOTE
The term survivor is only to be used for personnel who have escaped or been
Survivor recovered from the DISSUB and, in the opinion of a medical expert, are deemed
likely to live.
The time at which the SUBOPAUTH must have received a Surfacing Signal or a
Check Arrival Report from a Submarine. A SURFACING ZERO (SZER) TIME
is used when a submarine dives on a diving signal or for the last port in a
Subnote. The ARRIVAL ZERO (AZER) TIME is used in SUBNOTES only for
intermediate port visits. The meaning of AZER and SZER in terms of submarine
SURFACING and safety as described in this publication is equal.
ARRIVAL ZERO SURFACING and ARRIVAL ZERO TIME also designates the time to execute:
TIME a. SUBMARINE SAFETY COMCHECK (at SURFACING or ARRIVAL
ZERO TIME).
b. SUBLOOK (at SURFACING or ARRIVAL ZERO TIME plus one
hour).
c. SUBMISS (at SURFACING or ARRIVAL ZERO TIME plus 6 hours,
or 3 hours for one-compartment submarines).
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TERM DEFINITION
This duty should be assumed automatically by the first ship or submarine
Underwater arriving in the datum area and capable of communicating with or intercepting
Communications messages from a DISSUB. A suitably fitted helicopter may temporarily assume
Guard this duty until the arrival of the first Underwater Telephone (UWT) fitted ship or
submarine.
Submarine Rescue Any asset specifically designed or used for Submarine Escape and Rescue
Element Operations.
Any Submarine Rescue Element or set of Submarine Rescue Elements to be
Submarine Rescue
employed during the Escape and Rescue phase of a SUBSAR Operation or
System
during the preparations for this phase.
Any vessel (normally civilian) potentially available to carry onboard a
Vessel of
Submarine Rescue System to the DISSUB area. When the VOO is selected to
opportunity (VOO)
wear a System, it is called MOSHIP.
1. National Authority (NA). The NA is responsible for the Sovereignty, National Administration
and National Operations outside the immediate search area and for arranging National and NATO support
to the SSRA. By reason of financial responsibility, the NA will normally initiate the request to other
nations for logistic submarine SAR support (submarine rescue vehicles, commercial submersibles, diving
equipment, SUBSUNK stores, etc). The NA may delegate the coordination of support to the SSRA
conducting the SAR operation.
2. Alerting Authority (AA). Responsible for initiating the SUBSAR Operation, using the
SUBLOOK/SUBMISS/SUBSUNK procedures (see Annex 3B). If the position of the DISSUB is
unknown, the AA will advise the SSRA and the OSC on the extent of the Submarine Search and Rescue
Zone and, if possible, the most likely position of the submarine. The AA will normally establish the alert
on the ISMERLO web site. The ALERT can be created by any person having access to the web site as
soon as it is known that a Submarine is in distress.
c. Call upon one or more RCCs to assist with all means available.
d. On request by the NA, coordinate the logistic support for the submarine SAR operation.
e. Be responsible for the overall conduct of the search including provision of Search Forces. The
SSRA is also to coordinate the makeup of the Rescue Force, subject to overriding NA approval of
financial outlay.
f. Keep all appropriate involved authorities informed (including MODs/CHODs), about the
progress of the SUBSAR operation and any requirements for additional support.
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4. Support Authority. In submarine accidents requiring additional facilities, other commands shall
make available to the NA and/or SSRA all requested assistance, if applicable.
a. Assume responsibility for the SUBSAR Operation at the scene of the accident.
b. Send Situation Reports (SITREPs) which will serve to keep his own forces, the SSRA and NA
informed on the progress of the search. These SITREPs will be sent by the OSC on arrival at the
datum and at three-hourly intervals thereafter.
c. With the arrival of the Coordinator of Rescue Forces (CRF) provide overarching control of the
force and support to the CRF to execute the rescue operation.
d. Further information on specific use of the rescue coordination pages will be included in a
future annex.
Any ISMERLO web site member from any nation can activate an alert (real or exercise alert).
When activating a real alert, the system automatically sends an SMS to those responsible for Submarine
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Rescue Elements and SMER experts from Nations all over the world, facilitating the rapid response of
countries and people which could help during a Submarine Rescue Operation.
1. Sailing and Routing of Submarines. Submarines are routed by means of SUBNOTEs. The
SUBNOTE is to indicate details, when applicable, of the time at which the SUBOPAUTH will change
2. General Instructions for Check Arrival Report. A Check Arrival Report is sent by the
submarine once in port. It cancels the prior part of her SUBNOTE and has to be sent by the submarine and
received by the SUBOPAUTH before the “Arrival Zero Time” expires.
It is to be used if ports occur in a SUBNOTE and should be repeated for every port visit in the
SUBNOTE. After the Check Arrival Report the submarine will finish sending SUBCHECK messages (if
being used). Note that after a SZER Time the submarine can continue with a surfaced transit during which
a ‘SUBCHECK’ report could still be required.
3. General Instructions for Diving Signals. Except when operating in accordance with a
SUBNOTE, a Diving Signal is always to be made before a submarine dives, whether an attendant vessel is
present or not. The Submarine is not to dive until this signal has been cleared. One Diving Signal may
cover a series of dives in any specific exercise. Format for the Diving Signal is at Annex B.
5. General Instructions for SUBCHECK Reports. In order that they can be assured of the
continued safety of submarines under their control, SUBOPAUTHs will instruct submarines to make
SUBCHECK Reports at intervals specified in SUBNOTEs, Exercise or Operation orders. SUBCHECK
Reports may be waived at the discretion of the SUBOPAUTH with national approval
6. SUBCHECK Report Interval. The time interval between consecutive SUBCHECK reports. The
allowed interval is at the discretion of the SUBOPAUTH. It is measured from:
7. Safety in Exercises. In advanced exercises, the Officer Scheduling the Exercise (OSE), with prior
approval of national SUBOPAUTHS, may waive requirements for Diving or Surfacing Signals and
SUBCHECK Reports. This waiver must be included in the Exercise or Operation Order.
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b. Contact with a submerged submarine has been lost by participating units for a period of 2
hours, when such loss of contact has not been planned or anticipated as part of the exercise or
operation.
c. There is reason to believe that a submarine has suffered some form of breakdown and requires
assistance.
a. A vessel reports collision with an unknown object in an area where submarine(s) operate(s).
c. The sighting of wreckage, diesel fuel or air bubbles on the surface in an area where a submarine
is known to have been operating.
d. The sighting of red grenades or flares. The unexpected sighting of smoke candles or grenades
(of any colour) or a patch of fluorescent green dye on the surface may also be evidence that a
submarine accident has occurred.
i. Failure of a submarine to surface when ordered during specific exercises with anti-submarine
forces.
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An initial search is made of the submarine’s Exercise Area or Moving Haven, by ships in company
with the submarine and/or submarines, Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) and helicopters that might
be in close proximity. No other ships, submarines or aircraft are to divert to join the search until
ordered to do so by the authority conducting SUBLOOK.
The SUBLOOK Signal and an ISMERLO alert if initiated, will alert other rescue responders,
nations, appropriate RCC’s and other designated personnel to the possibility of a submarine
accident. The SUBLOOK will normally state the time at which it is intended to escalate to
SUBMISS, should SUBLOOK fail to establish the safety of the submarine.
(2) Send a signal to the submarine advising it that SUBLOOK has been initiated for it.
(3) Alert all units operating in the vicinity to submarine's expected position. Nothing should
inhibit authorities from initiating SUBMISS or SUBSUNK, without the preliminary
SUBLOOK, if circumstances dictate so. Although 5 hours (or 2 hours for single-compartment
submarines) is the normal maximum for the SUBLOOK phase, this may be extended by the
responsible authority (e.g. in the case of submarines on passage to distant waters). If possible,
the expected time of escalation to SUBMISS should be included in the SUBLOOK Signals.
(4) Provide minimum estimated survival time based on last contact, personnel onboard and
available stores and determine estimated time to first rescue.
(5) Consider the possibility/need of activating an alert on the ISMERLO web site
(www.ismerlo.org) especially if survival is potentially limited or TTFR is near or exceeds
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survivability. During the SUBLOOK phase, an ISMERLO alert will provide rescue responders
to make initial assessment of time to first rescue and availability of potential airlifts and vessels
of opportunity. Rescue Systems will not be mobilized during SUBLOOK.
(1) The initial search (SUBLOOK) has failed to establish the safety of the submarine, or
(2) A SUBCHECK Report, Surfacing Signal or Check Arrival Report is 6 hours overdue or 3
hours for one-compartment submarines based on SURFACING ZERO TIME.
(3) Circumstances indicate the need for an immediate full-scale search for a submarine. It may
be appropriate to declare SUBMISS or even SUBSUNK without first declaring SUBLOOK for
a preliminary search.
The release of the SUBMISS Signal will initiate a full-scale coordinated search that will
continue until the submarine or survivors are located. At the same time an Alert should be
activated on the ISMERLO web-page and preparations are to be made for a rescue operation.
Operational commanders should consider beginning rescue mobilization during SUBMISS
procedures when the submarine in question is predicted to have limited survivability or the
predicted TTFR is extensive. In this case actions should include early pre-positioning of rescue
system deployment aircraft for loading and mobilizing rescue systems to designated rescue
ports. These actions minimize TTFR while permitting decision makers additional time to
validate distressed submarine indications in the case where clear SUBSUNK criteria (e.g.,
direct contact with a distressed submarine, SEPIRB message reception) are not met.
c. SUBSUNK. Is intended for use when there are significant positive indications or is known that
a submarine has sunk (e.g., direct contact with a distressed submarine, SEPIRB message reception).
The signal will initiate full-scale search and rescue operation if this has not already been initiated
by declaration of SUBMISS.
0308 General instructions to the OSC and Units of the Search Force
1. Command of the Search Force. The SSRA has overall responsibility for the Search and Rescue
operation. The OSC is in command of all forces at the scene of the accident and the choice of the right
unit for this task is important. The following points are also relevant:
a. The SSRA should nominate (or confirm) the OSC as soon as possible. The OSC has to inform
all concerned as soon as he assumes the responsibilities of OSC. The ship of the OSC is to be
marked by a large red flag at the mast head by day and by an all-round flashing red light at the mast
head by night.
b. The OSC should establish a datum position Search Area based on the datum and send a
SITREP to the SSRA and the rest of the Search Force.
c. Whenever possible specialists sent to the scene of the accident should be embarked in the
OSC’s ship or in other units at the scene of action
d. The OSC should take appropriate actions in accordance with the check-off list CHARLIE (see
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Annex 3A).
2. SUBLOOK - Action by Ships and Submarines. On receipt of SUBLOOK, ships and submarines
should take the following action:
a. Ships in company with the submarine concerned should attempt to contact the submarine by all
available means. They should also initiate a visual search in the area with available naval and air
assets as ordered by OSC.
b. Submarines in company should surface, make a Surfacing Signal and act as ordered by the
OSC.
c. Other ships and submarines take no action until ordered to do so by the SSRA. Units more than
4 hours steaming from the Search Area/Datum are unlikely to be ordered to join the search unless
the incident escalates to SUBMISS.
c. Ships exercising with non-stricken dived submarines are to initiate surfacing procedures for
these submarines immediately. Ships are to remain in the vicinity until all submarines involved in
the exercise are safely on the surface. Additionally, ships are to inform the submarines of the
emergency before proceeding.
a. Come to immediate notice for full power, and continue with their programme.
b. If appropriate, report to the SSRA the estimated time of being ready to proceed.
c. Signal requirements for any additional personnel required for a Submarine SAR operation.
They are to take no other action unless ordered by the SSRA.
5. Details of Ships in Search Force. The SSRA requires information from units and Commands to
assist in the organization of the search. All ships proceeding to the search area are to report by
PRIORITY signal addressed to the SSRA the following information:
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g. Any additional equipment fitted or any defects or shortages particularly to sonar and
communications that affect the ship’s capabilities in a submarine SAR operation, including Portable
UWT and earliest launch time of UWT fitted helicopters or aircraft.
The SSRA will pass to the OSC details of those units who will be joining the Search Force. It is
important to keep the communication circuit as clear as possible particularly at the start of a
SUBMISS/SUBSUNK operation and, therefore, the signal is to be kept brief. Paragraphs that are NIL
may be omitted.
6. Check Off Lists. Check of lists for Search and Localisation phase are at Annex 3A.
During the early stages of the operation, the SSRA will be coordinating the transfer of DLT to the
scene of action.
A comprehensive two-way brief should be given as soon as the specialist advisers arrive on board.
As well as operational aspects, the brief should address possible problems, especially those after the
recovery of escapees, any advice or requirements that the visiting specialists may have, and also the
geography and domestic arrangements onboard the ship.
Once the team is onboard, it is essential that the ship provides a dedicated Liaison Officer, familiar
with the ship’s capabilities and layout, especially her communications outfit.
1. The crew of a DISSUB may be able to indicate her position by one or more of the following
methods:
b. Firing Submarine Launched One Way Transmission (SLOT) buoys which transmit on VHF
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c. Firing an expendable communications buoy (ECB) or SEPIRB, which will transmit a SARBE
DF beacon.
d. Firing yellow or white smoke candles or red or green grenades. The smoke candles may have
fluorescent dye containers attached, which produce patches of green dye in the water, and may also
carry a message.
e. Transmitting her name in voice plain language and/or in SST mode on the UWT.
g. Hull tapping.
i. Transmitting on UWT, maybe using the DISSUB bleeper if ships are thought to be close by.
2. If power supplies are available, the DISSUB will try to transmit continuously. If power supplies are
not available, the DISSUB crew will concentrate on using the Emergency UWT during sonar silence
periods, or at any interval, whenever the Senior Survivor believes it may attract the attention of the Search
Force. Additional information on DISSUB means of communication and other submarine specific data
are contained on the ISMERLO website www.ismerlo.org (rescue coordination pages)
3. Unless the DISSUB is observed to sink or in case she is not COSPAS/SARSAT Buoy capable, the
crew has to expect the Search Force to arrive in the vicinity well after one of her Safety signals is overdue.
Under this condition, it is possible that the DISSUB will fire smoke candles, if able to do so, in order to:
b. Attract the attention of any surface vessels that may be heard in the vicinity.
4. The submarine's crew will probably reserve a portion of smoke candles for discharge in the
following circumstances:
b. Shortly before escape has to be started (pending on physiological conditions inside the
submarine) in the hope that any aircraft or surface ship will see them.
This article aims to provide details of the likely situation at sea in a SUBSAR operation, some of
the problems likely to be encountered and guidance on the conduct of the search.
ORIGINAL
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ATP-57(B)
1. Degree of urgency. The earliest possible location of the DISSUB and/or escapees is of paramount
importance to the saving of the maximum number of lives.
2. Guidance for the OSC. The OSC is to conduct a search of the area detailed by the SSRA, using
the allocated Forces. The OSC is to transmit SITREPS both to the authorities ashore, and to his own
force. These should be sent on arrival at the datum and every 3 hours thereafter.
3. Appearance of escapees/survivors on the surface. It is possible that the crew may have escaped
from the DISSUB before the arrival of the search force, or survivors were left on surface before the
submarine sank. They will probably be wearing brightly coloured submarine escape and survival suits and
may be showing lights. Escapees may also blow whistles to attract attention and may be carrying PLBs to
assist location.
4. The datum position. If the position of the submarine is unknown, it is essential that a Datum
Position for the search should be established. If surface ships are operating with the submarine when the
accident occurs, the Senior Officer of this force is responsible for establishing a Datum Position. If no
surface ships are present when the accident occurs, the responsibility for defining the Datum Position lies
with the SSRA.
5. Datum position marking. It is essential that the Datum Position is positively marked and
accurately fixed at the earliest possible moment. The presence of a local reference point is of considerable
help to aircraft and to those vessels with limited navigational aids. When the depth of water permits, one
of the searching ships (preferably a less capable search platform) should be anchored in the Datum
Position. If this is not possible, a Dan Buoy with a radar reflector should be laid. If fitted, the ship
marking the Datum Position is to utilise a vertical search-light and IFF Mode 3 to advertise her role.
6. Promulgation of Datum Position. In all cases the position of the Datum, and how it is being
marked, should be promulgated as soon as possible together with an indication of the accuracy of the fix.
7. Priority of types of search. The priorities for types of search should be visual (and ESM), passive
sonar, active sonar. The following should be noted when conducting visual or active sonar searches:
a. Visual. The main requirement is to cover the whole area as soon as possible in order to sight an
Indicator Buoy, smoke candles, other visual indications of the submarine’s position, or indeed
survivors in the water. For this reason aircraft provide an invaluable method of searching the area.
b. Active Sonar. Not all units will be capable of this type of search. Depending on the equipment
available and the prevailing climatic and bathymetric conditions, the success of this type of search
against a bottomed, zero-Doppler target is by no means assured.
ORIGINAL
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ATP-57(B)
(4) As direct UWT link when the DISSUB has been found.
Due to the overlap the Search and Localization Phase normally will have with the Rescue Phase
during SUBSAR operations, the provisions of this article may cover all phases of the operation, although
instructions contained are more focused on the Search and Localization Phase.
b. ISMERLO Alert. Activating an alert on the ISMERLO website will automatically provide
immediate notification to registered SMER experts and rescue system capable nations world wide
c. Traffic management suggested rule. Experience has shown that SUBSAR operations can
generate a large amount of signal traffic. It may be highly desirable for the appropriate Maritime
Commander to implement MINIMIZE. In addition, as some units may not have on-line
communications facilities, traffic addressed to such ships must be kept to a minimum. Traffic
levels can also be reduced by sensible use of a policy of reporting by exception. The SSRA should
consider this whenever issuing a blanket request for information.
d. Visual communications. Table 3-2 below contains a list of distinguishing signals used by units
and Commands, during a SUBSAR Operation
ORIGINAL
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ATP-57(B)
b. Underwater Communications Guard. This duty should be assumed automatically by the first
ship or submarine arriving in the area and capable of communicating with, or intercepting messages
from a sunken submarine. Subsequently the OSC is to detail the most suitable ship available and,
as the search develops, a Guard Ship should be detailed for each searching Group. A helicopter
fitted with UWT may temporarily assume the duty of Underwater Communications Guard until the
arrival of the first UWT-fitted ship or submarine.
c. Initial calling of the DISSUB. Having marked the Datum position, the first ship capable should
carry out a periodic listening watch on sonar and attempt to establish communication by UWT. A
visual or active sonar search should not prejudice this initial action.
d. Use of UWT. No ship, submarine or helicopter of the Search Force is to transmit any
underwater signal unless:
(1) Suspected UWT Communications have been received from what appears to be the
DISSUB.
(2) The initial call is being made (See paragraph 0312.2.(c) above).
The time of all calls on UWT made by searching ships is to be logged so that subsequent
reports of interception of UWT messages can be evaluated.
Throughout the entire SUBSAR operation, ship and submarine names should be used on UWT.
e. Firing of Single Charges During Search. In order to keep the stricken submarine informed of
the presence and movements of surface ships, and indicate to her that distress signals will be seen,
the Search Force is to fire a single grenade every 10 minutes. If the Search Force is split into
several groups, the OSC must decide whether more than one ship should fire the charges; if it is
decided that the spread of forces merits more than one unit firing single charges, the OSC must co-
ordinate the firings to avoid confusion and interference.
ORIGINAL
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ATP-57(B)
f. Sonar Silence Periods. To give the DISSUB the best chance of being heard, all units of the
Search Force in the probability area are to stop all sonar transmissions from minute 00 to minute
05, and minute 30 to minute 35 of every hour. If possible, ships and submarines are to stop engines
during these periods. However, if the prevailing conditions make this impracticable, the OSC
should order units to slow to below cavitation inception speed during these periods.
Units in contact with an object on the seabed are also to maintain the silence periods, unless
conditions are so bad and the contact so faint that it is unlikely to be lost if transmissions are
ceased. Other units in the vicinity are to be informed.
1. Actions on Hearing Transmissions from the DISSUB. The ship, submarine or helicopter
hearing UWT, sonar, echo sounder transmissions or hull tapping is to:
a. Initiate the signal for sonar silence by any available method. The visual signal during
submarine SAR operations is:
(1) By day - Ships fly two black pennants and fire a green Very light. Submarines fire a green
grenade. Helicopters fire a green Very light.
(2) By night - As by day, less the pennants.
(1) Assume the duties of Underwater Communications Guard, if capable, keeping the OSC
informed.
(2) Ships in the vicinity are to reduce to slow speed and maintain sonar silence while the signal
for silence is in force.
(1) “In Communication With”. The expression 'in communication with' is not to be employed
unless the DISSUB has answered a call or has replied to a specific underwater morse or voice
signal, originally transmitted by one of the Search Force.
(2) ”Heard”. The term 'heard' is to be used to describe the receipt of any unusual transmissions
which do not in themselves comprise a call, answer to a call or indefinite signal.
2. Actions on Sighting a Submarine Indicator Buoy. The sighting of a Submarine Indicator Buoy
may well be the first indication of a submarine accident. Consequently, on sighting such a buoy, the
following actions are to be taken:
ORIGINAL
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ATP-57(B)
b. If possible, report the number of the buoy to enable its source to be identified by the
SUBOPAUTH.
Establishing the status of a buoy may be problematic; however, its physical state, whether or not it
is still transmitting, and any relative movement will help in evaluating whether or not there has been a
submarine accident. It is vital that the wire should not be broken. Under no circumstances should a boat
be attached to the buoy, nor turns taken on the wire once it has been established that the buoy is not adrift.
Divers should on no account to use the Indicator Buoy wire to pull them down to the DISSUB.
Full details of the Submarine Indicator buoys carried by each class of submarine are given in the
section II of this publication.
1. Ending Search and Localisation phase. With the location of the DISSUB, the Search phase of
the operation is complete and Recovery and/or Rescue should follow without delay in accordance with
ATP-57 procedures.
It is possible that the DISSUB will be located prior to the arrival of the Recovery or Rescue Forces,
it is also possible to find escapees on the surface. In this eventuality the OSC should follow the procedures
for Submarine Rescue stated in ATP-57) as far as possible.
The designated Coordinator Rescue Forces (CRF) will take the lead on the Rescue Phase/Operation
on arrival at the scene, The OSC for the Search and Localisation Force is to support the CRF
2. Communications with the DISSUB. As soon as possible after the DISSUB has been found
communications should be established using:
a. Marine Sound Signals (MSS). MSS or equivalent under water signals charges are to be fired to
indicate the presence of surface vessels. This is not essential if good two-way UWT
communications have been established with the DISSUB.
b. UWT. Communications should be established with the DISSUB on UWT if possible, and the
OSC is to nominate a unit as UWT Link as soon as this had been done. Other units in the vicinity
should keep a listening watch. Full use should be made of any recording facilities that are
available.
To ensure that SUBSAR Forces at sea receive appropriate support from shore authorities, the OSC
should send frequent, but brief, SITREPS to the SSRA. From these, the SSRA should compile a
composite signal to keep other authorities informed.
If the exact position of the submarine is not known, and the area to be searched is large, the OSC should
divide his forces into groups and decentralize the tactical command of each group. If the area of
ORIGINAL
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ATP-57(B)
probability is small (for example, if the submarine has been seen to sink) it will probably be better to keep
the force concentrated. If there is a large number of surface assets, it may be advantageous to establish a
holding area in which ships wait until they are allocated tasks. This will prevent overcrowding of the
Datum at the start of the operation.
The employment of surface assets on particular types of search will depend on the following factors:
There are two basic alternatives for the search profile: Line abreast or Area. The choice of profile will
depend on many variables, but some points for consideration by the OSC are given in following
paragraphs.
1. This appears to provide the beast means of covering an area quickly and can be used for all three
search types. The Search Force should be split into groups before the line becomes too unwieldy.
2. Command, Control and Communication within the Force and groups is straightforward, and
coordination of UWT calls. Grenade signals and sonar silence is easily achieved.
3. This search is more likely to ensure complete coverage of a given area than an area search would
do.
4. Unless sonar-fitted helicopters are available for lengthy periods, they will not add much to the
sonar swept path.
5. There can be problems with units catching up and rejoining the line having investigated a contact.
This problem can be alleviated in shallow waters it MCMV’s are designated as “pouncers” specifically to
investigate contacts and kept in the rear.
6. The speed of the search will not necessarily be the optimum speed for all ships.
7. If navigation facilities are limited, a line abreast search will probably leave fewer gaps
ORIGINAL
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ATP-57(B)
This will normally involve the allocation of boxes or sectors to units of the Search Force:
2. Newly arriving units can be deployed to their allocated areas and start searching without delay.
3. The size of the ship’s allocated area can be adjusted to suit her capabilities.
4. Units can investigate their own contacts without disrupting the overall search.
5. A sonar-fitted helicopter can be profitably allocated to a ship, even for a short time.
7. Navigation may prove difficult, and care must be taken to avoid leaving gaps.
8. The Command and Control problem is not easy to overcome as in the Line Abreast Search,
however aircraft can be used to relay messages.
3. The distance travelled between sonar silence periods increases, so the probability of a submarine
being heard decreases.
4. Self-noise increases
Experience has shown that the maximum Visual Search speed should be 20 knots, and that the maximum
Sonar Search speed should be 15 knots.
Experience has shown that the maximum distance apart for a Visual or Passive Search should be 3 miles,
and for an Active Sonar Search normal rules for stationing ASW units should be used.
ORIGINAL
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ATP-57(B)
1. Aircraft are ideal platforms for carrying out a rapid visual search of the Area and localization of
distress beacons using ESM. In addition, helicopters can be very useful when employed as “pouncers” to
extend the swept path of individual ships, or to investigate sighting reports. The tasking of MPA under the
control of the appropriate RCC should include:
This pattern is to be dropped in the last known position of the submarine. Upon hearing this signal the
submarine will surface if able, and communicate with the aircraft on 277.8 Mhz (Submarine SAR
reporting net). If the submarine is unable to surface it will fire a smoke candle (or grenade) to indicate its
position. If the aircraft does not establish contact with the submarine within minutes, then another
identical pattern of charges is to be dropped in the submarine’s predicted position, and repeated every 30
minutes whilst a search is carried out until contact is made, or until the OSC assumes coordination
responsibilities.
2. MPA are also often capable of providing a valuable communications relay platform.
Note: Smoke Floats. The smoke candles fired by submarines are easily confused with smoke floats
dropped by aircraft. Therefore air crews should avoid dropping smoke floats unless absolutely essential. If
smoke floats are dropped, a report is to be signalled by the aircraft giving the position of release and the
expected burn time. This report should be relayed to all ships and Authorities involved in Search
Operation.
1 Minesweepers carry no equipment of use in finding bottomed submarines, but have the ability to
bottom sweep as a last resort. They should normally be used for visual search operations or for marking
the datum.
2 Mine hunters are equipped with a very high frequency short-range sonar which gives a detailed
visual display at the bottom. Where the bottom is uncluttered they can proceed at up to 6 knots searching
at 400 yard swept path, though a slower speed is normal. A mine hunter’s sonar normally operates only to
a depth of 70 meters, but with some restriction of capability it can be used to 100 meters. MCMV’s should
be used to identify MRS contacts in shallow waters.
3 All mine hunters carry divers capable of diving to 55 meters. HUNT class MCMV’s also carry a
Remote Control Mine Disposal System (RCMDS). This is a bottom following vehicle incorporating an
underwater TV camera and searchlight with a proven operating depth of 70 meters. The RCMDS’
manoeuvrability is limited, but it has been successful in identifying bottomed contacts of submarine size.
ORIGINAL
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ATP-57(B)
4 Mine hunters can also be used to mark the position of seabed contacts with extreme accuracy
(within one metre), but the surface mark is small and may be difficult to see in high sea states. After the
primary visual search, the best role for these ships is searching relatively small areas (tipically one mile
square) around a reasonable accurate datum. They are also useful for classifying or identifying contacts
found by other means.
5 Mine hunters should be used to lay homing beacons adjacent to the DISSUB. Frequencies of such
beacons should be compatible with sonars fitted in rescue submersibles/ROVs likely to be operating in its
vicinity.
1. It is important that the DISSUB’s position is not lost, particularly in a tideway, in rough conditions or
at night. The position should therefore be marked by a Dan Buoy, or by anchoring a ship within sonar
contact range (but at least 50 yds from the DISSUB) as soon as possible. However, this should not be
allowed to interfere with the early recovery of escapers.
2. Care should be taken not to foul the submarine with the anchor or cable, either at the time of letting
go, or subsequently if the ship swings.
One Red, or a succession of Reds By Submarine: Attempting emergency surfacing, keep clear
One Green By Submarine: Have fired exercise torpedo
Two Whites, 3 minutes apart By Submarine: I am surfacing, keep clear
One Yellow By Submarine: Ascending to periscope depth
Red Smoke By Submarine: Attempting emergency surfacing. Keep clear
Two White or two Yellow, (3 seconds By Submarine: I am surfacing. Keep clear
apart)
ORIGINAL
I - 3 - 24
ATP-57(B)
ANNEX 3A
1. Initiate SUBLOOK Implementing Signal to Surface Forces in the vicinity of the Search Area,
nominating OSC (Annex 3B).
2. Consider Alerting the competent RCC for coordination of potential support of the maritime incident
that may be occurring in its area .
3. Establish availability of Air and Surface assets for search from appropriate authorities
5. Establish location of expert personnel with appropriate Authorities (see ATP 57).
7. Have National RCC initiate a NOTAM and a Naval Warning (Notice to Mariner)
8. Pass to OSC (when known) details of those units who will be joining the Search Force.
9.Consider activating an Alert on the ISMERLO web site (www.ismerlo.org). (Tel.: (+1) 757-836-1000.
10. Initiate a SITREP to MOD of DISSUB nation, the SUBOPAUTH and any other appropriate
authorities. Include actions taken and when it is intended to escalate to SUBMISS.
ORIGINAL
I-3-A-1
ATP-57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
ORIGINAL
I-3-A-2
ATP-57(B)
SSRA
1. Initiate SUBMISS implementing signal and activate an Alert on the ISMERLO web site
(www.ismerlo.org) if not previously done.
2. Nominate OSC.
3. Order all suitable assets immediately available to close the datum as soon as feasible and search as
ordered by OSC
4. Alert the competent RCC of the maritime incident in its area for coordination of potential support .
6. Bring all suitable vessels in harbour to immediate notice for sea if they are available, and sail them
as required
8. Nominate units to transport personnel to the search areas, and initiate the transfer
9. Re-distribute local manpower and equipment (eg helicopters) to make up any shortfalls in units of
the search force
10. Assemble additional personnel to augment units ashore and afloat involved in the search.
11. Check with the SUBOPAUTH that all other submarines in the area have surfaced and appropriate
safety signals have been received
13. Have National RCC initiate a NOTAM and a Naval Warning (Notice to Mariner)
Note: Actions in paragraph 4, 6, 7 and 12 may well have been completed if SUBLOOK preceded the
initiation of SUBMISS
ORIGINAL
I-3-A-3
ATP-57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
ORIGINAL
I-3-A-4
ATP-57(B)
OSC
Search Phase
1. Inform all concerned of assumption of role of OSC. Establish communications with CRF/REC
once nominated
5. Order Air Search of Area, ensuring aircrews are briefed on signalling and the use of smoke floats.
11. Transmit SITREP to SSRA and the rest of the Search Force.
12. Mark the Datum position and promulgate the position, how it is being marked and an indication of
the accuracy.
17. Take appropriate individual ship actions (Annex A - Check-off list DELTA).
ORIGINAL
I-3-A-5
ATP-57(B)
20. Prepare to hand over responsibility for the recovery/rescue of the DISSUB’s crew to CRF.
ORIGINAL
I-3-A-6
ATP-57(B)
SUBLOOK
SUBMISS/SUBSUNK
13. Brief Officer of the Watch (OOW), lookouts, aircrew on visual indications of a DISSUB’s position.
15. Brief OOW and Sonar Operators on underwater communications, sonar silence periods and
reactions on detection of the DISSUB.
16. Ensure most experienced UWT operators are available for communicating with DISSUB on UWT.
ORIGINAL
I-3-A-7
ATP-57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
ORIGINAL
I-3-A-8
ATP-57(B)
ANNEX 3B
PRIORITY
NATO CONFIDENTIAL
SIC LGQ
1. DIVING AT (Date and Zone lime). ........ ZULU UNTIL (Date and Zone Time)
............. ZULU IN ACCORDANCE WITH (WPP) .............. AMENDED TO CHANGE
............... OR IN AREA (LATILONG) ............ FOR (exercise) ....................
All figures quoted in the text are to be spelt out in full; lettered abbreviations should also be spelled
out using the phonetic alphabets.
ORIGINAL
I-3-B-1
ATP-57(B)
3B02 COMCHECK
FLASH:
FM: AA
TO: NAME OF SUBMARINE (Normally by separate signal)
INFO NA
AIG 5652
ALLIEDSUBCOM DET NORFOLK VA
ADDITIONAL ADJACENT COMMANDERS WHO HAVE/MIGHT HAVE SEARCH ASSETS.
SUBOPAUTH DESIGNATED IN SUBNOTE AS HOLDING NOK
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
SIC LGS/SIJ
SUBMARINE SAFETY COMCHECK. NAME OF SUBMARINE, INTERNATIONAL
CALLSIGN (IN WORDS).
ORIGINAL
I-3-B-2
ATP-57(B)
3B03 SUBLOOK
FLASH
FM AA
TO AIG 5652
ALLIEDSUBCOM DET NORFOLK VA
NAME OF SUBMARINE
ADDITIONAL ADJACENT COMMANDERS WHO HAVE/MIGHT HAVE SEARCH ASSETS
(IF APPROPRIATE)
NATIONAL AUTHORITY DESIGNATED IN SUBNOTE AS HOLDING NOK
ADDITIONAL NATIONAL AUTHORITIES (IF APPROPRIATE).
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
SIC LHA
1. SUBLOOK
2. NAME OF SUBMARINE, INTERNATIONAL CALLSIGN, INDICATOR BUOY
NUMBERS ....FWD....AFT, CREW STRENGTH
3. REASON AND AREA
EG (A) SUBCHECK REPORT OVERDUE AT ....ON PASSAGE...TO..., LAST KNOWN
POSITION OR (B) CONTACT LOST SINCE....DURING EXERCISE....IN AREA....,
LAST KNOWN POSITION
4. SSRA IS....
5. IS/IS NOT FITTED WITH A RESCUE SEAT
6. INTEND TO ESCALATE TO SUBMISS AT ....
ORIGINAL
I-3-B-3
ATP-57(B)
2. On receipt of a SUBLOOK signal from AA the designated SSRA is to initiate search operations
and originate a signal in the following form:
FLASH
FM SSRA
TO AIG 5652
ALLIEDSUBCOM DET NORFOLK VA
OTHER AIGS (IF APPROPRIATE)
ADDITIONAL ADJACENT COMMANDERS WHO HAVE/MIGHT HAVE SEARCH ASSETS
(IF APPROPRIATE)
ADDITIONAL NATIONAL AUTHORITIES (IF APPROPRIATE)
SHIPS AS APPROPRIATE
AIR BASES AS APPROPRIATE
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
SIC LHA
CARRY OUT OPERATION SUBLOOK
NAME OF SUBMARINE/INTERNATIONAL CALLSIGN INDICATOR BUOY NUMBER
...FWD ...AFT
REF: ATP 10 CHAPT 8 / ATP 57 CHAPT 3
1. THE FOLLOWING FORCES .... ARE TO PROCEED WITH ALL DESPATCH AND
SEARCH ...
2. R/V FOR PARTICIPATING FORCES
3. DUTIES AND LOCATIONS OF AUTHORITIES INVOLVED
4. AIR SEARCH DETAILS
ORIGINAL
I-3-B-4
ATP-57(B)
3B04 SUBMISS/SUBSUNK
FLASH
FM AA
TO AIG 5652
ALLIEDSUBCOM DET NORFOLK VA
NAME OF SUBMARINE
NATIONAL AUTHORITY DESIGNATED IN SUBNOTE AS HOLDING NOK
ADDITIONAL ADJACENT COMMANDERS WHO HAVE/MIGHT HAVE
SEARCH ASSETS (IF APPROPRIATE)
ADDITIONAL NATIONAL AUTHORITIES
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
SIC LHA/LHN
1. SUBMISS/SUBSUNK
2. NAME OF SUBMARINE AND INTERNATIONAL CALLSIGN
3. LAST KNOWN POSITION ...AT .../ESTIMATED POSITION.....AT.....(OBSERVED TO
SINK IN POSITION...)
4. SSRA IS ....
5. SUBMARINE INDICATOR BUOY NUMBERS FWD AFT ...)(IF FITTED)
6. IS/IS NOT FITTED WITH A RESCUE SEAT
2. On receipt of a SUBMISS or SUBSUNK signal from the AA or any unit/authority reporting the
sinking of a submarine, the designated SSRA is to initiate or continue search operations by originating a
signal in the following form (including as much information as possible to minimise the need for follow
on traffic):
FLASH
FM SSRA
TO AIG 5652
ALLIEDSUBCOM DET NORFOLK VA
OTHER AIGS AS APPROPRIATE
SHIPS AS APPROPRIATE
OTHER NATIONAL AUTHORITIES
ORIGINAL
I-3-B-5
ATP-57(B)
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
SIC LHA/LHN
CARRY OUT OPERATION SUBMISS/SUBSUNK
NAME OF SUBMARINE/INTERNATIONAL CALLSIGN (INDICATOR BUOYS
FWD....AFT....)
REF: ATP 10 CHAPT 8 / ATP 57 CHAPT 3
1. SHIPS: PROCEED/PROCEEDING WITH ALL DESPATCH TO START SEARCH
2. DATUM POSITION FOR SEARCH ... DEPTH (IN METRES), POSITION TO BE MARKED
BY ...
3. INITIAL AREA TO BE SEARCHED BY
(A) SHIPS:…
(B) AIRCRAFT:…
4. OSC IS ...
5. RENDEZVOUS AIR FORCES (IF NOT THE SAME AS THE DATUM)
6. DUTIES/LOCATION OF AUTHORITIES INVOLVED\
7. (NAMES OF SHIPS) EMBARK:
(A) SUBMISS STORES.
(B) RECOMPRESSION CHAMBERS.
(C) MEDICAL OFFICERS.
(D) NATIONAL LIAISON OFFICERS.
(E) MEDIA
ORIGINAL
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ATP-57(B)
Any unit or Authority aware that a submarine has sunk or the OSC when the DISSUB has been
located, is to originate a signal in the following form.
FLASH
FM ...
TO AIG 5652
ALLIEDSUBCOM DET NORFOLK VA
APPROPRIATE AREA COMMANDER(S)
APPROPRIATE SUBOPAUTH(S)
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
SIC LHA
SUBSUNK
1. NAME OF SUBMARINE (IF KNOWN)
2. OBSERVED TO SINK IN POSITION ......AT......(or LOCATED SUBMARINE SUNK IN
POSITION......AT......)
ORIGINAL
I-3-B-7
ATP-57(B)
IMMEDIATE
FM NATION
TO NATION(S) AND AIG 5652
ALLIEDSUBCOM DET NORFOLK VA
INFO SSRA
OSC
SIC LHA/LHN
REQUEST FOR SMER ASSISTANCE
REF: ATP-10 CHAPTER 8 / ATP-57 CHAPTER 3
1. SUBMARINE (NAME) MISSING/SUNK IN (APPROXIMATE) POSITION ...
2. NA IS ...
3. SSRA IS ...
4. OSC IS ...
5. NATIONS ARE REQUESTED TO REPORT TO SSRA INFO NA AND POST TO THE
ISMERLO WEBSITE THE READINESS STATUS OF THE FOLLOWING:
A. RECOMPRESSION CHAMBERS
(1) FITTED IN SHIPS
(2) PORTABLE
(3) SHORE BASED
B. LIFE/MEDICAL SUPPORT STORES
C. SUBMARINE RESCUE SYSTEMS
D. PERSONNEL
(1) SUBMARINE PARACHUTE ASSISTANCE GROUP
(2) OTHER ASSISTING PERSONNEL
(3) DIVING/MEDICAL PERSONNEL
E. OTHER
ORIGINAL
I-3-B-8
ATP-57(B)
A nation replying an SMER assistance request should use the following format:
FM NATION
TO NATION REQUESTING SMER ASSISTANCE
INFO SSRA
ALLIEDSUBCOM DET NORFOLK VA
SIC LHA/LHN
READINESS STATUS OF SMER ASSETS
REF: ATP-10 CHAPTER 8 / ATP-57 CHAPTER 3
1. SUBMARINE RESCUE SYSTEMS
A. LOCATION
B. AVAILABILITY
C. ETA
D. MEANS OF TRANSPORT
2. SHOREBASED RECOMPRESSION CHAMBERS
3. SHIPBORNE RECOMPRESSION CHAMBERS (A. TO D. AS PARA 1. ABOVE)
4. PORTABLE RECOMPRESSION CHAMBERS ASHORE (A. TO D. AS PARA 1. ABOVE)
5. MEDICAL LIFE SUPPORT STORES (A. TO D. AS PARA 1. ABOVE)
6. SUBMARINE ESCAPE/RESCUE EXPERTS (A TO D. AS PARA 1. ABOVE)
7. SUBMARINE/DIVING MEDICAL EXPERTS (A. TO D. AS PARA 1. ABOVE)
8. OTHER INFORMATION
Notes:
ORIGINAL
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PART I
CHAPTER 4
Mobilization and assembly of SMER Elements are most likely to comprise SMER capabilities
from different nations, and can be considered as a Multinational SUBSAR Response.
The SSRA, appointed by the National Authority (NA), will make the decisions on how the
operation is to be conducted and provide appropriate recommendations to the NA, for issuing a request
for SMER assistance, to meet the requirements of the operation.
Chapter 3 outlines NA and SSRA responsibilities, as well as the signal message formats for SMER
assistance and SMER facilities availability.
The logistic requirements of deploying one or more rescue elements will likely be the most
challenging aspect of the entire rescue operation. This deployment will require heavy airlift, cranes, road
transport, infrastructure needs, welders, and other labour elements.
A typical decision making flowchart is provided, as a guidance, in Table 4-1
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The ISMERLO website has been developed to quickly post information on available Rescue
Elements as well as the methods to mobilize equipment rapidly to the scene. Nations should make every
effort to keep posted information up to date so that National and Multinational Command and Control
Authorities can have a clear picture of the proper development of the rescue operation and the status of
available means. Although being the principal coordinating focal point, ISMERLO itself is not a
Command and Control Authority. The movement of equipment and orders to rescue forces will use
standard command and control circuits.
Validity at the Rescue Element Status on the ISMERLO Web Site is the key to the selection of the
preferred Rescue elements and the Mobilization Airport-Seaport Combination (MASC).
Each nation is encouraged to have their own dormant rescue plans, with recognized and approved
airport-seaport combinations and associated infrastructure capable of handling such Rescue elements.
