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I. LAWYER'S FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS

(Laarnie Llamas)
1. Angeles vs. Uy Jr. 330 SCRA 6, 17 (2000)
Facts: In a letter addressed to the Office of the Chief Justice, Judge Angeles of the RTC of Caloocan City charged
Atty. Uy Jr. with violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The accused manifested that she had already settled in full the civil aspect in the criminal case handled by respondent
under the sala of judge complainant. Accused further alleged that she paid P20,000.00 directly to the private
complainant and the balance of P16,500.00 was delivered to Atty. Uy, Jr., the lawyer of the private complainant and
conformably produced in open court the receipt for such payment signed by no less than the aforesaid lawyer.
However, private complainant manifested that she did not receive the amount paid to his lawyer, herein respondent,
thereby constraining the court to direct respondent to turn over the money to private complainant which he received in
trust for the client. Atty. Uy however argued that his client did not like to accept the money but the assertion of the
lawyer was belied by his own client, the herein private complainant, who manifested in open court her willingness to
accept the money. The Court again directed Atty. Uy to produce the money but the latter argued that he kept it in his
office. Consequently, the Court suspended the proceedings to enable Atty. Uy to get the money from his law office
which is located only at the second floor of the same building where this court is located. However, respondent did not
show up anymore.
Issue: Is the respondent guilty of professional misconduct?
Held: YES. The relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly fiduciary; it requires a high degree of fidelity and
good faith. It is designed "to remove all such temptation and to prevent everything of that kind from being done for the
protection of the client." Thus, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "a lawyer shall hold in
trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession." Furthermore, Rule 16.01 of the Code
also states that "a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client." The
Canons of Professional Ethics is even more explicit: "The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his
personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.
In the present case, it is clear that respondent failed to promptly report and account for the P16,500 he had received
from Trajano on behalf of his client. Although the amount had been entrusted to respondent, his client revealed during
the hearing that she had not yet received it. Worse, she did not even know where it was.
The records do not clearly show whether Atty. Uy had in fact appropriated the said amount; in fact, his client
acknowledged that she had received it. They do show, however, that respondent failed to promptly report that amount
to her. This is clearly a violation of his professional responsibility. It is settled that money collected by a lawyer in favor
of his clients must be immediately turned over to them and that lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or
property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct.
Verily, the question is not necessarily whether the rights of the clients have been prejudiced, but whether the
lawyer has adhered to the ethical standards of the bar. In this case, respondent has not done so.
2. Nakpil vs. Valdes 186 SCRA 758 (1998)
Facts:Jose Nakpil was interested in a piece of property situated in Moran, Baguio. He went into an agreement with
Atty. Carlos Valdes for thelatter to buy the property in trust for Nakpil. Valdes did buy the property by contracting 2
loans. The lands titles were transferred to his name.When Jose Nakpil died, Imelda Nakpil (his wife) acquired the
services of Valdes and his accounting and law firms for the settlement of the estate of Jose Nakpil. What Valdes did
was to exclude the property in Baguio from thelist of assets of Jose Nakpil (he actually transferred the property to his
company, the Caval Realty Corporation) while including the loans he contracted.What Imelda did was to file a suit for
reconveyance in the CFI.While the case was pending, Imelda also filed an administrative complaintf or disbarment
against Valdes. The CFI dismissed the action for reconveyance. The CA reversed the CFI.The complaint for
reconveyance went up to the SC and was decided in favor of Nakpil. The SC held that Valdes only held the lots intrust
for Nakpil.
Issue:W/n Atty. Valdes should be administratively sanctioned for hisacts, namely:o Excluding the property in Baguio
from the estate of Jose Nakpil;
Including his loans as claims on the estate; and

Apparently, representing conflicting interests when his accounting firm prepared the list of claims of creditors
Angel Nakpil and ENORN against the estate of Jose Nakpil, which was represented by his law firm.
Held:The SC found Valdes guilty of misconduct and suspends him for 1 year.The Court held that the first two acts
clearly show that Valdes broke the trust reposed on him by Imelda Nakpil when the latter agreed to use his
professional services as a lawyer and an accountant. As to the third charge, we hold respondent guilty of representing
conflicting interests which is proscribed by Canon 15 Rule15.03. In the case at bar, there is no question that the

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interests of the estate and that of its creditors are adverse to each other. Respondent's accounting firm prepared the
list of assets and liabilities of the estate and, at the same time,computed the claims of two creditors of the estate.
There is clearly a conflict between the interests of the estate which stands.
3. Liwag vs. Neri 107 Phil. 852 (1960)
Facts:
The complainants were requested by the Pinedas to act as counter-indemnitor with the Manila Surety & Fidelity
Company in a bond posted for the Pinedas in favor of NARIC. When the Pinedas failed to liquidate their obligation, the
NARIC enforced the bond against the Manila Surety & Fidelity Company and the latter in turn collected from the
complainant. Having failed to collect from the Pinedas, the complainant engaged the services of the respondent who
agreed to handle the matter on a contingent fee of forty percent.
The respondent tried to talk to the Pinedas. When no payment had been made, the respondent wrote a letter of
demand, threatening to take judicial action if the PInedas would still not meet their obligation. The complainant give the
respondent the needed filing fee for the complaint. The respondent did not actually file any complaint, although he
informed the complainant that he already done so. It did not take long before the truth was discovered and before the
complainant was provoked to file an administrative case.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Gilberto Neri should be disbar.
Held:
The respondent has committed a breach of professional ethics when he made the complainant believe that the Pineda
spouses had already been sued in court and did not return the amount intended for the filing fee.
Considering however, that the respondent has not yet received anything for his services and that the complainant has
subsequently been paid, disbarment or even suspension of the respondent from the practice of his profession would
be too harsh and unkind. The respondent was reprimanded for his offense, with the warning that a repetition of similar
misconduct or any violation of his oath will be dealt with more drastically.
4. Diaz vs. Kapunan 45 Phil. 848 (1923)
Facts:
Vicente Diaz and Secundino de Mendezona formed a business partnership. The business failed to prosper
and suffered losses. They formulated a document of sale and mortgage in which Mendezona recognized a
debt in favor of Diaz in the sum of 90k laid upon Mendezonas hacienda.
Later on, Mendezona was nowhere to be found and his family was unable to meet the payment. Thus, the
hacienda was offered for sale at public auction.
Diazs lawyer, Atty. Kapunan told the deputy sheriff of Leyte that he was ready to bid on the property up to 16k
in order to assist the Mendezona family.
Later, Diaz and Kapunan entered into an agreement wherein Kapunan should withdraw his bid and refrain
from bidding in consideration of 1,000 pesos from Diaz.
Following the termination of the sheriffs sale, Diaz pressed charges against Kapunan for alleged
unprofessional conduct.
It was found that Kapunan was also the lawyer of the Mendezona family and was given extensive authority.
When Kapunan took part in the sale, it must be assumed that he was bidding in representation of his clients
and not for the benefit of his clients.

Three charges were considered against Kapunan. The first two were related to Kapunans attempt to
represent both the parties in the case and to molest and disturb Diaz by frviolous motions. The third
charge has to do with Kapunan having intervened in the manner in which he did in the sale of the
property of his client Mendezona.
The Atty-General is of the opinion that the facts constitute a flagrant violation of the provisions of
article 1459 of the Civil Code and article 542 of the Penal Code.
Issue: WON Kapunan is guilty of such violations.
Held:

Article 1459 of the Civil Code provides that the following persons, naming them, cannot take by purchase,
even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another. The provision
contained in the last paragraph of said article is made to include lawyers.
The Court does not believe this article has been infringed by the respondent because he has not purchased
property at a public or judicial auction and because his participation was in representation of his client.
In article 542 of the Penal Code, it punishes any person who shall solicit any gift or promise as a
consideration for agreeing to refrain from taking party in any public auction.
The agreement of both parties wherein Diaz pays Kapunan the sum of 1,000 pesos to withdraw from the sale
is exactly the situation covered by article 542 of the Penal Code.

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Execution sales should be open to free and full competition in order to secure the maximum benefit
of the debtor.
The Court concluded that Atty. Kapunan has been guilty of a technical violation of art. 542 of the Penal Code.
However, since the complainant is equally guilty with the responded Kapunan and the latter was found to be
acting in good faith, Kapunan shall only be reprimanded.
5. Canlas vs. CA 164 SCRA 160
Facts:
Atty. Paterno R. Canlas, petitioner, was the lawyer of the private respondent, Francisco Herrera, in an injunction case
against L & R Corporation. . Two years later, and with no imminent end to the litigation in sight, the parties entered into
a compromise agreement whereby L & R Corporation accorded the private respondent another year to redeem the
foreclosed properties subject to payment of P600,000.00, with interest thereon at one per cent per month. They
likewise stipulated that the petitioner shall be entitled to attorney's fees of P100,000.00. On November 19, 1982, the
court approved the compromise.
The private respondent, however, remained in dire financial straits for which reason he failed to acquire the finding to
repay the loans in question, let alone the sum of P100,000.00 in attorney's fees demanded by the petitioner. That
notwithstanding, the petitioner moved for execution insofar as his fees were concerned. The court granted execution,
although it does not appear that the sum was actually collected.
Sometime thereafter, the petitioner and the private respondent met to discuss relief for the latter with respect to his
liability to L & R Corporation on the one hand, and his obligation to the petitioner on the other. The private respondent
said that it was the petitioner himself who 'offered to advance the money," provided that he, the private respondent,
executed a "transfer of mortgage" over the properties in his favor.
The parties, pursuant to their agreement, executed a "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Redemption and/or to
Redeem," a document that enabled the petitioner, first, to redeem the parcels in question, and secondly, to register the
same in his name. The private respondent contends that the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Redemption
and/or to Redeem" on file with the Register of Deeds (for Quezon City) had been falsified. Upon learning of the same,
the petitioner moved for the cancellation of the adverse claim and for the issuance of a writ of possession. The court
granted both motions. The private respondent countered with a motion for a temporary restraining order and later, a
motion to recall the writ of possession. Predictably, the petitioner moved for dismissal.
Issue:
Whether or not the inability of the client to pay lawyers fee be a reason for the lawyer to claim the property in question,
as his payment.
Held:
For obvious reasons, he placed his interests over and above those of his client, in opposition to his oath to "conduct
himself as a lawyer with all good fidelity to his client." The occasion fit to stress that lawyering is not a moneymaking
venture and lawyers are not merchants, a fundamental standard that has, as a matter of judicial notice, eluded not a
few law advocates. The petitioner's efforts partaking of a shakedown" of his own client are not becoming of a lawyer
and certainly, do not speak well of his fealty to his oath to "delay no man for money."
It is true that lawyers are entitled to make a living, in spite of the fact that the practice of law is not a commercial
enterprise; but that does not furnish an excuse for plain lust for material wealth, more so at the expense of another.
Law advocacy, we reiterate, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a job done or
service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from government
interference, is impressed with a public interest, for which it is subject to State regulation. 37Anent attomey's fees,
section 24, of Rule 138, of the Rules, provides in part as follows:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys, agreement as to fees. An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from
his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter
of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney... A written
contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable.
So also it is decreed by Article 2208 of the Civil Code, reproduced in part, as follows:
Art. 2208 ...
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
The Court dismissed the case and order the petitioner to pay the private respondent the sum of P 326,000.00, as and
for damages. The petitioner is also ordered to show cause to not impose a disciplinary action on him for violation of his
oath as a lawyer.
6. Capulong vs. Alino 22 SCRA 491 (1968)
FACTS: In 1957, the spouses Emilio and Cirila Capulong lost a civil case. They were represented by Atty.
Manuel Alio. The spouses then gave P298.00 (then a significant amount of money) in order for the lawyer to use the
money in paying for fees in appealing the case. However, the appeal was dismissed because Atty. Alio failed to pay

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the docket fees and other required fees.

The spouses then filed an administrative case against Atty. Alio. In his defense, Atty. Alio claimed that he was given
the option to either use the money for appeal if in his judgment an appeal is proper or to appropriate the same for his
legal services. The investigating fiscal recommended disciplinary action against Atty. Alio. The Solicitor General
agreed with the fiscal. When the case reached the Supreme Court, Atty. Alio manifested his intent to produce
additional evidence. The SC granted his request but, after four postponements which Atty. Alio asked for, he still failed
to adduce additional evidence within the prescribe period. The SC still gave him a chance and scheduled an oral
argument but again, Atty. Alio asked for postponement. In lieu of the oral argument, the SC required Alio to submit
his memorandum which he again failed to comply with.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Alio should be subjected to disciplinary action.
HELD: Yes. Alio was already negligent when he failed to pay the docket fees. In the first place, he already filed the
appeal, hence, he should have applied the money given to him to pay for the docket fees. It is clear that Alio
misappropriated the funds when he applied the same as payment for his fees.
But his later actions in this case shows his high degree of irresponsibility. He was given all chances by the SC but he
continually failed to comply with the orders of the court. Such display of irresponsibility indicates his unworthiness as a
member of the legal profession. Alio was disbarred by the Supreme Court.
7. Calejo v. Soriano
8. Penticostes vs. Ibanez 304 SCRA 281 (1999)
FACTS: The sister-in-law of Atty. Penticostes was sued for non-remittance of SSS payments. The respondent, Pros.
Ibanez was given by the sister-in-law of Penticostes P1,804 as payment of her SSS contribution arrears but
said respondent did not remit the amount to the system. Complainant filed with the RTC a complaint for
professional misconduct against Ibanez due to the latters failure to remit to the SSS her contribution and
for respondents misappropriation of the amount.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents act amounted to violation of his oath as a lawyer.
HELD: Yes. Non-remittance by a public prosecutor for over one year of funds entrusted to him constitutes conduct in
gross violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. Lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property
received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct.
II. LAWYER'S DUTIES IN HANDLING CLIENT'S CASES
1 Santiago vs. Fojas 248 SCRA 68 (September 7, 1995)
The Case:
Petitioners: The Complainants, former clients of the respondent, pray that the latter be disbarred for "malpractice,
neglect and other offenses which may be discovered during the actual investigation of this complaint." Attached in their
Affidavit of Merit, they allege that because of the respondents neglect and malpractice of law that they lost their case
to Judge Capulong and their appeal in the Court of Appeals.
Respondent: The unfavorable judgment by the Regional Trial Court in the case is not imputable to [his] mistake but
rather imputable to the merits of the case. He further claims that the complainants filed this case to harass him
because he refused to share his attorney's fees in the main labor case he had handled for them. The respondent then
prays for the dismissal of this complaint for utter lack of merit, since his failure to file the answer was cured and, even
granting for the sake of argument that such failure amounted to negligence, it cannot warrant his disbarment or
suspension from the practice of the law profession.
The Antecedent Facts:
Santiago, Hontiveros, Manas, and Nordista, members of Far Eastern University Faculty Association (FEUFA), were
alleged to have illegally expelled Paulino Salvador from the union. The latter filed a complaint with the Dept. of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) which ruled in favor of Salvador. Subsequently, Salvador filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Valenzuela a complaint against the complainants for actual, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees.
The respondent, As the complainants' counsel, filed a motion to dismiss the said case on grounds of (1) res judicata
and (2) lack of jurisdiction. Later, he filed a supplemental motion to dismiss. Judge Capulong granted the motion but

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was later re-instated upon Salvadors motion for reconsideration and required the complainants herein to file their
answer within a nonextendible period of fifteen days from notice. Instead of filing an answer, the respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration and dismissal of the case. This motion having been denied, the respondent filed with this
Court a petition for certiorari. Both petition and the subsequent motion for reconsideration were denied, respondent still
did not file the complainants answer. The respondent then filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to stop
the ex-parte reception of evidence before the Clerk of Court, but to no avail. Thereafter, the RTC rendered judgment in
favor of Salvador. Complainants, assisted by respondent, elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals but affirmed the
decision in toto by the RTC.
The respondent admits that it was his duty to file an answer in the civil case/ He justifies his failure to do so n his
overzealousness to question the Denial Order of the trial court, so he instead, thru honest mistake and excusable
neglect, filed a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI with the Honorable Court, and, when the Court of Appeals, to which
G.R. No. 100983 was referred, dismissed the petition, he again "inadvertently" failed to file an answer due to honest
mistake and because of his overzealousness as stated earlier. Petitioner contends that the respondents act was not
an honest mistake but was "deliberate, malicious and calculated to place them on the legal disadvantage, to their
damage and prejudice" for, as admitted by him in his motion to set aside the order of default, his failure to do so was
"due to volume and pressure of legal work."
Issue: Whether the respondent committed culpable negligence, as would warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for
the complainants an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91.
Ruling: It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to
become his client. He has the right to decline employment, subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility1. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence,
and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Else wise stated, he owes entire
devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion
of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law,
legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is
authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is
demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not
only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and
candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps
maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.
Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no excuse for the respondent's inability to exercise due diligence in
the performance of his duty to file an answer. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill,
and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
All told, the respondent committed a breach of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires him
to serve his clients, the complainants herein, with diligence and, more specifically, Rule 18.03 thereof which provides:
"A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable."
2.) Cantiller vs. Potenciano, 180 SCRA 246 (1989)
Facts: Humberto V. Potenciano is a practicing lawyer and a member of the Philippine Bar under Roll No. 21862. He is
charged with deceit, fraud, and misrepresentation, and also with gross misconduct, malpractice and of acts
unbecoming of an officer of the court.
An action for ejectment was filed against Peregrina Cantiller. The court issued a decision against the latter. A notice to
vacate was then issued against Cantiller.
Cantiller then asked the respondent to handle their case. The complainant was made to sign by respondent what she
described as a "[h]astily prepared, poorly conceived, and haphazardly composed petition for annulment of judgment.
The petition was filed with the Regional Trial Court in Pasig, Manila. Respondent demanded from the
1

Canon 14. Lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy.