These can be posted and integrated into the ISMERLO website to help minimize time to first rescue. It is
emphasized that this work should be coordinated with nations owning Rescue Elements, which may be
considered as systems to be received in the event of a DISSUB incident.
Information about these combinations will be displayed on the ISMERLO web site
(www.ismerlo.org).
It may also be necessary to deploy the Rescue Elements to nations that do not operate submarines
and are not familiar with this type of operation. In these cases, the Nation owning the Rescue Element(s)
liaises with the nation where its system is to be deployed.
SMER Elements can be divided into two main groups, both of them coordinated by the CRF:
a. Composition. These Forces may comprise one or more of the following main elements:
b. Tasks.
Recovery Forces main task will be to recover escapees from the surface, stabilize and triage, as
necessary, with subsequent timely transfer to the most suitable facility for definitive care. If
available, a SPAG could also be deployed to render initial medical assistance, as required.
Recovery Forces are likely to arrive at the datum in advance of the Rescue Elements.
Where there are multiple escapees requiring hyperbaric treatment, which exceeds the capacity
of chambers at the datum, the OSC will require transportation support to transfer them to shore
facilities.
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a. Composition. These forces may comprise one or more of the following elements:
- MOSHIPS transporting Submarine Rescue Elements for both Intervention and/or Rescue,
- DISSUB Liaison Team (DLT).
- Submarine Escape and Rescue Advisory Team (SMERAT).
b. Tasks. Rescue Elements are most likely to be divided into two types of operation:
Ships with Intervention Elements will normally be the first units arriving at the scene of the
incident.
- survey,
- debris removal and DISSUB preparation for SRV/SRC mating,
- transponder field preparation,
- ventilation and depressurisation operation,
- conducting ELSS POD-posting,
- providing safety redundancy for the SRV/SRC under mating operations with the
DISSUB.
SRVs and SRCs will normally be carried on board civilian or military MOSHIPS from the
MOPORT to the DISSUB’s Datum area. Rescue Forces main task will be to rescue the
DISSUB´s personnel.
For more information regarding the SMERAT (organization), see ATP-57 chapter 6.
1. General. Every SMER Element mobilized will have its own System Operators and SMER experts.
ATP-57 Part II contains national SMER data. Changes to this information should be reported to
ISMERLO as the situation demands. The latest and most reliable information reported is posted on the
rescue coordination pages of the ISMERLO web site (www.ismerlo.org).
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2. DISSUB briefing packs. These packs should include detailed and relevant information for the
OSC, CRF, pilots and operators, which are required for the Rescue, for instance:
At the same time the SSRA is initiating the search phase, the SSRA must assemble and start the
mobilization of Recovery and Rescue Forces.
Priority for assembling the Forces will depend on the nature of the incident. Check off List (e)
through (g) (Annex 4A), act as a guide.
The SSRA should nominate Ships to carry the First Reaction Store (1RS) (particularly the
hyperbaric facilities) and call for specialist advisors. If the quickest way of delivering assistance to the
DISSUB or to the survivors already at the surface is by air, the SSRA should advise the NA to request the
call out of a Submarine Parachute Assistance Group (SPAG).
Rescue Element mobilization demands a high degree of urgency; the logistics requirements means
that there is likely to be a long lead-time from alert to first rescue. Annex 4A contains check off lists for
the SSRA during SUBLOOK and SUBMISS operations. A shift from SUBLOOK directly to SUBSUNK
can occur. The checks off lists describe the sequence on which the SSRA should focus when proceeding
with the assembly and mobilization of the SMER Elements, pending the NA formal request for assistance.
For deployment of more than one Rescue Element, there will be a requirement to de-conflict
logistic support and mobilization activities. Identification of shortfalls and de-confliction of support
requirements can be coordinated through the ISMERLO website.
Mobilization timelines for each rescue scenario are developed as a baseline and are posted on the
ISMERLO web site.
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ANNEX 4A
5. Check for available hyperbaric chambers including those located ashore in the vicinity of the
datum.
6. Consult and Initiate discussion with the NA and other appropriate authorities regarding
provision, employment and deployment of Submarine Rescue Elements.
7. Nations post availability and tracking information of rescue capabilities and required logistics
to the alert page on the ISMERLO website.
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3. Sail Escape Gear Ships (EGSs) as soon as hyperbaric chambers and other stores (1RS)
needed for the treatment of escapees are embarked with hyperbaric chamber operators.
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Note: The following is a generic guide which will be adapted depending on the type of ship being used
and national considerations and practices.
5. Conduct two way brief between Ship and visiting Escape and Rescue and Medical specialists.
6. Ascertain numbers onboard the DISSUB if not included in the SUBMISS/SUBSUNK signal.
11. Brief:
- Detail non-medical guides, messengers, observers and log-keepers.
- Detail experienced UWT operators.
- Close up chamber operators, check out all systems.
- Recovery Boats Crews.
- All involved in reception of escapees.
- Ships Company.
13. Attempt to communicate with the DISSUB on UWT at least every 15 minutes.
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Once located:
16. Pass all relevant information (SITREP) to SSRA and appropriate Authorities.
17. When ready to receive escapees send SSS on UWT or make the 12 charge signal.
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PART I
CHAPTER 5
0501 Introduction
During the Mobilization of SMER resources, the SSRA will coordinate the SMER Force and
Elements deployment. Once a decision is made regarding Rescue Elements deployment, the most
appropriate MASC will be determined. Integral to this process is the embarkation of specialist personnel,
who will advise the CRF on the employment of the Rescue Elements.
Escape and Rescue Phases may overlap but would possibly occur in the following sequence:
As these activities may take place at the same time, coordination between Forces described above is
essential to speed up the process of saving as many DISSUB personnel as possible.
The CRF needs to be able to concentrate entirely on the saving of life by recovery and/or rescue
without other operational distractions. Accordingly, once the OSC has handed over the above
responsibilities to the CRF, he will continue to provide assistance with other tasks such as perimeter
patrol, communications guard, helicopter operations co-ordination (including possible evacuation of
escapees/rescuees), media operations and personnel transfer.
The Authorities involved in a SUBSAR Operation and their responsibilities are described in chapter
3. The CRF has the responsibility for coordinating and controlling the recovery of escapees on the surface
and/or the rescue of DISSUB personnel.
Once the CRF has arrived at the datum, a formal handover will be conducted by the OSC in
accordance with Check Off List India.
Each Rescue Element will be commanded by a Rescue Element Commander (REC), designated by
the providing Nation. The REC will coordinate with the CRF for the operation of their own Rescue
Element.
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The C2 organization during the Escape and Rescue phase is represented in figure 5-1. The OSC is
the Authority normally possessing Tactical Control of allocated Forces at datum. The OSC’s main
function during this phase is to allow the CRF to concentrate on the rescue effort.
The OSC reports directly to the SSRA and maintains overall responsibility for the operation.
On arrival at the Datum area, the CRF will assume tactical control of those units assigned by the
OSC. A shift of CRF responsibility is possible during the course of the operation. The REC(s) will be
under the tactical control of the CRF and shall report accordingly.
Annex 5A contains check off list INDIA, for the OSC handover to the CRF.
In general terms and in accordance with military chain of command the OSC must control all non-
SMER activities in order to allow the CRF the freedom of action to affect a speedy intervention and
rescue.
During a SUBSAR operation it is possible that the OSC, SSRA and other Authorities could belong
to different nations than that of the DISSUB. The CRF will have a direct relationship with the designated
SSRA and/or DISSUB NA, focused on avoiding any public release of sensitive information. This
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relationship is recorded by the dotted lines represented in figure 5-1. The CRF may or may not copy the
reports to the OSC, depending on the sensitivity of the issues and in accordance with particular directions
received from the NA.
1. General.
Communications with the submarine will normally be by UWT. However, Explosive Charge and
Hull Tap communication signals can also be used.
A significant amount of underwater noise will be present in a submarine rescue scenario and a strict
control of emission management is required to ensure efficient search and rescue operations.
Besides the communications that could be established with the submarine during the Search and
Localization phase, the following equipment and procedures can be used to communicate with the
DISSUB during the Escape and Rescue phase once the submarine has been located:
a. UWT
It is primarily used for communications between the DISSUB and the surface Forces when the
Submarine has been located. In the case of a loss of power, the DISSUB personnel can use an Emergency
UWT. This set works independently from the submarine electrical system, and it generally operates at 8
kHz.
b. TAP CODE
See related Scripts in Annex 5B
c. EXPLOSIVE CHARGES
See related scripts in Annex 5B
During the Search phase, only one ship should be designated to communicate with the DISSUB.
During the Rescue Phase, only the MOSHIP conducting the rescue operation should communicate with
the DISSUB.
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3. Communication challenges
a. Even at the best of times, communication by UWT is less effective than hard wired
systems. In order to avoid noise, which is likely to peak at 10 kHz and below, higher frequencies (eg
27kHz) should be used, where available for communication with the DISSUB.
SRV/SRC may also be used as a relay for communication between CRF/REC and DISSUB.
b. Some classes of warship may have problems in communicating with the DISSUB due to
transducer configuration. The answer is often to stand-off further, perhaps in excess of 3500 meters,
from the DISSUB.
d. Homing systems which interface with free running pingers or beacons are susceptible to
mutual interference, however they are normally able to be distinguished separately. Transponders
associated with Dynamic Positioning (DP), and other beacons, add further complications to the
choice of frequencies.
e. High frequency sonars are unlikely to be influenced by any of the above systems. Two
similar systems may interfere with each other but this is unlikely to degrade performance markedly.
However warships’ main-frame search sonars at lower frequencies could interfere with both UWT
and tracking, and once the DISSUB has been located these should be strangled.
Note: 1. Meanings in the code scripts at Annexe 5B differ from AXP1. These codes are only to be
used in SUBSAR operations.
2. Ships (SRV/SRC) and Submarines names are to be used as callsigns.
3. If there are personnel both forward and aft in the DISSUB the communications should
contain the appropriate word or 3-letter group added to the DISSUB's name to indicate location
followed by the message (e.g. ALFA ALFA ALFA DISSUBNAME DELTA DELTA DELTA).
4. Some aircraft do not carry charges but drop buoys (SUS Mk 84) which transmit a 2 tone
sound like a siren that can be picked up on UWT. On hearing this signal the DISSUB should fire
a candle to indicate her position.
5. A DISSUB may use taps in Morse code in addition to UWT. In this case the dash is to be
indicated by two or three rapid taps with a reduced interval and the dot by a single tap. The
interval between individual dots and dashes should be 1 - 2 seconds and the interval between
characters 5 seconds.
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If the unit in charge of coordinating the recovery of personnel on the surface is different from the
designated CRF, very close coordination between units is paramount for the success of the recovery
operation. It is unlikely but possible, that an Escape and a Rescue scenario would take place
simultaneously.
Prior to execution of the rescue effort, it may be necessary to assist the DISSUB in maintaining
conditions onboard by intervention. Intervention may be comprised of debris removal, preparing for
Escape or SRV/SRC operations, POD-posting ELSS, and Depressurisation/Ventilation.
The composition of the Rescue Force will vary, depending on the availability of Rescue Elements
and the location of the DISSUB. A very likely scenario will involve the use of a SRV/SRC operating from
a MOSHIP as the major lifesaver. If time permits, it is preferable to survey a DISSUB prior to
deployment of a SRV/SRC.
Coordination of the different SMER Elements is vital both for waterspace management and
achievement of the aim. The CRF should ensure that all his RECs receive adequate and timely briefings.
The arrival brief should include the DISSUB position and its internal conditions (if known), heading,
depth, heel, trim and, if applicable, which indicator buoys have been released. Details of water conditions
observed must be briefed as detailed in Check Off List India.
Every effort must be made to comply with the DISSUB's request for stores and to obtain specialist
advice on what might be required. Providing provisions will greatly assist in sustaining morale in the
DISSUB.
The NA/DLT advisor should carefully brief operators of SRVs/SRCs before their first mating
attempt. Drawings and photographs of the DISSUB should also be available onboard the SRV/SRC, for
immediate reference. Details of Submarine Specific Data are contained in ATP-57 Part II.
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ANNEX 5A
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ANNEX 5B
Communication Scripts
5B01 General
Note: All communication to and from the DISSUB should indicate which compartment by using either
FOXTROT (Forward) ALFA (Aft) or CENTRE (Center)
Charge/ MEANING
UWT Code
Tap code From MOSHIP From DISSUB
ALFA
ALFA Aft escape compartment. Aft escape compartment.
ALFA
BRAVO We are searching for you.
1 Charge every
BRAVO Fire a smoke candle to indicate
10 minutes
BRAVO your Position.
CENTRE
CENTRE Centre LET position. Centre LET position.
CENTRE
CHARLIE
CHARLIE First survivor making escape now.
CHARLIE
DELTA Total amount CO2 scrubbing Total amount of CO2 scrubbing left
DELTA material left in national absorption is (national absorption units):
DELTA units? DELTA DELTA DELTA X X
You have been found.
Attempt to communicate by UWT
ECHO and/or fire a smoke candle with
ECHO 6 Charges message carrier giving full details
ECHO of the conditions in submarine and
your intentions. Ref CHECK OFF
LIST INDIA
FOXTROT
FOXTROT Forward escape compartment. Forward escape compartment.
FOXTROT
GOLF Number of personnel in this
Report number of personnel in your
GOLF compartment is:
compartment of DISSUB.
GOLF GOLF GOLF GOLF X X
Intend to Pod Post mini-pod.
Attempt to communicate by UWT.
2 Charges/ Taps
MAMA If unable to do so, fire a smoke
followed after a ELSS requirements are: (give
MAMA candle with message carrier stating
short pause by 2 details).
MAMA ELSS needed.
more.
Once acknowledged, use the Pod
Posting Script.
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Charge/ MEANING
UWT Code
Tap code From MOSHIP From DISSUB
NEGATIVE
NEGATIVE UNABLE TO COMPLY UNABLE TO COMPLY
NEGATIVE
NOVEMBER Atmospheric readings are: (O2 in
Report present atmospheric
NOVEMBER percentage, CO2 in percentage and
conditions in DISSUB.
NOVEMBER absolute pressure in bar).
OSCAR Amount of oxygen left (in national
OSCAR How much oxygen left. generation Units): OSCAR OSCAR
OSCAR OSCAR X X X
Intend to Pod Post Emergency Life
Support Stores (ELSS). Attempt to
3 Charges/Taps communicate by UWT. If unable to
PAPA
followed after a do so, fire a smoke candle with ELSS requirements are: (give
PAPA
short pause by 3 message carrier stating ELSS details).
PAPA
more. needed.
Once acknowledged, use the Pod
Posting Script.
Intend to conduct a rescue using
SRV/SRC. Estimated TTFR
(hrs):
QUEBEC QUEBEC QUEBEC
Intend waiting for rescue.
QUEBEC XX
9 charges/
QUEBEC Once acknowledged, use the
taps n.b. During Exercises the meaning
QUEBEC SRV/SRC Script (table 5B02)
is: “Ready to start the exercise”
n.b. During Exercise the meaning
is: “I am ready to commence the
exercise”
ROMEO
ROMEO Message received Message received
ROMEO
SIERRA
Standing by on the surface. Surface Intend commencing escape in (hrs):
SIERRA 12 Charges
clear SIERRA SIERRA SIERRA XX
SIERRA
A rescue operation will not be
TANGO
attempted. Estimate escape must start in (hrs):
TANGO
TANGO Report estimate of latest time TANGO TANGO TANGO XX
escape must start
Number of injured personnel
UNIFORM
How many injured personnel requiring urgent medical treatment
UNIFORM
require urgent medical treatment? is (UNIFORM UNIFORM
UNIFORM
UNIFORM XX).
4 Charges/ Taps
VICTOR Intend to proceed with Ventilation.
followed after a
VICTOR Once you acknowledge, use the Acknowledge
short pause by 4
VICTOR Ventilation Script
more.
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Charge/ MEANING
UWT Code
Tap code From MOSHIP From DISSUB
X-RAY
Series of rapid Carrying out emergency
X-RAY Clear my position urgently
taps breakaway.
X-RAY
5 Charges/ Taps
YANKEE
followed after a I am going to abort current
YANKEE Abort current operation/exercise
short pause by 5 operation/exercise
YANKEE
more.
ZULU
ZULU DISSUB position clear
ZULU
In the national data add what the national units for CO2 scrubbing and oxygen generation are
Notes: 1. If possible tap signals should be acknowledge by repeating them back loudly and clearly.
2. Ship/Submarine Telegraphy (SST). The basic procedure to be used when signalling by SST
is the same as that used for signalling by radio telegraphy. Speed of transmission should not
normally exceed 6 words a minute. It should be appreciated the DISSUB crew may not contain
anyone familiar with morse code, although a copy of the code should be in escape compartments
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UWT TAP
STEP FROM TO MEANING REMARKS
CODE CODE
HOOKER To be used only
DOWNHAUL CABLE IS
01 MOSHIP DISSUB HOOKER 1*2 during operations
CONNECTED
HOOKER with SRC
WHISKEY HOLD YOU IN SIGHT.
RV identifies
02 SRV/SRC DISSUB WHISKEY PROCEEDING TO FWD/AFT
herself to DISSUB
WHISKEY HATCH
NOVEMBER
MY INTERNAL ABSOLUTE
03 DISSUB SRV/SRC NOVEMBER
PRESSURE IS (in bar)
NOVEMBER
KILO
HAVE SEAL. DRAIN HATCH
04 SRV/SRC DISSUB KILO 4*2
CAVITY
KILO
KILO
05 DISSUB SRV/SRC KILO 4* 2 DRAINING HATCH CAVITY
KILO
NOVEMBER
MY INTERNAL ABSOLUTE
06 DISSUB SRV/SRC NOVEMBER
PRESSURE IS (in bar)
NOVEMBER
LIMA
HATCH CAVITY DRAINED.
07 SRV/SRV DISSUB LIMA 3*2
OPEN UPPER HATCH.
LIMA
UWT TAP
STEP FROM TO CODE
MEANING REMARKS
CODE
Shout through the
01 SRV/SRC DISSUB SHUT HATCH AND DRAIN.
hatch
MIKE
02 DISSUB SRV/SRC MIKE 2*2 HATCH AND DRAIN SHUT
MIKE
MIKE
LIFTING OFF MOVING
03 SRV/SRC DISSUB MIKE 2*2
CLEAR.
MIKE
To be used only
during operations
with SRC, meaning
ZULU
that the downhaul
04 MOSHIP DISSUB ZULU DISSUB CLEAR
cable has been
ZULU
removed and the
SRC has been
recovered
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UWT TAP
STEP FROM TO CODE
MEANING REMARKS
CODE
HOTEL FLOOD TOWER (SSE), OPEN
01 MOSHIP DISSUB HOTEL 3 (UPPER) HATCH. I AM
HOTEL KEEPING CLEAR
TOWER (SSE)
HOTEL
FLOODED.HATCH OPEN.
02 DISSUB MOSHIP HOTEL 3
READY TO RECEIVE POD
HOTEL
OR BAG (MINI-POD)
JULIETT POD/BAG (MINI-POD) IN
03 MOSHIP DISSUB JULIETT 5 PLACE. HATCH CLEAR TO (2)
JULIETT SHUT.
INDIA CHECK YOUR ALIGNMENT
04 MOSHIP DISSUB INDIA 4 HATCH IS NOT OR WILL
INDIA NOT OPEN
ZULU
INTEND TO RELEASE POD
05 DISSUB MOSHIP ZULU
(MINI-POD)
ZULU
CLEAR TO
ZULU
RELEASE POD
06 MOSHIP DISSUB ZULU DISSUB CLEAR
(MINI-POD) IF
ZULU
NEEDED
Notes:
1. Terms in parenthesis are to be taken into consideration when conducting a MINI-POD Posting
Operation.
2. For first run only to a submarine without its own pod bag, this signal means “pod receiving
equipment in tower”.
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UWT TAP
STEP FROM TO CODE
MEANING REMARKS
CODE
GREEN PREPARING TO ATTACH
2 taps
01 MOSHIP DISSUB GREEN GUIDE WIRES AND
3 times
GREEN VENTILATION HOSES
NOVEMBER
MY INTERNAL ABSOLUTE
02 DISSUB MOSHIP NOVEMBER (1)
PRESSURE IS (IN BAR)
NOVEMBER
TYPHOON
4 taps VENTILATION HOSES
03 MOSHIP DISSUB TYPHOON
2 times ATTACHED.
TYPHOON
HURRICANE
4 taps
04 MOSHIP DISSUB HURRICANE OPEN AIR VALVES
3 times
HURRICANE
HURRICANE MOSHIP increases
4 taps
05 DISSUB MOSHIP HURRICANE AIR VALVES OPENED inlet air flow
3 times
HURRICANE (Eventually)
INDIGO
5 taps SHUT AIR VALVES, ABOUT
06 MOSHIP DISSUB INDIGO
3 times TO DISCONNECT
INDIGO
INDIGO
5 taps
07 DISSUB MOSHIP INDIGO AIR VALVES SHUT
3 times
INDIGO
YELLOW
2 taps
08 MOSHIP DISSUB YELLOW DISCONNECTING HOSES
3 times
YELLOW
ZULU
09 MOSHIP DISSUB ZULU DISSUB CLEAR
ZULU
Notes:
1. To be used by DISSUB each time there is a change of internal pressure. MOSHIP will regulate
inlet/outlet air flow accordingly
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PART I
CHAPTER 6
Additionally, National Publications both for Diving and Submarine operations may be used for reference
on individual submarine classes and operating procedures as well as decompression tables.
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3. Medical Organization during SUBSAR Operations. This chapter contains specific information
to SUBSAR participants, and facilitates the coordination between Commands and Units participating in
SUBSAR operations, keeping in mind that the main objectives for SUBSAR operations should be to speed
up response procedures (medical and non-medical) and to save as many survivors (escapees or rescuees)
as possible.
1. SUBSAR Operations - Terms and Definitions. This chapter complements preceding chapters in
this publication. Definitions related to terms included in this chapter but not described in detail in it, can
be found either in former chapters or in the Glossary, at the end of this publication.
2. Medical considerations for survivors from submarine escape or rescue are of paramount
importance. There are a large number of medical problems that may be encountered in this mass casualty
setting, some of which are relatively unfamiliar to non-specialist medical officers. Because of the large
number of medical, environmental and submarine variables, the strategies to organise and carry out
medical management laid out in this Chapter will need to be tailored to each individual incident scenario.
3. General guidance for organisation of the Submarine Escape and Rescue Assistance Team
(SMERAT), including triage and management of submarine survivors is provided in this Chapter. Medical
guidance pertaining to problems likely to be encountered in survivors of a DISSUB scenario is also
provided for specialist and non-specialist medical officers.
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0603 The medical component of the Submarine Escape and Rescue Assistance Team
(SMERAT)
The SMERAT consists of experts in the field of Submarine Escape and Rescue Operations and medical
specialists who are available to provide advice and assistance to the SSRA, OSC and CRF. The Officer in
Charge of the SMERAT (OCSMERAT) is an expert in the field of submarine escape and rescue
operations.
The Senior Medical Officer to SMERAT (SMO(S)) is in charge of the medical personnel allocated to the
SMERAT, and reports to OCSMERAT for an escape and to the CRF for rescue operations.
The SMO(S) is alerted by either National SMER Authorities or via OCSMERAT who will also initiate the
callout of all other designated SMERAT personnel in the event of a SUBSUNK.
The SMERAT should be capable of deploying at short notice to the scene of a DISSUB usually by
embarking on an Escape Gear Ship (EGS) together with First Reaction Stores (FRS). As information
about the condition of the DISSUB becomes available members of the team may need to embark on a
MOSHIP (such as that appointed CRF), MOSUB or any other participating unit in the SUBSAR
operation.
Senior Casualty
Clinician
Figure 6-1 above describes the general organization for the medical component to the SMERAT used
during escape operations. The following articles in this section detail responsibilities for the key medical
elements of the SMERAT. Later sections of this Chapter and Annex 6C contain information regarding the
rest of the medical manpower as well as treatment areas and equipment.
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Commander Rescue
Forces (CRF)
SMO(SMERAT)
DISSUB Medical Admin
Medical Officer and MHQ
Triage Team
(DMTT)
Senior Diving MO /
SCC
Figure 6-2 shows a generic organisation for Rescue operations. This is for guidance only as each rescue
system has its own manning requirements as laid down in their deployment orders. Section VIII into this
chapter contains further information on Rescue operations. Annex 6D deals with DISSUB Medical Triage
Team (DMTT) selection, deployment and equipment.
The Senior Medical Officer to SMERAT (SMO(S)) is in charge of the medical personnel allocated to the
SMERAT. He is responsible for:
The SCC reports directly to the SMO(S) and is responsible for the co-ordination of the medical resources,
both manpower and materiel, onboard the Escape Gear Ship (EGS) or Rescue Gear Ship (RGS). The SCC
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will usually be the Medical Officer most experienced in treatment of diving casualties. (The SCC may
also be known as the Senior Diving MO (SDMO))
0606 Medical Headquarters (MHQ) and the Medical Administration Officer (MAO)
The MHQ is the focal point for Casualty State administration and, as such, must remain manned at
all times. Location and personnel composition may vary depending on operational limitations. Normally,
the Medical Headquarters (MHQ) is composed by the following personnel and equipment:
b. Sufficient writers and runners to cover all casualty management areas (minimum of 3 runners).
c. Communications equipment.
The MAO is responsible for the collation and management of casualty information in the MHQ.
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0607 General
This section deals with the action list of the following medical personnel:
- The Senior Medical Officer to SMERAT (SMO(S))
- The Senior Casualty clinician (SCC) / Senior Diving MO
- The Medical Administration Officer (MAO).
1. General.
Prior to the deployment, the Senior Medical Officer SMERAT (SMO(S)) should assimilate as
much information as possible to allow full manning of the medical team, make sensible judgements on the
likely casualties and the requirements for their treatment. The Action lists below provide guidance on the
areas to be considered.
2. Pre-deployment:
(1) The Duty Senior Medical Officer of the Medical Centre or Hospital of the Naval Base
nearest to the departure base of the EGS. They may be able to supply qualified staff to assist in
manning the EGS or to provide assistance with CASEVAC of survivors.
(2) The Duty Senior Medical Officer at the Military Establishment or Hospital (Civilian or
Military) nearest to the sunken submarine. A casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) plan should be
developed with the shore based medical support and communicated to the OSC / CRF as soon
as possible to ensure that he is fully aware of SMO(S)'s intentions and is able to plan
accordingly.
Note: The SMO(S) must not assume that shore-based authorities local to the incident will take charge of the situation
or provide advice unless specifically asked to do so. The SMERAT is likely to be isolated and SMO(S) should seek sources
of advice from national and international technical or medical authorities as appropriate, by phone or through the
ISMERLO website. Early communication with these authorities whilst ashore or still in cell phone range is recommended
to ensure that communications can be achieved once deployed.
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3. Information Gathering:
Either in the pre-deployment phase or whilst en-route to the rescue site the SMO(S) should
ascertain the availability of additional resources including:
This information will direct the production of a medical evacuation plan for casualties and
survivors from the EGS / RGS / MOSHIP. SMO(S) should use either national medical authorities or the
ISMERLO web site to gain such information.
Chambers and medical facilities that may be of use during the rescue should be alerted to the
potential requirement for the transfer of casualties to them through national maritime or Foreign Ministry
routes. When en-route to the scene, communication methods to these facilities will need to be worked out
and links established.
4. On board an EGS
a. Request that an officer is detailed to act as the ‘Ship’s Recovery Coordinator’ to facilitate the
work of the medical SMERAT members. The ops officer or an officer of similar status and
experience is recommended. In addition to liaison tasks this officer should be responsible through
the command for the provision of recovery boat crews, stretcher bearers, communications numbers,
escorts and any other manpower which is required (see Chapters 1, 3 and 5).
b. Establish working location in the Operations Room or on the Bridge with a close line of
communications to the OCSMERAT and OSC.
c. Delegate the responsibility for the hands-on management of the medical manpower to the
Senior Casualty Clinician. Direct him to establish Triage and Treatment areas. Depending on
nations and vessels there may be pre-determined DISSUB casualty plans for the class of ship.
d. Establish contact and an agreed medical communications protocol with outside medical
facilities.
e. Liaise with the Nuclear Emergency Monitoring Team if appropriate and co-ordinate their
activities with those of medical treatment personnel.
f. The OCSMERAT and the SMO(S) brief the OSC on the relevant aspects of DISSUB survival,
escape and rescue as soon as possible after embarkation. The proposed treatment regimens and
casualty evacuation requirements must be fully explained to enable the OSC to request the
appropriate assistance, e.g. helicopters etc. See Annex 6A for points to be highlighted in the brief to
an OCS.
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g. Remain aware of the developing situation and the potential need to transfer medical staff and
equipment from the EGS onto Rescue Vessels. This will occur as the scenario dictates a need to
support rescue rather than escape. In this case SMO(S) will need to make early contact with the
CRF to discuss appropriate arrangements and give early advice about the potential use of, and need
to prepare, a DISSUB Medical Triage Team (DMTT) (see Annex 6D).
5. Onboard a RGS.
a. As a RGS (also known as MOSHIP) is likely to be a civilian vessel with limited crew, berthing
for rescue personnel and rescuees, identify any requirements for additional personnel for casualty
monitoring and transfers (e.g. stretcher bearers), administrative duties or logistic work. These
requirements should be presented to the CRF for resolution.
b. On arrival on the MOSHIP, areas should be identified for the Administration point and for
general patient regulating. Space may be extremely limited aboard the MOSHIP due to rescue
equipment. Areas and routes should be provided for movement of rescuees through the medical
areas including decontamination and a holding area post decompression. Transfer of rescuees either
by boat or helicopter from the vessel may be impacted by weather conditions and must be planned
for early.
c. Additional vessels carrying medical personnel and recompression facilities should be identified
and contact made through the CRF to ascertain what facilities are available and best methods of
transfer from the MOSHIP.
d. If more than one rescue system is deployed the SMO of each system should make contact with
each other and discuss medical equipment availability, personnel, rescue capacity of their systems
within the SRV, recompression facilities and medical facilities.
e. Brief the CRF on the relevant points from the OSC brief (see Annex 6A).
1. Pre-deployment:
a. Ensure that the First Reaction Stores including the recompression chamber and oxygen stores
have been correctly unpacked, stowed onboard and prepared for use.
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a. Identify, with the aid of the ship’s medical staff, suitable sites for the triage and treatment areas,
holding area and mortuary. Ensure that there is free passage from the point at which survivors will
be brought onboard to the triage area and then to the relevant treatment areas.
b. Where practical, all casualty routes should be under cover, on the same deck and casualty
landing or triage areas should be weather protected by use of portable awnings or weather proof
containers. The medical staff on board may already have a mass casualty handling plan which may
be adapted and consideration should be given to modifying the plan to accommodate the submarine
escape scenario. (In planning the routes and sitting treatment areas in and around the hanger,
consideration must be given to access when the EGS is at Flying Stations).
c. Where possible the primary and secondary treatment areas should be in the same geographical
situation, usually the helicopter hangar, to best facilitate the logistics of emergency medical care.
d. The SCC although having a responsibility for all areas will in all probability spend most of his
time close to the primary and secondary treatment areas. The SCC must remain flexible and be
prepared to re-evaluate and modify the plan to meet changing circumstances.
e. Allocate personnel, including stretcher and first aid personnel, and medical supplies to the triage
and treatment areas. Separate stretcher parties will be required to move casualties from the reception
area onboard to Triage and from Triage to the treatment areas. The minimum personnel and
equipment recommended for the triage and treatment areas are listed at Annex 6C.
f. Fully brief all medical teams about DISSUB hazards, triage and treatment of survivors.
Emphasise the manifestations and treatment of Decompression Illness (DCI). Ensure that a brief on
the management of casualties with radioactive contamination is given, if required.
g. Brief ship’s boat recovery crews and divers in accordance with Annex 6B.
a. Provide expert assistance to the medical teams in the treatment areas as required.
b. Ensure optimal use of on board oxygen supplies. Prophylactic use of high flow oxygen for all
escapees should be considered if adequate on board oxygen stores are available.
c. Supervise the recompression of casualties onboard the EGS. Recompression facilities will most
likely be quite limited and their use must be optimised. The SCC should apply the principles of
chamber operation found in Section 0619 to managing the treatment of escapees.
d. Ensure maintenance of clinical notes, casualty state boards and a flow of information, including
CASEVAC and recompression requirements, to SMO(S) and MHQ.
e. Ensure additional information regarding the DISSUB is obtained from survivors collated and
briefed to SMO(S) accordingly.
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a. Plan the most appropriate use of the available chambers with the CRF, SMO(S) and SRV
operating team.
b. Ensure the most effective use of the limited facilities for triage and treatment of rescuees in the
DCC.
c. Whilst not directly responsible for the safety of the SRV operators or chamber attendants, take
due cognisance of these requirements in planning rescuee decompression schedules, work rosters
and the use of these staff under pressure.
1. Establish the MHQ in a suitable area in close proximity to the treatment areas.
(Note: however information from the triage point on the disposal of survivors to particular treatment
areas onboard is crucial to allow the SCC to have oversight about how his resources are being used. The
MAO must ensure that this communication link with the triage point works effectively. Exercise
experiences have shown that if information is lost at this stage, the overall command and control of
casualty management will often fail.)
2. Establish communications with the medical teams and the SMO(S) in the Operations room by the
use of telephones, radio or messengers
5. Provide the Recovery Co-ordinator (Escape) or CRF Communications Co-Ordinator (Rescue) with
the information required for Casualty Reporting (CASREP) and Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) signals
(Templates at Annexes 6J and 6K).
(Notes: 1. Shore authorities require early information regarding casualties to prepare for casualty
reception, for informing the next of kin and for public relations. Therefore, the first and subsequent casualty
signals should be sent as soon as reasonably practicable. The precedence to be used for Casualty Reporting
is IMMEDIATE.
2. Early casualty evacuation by helicopter may be required and due to the rapidly changing
condition of some of the casualties, priorities for CASEVAC may change at very short notice. Last minute
changes to the evacuation plan must not result in inaccurate or incomplete CASEVAC signals being sent. To
ensure against this a runner should accompany the Senior Casualty Clinician when the final decision is made
to load which casualties).
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In any escape or rescue situation the SMERAT medical members will be widely distributed
throughout units participating in the operation. Accurate and adequate communications within the
SMERAT are essential to the smooth running of the response.
The SMO(S) (or deputy) is responsible for communications to the OSC, CRF and the CO / Master
of the RGS or MOSHIP. SMO(S) is also responsible for passing information back to the other members
of the SMERAT, particularly on casualties expected, operational matters or changes in the DISSUB
scenario.
All internal communications should be logged so that information can be checked and retransmitted
if necessary. Messages that may be particularly prone to transmission errors should be sent in a written
form by runner.
All external communications should be passed via the approved communications routes set up by
the OSC or CRF. This includes the release of signals, use of e-mail and chat areas on the ISMERLO
Website and the use of VHF for local contacts.
When more than 2 EGS or RGS / MOSHIPs are being used a formal communications programme
should be set up between the medical team leaders on each vessel and the SMO(S). This should allow co-
ordination of the use of resources and ensure that one vessel is not overloaded by casualties when the
other vessels have spare facilities.
When mobile phone / satellite phone or Internet communications are available these may be used
for ship to ship and ship to shore communications with the approval of the CO / Master (to avoid
interference with ship’s systems). All communications should be logged in the main communications log.
Care should be taken with the classification of information passed by this method, especially when
medically sensitive information is being transmitted.
When a Submarine Parachute Assistance Group (SPAG) has been deployed then the SMO(S)
should make contact with the OC and MO SPAG as soon as the EGS enters communication range. The
SPAG should be able to provide a list of escapees already recovered and a priority list for their evacuation
to the EGS. If no escapees have been recovered then the SPAG team themselves will require recovery
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before they become subject to environmentally related problems such as hypothermia. Further
information on the medical aspects of SPAG are available in the Medical Supplement.
The SMO(S) should remain in contact with a deployed DISSUB Medical Triage Team using
messages sent via the SRV or, if necessary, by use of an underwater telephone, if available.
0613 Logistics.
The initial deployment to an EGS or RGS / MOSHIP should include enough stores to commence
treatment of the expected number of escapees or rescuees. However, due to the bulk and weight of items,
particularly Oxygen supplies, it may not be possible to deploy the full requirements for the operation
during the initial phase. There will, therefore, be a need to re-supply the EGS / RGS / MOSHIP.
Logistic provision is the responsibility of the OSC or CRF. Logistic requirements should be
collated by the MAO and passed to the SMO(S). The SMO(S) should then brief the OSC / CRF on the
requirements and, where possible, provide guidance on where the materials required may be sourced. It
will be necessary to use national authorities and the SSRA to provide not only the required materials but
also transportation to the scene.
The supplies of Oxygen available may become a limiting factor on the ability to treat, decompress
and recompress survivors of a DISSUB. Before deployment the SMO(S) and his Senior Diving Medical
Officers should estimate the amount of O2 required for the number of survivors and the DISSUB pressure
scenario. This information should be passed early to the authority organising the DISSUB response to
ensure that an adequate supply of O2 is available to be transferred to the EGS / RGS / MOSHIP,
preferable before the vessel sails to reduce the risks and problems of loading heavy O2 cylinders or
‘QUADS’ at sea.
Dependant upon the location of the DISSUB, re-supplying may be difficult due either to the
distance from the nearest shore facilities or to the paucity of available stores. Therefore the SMO(S)
should know how to access additional equipment and supplies from their own nation, or other major
SMER nations and arrange for them to be transported to the scene. This should include any special
arrangements necessary for the transport of analgesic drugs controlled under national or international
legislation.
Limited supplies of clothing for DISSUB survivors should be included in the deployed stores. Due
to the possibility of chemical or radiological contamination of the survivors the stores should also include
over-suits to allow transfer of casualties without spreading the contamination.
Survivors of a DISSUB are likely to be significantly dehydrated and arrangements should be made
on the EGS / RGS / MOSHIP for adequate supplies of drinking water or hot drinks. Feeding requirements
will depend on how long the survivors will remain on board, the effects of DISSUB requirement (e.g.
starvation diarrhoea) and clinical condition.
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1. General: Within a DISSUB both survival and the decision to escape (if possible) are influenced by
many factors, including both physical and psychological factors. The major determinants are laid out below.
2. Multiple types of atmosphere contaminants are possible in a DISSUB. A catastrophe which results in
a DISSUB is likely to produce supplementary casualties and damage such as fires, flooding, and system
ruptures or leaks. It is imperative that additional casualties and damage are quickly contained to minimize
toxic atmosphere levels and the subsequent need for the survivors to use EABs.
An increase in DISSUB pressure significantly raises crew morbidity and mortality risk from
decompression illness (DCI). DCI becomes a problem from prolonged exposure (saturation) to atmospheric
pressures of greater than 7 msw (1.7 ATA). Once saturated, safe escape by buoyant ascent may not be
possible. Without Transfer Under Pressure (TUP) capability, rescued crew may be severely affected.
a. Control of toxic atmosphere contaminants to prevent donning Emergency Air Breathing (EAB)
systems. If EABs are required, survival time in the DISSUB will be reduced due to limited air
supplies and pressure will increase resulting in an increased risk of crew injury following escape or
rescue due to decompression illness.
b. Control of carbon dioxide and oxygen levels. Rest significantly reduces oxygen consumption
and carbon dioxide production. Conversely, hypothermia and the onset of shivering can lead to
increases in both. Efficient control of carbon dioxide and oxygen levels are critical to maximizing
survival time in a DISSUB.
The ability to survive and remain onboard will depend on the accuracy and the reliability of the
atmosphere monitoring equipment. To prolong the stay time in the submarine, the oxygen level can be
allowed to drop to 17 kPa, (17% at 101.3 kPa / 1 bar) and maintained at that level and the CO2 allowed to
rise to 2,5 kPa, (2.5% at 101.3 kPa / 1 bar) 3. These are extreme limits, and a certain percentage of the
survivors may not tolerate them easily, however, escape can be conducted from these levels. Other gases
in the DISSUB atmosphere may affect the decision to escape e.g. Chlorine from batteries that have been
contaminated with salt water, Carbon monoxide (CO) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) caused by combustion.
High partial pressures of Oxygen may also constitute a potential health risk to survivors. (Further
information on atmosphere control in the DISSUB can be found in the Medical Supplement).
3
Standard Atmospheric Pressure 1 atm = 101,325 x 103 Pa = 760 mmHg = 1,013 Bar, 14,6959 psi
2
1 litre = 1.057 quarts = 1.76 pints
3
4186,8 kJ = 1,000 kCal
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Hypothermia occurs when the core body temperature is lowered. Hypothermia impairs the judgment
and performance of the victim. Water temperature in deep oceans or cold climates is frequently below 5 oC.
Cold of this magnitude could be a significant factor in the survival of the DISSUB crew, depending on the
heat transfer characteristics of the boat and the number of survivors. Hyperthermia occurs when the core
body temperature is above normal. Heat stress conditions, posing the risk of heat casualties, may occur in
well-insulated submarines, in engineering spaces or to escapees on the surface in hot climates. See the
Medical Supplement for further information.
Whilst not always confirmed by trials, it is predicted that the temperature within the submarine will
gradually fall and reach equilibrium with the surrounding water. In order to prevent hypothermia and
shivering, personnel should attempt to remain dry and wear extra clothing. If escape and/or survival suits
are available, they will provide excellent insulation. However, if they are damaged, they will fail to
provide adequate protection after escape. Alternatively, a rising DISSUB temperature may lead to the
requirement to provide extra water to survivors and methods of cooling such as hand and arm immersion
is sea-water.
1. Psychological aspects. As with any disaster the psychological damage to both survivors and
responders must be considered. Careful follow-up will be required. Cases of post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) are likely to be encountered. Additionally acute psychiatric reactions are possible in the
survivor group and Nicotine withdrawal may also be a problem on the DISSUB.
3. Hydration and nutrition. Under simulated DISSUB conditions, survivors performed escape and
rescue procedures after seven days on a daily ration of one pint of water and 400 calories (kilogram
calories). Subjects existing solely on survival rations tend to become dehydrated and energy deficient.
Dehydration occurs sooner than starvation, making the need for water more important. Although
dehydrated, they may not feel thirsty and might therefore need to be forced to drink water. The research
indicated that each submarine survivor requires at least one (1) litre of water and around 1000 to 1200 Cal
per day. Extra food supplies will be required if survivors suffer with hypothermia. Hydration is even more
critical in hyperthermic DISSUB conditions, which may mandate several litres of water per man per day.
While resting, the survivors should be able to maintain their blood glucose levels. However,
minimal exercise may result in hypoglycaemia. In the cold, hypoglycaemia can lead to failure in
thermoregulation, with survivors cooling much more quickly and becoming hypothermic. Pod posting can
provide hot food and fluid replacement when rescue assets arrive. Eating foods high in fat content and
low in carbohydrates results in less carbon dioxide production. If the survivors choose to escape, at least
1000 cal should be eaten just prior to escape.
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4. Hygiene. The appropriate disposal of urine and faecal material is essential to prevent
gastroenteritis. Survivors should properly dispose of waste material. An outbreak of gastroenteritis will
increase survivor susceptibility to other hazards.
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SECTION VI – ESCAPE.
1. There are 2 methods to escape from a DISSUB these are Tower Escape and Compartment Escape
(sometimes called Rush Escape).
2. The Tower Escape procedure is essentially a very rapid bounce dive. As such, there are 2 main
hazards, decompression illness (DCI) and barotrauma. The increase in pressure during this ‘dive’ will
cause nitrogen to be absorbed into the body tissues - hence increasing the risk of developing DCI as the
pressure is reduced. The very rapid pressure transients may induce barotrauma to sensitive body organs.
3. There are national variations in the size and shape of escape towers but all are designed to facilitate
the rapid flooding up and pressurisation of the escapee within the escape tower followed by a rapid exit
from the DISSUB and a controlled rise to the surface. The escaper dons the SEIE and climbs into the
escape tower. The lower hatch is shut and the tower is flooded up and pressurised to the outside seawater
pressure. As the pressure inside and outside the tower equalise the upper hatch opens and the buoyancy
within the SEIE carries the escaper to the surface at a controlled rate. The SEIE is fitted with a hood to
enable the escaper to breathe normally, thus reducing the likelihood of pulmonary barotraumas.
4. Compartment Escape entails flooding the entire escape compartment up to the bottom of the escape
tower. The whole escape compartment is then pressurized to sea pressure, the lids of the escape tower are
opened and the survivors then proceed to escape in an orderly manner. This method entails the survivors
spending considerably more time under pressure with a consequent increase in the risks of DCI.
Additionally, given that the tower does not have to be drained down between escapes, escapees will arrive
at the surface in quick succession.
5. Thus, there are 3 main parameters affecting the safety of the escape procedure:
a. The depth of the DISSUB - hence the depth down to which the escaper must be pressurised. A
significant nitrogen load can be acquired over a very short time during exposures to deep escape
depths and the pressure transients are severe.
b. The time it takes to complete the procedure - the more time at increased pressure the greater the
risk of DCI. Therefore, once the escape process has commenced it should be completed as
smoothly and expeditiously as possible.
c. The ambient pressure within the DISSUB. If this is greater than 1 ATA the escaper will
already have an increase in tissue nitrogen loading and the chances of developing DCI are thus
increased. This is particularly relevant if the survivor has spent a long period of time at pressure.
All body tissues will become saturated with nitrogen after about 24 hours.
6. From an internal pressure of 1ATA escapes have been performed down to a depth of 180 metres
(during controlled exercises) and some nations have routinely exercised escapes from 90 metres in open
water condition. Thus the systems are well proven. A simulated escape pressure profile for a 180-metre
escape is shown in the figure below:
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E s c a p e t o w e r f lo o d s B ou y an t A s e n t (3 m etre/s)
200 P r e s s u re d o u b le s e v e r y 4 s e c o n d s E s c a p e le a v e s t o w e r
u n ti l e q u a l w i th s e a p r e s s u r e
Depth (metres)
150
100
50
7. Experimentation using a submarine escape simulator has been conducted to define the depth /
DISSUB internal pressure relationship - termed the ‘Safe to Escape Curve’. The research is has defined
the curve that has a 5 - 10% incidence of DCI at different depths and DISSUB internal pressures. This
curve is shown below. Other curves for different DCI risks are available but due to the interpretation
required should only be used by an experience submarine or diving MO.
S a fe to E s c a p e C u r v e
200
A
Submarine Escape Depth (MSW)
(1 8 0 )
150
100
50
1 .0 1 .5 B 2 .0
P re s su re w ith in D is su b (A T A )
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Notes:
1. The Safe to Escape Curve is based on experimental work and actual sea trials.
2. It only applies where the compartment 'air' is composed of 21% Oxygen and 79% Nitrogen.
3. Point A is the maximum depth from which escape has been performed during sea trials.
4. Point B (1.7ATA) represents the pressure within the DISSUB from which rapid
depressurisation back to 1ATA gives a 5% incidence of DCI. (assuming saturation at 1.7ATA).
5. The shape of the escape curve has been defined to demonstrate DCI incidence of between 5 -
10%. Below this curve escape would be considered 'relatively' safe.
6. The information will only apply to an escape system with the following characteristics:
- provides a doubling of pressure every 4 seconds during the compression phase
- has a 'bottom time' not exceeding 4 seconds
- has an ascent rate of 2.75 meters per second
Decompression Illness (DCI) is a complex series of signs and symptoms initiated by gas bubbles in
the blood stream and/or tissues during or following decompression. DCI may present as a wide range of
symptoms. Although symptoms may begin soon after surfacing, it is possible for the onset to be delayed
for some hours.
The incidence, rapidity of onset and the severity of the illness among the survivors will tend to
increase the greater the depth from which escape is made. With all methods of escape, the risk of DCI
may increase with each successive escape. With most escape systems, each escape sequence increases the
internal pressure of the submarine as water from the escape tower is drained into the internal volume of
the submarine. Thus those who escape later will have spent a longer time at increased pressure and will
have acquired a higher inert gas load.
Compartment escape requires longer periods under pressure and is thus more likely to cause DCI,
particularly for later escapees. Survival is unlikely below 70m and compartment escape should be
considered a method of last resort for most DISSUB situations.
0618 Barotrauma.
3. Interstitial Empyhsema. Air from mediastinal emphysema may migrate to cause subcutaneous
emphysema of the neck or upper chest. This presents with swelling and crepitus on palpation.
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The condition is not usually painful or dangerous in itself unless the upper airway is compromised
by excessive tissue swelling, but it should alert the examiner to the possibility of coexistent simple or
tension pneumothorax or arterial air embolism.
4. Pneumothorax. Symptoms will usually be shortness of breath and one-sided chest pain. Standard
medical treatment and close observation is indicated, with needle thoracostomy only if tension
pneumothorax develops. Recompression therapy for isolated non-tension pneumothorax is not required,
but a careful neurological screening examination is necessary to rule out the possibility of coexistent
arterial air embolism.
5. Arterial Gas Embolism. The rapidly progressive focal neurological signs and symptoms of
neurological arterial gas embolism, including decreasing level of consciousness, would typically arise
within minutes after completing a submarine escape. The symptoms and signs themselves are effectively
indistinguishable from rapid onset neurological DCI and, as such, the term DCI includes illness caused by
arterial gas embolism and treatment is described under the heading of Decompression Illness.
6. Otic Barotrauma. Otic barotrauma may occur with rapid pressurisation during the escape
procedures. The following problems and symptoms may occur.
a. Tympanic membrane injury - Injury or rupture of the tympanic membrane may occur resulting
in decreased hearing, pain, and bleeding. Only symptomatic treatment is required for this problem.
b. Round or oval window rupture - Forceful ear clearing during escape tower pressurisation may
cause this. In addition to ear pain, vertigo, hearing loss, and/or nausea may be seen as presenting
symptoms. These symptoms may make it difficult to distinguish this condition from neurological
DCI. If in doubt, treat for DCI while placing the patient in a semi-recumbent position, minimising
patient movement, and seeking consultation.
7. Tooth Barotrauma. A loose or cracked filling or crown may allow pressurised air to enter the
nerve root area during escape procedures. Severe jaw or tooth pain will result as this gas expands during
ascent. Despite the severity of symptoms, only symptomatic treatment is necessary after recovery aboard
the DISSUB.
8. Sinus Barotrauma. Blockage of a sinus opening into the nasal cavity may cause barotrauma
during either compression or decompression. If the orifice is blocked during compression, the sinus will
be at lower pressure than the rest of the body including the vasculature, and bleeding will occur into the
sinus cavity resulting in a nose bleed and residual sinus pain upon surfacing. If the sinus(es) become
blocked during ascent to the surface, pressure will build up in the sinus during ascent, resulting in sinus
pain and headache persistent on the surface. In either instance, neurological symptoms will not be present.
Tapping or applying digital pressure over the affected sinus(es) will confirm the aetiology of these
symptoms. Either condition requires only symptomatic management.
9. Oesophageal/Abdominal Barotrauma. Swallowed air may cause the lower portion of the
oesophagus to rupture during rapid ascent due to expansion of trapped gas. Anterior chest pain, usually
left-sided, will occur and subcutaneous emphysema may develop. Survivors in whom oesophageal
rupture is suspected should be medically stabilised, closely observed, and given a high priority for early
CASEVAC. Bowel rest, administration of intravenous fluids, broad-spectrum antibiotics if available, and
mask oxygen are indicated for this problem while awaiting CASEVAC.
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ATP-57(B)
Gastric or small bowel rupture can also occur with rapid ascent for the same reasons. In this event,
symptoms would include abdominal pain and possible abdominal distension. A high degree of suspicion
and thorough abdominal examination for sign of ruptured viscus is indicated. The treatment is similar to
that of oesophageal rupture, with the additional recommendation for placement of a nasogastric tube for
gastric decompression. Similar priority should be given for early CASEVAC.
1. Differential diagnosis
Survivors may be suffering from more than one condition. Those who are diagnosed or suspected
of serious or life-threatening DCI (either traditional decompression illness or arterial gas embolism) and
therefore categorised C1 (see Section X) should be treated by recompression immediately if practicable,
since any delay in such treatment will significantly reduce their chances of survival. Concurrent medical
conditions will not normally be affected by recompression and can be treated within the chamber.
Differential diagnosis may be difficult under these conditions, but the principle still applies: When in
doubt regarding serious DCI, recompress, providing chamber space can be made available and
operational limitations allow.
Evidence supporting the differential diagnosis of survivors should be available from other features
of the incident. Unconsciousness may be a consequence of a head injury suffered during escape, an
embolism occurring during ascent, hypoxia from near drowning, or from cold or heat exposure on the
surface.
However all survivors from submarine escape who lose consciousness within a few minutes of
surfacing must be treated by recompression, unless categorised as expectant (T4 (see Section X)). One
must assume the likelihood of pulmonary barotraumas with arterial gas embolism with this presentation.
(Cold or heat will normally affect persons after some interval on the surface. The interval will be related
to ambient conditions and the use of the submarine escape and immersion equipment.)
2. Diving related conditions. Reference: NATO publication ADivP-2; Allied Guide to Diving
Medical Disorders is the definitive document on diving related conditions.
The medical officer may have to cope with multiple cases of DCI and/or multiple survivors who
have a decompression obligation but at the time of assessment have not developed symptoms of DCI. The
casualties may present over several hours; triage and treatment will depend on the number and types of
recompression chambers available. If escape occurs before recovery forces arrive, the medical officer
may also have to cope with co-morbid medical conditions in addition to DCI although priority should be
given to the treatment of serious cases of DCI (i.e. those with pulmonary or neurological symptoms or
signs).
In managing multiple cases of DCI/decompression obligation with limited resources, in order to ‘do
the most for the most’, a number of important principles need to be considered:
a. In a pressurised DISSUB where the survivors have not had time to become saturated or the
pressure is rising, the more severe DCI cases can be expected in those last to leave the submarine
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ATP-57(B)
b. Recompression to provide hyperbaric oxygen therapy is the gold standard treatment for
decompression illness. Available oxygen stores will limit the number of chamber treatments that
can be supported. If re-supply will not be possible before the oxygen stores are exhausted, it may be
necessary to conserve oxygen to treat more severe cases of DCI in order to do the most for the
most. Even if hyperbaric oxygen is not available or practical for all patients, recompression on air
for the remainder is generally the second best option and should be considered. Where this is not
possible, treatment with high concentration oxygen at surface pressure and fluid replacement can be
used for treatment of DCI and for prophylaxis against DCI in those with a decompression
obligation until recompression facilities become available.
c. Only shallow oxygen tables (no tables in excess of a NATO Table VI with extensions) should
be used whenever multiple DCI casualties may exist with a single on board recompression
chamber. Consider procedures for shortening decompression times if the requirement for
immediate standard treatments is likely to exceed the recompression facilities immediately
available.
d. Recompression and treatment on tables deeper than 18 metres should only be done if absolutely
necessary with due consideration of the logistical requirements. Eighteen meter tables can be
swiftly interrupted, allowing more flexibility than deeper tables.
e. Although shipboard recompression chambers have a nominal rated capacity based upon
ambulatory patients, in practice only 1-3 serious cases with an attendant and MO can be
accommodated in most of these chambers.
f. It may be appropriate to accept and perform incomplete, but life saving, recompression therapy
on some survivors to make chamber space available to save other lives. Repeat follow up
treatments could then be performed when additional recompression facilities have become
available.
g. Do not be misled by survivors with mild or absent symptoms. AGE is usually symptomatic
upon surfacing or within minutes of surfacing, but there may be a lucent interval when the patient
appears well before suddenly worsening. Decompression sickness can develop immediately or
have no symptoms for many hours after ascent. Treat DCI or omitted decompression early before
symptoms develop.
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ATP-57(B)
preferable to use low flying (<1000 ft/300m) or aircraft pressurised to these levels. Unconscious patients
should be put in the recovery position during transport, with continuous use of high flow oxygen and care
of skin pressure areas. Intensive care may be required during transport. Transportation risks must be
weighed against delays in reaching a definitive care facility.
a. Consider delegation of this responsibility to the MO in charge of the recompression area if this
MO has been trained in diving casualty management. No survivor should be recompressed unless
authorised by the SCC or an MO to whom the SCC has delegated responsibility.
b. The sooner DCI or arterial gas embolism is treated, the better the prognosis. Time must not be
wasted in detailed evaluation prior to treatment. A detailed neurological examination can be
completed in the chamber under pressure following initial recompression in the case of survivors
with serious neurological findings on the preliminary screening examination.
d. The recompression chamber should be fully utilized immediately for patients that may be at risk
of DCI. After initial pressurisation, keep the recompression chamber inner lock pressurised to 18
metres (2.8 bar) and lock any additional cases in, if possible. Upward excursions during treatment
should be brief and avoided when possible. Casualties whose DCI becomes less serious with
treatment may be removed from the recompression chamber inner lock to the outer lock and then
surfaced after partial treatment to make room for more serious cases. Re-treatments can be
performed in due course.
8. Utilisation of Diving Medical Officers. If only one diving medical officer is present he/she
should not enter the chamber, as he/she must remain available to triage new casualties for treatment. An
attendant should remain in the chamber to monitor and care for survivors. If more than one diving medical
officer is present, one remains outside to continue triage and evaluate support requirements. The second
diving medical officer may be called upon to provide therapeutic support either in or outside the chamber
as necessary.
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ATP-57(B)
a. Catheterisation and turning of the paralysed patient with attention to pressure points.
b. Hydration with a crystalloid solution such as Ringer's Lactate (Hartman’s) Solution or Normal
Saline (recommended for serious DCI).
Within the Medical Supplement there is further guidance on the recognition and treatment of the
following specific injuries:
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ATP-57(B)
Fire, flooding, atmosphere contamination, and reactor emergencies are some of the major casualties
that could result in the need for surface abandonment of the crew. Conditions leading to abandonment
will likely develop rapidly and result in a hurried evacuation from the vessel. Once egress is
accomplished from the stricken submarine, survivors face numerous adverse conditions. Although the
surface survivor faces many hazards they can be broadly categorized into 2 major areas; the baseline
physical condition of the survivor upon arrival to the surface and environmental conditions encountered
on the surface. . All surface hazards compound one another and are further exacerbated by the time spent
on the surface prior to rendezvous with rescue forces.
The survivor will likely arrive on the surface in a deteriorated state of physical or mental capacities
as a result of the initial incident itself, the DISSUB experience and the escape experience. They may
present to the surface already demonstrating signs of trauma, respiratory compromise, barotrauma,
Decompression Syndromes, hypo/hyperthermia, and mental exhaustion. Surface abandonment in high sea
states also places the crew at risk for orthopaedic injuries with poorly timed jumps from the sail of the
submarine. Debris and petrochemicals may pose hazards upon immediately exiting the submarine.
Environmental conditions encompass a wide range of factors such as sea state, water temperature,
air temperature, radiant heat, and marine hazards. An immersion suit, such as the SEIE, is designed to
prolong surface survival by providing protection from environmental hazards. There are national
variations in Submarine Escape and Survival Personnel Equipment design. Some employ the free-floating
method whereby the survivor lies in the water. Others employ a small one-man life raft to raise the
survivor out of the water such as the MK 10 Submarine Escape and Immersion Equipment (SEIE).
Properly outfitted, the MK 10 SEIE has increased the projected surface survival time in cold waters to
about 24 hours with concurrent cold injury as likely presentation. Assuming that the submariner survives
the initial cold shock in response to entering cold water, survival time without an immersion suit is
considerably less than 24 hours: approximate times are shown in Table 6 – 1 below:
Table 6-1 Life expectancy times for immersion temperatures without SEIE
Note: The use of a properly outfitted SEIE with life raft will increase immersion
times to roughly 24 hours in 3-4° C water temperatures.
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ATP-57(B)
The use of SEIE does not guarantee complete environmental protection; various shortcomings may
still put the survivor at risk of environmental hazards. Improper donning of undergarments, loss of the
raft, or damage of the immersion equipment during egress compromises thermal protection of the SEIE.
Free-floating SEIE have several reported shortcomings including unfavourable flotation angle
increasing aspiration risk, severe low back pain, excessive suit flexion, inability to urinate, and decreased
circulation to limbs. The buoyancy and suit flexion of a large percentage of immersion suits negates the
self-righting ability of approved lifejackets. Splash guards to protect the face have been fitted to some
systems in efforts to reduce aspiration. Possible modifications to the MK 10 SEIE include addition of a
streamer or global positioning equipment to aid in search and recovery efforts.
The main animal hazard faced by survivors will be pelagic sharks. These animals may abrade
exposed areas or bite causing extensive injury.
The rate of heat loss of individual floating in the water depends on the following: water
temperature, air temperature, wind speed, insulation provided by immersion suit and clothing, rate of
agitation of the water, metabolic heat production (produced by shivering and exercise), ratio of body mass
to surface area, subcutaneous fat thickness, state of physical fitness, physical behaviour, and body posture
in the water.
4. Dehydration. Dehydration results from inadequate fluid intake, insensible fluid loss, seasickness,
or osmotic diarrhoea 2° salt water ingestion. Fluid loss in excess of 5 percent body weight may be
associated with headache, irritability, and pre-syncope symptoms. With losses of 8 - 10 percent,
performance declines significantly. Further losses lead to hallucinations and delirium. Death usually
occurs with acute losses in the range of 15 - 20 percent of body weight. Survival expectancy without
water is on average 3 days (or less in hot weather) and no more than about 5-6 days. Death from
starvation occurs in excess of a month.
5. Skin/soft tissue injury. Prolonged immersion leads to skin breakdown and ulcer formation.
Severe sun and wind burn may occur over unprotected skin. Cold induced injuries include freezing or non
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ATP-57(B)
freezing injuries (frostbite or chilblains). SEIE mitigates some of these conditions. Even with this
equipment, in waters of 5° C (41° F) or colder, non-freezing cold injury of the extremities may still occur.
Effects may be seen after 10-15 hours of exposure.
Eye exposure to petrochemicals, salt water, and ultraviolet light may impair vision by chemical or
solar conjunctivitis.
Rescued survivors may suffer from traumatic or exposure-related conditions- near drowning,
significantly impaired peripheral neuromuscular (nerve and muscle) function, blood volume alterations,
cardio-vascular function impairment, hypothermia, and electrolyte imbalances. The prolonged immersion
may leave soft tissue friable and subject to secondary injury during extraction efforts. Those not at risk
for aspiration should be extracted from the water with care, preferably horizontally, and handled as if they
were critically ill. Unconscious individuals or those at risk for aspiration should be removed in haste.
Rapid medical assessment of ABC’s should occur and near-drowning victims should receive oxygen as
soon as possible.
Cold survivors must be protected from further heat loss and placed in medical observation.
Severely hypothermic persons require extensive medical intervention and may overwhelm medical
capabilities if multiple casualties present. Core temperature re-warming should be done slowly and only
with critical care capability because of the increased risk of cardiac arrhythmias and cardiovascular
collapse. Re-warming hypothermic rescuees may be limited to blankets, warm showers, or heated PO
fluids.
Thorough evaluation of soft tissue cold injury cannot be made before thawing and does not
influence first aid treatment.
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ATP-57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
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ATP-57(B)
0626 Introduction.
There are a variety of rescue systems; each of them is operated by a different nation or group of
nations with their own Standing Operating Procedures. Therefore this chapter gives general guidance and
should be read in conjunction with the SOPs for the relevant system.
(Note: Where the term SRV is used in this section it covers both rescue vehicles and rescue chambers)
In addition to the problems of survival in a DISSUB there are some specific risks pertaining to the
rescue process between the DISSUB and arrival at shore facilities. Routine transport between vessels and
ashore are normal risks and are not considered.
1. Access to the SRV. The SRV will mate with the DISSUB via an escape tower or trunk. To access
the SRV there is a requirement to climb through the tower and then over a series of gaps through the tower
hatch, over the casing and into the SRV. This will be taxing for able-bodied rescuees but may be
impossible to debilitated survivors or those with injuries to one or more limb. Assistance to move
survivors through the submarine to the tower should be planned by the senior survivor and DMTT (if
deployed). Assistance with strops and winching should be provided by the SRV.
2. Immobile Patients. Rescuees who can not climb through the tower, even with assistance, may be
transferred to an SRV using a stretcher and winch arrangement. Due to the limits on access and turning in
the vehicle it is normal for only a half-back stretcher to be available. For lower limb injuries this will
mean that additional splinting will be required. Once in the SRV these casualties occupy space for at least
6 to 8 seated casualties and access to undertake interventions (airway manoeuvres, ventilation, IV access
e.t.c) is very limited. With similar difficulties in extracting these rescuees into the MOSHIP / MOSUB
and into a DCC careful planning will be required to retrieve these casualties.
3. CO2 Off Effect. The change from a contaminated submarine atmosphere, especially if the CO2
level is high (>3%) to a clean atmosphere can lead to sudden collapse. This may occur in the SRV or deck
reception area.
4. Vehicle Constraints. SRVs are small vehicle with limited space. On-board monitoring or
treatment for rescuees may be very limited until arrival on the MOSHIP deck and unloading. Therefore
rescuees with medical problems may worsen during transit in the SRV.
5. Transfer Under Pressure. Not all SRVs are capable of transferring rescuees directly to a
decompression system. These rescuees will need to be decompressed to surface and then placed in
chambers and taken back to depth. As the DISSUB pressure increases the time between surfacing and
onset of DCI shortens and these rescuees may be at significant risk of DCI during this period with
consequent requirement for prolonged decompression and therapeutic treatment.
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ATP-57(B)
En-route to the DISSUB the SMO (S), Senior Diving MO and the CRF should undertake a mission
planning exercise with the SRV operators to maximise chamber usage, decide on decompression tables
and ensure that injured survivors are brought out of the DISSUB at an appropriate point in the rescue
process. This plan will then form the basis for rescue cycles modified by further information received on
arrival at the DISSUB location. Guidance on the choice of decompression tables is in Annex 6G.
When more than 1 rescue asset is being used the medical teams supporting each SRV require to co-
ordinate casualty management. Unless the OSC has the facilities to co-ordinate the casualty response,
chamber availability and casualty information then 1 rescue system shall be nominated as the lead to co-
ordinate the rescue response, for compiling casualty details and collating rescue force store and
replenishment requirements.
Selection of the co-ordinating rescue system will depend upon the availability of administrative
staff and communications facilities on the MOSHIP to undertake this task.
The DMTT may require additional medical equipment to support the DISSUB survivors. This
should be supplied via the next available SRV trip. If multiple vehicles are being used this will require
co-ordination between the two medical teams to ensure the right equipment is provided in an appropriate
timescale.
0631 Resupply.
Additional medical supplies and oxygen, both for the chambers and for direct patient use, may be
needed during a rescue. The SMO(S) should feed these requirements to the CRF who will arrange for
resupply via the OSC. If poor weather or sea conditions are expected at the DISSUB location then
consideration should be given to loading additional stores before deployment from the MOPORT.
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ATP-57(B)
Survivors within the DISSUB are highly likely to have been exposed to a variety of potential
contaminants during the survival phase before escape or rescue. Contaminants vary depending on the
class of the submarine, and nature of the accident. These include: diesel fuel, lubricating oils and grease,
hydraulic oil, pyrolysis products, human excreta and in the case of nuclear submarines they may have
been exposed to radioactive contamination.
All forms of contamination represent a threat to the health of the survivors. Therefore all survivors
should be assumed to be contaminated until proven otherwise. All survivors from a nuclear DISSUB
should be assumed to be radiological contaminated until they have been adequately monitored and shown
to be uncontaminated. Furthermore it is highly probable that most survivors will have been exposed to
more than one sources of contamination.
If the contamination is not adequately managed and contained it could also represent a potential
hazard to rescue forces; this is true both for rescue forces on the surface and the DMTT. Furthermore the
flammability of flammable contaminates such as diesel fuel and lubricating oils will be increased in a
hyperbaric environment, thus there may be a significant fire hazard in the event of TUP being necessary
or, in the case of escapees, therapeutic recompression being required. These hazards can be reduced if
contaminated individuals are decontaminated as soon as reasonably practical and rescue forces follow a
few basic principles.
Contamination can be expected to be present both on survivors clothing and on their skin and hair.
Up to 80% of contamination can be removed by the simple process of undressing the individual.
If the conditions and supplies permit, every effort should be made for early decontamination of
escapees and rescuees. Escapees from a DISSUB are likely to arrive on the surface in some form of SEIE
suit, which will likely be worn over their clothes. Once they have been recovered to the EGS and have
undergone initial medical triage ambulatory escapees should undress and shower as soon as practically
possible. This process should be supervised by a medical trained individual since delayed decompression
illness may occur.
In the case of rescue decontamination should if at all possible start aboard the DISSUB. Clothing
should be removed and left in the DISSUB. The DMTT can assist where needed in decontamination and
dressing of rescuees on board the DISSUB. This procedure should reduce the amount of contamination
transferred to the rescue vessel. In addition it will also reduce the critical loss of time devoted to extensive
decontamination procedures on the MOSHIP.
If TUP is not required, ambulatory rescuees should be decontaminated as soon as practical after
initial triage. This process should be observed by a medically trained individual.
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ATP-57(B)
Every effort should be made by casualty receiving & caregivers to wear personal protective
equipment (PPE) to avoid cross-contamination. Contaminants likely to be encountered are most unlikely
to present a significant health hazard to rescue force personnel. Simple precaution such as wearing a
disposable plastic apron and surgical gloves should provide more than adequate protection. Respiratory
protection outside the DISSUB will unlikely be required for chemical contamination.
In most DISSUB scenarios it is highly likely that the survivors will be exposed to a number of
chemical contaminants. Damage to submarine systems may result in the release of diesel fuel, lubricating
oil, hydraulic oil, MEA, sulphuric acid and a number of other chemical contaminants. A further source of
chemical contamination is from pyrolysis products following a fire. Additionally it is inevitable that
during the survival phase the survivors will have to have deployed some means of carbon dioxide
scrubbing. This is most likely to have taken the form of either lithium hydroxide or soda lime; both have
the potential to release extremely caustic dust into the DISSUB.
Whilst survivors can be expected to have attempted to remove gross contamination they are still
likely to have residual contamination on their clothing, skin and hair. The presence of contamination on
the skin can be expected to cause skin irritation especially if has been present for several days.
Conditions within the DISSUB are likely to have been very primitive. Freshwater is likely to have
been in very short supply and thus it is most probable that survivors will be unwashed and potentially
contaminated with human excreta. Additionally injured survivors may have blood stained clothing as may
their colleagues who have rendered first aid. As with chemical contamination individuals should be
afforded every opportunity to shower or wash as soon as possible on the EGS or MOSHIP. Assistance
should be provided to injured survivors as required. Contaminated clothing again should be bagged for
disposal in accordance with national guidelines.
In the event of the DISSUB being nuclear powered there is a very real possibility that some or all of
the survivors will have been exposed to radiological contamination. This could result from a primary
coolant spill or, exposure to fission products if the incident has been of such severity that it leads to a loss
of core integrity. In both situations the radioactive isotopes involved will be Beta/Gamma emitters, which
have the potential to cause burns to the skin if not removed.
Individuals with skin contamination are at increased risk for internal contamination through
ingestion or inhalation. If internal contamination is suspected then this can be assessed by taking nose
blows from survivors collecting samples of urine and faeces. If there remains a persistent concern about
internal contamination, then this can be assessed once the individuals concerned have been transferred
ashore by whole body monitoring.
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ATP-57(B)
The DISSUB atmosphere may also be contaminated, and thus will represent a hazard to members
of the DISSUB entry team. Therefore if a radiological release is suspected members of the DMTT or
DET should wear respiratory protection prior to and during DISSUB entry.
Radiological contaminated individuals represent a potential hazard to rescue forces, particularly
those engaged in medical triage, decontamination and medical care. The risk can be ameliorated if
personnel engaged in these operations wear simple PPE; this should include: surgical type mask and hood,
waterproof apron, latex gloves and plastic overshoes.
It must also be remembered that any area were a contaminated individual is treated or is otherwise
held is at risk of becoming contaminated. Access to these areas must be controlled to individuals wearing
appropriate PPE and individuals leaving the area should undress and be monitored before being allowed to
enter any clean area. On completion of the rescue operation it will be necessary to monitor and
decontaminate any area where contaminated individuals had been held.
Rescuees from a nuclear DISSUB should be considered as radiological contaminated until proven
otherwise. Prior to entry into the rescue vehicle they should disrobe and don disposable identifiable
garments. On arrival at the MOSHIP they should undergo monitoring as soon as practical, the location
where this is conducted will depend on the design of the individual system. Contaminated individuals
should undergo decontamination as described above taking into account the limitations of the rescue
system if TUP is required.
Escapees from a nuclear DISSUB must be considered to be radiological contaminated until they
have been monitored and been shown to be uncontaminated. Given that they will have ascended from the
DISSUB through the water it is most unlikely that the exterior of the SEIE itself will be contaminated
however, contamination of the escapees clothing worn under the SEIE can’t be excluded. Able bodied
escapees should remove their SEIE prior to monitoring. SEIEs should be bagged as radiological waste in
accordance with national guidelines. Following monitoring areas of contamination and its severity should
be recorded.
Decontamination of able bodied escapees will best conducted in a designated decontamination area.
If available, this ideally would include a washroom equipped with showers as close as possible to the area
where the escapees are monitored. This avoids extending contamination into treatment areas. Non-able
bodied escapees should have their SEIE suits removed by medical staff prior to monitoring. If still
contaminated after removal of clothing they should be washed by medical staff using soap and water and
wash cloths. Irrigation run-off should be contained.
The route to the washroom should ideally be covered in absorbent paper to prevent the deck
becoming contaminated; access through this area should be restricted to escapees and rescue workers
wearing appropriate PPE. In the washroom the contaminated individual should undress themselves and
place their own clothes in bags which again should be treated as radiological waste in accordance with
national guidelines. They should then shower and wash using soap and water. The process should be
repeated till contamination is removed or reduced to twice the background reading. Scrubbing using a
scrubbing brush is not recommended, since it has the potential to abrade the skin and increase the
risk of internal contamination. Contaminated wounds should be irrigated with sterile normal saline,
with care being exercised to contain the irrigation fluid. Once they have showered they should be re-
monitored ideally in an area that has been kept clear of contaminated individuals. If clean they should
dress and leave the washroom.
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ATP-57(B)
If urgent recompression therapy is indicated this again should not be delayed by the need to
radiologically decontaminate an individual however, the SEIE and the patient’s clothing should be
removed, if at all possible, prior to the patient being placed in the chamber. However, it should now be
remembered that the chamber itself is now potentially contaminated and it should be treated as a
controlled contamination area.
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SECTION X – TRIAGE
0637 Introduction.
The aims of triage are to deliver the right patient to the right place at the right time so that they
receive the optimum treatment and also to ‘do the most for the most 4. The principles of triage should be
used whenever the number and severity of casualties exceeds the resources available. It is a dynamic
process since the appropriate triage category allocated to any individual will change with time and
treatment.
The triage system given in this section assigns each casualty a composite triage category consisting
of a medical ‘T’ component and a recompression ‘C’ component. This system is used to direct the
management of casualties as they arrive onboard an EGS or MOSHIP and also to direct their evacuation to
other facilities. A ‘triage sieve’ (based on mobility for example) should be used to rapidly allocate
survivors to treatment areas onboard an EGS or MOSHIP and a more complex ‘triage sort’ should be used
for the movement of casualties between areas onboard and for evacuation.
A proposed triage sieve is reproduced at Figure 1. This modifies the sieve proposed in the
Reference2 but includes the NATO definitions for T 1 – 3 laid out in STANAG 2879 MED (Edition 3) –
‘Principles of Medical Policy in the Management of a Mass Casualty Situation’. The STANAG uses
‘DELAYED’ for T2 (instead of urgent) and MINIMAL for T3 (instead of delayed). To avoid
communications difficulties the T category should be used supplemented by the NATO definition if
required.
This sieve may be useful in some DISSUB casualty scenarios but alternative strategies may be
preferable in others. For example this sieve is not designed to prioritise escapees for recompression
therapy; this recompression needs assessment could occur as part of a triage sort as opposed to a sieve but
in the case, for example, of an escapee who is witnessed surfacing then losing consciousness it would
unnecessarily delay recompression. Also it may not be able to separate cold exhausted uninjured
casualties from those that are cold, exhausted and have injuries. In situations like this the ability to
communicate or other assessments of conscious level may represent more appropriate decision thresholds.
Triage will ideally be conducted in an area shielded from the weather and readily accessible to
oncoming survivors that provides adequate space for medical care, depending on the class of the EGS or
MOSHIP. The area need not be large but there should be sufficient space to evaluate up to 5 casualties
prior to them being moved to the treatment or holding areas.
The Triage Medical Officer (TO) is responsible for the rapid assessment of survivors and their
placement into the relevant triage categories which will, in turn, determine which treatment area they are
initially taken to. If rescue has been carried out using a submarine rescue vehicle (SRV), or if escape took
place prior to the arrival on scene of the EGS, survivors may arrive in small or large groups. In the event of
a Compartment Escape the TO will have to assess a greater number of survivors and will require
assistance.
4
Major Incident Medical Management and Support The Practical Approach. 2nd Ed. Advanced Life Support Group.
2002 BMJ Publishing Group. London.
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ATP-57(B)
The TO requires a supply of triage cards, preferably either cruciform or folding triage cards.
yes
PRIORITY 3
(NATO Minimal)
WALKING
no
no
DEAD
AIRWAY
yes
Below 10 or
above 29
PRIORITY 1
RESPIRATORY (NATO Immediate)
RATE
120 or
10-29 more
<120
PRIORITY 2
PULSE RATE (NATO Delayed)
The TO will allocate each survivor a unique casualty identification number. This is to be written in
indelible ink on the forehead and on the Casualty Report Form. One or more fit survivor(s) should be
retained in Triage to assist with the identification of unconscious casualties. Immediate use of high-flow
oxygen should be considered for all unconscious patients as well as any patients in whom the suspicion of
DCI exists. A physical description of unconscious survivors is to be written in their notes to facilitate and
confirm identification. As soon as the TO has allocated a triage category and written brief clinical notes,
survivors are to be taken to the appropriate treatment areas. The clinical notes must accompany each
survivor at all times. (See Casualty Handling Algorithm - Annex 6F).
The Area Casualty Report Log (Annex 6I) is to be kept up to date at all times and the information
passed to the MAO as soon as possible. The MAO is to be informed of all casualty movements in or out
of triage area by telephone or written message and the destination and time of transfer is to be recorded in
the Triage Casualty Log and Master Casualty State Board (Annex 6H).
The standard NATO medical triage categories (T1, T2, T3, T4) are to be used to indicate medical
treatment priorities. In addition, it must be determined which survivors need immediate recompression
(C1) or non-urgent recompression (C2) in order to allocate them to recompression chamber spaces on the
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EGS / RGS and in receiving shore facilities. (See Medical and Recompression Triage Categories Grid -
Table 6-6).
1. T1. This category should only be applied to casualties who require immediate life saving medical
and/or surgical treatment which is not overly time-consuming, and who have a high probability of
survival. Examples of medical conditions in this category include haemorrhagic shock, tension
pneumothorax and other respiratory emergencies, and the finding of an acute surgical abdomen.
Casualties in the T1/C1 category require both lifesaving immediate medical treatment and stabilisation
prior to immediate recompression; whereas those in the T1/C2 category require non-urgent decompression.
Depending upon severity of injury and availability of resources, certain survivors that initially appear to be
in the T1/C1 category may be determined to be effectively unsalvageable with available resources (T4).
2. T2. This category should be applied to casualties requiring time-consuming major medical and/or
surgical treatment, and whose general condition permits delay in said treatment without unduly
endangering life. Examples of these medical conditions include: <20% second degree burns, open
fractures, inhalation pulmonary injuries, major lacerations, and moderate hypothermia. Category T2/C1
indicates the additional requirement for urgent recompression, and T2/C2 the need for non-urgent
recompression.
3. T3. This category will include both casualties with relatively minor injuries that may be managed
by First Aid trained personnel and casualties with no obvious injuries. Examples of these medical
conditions include: closed bony fractures without vascular compromise, minor lacerations, first degree
burns, and mild hypothermia. Casualties categorized as T3/C2 require non-urgent decompression as well
as medical/surgical treatment. Those individuals categorised as T3/C1 should be sent to the recompression
chamber for immediate treatment.
4. T4. This group comprises patients who have injuries so severe (serious and/or multiple injuries)
that even if they were treated under the best possible conditions, their probability of survival would be
extremely low. This categorisation is based both upon injury severity and availability of medical and
recompression resources. These casualties should not be abandoned, but receive simple palliative
treatment and made comfortable including use of opiod analgesics. They must be monitored by assigned
medical personnel, and their condition reviewed periodically. If sufficient medical and/or recompression
resources become available, these patients may be re-categorised.
1. C1. Patients in this category have symptoms of serious or life-threatening DCI and require
immediate treatment in the on board recompression chamber. To delay their treatment would entail a
significant increased risk of death or subsequent permanent injury.
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2. C2. Patients in this category have minor and non life-threatening DCI symptoms at the time they
are assessed. If the scenario involves rescuees from a DISSUB saturated at a DISSUB pressure above
1.7 bar, all rescuees have a decompression obligation and are at some risk of DCI. These rescuees by
definition fall into the C2 category and require close monitoring for the development of DCI symptoms.
If sufficient oxygen is available, they should receive prophylactic surface high flow mask oxygen
treatment until they can be recompressed and treated on a saturation decompression table.
Note: Escapers from any DISSUB or rescuees from a pressurised DISSUB (> 1.5 bar) with
no obvious symptoms should be considered C2 and should be held in the tertiary area for
medical observation due to the risk of late development of symptoms of DCI.
3. C0. Patients in this category have no current indication that recompression is required.
Radiation exposure must be taken into consideration in the emergency treatment and disposition
of casualties. Those survivors who are known or suspected to have received a high radiation dose (> 2
Gy) will require hospitalisation within 24 hours or after treatment of serious or life-threatening DCI. In
this case, they should be considered at least T2, with priority for early CASEVAC (See: AMedP-6 Vol
1).
Once allocated a triage category survivors are to be taken to the appropriate treatment area as
follows:
Table 6-2. Allocation of treatment area by triage category
All T3, T3/C2 (asymptomatic) and uninjured Area 3 (Tertiary Treatment and Observation)
survivors
Those casualties who do not require immediate recompression therapy, i.e. the T1, T2 and T3
groups, will be treated on board or be evacuated to other receiving hospitals or sick bays. Casualties who
require immediate or urgent recompression therapy, i.e. the C1 group, will be treated aboard the EGS /
RGS, in another nearby shipboard chamber, or immediately evacuated to a shore-based chamber
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(transferred under pressure if and whenever possible). (See Annex 6E - Triage Algorithm and Annex 6F
- Casualty Handling Algorithm).
Casualties in the T3 triage category asymptomatic for DCI (T3/C2) could receive surface oxygen
in the tertiary treatment area in order not to overcrowd the secondary treatment area. Category T3/C2
casualties that develop symptoms suspicious of DCI should be moved to the secondary treatment area
(nearer the decompression chamber) and be observed until they can either receive therapeutic
recompression treatment or be CASEVACed to a shore facility for treatment.
Once it is ascertained that all survivors have been recovered and Triage is complete, the Triage
Medical Officer is to report to the Medical Controller who will reallocate him to one of the treatment
areas.
Table 6-3 - Medical and recompression triage and treatment grid
C1 C2 C0
T1 Require lifesaving Require lifesaving Require lifesaving immediate
immediate medical immediate medical medical treatment
treatment treatment
No indication that
Require immediate Require non-urgent recompression is required
recompression recompression
T2 Require immediate Require non-lifesaving Require non-lifesaving major
recompression major medical treatment. medical treatment
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0643 Introduction.
Casualty recording is essential in both the escape and rescue scenarios. The guidance outlined is to
be followed for either escape or when a Submarine Rescue Vehicle (SRV) is used to rescue personnel
from a DISSUB.
The Medical Administration Officer (MAO) is responsible for co-ordination this information and
will require a series of assistants who can be used in the various triage and holding areas to collect
information from patients and medical staff. These personnel may need to be from the DISSUB nation to
avoid language difficulties with the rescuees.
1. General. To avoid confusion over casualty numbers, locations and identities each casualty should
be allocated a Unique Casualty Identifying Number (UCIN) at the earliest possible opportunity. The first
chance to do this will vary depending on whether escape or rescue is being conducted. This UCIN should
be used to follow the casualty through the whole process until returned to shore.
The UCIN should be marked prominently on the casualty (e.g. on the forehead), and on the
casualties triage documents. The use of wrist bands or numbered tabards should also be considered.
The MAO will collect the following information on each casualty and update it as the casualty
moves through triage, treatment, holding and transfer ashore:
2. Escapees. Once aboard an EGS each escapee should have their UCIN allocated by the Triage
Officer. The additional information in paragraph 1 above should be collected in the treatment areas and
forwarded to the MAO at the co-ordination point.
By prior agreement if SPAG is deployed to recover casualties the UCIN may be allocated by the
SPAG medical personnel to ease communication between SPAG and the EGS.