14.01 - A lawyer shall not decline to represent a person solely on account of the latters race, sex, creed or status of
life, or because his own opinion regarding the guilt of said person.

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14.02 A lawyer shall not decline, except for serious and sufficient cause, an appointment as counsel de oficio or as
amicus curiae or a request from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any of its chapters for rendition of free legal
aid.
14.03 A lawyer shall not refuse to accept representation of an indigent client unless: (a) he is not in position to carry
out the work effectively or completely; (b) he labors under conflict of interest between him and the present client and
the prospective client.
14.04 A lawyer who accepts the cause of a person unable to pay his professional fees shall observe the same
standard of conduct governing his relations with paying clients.
complainant P l,000.00 as attorney's fee. However the judge of the said court asked the respondent to withdraw as
counsel by reason of their friendship.
Later, Cantiller paid Potenciano P2,000.00 as demanded by the latter which was allegedly needed to be paid to
another judge who will issue the restraining order but eventually Potenciano did not succeed in locating the judge.
Complainant paid P 10,000.00 to Potenciano by virtue of the demand of the latter. The amount was allegedly to be
deposited with the Treasurer's Office of Pasig as purchase price of the apartment and P 1,000.00 to cover the
expenses of the suit needed in order for the complainant to retain the possession of the property. But later on Cantiller
found out that the amounts were not necessary to be paid. A demand was made against Potenciano but the latter did
not answer and the amounts were not returned.
Contrary to Potencianos promise that he would secure a restraining order, he withdrew his appearance as counsel for
complainant. Complainant was not able to get another lawyer as replacement. Hence, the order to vacate was
eventually enforced and executed.
Issue: Whether or not Potenciano breached his duties as counsel of Cantiller.
Held: When a lawyer takes a client's cause, he thereby covenants that he will exert all effort for its prosecution until its
final conclusion. The failure to exercise due diligence or the abandonment of a client's cause makes such lawyer
unworthy of the trust which the client had reposed on him. The acts of respondent in this case violate the most
elementary principles of professional ethics.
The Court finds that respondent failed to exercise due diligence in protecting his client's interests. Respondent had
knowledge beforehand that he would be asked by the presiding judge to withdraw his appearance as counsel by
reason of their friendship. Despite such prior knowledge, respondent took no steps to find a replacement nor did he
inform complainant of this fact.
Lawyers should be fair, honest, respectable, above suspicion and beyond reproach in dealing with their clients. The
profession is not synonymous with an ordinary business proposition. It is a matter of public interest.
3.) RODOLFO MILLARE, petitioner, vs. ATTY. EUSTAQUIO Z. MONTERO, respondent.
A.C. No. 3283 July 13, 1995
Facts:
Pacifica Millare, the mother of the complainant, obtained a favorable judgment from the MTC of Abra which ordered
Elsa Dy Co to vacate the premises subject of the ejectment case (Civil Case No. 844). Co, through respondent as
counsel, appealed the decision to the RTC. She neither filed a supersedeas bond nor paid the rentals adjudged by the
MTC. The RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC.
The CA dismissed Co's appeal from the decision of the RTC for failure to comply with Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129 and
Section 22(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines. According to the CA, Co should have filed a petition for review and
not an ordinary appeal.
The judgment of the MTC became final and executory on November 19, 1986.
Respondent filed a total of six appeals, complaints or petitions to frustrate the execution of the MTC judgment in Civil
Case No. 844, to wit:
(1)
Civil Case No. 344 Appeal from the decision rendered in Civil Case No. 844 of the Municipal Trial Court,
Bangued, Abra, with the Regional Trial Court, Abra;
(2)

CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 Appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Abra;

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(3)
CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 An Action For the Annulment of Decisions And/Or Reformation or Novation of
Decisions filed with the Court of Appeals;
(4)

G.R. No. 86084 Petition For Review On Certiorari filed with the Supreme Court;

(5)

CA-G.R. SP No. 17040 Appeal And/Or Review By Certiorari, Etc. filed also with the Court of Appeals; and,

(6)
SP Civil Action No. 624 Petition For Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus with Preliminary Issuance of
Prohibitory Order filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Bangued, Abra.
ISSUE:
1.
Whether or not respondent resorted to devious and underhanded means to delay the execution of the
judgment rendered by the MTC adverse to his clients. YES
2.

Whether or not respondent is guilty of forum shopping. YES

HELD:
Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to represent his client "within the
bounds of the law." The Code enjoins a lawyer to employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of
his client (Rule 19.01) and warns him not to allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case (Rule 19.03).
In short, a lawyer is not a gun for hire.
Under Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to exert every effort and consider it his
duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from
the same cause (Rule 12.02). A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse
court processes (Rule 12.04)
The rights of respondent's client in Civil Case No. 844 of the MTC were fully protected and her defenses were properly
ventilated when he filed the appeal from the MTC to the RTC. But respondent thereafter resorted to devious and
underhanded means to delay the execution of the judgment rendered by the MTC adverse to his client. The said
decision became executory even pending its appeal with the RTC because of the failure of Co to file a supersedeas
bond and to pay the monthly rentals as they fell due. Furthermore, his petition for annulment of the decisions of the
MTC and RTC which he filed with the CA (CA-G.R. No. 11690) was defective and dilatory. According to the CA, there
was no allegation therein that the courts had no jurisdiction, that his client was denied due process, or "that the
judgments in the former cases were secured through fraud."
Judging from the number of actions filed by respondent to forestall the execution of the same judgment, respondent is
also guilty of forum shopping. The Court explained that forum shopping exists when, by reason of an adverse decision
in one forum, defendant ventures to another for a more favorable resolution of his case
By having wilfully and knowingly abused his rights of recourse in his efforts to get a favorable judgment, which efforts
were all rebuffed, respondent violated the duty of a member of the Bar to institute actions only which are just and put
up such defenses as he perceives to be truly contestable under the laws
WHEREFORE, respondent is SUSPENDED for one year.
4. Choa vs. Chiongson (A.M. No. MTJ-95-1063. February 9, 1996)
FACTS:
A complaint was filed against Alfonso Choa for making untruthful statements or falsehoods in his Petition for
Naturalization. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 50322 and was assigned to Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MCTC) of Bacolod City Branch III presided by the respondent Judge Roberto Chiongson. On February 21,
1995, respondent Judge found the complainant guilty of the crime of perjury. Later on, Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz as
counsel for the complainant and verified by the latter, charged Judge Chiongson with grave misconduct, gross bias
and partiality, and having knowingly rendered an unjust judgment based on next-door-neighbor relationship between
Choa's wife the private complainant in the perjury case and respondent judge. Also, appeal on the criminal case was
filed together with the administrative complaint.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Quiroz assisted in filing a groundless, unfounded, or false suit against respondent judge.
Held:
YES.Lawyers must always remind himself of the oath he took upon admission to the Bar that he will not wittingly or

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willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; Needless to state,
the lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and the administration of justice,and it
must be done within the bounds of reason and common sense.
As to the respondent Judges being a next-door neighbor of the complainants wife - the complainant in the perjury
case - it must be stressed that that alone is not a ground for either a mandatory disqualification under the first
paragraph or for a voluntary disqualification under the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.
In any event, the complainant has failed to disclose in his complaint that he had raised this matter at any time before
the rendition of the judgment. In fact, the summary of the grounds of his motion for reconsideration in the respondents
order denying the said motion does not include this matter. If indeed the complainant honestly believed in the justness
of this grievance, he would have raised it in an appropriate pleading before the trial court and not filing an
administrative case.
WHEREFORE, we hereby impose upon ATTY. RAYMUNDO A. QUIROZ a FINE in the amount of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) to be paid within five (5) days from notice hereof. He is further WARNED that a
commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
5.) COSMOS FOUNDRY SHOP WORKERS UNION V LO BU
Facts:
After Cosmos Foundry Shop was burned , Ong Ting established Century Foundry Shop where he and his family
resided in the premises. After several attempts to settle a pending unfair labor practice case proved unsuccessful, Ong
Ting sold all his business, including equipment and rights in the New Century Foundry Shop to his compadre Lo Bu, for
Php20,000.
On Jan 16, 1973, petitioner CFSWU obtained from the Court of Industrial Relations the third alias writ of execution for
the satisfaction and enforcement of the judgment in its favor. Thereafter, writ was served January 17 and 18, 1973,
levying on the personal properties of the Cosmos Foundry Shop or the New Century Foundry Shop for the purpose of
conducting the public auction sale.
Respondent Lo Bu filed an urgent motion to recall writ of execution, asserting lack of jurisdiction of the Court of
Industrial Relations (CIR). The CIR, in its order dated Feb 23, 1973, denied his motion. So likewise was the motion for
reconsideration.
Lo Bu appealed by certiorari but the Court denied this petition in its resolution dated July 17, 1993. In the meanwhile,
there was a replevin suit by Lo Bu in the Court of First Instance (CFI) Manila covering the same properties.
Upon receipt of order from the Court denying certiorari, petitioner Labor Union filed a second motion to dismiss
complaint. After the complaint was dismissed by the lower court, decision was elevated to the Court of Appeals.
Atty. Busmente, counsel for respondent Lo Bu, did specifically maintain: "...in order to vindicate his rights over the
levied properties, in an expeditious or less expensive manner, herein appellant voluntarily submitted himself, as a
forced intervenor, to the jurisdiction of respondent CIR, by filing an urgent 'Motion to Recall Writ of Execution,' precisely
questioning the jurisdiction of said Court to pass upon the validity and legality of the sale of the 'New Century Foundry
Shop' to him, without the latter being made a party to the case, as well as the jurisdiction of said Court to enforce the
Decision rendered against the respondents in the ULP Case by means of an alias writ of execution against his
properties found at the 'New Century Foundry Shop.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not counsel Atty Busmente performed his obligation as an officer of the court while sustaining the
dignity of the profession while acting as counsel for Lo Bu.
Held:
A legal counsel is expected to defend a clients cause but not at the expense of truth and in defiance of the clear
purpose of labor laws. For even such case, Atty Busmente had not exculpated himself. He ought to remember that his
obligation as an officer of the court, no less than the dignity of the profession, requires that should not act like an
errand-boy at the beck and call of his client, ready and eager to do his every bidding. If he fails to keep that admonition
in mind, then he puts into serious question his good standing in the bar.
6. GAMALINDA VS ALCANTARA
FACTS:
complainant Domingo Gamalinda charges retired Judge Fernando Alcantara and Atty. Joselito Lim with grave abuse of
their profession, deception, threats, dishonoring and injuring the reputation of said complainant and bringing about the

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loss of his land but was dismissed. the record establishes that Atty. Lim was merely performing his duty as counsel for
the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3827 when he did what is now complained ofIn Civil Case No. 3827 and Felicidad Balot
had sued the heirs of Apolinario Gamalinda for reconveyance, with damages, of the eastern half of Lot No. 3217.
plaintiffs were able to secure a writ of preliminary injunction.
Pending appeal to the CA, complainant entered a portion of the area in dispute, in the belief that the whole of Lot No.
3217 belonged to him by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Quitclaim executed by the heirs of Apolinario
Gamalinda which was under the latter's name at that time. Thus, when the tenants of Salud Balot, entered the portion
being cultivated by complainant, the latter reported the incident to the police.
From Salud Balot's viewpoint, it was complainant who intruded into her land. Relying therefore on the injunction issued
by the lower court, she filed through counsel, Atty. Lim, a motion to declare complainant Gamalinda in contempt of
court.
Complainant interposed the defense that the area in dispute was different from the area occupied by him. The lower
court ordered a resurvey which showed that contrary to complainant's claim, the lot occupied by him was the very
same land involved. Accordingly, the lower court and CA declared complainant in contempt.
Atty. Lim moved for the execution of the affirmed judgment, and when the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied,
filed an "Urgent Motion to Require Domingo Gamalinda to Surrender TCT which was granted, but complainant refused
to surrender the Owner's Copy prompting Atty. Lim to file the questioned "Motion to Declare Owner's Copy of TCT Null
and Void," which the lower court granted.
the questioned acts of Atty. Lim were all done in line with his duty to prosecute his clients' cause in Civil Case No.
3827. The first motion was filed to protect his clients' possessory rights over the property in dispute while the second
motion was made to procure execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 3827.
Issue: WON the acts of atty. Lim were correct.
Held:
Yes. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
He shall serve his client with competence and diligence, and his duty of entire devotion to his client's cause not only
requires, but entitles him to employ every honorable means to secure for the client what is justly due him or to present
every defense provided by law to enable the latter's cause to succeed. An attorney's duty to safeguard the client's
interests commences from his retainer until the effective release from the case 16 or the final disposition of the whole
subject matter of the litigation. During that period, he is expected to take such reasonable steps and such ordinary care
as his client's interests may require.
This is precisely what Atty. Lim was doing when he filed the motions complained of. He should be commended, not
condemned, for diligently and competently performing his duties as an attorney;
ACCORDINGLY, the administrative charges against retired Judge Fernando Alcantara and Atty. Joselito Lim are
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
7.) J. P. JUAN & SONS, INC. VS. LIANGA INDUSTRIES, INC.
Background:
This is a simple collection case that unnecessarily reached the Supreme Court
PALE related phrase/s:
Rules of Court were devised to limit the issues and avoid unnecessary delays and surprises. Hence mandatory (are
the) provisions of the Revised Rules of Court for a pre-trial conference
The Rules further require that "every pleading shall be signed by at least one attorney of record that signature
constitutes a certificate by him that he read the pleading and to the best of his knowledge there is good ground to
support it; it is not interposed for delay" with the express admonition for a willful violation of this rule, an attorney may
be subjected to disciplinary action.
The cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is needed so that the salutary objectives of these Rules may be
attained.
oo0oo

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Facts:
Plaintiff sought recovery from defendant of the sum of P900 representing the unpaid balance of office equipment and
also for the payment of legal interests and costs for attorney's fees.
Judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff and defendant appealed the same to the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Defendant filed its Answer where it denied specifically all the allegations of paragraphs of the complaint, which are the
material allegations referring to its purchase of the office equipment, its partial payment and refusal and failure to pay
the unpaid balance despite repeated demands.
Defendant did not deny under oath the authenticity of the purchase order annexed to the complaint.
The lower Court rendered its decision granting plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Upholding the plaintiff's
position that "when defendant's answer denies the allegations because the defendant 'has no knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief' and 'specifically denies' other allegations, denials are in fact mere general denials
amounting to admissions.
Defendant filed its notice of appeal asking that its appeal be elevated to the Court of Appeals, resulting in further delay
in the resolution of this simple collection case,
No facts are disputed in this appeal defendant-appellant simply insists that it had tendered issues of fact and the Court
erroneously rendered judgment on the pleadings. The questions presented are issues only of law.
Consequently, the power of appellate review in this instance belongs to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the appeal should be dismissed?
Issue related to PALE: The duty of a litigant and his attorney in avoiding the needless clogging of court dockets.
Ruled
We find defendant's appeal to be frivolous. No error was committed by the Court below in ruling that "specific denials"
are in law general denials amounting to admissions of the material allegations based on the provisions of Rule 8,
section 10 and Rule 9, section 1 in relation to Rule 19, section 1 and Rule 20, section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The Supreme Court has stressed that An unexplained denial of information and belief of a matter of records, the
means of information concerning which are within the control of the pleader, or are readily accessible to him, is evasive
and is insufficient to constitute an effective denial.
Defendant-appellant has no cause to complain of the judgment appealed from. Its claim that it tendered an issue with
affirmative defense of having no obligation to pay was a mere conclusion not premised on an allegation of material
facts.
Failure to deny under oath the authenticity of the purchase order annexed required by Rule 8, section 8 of the Revised
Rules of Court was properly deemed an admission of the genuineness and due execution thereof.
Cases such as this contribute to the needless clogging of the court dockets. The Rules of Court were devised to limit
the issues and avoid unnecessary delays and surprises. Hence, the mandatory provisions of Rule 20 of the Revised
Rules of Court for a pre-trial conference for the simplification of the issues and the consideration of all matters which
may aid in the prompt disposition of an action. The Rules further require in Rule 7 section 5 that "every pleading of a
party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name" and that "the
signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay" with the
express admonition that "for a willful violation of this rule, an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action." The
cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is needed so that the salutary objectives of these Rules may be attained.
8. JUAN AZOR, complainant, vs. ATTORNEY EUSTAQUIO BELTRAN, respondent.
FACTS:
Eustaquio Beltran, a member of the Philippine bar, was accused of taking or causing to be detached from the rollo of
Special Proceedings No. 667 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, the financial report of complainant Juan
Azor as executor, as well as the order of the court terminating the same; of
thereafter filing a motion to require complainant to render an accounting and to deliver the property left in the will to the
beneficiaries; and of having instructed his client Lorelie Bornales and the latter's mother, Aniana Sadol-Escriba to enter
forcibly a parcel of land forming a part of the estate when he knew of its having been previously sold, thus

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necessitating a complaint for forcible entry.