3. Rescuees. Where the UCIN is allocated to rescuees will depend on whether a DISSUB Medical
Triage Team (DMTT) is deployed. If a DMTT is deployed then they should allocate UCINs to each
rescuee before they leave the DISSUB, and issue casualty cards listing any injuries or treatment given in
the DISSUB. If not, then the following routines should be followed:
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a. TUP Not Required. If the internal DISSUB pressure is such that there in no need to transfer
casualties to the decompression chambers then the casualties will be depressurised to the deck. On
emerging from the Submarine Rescue Vessel (SRV) or Deck Reception Chamber (DRC) each
casualty should be triaged and allocated a UCIN. The casualty’s details listed in paragraph 1 above
should be taken in the treatment area and forwarded to the MAO at the co-ordination point.
b. TUP Required. If TUP is required then casualties will pass from the SRV via the DRC to the
Deck Decompression Chambers (DDC). Once in the DDC they will remain there until their
decompression to the surface is complete before being released onto the MOSHIP deck. The
following routine should be used to record casualty details and control casualty location:
(1) The UCIN should be given to each rescuee as they pass through the DRC.
(2) Once in the DDC and commencing decompression then the surname and service number
should be collected from each rescuee and transmitted, along with the UCIN , to the outside of
the chamber.
(3) Once removed from the DDC the casualty should be triaged and referred to the appropriate
treatment area. On arrival the casualties details listed in paragraph 1 above should be taken and
passes to the MAO at the co-ordination point:
The MAO is responsible to the SMO(S) for maintaining accurate information on all escapees or
rescuees onboard the EGS / RGS / MOSHIP. The MAO is to maintain a running log of this information
and update the log on changes in the patient status (e.g. change of triage category or location).
The MAO is responsible to the SMO(S) for producing casualty signals and reports from the
information received on the escapees and rescuees. Signals shall be in the standard NATO format and
released by the Communications team.
All information on casualties is to be prefixed with the casualties UCIN whatever other forms of
identification are used. This will avoid confusion over surnames and incorrect service numbers.
Mobile casualties should be identified by the use of tabards, t-shirts or similar clothing so that they
can be differentiated from the ship’s company and rescue personnel.
Once transfer to another vessel or ashore is agreed the MAO will ensure that each casualty
transferred is logged off the MOSHIP and that they take their medical record / triage card with them to
their next point of care. Copies of medical records should be taken and retained on the MOSHIP if
possible.
On transfer from the MOSHIP the MAO shall keep a record of the location of the next point of care
and passed to the national authority of the DISSUB to allow them to make arrangements for continuing
follow up and appropriate repatriation of casualties / survivors.
When multiple EGS are used UCINs should be allocated so as not to duplicate numbers. The
SMO(S) should allocate numbers beginning at 100 to the first vessel, 200 to the next and so on.
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When using multiple SRVs the numbering of casualties will depend upon whether a DMTT has
been deployed. If a DMTT is deployed they should issue UCINs to each rescuee before they leave the
DISSUB. If no DMTT is deployed then the lead SRV should use UCINs beginning from 100, the second
SRV from 200, the third from 300 and so on.
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All current Safe to Escape Curves, Decompression and Therapeutic treatment schedules have a risk
that the escapees or rescuees will subsequently develop DCI. The risks of DCI following an Accelerated
Decompression schedule may be as high as 30%. These risks may be elevated in DISSUB survivors by
their general debilitation, dehydration, hypothermia and because of their prolonged saturation to DISSUB
pressure. Therefore DISSUB survivors being transferred ashore may require access to therapeutic
recompression facilities or treatment during transfer.
Therefore all escapees or rescuees should be observed for a minimum of 1 hour on the EGS / RGS /
MOSHIP before transfer to another vessel or ashore. Should helicopter transfer to another ship or shore-
side medical facilities be undertaken then similar precautions to flying DCI cases should be applied to
these casualties, with flight height limited to 300m whenever possible.
In case escapees / rescuees develop DCI whilst in transit they should be accompanied by medically
qualified persons who can recognise the onset of DCI and prioritising the use of available oxygen, as well
as informing receiving medical staff of the case(s) and their requirement for assessment and treatment. O2
equipment should supply surface high flow O2 via a reservoir mask. Oxygen supply equipment should be
carried sufficient to support 1 or 2 DCI cases per 10 rescuees for the duration of the journey and into an
appropriate medical facility. If the helicopter is using another ship for refuelling stopovers during its
journey then there may be access to medical review and further medical treatment on this vessel.
If the receiving hospitals or vessels are not from the same country as the DISSUB the provision of
interpreters or medical staff from the DISSUB country should be a priority requirement. Rescuees will
need the reassurance of being able to deal with rescue personnel speaking their own language in the
immediate post-rescue phase.
Should rescuees need to be returned to their country of origin by air then the risk of DCI for flying
at reduced cabin pressure should be assessed by a senior diving medicine specialist. It may be necessary
to hold personnel in area for several days or to arrange for aircraft to maintain a higher cabin pressure than
normal.
1. General. The SMO(S) should use information acquired during deployment and from the SSRA to
locate appropriate facilities ashore to transfer both conventional and decompression casualties. These
facilities should be alerted early and kept regularly informed of the likelihood of their use and the types of
casualties that may be transferred.
2. Casualty transfer. Whether the MOSHIP is offloading direct to shore facilities, to shore facilities
via a transit vessel or airhead or to another ship then the general considerations listed in Section 1 above
should be used for transfer planning. Distance, method of transfer, transfer duration and availability of
receiving facilities will all affect the decision on evacuation from the MOSHIP.
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Whilst the minimum holding time on the EGS / MOSHIP should be 1 hour if there are better
facilities on the EGS / MOSHIP to treat decompression casualties than ashore them C1 casualties
requiring immediate recompression should be treated on-board. If experience of treating decompression
casualties is limited ashore then the transfer of an experienced Diving MO with the casualties should be
considered.
3. Triage Categories. Specific consideration of the casualty’s triage categories will affect their
disposal:
b. T2 casualties (require urgent medical treatment) should be stabilised on board and transferred to
an appropriate receiving facility preferably within 6 hours. If they have an immediate or urgent
decompression obligation (C1 or C2) then consideration should be given to resolving the
decompression obligation before medical intervention.
c. T3 casualties should be held on the EGS / RGS / MOSHIP until other facilities have the
capacity to cope with them. Transfer of large numbers of T3 casualties to a limited receiving
facility should be avoided to stop the facility becoming overloaded. T3 casualties with immediate
or urgent decompression obligations should be fit for decompression after first aid treatment.
4. MOSHIP unable to off-load. Due to location, absence of other vessels and aircraft or weather
conditions it may be impossible to off-load rescuees from the EGS / RGS / MOSHIP once decompressed.
In this situation the rescuees will have to be accommodated and cared for on the EGS / RGS / MOSHIP.
If this is seen as a likely scenario then urgent consideration should be given to augmenting the SMERAT
with surgical and anaesthetic trained personnel prior to deployment.
SMO(S) and the Senior Diving MO should assess the likely requirement for chambers to provide
therapeutic decompression for surfaced survivors and agree with the CRF and the diving officer
controlling the chambers whether to retain a specific chamber for therapeutic decompression. This may
affect the number of personnel that can be rescued on each SRV trip.
Patients showing early symptoms of DCI, particularly skin and joint pain effects only, should
initially be treated by use of 100% oxygen at surface pressure and only transferred to the chambers if
space becomes available between treating more serious cases.
Assuming no re-supply, Oxygen supplies (both medical and chamber) will be a limiting factor on
the ability to decompress and to treat rescuees. This may limit the ability to use accelerated
decompression schedules, therapeutic tables and either slow the rescue process or increase the risk of
being unable to treat emergent DCI.
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Escapees and rescuees who remain on-board should be monitored by medical personnel for 4 hours
post their initial decompression and the by their own colleagues (buddy aid) for a further 12–24 hours.
Those requiring therapeutic decompression should be monitored for 12 hours by medical staff post their
treatment.
Annex 6F contains algorithms for casualty handling and transfer through the process to shore.
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ANNEX 6A
The different ways for getting the crew out of the distressed submarine are recorded in Chapter 2
into this publication. Rescue is normally the preferred method of extraction because it is inherently safer.
However, escape is more likely in a number of circumstances (see article 0203 for more details).
Decompression illness (DCI), including pulmonary barotraumas, may be the major medical
condition requiring treatment. Its occurrence will be dependent on the depth of the DISSUB, the pressure
in the DISSUB, and time of exposure to the pressurized atmosphere.
When the DISSUB’s crew is using Tower Escape (Hooded Ascent), it is expected that one to five
escapees will surface as rapidly as every 4-5 minutes, depending on the size, type, and number of escape
towers being operated.
When DISSUB’s crew is using Compartment or rush Escape, the SMO(S) has to expect all of the
survivors to arrive on the surface at a rate of up to 1 - 2 per minute. In this case, note that:
- A large number of survivors will surface in a short period of time. These survivors have a much
higher probability of serious injuries and DCI.
- The medical organization may be overwhelmed and there will be an urgent requirement for
additional asset such as medical personnel, equipment and CASEVAC facilities.
- If delay to scene: crew may be scattered over a wide area.
If the survivors have already escaped prior to the arrival of the rescue forces, they may have already
been in the water for several hours. Locating and recovery of escapees may be complicated by prevailing
current and wind direction.
In the event of known or suspected radioactive contamination, arrangements must be made to treat,
monitor and decontaminate survivors as well as minimizing the spread of contamination throughout the
ship.
The SMO(S) will make recommendations to the OSC for provision of necessary assets to support
triage and treatment of survivors. Oxygen supplies are vital for decompression casualties and trauma
casualties as well as recompression chamber operation. Oxygen re-supply may be required and should be
planned for early in the response.
The SMO(S) will brief the OSC on the requirements to transfer ashore escapees, including medical
support for them onboard and during the transfer.
Remember the potential need to transfer medical staff and equipment onto a MOSHIP or other
vessels to support rescue or further escape.
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ANNEX 6B
6B01 Check off list HOTEL: Medical brief for Recovery Boat's Crews
1. Submarine escapees may be suffering from one or more types of injury. Basic life support is the
same for all casualties:
a. Remember ABC:
CONDITION TREATMENT
C. PHYSICAL TRAUMA First Aid, stop bleeding, support fractures, protect spine.
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ANNEX 6C
1. General. Triage should be conducted close to the point that the escapees are brought onboard the
EGS. For rescue triage may be conducted either in the DRC or after coming out of the DCC.
2. Triage Area
a. Personnel: Triage Medical Officer (TMO), (who should ideally be a Diving Medical Officer),
Medical assistant, writer, and messenger.
b. Material: Basic resuscitation and airway management equipment and supplies, including
oxygen.
c. Space for several stretchers.
The TMO reports to the SCC and is responsible for the rapid assessment of survivors and their
placement into the relevant triage categories (see Section X).
b. Reception of survivors. Allocate each survivor a unique casualty identification number. Record
this:
- in indelible ink on his forehead
- in clinical notes/casualty card to accompany casualty
- on a Triage Area Casualty Report Log (format at Annex 6I)
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f. Ensure MAO is given regular updates of information from the Triage Area Casualty Report Log
(format at Annex 6I)
a. Personnel: One Medical Officer (MO), preferably with casualty or surgical training, Ships First
Aid Personnel, two medical assistants or ratings, writer, and messenger.
b. Equipment: resuscitation equipment and advanced life support equipment, including drugs,
oxygen, chest drains, intravenous infusion sets and fluids, and basic dressings and emergency
medications.
c. Characteristics: Area 1 will have adequate space for stretchers (estimate minimum of six), and
will be in the immediate vicinity of the recompression chamber.
Area 1 should be sufficiently large to hold all the casualties who are undergoing immediate
treatment and ideally be adjacent to, or within easy access of the Casualty Receiving Area and to the
Recompression Chamber Area (on warships with a helicopter hangar, this space is usually ideal). A clear
evacuation route between the triage and treatment area should be designated which avoids, as far as
possible, ladders and other obstacles that will hinder the movement of stretcher-borne casualties.
- One Diving Medical Officer on each ship for every two to three chambers (a minimum of
one Medical Officer for every 20-30 recompressed casualties), medical assistant, writer,
and messenger.
- Sufficient Diving Technicians/Supervisors to operate the chamber(s) - 1-2 per chamber per
shift.
- Sufficient diving medical assistants or divers with basic medical training to act as inside
chamber assistants for each chamber - one per chamber.
- Standard recompression chamber medical supplies and medications.
b. The Medical Officer (MO) allocated to the Recompression Chamber Area reports to the SCC
and is responsible for reception and treatment of casualties sent there. The following actions are to
be undertaken by the RCA MO:
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- Ensure accurate record keeping (use writer). A Recompression Area Casualty Report Log
(Format as in Annex 6I) is to be kept up to date and updated information is to be passed by
telephone or messenger to the MAO as frequently as possible for inclusion on the Master
Casualty State Board (format at Annex 6H).
6. Area 2 (T2)
- One (or more) Medical Officer(s) and medical assistant(s) - one for each five stretchers,
Ship’s first aid personnel, writer, and messenger.
- Resuscitation equipment, oxygen for at least fifteen casualties for six hours, chest drains,
intravenous infusion sets and fluids, standard dressings, medications, and first aid supplies.
- Space for a minimum of 10% of submarine crew.
b. Area 2 is for the treatment of less serious cases and should be physically close to Area 1. It is
important to designate an access route these areas that is clear of obstructions.
c. The Medical Officer (MO) allocated to Area 2 reports to the SCC and is responsible for
reception and treatment of casualties sent to the treatment area by the TMO. The action list below
should be completed by the T2 Area MO:
7. Area 3 (T3)
- Personnel: Medical Assistant (preferably with experience in diving medicine), ship’s first
aid personnel, writer, and messenger.
- Equipment: Basic resuscitation equipment including oxygen, first aid supplies, and
medications.
- Size: this area should have adequate space for seated or supine casualties (estimate
minimum of 20% of submarine crew)
b. Area 3 is where casualties who have undergone or who do not need primary or secondary
treatment can rest, receive first aid treatment, receive prophylactic oxygen therapy (if sufficient
supplies are available and allocated) and be monitored. This area should be separate but reasonably
close to the triage and other treatment areas.
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c. The Medical Branch Rating in charge of this area is responsible for the treatment and
monitoring of all survivors placed in his care. Some of these survivors may have traditional injuries.
Some may not but will be at risk of DCI either because of a decompression obligation from a
pressurized DISSUB or because of the risk of DCI following an escape. There may also be rescuees
who are uninjured and not at risk of DCI but who may be wet, cold and/or exhausted. These
survivors can be grouped together in an “uninjured holding area”.
d. The action list of the Medical Branch Rating in charge of this area includes:
8. Area 4 (T4)
b. A compartment or space near, but screened or isolated from the Area 3, should be identified for
the accommodation of T4 casualties.
c. The Medical Branch Rating in charge of the Area 4 (T4 Area Controller) is responsible for the
palliative care and monitoring of casualties placed in his care.
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Each national / multinational rescue system has its own manning and operating procedures. The
information below is for guidance only and should be modified to fit with those standard operating
procedures and the capabilities of the vessel to which the equipment has been deployed
There should be sufficient diving medical assistants, hyperbaric trained nurses or divers with basic
medical training to act as inside chamber assistants for transferring casualties between the SRV and DRC.
The number may vary with the composition of each SRV load.
Normally, at least one Diving Medical Officer should be able to be locked into the chamber at short
notice to assist with casualty triage or treatment.
2. Recompression chamber(s).
The following are the typical composition and material to operate recompression chambers:
a. One Diving Medical Officer for every one or two chambers (a minimum of one Medical Officer
for every 20-30 recompressed casualties) plus an MO available to be locked into the chamber if
required. Medical assistant, writer, and messenger.
b. Standard recompression chamber medical supplies and medications.
c. Sufficient Diving Technicians/Supervisors to operate the chambers in accordance with SOPs.
d. Sufficient diving medical assistants or divers with basic medical training to act as inside
chamber assistants for each chamber – at least one per chamber.
a. Triage Medical Officer (preferably a Diving Medical Officer), medical assistant, writer, and
messenger.
b. Basic resuscitation and airway management equipment and supplies, including oxygen.
c. Triage cards and recording forms.
d. Space to triage the maximum number of rescuees which can be held in each decompression
chamber.
a. One or two Medical Officers or Senior Medical Assistants capable of providing care to recuees
and observing for signs of DCI whilst transfer off the MOSHIP is arranged.
b. Personnel to escort the rescuees as necessary around the ship and stretcher bearers.
c. Writer and messenger.
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ANNEX 6D
6D01 General.
The DISSUB Medical Triage Team may be deployed to assist survivors who require medical care due
to injury, illness, and effects of atmospheric constituents or where multiple rescue systems are to be used and
casualties need to be triaged to the appropriate system. The team may form part of a larger group including
engineering support for the DISSUB.
6D02 Manpower:
3. Selection. The team should be drawn from personnel who are experienced in working either with the
class of DISSUB submarine or the rescue system. The DISSUB nation may be requested to provide the
DMTT personnel if language challenges make this appropriate. The selected DMTT personnel must be able
to communicate with the SRV personnel, an important consideration when multiple SRVs/SRCs are used.
6D03 Deployment.
The deployment and composition of a DMTT will be decided upon by the CRF advised by the
SMO(S). The potential gains from their specialist knowledge and expertise must clearly justify the additional
risk of placing personnel into a hazardous environment. Factors to be considered by the CRF and SMO(S)
include:
- Submarine engineering stability
- Submarine atmosphere and toxic contaminants (including radiological)
- Submarine pressure and decompression risks to DMTT
- Types of casualties reported
- Available DISSUB medical support and equipment
- Available medical resupply to the DISSUB
Depending on the scenario the DMTT may deploy and remain on the DISSUB throughout the rescue
or undertake a series or trips to make assessments and necessary treatments for the survivors. It is most
likely that the DMTT will be committed for the full duration of the rescue unless the DISSUB pressure is
below the requirement for decompression on the MOSHIP.
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6D04 Role.
Medical emergency equipment and supplies, appropriate for the particular circumstances on the
DISSUB, should be transferred on board in easily portable bags or vests.. Recommended items include:
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ANNEX 6E
6E01. Triage algorithm for Escape
TRIAGE
yes
yes T3
T1 / C2
T2 T2 / C2
T1 / C1
Severe DCI?
no
Severe DCI? Secondary
Tx Area yes
Recompression Primary T3 / C2
Therapy Tx Area yes T3 / C1
T2 / C1 Tertiary
Dependant upon resources Tx Area
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ANNEX 6F
TRIAGE
TO assess casualty and allocate category:
T1-T4
Allocate each survivor a unique casualty number Inform MAO of
casualty details
TREATMENT AREAS
Inform MAO of casualty details
CHANGE IN CONDITION
Reassess, re-triage and re-prioritise
Move casualty to appropriate treatment area
Inform receiving area and MAO
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TRIAGE
TO assess casualty and allocate category:
T1-T4 / C1-C2
Allocate each survivor a unique casualty
number Inform MAO of casualty details
TREATMENT AREAS
Inform MAO of casualty details
CHANGE IN CONDITION
Reassess, re-triage and re-prioritise
Move casualty to appropriate treatment area
Inform receiving area and MAO
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Submariners
Rescued by
SRV
Perform Reassess
Medical yes need for
Triage in recompression
Chamber
Recompression
Complete needed?
decompression
procedures
Hold for a
minimum of no
1 hour
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ANNEX 6G
1. Each Rescue system is expected to have a selected a series of decompression tables available to
use depending upon circumstances. Factors affecting the choice of tables include:
2. There are a wide variety of table available. None of these tables have been fully validated for use
in bringing rescuees to the surface, and most have been derived from basic diving theory and therapeutic
tables or are extensions of old air-saturation tables.
Research conducted into submarine escape indicates that decompression to the surface from saturation at
up to 1.6 bar can be conducted safely with a minimum risk of DCI. Therefore transfer to DDC and
subsequent decompression in the chambers is unnecessary for rescuees saturated at up to 1.6 bar.
However, these personnel should be monitored closely for signs of developing DCI and chambers should
be available to undertake therapeutic recompression should this occur. The RAN allow direct
decompression to the surface from up to 1.75 bar with the understanding that there may be a significant
risk of DCI. This limit may be of use in cases where a large number of submariners require to be
evacuated rapidly from a DISSUB.
Where the DISSUB internal pressure is greater than 2.8 bar then rescuees can not be placed on 100% FiO2
due to the risks of cerebral pulmonary Oxygen toxicity. Therefore initial decompression must be
commenced on Air, unless the chambers are fitted for mixed gas supply and a mixed gas table has been
agreed for use with the rescue system.
The USN has developed a protocol for use of oxygen pre-breathing at saturation depth prior to rescue
accelerate the decompression process. This protocol has been tested at equivalent air depths between 40
ORIGINAL
I-6-G-1
ATP-57(B)
and 60 feet of seawater (approx. 13 to 18 msw). The protocol is laid out in the medical supplement to this
document.
As part of the UK response to the sinking of the KURSK a modified RN table was produced to allow for
decompression of personnel without access to TUP. This table, Table 66, is a 100 minute table based on
holding rescuees at 14 msw (2.4ATA) for Oxygen breathing before a 10 min return to the surface. The
table can be extended as the DISSUB pressure increases. The tables can be found in the medical
supplement to this document.
In preparation for the introduction of the NATO Submarine Rescue System a review has been conducted
of the available tables to allow decompression from saturation at 5 or 6 bar absolute. This has led to the
development of a series of NSRS tables including long air tables based on the NOAA air saturation tables
to allow decompression from high DISSUB pressures. The NSRS tables are laid out in the medical
supplement.
ORIGINAL
I-6-G-2
ATP-57(B)
3. Selection Algorithm:
DISSUB Pressure
>1.6 bar < 2.8 bar (Equivalent Air Depth) < 1.6 bar
O2 re-breathers
available
Monitor for DCI post surfacing
with chambers on standby for
USN Accelerated therapeutic recompression
Decompression Tables
ORIGINAL
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ANNEX 6H
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I-6-H-1
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ANNEX 6I
ORIGINAL
I-6–I-1
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INTENTIONALLY BLANK
ORIGINAL
I-6–I-2
ATP-57(B)
ANNEX 6J
Precedence IMMEDIATE
SIC PQV
To OPCON AUTHORITY
DESIGNATED SUBMARINE COMMAND AUTHORITY
DESIGNATED MEDICAL AUTHORITY
CASREP
2. More to follow
ORIGINAL
I-6–J-1
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INTENTIONALLY BLANK
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I-6–J-2
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ANNEX 6K
Precedence IMMEDIATE
SIC PQV
To OPCON AUTHORITY
DESIGNATED SUBMARINE COMMAND AUTHORITY
DESIGNATED MEDICAL AUTHORITY
CASEVAC
ORIGINAL
I-6–K-1
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INTENTIONALLY BLANK
ORIGINAL
I-6–K-2
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ANNEX 6L
2. NATO Publications.
4. Stationery Equipment
a. Reporters Notebooks x8
b. Pens x 24
c. Indelible Marker Pens x 12
d. Pencils x 24
e. Paper Clips x 1 box
f. Stapler x1
g. Staples x 1 box
h. Hole Punch (single) x1
i. Casualty Log sheets x 40 (of each)
j. Case Contents List x1
ORIGINAL
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ORIGINAL
I-6–L-2
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ANNEX 6M
6M01 General.
ATA stands for Atmosphere Absolute. At sea level the atmosphere exerts a pressure of 1 ATA.
(Historically, ATA has been used within the NATO Submarine Escape and Rescue Working Group).
- 1 Bar
- 100 kPa
- 10 msw
- 33 fsw
- 760 mmHg
- 760 Torr.
1. Instructions for use. Start at the left hand side of the table with the unit you wish to convert from
and read along the row to the column headed by the unit you wish to convert to. Multiply the original
value by the number at the intersection.
Example: to convert 1.8 atmospheres absolute (ATA) to metres of seawater (msw), read along the
‘ATA’ row to the ‘msw’ column to get the conversion factor of 10.079. Multiplying 1.8 by 10.079 gives
18.142 msw.
ORIGINAL
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Note: Standard Temperature & Pressure (STP): 0 0C and 760 Torr
3. Partial Pressure (p.p.): the pressure a gas would exert if it alone occupied the same volume as the
whole gas mixture. The sum of the partial pressures of nitrogen, oxygen and carbon dioxide in air make
up the total ambient pressure of the air.
4. High concentrations are normally expressed in volume percent (Vol.%) i.e. 1 part of a substance
in 100 parts of air. Air consists of 21Vol.% oxygen. (i.e. 100 parts of air contain 21 parts of oxygen).
5. In smaller concentrations the engineering unit 'parts per million' is used (ppm). The concentration
ppm means 1 part of a substance in 1 million parts of air. 1Vol.% = 10,000 ppm.
ORIGINAL
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ATP-57(B)
GLOSSARY
Alerting Authority (AA). The military commander who first raises the alert for a possible
SUBSAR incident. Typically this is the SUBOPAUTH who is responsible for initiating
Submarine Safety COMCHECK procedure and operation SUBLOOK/SUBMISS/ SUBSUNK
Arrival Report. A signal transmitted by a submarine immediately upon its arrival in port. This
signal may be required by the SUBOPAUTH.
Atmospheric Diving System (ADS) . A one person hardsuit and associated Launch And Recovery
System (LARS), that allows the occupant to work underwater while still in a one atmosphere self
contained environment. The ADS is tethered to a surface ship from which it is launched and
recovered.
Articulated-Frame (A-Frame). A lifting device that allows movement through as many as three
separate axis and allows for the launch and recovery of equipment – typically submarine rescue
vehicles and associated equipment – from a platform on a ship into the ocean. Such devices are
commonly permanently fitted, although they may also be portable. Dependent on the size of the
platform and the capability of the A-frame, launch and recovery activity may be possible in higher
sea states than would otherwise be the case with less sophisticated systems.
COMCHECK. The signal originated by SUBOPAUTH when the safety of a submarine is in doubt.
Coordinator Rescue Forces (CRF). The Officer with responsibility for coordinating and controlling the
recovery of escapees and/or the rescue of the crew from the DISSUB. The most appropriate person
will be nominated as CRF by the SSRA.
Cospas-Sarsat System. A satellite system designed to detect distress beacons transmitting on the
frequencies 121.5 MHz and 406 MHz.
Datum. Any numerical or geometrical quantity or set of such quantities which may serve as reference or
base for other quantities. For SAR purposes, a geographic point, line, or area used as a reference in
Submarine search planning.
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Datum Area. Area in where it is estimated that the search object is most likely to be located.
Datum Line. A line, such as the distressed craft’s intended track line or a line of bearing, that defines the
center of the area where it is estimated that the search object is most likely to be located.
Datum point. Any reference point of known or assumed coordinates from which calculation or
measurements may be taken.
Dead Reckoning (DR). Determination of position of a vessel by adding to the last fix the distance based
on the craft’s course and speed for a given time.
Distressed Submarine (DISSUB). A submarine in distress on the seabed unable to surface. It may also
include a surfaced submarine requiring assistance following an incident.
DISSUB De-pressurization System (DSDS). A system designed to connect a DISSUB to the surface, via
hose(s) and specially designed fittings, such that ambient pressure within the DISSUB may be
relieved in controlled manner. Such a system serves to reduce or eliminate the requirement for
extensive decompression when rescuees arrive on the surface.
Diving Signal. A signal transmitted by a submarine before it dives, indicating the date and time of dive,
date and time of completion, position and reason for diving. Some nations do not send a diving
signal when operating on a subnote.
Emergency Life Support Stores (ELSS). Items of stores for use by the personnel in the DISSUB to
enable them to survive whilst awaiting rescue. Stores include such items as carbon dioxide
absorbent, oxygen candles and medical stores for emergency treatment of casualties. The ELSS are
pre-stored on board the submarine and may be re resupplied to the DISSUB by Pod-posting.
Escape. Any method by which a person leaves a DISSUB and makes his way to the surface without
direct assistance from outside agencies.
Escapee. Escapee – a person who makes their way to the surface by some buoyant means which has
already been incorporated into the DISSUB
Escape Gear Ship (EGS). Any ship nominated by the SSRA to carry the search area medical stores and
equipment to facilitate the recovery and treatment of escapees on reaching the surface.
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I - Glossary - 2
ATP-57(B)
Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB). A device, usually carried aboard maritime
vessel, that transmits a signal that alerts search and rescue authorities and enables rescue units to
locate the scene of the distress.
First Reaction Stores (1RS). Those SUBMISS/SUBSUNK stores deployed in the EGS and used by
the SMERAT in the recovery and treatment of escapees. It includes recompression facilities
Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS). A global communications service based on
automated systems, both satellite-based and terrestrial, to provide distress alerting and
promulgation of maritime safety information for mariners.
International Submarine Escape & Rescue Liaison Office (ISMERLO). Multinational coordinating
office for Submarine Escape and Rescue related issues. The office provides coordination through
its web site management system on Internet at www.ismerlo.org
Launch and Recovery System (LARS). A system designed to launch, handle and recover rescue
assets.
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I - Glossary - 3
ATP-57(B)
MASC. MOSHIP/Airport/Seaport combination used for delivery and embarkation of SMER Elements.
MOPORT. Any port from which submarine escape and rescue systems and equipment are dispatched,
either aboard dedicated vessels or vessels of opportunity, to the DISSUB location.
MOSHIP. A ship used to carry a Submarine Rescue Element to the scene of the submarine accident.
When the Element carrier is a submarine, the ship is called MOSUB (mother submarine).
Moving Havens (MHN). The normal method by which submarines are routed. The standard MHN is an
area 20 Nautical Miles (NM) ahead, 30 NM behind, and 5 NM on either side of the submarine’s
planned track position. The size of the MHN is stated in the SUBNOTE. 5
National Authority (NA). The State or Command Authority that sovereignty overe the DISSUB.
On-scene Commander (OSC). Is the military authority designated to Command assigned units either
during the Search and Localisation phase or during the Rescue Operation. The On-Scene
Commander may or may not be the same for both phases (Search and Localisation – Escape and
Rescue Ops), as well as may be changed any time as the situation demands. The Commander of the
unit which first reaches the vicinity of an accident or datum is to act as OSC. In the event that the
first unit on the scene is an aircraft, the Aircraft Commander will retain control of SAR operations
until the arrival of a surface unit to assume the duties of OSC. In all other cases, in order to
maintain continuity of Command, the Officer who subsequently may arrive on the scene is not to
assume Command by reason of seniority unless or until:
(1) Ordered to do so by the SSRA, or
(2) In his judgment, a change of Command is essential.
(3) The OSC will be nominated or confirmed by the SSRA.
The OSC will be nominated/confirmed by the SSRA.
Personal Locator Beacon (PLB). An emergency radio locator beacon, which may have a two-way speech
capability, carried by some crew members, either on their person or in their survival equipment,
and capable of providing homing signals to assist search and rescue operations.
5
MTP-1 Definition: A moving area of specified dimensions established about a submarine or surface ship, extending
about the ordered position along the track, and which is designated for use in transit by the unit to prevent attack by
friendly forces in wartime and to prevent or minimize submerged interference among friendly forces in peacetime.
ORIGINAL
I - Glossary - 4
ATP-57(B)
Pod Posting. The function of delivering ELSS to the DISSUB normally by pressure tight Pods
“posted” via Escape Towers by divers or other rescue assets.
Recovery. The process of retrieving an escapee from the water for subsequent
treatment/management and the process of retrieving a rescue element.
Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV). An unmanned underwater vehicle normally powered and controlled
via an umbilical from a surface vessel from which it is launched and recovered. ROVs can be used
for damage assessment of the DISSUB. If fitted with appropriate tools an ROV can also clear an
escape hatch for a Rescue Vehicle and Pod Post ELSS.
Rescue. Rescue is the act of saving life in which personnel are transferred from the DISSUB to a place of
safety by a SRV or an SRC.
Search and Rescue Plan. A general term used to describe documents that may exist at all levels of the
national and international SAR structure to describe goals, arrangements, and procedures which
support the provision of SAR services.
Search and Rescue Region (SRR). An area of defined dimensions , associated with an RCC, within
which SAR services are provided.
Senior Survivor. The senior submarine qualified member of the ship’s company in the DISSUB escape
compartment.
SUBCHECK Report. The signal transmitted by a submarine at specified intervals to ensure the
SUBOPAUTH of her continued safety.
SUBLOOK. The Codeword of the procedures initiated by the SUBOPAUTH when the safety of a
submarine is in doubt, or by a SUBOPAUTH when a Surfacing Signal, Arrival Report or
SUBCHECK Report from a submarine under his operational control becomes one hour overdue.
Submarine Escape Suit (SEIE/SPES). A suit that aids escape from a submarine, which meets the
requirements of STANAG 1321
ORIGINAL
I - Glossary - 5
ATP-57(B)
Submarine Launched One-way Tactical (SLOT) Buoy. A communications buoy that can be fired by a
DISSUB.
Submarine Escape and Rescue Assistance Team (SMERAT). A team of Submarine Escape and
Rescue experts augmented by medical specialists who are available to provide advice and
assistance.
Submarine Parachute Assistance Group (SPAG). A team of escape and rescue experts, augmented by
medical specialists, available at short notice to parachute into the water.
Submarine Search and Rescue Authority (SSRA). The Naval Authority responsible for the
planning and conduct of a SUBSAR operation. The SSRA may be a national or NATO Naval
Area/Subarea Commander or appointed maritime commander, depending upon the wishes of the
OPCON authority of the submarine or the wishes of the submarine’s NA. The SSRA will operate in
coordination with the relevant RCC. The submarine’s NA should seek prior agreement with
national or NATO Commands concerned. The SSRA is to be nominated in an OPORD.
Note: Bearing in mind the area within which the DISSUB was operating, the nature of the
operation/exercise and the wishes of the NA, the responsibilities of the SSRA may be passed to or
from the relevant national/NATO authorities. However, experience has shown that such changes
can lead to confusion.
Submarine Rescue Element. Any equipment or asset specifically designed or used for Submarine
Interventions or Rescue Operations.
Submarine Rescue Chamber (SRC). A bell that can mate with the NATO common rescue seat but in
addition has to be fitted with special securing arrangements.
Submarine Rescue Vehicle (SRV). Any submersible craft which may be used for the rescue of
personnel from a DISSUB.
SUBMISS. The Codeword of an operation which will be executed in order to initiate a fully co-ordinated
search for a submarine that is believed to be missing.
SUBSUNK. The Codeword of an operation which will be executed in order to initiate a fully co-
ordinated search for a submarine that is known to have sunk.
The Codeword of the signal originated by any unit or authority who has positive
information that a submarine has sunk or by the OSC when the DISSUB has been located.
Support Authority (SA). Any authority who provides assistance for the NA and/or the SSRA.
ORIGINAL
I - Glossary - 6
ATP-57(B)
Surfacing Signal. A signal transmitted by a submarine to indicate the completion of a dived period as
covered by a Diving Signal or to conclude a Subnote or portion thereof.
SURFACING/ARRIVAL ZERO TIME. The time at which the SUBOPAUTH must have received the
Surfacing Signal or CHECK ARRIVAL Report from a Submarine.
Time to first Intervention (TTFI). The estimated time taken from alertment until the first on-scene
intervention activity.
Time to first Rescue (TTFR). The estimated time calculated from alertment to the transfer of the first
rescuee, into the SRV/SRC.
Transfer Under Pressure (TUP). The ability to transfer rescuees, who have been previously evacuated
from a pressurized DISSUB compartment, from a pressurized condition within the rescue vehicle
directly into a decompression facility without exposure to normal atmospheric pressure.
Triage. The assignment of a degree of medical urgency to each rescuee/escapee need for treatment so as
to decide the order in which they should be treated.
Vessel of opportunity (VOO). Any vessel (normally civilian) potentially available to carry on board a
Submarine Rescue Element to the DISSUB area. When the Rescue Element is installed/embarked,
the VOO is then designated as a MOSHIP.
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ORIGINAL
I - Glossary - 8
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PART I
ANNEX A
Abbreviations/acronyms listed in table A-1 below are normally used during SMER operations.
Abbreviation /
Meaning
Acronym
1RS First Reaction Stores
AA Alerting Authority
ADS Atmospheric Diving System
BIBS Built-in Breathing System
BU Breathing Unit
CASEVAC Casualty Evacuation
CCTV Closed Circuit Television
CDAU Carbon Dioxide Absorption Unit
CHOP Chop Operational Control
COMPLAN Communications Plan
COSPAS Comicheskaya Sisttyma Poiska Avariynych Sudov (Space System for Search of
Vessels in Distress)
CRF Coordinator Rescue Forces
DCI Decompression Illness
DCC Decompression Chamber
DCS Decompression Sickness
DISSUB Distressed Submarine
DP Dynamic Positioning
DSDS DISSUB Depressurization System
DSRV Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle
DSV Dive Support Vessel
DSVDS DISSUB Ventilation and Depressurization System
EBS Emergency Breathing System
ECB Expendable Communications Buoy
EGS Escape Gear Ship
ELSS Emergency Life Support Stores
HIS Hood Inflation System
HP - LP High Pressure – Low Pressure
IAMSAR International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue
ICAO International Civil Aviation Authority
ISMERLO International Submarine Escape and Rescue Liaison Office
LARS Launch and Recovery System
LIVEX Live Exercise
MASC MOSHIP Airport/Seaport Combination
ORIGINAL
I–A-1
ATP-57(B)
Abbreviation /
Meaning
Acronym
MCASB (NATO) Military Committee AIR Standardization Board
MCMSB (NATO) Military Committee Maritime Standardization Board
MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation
MOSHIP Mother Ship (for a SMER Element)
MOSUB Mother Submarine (for a SMER Element)
NA National Authority
NSA Nato Standardization Agency
NSRS NATO Submarine Rescue System
OSC On Scene Commander
PLARS Portable Launch and Recovery System
PLB Personal Locator Beacon
RCC Rescue Co-ordination Centre
REC Rescue Element Commander
RHIB Rigid-Hulled Inflatable Boat
RIB Rigid Inflatable Boat
ROV Remotely Operated Vehicle
SAR Search and Rescue
SEIE Submarine Escape Immersion Equipment
SEPIRB Submarine Emergency Position-Indicating Radio Beacon
SITREP Situation Report
SLOT Submarine Launched One-way Transmission
SMER Submarine Escape and Rescue
SMERAT Submarine Escape and Rescue Advisory Team
SPAG Submarine Parachute Assistance Group
SRC Submarine Rescue Chamber
SRDRS Submarine Rescue Diving and Recompression System
SRS Submarine Rescue System
SRV Submarine Rescue Vehicle
SSE Submarine Signal Ejector
SSRA Submarine Search and Rescue Authority
SUBLOOK The code word of the procedures initiated by the Subopauth when the safety of a
submarine is in doubt
SUBMISS The code word of an operation which will be executed in order to initiate a fully
coordinated search for a submarine that is believed to be missing. It also identifies
the related signal.
SUBSUNK The code word of an operation which will be executed in order to initiate a fully
coordinated search for a submarine that is known to have sunk. It also identifies
the related signal.
SUPSUB Support Submarine
TTFI Time To First Intervention
TTFR Time To First Rescue
TUP Transfer Under Pressure
UWT Underwater Telephone
VOO Vessel of Opportunity
ORIGINAL
I–A-2
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ORIGINAL
I – LEP - 1
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Original II-1-FRA-I-1, II-1-FRA-I-2
Original II-1-FRA-II-1, II-1-FRA-II-2
Original II-1-FRA-III-1, II-1-FRA-III-2
Original II-1-FRA-IV-1 through II-1-FRA-IV-6
Original II-1-DEU-1 through II-1-DEU-6
Original II-1-GRC-1 through II-1-GRC-6
Original II-1-ISR-1 through II-1-ISR-6
Original II-1-ITA-1 through II-1-ITA-8
Original II-1-NOR-1 through II-1-NOR-4
Original II-1-NSRS-1 through II-1-NSRS-6
Original II-1-POL-1 through II-1-POL-6
Original II-1-PRT-1 through II-1-PRT-6
Original II-1-ESP-1 through II-1-ESP-8
Original II-1-SWE-1 through II-1-SWE-8
Original II-1-NLD-1 through II-1-NLD-4
Original II-1-TUR-1 through II-1-TUR-10
Original II-1-GBR-1 through II-1-GBR-8
Original II-1-USA-1 through II-1-USA-8
Original II-2-1 through II-2-6
Original II-2-AUS-1 through II-2-AUS-8
Original II-2-BGR-1 through II-2-BGR-8
Original II-2-CAN-1 through II-2-CAN-8
Original II-2-FRA-1 through II-2-FRA-14
Original II-2-DEU-1 through II-2-DEU-8
Original II-2-GRC-1 through II-2-GRC-10
Original II-2-ISR-1 through II-2-ISR-8
Original II-2-ITA-1 through II-2-ITA-16
Original II-2-NOR-1 through II-2-NOR-8
Original II-2-POL-1 through II-2-POL-14
Original II-2-PRT-1 through II-2-PRT-16
Original II-2-ESP-1 through II-2-ESP-8
Original II-2-SWE-1 through II-2-SWE-14
Original II-2-NLD-1 through II-2-NLD-14
Original II-2-TUR-1 through II-2-TUR-20
Original II-2-GBR-1 through II-2-GBR-26
Original II-2-USA-1 through II-2-USA-36
Original II-3-1 through II-3-44
ORIGINAL
I – LEP - 2
ATP 57(B)
PART II
GENERAL
THIS IS A NON RATIFIABLE PART
Based on SMERWG Terms of Reference (see also SMERWG yearly RAL) Nations are requested to provide
the Custodian with updates to their data on a regular basis, keeping NSA informed.
Nil responses are required.
Data not provided, because of their classification or because of national policy, will be made available to the
appropriate Rescue Elements by the DISSUB National Authority on a case by case basis, through the
DISSUB Liaison Team.
National data are also available on the ISMERLO WEB-site (password protected area) to accredited SMER
Nations.
Columns/rows with data may be added should a Country have more than one of a kind asset.
II-1 ORIGINAL
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II-2 ORIGINAL
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PART II
CHAPTER 1
GENERAL TEMPLATE
II-1-1 ORIGINAL
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INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-1-2 ORIGINAL
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Identification
Location
SRV (rescue capacity)
SRC (Rescue capacity)
Rescue depth
Transfer under pressure Yes/No
Deep Diving capabilities
ROV Yes/No
ADS Yes/No
Ventilation Yes/No
SPAG capable Yes/No
Dedicated MOSHIP / Yes/No
VOO
VOO Specifications
needed
Maximum Rescue
depth
Minimum Rescue
depth
Maximum sea state
Maximum current
Endurance
Mating angle (roll,
pitch)
Main dimensions
(length, weight, height
etc.)
Air portable
ADS REMARKS
IdentificatIon
Numbers
Location(s)
Maximum depth
Maximum current
Air portable:
Features:
II-1-4 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Identification:
Numbers:
Location(s):
Specifications:
Dedicated Moship Yes/No
STANAG 1450 Yes/No
interfaces available
Ashore Facilities
Military
Identification
II-1-5 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Location
Max capacity (Persons)
Max. working pressure
Transfer under pressure
Ashore Major Civilian
Facilities
Identification
Location
Max. Capacity (Persons)
Max. Working pressure
Transfer under pressure
II-1-6 ORIGINAL
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PART II
CHAPTER 1
AUSTRALIA
II-1-AUS-1 ORIGINAL
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INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-1-AUS-2 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
HMAS STIRLING
Submarine and Underwater Medicine Unit- West
Rockingham, WA 6168
Telephone: + 61 8 95532561
Facsimile: + 61 8 95532600
C/- HMAS STIRLING
PO Box 2188
Rockingham DC
Western Australia, 6958
Australia
ESCAPE AND RESCUE SPECIALIST
Contact Details (phone Submarine Escape and Rescue Manager
number, fax, PLA) Office Telephone: +61 (0)8 9553 3091
Mobile Telephone: +61 (0)417 932 537
Office Facsimile: +61 (0)8 9553 2487
SUBMARINE ESCAPE and RESCUE
CENTRE
C/- HMAS STIRLING
PO Box 2188
Rockingham DC
Western Australia, 6958
Australia
II-1-AUS-3 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
SPAG
Contact Details (phone NIL
number, fax, PLA)
II-1-AUS-4 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Identification: NIL
Numbers:
Location(s):
Specifications:
II-1-AUS-5 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Dedicated Moship
STANAG 1450
interfaces available
Total amount 2
Location Osborne Park
Western Australia 6017
Tel: +61 8 9446 9988
Fax: +61 8 9242 7966
Max. capacity (Persons) 36 persons (seated), 11 stretcher
II-1-AUS-6 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Ashore Facilities
Military
Identification There four 10 Man Recompression Chambers
in service,
RAN Diving School (HMAS Penguin) x 1
AUSCDT FOUR x 1 (In Lay Up).
SERC - SUBMARINE ESCAPE and
RESCUE CENTRE (HMAS Stirling) x 2
Location HMAS PENGUIN
Submarine and Underwater Medicine Unit- East
Middle Head Road
MOSMAN NSW 2088
Telephone: + 61 2 9960 0572
Facsimile: + 61 2 9960 4435
HMAS STIRLING
Submarine and Underwater Medicine Unit- West
Rockingham, WA 6168
Telephone: + 61 8 95532561
Facsimile: + 61 8 95532600
Victoria
Alfred Hospital
Hyperbaric Medicine Unit
Commercial Road
PRAHRAN Vic 3181
Switchboard: + 61 3 9276 2000
HMU: + 61 3 9276 2269/2323
Facsimile: + 61 3 9276 3052
II-1-AUS-7 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Tasmania
Royal Hobart Hospital
Hyperbaric Medical Unit
GPO Box 1061 L
HOBART Tas 7001
Switchboard: + 613 6222 8308
HMU: + 61 3 6222 8322
Facsimile: + 61 3 6222 8322
Northern Territory
Royal Darwin Hospital
PO Box 41326
CASUARINA NT 0810
Switchboard: + 618 8922 8888
Telephone: + 618 8922 8230
Facsimile: + 61 8 8922 8286
Queensland
Townsville General Hospital
Eyre Street
TOWNSVILLE QLD 4810
Switchboard: + 61 7 4781 9211
HMU: + 61 7 4781 9455/9456
Facsimile: + 61 7 4781 9582
Western Australia
Fremantle Hospital
Hyperbaric Medicine Unit
PO Box 480
FREMANTLE WA 6959
Switchboard: + 61 8 9431 3333
HMU Telephone: + 61 8 9431 2233/2235
Facsimile: + 61 8 9431 2819
South Australia
Royal Adelaide Hospital
Hyperbaric Medicine Unit
North Terrace
ADELAIDE SA 5000
Switchboard: + 61 8 8222 4000
HMU: + 61 8 8222 5116
Facsimile: + 61 8 8232 4207
II-1-AUS-8 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 1
BELGIUM
II-1-BEL-1 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-1-BEL-2 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-1-BEL-3 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Ashore Facilities
Military
Identification HYPERBARIC CENTER
Location NAVCENHYP – MARINEBASIS - ZEEBRUGGE GRAAF JANSDIJK 1
8380 ZEEBRUGGE
Max capacity (Persons) 14 patient sitting - 5 patients lying
Max. working pressure 11 ATA
Transfer under pressure No
Ashore Major Civilian
Facilities
Identification N/A
Transfer under pressure
II-1-BEL-4 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 1
BULGARIA
II-1-BGR-1 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-1-BGR-2 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Identification -
Location PROTEO
SRV (rescue capacity) -
SRC (Rescue capacity) 6 survivors
Rescue depth 120 m
Transfer under pressure No
Deep Diving capabilities No
ROV No
ADS No
Ventilation Yes
SPAG capable No
Dedicated MOSHIP / No
VOO
VOO Specifications -
needed
II-1-BGR-3 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Identification: -
Numbers: 1
Location(s): PROTEO
Specifications: -
Dedicated Moship No
STANAG 1450 No
interfaces available
II-1-BGR-4 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
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ATP 57(B)
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II-1-BGR-6 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 1
CANADA
II-1-CAN-1 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-1-CAN-2 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-1-CAN-3 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Identification DUO-COM
Total amount 4
Location 1) Fleet Diving Unit (Atlantic) 12 Wing
Shearwater, Nova Scotia
2) Fleet Diving Unit (Atlantic) CFB Esquimalt,
British Columbia
3) DCIEM EDU, Toronto, Ontario
Max. capacity (Persons) 2
Max. Working pressure 72 psig
II-1-CAN-4 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-1-CAN-5 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-1-CAN-6 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 1
FRANCE
II-1-FRA-1 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONNALLY BLANK
II-1-FRA-2 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-1-FRA-3 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
(See annex II for more details about french ROV (military and ROV) )
ADS REMARKS
Identification NEWTSUIT (FR ADS)
Numbers 1
Location(s) Toulon harbour
Maximum depth 300 mt
Maximum current 0.5 knt
Air portable: Yes 128 m3, 37305 Kg
Features: SURVEY capable
POD POSTING capable
HATCH CLEARING capable
VENTILATION capable
Simple underwater engineering
II-1-FRA-4 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
(See annex I for more details about French ventilation / depressurisation system )
II-1-FRA-5 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
(See annex IV for more details about hyperbar caisson (military and ROV))
II-1-FRA-6 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
ANNEX I
2. Equipment to be embarked
1 One compressed air generation module
2 One process control module
3 One submarine link module
4 One reel bearing two 300-meter long air hoses
5 One electricity-generating module
4. Description
4.1 Process control module
Can be transported by sea, air, rail or road. It contains the whole air distribution and analysis installation.
Dimensions: length 3.00m x width 2.44m x height 2.13m
Volume: 15.53m3
Weight: 2500kg
II-1-FRA-I-1 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Can be transported by sea, air, rail or road. It provides 475Nm3/h @ 10 bars for
ventilation/decompression and 57Nm3/h @ 30 bars for draining air hoses after connexion on the
submarine.
Dimensions: length 6.06m x width 2.44m x height 2.62m
Volume: 38.70m3
Weight: 8000kg
4.7 Rigging
The rigging includes a standing rigging and a running rigging.
The standing rigging is a nylon cable tightened between the ship and the submarine deck.
The running rigging includes all the fresh air and foul air hoses supported by a hemp rope.
The running rigging slides along the standing rigging by using safety hooks.
5 Diagram
II-1-FRA-I-2 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
ANNEX II – FR
1- Military means
MARINE Characteristics Maximum Equipment Capacities
NATIONALE depth
ACHILLE Length 720 mm 300 metres - 1 colour camera To be used for
Width 600 mm - sounder and sonar surveillance of the
Height 510 mm -1 articulated arm (3 divers and the
Weight 70 kg functions) atmospheric diving
suit
ULISSE Length 1340 mm 1000 metres - 1 articulated arm (4 To be used for AEM
Width 1090 mm functions) action and ADS
Height 1000 mm - 1 articulated arm (5 surveillance
Weight 526 kg functions)
- sounder and sonar
- black and white camera
- color camera
2- Civil means
List of civil organisation using ROVs which can be sollicited by the French Navy
VICTOR 6000 Length 720 mm 6000 metres -Colour cameras - speed 1.5 knots
Width 600 mm -sounder and sonar - intervention and
Height 510 mm articulated arms investigation on wrecks
Weight 4000 kg type "slave master" and and manned
(7 functions) submarines
-2
II-1-FRA-II-1 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
2-CIVIL MEANS
List of civil organisations using ROVs which can be solicited by the French Navy.
II-1-FRA-II-2 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
ANNEX III – FR
Nota bene: for submarines in distress, fresh-air ventilation is activated pending the arrival of a rescue vehicle,
either by human intervention up to 80 metres (GPD) or by atmospheric diving module up to 250 metres
immersion (SIE cell manufactured by CEPHISMER)
2 –CIVIL MEANS
List of carriers run by civil organisations which can be _olicited by the French Navy
II-1-FRA-III-1 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-1-FRA-III-2 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
ANNEX IV – FR
1 CHANNEL COAST
1.1. Operational unit equipped with hyperbar caisson but not providing medical assistance
2. ATLANTIC COAST
2.1. Unit in charge of victims of military diving, and providing medical assistance
UNITS OBSERVATIONS
II-1-FRA-IV-1 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
2.2. Operational units equipped with hyperbar caisson but not providing medical assistance
3. MEDITERRANEAN COAST
3.1. Unit in charge of the treatment of victims of diving accidents and providing medical
assistance
II-1-FRA-IV-2 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
3.2. Operational units equipped with hyperbar caissons but not providing medical assistance
II-1-FRA-IV-3 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
3.3. Vocational training units equipped with hyperbar caissons but not providing medical
assistance
4. INTERIOR ZONES
II-1-FRA-IV-4 ORIGINAL
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INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-1-FRA-IV-6 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 1
GERMANY
II-1-DEU-1 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-1-DEU-2 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Civilian:
Identification ROV Kiel 6000 carried onboard
Numbers 1 IFM-GEOMAR
Location(s) Kiel, Institute of marine sciences IFM-GEOMAR research vessel(s)
II-1-DEU-3 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Portable
Identification Type HAUX-1300
Total amount 3
Location Eckernfoerde , Neustadt (AZS), Warnemuende
Max. capacity (Persons) 3+1
Max. Working pressure 6 ATA
Transfer under pressure ---
Air portable 1x 20 ft ISO container each
II-1-DEU-4 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Ships name / Class "Bad Bevensen", "Bad Rappenau", "Datteln", minehunter class "MJ
"Dillingen", "Fulda", "Grömitz", "Homburg", 332"
"Rottweil", "Sulzbach-Rosenberg", "Weilheim"
Total amount of ships 10
Max. Capacity (Persons) 3+1 HAUX Spacestar 1300
Max. Working pressure 6 ATA
Transfer under pressure ---
Maximum SOA 18 kts
II-1-DEU-5 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-1-DEU-6 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 1
GREECE
II-1-GRC-1 ORIGINAL
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INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-1-GRC-2 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-1-GRC-3 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-1-GRC-4 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-1-GRC-5 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-1-GRC-6 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 1
ISRAEL
II-1-ISR-1 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-1-ISR-2 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
DETAILS OF NATIONAL FACILITIES ASHORE AND AFLOAT
TO SUPPORT SUBSAR OPERATION
Identification
Location
SRV (rescue capacity)
SRC (Rescue capacity)
Rescue depth
Transfer under pressure
Deep Diving capabilities
ROV Yes
ADS No
Ventilation No
SPAG capable No
Dedicated MOSHIP / No
VOO
VOO Specifications
needed
II-1-ISR-3 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROV) REMARKS
Identification SCORPIO 7
Numbers 1
Location(s) Haifa naval base
Maximum depth 600 mt
Maximum current
Air portable
Features
ADS REMARKS
IdentificatIon N/A
Identification:
Numbers:
Location(s):
Specifications:
Dedicated Moship Yes
STANAG 1450 Yes
interfaces available
II-1-ISR-4 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Identification
II-1-ISR-5 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-1-ISR-6 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 1
ITALY
II-1-ITA-1 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-1-ITA-2 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Identification
Location LA SPEZIA Aboard ITS ANTEO
SRV (Rescue capacity) 300 metres – 12 survivors
SRC (Rescue capacity) 120 metres – 6 survivors
Rescue depth SRV 300 mt / SRC 120 mt
Transfer under pressure NO (SRV up to 5 bar -
no transfer connection
once aboard the MOSHIP)
Deep Diving 250 METRES (saturation dvr) ITS ANTEO
capabilities
ROV up to 300 mt ITS ANTEO/COMSUBIN
ADS up to 300 mt COMSUBIN
Ventilation Yes
SPAG capable Yes
Dedicated MOSHIP ITS ANTEO
/VOO
VOO Specifications
needed
II-1-ITA-3 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-1-ITA-4 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
ADS REMARKS
Identification
Numbers 3 (three)
Location(s) LA SPEZIA
Maximum depth 300 metres
Maximum current 2 knt
Air portable: Yes 4 pallet standard Nato
HCU-6/E 108 in x 88 in
for 2 ADS
Features: SUPERIOR SIDE 150 KG
INFERIOR SIDE 110 KG
ARM 200 KG
THUSTER 100 KG
UCM 160 KG
COMPUTER 80 KG
POWER SUPPLY 100 KG
COMUNICATIONS 80 KG
SONAR 80 KG
VIDEO 80 KG
UMBILICAL 300 KG
TRANFORMER 50 KG
MOTORPOWER SUPPLY 800 KG
MAINTENANCE 300 KG
UNDERPINNING 80 KG
Identification:
Numbers: 1
Location(s): LA SPEZIA Aboard ARS ANTEO
Specifications: INLET HOSE: 30 bar Ø 12 mm
OUTLET HOSE: 15 bar Ø 50 mm
Dedicated Moship Yes ARS ANTEO
STANAG 1450 No
interfaces available
II-1-ITA-5 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Portable
Identification NA On open trailer
Total amount 6 (six)
Location 2 La Spezia, 1 Ancona, 1 Taranto, 1 Cagliari,
1 Augusta
Max. capacity (Persons) 2 + 2 each
Max. working pressure 5 bar
Transfer under pressure Yes Nato standard adaptor set
female coupling ref.
(ADivP-1(A)/MDivP-1(A)
Air portable Yes 2,6 t
II-1-ITA-6 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-1-ITA-7 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-1-ITA-8 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 1
NORWAY
II-1-NOR-1 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-1-NOR-2 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-1-NOR-3 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Max. Working pressure 6
Transfer under pressure
Maximum SOA
Ashore Facilities
Military
Identification
Location Diving School Haakonsvern
Max capacity (Persons) 19 (O2) 39/15 Sitting/ lying
Max. working pressure 10
Transfer under pressure
Ashore Major Civilian
Facilities
Identification NUI Contact Coordinator
Submarine Escape and
rescue for other facilities
Phone: +47 55503376
Location Bergen
Max. Capacity (Persons) 24/24 Sitting/ lying
Max. Working pressure 6
Transfer under pressure
II-1-NOR-4 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 1
(NSRS)
II-1-NSRS-1 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-1-NSRS-2 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Identification NSRS
Location HM Naval Base Clyde, Faslane
SRV (rescue capacity) Up to 15 rescuees
SRC (Rescue capacity) -
Rescue depth 610 metres
Transfer under pressure Yes
Deep Diving capabilities
ROV Yes
ADS No
Ventilation No
SPAG capable Yes
Dedicated MOSHIP / No
VOO
VOO Specifications At least 400m2 deck space, 10 metre width at
needed transom, 5 te/m2 deck strength
II-1-NSRS-3 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Submarine Rescue Vehicle (SRV) REMARKS
Identification SRV
Location HM Naval Base Clyde, Faslane
Tethered No
Manipulators Yes
Rescue capacity Up to 15 rescuees
Transfer under Yes
pressure
Maximum Rescue 610 m
depth
Minimum Rescue 40 m
depth
Maximum sea state SS 6 (5 m SWH)
Maximum current 2.5 kts
Endurance Unlimited
Mating angle (roll, 60 degrees
pitch)
Main dimensions Length 10.3 m, Width 3.3 m, Height 3.8 m, Weight
(length, weight, height 29 te
etc.)
Air portable C-17, C-5, AN-124
ADS REMARKS
IdentificatIon NO
Identification: NO
II-1-NSRS-4 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Diving and Submarine Rescue Support Ship / Dedicated MOSHIP REMARKS
Identification: NO
II-1-NSRS-5 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-1-NSRS-6 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 1
POLAND
II-1-POL-1 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-1-POL-2 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
DETAILS OF NATIONAL FACILITIES ASHORE AND AFLOAT
TO SUPPORT SUBSAR OPERATION
SPAG
Contact Details (phone
number, fax, PLA)
Identification No
II-1-POL-3 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Location(s) On board ORP PIAST
Maximum depth 100 m./ 300m
Maximum current 1 kn/ 3kn
Air portable Yes / yes
Features 1 camera, 1 manipulator, 1 sonar/ camera 2,
manipulator 1, sonar 1
Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROV) REMARKS
Identification BENTHOS MK 2/ SAAB SEAEYE FALCON
Numbers 1/1
Location(s) On board ORP LECH
Maximum depth 300 m / 300m
Maximum current 1 kn/3kn
Air portable Yes / yes
Features 1 camera, 1 manipulator, 1 sonar/ camera 2,
manipulator 1, sonar 1
ADS NO REMARKS
Identification: NO
II-1-POL-4 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Max. Working pressure 10 MPa
Transfer under pressure Yes
Air portable No
Identification Containerized Chamber System
Total amount 2
Location GDYNIA POLAND
Max. capacity (Persons) 14
Max. Working pressure 10 MPa
Transfer under pressure YES
Air portable Yes
Built into ships
Yes 4
Ships name / Class ORP PIAST / ORP LECH/ 281 / 282
ORP ZBYSZKO / ORP MACKO R – 14 / R – 15
Total amount of ships 4 1/1/1/1
Max. Capacity 18 6/6/3/3
(Persons)
Max. Working pressure 10 MPa Any ship
Transfer under pressure No
Maximum SOA
Ashore Facilities
Military
Identification Polish Naval Academy
Location Gdynia POLAND
Max capacity (Persons) 10
Max. working pressure 12 MPa
Transfer under pressure No
Identification Military Diving School Gdynia
Location Gdynia POLAND
Max capacity (Persons) 4
Max. working pressure 7 MPa
Transfer under pressure No
Ashore Major Civilian
Facilities
Identification National Centre for Hyperbaric Medicine www.hiperbaria.gdynia.pl
Location Gdynia POLAND
Max. Capacity 8/10/12
(Persons)
Max. Working pressure 20 / 6 / 3 MPa
Transfer under pressure YES
II-1-POL-5 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-1-POL-6 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 1
PORTUGAL
II-1-PRT-1 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-1-PRT-2 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Identification No
Location
SRV (rescue capacity)
SRC (Rescue capacity)
Rescue depth
Transfer under pressure No
II-1-PRT-3 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Deep Diving capabilities Yes Divers team equipped with
semi-closed breathing
apparatus CARLETON
VIPER+, HELIOX
autonomous diving.
ROV Yes
ADS No
Ventilation Yes Submarine Squadron
equipped with one
BAUER
KOMPRESSOREN (High
Pressure Breathing Air
Compressor) from
UTILUS CAPITANO
MARINER and 70 air
lines of 10 mts each
interconnectable. All
necessary gear to assemble
to submarines is available.
SPAG capable No
Dedicated MOSHIP / No
VOO
II-1-PRT-4 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
ADS REMARKS
Identification No
Ashore Facilities
Military
Identification HAUX STAMED 2200/10
Location Lisbon Naval Hospital
Max capacity (Persons) 12 persons
Max. working pressure 11 bar Details of gas mixture: Air
/ Oxygen / Nitrox
Transfer under pressure No
Ashore Facilities
Military
Identification COMEX PRO CX 2000
II-1-PRT-5 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Location Lisbon Naval Hospital
Max capacity (Persons) 10 persons
Max. working pressure 6 bar Details of gas mixture: Air
/ Oxygen / Nitrox
Transfer under pressure No
II-1-PRT-6 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 1
SPAIN
II–1–ESP-1 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II–1–ESP-2 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II–1–ESP-3 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
ADS REMARKS
Identification ------
Portable
Identification 01, 02, 03, 04, 05
Total amount 5
Location See Note 1 and 2.
Max. capacity (Persons) 3 to 4 + 1
Max. Working pressure 5 to 7,5 atm
Transfer under pressure YES
Air portable YES
Built into ships
Ships name / Class “SEGURA” class (MHC)
Total amount of ships 6
Max. Capacity (Persons) 3+1
Max. Working pressure 7,5 atm
Transfer under pressure YES
Maximum SOA 14.5 knots Homeport: Cartagena
II–1–ESP-5 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Compression Chambers REMARKS
Max. Working pressure 7,5 atm
Transfer under pressure YES
Maximum SOA 15 knots Homeport: Cartagena
II–1–ESP-6 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
- 01 and 02: Cartagena, Spanish Navy Diving Center (CBA) Estación Naval La Algameca 30209
(Cartagena). Phone Number +34-968127170/fax 9687175;
- 03: Las Palmas, Diving Unit, C/ León y Castillo, 300. Arsenal Militar 35060 Las Palmas. Phone
number +34 928443129/fax 928443113;
- 04: Cádiz, Diving Unit, E.N. Puntales, 11011, Cádiz. Phone number: +34 956599390/fax
956599385;
- 05: Ferrol, Diving Unit, E.N. La Graña, Ferrol, (La Coruña), Phone Number: +34 981346206/fax.
981.336206
Note 2. More decompression chambers are available, but, in order to reduce this annex, information has
been focused on main chambers.
Spanish Navy Diving Center (CBA) personnel establish periodically contacts with civilian organisms for
updating a database with all military and civilian decompression chambers that could be used for
treatment of decompression diseases.
II–1–ESP-7 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II–1–ESP-8 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 1
SWEDEN
II-1-SWE-1 ORIGINAL
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INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-1-SWE-2 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-1-SWE-3 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-1-SWE-4 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Maximum depth 1000 m
Maximum current 3 knots Depending on depth and
conditions
Air portable No
Features 1 Schilling grabber Cutter, grinder, drill,
1 Schilling Orion 7 function manipulator suction/flushing pump
ADS REMARKS
IdentificatIon N/A
Identification: N/A
II-1-SWE-5 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-1-SWE-6 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-1-SWE-7 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-1-SWE-8 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 1
THE NETHERLANDS
II-1-NLD-1 ORIGINAL
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INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-1-NLD-2 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
DETAILS OF NATIONAL FACILITIES ASHORE AND AFLOAT
TO SUPPORT SUBSAR OPERATION
Identification N/A
ADS REMARKS
IdentificatIon N/A
II-1-NLD-3 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Identification: N/A
II-1-NLD-4 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 1
TURKEY
II-1-TUR-1 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-1-TUR-2 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-1-TUR-3 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Diving Medical Officer, Underwater and Salvage
Command
Tel: +90 216 424 1480/81
Fax: +90 216 424 1378
Signal Message Address: COMTURRESGROUP
Undersea and Hyperbaric Medicine Physician,
GATA Haydarpasa Training Hospital
Tel: +90 216 542 2020 (Ext. 2970)
Tel: +90 216 542 2738 – 2739
Fax: +90 216 542 2609
ESCAPE AND RESCUE SPECIALIST
Contact Details (phone SUBMARINE SEARCH AND RESCUE
number, fax, PLA) COORDINATION BOARD
II-1-TUR-4 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Deep Diving
Capabilities: HEO2
ROV: Yes
ADS: Yes
Ventilation: Yes
SPAG Capable: Yes
Dedicated
MOSHIP/VOO: No
VOO Specifications
Needed: -
ADS REMARKS
Identification: ADS-1200
Numbers: 1
Location(s): Beykoz / ISTANBUL
Maximum Depth: 365 m
Maximum Current: 3
Air Portable: Yes
Features: Depth Sensor
Sonar
Emergency Beacon
SIT, Pan and Tilt Coloured Camera
Integrated Positioning System
II-1-TUR-6 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Decompression Chamber
Capabilities: 2 Double-lock Recompression Chambers
Helicopter Capable: No
Maximum Speed of
Advance: 12 kts
4 Points Mooring/DP 4 Points Mooring
(Class)
Other Specifications: Diving Medical Officer onboard (A designated
Medical Department),
Underwater work tools and salvage equipments
onboard.
II-1-TUR-7 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-1-TUR-8 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Ashore Facilities
Military
Identification: Double-Lock Chamber
Location(s): Narlidere / IZMIR Southern Sea Area
Max. Capacity (Persons): 8 Command
Max. Working Pressure: 6.8 kg/cm², 225 fsw
Transfer Under Pressure: No
II-1-TUR-9 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Significant Airport / Seaport Combinations REMARKS
Airport Identification: (1) ATATURK Airport (civilian) /
ISTANBUL
(2) SABIHA GOKCEN Airport (civilian) /
ISTANBUL
Airport Capability: C-17, C-130 J, A-400 M, ANTANOV
Seaport Identification: a. Haydarpasa Port / ISTANBUL
b. Derince Port / KOCAELI
Seaport Capability: Not available yet
Road Distance
in-between (km): 1-a: 40 km; 1-b:120 km; 2-a:30 km; 2-b:50 km
Road Limitations: Not available yet
Airport Identification:
(1) ADNAN MENDERES International
Airport / IZMIR
(2) Cigli Military Airfield / IZMIR
II-1-TUR-10 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 1
UNITED KINGDOM
II-1-GBR-1
ATP 57(B)
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II-1-GBR-2
ATP 57(B)
DETAILS OF NATIONAL FACILITIES ASHORE AND AFLOAT
TO SUPPORT SUBSAR OPERATION
Identification UKSRS
Location UKSRS HQ, Renfrew, Glasgow
SRV (rescue capacity) 16 Rescuees at 5 bar
SRC (Rescue capacity) n/a
Rescue depth 400m
Transfer under pressure Yes
Deep Diving capabilities
ROV Yes
ADS No
Ventilation No
SPAG capable Yes
Dedicated MOSHIP / No
VOO
VOO Specifications Generally 350 m2 for VOO’s with own handling
needed system, 450 m2 for VOO’s which require UKSRS
PHS. Min width for PHS 12m.
II-1-GBR-3
ATP 57(B)
II-1-GBR-4
ATP 57(B)
Features Vehicle:
Length – 2.25m
Width – 1.75m
Height – 1.64m
Weight – 1.6tonnes
Container (tracking system) – weight 6 tonnes
Container (spares) – weight 4.5 tonnes
EFFER overboarding knuckle-boom crane
Sonars/Homers:
AMETEK 250A – 107 & 122 KHz
Homing 27KHz
TRITECH SEAKING 325 Hz & 675 Hz
Cameras:
1 x SIT pan/tilt
1 x SIT fixed
1 x colour pan/tilt
Fitted radiation monitor and UWT transducer 10KHz
& 27 Khz
Pod Posting Claw
TA9 Multi-function manipulator
35mm Hydraulic Cutter
ADS REMARKS
IdentificatIon N/A
Identification: n/a
Portable
Identification Type B First reaction stores at 6 Hrs Notice to Deploy
Total amount 6 x 10 person Length – 3.2m
Width – 2.0m
Height – 2.1m
Weight – 1565kg
Location 3 x 10 man – Northern Diving Group, Clyde
Submarine Base, Faslane, Dumbartonshire, Scotland.
3 x 10 man – Southern Diving Group, SDGHQ, HM
Naval Base, Plymouth, Devon.
Max. capacity 10 persons
(Persons)
II-1-GBR-5
ATP 57(B)
Max. Working 7 Bar
pressure
Transfer under Yes
pressure
Air portable Yes
Built into ships
Ships name / Class
Total amount of ships
Max. Capacity
(Persons)
Max. Working
pressure
Transfer under
pressure
Maximum SOA
Ashore Facilities
Military
Identification Type A
Location 1 x 15 person – Southern Diving Group, HM Naval
Base, Plymouth, Devon, England
1 x 15 person – Northern Diving Group, Clyde
Submarine Base, Faslane, Scotland.
1 x 15 person – SDU 2, HMS EXCELLENT, Whale
Island, Portsmouth
Max capacity 15 Person
(Persons)
Max. working pressure 8 Bar
Transfer under Yes
pressure
Identification Type A
Location QinetiQ, Alverstoke, Gosport, England, Hants
Max capacity 15 on BIBS
(Persons)
Max. working pressure 35.5 Bar
Transfer under No
pressure
Identification Type A
Location QinetiQ, Alverstoke, Gosport, England, Hants
Max capacity 10 on BIBS
(Persons)
Max. working pressure 130 Bar
Transfer under No
pressure
II-1-GBR-6
ATP 57(B)
Ashore Facilities
Military
Identification Type A
Location Haslar Hospital, Alverstoke, Gosport, England, Hants
Max capacity 8
(Persons)
Max. working pressure 7.5 Bar
Transfer under No
pressure
Identification Type A
Location Queen Alexandra’s Hospital, Cosham, Portsmouth,
England, Hants
Max capacity 11
(Persons)
Max. working pressure 7 Bar
Transfer under No
pressure
Identification Type A
Location Submarine Escape Training Tank, Fort Blockhouse,
Gosport, England, Hants, PO12 2AB
Max capacity 10
(Persons)
Max. working pressure 7 Bar
Transfer under No
pressure
Identification Type A
Location Northern Diving Group, Clyde Submarine Base,
Faslane, Dumbartonshire, Scotland
Max capacity 10
(Persons)
Max. working pressure 7 Bar
Transfer under No
pressure
Ashore Major
Civilian Facilities
Identification
Location Aberdeen – National
Hyperbaric Centre
Max. Capacity
(Persons)
Max. Working
pressure
Transfer under
pressure
II-1-GBR-7
ATP 57(B)
REMARKS
Significant Airport / Seaport combinations
Airport identification Data to be supplied by
Stuart Little NSRS
Airport capability
Seaport identification
Seaport capability
Road distance in-
between (km)
Road limitations
II-1-GBR-8
ATP 57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 1
II-1-USA-1 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-1-USA-2 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
ADS REMARKS
Identification Hard Suit 2000
Numbers 1-4
Location(s) DSU San Diego, CA
Maximum depth 2000 FSW LARS mode/950 FSW Hand Tended mode
II-1-USA-5 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Maximum current 0-853 FSW 2 knots
853-1509 FSW 1.2 knots
1509-2000 FSW 1 knot
Air portable: Yes
Features: Sonar, constant speed variable pitch 2 ¼ horse power
thrusters, lights, digital camera
II-1-USA-6 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-1-USA-7 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
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II-1-USA-8 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 2
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
Drawings (Side view, Top view, etc.) will display submarine’s SMER equipment/devices location/salvage
points, towing attachment points including “rip-out” towing bridal (if equipped) and contain related
dimensions (heights, distances, length, width etc.) of the submarine hull and fin/sail.
Special attention should be given to distances/dimensions between any obstructions and rescue seats.
GENERAL TEMPLATE
II-2-1 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
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II-2-2 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
SUBMARINE SPECIFIC DATA
DATA REMARKS
Submarine Class:
Number of Compartments:
Volume Rescue / Escape compartment:
Volume / Pressure HP Air bottles with
connection to Rescue / Escape
compartment(s):
Single Escape trunk: Yes/no
Two man escape trunk: Yes/no
Compartment Escape (Rush escape): Yes/no
Escape Suites: Yes/no (mention type and available
number aboard)
Maximum number of crew:
Number of Rescue Seats
(STANAG 1297):
Seat Certification: Yes/no
SRC capable: Yes/no
POD Capable / possible limitations:
POD bags w/ropes pre-stored on board: Yes/no
Dimensions Hatches and POD Trunks
(Transferred from STANAG 1391):
Ventilation / Depressurisation Yes/No
capabilities (STANAG 1450)
Surface assisted emergency blowing Yes/No
capabilities:
Re-supply of BIBS/HP air capability: Yes/No
II-2-3 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Emergency Sonar Beacon/Noise
Pinger
Compartment:
Remotely operated: Yes/no
Frequency:
Type:
Endurance:
Indicator buoy tethered
Length of cable:
Frequency:
Endurance:
Indicator light: Yes/no
Combined life raft/indicator buoy Yes/no
Expendable Communication Buoy
Frequency:
Compartment:
Endurance:
SEEPIRB
Compartments:
Type:
Endurance:
Personal Locator Beacon
Compartments:
Frequency:
Type:
Endurance:
Pyrotechnics (Flares)
Compartment:
Type:
Colors:
Endurance:
Submarine Signal Ejector
Compartments:
Mini POD Capable: Yes/no
II-2-4 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Submarine Particulars
Surfaced Displacement (T):
Overall Length (m):
Max surfaced Drafts (m):
Beam (m):
Max Casing Height (m):
Trim Fwd or Trim Aft:
II-2-5 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-6 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 2
AUSTRALIA
II-2-AUS-1 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
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II-2-AUS-2 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
3.2M
II-2-AUS-3 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
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II-2-AUS-4 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
SUBMARINE SPECIFIC DATA
DATA REMARKS
Submarine Class: Collins
Number of Compartments: 2
Volume Rescue / Escape compartment: Tunnel 3100 litres
Escape tower 800 litres
Volume / Pressure HP Air bottles with 33.6 million litres
connection to Rescue / Escape 27 – 29 Mpa
compartment(s):
Single Escape trunk: Yes
Two man escape trunk: No
Compartment Escape (Rush escape): Yes Fwd only
Escape Suites: Yes (67 SEIE Mk 10 Modern)
Maximum number of crew: 55
Number of Rescue Seats 1
(STANAG 1297):
Seat Certification: Yes
SRC capable: Yes
POD Capable / possible limitations: Yes
POD bags w/ropes pre-stored on board: No
Dimensions Hatches and POD Trunks Yes
(Transferred from STANAG 1391):
Ventilation / Depressurization No
capabilities (STANAG 1450)
Surface assisted emergency blowing No
capabilities:
Re-supply of BIBS/HP air capability: No
II-2-AUS-5 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
Emergency Sonar Beacon/Noise
Pinger
Yes
Compartment: Fwd / Aft
Remotely operated: Yes
Frequency: 9.25± 0.5 KHz / 37± 0.5 KHz
Type: LYNDA U2
Endurance: 10 Days
Indicator buoy tethered
NIL
Length of cable:
Frequency:
Endurance:
Indicator light:
Combined life raft/indicator buoy
SEEPIRB
SERB Mk 2
Frequency: 121.5, 243.0, 406.025 MHz
Compartment: 8 x Fwd, 8x Aft
Endurance: 48 Hrs Min
Expendable Communication Buoy
NIL
Compartments:
Type:
Endurance:
Personal Locator Beacon
Compartments: 4x Fwd, 4x Aft
Frequency: 121.5, 243.0 MHz
Type: Fastfind Plus
Endurance: 24 Hrs Min
Pyrotechnics (Flares)
Compartment: Fwd, Aft
Type: FSS Mk N3 Mod 2,
WS Mk N6 Mod 3
Colors: Red, White Smoke
Endurance:
Submarine Signal Ejector
Compartments: Fwd, Aft
Mini POD Capable: No
II-2-AUS-6 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
capabilities and emergency food/water:
Number of National Units CO2 440 units FWD
scrubbing material referred in kg: 440 units AFT
Based on stores held onboard each S/M
Number of National Units O2 112 units FWD 3000 Litres per SCOG
bottles/candles referred in liters: 112 units AFT
Based on stores held onboard each S/M
Submarine Particulars
Surfaced Displacement (T): 2500
Overall Length (m): 78 m
Max surfaced Drafts (m): 8 metres
Beam (m): 7.8 metres
Max Casing Height (m): 1.5 metres
Trim Fwd or Trim Aft: Yes
II-2-AUS-7 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
Location from Fwd Perpendicular (m): 21.85m
Max Permissible Longitudinal Load Not recommended for Towing
(T):
Max Permissible Transverse Load (T): Not recommended for Towing
II-2-AUS-8 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 2
BULGARIA
II-2-BGR-1 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
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II-2-BGR-2 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
II-2-BGR-3 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
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II-2-BGR-4 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
SUBMARINE SPECIFIC DATA
DATA REMARKS
Submarine Class: ROMEO
Number of Compartments: 7
Volume Rescue Compartment: 3 m3
Volume / Pressure HP Air bottles inside No
rescue compartment(s):
Single Escape trunk: No
Compartment Escape (Rush escape): Yes
Escape Suites: Yes
Maximum number of crew: 60
Number of Rescue Seats 1 Non fitted with NATO Common
(STANAG 1297): Rescue Seat (1600x1420 mm)
Seat Certification: No
SRC capable: Yes
POD Capable / possible limitations: Yes
POD bags w/ropes pre-stored on board: No
Dimensions Hatches and POD Trunks POD Trunk (650x1130 mm)
(Transferred from STANAG 1391):
Ventilation / Depressurization Yes
capabilities (STANAG 1450)
Surface assisted emergency blowing Yes
capabilities:
Re-supply of BIBS/HP air capability: Yes
II-2-BGR-5 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
SEEPIRB
No
Submarine Particulars
Surfaced Displacement (T): 1333 t
Overall Length (m): 76,60 m
II-2-BGR-6 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
Max surfaced Drafts (m): 5,40 m
Beam (m): 6,70 m
Max Casing Height (m): 6,70 m
Trim Fwd or Trim Aft: -
II-2-BGR-7 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-BGR-8 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 2
CANADA
II-2-CAN-1 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
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II-2-CAN-2 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
II-2-CAN-3 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
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II-2-CAN-4 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
SUBMARINE SPECIFIC DATA
DATA REMARKS
Submarine Class: VICTORIA Former UPHOLDER (UK)
Number of Compartments: Two
Volume Rescue / Escape compartment: Fwd: 361939L Aft: 767088L
Volume / Pressure HP Air bottles with Fwd Aft
connection to Rescue / Escape 3 bottles @ .258cu m 3 bottles @ .258cu m
compartment(s):
Single Escape trunk: Yes
Two man escape trunk: No
Compartment Escape (Rush escape): No
Escape Suits: Yes
Maximum number of crew: Fifty-five
Number of Rescue Seats Two
(STANAG 1297):
Seat Certification: Yes USN certified for DSRV/SRC.
Compatibility with LR5/NSRS
is assumed.
SRC capable: Yes
POD Capable / possible limitations: Yes, receive only. Certified for POD posting to
180 metres due to Escape
Tower Hatch limitations.