ISSUE: Whether or not Beltran is guilty of malpractice and gross misconduct based on the alleged acts.
HELD:
No. The court adopts the report and recommendation of the Solicitor General which states that: "The records are
entirely bereft of any direct, positive and competent evidence to support the charge that respondent detached and
removed official records from the Office of the Clerk of Court of Camarines Sur, particularly the financial report in, and
the order of closure of, Special Proceeding No. 667. If at all, complainant appears to have merely assumed that
because, when he was allegedly shown by the clerk of court the records of said case, the same purportedly contained
at the time only the probated will and respondent's motion for an accounting therein then respondent must have
spirited away the financial report filed therein by complainant and the order of the court for the closure of said
proceedings. On the other hand, respondent did not only vigorously deny the imputation that he took said records from
the expediente of the case, but he also submitted in evidence a certification of the branch clerk of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur attesting to the fact that the records of the aforecited probate proceedings, including the
allegedly missing financial report and order, are all intact and unaltered. Needless to state, mere assumptions cannot
be the basis of any finding against any member of the bar who, as an official of the court, is presumed to act with the
utmost decorum and good faith in all his dealings."
As to the accusation that respondent still filed a motion for accounting on July 5, 1971 despite his previous knowledge
that the complainant as executor had already filed his financial report and that in fact the probate proceedings had
been closed and terminated, the report characterized it as "unfounded and baseless. Respondent explained that when
he examined the records of said case on July 5, 1971, he found on the last page thereof the financial report of
complainant of May 11, 1959, together with the latter's motion for the consideration and approval thereof, but that as
said motion appeared not to have been resolved by the court, he then got the impression that the probate proceedings
had not yet been finally terminated. That such explanation is reasonable and believable is shown by the fact that even
the probate court found complainant's financial report on the last page of the record of the case still unacted upon,
which situation likewise led it to believe that the case had not yet been terminated. Of course, had respondent made a
more diligent and exhaustive examination of the records of said probate proceedings, he would have found
somewhere therein complainant's financial report of July 8, 1958 and the court's order of closure of January 5, 1959,
and he would not have filed his motion for accounting in question. Be this as it may, however, we fail to discern in
respondent's filing of his aforesaid motion for accounting any deliberate attempt or intention on his part to mislead the
probate court in said case, or to cause complainant discredit or put him in disrepute so as to justify disciplinary action
against him in this case. There was no justification either for the allegation that respondent induced his clients, Lorelie
Bornales and the latter's mother Aniana Sadol-Escriba, to enter forcibly one of the parcels of land subject of Special
Proceeding No. 667.
Thus, respondent should he absolved of the charges hurled against him. Complainant ought to have displayed a
greater sense of responsibility. He should have refrained from imposing on this Court or the Office of the Solicitor
General a needless burden and inconvenience. Apparently what motivated him in filing his complaint was the zeal with
which respondent fought for the interests of his client. Complainant
should be aware that this Court does not look with favor upon accusations arising from dissatisfaction and resentment
at the mode in which a lawyer diligently and tenaciously prosecutes matters entrusted to him. Instead of being
condemned under the circumstances, he should be commended. Fairness to both complainant and respondent
compels the observation that the latter, as a member of the bar, is called upon to be much more careful and meticulous
in examining the records of a case and noting every pleading, even if as has happened in not a few cases, the papers
are not kept in as orderly a manner as is both proper and desirable.
9.) ALFONSO VISITACION vs. VICTOR MANIT, substituted by his widow LEONARDA MANIT and daughters
VIRGINIA DUNGOG, VICTORIA BATUCAN and MERLINDA MANIT, defendants-appellants. G.R. No. L-27231
March 28, 1969
Facts:
Plaintiff Alfonso Visitacion filed a case against defendant Victor Manit to hold him liable subsidiarily as employer for the
death of plaintiff's son, Delano. Delano's death was due to a vehicular collision involving laid defendant's driver Giron,
who was found insolvent after having been convicted and sentenced in a previous criminal case arising out of said
death. An Answer to the complaint was filed in due course by Atty. Garcia on behalf of defendant. On June 1, 1956, the
case was heard, without defendant or his counsel being present, and plaintiff presented his evidence and the case,
was submitted for decision. Defendant, however, filed a motion for new trial which was granted by the trial court.
Plaintiff presented his oral and documentary evidence and was cross-examined by Atty. Garcia. The record further
shows that Atty. Garcia commenced the presentation of evidence on behalf of defendant. When the case was
scheduled for continuation of the trial, Atty. Garcia manifested that the original defendant, Victor Manit had recently
died, and the trial court on the same date directed him to furnish plaintiff's counsel the names of the said defendant's

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heirs, so that plaintiff could amend the complaint accordingly. The only amendment in the complaint consisted in
impleading the widow and heirs of the deceased original defendant in substitution for him. The court admitted the said
Amended Complaint. The case was again set for hearing with notice to the parties through their counsels of record.
One day before the said hearing, Atty. Garcia filed a "Motion to Withdraw as Counsel", alleging that "the heirs of Victor
Manit have not hired him to represent them and consequently, his continued appearance in representation of a dead
client would be illegal" and asking the trial court "that he be relieved as counsel in the above-entitled case for the
reasons stated herein." When the case was called on the next day, neither defendants nor Atty. Garcia appeared, and
the trial court noting "defendants' apparent lack of interest as can be gleaned from the records" considered them to
have renounced their right to appear and present evidence to contest plaintiff's claim. It did not pass upon Atty.
Garcia's Motion to Withdraw as Counsel and proceeded to render judgment in favor of plaintiff.
The CA certified the case to the SC.
Issue: WON Atty. Garcia's appeal "in his capacity as officer of the Court and as former counsel of the deceased Victor
Manit" is tenable
Held:
The SC ruled in the negative. The trial Court was perfectly correct in relying upon Atty. Garcia's representation in
accordance with Rule 138, section 21 of the Rules of Court which provides that "(A)n attorney is presumed to be
properly authorized to represent any case in which he appears ...." This appeal must accordingly be dealt with as an
appeal on behalf of said heirs as defendants-appellants and not in the "unique" concept with which Atty. Garcia would
circumscribe it. The contention that said defendants-appellants, as substituted parties-defendants by virtue of their
being the heirs of the deceased original defendant should have been brought within the Court's jurisdiction by
summons is fallacious. For the record shows that Atty. Garcia at the time acknowledged receipt of the Amended
Complaint substituting said defendants-heirs for the deceased original defendant as "Attorney for the defendants",
presented no opposition thereto, and furthermore prayed for and was granted by the Court a period of 15 days to file
an answer to the Amended Complaint. Having been duly impleaded and having submitted to the Court's jurisdiction
through their counsel, Atty. Garcia, the issuance of a summons was unnecessary. Further, the trial court did not err in
ignoring the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel filed by Atty. Garcia. In the face of Atty. Garcia's previous representations
and appearance as counsel of record for the substituted defendants, his last hour motion to withdraw as counsel and
disclaimer that said defendants have hired him to represent them which he filed one day before the date set for
resumption of the hearing came too late and was properly ignored by the Court. His motion was not verified. Aside
from the fact that his said motion carried no notice, in violation of the requirement of the Rules of Court, and could
therefore be treated as a "mere scrap of paper", the said motion was likewise fatally defective in that it carried no
notice to his clients on record, the defendants-appellants, as required by the Rules of Court. Furthermore, it is well
settled that "(A)n attorney seeking to withdraw must make an application to the court, for the relation does not
terminate formally until there is a withdrawal of record; at least so far as the opposite party is concerned, the relation
otherwise continues until the end of the litigation." The trial court's ignoring of the last-hour motion and its handing
down of its decision on the day of the hearing, upon the failure of defendants and their counsel to appear, in spite of
their having been duly notified thereof, was in effect a denial of counsel's application for withdrawal. Atty. Garcia's
unexplained failure to appear was unexcusable. He had no right to presume that the Court would grant his withdrawal.
If he had then appeared and insisted on his withdrawal, the trial court could then have had the opportunity to order the
appearance of defendants-appellants and verify from them the truth of his assertion that they had not "hired him to
represent them." The circumstances of the case and the appeal taken all together lead to the conclusion that the lasthour withdrawal application of Atty. Garcia and his appeal "as officer of the Court and then counsel of the deceased"
was but a device to prolong this case and delay in the execution of the judgment, which should have been carried out
years ago.
10. FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA
BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS
BERNAL, SR.,
Facts:
The firewall of a burned out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the
family of the private respondents resulting in injuries to private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate
their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do. In the RTC, petitioners were found
guilty of gross negligence. On the last day of the 15 days period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration which was again denied. The Supreme Court finds that Court of Appeal did not commit a grave abuse
of discretion when it denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Counsel for petitioner contends that the said case
should not be applied non-publication in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official Gazette before they can be
binding.
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NO.There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in the Official Gazette before they can be
binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to
keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated
and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as the SCRA and law
journals.
In the instant case, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on September 9, 1987, more than a year after the
expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage of the grace period.
Considering the length of time from the expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the decision of the Court
of Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for
their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the
Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the
Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension
requested.
11. Cuaresma vs. Daquis G.R. L-35113 March 25, 1975
FACTS:
An order to demolish the house of Eugenio Cuaresma, herein petitioner, was issued. Macario Directo, counsel of
Cuaresma, filed a petition for certiorari and alleged that he has no knowledge of the existence of
the case. However, it turned out that petitioner and his counsel were aware of the existence of the case.
Directo was given opportunity to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for deliberately
making false allegations in such petition. Directo explained that his knowledge of the case came only after the decision
was issued and that there was no deliberate attempt and intent of misleading the Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Directo should be subject to disciplinary actions
HELD:
He was merely reprimanded. His explanation is merely an afterthought. It could be very well that after his attention was
called to the misstatements in his petition, he decided on such version as a way out.
Moreover, judging from the awkwardly worded petition and even his compliance quite indicative of either carelessness
or lack of proficiency in the handling of the English language, it is not unreasonable to assume that his deficiency in the
mode of expression
contributed to the inaccuracy of his statements. While a mere disclaimer of intent certainly cannot exculpate him, still,
in the spirit of charity and forbearance, a penalty of reprimand would
suffice. At least, it would serve to impress on respondent that in the future he should be much more careful in the
preparation of his pleadings so that the least doubt as to his intellectual honesty cannot be entertained. Every member
of the bar should realize that candor in the dealings with the Court is of the very essence of honorable membership in
the profession.
12. AURORA CAMARA VDA. DE ZUBIRI, vs. WENCESLAO ZUBIRI alias BEN, ET AL.,
FACTS:
Aurora Camara Vda. de Zubiri, filed with the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte a complaint for the recovery of
her alleged share in two commercial lots situated in Iligan City against Wenceslao Ben Zubiri, and the Standard
Vacuum Oil Co., the occupant of portions of the said properties. The plaintiff alleged that the said lots were conjugal,
having been purchased by her and her late husband during their marriage, so that at least one-half of the same
belonged to her "plus the equal share of the heir or heirs of the decedent." Moreover, the plaintiff claimed that the said
parcels were in the possession of the defendant who, "unless he can prove before this Honorable Court that he is a
duly recognized natural child of the late Jesus Zubiri, [he] has no right, interest, and participation whatsoever over the
abovementioned two lots."
Four (4) pleadings were filed namely: 1) the herein appellant's answer which showed on its face that it was signed by
the latter in his own behalf and unassisted by counsel; 2) a Stipulation of Facts, signed by the plaintiff, assisted by
counsel, and the defendant, without such assistance; 3) a motion to render judgment on the pleadings, again signed
by the plaintiff, duly assisted by counsel, and the defendant-appellant herein, signing alone, without benefit of counsel;

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and 4) the defendant Standard Vacuum Oil Company's answer to the above complaint.
Trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the aforementioned Stipulation of Facts. Since in both the answer of
the herein defendant-appellant and the stipulation of facts the latter admitted practically all the allegations of the
complaint, the decision rendered in accordance therewith was actually in favor of the plaintiff.
Wenceslao Zubiri for the first time thru counsel, filed with the trial court a petition to set aside judgment upon two
grounds, to wit: first, the three pleadings filed namely: appellant's answer, the stipulation of facts and the motion to
render judgment on the pleadings were all prepared by the plaintiff's counsel and that he, the appellant, was made to
sign all of them when he was ill and incapable of realizing the full consequences of the act.
Wenceslao seeks annulment of judgment based on the allegations to wit: that it was the plaintiff's counsel who
prepared and induced the defendant to sign all the pleadings upon which the assailed decision was based, including
and particularly the said defendant's answer, that the dismissal of the same, in the absence of the petitioner and
without affording him the chance to be heard thereon, indeed was incompatible with the exercise of sound judicial
discretion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lawyer of the plaintiff can communicate with the defendant directly and testify upon the signing of
documents
HELD:
The active participation of a lawyer in one party's affairs relating to a pending case in which the said lawyer is the
counsel for the opposing party is brazenly unethical to say the least. The Canons of Legal Ethics very explicitly declare
that "it is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests" (No. 6), and command that
A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel;
much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should deal only with his counsel.
It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented
by counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to the law. (No. 9)
As we have already said in the case of Cantorne v. Ducusin, 57 Phil. 23, the simultaneous representation by a lawyer
of both parties to a suit constitutes malpractice which should be severely condemned and the lawyer corrected by
disciplinary action. If but for this consideration alone, the court below should have allowed the motion for
postponement pleaded by the appellant and heard the merits of the latter's petition to set aside judgment.
Moreover, the affidavits of merit appended to the petition to set aside judgment recited that the defendant-appellant
was seriously sick at the time he was made to sign and swear to the above three repudiated pleadings. To be sure, no
less than the officer before whom the said pleadings were subscribed and sworn to admitted that this verification was
conducted at the appellant's residence in Cebu where the latter was confined "suffering from fever, with an ice cap on
his head and profusely perspiring." Under the circumstances, therefore, the mental capacity of the appellant to
responsibly assent to commitments set forth in the same three pleadings became doubtful and the trial court should
have exerted its earnest efforts to resolve the doubt. Especially so when account is taken of the fact that the subject
matter of the suit was not just an insubstantial sum but properties allegedly worth some P165,000.00.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the court below denying the appellant's petition to set aside
judgment is hereby revoked and set aside.
13. Deluao vs. Casteel
Facts:
Nicanor Casteel filed a fishpond application for a big tract of swampy land. Spouses Inocencia Deluao and Felipe
Deluao entered into a contract of service with Nicanor Casteel for the administration of fishfond. In a decision of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Casteel was awarded with the subject fishpond. Thereafter, Nicanor
Casteel forbade Inocencia Deluao from further administering the fishpond, and ejected the latter's representative from
the premises. Consequently, spouses Deluao filed a civil case for specific performance and damages against Casteel.
After the issues were joined, the case was set for trial. Then came a series of postponements. The lower court (Branch
I, presided by Judge Enrique A. Fernandez) finally issued on March 21, 1956 an order in
open court transferring the hearing to May 2 and 3, 1956 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. And considering the case was
pending since April 3, 1951 and under any circumstance the Court will not entertain any other transfer of hearing of this
case and if the parties will not be ready on that day set for hearing, the court will take the necessary steps for the final
determination of this case.

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The defendants, thru counsel, filed a motion for postponement. The lower court (Branch II, presided by Judge Gomez)
issued an order that while the motion for postponement was filed with the conformity of the counsel for plaintiff , the
same should be referred back to Branch I, so that the same may be disposed therein.
On the scheduled date of hearing, that is, on May 2, 1956, the lower court (Branch I, with Judge Fernandez presiding),
when informed about the defendants' motion for postponement issued an order reiterating its previous order handed
down in open court on March 21, 1956 and directing the plaintiffs to introduce their evidence ex parte, there being no
appearance on the part of the defendants or their counsel.
Issue: Whether the postponement of hearings depend upon agreement of the parties.
Held No.
It is of no moment that the motion for postponement had the conformity of the appellees' counsel. The postponement
of hearings does not depend upon agreement of the parties, but upon the court's discretion.
It was the duty of Atty. Ruiz, or of the other lawyers of record, not excluding the appellant himself, to appear before
Judge Fernandez on the scheduled dates of hearing Parties and their lawyers have no right to presume that their
motions for postponement will be granted.5 For indeed, the appellant and his 12 lawyers cannot pretend ignorance of
the recorded fact that since September 24, 1953 until the trial held on May 2, 1956, the case was under the
advisement of Judge Fernandez who presided over Branch I. There was, therefore, no necessity to "re-assign" the
same to Branch II because Judge Fernandez had exclusive control of said case, unless he was legally inhibited to try
the case and he was not.
There is truth in the appellant's contention that it is the duty of the clerk of court not of the Court to prepare the
trial calendar. But the assignment or reassignment of cases already pending in one sala to another sala, and the
setting of the date of trial after the trial calendar has been prepared, fall within the exclusive control of the presiding
judge.
14. Heirs of Elias Lorilla vs. CA
Facts:
Private respondent Pentacapital Finance Corp (Pentacapital) filed a complaint with RTC Makati for sum of money
against Sanyu Machineries Agencies, Inc. and several other defendants including petitioner herein Elias Lorilla (now
represented by his heirs) who acted as surety for 2 corporate debtors.
During the pendency of the case, Lorilla executed a dacion en pago over a property in favor of JOint Resources
Management Development Corp (JRMDC) as payment of his obligation to the latter. However, The same property was
the subject of execution in favor of Pentacapital.
Before the writ of execution was issued by RTC Makati, Elias Lorilla died. No appeal was taken by Atty. Alfredo
Concepcion, counsel of record of Elias Lorilla.
Thereafter, Petitioners(heirs) filed a motion to quash the writ of execution and annulment of dacion en pago, arguing
that the judgment cannot be enforce since Lorilla passed away 1 yr and 3 months before RTC Makati rendered
judgment raising sec. 21 of Rule 3 of the Rules of court as basis, which states: when the action is for recovery of
money, debt, interest and the defendant dies before the final judgment in the CFI, it shall be dismissed in the manner
provided in these rules.
Issue: 1.WON the judgment should be final and executory against petitioners despite Atty. Concepcion's failure to
notify the court of Elias death and to appeal such judgment.
2. WON petitioners were denied due process of law as there was no substitution due to Atty. Concepcion's fault.
Held:
1. Yes. No notice of death was filed by Atty. concepcion thus, the court nor Pentacapital were made aware of the death
of Elias Lorilla. The trial court could not be expected to know or take judicial notice of the death of Elias Lorilla. Neither
the petitioners have been aware of the adverse judgment since all notices and orders of the court were sent to Lorilla's
counsel of record.
It is the duty of the counsel to promptly inform the court of the death of his client. The failure of such counsel binds
herein petitioners as much as the client himself could be so bound. Jurisprudence holds that a client is bound by the

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conduct, negligence and mistake of his counsel.

Furthermore, since there was no timely appeal taken from the judgment of the RTC Makati, such judgment had
properly become final and executory.
2. Petitioners claimed that they were denied due process of law since there was no proper substitution as defendants
due to Atty. concepcion's fault, however, the property which they claim as lawful inheritance was no longer part of the
estate of at the time of lorilla's death. Lorilla earlier executed a dacion en pago in favor of JRMDC as his payment of
his obligation to the latter. A new TCT therefore was issued in favor of JRMDC. Therefore, petitioners do not have any
interests in the property for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
15.) Avelino vs. PALANA
Facts: A complaint was filed by Valentin Avelino against Atty. Pedro K. Palaa. the latter was charged with malpractice
in connection with his professional conduct as the complainant's counsel. such malpractice having given rise to the
rendition of judgment against said complainant and his wife.
1. Atty. Palaa did not duly inform his client of the date of the trial scheduled for November 15, 1957 when the
evidence shows that he received notice of such hearing on October 11, 1957.
2.
The filing of the motion for new trial on January 7, 1958 was made out of time. The delay in the filing of the
said motion remains unexplained.
3. Atty. Palaa's 2nd motion for new trial, after the Court had afforded him all the opportunity to plead his motion
successfully, was denied by the lower court on the ground that he failed to comply with an order of the court dated
February 1, 1958. While the said motion was duly filed on time, a previous order of the Court directed the movant (Atty.
Palaa to serve a copy of his amended motion to the other party through counsel, but compliance therewith does not
appear on the said motion).
The trial was set for hearing but the respondent instead of attending the hearing, just submitted the memorandum
and the representative from OSG didn't appear before the court.
Issue: WON Palana is guilty of malpractice.
Held:
Upon consideration of the whole record, We find no sufficient justification to reverse the finding made by the Office of
the Solicitor General to the effect that respondent "did not duly inform his client of the date of the trial scheduled for
November 15, 1957" in spite of the fact that, according to the evidence, he had received notice of such hearing four
days before.
As regards respondent's failure to appear in court on the day set for the trial, We are inclined to accept his claim that it
was due to the fact that early in the morning of that date he had "a severe stomach ache, followed by constant moving
of bowel and vomiting and that as a consequence he became very weak." But while this might be, to a certain extent, a
good excuse for his non-appearance in court, it is obviously not sufficient to explain his failure to notify his clients in
due time of the date of the trial. Had he done so, his clients would probably have tried to contact him in due time, and
upon discovering that he was sick they would have either gone to court to ask for the postponement of the trial, or they
would have looked for another lawyer to represent them in court.
16. Diman vs Alumbres : 131466 : November 27, 1998 :
FACTS:
The petition for review on certiorari in this case was initially dismissed by Resolution dated January 14, 1998 but after
deliberating on petitioners' motion for reconsideration dated February 23, 1998, the private respondents' comment
thereon, the reply to the comment, as well as the record of the case itself, the Court was convinced that the order of
dismissal should be reconsidered and the petition reinstated. The court accordingly promulgated a resolution to that
effect on October 12, 1998, and required respondents to file their Comment on the petition within ten (10) days from
notice. Notice of the Resolution was duly served on private respondents' attorney on October 21, 1998. The latter filed
a motion for extension of time of thirty (30) days to file comment, counted from October 31. The Court granted the
extension sought, but only for fifteen (15) days. The comment was filed late, on November 20, 1998, Counsel's
explanation is that he had sought an extension of 30 days "due to the other volume of legal works similarly situated
and school work of the undersigned as professor of law and dean of the University of Manila," and had entertained "the
honest belief" that it would be granted. However, he learned belatedly that only a 15-day extension had been
conceded. He forthwith completed the comment and filed it, albeit five days late.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the comment should be admitted by the court

HELD:
The Court admits the late comment, but takes this occasion to reiterate the familiar doctrine that no party has a right to
an extension of time to comply with an obligation within the period set therefor by law; motions for extension are not
granted as a matter of course; their concession lies in the sound discretion of the Court exercised in accordance with
the attendant circumstances; the movant is not justified in assuming that the extension sought will be granted, or that it
will be granted for the length of time suggested by him. It is thus incumbent on any movant for extension to exercise
due diligence to inform himself as soon as possible of the Court's action on his motion, by time inquiry of the Clerk of
Court. Should he neglect to do so, he runs the risk of time running out on him, for which he will have nobody but
himself to blame.
17. LUCIANO A. SAULOG v CUSTOMBUILT MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, ET AL.,
FACTS: Plaintiff Saulog sued in the City Court of Manila for damages and attorneys' fees against defendants
Custombuilt Manufacturing Corporation (Custombuilt), Northwest Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. (Northwest), and the
City Sheriff of Manila. Plaintiff complained that Custombuilt caused to be sold on execution certain properties
belonging to him which he leased to one Adriano Go, Custombuilt's judgment debtor in another case. Those properties
consisted of a piano with a stool, and a rattan dinner and sala set. Plaintiff filed a third-party claim to stave off levy. But
Custombuilt posted a P1,200-bond to pave the way for the execution sale of said properties. The court rendered
judgment in favor of the plaintiff (judgement was based on plaintiff's evidence ex-parte because all of the defendants
failed to appear for trial despite due notice). Custombuilt appealed to CFI Manila. When the pre-trial was had,
Custombuilt's counsel was in the courtroom but left before the case was called. On plaintiff's motion, the judge, on the
same day, dismissed the appeal and revived the city court's judgment. The copy of the dismissal was received by
Custombuilt's counsel on November 10 and filed a petition for relief 4 days after. Plaintiff opposed. On November 27,
the court denied the petition for lack of merit. Custombuilt appealed.
ISSUE: WON it was proper for the CFI to deny the defendant's petition for relief from judgment.
RULING: The city court's judgment as revived by the Court of First Instance must be sustained.
At the start of the pre-trial, Custombuilt's attorney was present. But he unceremoniously left the courtroom. Counsel
reasons that he had to leave because "he was summoned home all too suddenly" as "his pregnant wife had been
having labor pains" which "were cause for alarm" and she finally delivered 5 days after.
Counsel did not have the foresight required of him. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 20 of the Rules of
Court, both client and counsel must appear at the pre-trial. This is mandatory. Failure of the client to appear is ground
for dismissal. If one representing his client, a corporation, was present, counsel could have easily left word for the
former to tell the judge that he was suddenly summoned to his home. If the client were not present, then the case just
the same would have been dismissed. But, the point is that allegedly someone summoned said attorney to go back
home. If this were true, then it would have been quite easy for the lawyer to have asked that man to stay around and
tell the judge or the clerk or the branch deputy clerk of court of his predicament. Or, he himself could have as easily
told the judge, or either clerk, or the adverse counsel, the court stenographer, the interpreter, the bailiff, or anyone for
that matter, of his inability to wait for the pre-trial. He failed to do anyone of these.
In his petition for relief, Custombuilt's lawyer also made the statement that his wife did not give birth until five days
later. It is unreasonable to assume that during the whole period his mind was in blank, such that it was impossible for
him to have taken steps to tell the court personally or otherwise that his absence during the pre-trial was excusable.
Again, he did not. He received copy of the decision on November 10. He did not file the petition for relief until
November 14.
All of these facts point to one conclusion: lack of interest on the part of appellant to defend itself against the complaint.
Rather, the pattern of conduct discloses a desire to delay disposal of the present case. Failure to prosecute is a ground
for dismissal of the appeal and revival of the judgment of the city court under Section 9, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court.
18. People vs. HILARION CASIMIRO, ET AL., defendants, BENJAMIN ICALLA, RODOLFO SORIANO and
BENJAMIN CINCO, defendants-appellants, MANUEL N. SANGLAY, respondent.
FACTS:
This is yet another instance of a member of the Philippine Bar, this time, respondent Manuel N. Sanglay, being
administratively proceeded against for failure to file the brief within the reglementary period for appellants Benjamin
Icalla, Rodolfo Soriano and Benjamin Cinco.

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He was given the opportunity to explain in our February 3, 1972 resolution, which reads thus: "For failure to file brief for
appellants Benjamin Icalla, Rodolfo Soriano and Benjamin Cinco within the period which expired on December 23,
1971, the Court resolved to [require] Atty. Manuel N. Sanglay to explain, within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why
disciplinary action should not be taken against him." 1 It was not until the end of that month that his manifestation and
explanation came. He would absolve himself from any blame as, in his view, no fault could be attributed to him.
As set forth in such pleading, this is how he would explain matters: "Upon receiving the notice from this Honorable
Court advising me to file the brief for the appellants, I immediately contacted the parents of the three appellants. Pablo
Icalla and the father of Benjamin Cinco came but the mother of Rodolfo Soriano failed to appear. At that time Rodolfo
Soriano was already at large for he escaped from prison at the La Union Provincial Jail. In our conference, the father of
Benjamin Cinco reiterated his former desire not to appeal the case of his son. But later on, Pablo Icalla, father of
appellant Benjamin Icalla prevailed on the father of Benjamin Cinco that they continue the appeal. According to Pablo
Icalla he had already engaged the services of a good lawyer to prepare their brief. Pablo Icalla further informed me
that he had already taken all the transcript of the case from the stenographer." He felt justified in concluding then: "My
failure therefore to file the brief for the appellants is attributable to the fault of the accused themselves represented by
their parents. Their parents disauthorized me to prepare and file the brief for the appellants by engaging another
lawyer to do the same. In so far as the appellant, Rodolfo Soriano, I could not have also filed his brief for the reason
that he escaped from jail."
ISSUE: w/n there was negligence for failing to file the brief within the reglementary period.
HELD:
In the light of the above, the most that can be admitted is that appellant's failure to file the brief was not a willful act on
his part. At least his good faith cannot be impugned. Nonetheless, the exculpation he seeks cannot be granted. He
knew that the period for filing the brief was running. He was equally aware that this Court expected that the matter will
be taken care of by him, as he was the counsel of record. There was no other appearance. Under the circumstances,
the least that was expected of him was that he would inform this Tribunal of the developments set forth in his
explanation and as that he be allowed to withdraw as counsel. Such a step he did not take until after the resolution of
February 3, 1972 requiring him to explain the failure to comply with his duty as officer of the Court. It came too late. It
did not wipe out the previous manifestation of negligence on his part. He cannot therefore escape liability. If this sad
state of affairs came to pass, he had only himself to blame.
WHEREFORE, respondent Manuel N. Sanglay is reprimanded.
19. People vs. ELEGIO NADERA, JR. Y SADSAD
[G.R. Nos. 131384-87. February 2, 2000]
Facts:
Accused-appellant Elegio Nadera, Jr. has four children by his wife Daisy, namely: Oleby; Maricris; March Anthony; and
Sherilyn.
Daisy left for a job in Bahrain.
Oleby and Maricris, assisted by a neighbor, Lita Macalalad, told their mother that they had been raped by their father,
herein accused-appellant. Thereupon, they went to the police authorities of Naujan and filed a complaint against
accused-appellant.
After preliminary examination, four informations charging accused-appellant with rape on various dates were filed in
the Regional Trial Court, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro.
The record shows that at his arraignment, accused-appellant, assisted by Atty. Manolo A. Brotonel of the Public
Attorney's Office, pleaded not guilty to the charges filed against him.However, after the prosecution had presented Dr.
Cynthia S. Fesalbon, accused-appellant pleaded guilty to the crime charged in all the informations.
After Oleby's direct examination had been finished, Atty. Brotonel, accused-appellant's counsel, did not conduct any
cross examination on the ground that he was convinced Oleby was telling the truth. The prosecution formally offered
its documentary evidence and rested its case thereafter.
Accused-appellant did not present any evidence in his defense. The trial court rendered judgment finding accusedappellant guilty of four counts of rape against his daughters and sentencing him to suffer death penalty.
Issue: Whether the accused's counsel faithfully complied with his duty as a lawyer?
Held:

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NO. The cavalier attitude of accused-appellant's counsel, Atty. Manolo A. Brotonel of the Public Attorney's Office,
cannot go unnoticed. It is discernible in (a) his refusal to cross examine Oleby Nadera; (b) the manner in which he
conducted Maricris Nadera's cross examination; and, (c) his failure not only to present evidence for the accused but
also to inform the accused of his right to do so, if he desires.
The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of
standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance
extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an
active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind
of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case and his knowing the fundamental procedures,
essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by
the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance
and not a simple perfunctory representation.
Measured by this standard, the defense counsels conduct in this case falls short of the quality of advocacy demanded
of him, considering the gravity of the offense charged and the finality of the penalty. A glaring example of his manifest
lack of enthusiasm for his client's cause is his decision not to cross examine Oleby Nadera, as revealed in the
following portion of the records:
COURT:
.......Any cross? ATTY. BROTONEL:b
.......If Your Honor please, we are not conducting any cross-examination, because this representation, from the
demeanor of the witness, I am convinced that she is telling the truth.
It may be so that defense counsel personally found Oleby's testimony to be believable. Nonetheless, he had the
bounden duty to scrutinize private complainant's testimony to ensure that the accused's constitutional right to confront
and examine the witnesses against him was not rendered for naught.
20. Jose

Tupacio

Nueno v.