POD bags w/ropes pre-stored on board: Yes
Dimensions Hatches and POD Trunks 660.4 mm
(Transferred from STANAG 1391):
Ventilation / Depressurisation No Project underway to establish
capabilities (STANAG 1450) DP&V capability and fittings
Surface assisted emergency blowing No
capabilities:
Re-supply of BIBS/HP air capability: No
II-2-CAN-5 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
Frequency Transmitting: 43Khz / 27Khz / 10Khz
Automatic Emergency Mode: Pinger only
Emergency Sonar Beacon/Noise
Pinger
Compartment: Weapon Stowage Compartment /
Motor Room
Remotely operated: No
Frequency: 10Khz / 43Khz
Type: 2073
Endurance: 5hrs HF Ping / 7 Days LF Ping
Indicator buoy tethered
Length of cable: 1000M
Frequency: 406.025Mhz / 243Mhz
Endurance: 72 Hrs
Indicator light: Yes
Combined life raft/indicator buoy No
Expendable Communication Buoy
Frequency: 168Mhz – 310 Mhz Alert Mode 243Mhz
Compartment: Weapon Stowage Ccompartment /
Motor Room
Endurance: 1-240Min set time
SEEPIRB
Compartments: Weapon Stowage Ccompartment /
Motor Room
Type: Type 1
Endurance: 48 Hrs
Personal Locator Beacon
Compartments: Weapon Stowage Ccompartment /
Motor Room (3 each)
Frequency: 121.5Mhz & 243 Mhz
Type: TR 125
Endurance: 24 Hrs @ 20NM
Pyrotechnics (Flares)
Compartment: Weapon Stowage Ccompartment /
Motor Room
Type: ADI / MK121
Colors: Red Flare / White Smoke
Endurance: 15-45 Sec / 55 Sec
Submarine Signal Ejector
Compartments: Weapon Stowage Ccompartment /
Motor Room
Mini POD Capable: No
II-2-CAN-6 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
SURVIVABILITY / Emergency Life Support Stores (ELSS)
REMARKS
Submarine Particulars
Surfaced Displacement (T): 2168
Overall Length (m): 70.3
Max surfaced Drafts (m): 5.5
Beam (m): 7.6
Max Casing Height from water line
(m):
Trim Fwd or Trim Aft: 7.0/7.2
II-2-CAN-7 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
Location from Fwd Perpendicular (m): N/A
Max Permissible Longitudinal Load N/A
(T):
Max Permissible Transverse Load (T): N/A
II-2-CAN-8 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 2
FRANCE
II-2-FRA-1 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-FRA-2 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
17.00 12.60
32.75
73.80
80.98
111.75
21.30
138.00
II-2-FRA-3 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-FRA-4 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
NO
Personal Locator Beacon
Pyrotechnics (Flares)
Compartment: Forward
Type:
Colors: Red, green, white
Endurance:
Submarine Signal Ejector
Compartments:
Mini POD Capable:
II-2-FRA-6 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
EQUIPMENT REMARKS
Endurance:
Fixed Emergency Breathing System
Compartment, Volume and Pressure: Both compartments, 38 m3 max,
250 bar
Fin Capability NO
II-2-FRA-7 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
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II-2-FRA-8 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
RUBIS CLASS
10.00 7.60
14.15
73.10
II-2-FRA-9 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-FRA-10 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
NO
Personal Locator Beacon
Yes
Pyrotechnics (Flares)
Compartment: Forward
Type:
Colors: Red, white, green
Endurance:
Submarine Signal Ejector
Compartments: Forward
Mini POD Capable: No
II-2-FRA-12 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
EQUIPMENT REMARKS
Fixed Emergency Breathing System
Compartment, Volume and Pressure: Aft and forward, 9750 l / 250 bar
II-2-FRA-13 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
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II-2-FRA-14 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 2
GERMANY
II-2-DEU-1 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
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II-2-DEU-2 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
II-2-DEU-3 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
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II-2-DEU-4 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
II-2-DEU-5 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-DEU-6 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
II-2-DEU-7 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
Types: Rosemount (H2), SICK Maihak
Zellweger System 57 (O2, CO2) S 700 - system
Gases: H2, O2, CO2 H2, O2, CO2, CO, R134A
Fixed Emergency Breathing System
Breathing air: 4 x 65 ltr./ 250 bar 2 x 400 ltr./ 250 bar
Breathing gas (35% / 65 %): 6 x 65 ltr./ 250 bar 1 x 400 ltr./ 250 bar
II-2-DEU-8 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 2
GREECE
II-2-GRC-1 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
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II-2-GRC-2 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
II-2-GRC-3 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
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II-2-GRC-4 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
DATA REMARKS
Submarine Class: TYPE 209
Number of Compartments: 1 One - Compartment Submarine
Volume Rescue/Escape Compartment: 700 m3 Volume of the pressure hull
Volume / Pressure HP Air bottles with 1. 20 Bottles O2 – 50lts Volume – -
connection to Rescue / Escape Pressure 200ATU
compartment(s): 2. 4 Bottles Breathing air - 340lts Consisting of 1 bottle dry air
Volume – Pressure 250ATU and 3 bottles mixture 35% O2
65% N2
Not compatible to any rescue
Single Escape trunk: Yes
vehicle
Two man escape trunk Yes
Not compatible to any rescue
Compartment Escape (Rush escape): Yes
vehicle
Escape Suites: Yes 46 items BEAUFORT MK-10
Maximum number of crew: 40 -
Number of Rescue Seats -
-
(STANAG 1297):
Seat Certification: No -
SRC capable: No -
POD Capable / possible limitations: No -
POD bags w/ropes pre-stored on board: No -
Dimensions Hatches and POD Trunks -
-
(Transferred from STANAG 1391):
Ventilation / Depressurization -
No
capabilities (STANAG 1450)
Surface assisted emergency blowing GLAFKOS CLASS: No -
capabilities: POSSIDON CLASS: Yes
Re-supply of BIBS/HP air capability: No -
II-2-GRC-5 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
II-2-GRC-6 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
Endurance: - -
Submarine Signal Ejector -
Compartments: TORPEDO ROOM -
Mini POD Capable: No -
II-2-GRC-7 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
II-2-GRC-8 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
EQUIPMENT
Special Towing Eyes (if fitted) Fwd Aft
Size of Eye (mm): - -
Location: - -
Max Loading (T): - -
Anchor Facility and location
Size of cable (mm): 19 -
Length of Cable (m): 200 -
Max Loading (T): 9,53 -
Other Information Fwd Aft
Number of Capstans: 1
Number of Bullrings:
II-2-GRC-9 ORIGINAL
ATP-57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-GRC-10 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 2
ISRAEL
II-2-ISR-1 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
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II-2-ISR-2 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
DOLPHIN CLASS
Drawing
Aft MBT
ילכימל ריוא ירי
emergency Pressure hall-
ריוא ירי ללחלaft
הלילצ1,2 -תללוצה
blowing ventilationירוחאconnector
Fw. MBT
ריוא ירי ילכימל
הלילצ3,4
emergency
blowing
II-2-ISR-3 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-ISR-4 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
DATA REMARKS
Submarine Class: DOLPHIN
Number of Compartments: Single Compartment
Volume Rescue / Escape Compartment: 1000 cubic meter
Volume / Pressure HP Air bottles with 1200 l * 250 bar
connection to Rescue / Escape
compartment:
Two Man Escape Trunk: Yes
Compartment Escape (Rush escape): Yes From 3 different points
Escape Suites: MK-8 Jerkin BEAUFORT
Maximum number of crew: 50
Number of Rescue Seats 1
(STANAG 1297):
Seat Certification:
SRC capable: Yes
POD Capable / possible limitations: Yes
POD bags & ropes pre-stored on board: Y
Dimensions Hatches and POD Trunks: 650 mm
II-2-ISR-5 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Remotely operated:
Frequency: NATO- 3.5 KHZ Pinger
12 KHZ
Type:
Endurance:
Indicator buoy tethered
Length of cable: N/A
Expendable Communication Buoy
Frequency: N/A
SEEPIRB
YES (2)
Compartments: Single compartment
Type: T-1630
Endurance:
Personal Locator Beacon
YES
Compartments: Single Compartment
Frequency: UHF
Type:
Endurance:
Pyrotechnics (Flares)
Compartment: Single Compartment
Type:
Colors: Green, red
2 SSE
Submarine Signal Ejector
Yes (2)
Compartments: Single Compartment
Mini POD Capable:
II-2-ISR-6 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Submarine Particulars
Surfaced Displacement (T): 1560 T
Overall Length (m): 67 m
Max surfaced Drafts (m): 7m
Beam (m): 6m
Max Casing Height (m): 2m
2m
Trim Fwd or Trim Aft:
II-2-ISR-7 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Height of raised Bollard above
270 mm 270 mm
Casing (mm):
Max Longitudinal Load Capability
58 T
(T):
Max Transverse Load Capability (T): 58 T
II-2-ISR-8 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 2
ITALY
II-2-ITA-1 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-ITA-2 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
ITALY
SAURO CLASS III BATCH
II-2-ITA-3 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
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II-2-ITA-4 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
ITALY
SAURO CLASS IV BATCH
II-2-ITA-5 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
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II-2-ITA-6 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
ITALY
TODARO CLASS
11
12
II-2-ITA-7 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
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II-2-ITA-8 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-ITA-9 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Automatic Emergency Mode: Yes
Emergency Sonar Beacon/Noise
Detection and localization
Pinger
Compartment: 1 (one)
Remotely operated: No
Frequency: 8800 Hz +/- 50 Hz
Type: ESUG 1A using GS-231A pinger It is a part of QRUX 1B system
Endurance: 2 (two) months 2 (two) months
Emergency Sonar Beacon Homing
Type: Acoustic transponder RS-100
6850 Hz
± 2% on transmission
Frequency: 8200 Hz
± 8% on reception
10000 Hz
Endurance > 150 hours
Indicator buoy tethered NO
SEPIRB
Devices are released through the
Compartment: 2 in Fore and 2 in Aft compartment
Signal Ejector tube
Type: T 1630 SRT
Endurance: > 48 hours
Frequency: - 406.025 MHz (COSPAS-SARSAT
message)
- 121.5 MHz (Beacon – 6 hours delay)
Pyrotechnics (Flares)
Compartment: Fore and Aft 12 (twelve) red lights and smoke
signals in each compartment
Type: STA or PIC The maximum launching depth is 600
mts
Colors: Light and smoke signals in each
Red – Yellow – Green compartment
Endurance: 120 sec. 60 sec smoke + 60 sec light
II-2-ITA-10 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Compartments: 1 in fore and 1 in aft compartments
Mini POD Capable: No
II-2-ITA-11 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Fin Capability No capability
Fwd Aft
Bollards (if fitted) III Batch IV Batch III Batch IV
Batch
Location from Fwd Perpendicular 7.5 7.5 39.55 45
(m):
Number of Bollards: 2x2 2x2 2x2 2x2
Height of raised Bollard above 300 300 300 300
Casing (mm):
Max Longitudinal Load Capability // // // //
(T):
Max Transverse Load Capability (T): // // // //
II-2-ITA-12 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Emergency UWT NO
II-2-ITA-13 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Frequency: 5 KHz and 35 KHz
Type: SBE1 – 20 ELAC - Nautik
280 hrs
1200 hrs
Endurance: at high and low Automatic TX when sensors wet
at low frequency
frequency
Indicator buoy tethered EPIRB
Length of cable: 600 meters
Frequency: 406 MHz ACR–GLOBAL FIX 406 MHz
Endurance: //
Indicator light: Yes
Combined life raft/indicator buoy Yes
Expendable Communication
Buoy No
SEEPIRB
Compartment: One compartment submarine 4 (four) signals
Type: SRT 1600 406 MHz
- 406.025 MHz ( Cospas –Sarsat
satellite message)
Frequency:
- 121.5 MHZ (beacon – 6 hours
delay)
Endurance: 48 hrs
Personal Locator Beacon No
Pyrotechnics (Flares)
Compartment: One compartment submarine
Type: PIC or STA Releasable up to 600 meters
Colors: Yellow – Green and RED
Endurance: ≥ 5 minutes
Submarine Signal Ejector
Compartments: One compartment submarine
Mini POD Capable: No
II-2-ITA-14 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Submarine Particulars
Surfaced Displacement (T): 1507.696
Overall Length (m): 57.150
Max surfaced Drafts (m): 6.0
Beam (m): 7.61
Max Casing Height (m): 2.64
Trim Fwd or Trim Aft: From 0.5 aft to 0°
II-2-ITA-15 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Length of Cable (m): 200
Max Loading (T): 21.1 (30.1 break)
Note: inside the fin there are 400 meters of synthetic wire (Ø 36 mm)
II-2-ITA-16 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 2
NORWAY
II-2-NOR-1 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-NOR-2 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-NOR-3 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-NOR-4 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
DATA REMARKS
Submarine Class: Ula
Number of Compartments: 2
Volume Rescue / Escape compartment: 430 m3 Aft/ 240 m3 Fwd
Volume / Pressure HP Air bottles with Aft 8 bottles à 340 litres 250 bar |
connection to Rescue / Escape
compartment(s): Fwd 3 bottles à 340 litres 250 bar
plus 7 bottles à 149 litres 250 bar
II-2-NOR-5 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Frequency Transmitting:
Automatic Emergency Mode:
Emergency Sonar Beacon/Noise
Pinger
Compartment: Aft
Remotely operated: No
Frequency:
Type: Scanmatic SM2500 Noise pinger
Endurance:
Indicator buoy tethered
Length of cable: 600 meter Line attached to life raft
Frequency: 406 MHz and 121.5 MHz
Endurance: 48 Hours
Indicator light: Yes
Combined life raft/indicator buoy Yes
Expendable Communication Buoy
Frequency:
Compartment:
Endurance:
SEEPIRB
Compartments: 1 Aft/ 1 Fwd
Type: SEEPIRB 406
Endurance: 48 Hours
Personal Locator Beacon
Compartments: 5 Aft/ 5 Fwd
Frequency: 406 MHz and 121.5 MHz
Type: MR 509
Endurance: 24 Hours
Pyrotechnics (Flares)
Compartment: 4 Aft/ 4 Fwd
Type: UNR ADI
Colors: Red
Endurance: 700 M
Compartment: 4 Aft/ 4 Fwd
Type: Poseidon Will be replaced by ADI
Colors: White
Endurance: 100 M
Compartment: 3 Aft/ 3 Fwd
Type: Poseidon Will be replaced by ADI
Colors: Yellow smoke
Endurance: 100M
II-2-NOR-6 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-NOR-7 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Rip Out Tow Yes
Length of Wire (m): 30
Max Load (T): 30 kN
Fin Capability
Length (m): 10.9
Width (m): 1.6
Height above Casing (m): 3.9
Location from Fwd Perpendicular 20.8
(m):
Max Permissible Longitudinal Load -
(T):
Max Permissible Transverse Load -
(T):
Bollards (if fitted) Fwd Aft
Location from Fwd Perpendicular 3.000 38.000
(m):
Number of Bollards: 4 4
Height of raised Bollard above 269 269
Casing (mm):
Max Longitudinal Load Capability 115 kN 115 kN
(T):
Max Transverse Load Capability (T): 115 kN 115 kN
Special Towing Eyes (if fitted) Fwd Aft
Size of Eye (mm): - -
Location:
Max Loading (T):
Anchor Facility and location
Size of cable (mm): 16
Length of Cable (m): 150
Max Loading (T): 154 kN
Other Information Fwd Aft
Number of Capstans: 1
Number of Bullrings: -
II-2-NOR-8 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 2
POLAND
II-2-POL-1 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-POL-2 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
KILO Class
II-2-POL-3 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-POL-4 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-POL-5 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-POL-6 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-POL-7 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Indicator buoy tethered
Length of cable: 400 m
Frequency: 406,025 MHz
Endurance: ---
Indicator light: YES
Combined life raft/indicator buoy YES
Expendable Communication Buoy
NO
---
SEEPIRB
NO
Compartments: ---
---
Type:
Endurance: ---
Personal Locator Beacon
Compartments: ---
Frequency: 121,5 / 243 / 406,025 MHz
Type: MR-509 and SARBE-10
Endurance: ---
Pyrotechnics (Flares)
Compartment:
Type: Mk-3
Colors: Green and red star, white candle,
yellow smoke
Endurance:
Submarine Signal Ejector YES
---
Compartments:
Mini POD Capable: YES
II-2-POL-8 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Submarine Particulars
Surfaced Displacement (T): 520 546 (296)
Overall Length (m): 47,24 48,74 (296)
Max surfaced Drafts (m): 4,80
Beam (m): 4,68
Max Casing Height (m): 4,80
Trim Fwd or Trim Aft: AFT
II-2-POL-10 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-POL-11 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Emergency Sonar Beacon/Noise
Pinger
Compartment: ---
Remotely operated:
Frequency: 3200 OR 6700 Hz
Type: MGS-30
Endurance: ---
Indicator buoy tethered
Length of cable: 200 m
Frequency: 121,5 / 243 / 406,025 MHz
Endurance: ---
Indicator light: YES
Combined life raft/indicator buoy NO
Expendable Communication Buoy
NO
---
SEEPIRB
NO
---
Personal Locator Beacon
Compartments: ---
Frequency: 121,5 / 243 / 406,025 MHz
Type: MR-509
Endurance: ---
Pyrotechnics (Flares)
Compartment:
Type: KSP
Colors: Green and Red
Endurance:
Submarine Signal Ejector
Compartments: ---
Mini POD Capable: YES
II-2-POL-12 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Submarine Particulars
Surfaced Displacement (T): 2325
Overall Length (m): 74,26
Max surfaced Drafts (m): 6,7
Beam (m): 9,9
Max Casing Height (m): 14,76
Trim Fwd or Trim Aft: Fwd
Rip Out Tow YES
Length of Wire (m): 80 + 21
Max Load (T): 59 and 61
Fin Capability
Length (m):
Width (m):
Height above Casing (m):
Location from Fwd Perpendicular (m):
Max Permissible Longitudinal Load (T):
Max Permissible Transverse Load (T):
Bollards (if fitted) Fwd Aft
Location from Fwd Perpendicular (m): 12,6 and 13,2 48 and 48,6
Number of Bollards: 4 4
Height of raised Bollard above Casing
260 260
(mm):
Max Longitudinal Load Capability (T): --- ---
Max Transverse Load Capability (T): --- ---
Special Towing Eyes (if fitted) Fwd Aft
Size of Eye (mm): 180 ---
II-2-POL-13 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Location: Fwd ---
Max Loading (T): 61 ---
Anchor Facility and location
Size of cable (mm): 31
Length of Cable (m): 175
Max Loading (T): ---
Other Information Fwd Aft
Number of Capstans: 1 1
Number of Bullrings: --- ---
II-2-POL-14 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 2
PORTUGAL
II-2-PRT-1 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-PRT-2 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-PRT-3 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-PRT-4 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-PRT-5 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-PRT-6 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-PRT-7 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-PRT-8 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-PRT-9 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-PRT-10 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
DATA REMARKS
Submarine Class: ALBACORA CLASS TYPE “DAPHNÉ”
Number of Compartments: 5 Not Resistant
Volume Rescue Compartment: 35 m3 Considered the Aft
compartment. None of them is
Pressure Resistant.
Volume / Pressure HP Air bottles inside 3200 LT / 250 BAR Considering total of air bottles
rescue compartment(s): inside the submarine.
Single Escape trunk: No
Compartment Escape (Rush escape): Yes
Escape Suites: No Exists 60 Beuchat lifejacket
type M.N. P.97 aboard for rush
escape
Maximum number of crew: 60
Number of Rescue Seats One
(STANAG 1297):
Seat Certification: Yes LR5
SRC capable: No
POD Capable / possible limitations: Yes Via Signal Ejector. Restricted to
the 100mm diameter and 100m
depth.
POD bags w/ropes pre-stored on board: No
Dimensions Hatches and POD Trunks Aft Hatche: 700 mm
(Transferred from STANAG 1391): Fwd Hatche: 750 mm
Torpedo Hatche: 750 mm
Tower Trunk (2): 600 mm
Signal Ejector: diameter 100 mm,
length 400 mm, maximum operation
depth 100 m
Ventilation / Depressurization Yes
capabilities (STANAG 1450)
Surface assisted emergency blowing Yes
capabilities:
Re-supply of BIBS/HP air capability: Yes
II-2-PRT-11 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Frequency Transmitting: 8087 Hz 8087+/- 2Hz, Omni-directional
reception and transmission,
Acoustic power delivery 50W,
Modulation in the lower single
side band (400-3500 Hz),
possibility of operation of an
800 Hz audio frequency with
possibility of Doppler
avoidance, range 4000 m.
Automatic Emergency Mode: No The underwater telephones
fitted on “Albacora” class
submarines (TUUM 1A-TUUM
2A/B) may operate in automatic
transponder mode, under the
characteristics mentioned in
para. 1.
Emergency UWT
No
II-2-PRT-12 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-PRT-13 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-PRT-14 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Submarine Particulars
Surfaced Displacement (T): 869 ton
Overall Length (m): 57,78 m
Max surfaced Drafts (m): 5,27 m
Beam (m): 6,762 m
Max Casing Height (m): 0,5 m
Trim Fwd or Trim Aft: 25º
Fin Capability
Length (m): 7,0 m
Width (m): 1,5 m
Height above Casing (m): 4,4 m
Location from Fwd Perpendicular (m): 24,30 m
Max Permissible Longitudinal Load Unknown
(T):
Max Permissible Transverse Load (T): Unknown
II-2-PRT-15 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-PRT-16 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 2
SPAIN
II-2-ESP-1 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-ESP-2 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-ESP-3 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-ESP-4 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
DATA REMARKS
Submarine Class: GALERNA French AGOSTA type
Number of Compartments: 3 Fwd and aft are escape
compartments
Volume Rescue / Escape compartment: Fwd: 226 m3 / Aft: 180 m3
Volume / Pressure HP Air bottles with Fwd: 7600 m3/ 250 Kg/cm2
connection to Rescue / Escape Aft: 1200 m3/ 250 Kg/cm2
compartment(s):
Single Escape trunk: Yes Escape trunk in fwd and aft
compartments
Two man escape trunk: No
Compartment Escape (Rush escape): Yes Rush escape is possible from
fwd and aft comp.
Escape Suites: 120 MK-10 (60 in each escape
compartment)
Maximum number of crew: 60
Number of Rescue Seats 2
(STANAG 1297):
Seat Certification: Yes
SRC capable: Yes
POD Capable / possible limitations: Yes Using fwd escape trunk
POD bags w/ropes pre-stored on board: No
Dimensions Hatches and POD Trunks 600 mm
(Transferred from STANAG 1391):
Ventilation / Depressurization Yes
capabilities (STANAG 1450)
Surface assisted emergency blowing Yes
capabilities:
Re-supply of BIBS/HP air capability: No
II-2-ESP-6 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Submarine Particulars
Surfaced Displacement (T): 1510 Tons
Overall Length (m): 67,750 mts
Max surfaced Drafts (m): 5,40 mts
Beam (m): 6,8 mts
Max Casing Height (m): 1,4 mts
Trim Fwd or Trim Aft:
II-2-ESP-7 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Size of Eye (mm): --- ---
II-2-ESP-8 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 2
SWEDEN
II-2-SWE-1 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-SWE-2 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Gotland Class
II-2-SWE-3 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-SWE-4 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
DATA REMARKS
Submarine Class: Gotland
Number of Compartments: 2
Volume Rescue / Escape compartment: 0,9 m3
Volume / Pressure HP Air bottles with 10*160 lit / 25 MPa
connection to Rescue / Escape 1*200, 1*160 / 25 MPa (HIS)
compartment(s): 7*270 lit/25 MPa (emergency)
Single Escape trunk: Yes
Two man escape trunk: No
Compartment Escape (Rush escape): No
Escape Suites: Yes 35 x SEIE MK 10 S-2
Maximum number of crew: 35
Number of Rescue Seats 1
(STANAG 1297):
Seat Certification: Yes
SRC capable: No
POD Capable / possible limitations: Yes (max depth 300 m) Only with Swedish PODs
POD bags w/ropes pre-stored on board: No
Dimensions Hatches and POD Trunks Inner hatch elliptical. 450*350 mm
(Transferred from STANAG 1391):
Ventilation / Depressurization No
capabilities (STANAG 1450)
Surface assisted emergency blowing No
capabilities:
Re-supply of BIBS/HP air capability: Yes
II-2-SWE-5 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Emergency UWT
Compartments: Passage/Escape tower compartment
Type: SLINGSBY ENGINEERING, A
046
Frequency Transmitting: 10, 27, 37,5, 43 and 45 KHz
Max 100W (10 KHz)
Automatic Emergency Mode: Yes
Emergency Sonar Beacon/Noise
Pinger
Compartment: Forward
Remotely operated: No Manual or automatic if
compartment is flooded
Frequency: 9,25 and 37 KHz
Type: Amlab, UB-pinger U2
Endurance: > 10 days
Indicator buoy tethered
Length of cable: 500 m
Frequency: 243 MHz (UHF), 121,5 kHz (VHF)
Endurance: > 10 days
Indicator light: Yes White, 30 Fl/min automatic.
Combined life raft/indicator buoy No
Expendable Communication Buoy
Frequency: N/A
SEEPIRB
Compartments: Passage/Escape compartment
Type: Ultra Electronics T-1639 / SRT
Endurance: Approximately 24 hours
Personal Locator Beacon
Compartments: N/A
Pyrotechnics (Flares)
Compartment: Forward/ Aft
Type: VLJ 71/K (White for exercise)
VLJ 72/K (White for emergency)
RLJ 73/K (Red)
RLJ 74/K (Red)
Colors: Red/ White
Endurance: 240 s
Submarine Signal Ejector
Compartments: Fwd and Aft
Mini POD Capable: No
II-2-SWE-6 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Submarine Particulars
Surfaced Displacement (T): 1490
Overall Length (m): 60
Max surfaced Drafts (m): Pending on weight
Beam (m): 6,1
Max Casing Height (m): 6
Trim Fwd or Trim Aft:
II-2-SWE-7 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-SWE-8 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Södermanland Class
II-2-SWE-9 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-SWE-10 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
SUBMARINE SPECIFIC DATA
DATA REMARKS
Submarine Class: Södermanland
Number of Compartments: 2
Volume Rescue / Escape compartment: 0,9 m3
Volume / Pressure HP Air bottles with 6*267 lit / 25 MPa (ordinary)
connection to Rescue / Escape 7*267 lit / 25 MPa (emergency)
compartment(s):
Single Escape trunk: Yes
Two man escape trunk: No
Compartment Escape (Rush escape): No
Escape Suites: Yes 35 x SEIE MK 10 S-2
Maximum number of crew: 30
Number of Rescue Seats 1
(STANAG 1297):
Seat Certification: Yes
SRC capable: No
POD Capable / possible limitations: Yes Only with Swe PODs.
POD bags w/ropes pre-stored on board: Yes
Dimensions Hatches and POD Trunks Upper hatch: 740 mm
(Transferred from STANAG 1391): Lower hatch: 490mm x 350 mm
(oval)
Legth (clear): 1000 mm
Ventilation / Depressurization No
capabilities (STANAG 1450)
Surface assisted emergency blowing No
capabilities:
Re-supply of BIBS/HP air capability: Yes
II-2-SWE-11 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Emergency Sonar Beacon/Noise
Pinger
Compartment: Forward
Remotely operated: No Automatic Emergency Mode
Frequency: 9,25 and 37 KHz
Type: Amlab, UB-pinger U2
Endurance: > 10 days
Indicator buoy tethered
Length of cable: 350 m
Frequency: 243 MHz (UHF), 121,5 MHz (VHF)
Endurance: > 10 days
Indicator light: Yes White, 30 Fl/min
Combined life raft/indicator buoy No
Expendable Communication Buoy
Frequency: 406 MHz
Compartment: Passage/Escape Tower
Compartment
Endurance: Approximately 24 hours
SEEPIRB
Compartments: Passage/Escape compartment
Type: Ultra Electronics T-1639 / SRT
Endurance: Approximately 24 hours
Personal Locator Beacon
N/A
Compartments:
Pyrotechnics (Flares)
Compartment: Forward/ Aft
Type: VLJ 71/K (White for exercise)
VLJ 72/K (White for emergency)
RLJ 73/K (Red)
RLJ 74/K (Red)
Colors: Red/ White
Endurance: 240 s
Submarine Signal Ejector
Compartments: Fwd and Aft
Mini POD Capable: No
II-2-SWE-12 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Number of National Units CO2 Classified information
scrubbing material referred in kg:
Number of National Units O2 2.6 lit * 62 units (FWD Normaly GOX from AIP
bottles/candles referred in liters: compartment) system used
Submarine Particulars
Surfaced Displacement (T): 1412
Overall Length (m): 60
Max surfaced Drafts (m):
Beam (m): 6.1
Max Casing Height (m): 6
Trim Fwd or Trim Aft:
II-2-SWE-14 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
PART II
\
CHAPTER 1
THE NETHERLANDS
II-2-NLD-1 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-NLD-2 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-NLD-3 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-NLD-4 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-NLD-5 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Remotely operated: Yes
Frequency: 10 and 35 Kc 3,5 Kc
Type: Elac SBE 2 -53 Elac SBE 2-52
Endurance: 370 hours 360 hours
Indicator buoy tethered
Length of cable: 600mtr
Frequency: 8364Kc, 243 and 406 Mhz
Endurance: 3 days
Indicator light: Yes
Combined life raft/indicator buoy No
Expendable Communication Buoy
Frequency: No
Compartment: No
Endurance: No
SEEPIRB
Compartments: No
Type: No
Endurance: No
Personal Locator Beacon
Compartments: 2 in fwd, 2 in aft compartment
Frequency: 121,5, 243,0 and 406,025
Type: MR 509
Endurance: > 24 hours
Pyrotechnics (Flares)
Compartment: Fwd and aft escape compartment
Type: Nr 21 / 4 inch NSN 1370-17-054-0001
Colors: Red, green, yellow, white, white
with messenger and green dye
Endurance: Minimal 6 minutes
Submarine Signal Ejector
Compartments: Escape compartment forward and aft
Mini POD Capable: Yes
Submarine Particulars
Surfaced Displacement (T): 2400
Overall Length (m): 68
Max surfaced Drafts (m): 7.2
Beam (m): 6.8
Max Casing Height (m): 3.5
Trim Fwd or Trim Aft: 8.6
II-2-NLD-7 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-NLD-8 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-NLD-9 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-NLD-10 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-NLD-12 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Submarine Particulars
Surfaced Displacement (T): 2400
Overall Length (m): 68
Max surfaced Drafts (m): 7.2
Beam (m): 6.8
Max Casing Height (m): 3.5
Trim Fwd or Trim Aft: 8.6
II-2-NLD-13 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Max Transverse Load Capability (T): 40 Kn 40 Kn
II-2-NLD-14 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 2
TURKEY
II-2-TUR-1 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-TUR-2 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-TUR-3 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-TUR-4 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
DATA REMARKS
Submarine Class: AY Class Type 209 (T 1200)
Number of Compartments: Single Compartment No Watertight Bulkheads
Volume Rescue / Escape Compartment: 700 m³ Single Compartment.
No watertight Bulkhead
Volume / Pressure HP Air bottles with 4 x 340Lt. x 250 Kg/cm² Single Compartment.
connection to Rescue / Escape No watertight Bulkhead
compartment:
Two Man Escape Trunk: Yes
Compartment Escape (Rush escape): Yes
Escape Suites: MK-10 Beaufort / 45
Maximum number of crew: 39
Number of Rescue Seats No
(STANAG 1297):
Seat Certification: No
SRC capable: No
POD Capable / possible limitations: Yes
POD bags & ropes pre-stored on board: Yes
Dimensions Hatches and POD Trunks: UH: 650 mm
LH: 650 mm
Length: 2045mm
Ventilation / Depressurisation Yes
capabilities (STANAG 1450)
Surface assisted emergency blowing Yes
capabilities:
Re-supply of BIBS/HP air capability: No
II-2-TUR-5 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Emergency Sonar Beacon/Noise
No
Pinger
SEEPIRB
No
Endurance:
Pyrotechnics (Flares)
Compartment: Single Compartment No Watertight Bulkheads
Type: MKE
Colors: 3 Red, 10 Green, 10 White
Submarine Signal Ejector
Yes
Compartments: Single Compartment No Watertight Bulkheads
Mini POD Capable: No
II-2-TUR-6 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Submarine Particulars
Surfaced Displacement (T): 1180 T
Overall Length (m): 55,87 m
Max surfaced Drafts (m): 5,6 m
Beam (m): 6,2 m Aft Hydroplanes - 7,60 m
Max Casing Height (m): 7,1 m (For boats TCG Atilay & TCG Fin - 11.8 m
Saldiray)
7,7 m (For boats TCG Yildiray, TCG
Batiray, TCG Doganay,
TCG Dolunay)
Trim Fwd or Trim Aft: 0 Trim
II-2-TUR-7 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Max Transverse Load Capability 24 T 24 T
(T):
II-2-TUR-8 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-TUR-9 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-TUR-10 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
DATA REMARKS
Submarine Class: Preveze Class Type 209 (T 1400)
Number of Compartments: Single Compartment No Watertight Bulkheads
Volume Rescue / Escape Compartment: 712 m³ Single Compartment.
No watertight Bulkhead
Volume / Pressure HP Air bottles with 4 x 340Lt. x 250 Kg/cm² Single Compartment.
connection to Rescue / Escape No watertight Bulkhead
compartment:
Two Man Escape Trunk: Yes
Compartment Escape (Rush escape): Yes
Escape Suites: MK-10 Beaufort / 50
Maximum number of crew: 44
Number of Rescue Seats 1 - Forward Escape Trunk Hatch
(STANAG 1297):
Seat Certification: Yes
SRC capable: Yes
POD Capable / possible limitations: Yes
POD bags & ropes pre-stored on board: Yes
Dimensions Hatches and POD Trunks: UH: 650 mm
LH: 650 mm
Length: 2350 mm
Ventilation / Depressurisation Yes
capabilities (STANAG 1450)
Surface assisted emergency blowing Yes
capabilities:
Re-supply of BIBS/HP air capability: No
II-2-TUR-11 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Pyrotechnics (Flares)
Compartment: Single Compartment No Watertight Bulkheads
Type: MKE
Colors: 3 Red, 10 Green, 10 White
Submarine Signal Ejector
Yes
Compartments: Single Compartment No Watertight Bulkheads
Mini POD Capable: No
II-2-TUR-12 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Number of National Units CO2
scrubbing material referred in kg: 5500 Kg
Number of National Units O2
bottles/candles referred in liters: 21 x 50 Lt x 200 Kg/cm²
Submarine Particulars
Surfaced Displacement (T): 1454 T
Overall Length (m): 62 m
Max surfaced Drafts (m): 5,8 m
Beam (m): 6,2 m Aft Hydroplanes - 7,60 m
Max Casing Height (m): 7,7 m Fin - 12.5 m
Trim Fwd or Trim Aft: 0 Trim
II-2-TUR-13 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-TUR-14 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-TUR-15 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-TUR-16 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-TUR-17 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Emergency Sonar Beacon/Noise
Pinger
Compartment: Single Compartment No Watertight Bulkheads
Remotely operated: No
Frequency: LF 5 kHz.
HF 35 kHz.
Type: Honeywell ELAC SBE 1-10
Endurance: ~ 400 Hours
Indicator buoy tethered
No Life Raft acts as indicator
within length of cable.
Length of cable: 650 m
Frequency:
Endurance:
Indicator light: No
Combined life raft/indicator buoy Yes
Expendable Communication Buoy
No
Pyrotechnics (Flares)
Compartment: Single Compartment No Watertight Bulkheads
Type: MKE
Colors: 3 Red, 10 Green, 10 White
Submarine Signal Ejector
Yes
Compartments: Single Compartment No Watertight Bulkheads
Mini POD Capable: No
II-2-TUR-18 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Submarine Particulars
Surfaced Displacement (T): 1454 T
Overall Length (m): 62 m
Max surfaced Drafts (m): 5,8 m
Beam (m): 6,2 m Aft Hydroplanes - 7,60 m
Max Casing Height (m): 7,7 m Fin - 12.5 m
Trim Fwd or Trim Aft: 0 Trim
II-2-TUR-19 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-TUR-20 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 2
UNITED KINGDOM
II-2-GBR-1 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-GBR-2 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Vanguard Class
More detailed information will be provided by the UK Rescue coordination centre as required
II-2-GBR-3 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-GBR-4 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
DATA REMARKS
Submarine Class: Vanguard
Number of Compartments: Two
Volume Rescue / Escape compartment: Fwd Compartment:
Volume = 3032m3
Aft Compartment:
Volume = 1667m3
Volume / Pressure HP Air bottles with Fwd Compartment:
connection to Rescue / Escape Volume: 2.322m3 9 off 0.258m3 Cylinders
compartment(s): Pressure: 276 Bar
Aft Compartment:
Volume: 2.322m3 9 off 0.258m3 Cylinders
Pressure: 276 Bar
Single Escape trunk: No
Two man escape trunk: Fwd Compartment: LET (Logistics & Embarkation
LET Trunk)
Aft Compartment:
LET
Compartment Escape (Rush escape): Yes
Escape Suits: Fwd Compartment: SEIE Mk10
168 in number (Plus additional suits for sea
Aft Compartment: riders as required)
168 in number 2008-2010 to be replaced by
BFA SPES
Maximum number of crew: 162 in number
Number of Rescue Seats 3 in number one at fwd LET, one at
(STANAG 1297): amidships LET and one at aft LET
Seat Certification:
SRC capable: No
POD Capable / possible limitations: POD Posting Capable
Depth Limit 426m using
ROV/ADS/Divers/LR5/RV
POD bags w/ropes pre-stored on board: Yes
Dimensions Hatches and POD Trunks Hatch Dimensions:
(Transferred from STANAG 1391): Fwd LET Upper – 762mm Diameter
Fwd LET Lower – 762mm Diameter
Aft LET Upper – 762mm Diameter
Aft LET Lower – 762mm Diameter
II-2-GBR-5 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-GBR-6 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-GBR-7 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Submarine Particulars
Surfaced Displacement (T): 13996tonnes Deep surface condition
Overall Length (m): 149.3metres
Max surfaced Drafts (m): Fwd Marks: 10.1metres Deep surface condition
Aft Marks: 11.0metres
Beam (m): 19.3metres Extreme to outside of
stabilisers
Max Casing Height (m): 4.0metres Waterline to top of casing
Trim Fwd or Trim Aft: 0.9metres by the stern Deep surface condition
Yes
Rip Out Tow
Length of Wire (m): 100metres High Modulus Polyethylene
Rope
II-2-GBR-9 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Max Load (T):
Fin Capability
Length (m):
Width (m):
Height above Casing (m): 6.9metres
Location from Fwd Perpendicular 25.9metres Fin Fairing/casing intersection
(m): 28.0metres Fin leading edge intersection
Max Permissible Longitudinal Load
(T):
Max Permissible Transverse Load
(T):
Fwd Aft
Bollards (if fitted)
Location from Fwd Perpendicular Fwd: 15.4metres Fwd: 89.6metres
(m): Centre: 25.6metres Centre: 101.2metres
Aft: 46.1metres Aft: 118.6metres
Number of Bollards: Fwd: 3 in number Fwd: 2 in number
Centre: 1 in number Centre: 1 in number
Aft: 2 in number Aft: 3 in number
Height of raised Bollard above Casing 225mm 225mm
(mm):
Max Longitudinal Load Capability
(T):
Max Transverse Load Capability (T):
Fwd Aft
Special Towing Eyes (if fitted)
Size of Eye (mm): n/a n/a
Location: n/a n/a
Max Loading (T): n/a n/a
Anchor Facility and location
Size of cable (mm): 35mm
Length of Cable (m): 247.0metres
Max Loading (T): Anchor Windlass Brake = 21tonnes
Anchor Chain =
Fwd Aft
Other Information
Number of Capstans: 1 in number 1 in number
Number of Bullrings: 1 in number 2 in number
II-2-GBR-10 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Trafalgar Class
More detailed information will be provided by the UK Rescue coordination centre as required
II-2-GBR-11 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-GBR-12 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
DATA REMARKS
Submarine Class: Trafalgar
Number of Compartments: Two
Volume Rescue / Escape compartment: Fwd Compartment:
Volume = 220m3
Aft Compartment:
Volume = 789m3
Volume / Pressure HP Air bottles with Fwd Compartment:
connection to Rescue / Escape Volume – 1.29m3 5 in number 0.258m3 Cylinders
compartment(s): Pressure – 295bar
Aft Compartment:
Volume – 1.29m3 5 in number 0.258m3 Cylinders
Pressure – 295bar
Single Escape trunk: Fwd Compartment:
Yes, SET
Aft Compartment:
Yes, SET
Two man escape trunk: No
Compartment Escape (Rush escape): Yes
Escape Suits: Fwd Compartment: SEIE Mk10
115 in number (plus additional suits for sea
Aft Compartment: riders as required)
115 in number 2008-2010 to be replaced by
BFA SPES
Maximum number of crew: 124 in number
Number of Rescue Seats 2 in number one at Fwd SET and
(STANAG 1297): one at Aft SET
Seat Certification:
SRC capable: No
POD Capable / possible limitations: POD Posting Capable Introduction of higher depth
Depth Limit 180metres rated lower lid will allow POD
posting to maximum rescue
depth
POD bags w/ropes pre-stored on board: Yes
Dimensions Hatches and POD Trunks Hatch Dimensions:
(Transferred from STANAG 1391): FET – Upper Hatch – 0.610m clear
opening
AET – Upper Hatch – 0.610m clear
opening
II-2-GBR-13 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-GBR-14 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Indicator buoy tethered
Length of cable: 1000 metres Type 639 – 2 in number one
forward and one aft
Frequency: GMDSS 243 and 406.0MHz (Alert and Locate)
Endurance: 72 Hours
Indicator light: Yes
Combined life raft/indicator buoy No
Expendable Communication Buoy
Frequency: GMDSS 406.0MHz Type 680
Compartment: Fwd Compartment:
2 in number
Aft Compartment:
2 in number
Endurance: 8 Hours
SEPIRBS being introduced
SEEPIRB
across the Flotilla 2009. Check
with SUBOPAUTH for
individual unit fit.
Compartments:
Type:
Endurance:
Personal Locator Beacon
Compartments: Fwd Compartment: Generally deployed first, middle
3 in number and second last escapee
Aft Compartment:
3 in number
Frequency: GMDSS 121.5/243/406.0MHz
Type: PLB(S) SARBE 10
Endurance: 24 Hours
Pyrotechnics (Flares)
Compartment: Fwd Aft
Type: Grenade and Grenade and
Smoke Candles Smoke Candles
Colors: Red Grenade Red Grenade
White Smoke White Smoke
Endurance: 4 in number Red 4 in number Red
Grenades and 6 Grenades and 6
in number White in number White
Smoke Smoke
Submarine Signal Ejector
Compartments: Fwd Compartment: Type Mk8
1 in number
Aft Compartment:
1 in number
II-2-GBR-15 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-GBR-16 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Emergency Atmospheric Monitoring
Type: Fwd Compartment:
2 x Draeger Gas Detector Kits
2 x Analox Multi Gas and Pressure
monitors
1 x Absolute Pressure Gauge
Aft Compartment:
2 x Draeger Gas Detector Kits
2 x Analox Multi Gas and Pressure
monitors
1 x Absolute Pressure Gauge
Gases: Oxygen
Carbon Dioxide
Chlorine
Endurance: Oxygen: 38packs (380tubes) 0.5 hourly – 7.9days
Carbon Dioxide: 30packs (300tubes) 0.5 hourly – 6.25days
Chlorine: 2packs (20 tubes) 6 hourly, 2 hourly – 5days,
1.6days
Fixed Emergency Breathing System
Compartment, Volume and Pressure: Fwd Compartment:
Volume 1.29m3 5 x 0.258m3 Cylinders
Pressure – 295Bar
Aft Compartment:
Volume 1.29m3 5 x 0.258m3 Cylinders
Pressure – 295Bar
Submarine Particulars
Surfaced Displacement (T): 4740 tonnes Deep Surfaced
Overall Length (m): HMS Trafalgar 85.4metres
HMS Turbulent onwards 86.0metres
Max surfaced Drafts (m): Forward Marks 8.1metres Deep surface condition
Aft Marks 8.8metres
Beam (m): HMS Trafalgar 13.9metres Extreme to Outside of
HMS Turbulent onwards 14.2metres stabilizers
Max Casing Height (m): 10.7metres USK to top of superstructure
casing
Trim Fwd or Trim Aft: Trim Aft 0.8metres Deep surface condition
II-2-GBR-18 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Swiftsure Class
More detailed information will be provided by the UK Rescue coordination centre as required
II-2-GBR-19 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-GBR-20 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-GBR-21 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
UK ELSS POD Dimensions:
Overall Length = 1260mm
Outside Diameter = 360mm
Ventilation / Depressurization Ventilation: No
capabilities (STANAG 1450) Depressurisation: No
Surface assisted emergency blowing Yes Utilising salvage techniques
capabilities:
Re-supply of BIBS/HP air capability: BIBS: No Re-supply of BIBS bottles from
HP Air: No Submarine HP air system only
possible with base support
II-2-GBR-22 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-GBR-23 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-GBR-24 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Gases: Oxygen
Carbon Dioxide
Carbon Monoxide
Hydrogen
R114, R12
Halon 1301 / Freon 13B1
Benzene
Aliphatic Organics
Aromatic Organics
Emergency Atmospheric Monitoring
Type: Fwd Compartment:
2 x Draeger Gas Detector Kits
2 x Analox Multi Gas and Pressure
monitors
1 x Absolute Pressure Gauge
Aft Compartment:
2 x Draeger Gas Detector Kits
2 x Analox Multi Gas and Pressure
monitors
1 x Absolute Pressure Gauge
Gases: Oxygen
Carbon Dioxide
Chlorine
Endurance: Oxygen: 38packs (380 tubes) 0.5hourly – 7.9days
Carbon Dioxide: 30packs (300 0.5hourly – 6.25days
tubes)
Chlorine: 2packs (20 tubes) 6hourly, 2hourly – 5days,
1.6days
Fixed Emergency Breathing System
Compartment, Volume and Pressure: Fwd Compartment:
Volume 1.29m3 5 x 0.258m3 Cylinders
Pressure – 295Bar
Aft Compartment:
Volume 1.29m3 5 x 0.258m3 Cylinders
Pressure – 295Bar
Submarine Particulars
Surfaced Displacement (T): 4501tonnes Deep Surface Condition
Overall Length (m): 82.9metres
Max surfaced Drafts (m): Fwd Marks 8.0metres Deep Surface Condition
Aft Marks 8.8metres
Beam (m): 13.3metres Extreme to outside of
stabilisers
II-2-GBR-25 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Max Casing Height (m): 10.7metres USK to top of superstructure
casing
Trim Fwd or Trim Aft: Trim Aft 0.8metres Deep surface condition
II-2-GBR-26 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 2
II-2-USA-1 ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-USA-2 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Los Angeles Class
II-2-USA-3 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-USA-4 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-USA-5 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
EMERGENCY COMMUNICATON AND ALERTING CAPABILITIES
EQUIPMENT REMARKS
Main UWT
Compartments: Forward
Type: AN/WQC-2 or 6 as applicable
Frequency Transmitting: Voice Low 1.45 to 3.1 kHz Keyed Continuous Wave
High 8.3 to 11.1 kHz carrier: 2.85(Low), 8.84 (High)
kHz
Automatic Emergency Mode: No
Emergency UWT
Compartments:
Type:
Frequency Transmitting:
Automatic Emergency Mode:
Emergency Communication - Other
Compartments: Forward & aft compartments Mounted adjacent to each
escape trunk
Type: Posted Tap-Code placard with e.g., “SOS SUB SUNK SOS”
attached ball-peen hammer
Emergency Sonar Beacon/Noise Pinger
Compartment: 1 – Forward, 1 – Aft In MBT2B Fr 15 - 16 or Fr 20
In MBT4A, Fr 127 - 128
Remotely operated: No
Frequency: 3.5 kHz
Type: AN/BQN-13 To aid detection, localization
and homing on DISSUB
Endurance: > 360 Hours
Indicator buoy tethered No
Length of cable:
Frequency:
Endurance:
Indicator light: No
Combined life raft/indicator buoy No
EQUIPMENT REMARKS
Expendable Communication Buoy
AN/BRT-6
Frequency: 290-315 MHz
Compartment:
Endurance:
SEPIRB
Compartments: 2 – Forward, 2 – Aft Release via SEPIRB Trunk
Launch Tube or 3-inch
Launcher
Type: (T-1630/SRT) Beacon: 121.5 MHz
Distress: 406.025 MHz
Endurance: > 48 Hours
Personal Locator Beacon None
Compartments:
II-2-USA-6 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Frequency:
Type:
Endurance:
Pyrotechnics (Flares)
Compartment: Forward Compartment Only Ejected via 3-inch Launcher
Type:
Colors: Red, Green, Yellow
Endurance:
Submarine Signal Ejector
Compartments: Forward compartment only 3-inch Launcher
Mini POD Capable: No
SEPIRB Trunk Launch Tube
Compartments: 1 set forward inside locker 2-47-4 in Used in forward or aft escape
storage container S2-47-6; 1 set aft trunks For submerged SEPIRB
Engine Room Upper Level Frame launch
86 stbd locker 1-85-3.
REMARKS
II-2-USA-7 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-USA-8 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
SUBMARINE TOWING DATA
EQUIPMENT REMARKS
Submarine Particulars
Surfaced Displacement (T):
Overall Length (m):
Max surfaced Drafts (m):
Beam (m):
Max Casing Height (m):
Trim Fwd or Trim Aft:
II-2-USA-9 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-USA-10 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Seawolf Class
II-2-USA-11 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-USA-12 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-USA-13 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-USA-14 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
DATA REMARKS
Submarine Class: USS SEAWOLF (SSN 21) Including SSN 21/22/23
Number of Compartments: 2 Forward / aft
Volume Rescue / Escape compartment: SSN21/22: 83,300 FWD; 64,600 aft; Water tight compartment
SSN23: 154,000 FWD; 64,600 aft. volumes in ft-cu (approximate)
Volume / Pressure HP Air bottles with Forward & aft air banks onboard as Emergency Main Ballast Tank
connection to Rescue / Escape well as other oxygen containing air (EMBT) forward air bank blow
compartment(s): bottles. actuator valves are located in
the Auxiliary Equipment Space
#1. Aft air bank blow actuator
valves are located in the engine
room, middle level, aft of frame
98. Air banks 1, 2 and 3 are
located in the forward ballast
tank; banks 4 and 5 are located
in the aft ballast tanks. Air
banks 1, 2, and 3 also serve as
stowage for diver quality air.
Single Escape trunk: No
Two man escape trunk: Yes
Compartment Escape (Rush escape): No
Escape Suites: SSN21/22: 163 SEIE suits (129 SEIE MK10 suits allow buoyant
FWD; 34 aft); SSN23: 218 SEIE breathing ascent from as deep
suits (184 FWD; 34 aft). as 600 feet. Each equipped
Additionally, SEIE suit crash bags with a single-seat life raft that
are located in the vicinity of the can be inflated and boarded at
Escape Trunks both forward and aft surface after ascent or after
and contain equipment necessary to surface abandonment.
facilitate a buoyant ascent escape.
Maximum number of crew: 121 (SSN21/22), 178 (SSN23)
Number of Rescue Seats 2
(STANAG 1297):
Seat Certification: Yes
SRC capable: Yes
POD Capable / possible limitations: No lower hatch blockage limitation
POD bags w/ropes pre-stored on board: No
Dimensions Hatches and POD Trunks Upper&Lower: 30.0”(762 mm) Dia.
(Transferred from STANAG 1391): Vertical Length: 51.5”(1308 mm)
Ventilation / Depressurization No
capabilities (STANAG 1450)
Surface assisted emergency blowing Yes
capabilities:
Re-supply of BIBS/HP air capability: No
II-2-USA-15 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
EQUIPMENT REMARKS
Main UWT
Compartments: Forward
Type: AN/WQC-6
Frequency Transmitting: Voice Low 1.45 to 3.1 kHz Keyed Continuous Wave
High 8.3 to 11.1 kHz carrier: 2.85(Low), 8.84 (High)
kHz
Automatic Emergency Mode: No
Emergency UWT
Compartments:
Type:
Frequency Transmitting:
Automatic Emergency Mode:
Emergency Communication - Other
Compartments: 1 – Forward, 1 – Aft Mounted adjacent to each
escape trunk
Type: Posted Tap-Code placard with e.g., “SOS SUB SUNK SOS”
attached ball-peen hammer
Emergency Sonar Beacon/Noise Pinger
Compartment: 1 – Forward, 1 – Aft
Remotely operated: No
Frequency: 3.5 kHz
Type: AN/BQN-13 To aid detection, localization
and homing on DISSUB
Endurance: > 360 Hours
Indicator buoy tethered
No
Length of cable:
Frequency:
Endurance:
Indicator light:
Combined life raft/indicator buoy
EQUIPMENT REMARKS
Expendable Communication Buoy Also AN/BRT-1
AN/BRT-6 Communication Slot Buoy
Frequency:
Compartment:
Endurance:
SEPIRB
Compartments: 2 – Forward, 2 – Aft Release via SEPIRB Trunk
Launch Tube or 3-inch
Launcher
Type: (T-1630/SRT) Beacon: 121.5 MHz
Distress: 406.025 MHz
Endurance: > 48 Hours
Personal Locator Beacon
II-2-USA-16 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Compartments:
Frequency:
Type:
Endurance:
Pyrotechnics (Flares)
Compartment: Forward compartment only Ejected via 3-inch Launcher
Type:
Colors: Red, Green, Yellow
Endurance:
Submarine Signal Ejector
Compartments: Forward compartment only Two 3-inch Launchers
Mini POD Capable: No
SEPIRB Trunk Launch Tube
Compartments: 1 set forward auxiliary equipment Used in forward or aft escape
space #2 second level frame 19 trunks for submerged SEPIRB
locker 12-018-003 (SSN21/22) and launch
locker 11-032-004 (SSN23); 1 set
aft Engine Room Upper Level
Frame 80 port locker 51-081-766.
II-2-USA-17 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Other: First aid boxes, medical kits,
resuscitator-aspirators, nuclear
biological chemical lockers, and
anti-contamination clothing are
stored in both compartments.
Variations in the outfit of different The 21 Class submarines do not
escape compartments within the same carry life rafts aboard as equipage.
Class not previously addressed:
Variations in the outfit of different
submarines within the same Class not
previously addressed:
II-2-USA-18 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Submarine Particulars
Surfaced Displacement (T):
Overall Length (m):
Max surfaced Drafts (m):
Beam (m):
Max Casing Height (m):
Trim Fwd or Trim Aft:
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-USA-20 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Ohio Class
II-2-USA-21 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-USA-22 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
DATA REMARKS
Submarine Class: USS OHIO (SSBN/GN 726)
Number of Compartments: 3
Volume Rescue / Escape compartment: 101,500 Forward; 149,200 Missile; Water tight compartment
115,700 aft. volumes in ft-cu (approximate)
Volume / Pressure HP Air bottles with Forward & aft air banks onboard as Emergency Main Ballast Tank
connection to Rescue / Escape well as other oxygen containing air (EMBT) blow actuator valves
compartment(s): bottles. are located near the ballast
control panel in the
Control/Attack center located in
the forward compartment. Air
banks 1 and 2 are located in the
forward ballast tank; banks 3
and 4 are located in the aft
ballast tanks.
Single Escape trunk: No
Two man escape trunk: Yes
Compartment Escape (Rush escape): No
Escape Suites: 262 SEIE suits (95 FWD, 126 MSL, SEIE MK10 suits allow buoyant
41 Aft). breathing ascent from as deep
Additionally, SEIE suit crash bags as 600 feet. Each equipped
are located in the vicinity of the with a single-seat life raft that
Escape Trunks both forward and aft can be inflated and boarded at
and contain equipment necessary to surface after ascent or after
facilitate a buoyant ascent escape. surface abandonment.
Maximum number of crew: 162 (SSBN), 178 (SSGN)
Number of Rescue Seats 3
(STANAG 1297):
Seat Certification: Yes
SRC capable: Yes
POD Capable / possible limitations: No lower hatch blockage
POD bags w/ropes pre-stored on board: No
Dimensions Hatches and POD Trunks Upper&Lower: 30.0”(762 mm) Dia.
(Transferred from STANAG 1391): Vertical Length: 42.5”(1079 mm)
Ventilation / Depressurization No
capabilities (STANAG 1450)
Surface assisted emergency blowing Yes
capabilities:
Re-supply of BIBS/HP air capability: No
II-2-USA-23 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-USA-24 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-USA-26 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
equipment, Drager Multi-Gas
Detector kit and a OTTO fuel
detector Mk 15 Mod 0.
Emergency Atmospheric Monitoring
Type: Drager Multi-Gas Detector kits and Draeger kits have a variety of
Portable Analox SUB Mk IIP detection tubes for detecting the
O2/CO2 Gas DISSUB Monitors are trace contaminants most
located in all three compartments. commonly encountered in
submarines including CO2.
Gases: Draeger: Various in partial pressure;
Analox: CO2 and O2 in SEV and
compartment pressure in FSW.
Endurance: Indefinite
Submarine Particulars
Surfaced Displacement (T):
Overall Length (m):
Max surfaced Drafts (m):
Beam (m):
Max Casing Height (m):
Trim Fwd or Trim Aft:
II-2-USA-27 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
II-2-USA-28 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
Virginia Class
II-2-USA-29 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II-2-USA-30 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
DATA REMARKS
Submarine Class: USS VIRGINIA (SSN 774)
Number of Compartments: 2
Volume Rescue / Escape compartment: 79,800 Forward; 62,800 aft. Water tight compartment
volumes in ft-cu (approximate)
Volume / Pressure HP Air bottles with Various
connection to Rescue / Escape
compartment(s):
Single Escape trunk: No
Two man escape trunk: Yes
Compartment Escape (Rush escape): No Future capability from the 20
man escape compartment.
Escape Suites: 150 SEIE suits (113 FWD; 37 aft). SEIE MK10 suits allow buoyant
Additionally, SEIE suit crash bags breathing ascent from as deep
are located in the vicinity of the as 600 feet. Each equipped
Escape Trunks both forward and aft with a single-seat life raft that
and contain equipment necessary to can be inflated and boarded at
facilitate a buoyant ascent escape. surface after ascent or after
surface abandonment.
Maximum number of crew: 134
Number of Rescue Seats 2
(STANAG 1297):
Seat Certification: Yes
SRC capable: Yes
POD Capable / possible limitations: No
POD bags w/ropes pre-stored on board: N/A
Dimensions Hatches and POD Trunks N/A
(Transferred from STANAG 1391):
Ventilation / Depressurization No
capabilities (STANAG 1450)
Surface assisted emergency blowing Yes
capabilities:
Re-supply of BIBS/HP air capability: No
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Frequency:
Type:
Endurance:
Pyrotechnics (Flares)
Compartment: Ejected via 3-inch Launcher
Type:
Colors: Red, Yellow, Green
Endurance:
Submarine Signal Ejector
Compartments: 1-Forward, 1-Aft 3-inch Launcher
Mini POD Capable: No
SEPIRB Trunk Launch Tube
Compartments: 1 set forward inside locker 2-47-4; Used in forward or aft escape
1 set aft Engine Room Upper Level trunks For submerged SEPIRB
Frame 86. launch
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ATP 57(B)
stored in both compartments.
Two (2) Mark V CO-Hz Burners
with lithium carbonate filters are
available to remove CO, H2 and
hydrocarbons from the air.
Variations in the outfit of different None
escape compartments within the same
Class not previously addressed:
Variations in the outfit of different None
submarines within the same Class not
previously addressed:
Submarine Particulars
Surfaced Displacement (T):
Overall Length (m):
Max surfaced Drafts (m):
Beam (m):
Max Casing Height (m):
Trim Fwd or Trim Aft:
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ATP 57(B)
PART II
CHAPTER 3
MEDICAL SUPPLEMENT
This supplement contains information which can be used to assist in the medical response laid out
Part I Chapter 6. It contains information which may be of assistance in providing guidance to the
DISSUB or in the assessment and treatment of specific illness or injuries likely to be found during a
SMERAS scenario.
2. Toxic Contaminants. Careful checks of all accessible systems containing toxic materials must be
made as soon as is practical in a DISSUB scenario. Slow leaks must be identified and stopped before they
produce toxic conditions. The following toxic contaminant sources should be checked for leaks periodically.
3. Monitoring. Portable atmospheric monitoring should begin as soon as possible after stabilizing
any casualties resulting from the initial DISSUB casualty. Values should be recorded to evaluate current
levels and used as a baseline to identify trends. A sampling plan should be developed after conducting an
inventory of life support and atmosphere monitoring assets. Some toxic gases, like halocarbons
(Refrigerant and fire-suppressant gases), are heavier than air and will concentrate in the lowest spaces.
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4. Avoiding Emergency Air Breathing systems (EABs). The use of EABs should be avoided unless
absolutely necessary. Using EABs significantly decreases the DISSUB crew’s survival time. Extending
exposure limits and accepting higher levels of contaminants before donning EABs is appropriate and may be
necessary, depending on the individual DISSUB situation and chance of rescue.
1. Physiological Effects. Normal carbon dioxide levels in a submarine are 0.5 to 0.8%. Carbon
dioxide production by each survivor at rest in a DISSUB is estimated to be 23 litres per man per hour at
STP, however this can vary depending on activity levels. Elevated levels of carbon dioxide cause
progressive performance impairment beginning at 2.5%. Unconsciousness occurs, rapidly followed by
death, when carbon dioxide is at about 10%, regardless of the oxygen level. Critical planning and actions
must take place before impairment occurs. Escape should be considered when the CO2 level reaches 5%
and is increasing. Table 6-1 describes the physiological effects of high carbon dioxide concentrations.
2. Carbon Dioxide Measurement and Limits. The practical limit for carbon dioxide in a DISSUB
scenario is 5-6.0%. Carbon dioxide measurements in hyperbaric conditions should be converted to
surface equivalent values (SE).
3. Carbon Dioxide Removal. Carbon dioxide removal is vital in DISSUB conditions since in most
scenarios the carbon dioxide level is the most critical for survival. If power is available, normal carbon
dioxide scrubbing should be performed. Without power, passive carbon dioxide scrubbing by non-
regenerative chemical or other means will be required for survival. To assess the rates of CO2 removal
reference should be made to the DISSUB Nation’s technical specifications or Guard-Book.
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1. Oxygen Consumption Rates. Oxygen consumption rates depend on the activity level of the
individual. In a DISSUB scenario, oxygen consumption rates must be kept as low as possible by
minimizing the activities of the survivors. For DISSUB oxygen consumption calculations, a nominal
consumption rate of 27 litres/man/hour may be used. Actual resting oxygen consumption rates can be as
much as 30% or even higher in a DISSUB due to hypothermia, stress, and damage control or escape
efforts.
2. Oxygen Measurement and Limits. Oxygen concentration is measured using portable oxygen
monitors or sampling tubes. Oxygen levels are ideally maintained between 18-21%.
Oxygen
Effect
Concentration
(in ATA) Acute Chronic
0.21 No significant effects No significant effects
0.17 No significant effects No significant effects
Increased respiratory rate; headaches
0.15 No significant effects
in 25% of personnel
Initial impairment to thinking Acclimation to effect on thinking; 50%
0.13
(judgment) and motor performance develop respiratory and brain effects
Difficulty concentrating, impaired Almost all will show problems,
0.11 judgment, heavy breathing, and including nausea, vomiting, and
severe headaches confusion
Loss of consciousness in less than
0.09 Death
10 minutes
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Pulmonary oxygen toxicity can occur after a 24-hour exposure to an oxygen partial pressure of as
little as 0.5 ATA. The first symptom is mild retro-sternal pain or discomfort at the end of deep
inspiration. Higher levels may lead to a burning sensation on inspiration and progress to frank pain.
Pulmonary function will decrease and permanent lung damage may result. Pulmonary oxygen toxicity, if
present, may make the treatment of decompression sickness significantly more difficult.
Acute central nervous system toxicity may occur at oxygen partial pressures of 1.6 ATA or greater.
Symptoms of CNS toxicity can develop in minutes to hours and may present as mild sensory symptoms or
as a grand mal seizure. High carbon dioxide levels may increase the likelihood of CNS oxygen toxicity.
Convulsions are the most important deleterious effect of oxygen poisoning and may occur suddenly
without warning. These convulsions will normally be self-limiting provided that further exposure to
oxygen is reduced. Warning signs that may precede convulsions are as follows:
• Muscle twitching: usually appears first in the lips or the face. It may affect any muscle.
• Nausea: this may be intermittent.
• Abnormalities of vision or hearing: tunnel vision or tinnitus may occur.
• Difficulty in breathing.
• Anxiety and confusion.
• Unusual fatigue.
• Loss of coordination.
The partial pressure of oxygen in the DISSUB may be reduced by simply allowing survivor to
"breathe down" the oxygen level. Otherwise, there is no specific internal means by which the oxygen
partial pressure can be reduced.
5. Oxygen Sources.
Oxygen can be provided by the combustion of Oxygen candles, supply from oxygen banks or by bleeding
air into the submarine from air banks.
Bleeding air banks is a last option as it adds only limited amounts of Oxygen for a significant
pressure increase due the residual Nitrogen.
Oxygen Candles: Oxygen candles (usually Chlorate based) can be burned in candle furnaces (oxygen
generator) or stand-alone cases to provide oxygen. As candles produce a fixed volume of oxygen the
number burned and the frequency of initiation need to be tailored to monitoring results.
Oxygen Banks: Bleeding oxygen from oxygen banks can be tailored to provide a balanced replacement for
oxygen used. When the oxygen bleed rate equals the rate oxygen is metabolized by the survivors, and CO2
is removed, compartment internal pressure will not increase. Compartment pressurization can occur if the
bleed rate exceeds the metabolic rate. Compartment pressurization must be avoided. Compartment pressure
and oxygen levels should be monitored frequently and adjusted to maintain a constant oxygen bleed rate and
levels.
Air Banks: Bleeding air banks to replenish oxygen should be used only as a last resort, prior to donning
EABs for low oxygen levels. Bleeding air banks provide only limited supplies of oxygen. Since 79% of the
air bank is nitrogen, bleeding the air banks will significantly increase the pressure in the DISSUB and the
risk of decompression illness during escape or rescue. If the air bank must be used to provide oxygen,
bleeding the air bank into the compartment produces a longer survival time than donning EABs. EABs
pressurize the compartment more rapidly than using air banks to raise the partial pressure of oxygen.
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1. General. Past experience of submarine accidents has shown that a DISSUB is invariably
pressurized to some extent. Survival for up to one week at a pressure of about 5 ATA is considered
possible. However, it should be noted that this has never been proven scientifically. Above this level the
crew would be unlikely to survive for long due to the toxic effects of raised partial pressures of carbon
dioxide, nitrogen, and oxygen.
2. Effects of Increased Atmospheric Pressure. Increased atmospheric pressure raises the amount of
nitrogen dissolved in the body tissues. When the body is later depressurized, the dissolved nitrogen can come
out of solution, producing bubbles in the joints, blood vessels, or brain. This, in turn, can result in pain,
paralysis, or death. This effect is known as decompression illness (DCI) or “the bends”.
The magnitude of the effect differs between individuals and is directly related to the amount of
pressure and the length of time spent under increased pressure. The higher the pressure that the casualty is
exposed to and the longer the time under pressure (up to 24 hours), the greater the severity of decompression
illness and risk of injury or death.
Nitrogen at higher pressures can also cause nitrogen narcosis. This effect usually begins at pressures
up to 3 to 5 ATA, with symptoms such as overconfidence, heightened sense of well-being, anxiety, or errors
of reasoning. These symptoms worsen as pressure increases and may develop into confusion, euphoria,
hallucinations, and unconsciousness.
3. Pressure Measurements and Limits. Standard diver’s depth gauges are a convenient means to
measure DISSUB atmospheric pressure directly and accurately. Other devices may also be used to
determine pressure in the boat. Depending upon keel depth an internal DISSUB pressure of 1.7 ATA is
considered the upper physiological limit for safe submarine escape. The risk of decompression illness to
survivors of a pressurized DISSUB is the same for rescue as it is for escape unless TUP facilities are
available.
4. Sources of Increased Compartment Pressure. Most DISSUB scenarios involve some internal
compartment pressure increase. Some compartment pressurization will occur as a result of flooding. The
pressure increase is directly related to the size of the space and amount flooded. Bleeding or rupture of
high pressure air system would increase the pressure of the compartment. Use of EABs causes a rapid
increase in DISSUB internal pressure, significantly increasing the risk of decompression illness upon escape
or rescue. Some pressurization will occur during escape from venting of air and draining of water from the
escape trunk. Incremental pressurization is most significant when performing many escape cycles from
small compartment volumes.
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0305 Introduction
Several countries have developed a Submarine Parachute Assistance Group (SPAG) to assist
submariners who may need to escape from a DISSUB prior to rescue. SMERAT personnel require to
know what the capabilities of individual SPAG teams are and how to interact with them. There is inter-
country variability between the SPAG teams, however they are generally made up of an Officer in Charge,
a Medical Officer, medic and several personnel who undertake casualty recovery, boat driving and man
life-rafts. Teams may be up to 10 strong.
SPAG teams are on a nationally determined notice to move (UK 6 hours to flight departure).
However there are restrictions on their deployment. The parachute limitations include wind speed of
30kts, sea state 4 cloud base of 1700ft (560m) for square parachutes and 1300 ft (425m) for round chutes
including 500ft (160m) above the minimum drop height. Night jumps are not possible and there is a
distance restriction of approximately 8 hours flying in a C130 or equivalent.
The deployed teams are usually capable of insertion by surface vessel, helicopter or parachute and
are capable of operating with minimal air support for a period of up to 24 hours. In addition to the
personnel the teams can deliver boats, life-rafts and equipment. The UK team can deliver a maximum of 8
x 25 man life-rafts, 2 medium inflatable boats (MIB) with 25hp outboard motors, 78,00 litres of Oxygen,
underwater telephone, GPS, hand held VHF RADIO, sabre, satellite phone, radiation monitoring
equipment and rations (hot and cold).
The insertion commences with the dropping of 2 SPAG personnel followed by a MIB. Once in
the water the personnel rig the MIB and contact the aircraft to call in the next team. They will also
attempt to contact the DISSUB on the UWT. Once the second team are inserted and both boats are rigged
then the life-rafts are dropped. The MIBs will collect the rafts and link them together and the remaining
personnel will be collected and transferred to the rafts to form the medical and command cells.
The SPAG MO will stay within the life-raft to triage the survivors and administer first-aid. Once
on scene the SMO SMERAT should establish radio contact with the SPAG MO to establish how many
casualties of which priority are in the life-rafts. This will allow decisions to be made on the precedence
and methods for collecting the casualties and return them to the EGS for subsequent treatment. The
SMO(S) should also ensure that the EGS casualty figures are reconciled with those held by SPAG.
SPAG personnel should also be recovered to the EGS. They should be triaged because they could
suffer from hypothermia, sea-sickness dehydration or exhaustion from their period in the sea. After an
appropriate rest period SPAG personnel may be redeployed to other roles within the escape or rescue
response organisation.
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0309 Hypothermia.
1. Hypothermia.
Hypothermia is associated with a succession of symptoms ultimately leading to life threatening cardiac
arrhythmias. Involuntary shivering may progress to the point that it interferes with an individual's ability
to care for himself. This begins when the body's core temperature falls to about 35.5° C (96° F). When the
core temperature reaches 35 - 32° C (95 - 90° F), sluggish thinking, irrational reasoning, and a false
feeling of warmth may occur. Core temperatures of 32 - 30° C (90 - 86° F) and below result in muscle
rigidity, unconsciousness, and barely detectable signs of life. If core temperature falls below 25° C (77°
F), death is almost certain.
2. Effects of Hypothermia.
Hypothermia reduces the individual’s ability to physically and mentally function and can eventually kill.
Even mild cases of hypothermia affect survival time. Shivering (mild hypothermia) consumes more oxygen
and produces more carbon dioxide.
Prevention of Hypothermia.
In the event of boat cooling, avoid allowing body temperatures to fall to the point of shivering.
The following steps should be undertaken as soon as possible:
a. If the compartment is partially flooded, move survivors to locations where they are not
immersed in water. Water conducts heat away from the body 20 to 30 times faster than air.
Immersion in apparently warm water will still cause hypothermia.
b. Remove wet clothing. Wet clothing will accelerate heat loss (evaporation effect).
c. Keep heads covered. Don watch caps, ball caps, towels, etc. Approximately 50% of body heat
loss occurs from the head and neck.
d. Wrap survivors in layers of clothing and blankets. Huddle together to decrease heat loss.
e. If the compartment is partially flooded, move survivors to locations where they are not
immersed in water. Water conducts heat away from the body 20 to 30 times faster than air.
Immersion in apparently warm water will still cause hypothermia.
f. Remove wet clothing. Wet clothing will accelerate heat loss (evaporation effect).
g. Keep heads covered. Don watch caps, ball caps, towels, etc. Approximately 50% of body heat
loss occurs from the head and neck.
h. Wrap survivors in layers of clothing and blankets. Huddle together to decrease heat loss.
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4. Recognition
There is a great individual variation in susceptibility to hypothermia and ability to survive. When a
DISSUB loses heating capability following an accident in cold water, a significant portion of the crew
may even be affected prior to surface survival phase. This is especially true if some degree of flooding has
occurred. Hypothermia can occur even in relatively warm waters if the exposure time is long enough.
The diagnosis of hypothermia should not present a problem in the conscious survivor who will
probably be shivering violently and complain of cold. His degree of shivering will quickly draw attention
to the possibility of hypothermia, which can be confirmed by measuring rectal temperature with a low
reading thermometer. Conscious, shivering patients can be assumed to have a core temperature of equal
or greater than 30C (86 F).
Core temperature may not be so easy to estimate in the deeply unconscious or apparently dead
patient. A rectal temperature is essential if possible and practical to obtain.
At core temperatures below 27-28C (80.6-82.4F), the muscles are flaccid, pupils are dilated and
fixed, peripheral pulses are not palpable, BP is un-recordable, heart sounds are inaudible, respiration is
undetectable and, to all intents and purpose, the individual seems dead.
A rectal temperature gives information to help make this distinction as does the condition of other
survivors, a general assessment of conditions, the likely time of exposure, and whether or not the casualty
remained dry inside his survival suit... Unconsciousness usually supervenes at a core temperature at or
below about 30C (86F).
b. Chest compression should be started only if all the following conditions are met:
- A pulse was present initially, but disappears
- There is no palpable carotid pulse detectable after palpating for one minute
- There is reasonable expectation that effective CPR can be provided continuously until the
casualty can be transported to a hospital site where advanced life support can be provided.
In practice, this means being within approximately 2 hours travel time to a suitable
hospital. Initiating CPR that cannot be maintained effectively will only serve to exhaust
the rescuers and deplete personnel resources.
6. Management of Hypothermia.
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If possible, providing this does not delay recovery, ensure that all cold casualties are removed
from the water in a horizontal position to avoid inducing shock in those survivors.
Lie casualties flat, give essential first aid for any injury, and undertake resuscitation if indicated
(see guidance below).
Prevent further heat loss by enclosing the casualties in a casualty bag or sleeping bag, or cover
with any available material such as blankets, including cover for the head. Insulate from the ground
and provide water- and wind-proof protection. Any disturbance of this protective cocoon risks
further heat loss.
Move the casualties, lying flat, to a warmer and protected environment such as the ship’s
hangar to reduce further heat loss.
Proceed with passive rewarming, with rewarming heat from the body core rather than the
surface. Even in a warmer environment, the casualty should be wrapped in blankets or a sleeping
bag to insulate from external heat loss. There is a danger that rewarming may occur too rapidly
from the body surface inwards, resulting in a potentially catastrophic fall in blood pressure
('rewarming shock').
Provide airway insulation with a loose scarf over the nose and mouth to trap heat from exhaled
breath, provided that the airway is not compromised. Medical oxygen cylinders should be kept as
warm as possible before use in order to minimise respiratory heat loss to the cold gas.
Maintain close observation of overall status, including pulse and respiration, and provide any
supportive treatment indicated within the limits of available resources.
In general, conscious and shivering survivors will not require any intensive medical treatment
provided they have sufficient energy reserves to maintain shivering. These survivors can be
assumed to have a core temperature of at or above 30C (86F). Once in a sheltered environment, if
the casualty's clothing is dry he should be kept in blankets or a sleeping bag with cover over his
head and allowed to rewarm slowly. Any wet clothing should be removed with assistance and
replaced with dry.
Warm, sweetened drinks may be given, if the casualty is able to swallow easily and is
sufficiently responsive. No alcohol should be given. Warmed intravenous fluids (up to 40C - 104F)
may be administered if indicated, remembering that hypothermic patients are vasoconstricted with a
reduced vascular volume - they may be fluid overloaded with less volume replacement. There is the
possibility that with vasodilation as core temperature increases, survivors could go into
hypovolaemic shock.
Active, immersion rewarming may be considered as an option to rapidly treat some of the less
severe casualties if sufficient facilities and support staff are available.
If this treatment is pursued, the casualty may be immersed to the neck (supine) in a hot bath,
with bath temperature not to exceed 40C (104F). Constant stirring and addition of hot water as
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necessary should be undertaken to maintain the temperature of the bath. Cessation of shivering will
occur almost immediately after immersion, but this should not be interpreted as an indication for
removing him from the bath. When the casualty becomes comfortably warm, help him out of the
bath, cover him with blankets, and keep him supine until he is warm to the touch. Do not leave him
in the bath if he complains of feeling hot or begins sweating. If a warm shower is used, casualties
should be kept in a recumbent or sitting position. All casualties being rewarmed must be carefully
observed throughout and following this treatment.
Carefully place the casualty in a position to protect his airway from possible aspiration
until he regains consciousness, and then keep him lying supine until he is warm subjectively and to
the touch.
These casualties should have a high priority for medical evacuation, since active
rewarming of profoundly hypothermic patients aboard the EGS cannot be accomplished easily or
safely under mass casualty conditions.
Prolonged exposure to a cold environment may occur aboard the DISSUB, or on the surface after
escaping. The areas most susceptible to cold injury are the face, hands, and feet. The likelihood of cold
injury is higher at ambient air temperatures below 5C (41F) and sea temperatures below 20C (68F),
especially when associated with wind. Non-freezing cold injury (NFCI) is most likely but freezing cold
injury (frostbite) may occur in areas of exposed skin with low temperatures and/or even moderate wind
speeds.
In the case of survivors wearing SEIE, freezing cold injury is most likely to occur on the face and
may be recognised by a pale waxy appearance of the affected area. The area may feel indurated and
sensation will be absent. Treatment consists of rapidly rewarming the affected area with hot (41C,
105.8F) poultices, or by skin to skin rewarming. Analgesics will be required during the thawing process.
If the skin is broken, antibiotics and sterile dressings will be necessary.
This condition can affect any part of the body. Cold damage to vasomotor nerves occurs. It is
usually seen in the hands and/or feet and is often associated with general hypothermia. When the feet are
affected it is usually called 'immersion foot'. It is characterised by redness, swelling and some
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paraesthesia. Blotchy discolouration and ischaemic changes appear and a wet gangrene may develop.
Treatment is to warm the remainder of the body but not the affected part.
The affected part should be gently cleaned with a lukewarm cleansing agent (such as Cetavlon),
gently patted dry, slightly elevated and left exposed to room temperature. If there is any abrasion of the
skin, broad spectrum antibiotic cover is required. Great care should be taken not to heat or abrade the
skin.
Failure to treat correctly may result in months of hospitalisation or even amputation. Every
survivor who has been exposed to prolonged low temperatures aboard the DISSUB or has spent some time
in very cold water must be carefully examined for this condition. Pain is a common early and delayed
consequence of non-freezing cold injury: the only effective treatment for this is Amitriptyline, starting
with a single 50 mg dose given in the evening, increasing as necessary to a maximum of 150 mg in the
single dose. Early treatment of pain is important in the avoidance of chronic pain, which can be refractory
to treatment.
0311 Hyperthermia.
1. Effects of Hyperthermia.
Hull insulation, heat production of survivors, removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere using
exothermic chemical methods, and burning of oxygen candles all contribute to heat build up in the
DISSUB environment.
Engineering spaces are especially susceptible to temperature increase after ventilation ceases.
Humidity in DISSUB conditions can also rise over time, causing discomfort and adding to the risk of
dehydration and heat related illness. Survivors should be assumed to be non-heat acclimated.
2. Prevention of Hyperthermia.
If heat stress conditions develop or appear imminent, the following steps should be undertaken as soon as
possible:
a. Lower levels or spaces lacking insulation can be expected to be cooler. Survivors should be
permitted to move to cooler areas if conditions permit.
b. Survivors should initiate a buddy system and pair up. Buddies should check each other hourly
when awake for signs of dehydration such as light-headedness on standing or greater than 1 pound
per day of weight loss. If possible, all survivors should be weighed daily prior to eating and
monitored for weight loss.
c. Adequate fluid replacement is essential to avoid dehydration in the presence of heat stress.
Fluids should be encouraged at quantities depending on body size, temperature and humidity.
Several quarts a day may be needed. Food intake should supply adequate salt replacement.
Decreased urination or dark urine is a sign of dehydration.
d. Body cooling is an effective way of preventing core body temperature increase and heat stress
injury. This can be achieved by immersing the forearms and hands and/or feet and legs in pans or
buckets of cool or even tepid water periodically for 10 minutes or more. Likewise, immersion in
floodwater or a coldwater shower from the escape trunk drain can be effective.
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With loss of normal ventilation and air conditioning, the thermal environment of a submarine in
tropical waters may deteriorate and heat casualties may occur. Exertion will exacerbate the situation. The
rate at which such deterioration occurs will depend upon the type of submarine, its contained volume, the
number of survivors and the circumstances of the accident.
If survivors are forced to escape before rescue vessels arrive they will be faced with the problem of
surviving in tropical conditions on the surface whilst wearing survival gear and without access to drinking
water. In seawater temperatures of around 27-32C (80-90F) and ambient air temperatures of 32-49C (90-
120F) the survival length has yet to be determined. It is clear those survivors will be subjected to
considerable thermal stress if the survival suit is worn fully sealed, since it is impermeable to water and
unventilated. It is recommended that survivors in warm waters employing the free-floating survival suit
deflate the outer portion of the suit and float vertically supported by the stole portion, with hood and
gloves removed.
3. Heat syncope
Heat Syncope is the most common heat disorder seen in standard medical practice. This generally
occurs in unacclimatised personnel and is associated with a moderately raised rectal temperature and
symptoms similar to the well-known vaso-vagal "faint". In the submarine escape situation, the recumbent
posture will minimise the risk of syncope. It is most likely to occur when a survivor is taken aboard the
rescue vessel and resumes physical activity. When rescuing escapers, they should be transferred to the
rescue vessel via stretcher or small boat lift in a supine or recumbent position to avoid this problem.
Treatment is to rest the patient, cool them, and administer fluids. All forms of alcohol are contra-
indicated.
This condition may occur in submarine survivors exposed to tropical heat for more than a few
hours. They may have no means of obtaining water and may sweat a great deal even though the sweat
produced cannot evaporate. A loss of body salt will occur but because sweat is hypotonic, plasma sodium
will be high. Symptoms of water depletion include intense thirst, which may become obsessive to the
point where seawater is drunk with disastrous results. Other symptoms commonly seen are giddiness,
faintness, diminished urinary output and pyrexia; delirium follows and then death. Severe salt deficiency
may cause excruciatingly painful spasms of voluntary muscles. With an unconscious patient, the
diagnostic difficulty is to determine whether the primary condition is water or salt deficiency.
Treatment: in submarine escape conditions, water depletion is the primary danger and treatment is
directed towards replacement of fluids. Start an IV of 5% glucose in water. Isotonic saline can be used if
there is any doubt as to whether salt deficiency or severe hypovolaemia is a contributory factor. Keep the
patient in the shade in a cool environment; reduce pyrexia by spraying with tepid water and keep careful
fluid intake and output charts. Body weights may be used to help guide fluid replacement. Recovery is
usually rapid and, when consciousness returns, fluids can be administered by mouth. Diet should begin
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with liquids and be gradually increased to a normal diet. Heavily salted fluids are not usually required but
it is advisable to test the urine for chloride to ensure that a salt deficiency does not supervene following
the replacement of water losses.
5. Heat stroke
Complete failure of the thermoregulatory mechanism of the body results in heat-stroke. It is often
fatal and death is inevitable unless immediate treatment is given. Classically, the disorder is associated
with a rectal temperature of 40.6C (105F) or more, generalised anhydrosis and disturbances of the central
nervous system, which may result in headaches, fits, convulsions or coma. In some patients however,
sweating may be present or they may be perfectly rational. If a rectal temperature of 40.6C (105F) or
higher is found, immediate and energetic treatment for heat stroke must be given. A delay in treatment of
more than four hours indicates a poor prognosis.
Treatment consists of rapid cooling to drop rectal temperature to 38.9C (102F) within an hour.
This may be achieved by the following measures:
c. Spray a mist of 25-30C (77-86F) water over exposed skin and fan to enhance evaporation
e. In the case of unconscious or unresponsive patients, consider central cooling with chilled saline
gastric or rectal lavage as an additional measure.
(1) If immersed in cool water or sprayed with mist and fanned, discontinue this treatment when
the patient's rectal temperature falls below 39C (102F). Very cold water (below 10 C) or ice
should not be used to cool the skin, since it causes vasoconstriction which decreases blood flow
to the skin and actually slows the process of lowering core temperature. Hypotension should be
treated by an initial infusion of 300-500 cc normal saline, and this may need to be followed by
sustained infusion at a rate of 1000 cc per hour or more, according to blood pressure and clinical
responses.
(2) There is a risk of pulmonary oedema in heat-stroke, especially after vasoconstriction which
occurs in the cooling phase. When body temperature is near normal, hypotension and
dehydration may be treated with standard amounts of intravenous fluids. The airway must be
protected in all patients with a decreased level of consciousness. Many patients with heat stroke
vomit, therefore all stuporous or comatose patients must be placed in the recovery position to
protect their airway, or have an endotracheal airway placed to avoid aspiration. All cases of
moderate to severe cases of heat stroke must be evacuated to a hospital care facility as soon as
possible in order to avoid irreversible brain or renal injury, or disseminated intra-vascular
coagulation and multi-organ failure.
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ATP 57(B)
1. General.
France, Russia, China, the US and the UK operate nuclear powered submarines. In the event of a
SUBSUNK, specialist medical advice will be made available to deal with any radiation hazards. Further
details of Radiation Injury are also available in NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC
Defensive Operations AMed P-6C Volume 1 - Nuclear.
The overriding principle that applies in the management of casualties from any incidents that may
or may not involve radioactivity is that standard lifesaving emergency medical care must take priority over
any radiological concerns.
Casualties from a nuclear powered DISSUB with a damaged reactor may have been irradiated,
contaminated, or both. Purely irradiated casualties pose no radiation hazard to the crew of a rescue vessel.
Casualties who have external contamination with radioactive fission products can pose a hazard if these
fission products are allowed to spread. However simple procedures including the undressing of casualties
can contain this hazard so that the risk to the rescue vessel crew and carers becomes negligible.
Radiation monitoring equipment can assist in the management of survivors by confirming and
identifying areas of contamination. However survivors can be safely and effectively managed whilst
waiting for these resources to arrive by making an assumption that they are contaminated and following
simple decontamination and containment procedures.
2. Irradiated Casualties.
Survivors will report the dose of ionising radiation (penetrating gamma radiation) in units called
Grays (Gy) or Sieverts (Sv) ( in the DISSUB scenario assume that 1 Gy is exactly the same as 1 Sv).
Above 1 Gy (1 Sv) the survivors will begin to develop the effects of the Acute Radiation Sickness (ARS).
The initial symptoms (Prodromal Symptoms) of nausea, vomiting, lethargy and perhaps diarrhoea will
begin within several hours but then wear off after perhaps 24 hours. Affected personnel will recover
somewhat over the next few days (the Latent Period) but the symptoms will return in due course - within
days for severe doses (> 3 Grays) but perhaps taking longer - several weeks for lesser doses (the Manifest
Illness Phase). There should be no deaths form ARS for doses below 1 Gy. 2 Gy equates to a 5%
mortality from ARS. The LD50/60 (Lethal Dose for death in a 60 day period following exposure for 50%
of those exposed, assuming no treatment) is around 4.5 Gy.
The Acute Radiation Syndrome should not interfere with the provision of prompt emergency
medical care. Trauma, hypothermia, DCI etc. must be treated as soon as possible and then the ARS can be
dealt with by prompt CASEVAC to an appropriate shore based establishment. The combination of ARS
and other injury such as trauma or DCI will result in 'the combined injury syndrome' and markedly
increase the potential mortality and morbidly.
3. Contaminated Casualties.
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ATP 57(B)
Fission products that have been deposited on the skin and clothing of survivors may cause severe
radiation burns to the skin (similar to conventional thermal burns) due to the intense radiation (mainly beta
particles) emitted by the deposited radioactive material. Beta particles can penetrate clothing so skin
damage will not be confined to exposed areas such as the hands and face
An internally contaminated survivor is not a hazard to treatment teams and there is little that can be
done for this problem at this stage apart from giving stable iodine (if this has not already been done on the
DISSUB) to protect the thyroid gland from Iodine131. It would also be beneficial to collect and hold all
urine, stool and vomit if this is reasonably practicable. In the later stages of care these samples will help
assess the extent of internal contamination and thereby direct the need for other forms of medical
intervention.
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ATP 57(B)
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
II - 3- 18 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
The tables outlined below have been proposed for use in the decompression of rescuees from a
DISSUB. They are fully outlined in the reports referenced with each set of tables. These reports include
the background information on how the tables were defined, their safety limitations and how the Authors
intended the tables to be used. Readers are advised to acquire and review the reports before considering
using the tables.
Of the tables reproduced below only the USN Accelerated O2 decompression tables have been
subject to trails, including manned trails. There is intention to undertake animal based validation of the
NSRS tables but no date has yet been set for this. This supplement will be updated once this validation is
complete.