Pascual

Santos

FACTS
Judge Anacleto Diaz of the Court of First Instance was made a special investigation of conditions in the city
government of Manila. In the course of the investigation a complaint was filed by Jose Topacio Nueno, a member of
the municipal board of the City of Manila, against Pascual Santos, another member of municipal board, it being alleged
that the latter had interested himself in prohibited games. Santos denied the charges. Hearings were had on the said
charges and the testimony of a number of witnesses was taken. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Diaz made a
report to the Honorable, the Secretary of the Interior, in which he recommended the removal of the respondent from his
office of member of the municipal board, and that all the papers connected with the charge be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for action, "it being evident that the respondent, as a member of the Bar, violated his oath of office by
deceiving the court and consenting a falsehood to be committed."
On receipt of the report of Judge Diaz against Attorney Santos, the court ordered it referred to the Attorney-General for
investigation, report, and recommendation. It wrote respondent a letter informing him of the investigation and asking
whether he will submit additional evidence. The respondent eventually filed an answer denying the charge and
requesting that he be given an opportunity to present evidence in support of his defense.
It appears from the facts that respondent was the counsel for Iigo Hernandez who was charged for violating an
ordinance for having willfully and unlawfully encouraged, tolerated and permitted to be played a game of chance and
hazard commonly known as monte. Respondent entered a plea of guilty for
Hernandez although he knew that the latter was a mere waiter and did not encourage, tolerate, or permit a game of
"monte" to be played. The report of the Solicitor-General concludes with the recommendation that disciplinary action
be taken against the respondent.
ISSUE: WON respondent violated his oath of office by deceiving the court and consenting a falsehood to be
committed.
HELD
Yes. The court believes that there is no escaping the conclusion that the respondent attorney consented to the doing of
a falsehood and deceived the court when he had an accused plead guilty to an offense which he had not committed.
The background of the administrative investigation showing the respondent's connection with prohibited games, under
circumstances of the case, can only be taken into consideration in so far as it relates to the precise charge laid against

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him. There was a clear violation of the lawyer's oath that he would do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in
court.
The court ordered that respondent Pascual Santos be suspended from the practice of Law for a period of three
months.
III. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE
(J.Era Lipa)
1. In re: Lanuevo, 66 SCRA 245 (1975)
FACTS: Administrative proceeding against Victorio Lanuevo for disbarment.
Admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang back to the respective examiners for reevalution or re-checking.
The five examiners admitted having re-evaluated or re-checked the notebook to him by the Bar Confidant, stating that
he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and was on
the borderline of passing.
Ramon galang was able to pass the 1971 bar exam because of Lanuevos move but the exam results bears that he
failed in 5 subjects namely in (Political, Civil, Mercantile, Criminal & Remedial).
Galang on the otherhand, denied of having charged of Slight Physical Injuries on Eufrosino de Vera, a law student of
MLQU.
RULING: The court disbarred Lanuevo has no authority to request the examiners to re-evaluate grades of
examinees w/o prior authority from Supreme Court.
He does not possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of examinees to the bar. He does not a
have any business evaluating the answers of the examinees.
Consequently, Galang was also disbarred Sec. 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Curt of 1964, candidates for
admission to the bar must be of good moral character. Galang has a pending criminal cases of Physical Injuries, he
committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case this resulted him to revoked his
license.
2. First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. VS CA 237 SCRA 519 (1994)
Facts:
1. Petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions of B.P. 129, EO 226 (Art. 82) and a circular, 1-91 issued by the
Supreme Court which deals with the jurisdiction of courts for appeal of cases decided by quasi-judicial agencies such
as the Board of Investments (BOI).
2. BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by
changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Oppositor Mariwasa filed a
motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to
reconsider the same nor appeal therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition for
review with CA.
4. CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. The TRO lapsed by its own terms twenty (20)
days after its issuance, without respondent court issuing any preliminary injunction.
5. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the restraining order contending that CA does not have jurisdiction
over the BOI case, since the same is exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1987.
6. Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or B.P. 129 and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the
Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and
Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to respondent court because the procedure for
appeal laid down therein runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from decisions or orders
of the BOI shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court.
7. While Mariwasa maintains that whatever inconsistency there may have been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of
E.O. 226 on the question of venue for appeal, has already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which
was promulgated on February 27, 1991 or four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case
YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of

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enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by
statute was previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of
Appeals.
3. In Re: Cunanan 94 PHIL 534 (1954)
FACTS:
1. RA 972 IS CONTRARY TO PUBLIC INTEREST BECAUSE IT QUALIFIES 1,094 LAW GRADUATES WHO
CONFESSEDLY HAD INADEQUATE PREPARATION FOR THE PRACTICE OF THE PROFESSION.
1. Public interest demands adequate preparation and efficiency, especially that legal problems become more difficult.
i. RA 972 (BAR FLUNKERS ACT 1953): in order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed his examinations
successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75% in all subjects, without falling below 0% in any subject.
1.This court passed and admitted to the bar, candidate who had obtained an average only of 72 then raised to 75%.
2. Unsuccessful candidates of few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for and
secured in 1951 the passage Senate Bill 12, reduced the passing grade to 70% since 1946.
a. President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved the bill without its signature.
i. Any bar candidate who obtained 70% after July 1946 to Aug 1951, 71% 1952, 72% 1953, 73% 1954,
74% 1955 without a below 50% in any subject shall be allowed to take oath.
ii. Any bar candidate who obtained 75% in any subject after July 1946 shall be deemed to have passed,
such grades shall be added in computing the passing the general average that said candidate may obtain any
following examinations.
b. After approval, unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions,
others who motioned for revision of exam papers also invoked the law.
i. To avoid injustice, court reviewed motions for reconsideration. Court did not find a reason to revise their
grades. If they are admitted to bar, it must be pursuant to RA 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied equally to
all concerned whether they filed petitions or not.
3. Unsuccessful candidates who benefited section 1 totaled 1,168. 92 have passed the subsequent examination and
only 568 have filed either motions for admission to bar pursuant to the Act or mere motions for reconsideration.
a. 10 candidates are to be benefited, each taken from 2 to 5 different examinations, but failed to obtain passing
average in any of them. Consolidating, highest grades in different subjects with their latest marks, they would be
sufficient to reach passing average as provided in RA 972.
b. Total number of candidates to be benefited is 1,094 with only 604 filed petitions.
c. 33 who failed in 1946-1951 filed motions for reconsideration got denied.
d. 125 of 1952 and 56 of 1953 were pending.
e. Tribunal found no sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades.
ISSUE: WON RA 972 is constitutional. NO.
HELD: Portion of Art. 1 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and all of Art. 2 of said law are unconstitutional.
Therefore, void and without force and effect.
Part of Art. 1 referring to the examinations following to the approval of the law from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and
shall continue to be in force, in conformity with Sec. 10, Art. 7 of the Constitution.
Consequently:
a. All the above-mentioned petitions 1946 to 1952 are denied
b. All candidates in 1953 examinations, obtaining 71.5%+, without having a grade -50% in any subject, are considered
passed.
c. Permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar
1. Article 2 permits partial passing of examinations at indefinite intervals.
a. Does not take into account that the laws and jurisprudence are not stationary
b. Article not expressed in the title will have temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes a
permanent system for an indefinite time.
i. Contrary to Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from
article 1, it is obvious that its nullity affect the entire law.
2. UNCONSTITUTIONALITY:
a. Not within the legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers.
b. Create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles.
c. Purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic principles.
3. GENERAL RULE:
a. A classification to be valid must rest upon material differences between the person included in it and those
excluded.
b. Must be based upon substantial distinctions.

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c. Therefore, any law that is made applicable to one class of citizens only must be based on some substantial
difference between the situation of that class and other individuals who do not apply.
d. Must rest on some reason on which it can be defended.
e. There should be a a difference between the situation and circumstances of all the members of the class and the
situation and circumstances of all other members of the state.
4. LAW NOT CONSIDERED GENERAL:
a. Operates on all within a clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is made to operate on that class only, and
not generally on all.
i. It was indicated why unsuccessful candidates prior 1946 were not included.
ii. No record of examinations prior to 1946, does not mean they dont have right for equal consideration.
4. Kuroda VS Jalandoni 83 PHIL 171 (1949)
Facts: Kuroda, Lieutenant General of the Japanese Imperial Army, was prosecuted for war crimes before the Military
Commission set up by Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines. Kuroda challenged the legality and
constitutionality of the Military Commission and contended that it lacked jurisdiction to try him for violation of the Hague
and Geneva Conventions on the Laws of War, since the Philippines was not a signatory to these conventions.
Issue: Whether or not the established Military Commission is legal and constitutional.
Held: The court ruled that the Military Commission was legal and constitutional base on the citation of Article II, Section
3 of the Philippine Constitution declaring that the Philippine adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the nation.
The court ruled that in accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law of the present day,
including the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention, and significant precedents of international jurisprudence
established by the United Nations, all those persons, military or civilian, who had been guilty of planning, preparing or
waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto, in
violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization, were held accountable therefore. Although the
Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, our Constitution has been deliberately general
and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of international law as
contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory. Consequently, in the
promulgation and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68, the President of the Philippines had acted in conformity with
the generally accepted principles and policies of international law which are part of our Constitution.
5. Omico Mining & Industrial Corp. VS Vallejos 63 SCRA 285 (1945)
6. People VS Villanueva 14 SCRA 109 (1965)
FACTS: On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the crime
of Malicious Mischief, before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused was represented by
counsel de oficio, but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was represented by
City AttorneyAriston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private-prosecutor, after securing the
permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear
at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any
payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel
for the accused.
ISSUE: Whether or not the isolated appearance of Atty. Fule as private prosecutor constitutes practice of law.
RULING: No. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as a agent or friend of the
offended party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional
capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of Sail Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of
crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal cases coming
from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attorney of San Pablo. As such,
there could be no possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule us Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo
and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. Furthermore, the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not
constitute private practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated
appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. Thus, the
appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of
law. And, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate supervisor, the

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Secretary of Justice, to represent the complaint in the case at bar who is a relative. Decision affirmed.
7. Dia-Anonuevo VS Judge Bercasio
FACTS: Mrs. Concepcion Dia-Aonuevo, claims to be a co-owner of an undivided interest of a certainparcel of
irrigated riceland situated in Cabilogan, Sto. Nio, Sto. Domingo, Albay. This property was theobject of a deed of sale
executed by Maximo Balibado, Justo Balibado and Petrona Balibado de Barriosin favor of Alfredo Ong and
acknowledged before Municipal Judge Bonifacio Bercacio, respondentherein, as ex-officio notary public, on January
25, 1972. complainant informed respondent judge thatthe vendors owned only one-third undivided portion of the
property and that she and other cousins ofhers owned two-thirds thereof. Judge Bercacio advised the complainant to
redeem or repurchase theproperty from the vendee, Alfredo Ong. Complainant then requested the judge to intercede
in theirbehalf with the vendee to allow them to redeem the property and for that purpose she gave respondentthe
amount of P3,500.00 to be used to pay Alfredo Ong. Respondent agreed and received the amount ofP3,500.00.
Respondent sent the corresponding letter to Alfredo Ong but the latter did not answer.Forthwith a complaint was filed
on March 8, 1972 with the Court of First Instance of Albay. During thependency of the civil case, complainant asked
respondent judge to allow her to withdraw P3,500.00 shehad deposited with him as she was then in need of money,
but no action was taken by respondent.
Issue: WON respondent is engaging in the practice of law violating Judiciary Act of 1948
Ruling: Yes. Respondent violated Section 77 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, which provides inpart: All
provisions relative to the observance of office hours and the holding of sessions applicable tocourts of first instance
shall likewise apply to municipal judges, but the latter may, after office hours andwith the permission of the district
judge concerned, engage in teaching or other vocation not involvingthe practice of law ...Respondent submits that it
was Atty. Berango and not he who assisted the complainant, Mrs.Aonuevo, and her co-plaintiffs as counsel in the civil
case. Respondent's claim is belied, however, bythe active interest he took in the case of Mrs. Aonuevo manifested as
follows: (a) He gave Mrs.Aonuevo legal advice on the remedy available to her and her co-owners with regards to the
propertysold to Alfredo Ong. (b) He accepted from Mrs. Aonuevo the sum of P3,500.00 for purposes ofredeeming the
property from the vendee, plus P100.00 for incidental expenses. (c) He wrote to AlfredoOng for and in behalf of Mrs.
Aonuevo and her co-owners offering to redeem the land in question. (d)When his attempts at an out-of-court
settlement failed, he caused the filing of the complaint in CivilCase No. 4591 for which he was issued a receipt for
docket and legal research fees. (e) He was presenttogether with Atty. Berango at the pre-trial of July 5, 1972, and
although, as he claims, it was Atty.Berango who made an appearance for that pre-trial, the trial Judge nonetheless
took note ofrespondent's presence so that the Order dictated on that occasion reads: "Attys. Berango and Bercacioare
notified of the date of the trial.The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or participation in
courtproceedings but also includes preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a litigation, giving oflegal
advice to clients or persons needing the same, etc.
8. De Guzman VS Visayan Rapid Transit Co. 68 PHIL 469 (1939)
9. Cayetano VS Monsod 201 SCRA 210 (1991) ***
Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of chairman of
the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses required qualification
of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article
IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of
a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years.
Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct
of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body,
the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience.

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The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsods past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager,
a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor
verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
10. In Re: Edillon 84 SCRA 554 (1978)
FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of
Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for
stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of
par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment ofmembership fee and
suspension for failure to pay the same.
Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of hisconstitutional rights in the sense that he is
being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and
to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization
to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to
him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP ByLaws are void and of no legal force and effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the IBP.
HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of as distinguished from bar
associations in which membershipis merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment a reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The
Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional freedom to
associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting
of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment ofannual dues. The Supreme Court in order to further the States legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require thet the cost of the regulatory program the lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right to practice law before the courts
of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its payment is not void as unreasonable as
arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of admission, suspension, disbarment, and
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the court
may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.
11. Tejan VS Cusi Jr. 57 SCRA 154 (1974)
12. Alcala VS Vera 56 SCRA 30 (1974)
Facts: Jose Alcala engaged the services of Atty. Honesto De Vera to defend him in a civil case.
On April 17, 1963, the court rendered a decision against Alcala.
On April 19, 1963, Atty. De Vera received a copy of the adverse decision. Atty. De Vera failed to inform Alcala about the
adverse decision.
On July 17, 1963, the court sheriff went to Alcala to serve a writ of execution. That was the only time when Alcala
learned that he lost. And because of Atty. De Veras failure to inform him of the adverse decision, the period within
which Alcala can appeal his case had already lapsed.
As a result, in September 1963, Alcala filed a civil case against Atty. De Vera in order to collect damages as he averred
that he sustained damages due to Atty. De Veras negligence. The court however ruled that Alcala is not entitled to
damages.
Unfettered, Alcala filed a disbarment case against Atty. De Vera.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. De Vera should be disbarred because of his failure to update his client of the status of the
case.
HELD: No. Disbarment is not warranted in this case. It is true that Atty. De Vera had been remiss in his duties as
counsel for Alcala because he failed to update him of the status of the case, however, it appears that Alcala did not
sustain any damage by reason of such negligence. But this is not to say that Atty. De Vera can go scot-free. The lack
of damage to Alcala will only serve as a mitigating circumstance. The Supreme Court found Atty. De Vera guilty of
simple negligence and he was severely censured for his negligence. Atty. De Veras failure to notify his clients of the
decision in question manifests a lack of total dedication or devotion to the clients interest expected of Atty. De

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Vera under the lawyers oath.

In this case, it can also be gleaned that not all negligence by counsel entitles the client to collect damages from the
negligent lawyer.
13. Catimbuhan VS Cruz 126 SCRA 190 (1983)
14. Hydro Resources Contractors Corp. VS Pagalilauan 172 SCRA 399
FACTS: Petitioner corporation hired the private respondent Aban as its "Legal Assistant and received basic monthly
salary of Pl,500.00 plus an initial living allowance of P50.00 which gradually increased to P320.00. September 4, 1980,
Aban received a letter from the corporation informing him that he would be considered terminated effective October 4,
1980, because of his alleged failure to perform his duties well. Aban filed a complaint against the petitioner for illegal
dismissal. (he labor arbiter ruled that Aban was illegally dismissed. (his ruling was affirmed by the)NLRC on appeal.
Hence, this present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was an employer-employee relationship between the petitioner corporation and Aban.
HELD: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit, and reinstate Aban to his former or a similar
position without loss of seniority rights and to pay three years backwages without qualification or deduction and
P5,000.00 in attorney's fees. Should reinstatement not be feasible, the petitioner shall pay the private respondent
termination benefits in addition to the above stated three years backpay and P5,000.00attorney's fees. A lawyer, li/e
any other professional, may very well bean employee of a private corporation or even of the government. (his
court has consistently ruled that the determination of whether or not there is an employer-employee relation depends
upon four standards the manner of selection and engagement of the puntative employee the mode of payment of
wages the presence or absence of a power of dismissal and the presence or absence of a power to control the
putative employee3s conduct. Of the four, the right of control test has been held to be the decisive factor.6n this case,
Aban received basic salary plus living allowance, wored solely for the petitioner, dealt only with legal matters involving
the said corporation andits employees and also assisted the Personnel officer processing appointment papers of
employees which is not act of a lawyer in the e7ercise of his profession. (these facts showed that petitioner has the
power to hire and fire the respondent employee and more important, exercised control over Aban by defining the duties
and functions of his wor/ which met the four standards in determining whether or not there is an employee-employer
relationship.
15. Ramos VS Rada 65 SCRA 179 (1975)
Facts: Moises R. Rada is a messenger in the Court of First Instance of Camarines, Norte
He was charged with violation of Section 12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII, which provides as follows:
Sec.12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected
with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of
Department: Provided, that this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties
and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the government
Respondent Rada was extended appointment by the Avesco Marketing Corporation on December 15, 1972 as
representative to manage and supervise real properties situated in Camarines Norte which were foreclosed by the
corporation.
His acceptance of such appointment was the basis of the administrative complaint against Rada which was filed with
the Department of Justice on October 3, 1973.
Later, on October 27, 1973, Rada requested permission to accept appointment.
It was not indicated that his acceptance and discharge of the duties as administrator has at all impaired his efficiency
as messenger, nor has it been shown that he did not observe regular office hours.
Issue: Whether respondent Rada is guilty of violation of sec.12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII
Held: Rada was adjudged guilty of technical violation (lack of prior permission) of Sec 12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII
and meted a penalty of reprimand.
The duties of messenger Rada are generally ministerial which do not require that his entire day of 24 hours be at the
disposal of the government. Such being his situation, it would be to stifle his willingness to apply himself to a
productive endeavor to augment his income, and to award premium for slothfulness if he were to be banned from

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engaging in or being connected with a private undertaking outside of office hours and without forseeable detriment to
the Government service.
His connection with Avesco Marketing Corporation need not be terminated, but he must secure a written permission
from proper government authority.
16. Beltran VS Elaio Abad 132 SCRA 453 (1984)
FACTS: Court held respondent Elmo S. Abad a successful bar examinee but has not been admitted to the Philippine
Bar in contempt of Court for unauthorized practice of law and he was fined P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case he failed to pay the fine. (121 SCRA 217). He paid the fine. Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., the complainant, filed a
MOTION TO CIRCULARIZE TO ALL METRO MANILA COURTS THE FACT THAT ELMO S. ABAD IS NOT
AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE LAW. The Report has found as a fact, over the denials of the respondent under oath,
that he signed Exhibits B, C, and D, and that he made appearances in Metro Manila courts. This aspect opens the
respondent to a charge for perjury. The Report also reveals that Atty. Ruben A. Jacobe collaborated with the
respondent as counsels forAntonio S. Maravilla one of the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 26084, 26085 and 26086 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. (Exhibit D.) Atty. Jacobe should be called to account for his association with
the respondent.
Respondent, when asked about the aforesaid motions, Exhibits "B" and "D", and the signatures therein, denied that he
filed the same and that the signatures therein are his. He also denied that he appeared in the hearing in the afternoon
of December 8, 1983 in the said trial court. According to him, he was in Batangas at the time. He also testified that the
only explanation he could give regarding the signatures in the aforesaid exhibits is that the same could have been
effected by Atty. Beltran to show the Supreme Court that he (respondent) was still illegally practicing law. As to the
motion for examination and analysis of respondent's signature, the Investigator, to afford respondent full opportunity to
prove his defense, sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation to compare respondent's signature in
the aforesaid exhibits with the signatures appearing in the pleadings that he filed in the Supreme Court, which latter
signature he admits as genuine and as his own. The aforesaid documentary and testimonial evidence, as well as the
above report of the NBI, have clearly proved that respondent Abad is still practicing law despite the decision of this
Court of March 28, 1983.
ISSUES: Whether or not Abad can engage in practice of law.
Whether or not Atty. Jacobe liable in his collaboration with the respondent.
HELD: No. Only those licensed by the Supreme Court may practice law in this country. The right to practice law is not
a natural or constitutional rightbut is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with
special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity,
legal knowledge, educational attainment and even public trust, since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A
bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is
a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person
seekingadmission had practiced law without license. Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances which he
has narrated do not constitute his admissionto the Philippine Bar and the right to practice law thereafter. He should
know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be
administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs. 17 and 19, Rules of Court.) The
regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person
who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court. Mr. Elmo S. Abad is
hereby fined Five Hundred (P500.00) pesos payable to this Court within ten (10) days from notice failing which he shall
serve twenty-five (25) days imprisonment.
Yes. He violated Canon 9 Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any
task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar. in good standing. A lawyer shall not assist anyone
who is not a member of the Bar to practice law in this country. Thus, he must not take as partner or associate in his law
firm a person who is not a lawyer, a lawyer who has been disbarred and a lawyer who has been suspended from
practice of law. The lawyer who assists in an unauthorized practice of law whether directly or indirectly is subject to
disciplinary action. Finally, Atty. Ruben A. Jacobe is required to explain within ten (10) days from notice why he should
not be disciplined for collaborating and associating in the practice of the law with the respondent who is not a member
of the bar.
17. Baraco VS Pinatacan 127 SCRA 218 (1984)
Facts: This is an administrative case filed against respondent with moral turpitude and immorality. Complainant gave
birth to a baby girl named Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan; that because of respondent's betrayal, her family suffered
shame, disrepute, moral distress and anxiety; and, that these acts of respondent render him unfit to become a member
of the Bar. On the other hand, respondent maintains that even admitting the truth of complainant's allegations, the

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circumstances of their relationship with each other, does not justify him for disqualification to the practice of law.
Issue: WON respondent is entitled to take the lawyers oath despite having a case involving his good moral character
Held: Yes, the court allowed Ruben to take the lawyers oath. considering that respondent has legally recognized and
acknowledged complainant's child Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan as his own, and has undertaken to give financial
support to the said child, We hold that he has realized the wrongfulness of his past conduct and is now prepared to
turn over a new leaf. But he must be admonished that his admission to and continued membership in the Bar are
dependent, among others, on his compliance with his moral and legal obligations as the father of Maria Rochie
Bacarro Pinatacan.
Ratio: One of the indispensable requisites for admission to the Philippine Bar is that the applicant must be of good
moral character. This requirement aims to maintain and uphold the high moral standards and the dignity of the legal
profession, and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those
persons who are known to be honest and to possess good moral character. "As a man of law, (a lawyer) is necessary
a leader of the community, looked up to as a model citizen" He sets an example to his fellow citizens not only for his
respect for the law, but also for his clean living. Thus, becoming a lawyer is more than just going through a law course
and passing the Bar examinations.
18. Diao VS Martinez 7 SCRA 475 (1963)
19. In Re: Argosino 270 SCRA 26 (1997)
20. Collantes VS Renomeron 200 SCRA 584 (1991)
LAWYERS DUTIES TO SOCIETY
1. Montecillo VS Gica 60 SCRA 234 (1974)
2. In Re: Gutierrez 5 SCRA 661 (1962)
FACTS: Jorge Montecillo was accused by Francisco Gica of slander. Atty. Quirico del Mar represented Montecillo and
he successfully defended Monteceillo in the lower court. Del Mar was even able to win their counterclaim thus the
lower court ordered Gica to pay Montecillo the adjudged moral damages.
Gica appealed the award of damages to the Court of Appeals where the latter court reversed the same. Atty. Del Mar
then filed a motion for reconsideration where he made a veiled threat against the Court of Appeals judges intimating
that he thinks the CA justices knowingly rendered an unjust decision and judgment has been rendered through
negligence and that the CA allowed itself to be deceived.
The CA denied the MFR and it admonished Atty. Del Mar from using such tone with the court. Del Mar then filed a
second MFR where he again made threats. The CA then ordered del Mar to show cause as to why he should not be
punished for contempt.
Thereafter, del Mar sent the three CA justices a copy of a letter which he sent to the President of the Philippines asking
the said justices to consider the CA judgment. But the CA did not reverse its judgment. Del Mar then filed a civil case
against the three justices of the CA before a Cebu lower court but the civil case was eventually dismissed by reason of
a compromise agreement where del Mar agreed to pay damages to the justices. Eventually, the CA suspended Atty.
Del Mar from practice.
The issue reached the Supreme Court. Del Mar asked the SC to reverse his suspension as well as the CA decision as
to the Montecillo case. The SC denied both and this earned the ire of del Mar as he demanded from the Clerk of the
Supreme Court as to who were the judges who voted against him.
The Supreme Court then directed del Mar to submit an explanation as to why he should not be disciplined. Del Mar in
his explanation instead tried to justify his actions even stating that had he not been convinced that human efforts in
[pursuing the case] will be fruitless he would have continued with the civil case against the CA justices. In his
explanation, del Mar also intimated that even the Supreme Court is part among the corrupt, the grafters and those
allegedly committing injustice.
Del Mar even filed a civil case against some Supreme Court justices but the judge who handled the case dismissed
the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Del Mar should be suspended.
HELD: Yes. Atty. Del Mar, by his contemptuous acts is in violation of his duties to the courts. As an officer of the court,
it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarilythe high esteem and regard towards the court
so essential to the proper administration of justice.
It is manifest that del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged
error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly
rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance

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of the law, in disposing of the case of his client. Del Mar was then suspended indefinitely.
3. Oronce VS CA 298 SCRA 133 (1988)
Facts: During a dispute over land, Flaminiano illegally took possession of the property in litigation using abusive
methods. She was aided by her husband, a lawyer. The illegal entry took place while the case was pending in the CA
& while a writ of preliminary injunction was in force.
Held: Atty. Flaminianos acts of entering the property without the consent of its occupants & in contravention of the
existing writ or preliminary injunction & making utterances showing disrespect for the law & this Court, are unbecoming
of a member of the Bar. Although he says that they peacefully took over the property, such peaceful take-over
cannot justify defiance of the writ of preliminary injunction that he knew was still in force. Through his acts, he has
flouted his duties as a member of the legal profession. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is prohibited
from counseling or abetting activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
4. De Ysasi VS NLRC 231 SCRA 173 (1994)
FACTS: Jon De Ysasi and Jon De Ysasi III are father and sons respectively. The elder Ysasi owns a hacienda in
Negros Occidental. De Ysasi III is employed in the hacienda as the farm administrator. In November 1982, De Ysasi III
underwent surgery and so he missed work. He was confined and while hes nursing from his infections he was
terminated, without due process, by his father. De Ysasi III filed against his father for illegal dismissal before the
National Labor Relations Commission. His father invoked that his son actually abandoned his work.
ISSUE: Whether or not De Ysasi III abandoned his work.
HELD: No. His absence from work does not constitute abandonment. To constitute abandonment, there must be a.)
failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and b.) a clear intention to sever the employeremployee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt
acts. No such intent was proven in this case.
The Supreme Court, in making its decision, noted that the lawyers for both camps failed to exert all reasonable efforts
to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the direct and immediate
consanguineous ties between their clients especially considering that the parties involved are father and son. This
case may have never reached the courts had there been an earnest effort by the lawyers to have both parties find an
off court settlement but records show that no such effort was made. The useful function of a lawyer is not only to
conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He is often called upon
less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life. He should be a mediator for concord
and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation.
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that (a) lawyer shall encourage his client to
avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement. Both counsel fell short of what was expected of
them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the court. In the same manner, the labor arbiter who handled this
regrettable case has been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor arbiter
shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction. If he ever did so, or at
least entertained the thought, the copious records of the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any reflection of
the same.
5. Pajares VS Abad Santos 30 SCRA 748 (1969)
6. People VS Rosqueta 55 SCRA 486 (1974)
FACTS: Rosqueta Jr and two others were convicted of a crime. They appeal their conviction until it reached the
Supreme Court. Their lawyer (counsel de parte), Atty. Gregorio Estacio, failed to file their Brief. And so the Supreme
Court ordered Atty. Estacio to show cause why he should not be disciplined for failure to file said Brief. Atty. Estacio
failed yet again to submit his explanation. The Supreme Court then suspended him from the practice of law except for
the purpose of filing the Brief in this particular case. Atty. Estacio then filed a Motion for Reconsideration where he
explained that he did actually prepare an explanation the same being left with Rosqueta Sr (father of accused) for the
latter to mail it. But then Rosqueta Sr.s house burned down together with the explanation. He only came to know of
this fact when he was preparing for the Motion for Reconsideration.
Atty. Estacio also explained that his clients are withdrawing their appeal by reason of their failure to raise the needed
fund for the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Estacios suspension should continue.
HELD: No. His liability is mitigated. But the Supreme Court noted that Atty. Estacio has been irresponsible, has been
negligent and inattentive to his duty to his clients. Atty. Estacio should be aware that even in those cases where

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counsel de parte is unable to secure from his clients or from their near relatives the amount necessary to pursue the
appeal, that does not necessarily conclude his connection with the case. He should be aware that in the pursuance of
the duty owed this Court as well as to a client, he cannot be too casual and unconcerned about the filing of pleadings.
It is not enough that he prepares them; he must see to it that they are duly mailed. Such inattention as shown in this
case is inexcusable.
7. De Roy VS CA 157 SCRA 757 (1988)
FACTS: The firewall of a burned out building owned by Felisa De Roy collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop
occupied by the family of Luis Bernal resulting in injuries and even to the death of Bernals daughter. De Roy claimed
that Bernal had been warned prior hand but that she was ignored.
In the RTC, De Roy was found guilty of gross negligence. She appealed but the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC.
On the last day of filing a motion for reconsideration, De Roys counsel filed a motion for extension. It was denied by
the CA. The CA ruled that pursuant to the case of Habaluyas Enterprises vs Japzon (August 1985), the fifteen-day
period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.
De Roys counsel however argued that the Habaluyas case should not be applicable because said ruling was never
published in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official Gazette before they can be binding.
HELD: No. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in the Official Gazette before they can
be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice
to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated
and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as the SCRA and law
journals.
8. Far Eastern Shipping Co. VS CA
INTRODUCTION & ADMISSION TO PRACTICE
(1-5 by Millicent Pangilinan)
1. Director of Religious Affairs vs. Bayot
Facts: Respondent is charged with malpractice for having published an advertisement in Sunday Tribunal on June 13,
1943 which reads as follows
Marriage license promptly secured thru our assistance and the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired and
marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.
Legal assistance service
12 Escolta, Manila
Room 105, Tel. 2-41-60
Issue: Whether or not the advertisement is ethical.
Held: It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was aflagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his
profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among
other things that the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice. It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a
merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practice of merchantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a
member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the
temple of Jehovah. The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must
be the outcome of character and conduct. (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)
2. Ledesma v. Climaco, GR No. 12815, June 28, 1974
Facts: Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case pending in the sala of the
respondent judge.
On October 13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He
commenced discharging his duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from his position as counsel de parte.

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The respondent Judge not only denied the motion but also appointed him as counsel de oficio for the two defendants.
On November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on
the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of
petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense.
On November 6, Judge denied the motion. Hence, Ledesma instituted this certiorari proceeding.
Issue: Whether or not a member of the bar may withdraw as counsel de oficio due to appointment as Election
Registrar.
Held: The ends of justice would be served by requiring Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio because: the case
has been postponed at least 8 times at the defense's instance; there was no incompatibility between duty of petitioner
to defend the accused, and his task as an election registrar. There is not likely at present, and in the immediate future,
an exorbitant demand on his time.
Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty required of the legal profession. He ought
to have known that membership in the bar is burdened with conditions. The legal profession is dedicated to the ideal of
service, and is not a mere trade. A lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio to aid in the performance of the
administration of justice. The fact that such services are rendered without pay should not diminish the lawyer's zeal.
In People v. Holgado: In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be
heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel.
Even the most intelligent or educatedman may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure,
and; without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the
right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so
implemented that under rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an
attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should
assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own.
The present Constitution provides not only that the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel
but further provides that Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall
be inadmissible in evidence. This made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of the
accused.
Thus, Ledesma should exert himself sufficiently, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a
member of the profession in good standing. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal
practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the
promptings of self-interest.
3. Cusi v. 11 Scra 755 (1964)
FACTS:
-Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Dona Benigna Cui, now
deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless
persons." It acquired corporate existence by legislation and endowed with extensive properties by the said spouses
through a series of donations, principally the deed of donation.-Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial
management to the founders jointly and, incase of their incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may
nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them."-Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued
to administer the Hospicio until her death in 1929. Thereupon the administration passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio
Jakosalem who both died. Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became the administrator.-Plaintiff Jesus
Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the
spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa Benigna Cui.On 27 February 1960 the then incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro
Cui, resigned infavor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between them and embodied in
a notarial document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had
no prior notice of either the "convenio" or of his brother's assumption of the position.-Dr. Teodoro Cui died on August
27, 1960; on Sept 5 1960 the plaintiff wrote a letter to the defendant demanding that the office be turned over to him;
and the demand not having been complied with the plaintiff filed the complaint in this case. Romulo Cui later on
intervened, claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui,another one of the nephews mentioned

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by the founders of the Hospicio in their deed of donation.-As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon
their respective qualifications tothe position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under
equal circumstances would be preferred pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation. However,before the test of age
may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the
nephews therein named, "que posea titulo de abogado, omedico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos
titulos el que pague al estadomayor impuesto o contribucion."-The specific point in dispute is the meaning of the term
"titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma.Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas
(Class1926) but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify himas one. Antonio Ma.
Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and althoughdisbarred by this Court, he was reinstated by resolution
promulgated on 10 February1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospiciode
Barili
.-Court a quo
- decided in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo de abogado,"taken alone, means that of a full-fledged
lawyer, but that has used in the deed of donation and considering the function or purpose of the administrator, it should
not be given a strict interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a law degree or diploma of Bachelor of
Laws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous both by the defendant and by The intervenor
ISSUE:
(YES)

WON

the

plaintiff

is

not

entitled,

as

against

the

defendant,

to

the

office

of administrator.