The guidance on selecting a decompression table is laid out in Chapter 6 Annex G. This is
generic and should be modified by each rescue system as appropriate to their decompression facility,
available gas supplies and the ability to transfer casualties under pressure between the SRV and the
decompression system.
Reference: This information is reproduced from Appendix A of the US Navy Experimental Diving
Unit report NEDU TR 11-00 entitled ‘Accelerated Decompression Using Oxygen For Submarine Rescue
– Summary Report And Operational Guidance’.
Limitations: The full US Navy report includes the following advice: “The procedure which follows in
Appendix A is our best estimate of the minimum safe decompression, based on experience gained in these
experiments. We do not regard these recommendations as definitive, and caution that the status of the
subjects and the quality of the oxygen delivery system must be taken into consideration. If operationally
feasible, we recommend extending the time for decompression on oxygen beyond these minimal times.”
These decompression procedures are designed to be used in the Deep Submergence Rescue
Vehicle (DSRV) fitted with Field Change 665, the Onboard Decompression System; however, they may
be adapted for use in any rescue system, such as the planned Submarine Diving and Recompression
System (SRDRS), with the capacity to provide safe delivery of oxygen for breathing during a controlled
decompression. The maximum depth to which these tables have been trailed is 60 feet of sea-water and
decompression from depths greater than this are not addressed.
In systems without on-board decompression in the rescue vehicle, or transfer under pressure
capability, it will probably be necessary to bring rescuees to surface pressure in order to transfer from the
rescue vehicle to the recompression chamber. Limit the surface interval to 15 minutes or less whenever
possible. Recompress the rescuees back to the DISSUB internal pressure and then begin the procedure
described below.
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ATP 57(B)
Table II-3-3 gives the decompression times on oxygen needed to safely return pressurized rescuees
to normal atmospheric pressure. These times do not include air breaks (discussed below) which may
increase the total time required by as much as 25%.
O2 Time
EAD at Depth Total O2
Decompression Stop Depth (fsw)
(fsw) (O2 Pre- Time (min)
breathe)(min)
45 40 35 30 25 20
20 0 0
25 70 Oxygen Breathing Times at Depth (min) 70
30 140 140
35 120 40 40 200
40 120 10 85 40 255
45 120 20 105 115 50 410
50 120 85 105 115 50 475
55 120 55 95 105 115 50 540
60 120 30 85 95 105 115 50 600
Notes:
1. Oxygen Breathing Times are given in minutes.
2. If air breaks are used, the time for each decompression stop may increase (see below)
3 The time required to purge the closed-circuit breathing loop of nitrogen is included in the
decompression stop time and does not need to be accounted for separately.
1. First calculate the rescuee's Equivalent Air Depth (EAD). This is necessary because the
pressurized atmosphere of the DISSUB will likely have different partial pressures of oxygen and nitrogen
than standard air. Decompression requirements are determined by the partial pressure of nitrogen in the
tissues, and the use of the EAD is a convenient method of expressing the amount of nitrogen in the
pressurized atmosphere. The EAD may be calculated from the following formula:
II - 3- 20 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
If the information is available, use the highest Dsub and the lowest FO2 recorded in the last 24 hours
when making the EAD calculation.
2. Enter Table S605 - 1 at the depth which is exactly equal or next greater than the calculated EAD.
Begin the procedure by placing the rescuees on the oxygen breathing system. Breathe oxygen for the time
indicated in the second column, "O2 Time at Depth." Time is given in minutes. This oxygen period is
termed "pre-breathing" because it takes place before decompression begins.
3. When the pre-breathing period is complete, decompress at 1-5 fsw/min to the first decompression
stop indicated in the table.
4. Breathe oxygen at each decompression stop for the time indicated in the table. Oxygen breathing
times are given in minutes.
5. Ascend between decompression stops at 1-5 fsw/min. Ascent time between stops is included in the
subsequent stop time.
6. Upon completion of the last oxygen breathing period, remove the oxygen mask and decompress to
atmospheric pressure at 1-5 fsw/min.
In emergency situations, it is highly likely that many factors could result in the need to vary or
modify these procedures, and the on-scene Undersea (Diving) Medical Officer should be allowed to do so
if necessary to accommodate priorities. The following recommendations should be followed whenever
possible.
Periodic interruption of 100% oxygen breathing during pre-breathing and decompression is highly
desirable to reduce the injurious effects of oxygen on the central nervous system and lung. Interruption of
oxygen breathing may also be necessary to change CO2 canisters in the closed-circuit breathing loop.
Unexpected interruption of oxygen breathing may also occur because of rescuee illness or injury.
When at a pressure greater than 45 fsw (actual pressure, not EAD), interrupt oxygen breathing
every 30 minutes with at least five minutes on air to minimize the risk of central nervous system oxygen
toxicity (in this section, the term "air" refers to any approximately normoxic breathing mixture, or ambient
cabin atmosphere).
When 45 fsw and shallower, interrupt oxygen breathing every two hours with at least 10 minutes
on air. If the rescue timeline permits, interrupt oxygen breathing every 60 minutes with 15 minutes on air
when 45 fsw and shallower. This pattern of 60 minutes on oxygen, 15 minutes on air is optimal for
minimizing lung injury.
Once oxygen breathing is begun, consider any time spent on air to be "dead time," that is, not to
count toward meeting the oxygen decompression requirement. Lengthen the time at each stop, and the
total decompression time, correspondingly so that all the required time on oxygen during pre-breathing
and at each stop is completed.
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ATP 57(B)
Optimally, rescuees should be on oxygen for at least 15 minutes prior to decompression to the first
stop and should continue to breathe oxygen during decompression to the stop. This, however, is not a
requirement. Ascent to the first decompression stop may be made on air or cabin atmosphere if necessary.
During oxygen pre-breathing, the time on air or cabin atmosphere should not exceed 15 minutes for
each hour of oxygen breathed. Otherwise, some of the beneficial effects of oxygen pre-breathing will be
lost. If the time on air exceeds 15 minutes per hour, add two minutes to the pre-breathing time for each
minute spent on air beyond the 15 minute allowance.
Oxygen pre-breathing in the Distressed Submarine (DISSUB), or in the rescue vehicle during
transit, could be used to shorten the time required for decompression at the final destination. The decision
to employ oxygen pre-breathing in the DISSUB or rescue vehicle during transit would depend on the
availability of suitable equipment to supply oxygen, the risk of fire in the rescue vehicle cabin, the extent
to which rescuees are already suffering from pulmonary oxygen toxicity or other pulmonary injury, and
the anticipated risk of central nervous system oxygen toxicity. 100 % oxygen should not be breathed at an
actual pressure greater than 60 fsw due to the risk of CNS oxygen toxicity.
Reduce the oxygen time in Table A1 by one minute for each minute spent pre-breathing oxygen in
the DISSUB or during transit. Subtract oxygen time from the pre-breathing time in Table 1 first, then
from the decompression stops, beginning with the shallowest decompression stop first.
Example: A rescuee on the 45 fsw EAD schedule breathes oxygen for 180 minutes during transit. The
120 minute pre-breathe requirement has already been satisfied, so direct ascent to the first stop is allowed.
The remaining 60 minutes is subtracted first from the 20 fsw stop (50 minutes), then from the 25 fsw stop
(10 minutes). The rescuee may surface after completing 105 minutes on oxygen at 25 fsw.
Use the effective pre-breathing time, not the actual pre-breathing time in the DISSUB or during
transit, to determine how much decompression time to subtract from Table A1. The effective pre-
breathing time is the actual pre-breathing time minus two minutes for each minute spent on DISSUB or
DSRV atmosphere beyond the 15 minute allowance per hour of oxygen.
Example: A rescuee prebreathes oxygen in the DISSUB for two 60 minute periods separated by a 15
minute air break, then breathes air for 60 minutes in the DSRV during transit from the DISSUB to the
MOSUB. How much decompression time should be subtracted from Table 1?
Solution: Thirty minutes on air is allowed for the two hours of oxygen breathed. The rescuee, however,
has spent a total of 75 minutes on air (the 15 minute air break + the 60 minute transit in the DSRV). The
excess air time is 45 minutes (75-30). The effective oxygen pre-breathing time therefore is 120 - (2 x 45)
= 30 minutes. Subtract 30 minutes from the oxygen decompression time in Table A1.
For DISSUB pressures up to an EAD of 40 fsw, all of the oxygen decompression time required by
Table A1 can generally be completed by pre-breathing without a significant risk of pulmonary or CNS
oxygen toxicity.
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ATP 57(B)
For DISSUB pressures greater than an EAD of 40 fsw, the allowable pre-breathing time will be
governed primarily by the extent to which pulmonary symptoms are already present and by the actual
DISSUB pressure, which governs the inspired oxygen partial pressure during the pre-breathing period.
The actual DISSUB pressure may be significantly less than the equivalent air depth due to oxygen
consumption in the DISSUB. This lower actual pressure allows for a greater use of oxygen pre-breathing.
As a general rule, limit oxygen pre-breathing to 240 minutes at an actual DISSUB pressure up to 40 fsw
and to 120 minutes at an actual pressure of 41-60 fsw. 100 % oxygen should not be breathed at an actual
pressure greater than 60 fsw due to the risk of CNS oxygen toxicity.
3. Shortened Decompression
In many cases, system constraints will force system operators and inside medical tenders to
decompress at the same time as the rescuees. To achieve safe decompression, operators and tenders must
breathe oxygen during the decompression for the times indicated in Table A2. Oxygen breathing may be
synchronized with rescuee breathing cycles and follow the same pattern of time on oxygen and time on
air. Oxygen breathing by operators and tenders should be timed so that the last minute of oxygen
breathing is completed when the rescuees are ready to make the final decompression to the surface.
In Table S605 - 2, Operator Exposure Time is defined as the elapsed time from initial
pressurization of the rescue vehicle until the rescuees begin oxygen pre-breathing after mating to the
MOSUB or SRDRS chamber. Enter the table at the Operator Exposure Time that is exactly equal to or
next greater than the actual exposure time. Read down to the EAD schedule being used by the rescuees.
Find the oxygen breathing time in minutes.
During the pre-breathing period, operators and tenders will be exposed to an additional period of
time at the DISSUB depth beyond that already included in the Operator Exposure Time. This additional
time has been incorporated into the calculation of the decompression requirement in Table II-3-4 and need
not be accounted for separately.
If the rescuees breathe oxygen during transit, some decompression schedules may be shortened to
the point where the oxygen breathing requirement of the operators and tenders exceeds the remaining
decompression time. This is especially true of shallow schedules with long operator exposure times. In
these cases, the operators should begin oxygen breathing during transit along with the rescuees so that
they have an opportunity to complete all the required oxygen time prior to decompression to the surface.
Use the operator's effective pre-breathing time (see calculation above) when computing his remaining
oxygen decompression time.
II - 3- 23 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
EAD (fsw)
Operator Exposure Time (minutes)2
Schedule1
03 120 240 360 480 600 720
25 0 0 0 20 40 60 70
30 0 10 40 70 100 120 140
35 0 30 80 110 140 160 180
40 15 70 120 150 180 210 230
45 70 120 160 190 220 250 270
50 100 150 190 230 260 280 300
55 130 180 220 260 280 300 320
60 160 210 250 280 310 330 350
Notes:
1: Use the same decompression schedule as the rescuees, based on the EAD, and breathe oxygen for the
times indicated.
2: Operator Exposure Time is the elapsed time from initial pressurization of the rescue vehicle until the
rescuees begin breathing oxygen after mating to the MOSUB or SRDRS chamber or decanting to a deck
recompression chamber.
3: Use the zero column for a tender who locks into the recompression chamber at the beginning of the
oxygen pre-breathing period and remains in the chamber throughout the remaining decompression.
1. General.
Decompression sickness or arterial gas embolism (AGE) could occur in any DISSUB scenario,
either after use of the schedules in the previous section, or in the likely event that conditions could not
allow use of the procedures due to time or equipment constraints. Therefore, treatment of a DISSUB
casualty must take into account not only the fact that the rescuee has decompression sickness or arterial
gas embolism, but also that he may have omitted a significant amount of saturation decompression.
Standard treatments may resolve the immediate clinical problem, but not satisfy the patient's
saturation decompression obligation. Failure to take this omitted decompression time into account may
result in inadequate treatment with subsequent recurrence of symptoms. The following procedures are
designed to provide both recompression therapy and the total oxygen time needed to resolve the patient's
remaining decompression obligation.
2. Procedure.
a. Allocate patients for recompression treatment following the appropriate DISSUB triage
algorithm.
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ATP 57(B)
b. Compress to 60 fsw and begin treatment with oxygen according to U.S. Navy Treatment Table
6. Recompression deeper than 60 fsw should not be undertaken unless it is certain that chamber
resources can be devoted exclusively to that patient, for example, at a shore-based referral site.
c. Follow Treatment Table 6 to the completion of the 30 fsw stop using allowed extensions at 60
and 30 fsw to resolve symptoms, as needed.
d. Add the time spent on oxygen during the current treatment to any time spent on oxygen during
saturation decompression or prior recompression treatments to calculate the patient's total oxygen
time to that point.
e. Determine the oxygen time required for safe decompression from the DISSUB depth using
Table II-3-5 below. Subtract the patient's total oxygen time from the required oxygen time to
determine the patient's remaining omitted oxygen decompression time.
f. If no omitted oxygen decompression time remains, complete Table 6 by surfacing from 30 fsw
on oxygen at 1 fsw/min. If less than 170 minutes of omitted oxygen decompression time remain,
ascend to 15 fsw at 1 fsw/min on oxygen, complete the remaining oxygen time at 15 fsw, then
ascend to the surface on oxygen at 1 fsw/min. If more than 170 minutes of omitted decompression
time remain, complete any time in excess of 170 minutes at 30 fsw, then ascend to 15 fsw at 1
fsw/min on oxygen, complete 170 minutes on oxygen at 15 fsw, then ascend to the surface on
oxygen at 1 fsw/min. Oxygen breathing during the additional time at 30 and 15 fsw should be
interrupted every 60 minutes with a 15 minute air break continuing the pattern of oxygen exposure
begun at 30 fsw on Table 6.
h. Once treatment is initiated, complete one Treatment Table 6 at a minimum even if the omitted
oxygen decompression time is zero (i.e., the calculated amount of necessary oxygen decompression
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ATP 57(B)
was given prior to onset of DCS). Interrupt treatment only if premature surfacing is required to
accommodate a more emergent case.
j. Asymptomatic rescuees with omitted oxygen decompression time are at significant risk for
decompression sickness. These individuals should be recompressed and treated as above when
circumstances permit. While awaiting recompression, these individuals should breathe surface
oxygen and remain at rest in the supine position. Surface oxygen should be continued for a period
not less than three times the omitted oxygen decompression time.
k. The on-scene Undersea Medical Officer should have the discretion to vary these procedures due
to other needs of the patient, allocation of resources, or other considerations.
0319 - Reference.
Naval Sea Systems, U.S. Navy Diving Manual, Vol. #5, Rev. 4., Naval Sea Systems Command,
NAVSEA SS521-AG-PRO-010 (Arlington, VA: U.S. Navy, 1999), Chapter 21.
Reference: The information for this section is drawn from INM Report No. R2002.004 –
‘Accelerated Decompression Following Rescue from a Pressurised Submarine - Interim Procedures’ by
Surgeon Commander P J Benton, Royal Navy, March 2002
Limitations: These tables were designed using available information from manned and animal trials
available in 2000. They are based on a maximum of a 5 minute window between surfacing in the SRV
and being back at depth within the decompression facility. These tables have not been validated by trials.
The attendant must breath oxygen for the last 20 minutes of the table including the 10 minute ascent from
14 metres to the surface
The attendant for a Table 66 Mod I must breath oxygen for the last two 30 minute oxygen periods at 14
metres and throughout the 10 minute ascent to the surface.
0321 - Procedures
1. The Equivalent Air Depth (EAD) principle is a method by which a decompression table developed
for use by divers breathing air can be adapted for use when the atmosphere breathed is composed of
varying fractions of nitrogen (fN2) and oxygen (fO2). This is of importance as the decompression
obligation is determined by the partial pressure of nitrogen in the air breathed and not simply the depth at
which the air is breathed. The equation for calculation of EAD is at Fig 1. Because the escape
compartment air is unlikely to contain 21% oxygen the EAD, calculated from the compartment pressure
and fraction of oxygen (fO2), is the simplest method of determining decompression obligation as diving
tables list decompression procedures for given depths and not fN2. Within a stricken submarine the fO2
will slowly fall with a corresponding increase in fN2. Thus, the EAD may be in excess of the measured
depth (pressure) of the compartment. Assuming that the maximum compartment pressure to be 5 bar
(0.5mPa) and survival possible down to an pO2 of 0.12 bar (12kPa), the pO2 will have dropped slowly
over time so permitting a degree of acclimatisation, the EAD could be as great as 51.7 metres.
Saturation EADs less than 7 metres. Research has shown that the incidence of decompression
illness (DCI) amongst subjects, who have remained at a pressure of 1.65 bar (0.165mPa) for sufficient
time for their tissues to become saturated with nitrogen, and then decompressed to 1 bar (0.1 mPa) over a
minute is extremely low. Thus survivors recovered from a compartment with an EAD of 7 metres or less
will have a very low probability of developing decompression illness. Although the probability of DCI
would be low, if adequate supplies of oxygen are available it is recommended that following
decompression within LR5 the survivors be given 100% oxygen at 1 bar (0.1mPa) for 60 minutes as a
precautionary measure.
However, if the EAD is in excess of 7 metres (0.17mPa) the incidence of DCI will increase as the
EAD increases, making it essential that survivors are recompressed as soon as possible after leaving LR5.
Survivors rescued from a submarine compartment can also be expected to have had restricted fluid and
calorie intake for many days as well as being mildly, or markedly, hypothermic. Individuals in such a
condition will be not dissimilar to some of the critical care patients managed at the Hyperbaric Medicine
Unit at the Royal Hospital Haslar who have shown an increased tendency to develop oxygen seizures
II - 3- 28 ORIGINAL
ATP 57(B)
when exposed to therapeutic levels of oxygen (pO2 of 2.8 bar (0.28mPa)). Because of the difficulties of
managing a convulsing individual within the cramped conditions of a recompression chamber containing
up to 14 individuals it is considered advisable to restrict the pO2 to a slightly lower level. Royal Navy
Table 66 is a 2.4 bar (0.24mPa) therapeutic table that can be easily modified to provide an accelerated
decompression schedule. Experience has shown that the incidence of oxygen seizures amongst critical
care patients treated with this table is very low and as such it is considered unlikely that oxygen seizures
will occur amongst survivors rescued from a stricken submarine.
Royal Navy Table 66 is only of 100 minutes duration and as such would be of inadequate duration
for the management of survivors rescued from a pressurised compartment with a significantly increased
EAD. However, by the simple inclusion of additional 30 minute oxygen breathing periods at 2.4 bar
(0.24mPa), separated by 5 minute air breaks, the table can be easily adapted to provide an accelerated
decompression schedule. By holding the survivors at 2.4 bar (0.24mPa) for the full duration of the
decompression schedule with only a 10 minute decompression from maximum chamber depth (2.4 bar,
0.24mPa) to the surface (1 bar, 0.1mPa) maximum benefit can be obtained from breathing hyperbaric
oxygen. This approach differs from standard decompression procedures for in water diving and also from
the approach adopted by the US Navy in their accelerated decompression tables which both utilise a
stepped decompression. However, it should be noted that the US Navy accelerated decompression tables
do utilise oxygen breathing at depths down to 60 fsw (approximately 2.8 bar, 0.28mPa) whilst survivors
are being transported within the rescue submersible. The decision as to how many additional oxygen
breathing periods should be included is based upon a combination of data from existing decompression
tables and results from the US Navy accelerated decompression table trials.
Saturation EADs in excess of 7 metres but not exceeding 18 metres. For dives to 15 metres with
duration in excess of 450 minutes RN Table 11-Mod requires 80 minutes of decompression stops with the
deepest decompression stop at 6 metres. For a dive to 18 metres for duration in excess of 495 minutes RN
Table 11-Mod requires a total of 125 minutes of decompression with the deepest decompression stop at 9
metres. In both examples the diver breathes air during all decompression stops. Although these profiles
are extreme exposures significantly below the Limiting Line in an emergency situation the risk of DCI
would be considered acceptable especially if recompression facilities were available on site. RN Table 66
provides 80 minutes of oxygen breathing at 2.4 bar (0.24mPa) with an additional 10 minutes oxygen
breathing during the ascent to 1 bar (0.1mPa). The duration of the RN Table 66 is thus in excess of the
decompression required for a 15 metre dive of maximum duration and only some 25 minutes shorter than
the decompression time required for an 18 metre dive of maximum duration. However, RN Table 66
utilises oxygen breathing at 2.4 bar (0.24mPa) whereas RN Table 11-Mod uses air. Oxygen breathing
markedly increases inert gas removal from tissues and as such it can be expected that even with the shorter
decompression time for the 18 metre exposure the RN Table 66 will have a lower risk of DCI than the RN
Table 11-Mod. Based upon this argument individuals rescued from an EAD in excess of 7 metres but not
exceeding 18 metres should be recompressed and treated using RN Table 66. RN Table 66 is equivalent
to 264 UPTDs.
For saturation EADs in excess of 18 metres but not exceeding 30 metres. Little data is available for
decompressions from such shallow saturation exposures although some guidance can be obtained from
experience gained by the construction industry in their use of compressed air for both tunnel and caisson
work. Recent studies investigated the use of oxygen decompression following a 4 hour working shift at
2.85bar (0.285mPa). The decompression profile (Blackpool Tables) for such an exposure currently
requires 110 minutes of decompression breathing air, 45 minutes of which are at 1.6 bar (0.16mPa).
During the trial oxygen was breathed for 35 minutes of the 45 minute decompression stop at 1.6 bar
(0.16mPa). Doppler scoring using the Kisman Masurel system revealed a median score at rest of 3 for the
controls who breathed compressed air during decompression and a median score of 0 for the subjects who
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ATP 57(B)
breathed oxygen. Following movement the median scores were 4 for the control group (air
decompression) and 1 for the subject group (oxygen decompression). Thus it would appear that even with
a relatively short duration of oxygen breathing at only 1.6 bar (0.16mPa) a significant reduction in inert
gas burden, and hence decompression stress and Doppler score can be achieved. Based upon this
information RN Table 66 was extended by 3 full 30 minute oxygen periods at 2.4 bar (0.24mPa) giving a
total of 180 minutes oxygen breathing before decompression to the surface. This extended Table is known
as RN Table 66 Mod I and should be used for survivors who have been saturated at EADs in excess of 18
metres but not exceeding 30 metres. RN Table 66 Mod I is equivalent to 568 UPTDs.
For saturation EADs in excess of 30 metres. Survivors rescued from compartments at such a high
EAD will have a considerable inert gas burden that ideally should be treated using a saturation
decompression schedule such as RN Table 64. However, where this is not possible RN Table 66 can be
extended to include 240 minutes of oxygen breathing at 2.4 bar (0.24mPa). This extended table is known
as RN Table 66 Mod II. The probability of DCI following such a relatively short decompression table is
unknown but probably quite high. However, the severity of DCI can be expected to be relatively minor
with sufficient time between surfacing and onset of symptoms that the individual will ideally already have
been evacuated shore side to a hyperbaric facility for observation and additional treatment if required. RN
Table 66 Mod II should only be used in circumstances, such as when there is only a single recompression
chamber on the MOSHIP, when it is essential to free that chamber for use by the next group of survivors
to arrive onboard the MOSHIP. RN Table 66 Mod II is equivalent to 750 UPTSs.
Tables 66, 66 Mod Table 66 Mod I and II are at Annex B. A summary of the recompression tables
to be used is at Table 1. It must be emphasised that these decompression procedures have not been
formally evaluated in this role. The procedures should be considered as being a ‘best guess’ based upon a
combination of incomplete scientific data, the clinical experience of the author and the facilities and
equipment that can be expected to be available onboard an LR5 MOSHIP.
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Work has been completed by the US Navy to develop accelerated decompression tables which are
of longer duration than the Table 66 Mod I and II. However, the US Navy tables do not utilise such
lengthy periods of oxygen breathing at 2.4 bar (0.24 mPa) choosing instead to use a longer stepped
decompression following, when possible, a period of oxygen pre breathing at escape compartment
pressure. Although such a stepped decompression follows standard decompression practice for in water
dive decompression tables in the case of an emergency accelerated decompression table it is considered
that this may not be appropriate. The aim of any decompression table is to remove inert gas as rapidly and
safely as possible so permitting the diver to return to the surface. With in water decompression the depth
at which oxygen breathing can commence is restricted to relatively shallow depths. This is due to a
combination of facts. These are the increased sensitivity of the immersed individual to raised partial
pressures of oxygen compared to the individual within a dry chamber plus the fact that the consequences,
often death, of an in water oxygen convulsion are far more severe than the consequences of convulsion
within a dry chamber. There is also the problem of pulmonary oxygen toxicity. Therapeutic hyperbaric
oxygen tables differ from decompression tables in that they provide the subject/patient with the maximum
safe ‘dose’ of oxygen accepting that the therapeutic benefit from treatment outweigh the risk of oxygen
toxicity. It is suggested that an emergency accelerated decompression table should be thought of in the
same way as a therapeutic table with the benefits, in the form of reduced decompression time, made
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possible by remaining at a relatively high pO2 outweighing the problems of minor pulmonary oxygen
toxicity. Pulmonary oxygen toxicity is unlikely to be a significant problem as even RN Table 66 Mod II
only has an oxygen exposure of 750 UPTDs which is comparable to the exposure (759 UPTDs) associated
with an RN Table 62 with 2 extensions at 2.8 bar (0.28mPa). As has been already discussed clinical
experience suggests that even with dehydrated and physically exhausted subjects the probability of oxygen
convulsions at 2.4 bar (0.24mPa) is low.
The proposed accelerated decompression tables also differ from the US Navy tables in that the
primary aim is to prevent severe life threatening DCI, such as acute pulmonary DCI (the chokes), and to
markedly reduce the probability of DCI developing post treatment. This is in contrast to the US Navy
accelerated decompression tables that have been designed to provide a complete decompression from
saturation. Although it is hoped that the use of Table 66 and Table 66 Mod I and II would provide a
complete decompression it is accepted that symptoms of DCI may develop after completion of these
tables. However, any such cases could be expected to present with relatively minor non-life threatening
symptoms such as limb pain. Survivors presenting with such symptoms could be treated with 100%
surface oxygen whilst awaiting availability of a suitable recompression chamber. Indeed, as such
symptoms would probably not present for a number of hours after completion of the decompression table
it is probably that the survivor would already have been evacuated ashore to the vicinity of a hyperbaric
unit. During both the evaluation trials for the US Navy accelerated decompression tables (8) and recent
simulated submarine escapes following saturation carried out at QinetiQ Alverstoke there has been a
minimum period of 2 hours post decompression before the onset of symptoms of DCI.
During a rescue from a pressurised submarine compartment the recompression chamber operators
(RCOs) within the rescue chamber of the LR5 would also be exposed to increased pressure. Provided that
the pressure was below 1.9 bar (0.19mPa), which equates to a depth of 9 metres, there would be no
decompression obligation. For pressures in excess of 1.9 bar (0.19mPa) but less than 4.3 bar (0.43mPa),
which equates to a depth of 33 metres, Royal Navy Table 14-Mod (an air surface decompression table)
can be used. For pressures exceeding 4.3 bar (0.43mPa) but less than 5 bar (0.5mPa), which equates to a
depth of 40 metres, Royal Navy Table 15-Mod (an oxygen surface decompression table) can be used.
Even for pressures exceeding 1.9 bar (0.19mPa) with careful use of Royal Navy Table 11-Mod it
may be possible to limit the RCOs exposure to the no-stop time for a given depth. All of these
decompression tables are detailed within the Royal Navy Diving Manual, BR2806. As the RCOs would
be breathing air either from the LR5 breathing systems or from self-contained air breathing apparatus if
entry to the submarine was required fO2 of the escape compartment would not be a factor in determining
the RCOs decompression obligation.
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Because any survivors rescued from a pressurised submarine will have a very different
decompression obligation to that of the LR5 RCOs whenever possible at least 2 recompression chambers
should be deployed onboard the MOSHIP. One chamber should be available to provide treatment for
survivors with the second dedicated to the surface decompression of the LR5 chamber operators.
Unfortunately even when the MOSHIP is a large vessel space constraints may permit only one multiplace
recompression chamber to be deployed. In such circumstances surface decompression can either be
performed within small monoplace chambers such as the HYPERLITEor by treating both the LR5 RCOs
and survivors within the same chamber.
If the RCOs are to be treated within the same recompression chamber as the survivors then there
are 2 options. These are:
a. For the RCOs to act as attendants to the survivors and complete the same decompression schedule
(RN Table 66 or RN Table 66 Mod I or II) as required by the survivors.
b. For the RCOs to spend the total decompression time, irrespective of depth of decompression stop,
required according to RN Table 14-Mod or Table 15-Mod (whichever appropriate) breathing oxygen at 14
metres. On completion the RCOs would transfer to the man lock of the recompression chamber and be
decompressed to the surface over 10 minutes whilst continuing to breath oxygen. Oxygen breathing
periods at 14 metres would be of 30 minutes on oxygen, 5 minutes on air. Only time spent breathing
oxygen would be counted towards the decompression time, time spent breathing chamber air being 'dead
time'.
The decision as to which of the above procedures to complete will depend upon factors such as
manpower availability as well as pressure time exposure of the RCOs.
Accelerated decompression tables will almost without exception utilise oxygen. Consideration
must therefore be given to the provision of adequate supplies of oxygen onboard the MOSHIP as well as
to methods of supplying the oxygen to the survivors within the recompression chambers. The following
calculations are based upon a respiratory minute volume of 15 litres per minute surface equivalent
representative of the gas usage of an individual at rest.
Survivor Attendant
* Assumes at rest and respiratory minute volume of 15 litres per minute surface equivalent
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ATP 57(B)
Tables 66 and 66 Mod I & II are based on 30 minute duration oxygen breathing periods at 2.4 bar
(0.24mPa) with a final 10 minute period breathing oxygen during which the pressure is reduced from 2.4
bar (0.24mPa) to 1.0 bar (0.1mPa). Thus for each 30 minute period at 2.4 bar (0.24mPa) the oxygen usage
per person is 30 x 2.4 x 15 = 1080 litres. Oxygen usage during the 10 minute bleed to surface can be
calculated by averaging the pressure over the 10 minute period. Thus, oxygen usage per person during the
10 minute bleed to the surface is (10 x 1.7 x 15) = 255 litres. Table 66 is slightly different in so far as the
final 30 minute oxygen period includes the 10 minute bleed to the surface. Oxygen usage per person
during the final 30 minutes of a standard Table 66 is thus (20 x 2.4 x 15) + (10 x 1.7 x 15) = 975 litres.
Based upon these calculations Table 3 provides details of oxygen requirement per survivor for each
decompression table. Details are also provided of the oxygen requirement for chamber attendants.
The volumes of oxygen required are considerable. If a worst case scenario of 100 personnel
rescued from a submarine compartment with an EAD above 30 metres, and hence requirement for use of
Table 66 Mod II, is considered a total volume of 889,500 litres of oxygen would be required for the
survivors alone. Assuming a ratio of 10 survivors per attendant an additional 24,150 litres would be
needed. Thus a total of 913,650 litres of oxygen would be required. Even assuming 100% utilisation this
would require over 215 standard 150 cubic foot oxygen cylinders or 7 commercial ‘quads’ (each contain
140,000 litres of oxygen at 200 bar and weigh in excess of 500kg). Because of the large volumes and
problems inherent in transporting between 4 and 5 tonnes of oxygen cylinders it is essential that alternate
means of supplying oxygen, other than the use of oxygen cylinders is required. Alternatives include the
use of closed circuit rebreathers which would reduce the quantity of oxygen required to that of metabolic
need plus the possible use of oxygen concentrators or cryogenic systems.
The use of an oxygen rebreathing system would reduce the oxygen requirements to approximately
1.5 litres per man per minute, a ten fold decrease in the volume required to supply an open circuit system.
As well as oxygen a rebreather also requires quantities of a CO2 absorbent material such as soda lime.
The quantity of absorbent depends on both the metabolic rate of the subject and also the design of the
absorbent canister. The Clearance Diving Breathing Apparatus (CDBA) used by the Royal Navy contains
3kg of soda lime which is sufficient to maintain efficient removal of CO2 for a 4 hour period. Unlike the
diver who can be expected to be working hard during a 4 hour dive the survivor rescued from a submarine
undergoing recompression will be at rest during an accelerated decompression procedure and as such have
a much reduced metabolic rate and hence CO2 output. Provided the absorbent canister is of efficient
design it is estimated that approximately 1.5kg of soda lime would probably be sufficient to maintain
acceptable inspired CO2 levels during the nearly 5 hour duration of a Table 66 Mod II. Based upon 100
survivors a total of 150 kg of soda lime would be required in addition to some 22 standard 150 cubic foot
oxygen cylinders or a single commercial ‘quad’ of oxygen.
The adoption of an oxygen rebreathing system, as well as reducing the volume and mass of
consumables to be transported and stored upon the MOSHIP, has the added advantage of minimal impact
upon the internal pressure of the recompression chamber in which oxygen is to be administered. In the
case of a deck mounted recompression facility this is not a major problem as standard practice is to
‘dump’ the exhaled oxygen overboard from the chamber. However, this is not possible within a rescue
submersible such as LR5 where use of an open circuit oxygen system would result in a rapid increase of
both compartment pressure and oxygen content, both of which would be unacceptable. Adoption of an
oxygen rebreather might make possible the commencement of oxygen breathing within LR5 during its
transition make to the MOSHIP. The ability to pre breathe oxygen prior to the decompression to 1 bar
would almost certainly reduce the probability of DCI occurring during the surface interval. This would be
of especial benefit following rescues from high compartment pressures.
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0326 - Conclusions
Survivors rescued from a pressurised submarine compartment by a rescue submersible such as LR5
will in the absence of a TUP facility be at considerable risk of developing DCI. In the case of rescue from
a compartment with an EAD above 20 metres fatalities can be expected. By adoption of a surface
decompression in which the time between commencing decompression within the rescue submersible to
arriving at pressure within a surface recompression chamber is minimised it is hoped that DCI can be
prevented. The procedures described should only be considered as a temporary solution pending
procurement of a TUP facility or for use in circumstances in which a TUP facility is not available.
0327 - Reference
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0327 - Reference: The information contained below is drawn from ‘Procedures For Saturation
Decompression Of Submariners Rescued From A DISSUB - A Review Of Published Procedures And
Recommendation Of Interim NSRS Decompression Procedures (3rd Edition)’ by Surgeon Commander
Senior Grade Jan Risberg, Head Of Submarine and Diving Medicine RNON
Limitations: These tables have been extrapolated theoretically from decompression procedures
reviewed by Surg Cdr Risberg. These include air decompression tables for shallow saturation which have
maximum depths of up to 60msw for NITROX or 30msw for air. The tables are designed around
compressed air as the chamber gas and air or oxygen as the breathing gas. Where the breathing gas is
oxygen then 30 minutes of O2 should be followed by a 10 minute air break.
NSRS TABLE 1
An air-only decompression procedure. Targeted to give a K=1.5 msw/h/Bar at depth and 1,0 at shallow
depth Considered the optimal and safest choice when there is no constraint on decompression time.
NSRS TABLE 2
Air breathing to 12 msw, oxygen (and air breaks) from 12 msw to surface. Targeted to give K=1.5
msw/h/Bar at depth at K=0.8 msw/h/Bar from 12 msw to surface. Considered an acceptable compromise
if decompression time is constrained and a moderate exposure to hyperoxia acceptable.
NSRS TABLE 3
Air breathing to 18 msw, oxygen breathing (with air breaks) from 18 msw to surface. This is the
procedure of choice if there is severe constraints on decompression time and the submariners are expected
to tolerate severe hyperoxia. The oxygen burden using this procedure is so high, that severe symptoms of
pulmonary toxicity (chest discomfort, chest pain, coughing) should be expected.
NSRS TABLE 4
Nitrox 40 breathing (40% Oxygen in balance Nitrogen) from 50 to 18 msw. Compressed air breathing
(chamber gas) from 18 msw to surface. This is the procedure of choice if there is a vast number of
survivors pressurized at a high ambient pressure, and there is a need for rapid turnover in the chamber
complex. This procedure will cause a significant hyperoxic burden, but will allow the submariners to
decompress from 50 to 18 msw in 14h 20min (from 40 msw in 10h 50 min and from 30 msw in 5h
50min). A pressure equivalent to 18 msw is targeted as this will allow transfer to other pressure chambers
of opportunities in immediate vicinity (considering 18 msw as the deepest 100% Oxygen should be
breathed).
Below are listed summary performance parameters for the suggested NSRS decompression procedures
0329 - Safety
The k-values and other safety considerations, such as pulmonary oxygen toxicity, for the proposed NSRS
tables are discussed in the report.
0330 - Conclusion
NSRS 1 is recommended for decompressing submariners saturated with air at a pressure not exceeding 6
Bar (50 msw), NSRS 2-4 could be considered if time is critical and hyperoxic exposure acceptable.
NSRS TABLE 1
CHAMBER GAS
To contain FO2= 21 % ± 1%, balance Nitrogen, pCO2<1 kPa (preferably <0,05 kPa), Chamber
temperature comfortable (18-23 ºC), RH 50-70%.
BREATHING GAS
Compressed air throughout (chamber gas).
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DECOMPRESSION RATE
Decompression optimally to be performed in linear bleed, alternatively pressure drop of 0.5 or 1.0 meter
depending on operational experience/opinion/routine. No night stop. The table below present ascent rate
depending on depth and should be interpreted as “hold time” per meter for the depth range given. (E.g.
“21-15 msw” column with an ascent rate of 70 min/msw: Pressure should be held for 70 min when the
chamber reaches 21 m, a pressure drop to 20 msw is then allowed. After 70 min at 20 m the pressure could
be decreased to 19 msw a.s.o. When the pressure reaches 14 msw the pressure should be held for 120 min
(row below).)
If there is a problem maintain pressure seal or working dumps (toilet, gray water, BIBS) at shallow depths,
the chamber may alternatively be held at 3 msw for the full extension of the remaining decompression
time (i.e. the time scheduled for 3 msw to surface).
NSRS TABLE 2
CHAMBER GAS
To contain FO2= 21 % ± 1%, balance Nitrogen, pCO2<1 kPa (preferably <0,05 kPa), Chamber
temperature comfortable (18-23 ºC), RH 50-70%.
BREATHING GAS
Compressed air (chamber gas) from 50 msw to 13 msw, and 100% Oxygen from 12 msw.
DECOMPRESSION RATE
Decompression optimally to be performed in linear bleed, alternatively pressure drop of 0.5 or 1.0 meter
depending on operational experience/opinion/routine. No night stop. The table below present ascent rate
depending on depth and should be interpreted as “hold time” per meter for the depth range given. (E.g.
“21-15 msw” column with an ascent rate of 70 min/msw: Pressure should be held for 70 min when the
chamber reaches 21 m, a pressure drop to 20 msw is then allowed. After 70 min at 20 m the pressure could
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ATP 57(B)
be decreased to 19 msw a.s.o. When the pressure reaches 14 msw the pressure should be held for 120 min
(row below).)
NB! Air breaks are not included in the ascent rates given above. It is suggested that the submariners are
allowed an additional 10 min of airbreak for every 30 min of Oxygen breathing.
If there is a problem maintain pressure seal or working dumps (toilet, gray water, BIBS) at shallow depths,
the chamber may alternatively be held at 3 msw for the full extension of the remaining decompression
time (i.e. the time scheduled for 3 msw to surface).
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ATP 57(B)
NSRS TABLE 3
CHAMBER GAS
To contain FO2= 21 % ± 1%, balance Nitrogen, pCO2<1 kPa (preferably <0,05 kPa), Chamber
temperature comfortable (18-23 ºC), RH 50-70%.
BREATHING GAS
Compressed air (chamber gas) from 50 to 19 msw and 100% Oxygen from 18 msw.
DECOMPRESSION RATE
Decompression optimally to be performed in linear bleed, alternatively pressure drop of 0.5 or 1.0 meter
depending on operational experience/opinion/routine. No night stop. The table below present ascent rate
depending on depth and should be interpreted as “hold time” per meter for the depth range given. (E.g.
“30-21 msw” column with an ascent rate of 60 min/msw: Pressure should be held for 60 min when the
chamber reaches 30 m, a pressure drop to 29 msw is then allowed. After 60 min at 29 m the pressure could
be decreased to 28 msw a.s.o. When the pressure reaches 20 msw the pressure should be held for 17 min
(row below).)
NB! Air breaks are not included in the ascent rates given above. It is suggested that the submariners are
allowed an additional 10 min of airbreak for every 30 min of Oxygen breathing.
If there is a problem maintain pressure seal or working dumps (toilet, gray water, BIBS) at shallow depths,
the chamber may alternatively be held at 3 msw for the full extension of the remaining decompression
time (i.e. the time scheduled for 3 msw to surface).
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ATP 57(B)
NSRS TABLE 4
CHAMBER GAS
There are two options: Either compressed air (FO2= 21 % ± 1%, balance Nitrogen) or a proper Nitrox mix
(FO2= 40 % ± 1%, balance Nitrogen). In the first case, Nitrox 40 must be available on BIBS, in the latter
case compressed air should be available on BIBS.
BREATHING GAS
Nitrox 40 from 50 to 19 msw, Compressed air from 18 msw.
DECOMPRESSION RATE
Decompression optimally to be performed in linear bleed, alternatively pressure drop of 0.5 or 1.0 meter
depending on operational experience/opinion/routine. No night stop. The table below present ascent rate
depending on depth and should be interpreted as “hold time” per meter for the depth range given. (E.g.
“30-21 msw” column with an ascent rate of 60 min/msw: Pressure should be held for 60 min when the
chamber reaches 30 m, a pressure drop to 29 msw is then allowed. After 60 min at 29 m the pressure could
be decreased to 28 msw a.s.o. When the pressure reaches 20 msw the pressure should be held for 17 min
(row below).)
NB! Air breaks are not included in the ascent rates given above. It is suggested that the submariners are
allowed an additional 10 min of airbreak for every 30 min of Nitrox breathing.
If there is a problem maintaining pressure seal or working dumps (toilet, gray water, BIBS) at shallow
depths, the chamber may alternatively be held at 3 msw for the full extension of the remaining
decompression time (i.e. the time scheduled for 3 msw to surface).
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ATP 57(B)
Optionally, the breathing gas may be changed to Nitrox 50 from 30 to 19 msw. In that case,
decompression rate may be increased to 30 min/msw from 30 to 19 msw. This will, however, increase the
risk for symptoms of (pulmonary) oxygen toxicity.
0332 - Reference:
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