RATIO: Whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado" means not mere possession of the academic
degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of
law. A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic
requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer
or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general signification, and has reference to that class of persons who are
by license officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the
completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in some other way. Indeed there are instances,
particularly under the former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons who had not gone through any formal legal
education in college were allowed to take the Bar examinations and to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code
required possession of "the necessary qualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that
such persons do not possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic degree of Bachelorof Laws
from some law school or university. The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the
foregoing test advisely, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator should be a doctor
or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be theonewho pays the highest taxes
among those otherwise qualified. A lawyer, first of all, because under Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees of the
Hospicio shall "make regulations for the government of said institution; shall "prescribe the conditions subject
to which invalids and incapacitated and destitute persons may be admitted to the institute"; shall see to it that the
rules and conditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict with the provisions of the Act; and shall administer
properties of considerable value for all of which work, it is to be presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a
license to practice the profession would beadistinct asset.Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not
entitled, as against thedefendant, to the office of administrator.
As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking reinstatement to the office
of attorney cannot be less exacting than that implied in paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as a requisite for the office
which is disputed in this case. When the defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and
disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.For the claim of intervener and appellant Romulo
Cui. This party is also a lawyer, grandsonof Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio mentioned
by them in thedeed of donation. He is further, in the line of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui,who is a son of
Mariano Cui, another one of the said nephews.Besides being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui
is older than he andtherefore is preferred when the circumstances are otherwise equal. The intervenor contends that
the intention of the founders was to confer the administration by line and successively tot he descendants of
the nephews named in the deed, in the order they are named. Thus, hear guess, since the last administrator was Dr.
Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio Cuiline, the next administrator must come from the line of Vicente
Cui, to whom the interven or belongs. This interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms of the deed of
donation.
4. Villegas v. Legaspi 113 scra 39 (1982)
113 SCRA 39 Political Law The Legislative Department Appearance in Court by a Congressman
This case is a consolidation of two cases involving the issue of whether or not a member of Congress may appear
before the regular courts as counsel for ordinary litigants.
Case 1
In September 1979, Raul Villegas filed a civil case against spouses Vera Cruz et al before the Court of First Instance
(CFI) Cebu. The Vera Cruz spouses filed their answer to the complaint and they were represented by Valentino

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Legaspi, then a member of the Batasang Pambansa. Villegas then challenged the representation made by Legaspi as
counsel for the spouses on the ground that it is unconstitutional; as pointed out by Villegas no member of the
Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without appellate jurisdiction. The presiding judge
however overruled Villegas challenged and proceeded with the trial. The judge said that CFIs have appellate
jurisdiction.
Case 2
In July 1979, Edgardo Reyes filed a civil case against N. V. Verenigde Buinzenfabrieken Excelsior-De Maas, a
corporation, before CFI Rizal. Estanisalo Fernandez appeared as counsel for the corporation. Reyes questions the
appearance of Fernandez as counsel for the corporation on the same ground invoked in Case 1 because Fernandez is
also a member of the Batasang Pambansa.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said members, Estanislao Fernandez and Valentino Legaspi, of the Batasang Pambansa
may appear as counsels before the said CFIs.
HELD: No. Members of Congress are prohibited to appear as counsel berfore CFIs acting in their original
jurisdiction. CFIs have dual personalities. They can be courts of general original jurisdiction (courts of origin) or
appellate courts depending on the case that they took cognizance of. In the cases at bar, CFI Cebu and CFI Rizal
acted as a courts of general original jurisdiction. Both cases were not elevated to the said CFIs from any lower courts.
Thus, the CFIs in the case at bar are courts without appellate jurisdiction.
NOTE: Under Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:
No Senator or member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice
or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or
indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the
Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
Appearance of the legislator is now barred before all courts of justice, regardless of rank, composition, or jurisdiction.
The disqualification also applies to the revived Electoral Tribunal and to all administrative bodies, like the Securities
and Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations Commission. Courts martial and military tribunals, being
administrative agencies, are included.
5. Enriquez v. Gimenez, 701 Phil 932
Facts: R.A. No. 1383 was passed creating the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) as a public
corporation and vesting in it the ownership and control over all existing government-owned waterworks systems.
However, Bauan Batangas passed Res. No. 152 stating that it does not desire to submit their local waterworks to the
provisions of said R.A. No. 1383.
Provincial Fiscal rendered an opinion holding that R.A. No. 1383 is valid and constitutional and declined to represent
the municipality of Bauan in an action to be brought against the NAWASA to test the validity and constitutionality of the
Act. Given this, the municipality engaged the services of a special counsel to commence an action challenging
the constitutionality of R.A. No. 1383.
The Petitioners are the special counsel seeking reimbursement for initial attorneys fees, which the Auditor General
disallowed citing that the Municipality of Bauan had no authority to engage the services of a special counsel
Issue: Whether municipality of Bauan had authority to engage the services of a special counsel
Held: No. The Provincial Fiscal is the legal adviser of the mayor and counsel of the various municipalities of a province
and it is his duty to represent the municipality in any court except when he isdisqualified by law, which in this case he is
not. A fiscal cannot refuse the performance of his functions on grounds not provided for by law without violating his
oath of office. Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney, the municipal council should have requested the
Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who had declined to handle
and prosecute its case in court.
The services of the petitioner having been engaged by the municipal council and mayor without authority of law, the
Auditor General was correct in disallowing in audit the petitioner's claim for payment ofattorney's fees.
(6-10 by Fr. Ramil Esplana)
6. Salcedo v. Hernandez 61 Phil 724 (1935)
61 Phil. 724 Legal Ethics Respect to the Courts Use of Temperate Language
In 1935, Atty. Vicente Francisco was the counsel for Felipe Salcedo in a case entitled Felipe Salcedo vs Francisco

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Hernandez. Salcedo lost in that case and Atty. Francisco filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
The trial court however ordered Atty. Francisco to explain why he should not be disciplined. It appears that in the
Motion filed by Atty. Francisco, he expressed his disagreement with the judgment by stating that the judgment is
absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the right of [Salcedo] and a mockery of the popular will
expressed at the polls in the Municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas (so this could be an election case); that the court
should rectify itself or else the voters in Tiaong might resort to the press publicly to denounce the judicial outrage
and that if uncorrected, the judgment will lead to the increase [of] the proselytes (new converts) of sakdalism and
make the public lose confidence in the administration of justice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Francisco should be disciplined.
HELD: Yes. He is guilty of contempt. A lawyer owes respect to the courts. A lawyer is duty bound to uphold the courts
dignity and authority and to defend its integrity. The language used by Atty. Francisco is uncalled for and unjustified. In
order to appeal to reason and justice, it is highly improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats. Even if
assuming that the trial court did err in its judgment, Atty. Francisco should still use temperate and respectful language
in advancing the cause of his client.
His insinuations that the voters in Tiaong, Tayabas might resort to sakdalism (a seditious movement) is a suggestion to
the people there of what they should do should his client not get a favorable judgment. This is a veiled threat to the
courts. It promotes distrust to the courts.
It is laudable for Atty. Francisco to defend his client with all fervor and energy but he must do so with respect to the
dignity of the courts. The lawyer was fined and reprimanded.
Note: Justice Malcolm dissented; Atty. Francisco is protected by Freedom of Speech.
7. Alawi v. Alauya 268 Scra 628 (1997)
Facts:
Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing
company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City,
They were classmates, and used to be friends.
Through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing
units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his
contract with the company. He claimed that his consent was vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the Vice
President of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC.
On learning of Alauya's letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against him. One of her grounds was Alauyas
usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-atlaw." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because
"counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator
beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
Issue:
Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Sharia bar, can use the title of Attorney
Held:
He cant. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine bar.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who pass
the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts.
While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both
be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is
an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law
and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
8. Pangan v. Ramos 93 Scra 87 (1979)
93 SCRA 87 Legal Ethics Lack of Candor by a Lawyer Proper name to be used by a lawyer
In 1979, a pending administrative case filed by Santa Pangan against Atty. Dionisio Ramos was delayed because Atty.
Ramos allegedly appeared before a court in Manila. When the records of the said case was checked (one which Atty.
Ramos appeared in), it was found that he used the name Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos. In his defense, Atty. Ramos said
he has the right to use such name because in his birth certificate, his name listed was Pedro Dionisio Ramos. D.D.
stands for Dionisio Dayaw with Dayaw being his mothers surname. However, in the roll of attorneys, his name listed

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was Dionisio D. Ramos.

ISSUE: Whether or not what Atty. Ramos did was correct.
HELD: No. The attorneys roll or register is the official record containing the names and signatures of those who are
authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of
Attorneys in his practice of law. The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he will do no falsehood. As
an officer in the temple of justice, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of truthfulness, candor and frankness. In
representing himself to the court as Pedro D.D. Ramos instead of Dionisio D. Ramos, respondent has violated his
solemn oath and has resorted to deception. The Supreme Court hence severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned
that a similar infraction will warrant suspension or disbarment.
9. Philippines Lawyer's Association v. Agrava 105 Phil 173 (1959)
PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION VS. CELEDONIO AGRAVA,in his capacity as Director of the Philippines
Patent OfficeFACTS:
A petition was filed by the petitioner for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director
of the Philippines Patent Office. On May 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had
scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination forthe purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent
attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office. The petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar examinations
and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to
practice before the Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent Directors holding an examination for the purpose
is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law. The respondent, in reply, maintains the prosecution of
patent cases does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and
technical knowledge and training as a matter of actual practice so as to include engineers and other individuals who
passed the examination can practice before the Patent office. Furthermore, he stressed that for the long time he is
holding tests, this is the first time that his right has been questioned formally.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent application,
etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their
opposition thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Moreover, the practice before the patent Office
involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be
established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct
of cases or litigation in court but also embraces all other matters connected with the law and any work involving the
determination by the legal mind of the legal effects of facts and conditions. Furthermore, the law provides that any
party may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director. Thus, if the transactions of
business in the Patent Office involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then
logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or
technical men, which is not the case.
10. Li v. Bonifacio 333 Scra 38 (2000)
Facts:
Complainant Lesli Ui found out that her husband, Carlos Ui, was carrying out an illicit relationship with respondent Atty.
Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot two children. Hence, a complaint for disbarment was filed by complainant against
respondent before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on the ground of
immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainants husband. It is respondents
contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were married abroad and that after June 1988,
when respondent discovered Carlos Uis true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that
Carlos Ui never lived with her.
Issue:
Whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the practice
of law.
Held:
The complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, was dismissed.
(11-16 by Jayrom Carabido)

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11. Deles v. Aragona, 27 SCRA 1 (1969)

Facts:
Aurora Soriano Deles, complainant , filed a verified letter-complaint against Atty. Vicente E. Aragona, Jr. , respondent,
for having made, under oath, false and unfounded allegations against Deles in a motion filed in Court of Agrarian
Relations, Iloilo, cases 1254 and 1255, which allegedly caused hergreat mentaltorture and moral suffering.
The CAR Case -- an intestate court issued an order denying a proposed lease of 10 hectares of the estate by Deles to
one Carlos Fuentes and sustaining the possession of Enrique Soriano (brother of Deles) as lessee of said land. In
effect, the order likewise sustained the possession by the brothers Federico and Carlos Aglinao of a portion of the said
land being tenanted by them upon authority of the lessee, Enrique.
IN DISREGARD OF THE ORDER, Deles attempted to take possession of the landholdings by placing thereon her own
tenants. The Aglinaos countered by filing against Deles two petitions with the Court of Agrarian Relations, Iloilo. After a
hearing, the men of Deles entered the land in question and planted rice thereon, this unauthorized entry prompted Atty.
Aragona to file an "Urgent Motion for Issuance of Interlocutory Order" praying that Deles, her agent, or any person
acting for and in her behalf from interfering with the work of the Aglinaos in their respective landholdings. Mrs. Soriano
(wife of Enrique) went to see Atty. Aragano - she told him that she was personally present when one Albert, a tenant of
Deles, accompanied by armed men, went to the land in question and harvested the palay thereon over the protests f
the Aglinaos; and that she was told that they were acting upon orders of the Deles. POSSESSED OF THE ABOVE
INFORMATION, Atty. Aragona promptly prepared and filed with the CAR an "Urgent Motion to Declare [Deles] in
Contempt of Court."
Issue/s:
Whether Atty. Aragona should be disciplined or disbarred for having prepared and filed under oath the said motion.
Held: No. #1 -- In People vs. Aquino, this Court laid down the decisional authority that statement made in the course of
judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged that is, privileged regardless of defamatory tenor and of the presence
of malice if the same are relevant, pertinent or material to the cause in hand or subject of the inquiry. And that, in
view of this, the person who makes them such as a judge, lawyer, or witness does not thereby incur the risk of
being found liable thereon in a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages.
Since there is no doubt that the allegations made by the respondent in the questioned motion for contempt are
statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding i.e., in C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255 besides being
relevant, pertinent or material to the subject-matter of the said cases, they are absolutely privileged, thereby precluding
any liability on the part of the respondent.
#2 -- Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the
charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. Xxx. The ultimate test
is that of bona fides.
Indeed, the actuations of Atty. Aragano were motivated by the legitimate desire to serve the interests of his clients -Mrs. Soriano informed Atty. Aragano of the incident coupled with Deles' admissions.
12. Blanza v. Arcangel, 21 SCRA 1 (1969)
Facts: On April, 1955, Atty. Arcangel volunteered to help them in their respective pension claims in connection with the
death of their husbands, both P.C. soldiers. They handed Arcangel pertinent documents and also affixed their
signatures on blank papers. After which, they noticed that respondent lost interest and no progress was made. After 6
years they finally asked respondent to return the said documents but the latter refused. Upon questioning by Fiscal
Rana to whom the case was referred by the Solicitor General respondent admitted having received the documents but
explained that it was for photo stating purposes only. His failure to immediately return them was due to complainants
refusal to hand him money to pay for the photo stating costs which prevented him from withdrawing the documents.
nyway, he had already advanced the expenses himself and turned over the documents to the fiscal. Fiscal found
respondents explanation satisfactory and recommended the respondents exoneration. However, Sol Gen feels that
respondent deserves at least a severe reprimand considering his failure to attend to complainants pension claims
for 6 years; his failure to immediately return the documents despite repeated demands.
Issue: WON Atty. Arcangel is guilty of professional non-feasance
Held: No. Respondents explanation for the delay in filing the claims in returning the documents has not been
controverted by complainants. On the contrary, they admitted that respondent asked them to shoulder the photostating
expenses but they did not give him any money. Hence, complainants are partly to blame. Moreover, the
documents and their photostats were actually returned by respondent during the fiscals investigation with him paying
for the photostating costs himself. As for the alleged failure of the respondent to all her documents to omplainant
Pasion, the former denies this. the affidavit of Mrs. Blanza pardoning respondent cannot prejudice complainant

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Pasion because res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet.
13. Zarote v. Simoliciano, 443 SCRA 1 (2004)
FACTS:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed against Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano for allegedly notarizing several
documents during the year 2002 after his commission as notary public had expired.
It is evident from the foregoing that when respondent notarized the aforementioned documents, he was not
commissioned as notary public, which was in violation of the Notarial Law; for having notarized the 590 documents
after the expiration of his commission as notary public without having renewed said commission amounting to gross
misconduct as a member of the legal profession.
Against the evidence presented by complainant, respondent did not even attempt to present any evidence. His
counsel filed an ex-parte motion for extension to file answer, which was granted, but no answer was forthcoming. Still,
Hearing Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro gave respondent a last chance to file his answer; which was again unheeded.
Thus, respondent was unable to rebut complainants evidence that he was not so commissioned for the year in
question. His lack of interest and indifference in presenting his defense to the charge and the evidence against him
can only mean he has no strong and valid defense to offer. Conclusively, respondent Atty. Simpliciano is not a duly
commissioned Notary Public for and in Quezon City for the year 2002.
ISSUE: What is the significance of the commission?
RULING:
The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a mere casual
formality. The Court has characterized a lawyers act of notarizing documents without the requisite commission
therefore as reprehensible, constituting as it does not only malpractice but also x x x the crime of falsification of public
documents.
For such reprehensible conduct, the Court has sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from the practice of law,
revocation of the notarial commission and disqualification from acting as such, and even disbarment. In the case of
Nunga v. Viray, the Court had occasion to state that where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the
Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to
disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial without such commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey
the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is
not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath similarly
proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
14. A-1 Financial Services, Inc. v. Valerio, 662 SCRA 616
Facts: Atty. Valerio obtained a loan from complainant and secured the payment of the loan obligation by issuing a
postdated check. However, upon its maturity date, the check was dishonored due to insufficient funds. As of the filing
of the instant case, despite repeated demands to pay her obligation, Atty. Valerio failed to pay the whole amount of her
obligation. After repeated demands by the trial court Atty. Valerio failed to give any response. After an administrative
case had been filed by complainant against Atty. Valerio with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), the
latters mother explained that her daughter had been diagnosed with schizophrenia; thus, could not properly respond
to the complaint against her. IBP-CBD recommended Atty. Valerio be suspended from the practice of law for a period
of two (2) years, having found her guilty of gross misconduct. IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with
modification of the period of suspension to 1 year.
Issue: whether respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Held: WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-647 dated December 11, 2008 of the IBP, which found respondent
Atty. Laarni N. Valerio guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. She is hereby SUSPENDED for two (2) years from the practice of law, effective
upon the receipt of this Decision. She is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more
severely.
Ruling: SC sustains the findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD.
They must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which include
prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a manner that reflects the values and norms
of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

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The Court, finds unmeritorious Mrs. Valerios justification that her daughter, Atty. Valerio, is suffering from a health
condition, i.e. schizophrenia, which has prevented her from properly answering the complaint against her. Indeed, we
cannot take the medical certificate on its face, considering Mrs. Valerios failure to prove the contents of the certificate
or present the physician who issued it.
Atty. Valerios conduct in the course of the IBP and court proceedings is also a matter of serious concern. She failed to
answer the complaint against her. Despite due notice, she failed to attend the disciplinary hearings set by the IBP. She
also ignored the proceedings before the court as she likewise failed to both answer the complaint against her and
appear during her arraignment, despite orders and notices from the court. Clearly, this conduct runs counter to the
precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility and violates the lawyers oath which imposes upon every member
of the Bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice. Atty. Valerio has failed to live up to the values and norms of
the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
SC deems it reasonable to affirm the sanction imposed by the IBP-CBD, i.e., Atty. Valerio was ordered suspended from
the practice of law for two (2) years, because, aside from issuing worthless checks and failing to pay her debts, she
has also shown wanton disregard of the IBPs and Court Orders in the course of the proceedings.
15. RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS B.M. No. 1222
Facts: On 22 September 2003, the day following the bar examination in Mercantile Law, Justice Jose C. Vitug,
Chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee, was apprised of a rumored leakage in the examination on the
subject. After making his own inquiries, Justice Vitug reported the matter to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and to
the other members of the Court, recommending that the bar examination on the subject be nullified and that an
investigation be conducted forthwith. On 23 September 2003, the Court adopted the recommendation of Justice Vitug,
and resolved to nullify the examination in Mercantile Law and to hold another examination on 04 October 2003 at eight
oclock in the evening (being the earliest available time and date) at the De La Salle University, Taft Avenue, Manila.
The resolution was issued without prejudice to any action that the Court would further take on the matter. Following the
issuance of the resolution, the Court received numerous petitions and motions from the Philippine Association of Law
Schools and various other groups and persons, expressing agreement to the nullification of the bar examinations in
Mercantile Law but voicing strong reservations against the holding of another examination on the subject.
Upon learning from Justice Vitug of the leakage of the bar questions prepared by him in mercantile law, Atty.
Balgos immediately called together and questioned his office staff. He interrogated all of them except Atty. Danilo De
Guzman who was absent then. All of them professed to know nothing about the bar leakage. DANILO DE GUZMAN
testified that he joined Balgos & Perez in April 2000. As a member of the fraternity, he was active during bar
examinations and participated in the fraternitys bar ops.
Issue: whether or not the conduct of de Guzman constitute grounds for disbarment
Held: NO. The Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The disbarment of
DANILO G. DE GUZMAN from the practice of law is hereby COMMUTED to SEVEN (7) YEARS SUSPENSION FROM
THE PRACTICE OF LAW, reckoned from February 4, 2004. He transgressed the very first canon of the lawyers Code
of Professional Responsibility which provides that [a] lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land,
and promote respect for law and legal processes.
By transmitting and distributing the stolen test questions to some members of the Beta Sigma Lambda Fraternity,
possibly for pecuniary profit and to given them undue advantage over the other examiners in the mercantile law
examination, De Guzman abetted cheating or dishonesty by his fraternity brothers in the examination, which is
violative of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, as well as Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for members of the
Bar, which provide:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct
Canon 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
De Guzman was guilty of grave misconduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. He violated the law instead of
promoting respect for it and degraded the noble profession of law instead of upholding its dignity and integrity. His
actuations impaired public respect for the Court, and damaged the integrity of the bar examinations as the final
measure of a law graduates academic preparedness to embark upon the practice of law.
(16-20 Randy Baconawa)
16. In re: Petitioner to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, Medado, September 24, 2013
I. Terms
Canon 9- A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law
II. Reliefs Sought
Atty. Michael Medado filed a petition to be able to sign the roll of attorneys.
III. Facts
Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines College of Law in 1979, passing the Bar with an average of

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82.7%
May 7, 1980: He took the lawyers oath.
He was scheduled to sign the roll of attorneys on May 13, 1980, but failed to do so, as he had misplaced the Notice to
Sign the Roll of Attorneys given by the Bar Office, which he had left in his province.
Years later, he found the notice, realizing he had not signed the roll. At that time, he was already working in the field of
corporation and tax, which did not include much litigation.
In 2005, he attended the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education seminar, which required him to provide his roll
number to be credited, but he could not produce it.
Feb 6, 2012: He filed a petition to be allowed to sign the roll.
The Office of the Bar confidant had recommended that the petition be denied for gross negligence, misconduct, and
lack of merit, as he did not have a valid justification for his actions.
IV. Issue/s and Held
1. Whether or not Atty. Medado acted in gross negligence and misconduct.
Held: Yes, but the court granted his petition, with an additional fine of P32,000, and penalty of not allowing him to sign
for 1 year (because he cannot be suspended yet, as he is not a full-fledged lawyer), wherein he is not allowed to
practice.
To not allow Medado to sign the roll of attorneys would be like the penalty of disbarment, which is reserved for the
most serious of ethical transgressions.
The petitioner acted in good faith, as he had filed the petition himself, acknowledging his own lapses. He had also
showed his good moral character in that he had not been a subject of disqualification, showing that he had
continuously adhered to the strict requirements of the legal profession. He has also proved his competence and ability,
as shown through his work in the Laurel Law Office, Petron, Petrophil Corp., PNOC, and EDC
The practice of law is a privilege to those who can show mental and moral fitness.
The petitioners failure to sign for 30 years cannot be deemed as a mistaken belief.
Ignorantia facti excusat; Ignorantia legis nemimem excusat
It was an honest mistake when he had thought that he had already signed the roll during his oath-taking (attendance
pala), but after discovering the notice, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice, which is an indirect contempt
of court
Canon 9 applies to him, as signing in the roll is a requirement to become a full-fledged lawyer.
17. In re: David 93 Phil 461
Facts: Respondent was suspended for bad practices in the exercise of his profession as a lawyer for a period of five
years from the November 9, 1949. The defendant admits this suspension in `his written report filed on March 17, 1951,
yet he continued to exercise the profession within the period of suspension, November 9, 1949 to November 8, 1954.
On Feb 28 1950 the respondent file a claim in the case of Tan Tek vs Sy not as a lawyer but as an agent. (For and in
behalf of Tan Tek Sy) CFI decided in favor of Tan Tek, subsequently Atty Felix David filed a motion for execution. In
another civil case of the CFI called Malayan Saw Mill, Inc vs Tolentino, defendant filed a brief for an order to demolish
homes.
In order - says the appeal - to show That I did not Have the intention to disregard the suspension of the Supreme
Court, I did not With The Knowledge of Tan Tek Identified Sy Even myself as the attorney for the Appelles But In Good
Faith, I signed for and in Behalf of the appellee Without Designating That I am Practicing as attorney-at-law.
ISSUE: Whether the acts of Atty Felix David is tantamount to practice of law.
HELD: Yes. Neither can he allow his name to appear in such pleading by itself or as part of firm name under the
signature of another qualified lawyer because the signature of an agent amounts to signing of a non-qualified senator
or congressman, the office of an attorney being originally an agency, and because he will, by such act, be appearing in
court or quasi-judicial or administrative body in violation of the constitutional restriction. He cannot do indirectly what
the Constitution prohibits directly.
18. PLA v. Agrava 105 Phil 173
FACTS:
This is a petition filed by the Philippine Lawyers Association for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio Agrava,
in his capacity s Director of the Philippines Patent Office. On May 23, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular
announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified
to practice as patent attorneys before the said office. Petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar
examinations, and is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office and that the
respondent Director's holding an examination for the purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the

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law. The respondent, in reply, maintains that the prosecution of patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the
practice of law but include the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training as a matter of actual
purpose so as to include engineers and other individuals who passed the examination can practice before the Patent
Office. Furthermore, respondent contends that he has previously conducted such examinations and that this is the first
time that he is questioned formally.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not members of the bar should first take and pass an examination conducted by the Patent Office before
he would be allowed to practice law in said office;
2. Whether or not appearance before the Patent Office and the preparation of applications or patents, etc. constitutes
practice of law or is included in the practice of law; and,
3. Whether or not the Director of the Patent Office is authorized to conduct examinations for patent attorneys.
RULING:
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines and any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity,
whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines. Moreover, "The practice of law is not limited to
the conduct of cases or litigation m court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges
and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation sendees, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have
been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. As such, , the practice of
law includes such appear ance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other
persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their
rights in patent cases. Thus, under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to
practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of
the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent
Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the
functions of the Patent Director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions
are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court. In sum, the practice of law covers any activity in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedures, principles or practice and calls for legal knowledge, training and
experience. And, only the Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the
practice of law.
19. Cayetano v. Monsod 201 SCRA 210
Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of chairman of
the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses required qualification
of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article
IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of
a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years.
Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct
of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body,
the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience.

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The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsods past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager,
a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor
verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
20. De leon vs. CA 383 SCRA 216
(21-28 Troy Manalo)
21. Roberto Soriano vs. Atty. Manuel Dizon
Facts: This is a case of disbarment filed against the accused due to his conviction of frustrated homicide.the case
stemmed from a traffic altercation by the respondent with the complainant. In the course of their trouble,respondent
was able to hit the neck of the complainant by his revolver making the complainant physically paralyzed.the manner
which the respondent attacked the complainant and a credible corroboration of witnesses as to the crime lead the
conviction of the respondent of the said crime but later the rtc suspended the sentence by granting the respondent a
probation.respondent banking his defense on a concocted story and alibi which later disregarded by the court due to
existence of credible documentary and testimonial evidence.
Issue: whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude? Whether his conviction warrants disbarment?
Ruling: the court resolved the matter by declaring the actuation of the respondent in the crime of frustrated homicide
involved moral turpitude.the court also consider the rtcs findings of treachery as a further indications of skewed morals
of respondent.it is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed canon 1 of the code of professional
responsibility thru his possession of an unlicensed fire arm and his unjust refusal to satisfy civil liabilities.the court
remind him both the attorneys oath and code of professional responsibility.the appalling vindictiveness and,treachery,
and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as member of the bar.thus the
court,disbarred the respondent and odered the name of the latter be stricken from the roll of attorneys.
22. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
Eduardo Gomez opened an account with Golden Savings and deposited 38 treasury warrants. All warrants
were subsequently indorsed by Gloria Castillo as Cashier of Golden Savings and deposited to its Savings account in
Metrobank branch in Calapan, Mindoro. They were sent for clearance. Meanwhile, Gomez is not allowed to withdraw
from his account, later, however, exasperated over Floria repeated inquiries and also as an accommodation for a
valued client Metrobank decided to allow Golden Savings to withdraw from proceeds of the warrants. In turn, Golden
Savings subsequently allowed Gomez to make withdrawals from his own account. Metrobank informed Golden
Savings that 32 of the warrants had been dishonored by the Bureau of Treasury and demanded the refund by Golden
Savings of the amount it had previously withdrawn, to make up the deficit in its account. The demand was rejected.
Metrobank then sued Golden Savings.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Metrobank can demand refund agaist Golden Savings with regard to the amount withdraws to make
up with the deficit as a result of the dishonored treasury warrants.
2. Whether or not treasury warrants are negotiable instruments
Held:
No. Metrobank is negligent in giving Golden Savings the impression that the treasury warrants had been
cleared and that, consequently, it was safe to allow Gomez to withdraw. Without such assurance, Golden Savings
would not have allowed the withdrawals. Indeed, Golden Savings might even have incurred liability for its refusal to
return the money that all appearances belonged to the depositor, who could therefore withdraw it anytime and for any
reason he saw fit.
It was, in fact, to secure the clearance of the treasury warrants that Golden Savings deposited them to its account with
Metrobank. Golden Savings had no clearing facilities of its own. It relied on Metrobank to determine the validity of the
warrants through its own services. The proceeds of the warrants were withheld from Gomez until Metrobank allowed
Golden Savings itself to withdraw them from its own deposit.
Metrobank cannot contend that by indorsing the warrants in general, Golden Savings assumed that they were genuine
and in all respects what they purport to be, in accordance with Sec. 66 of NIL. The simple reason that NIL is not
applicable to non negotiable instruments, treasury warrants.
No. The treasury warrants are not negotiable instruments. Clearly stamped on their face is the word: non

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negotiable. Moreover, and this is equal significance, it is indicated that they are payable from a particular fund, to wit,
Fund 501. An instrument to be negotiable instrument must contain an unconditional promise or orders to pay a sum
certain in money. As provided by Sec 3 of NIL an unqualified order or promise to pay is unconditional though coupled
with: 1st, an indication of a particular fund out of which reimbursement is to be made or a particular account to be
debited with the amount; or 2nd, a statement of the transaction which give rise to the instrument. But an order to
promise to pay out of particular fund is not unconditional. The indication of Fund 501 as the source of the payment to
be made on the treasury warrants makes the order or promise to pay not conditional and the warrants themselves
non-negotiable. There should be no question that the exception on Section 3 of NIL is applicable in the case at bar.
23. WELLINGTON REYES vs. ATTY. SALVADOR M. GAA
FACTS
Wellington Reyes, a complainant, reported to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that he had been the
victim of extortion by Atty. Gaa, a respondent lawyer and a former Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, who was
investigating a complaint for estafa filed by complainants business rival. According to complainant, he had given
respondent P500.00 on March 1, 1971 and a total of P1, 500.00 on three other occasions. He said that another
payoff was scheduled at 11:00 A.M. on the same day in respondents office at the City Hall. An entrapment was set
up by the NBI after complainant furnished the NBI agents several peso bills totaling P150.00 for marking. The paper
bills were sent to the Forensic and Chemistry Division of the NBI and subsequently returned to complainant for use in
the entrapment. When complainant went to respondents office, he was told that the latter would not return until
around 2:30 P.M. As there were other persons doing business with respondent. When finally complainant was able to
see the respondent after thirty minutes of waiting, the complainant then handed to respondent the marked money
which he placed inside his right pocket. The NBI agents then apprehended respondent and brought him to the NBI
Forensic and Chemistry Division for examination. Respondents hands were found positive of the yellow florescent
powder applied earlier to the marked money. Respondent was thereafter taken to the Office of the Anti-Organized
Crime Division of the NBI where he was photographed, fingerprinted and record checked. Respondent declined to give
a sworn statement to explain his side of the case, invoking his right against self-incrimination. Thereafter, the NBI
recommended the prosecution of respondent for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019. The NBI recommended to
the Secretary of Justice the filing of administrative charges and the institution of disbarment proceedings against him.
An administrative complaint for disbarment charges respondent with malpractice and willful violation of his oath as an
attorney. In an answer to such complaint, respondent asserted that complainant surreptitiously planted the marked
money in his pocket without his knowledge and consent. He further said that the criminal case (IS No. 71-6558) filed
against him by the NBI was still pending preliminary investigation by the City Fiscal of Manila. In connection with the
incident of March 30, 1971, he said that he had filed a criminal complaint for incriminatory machination, perjury and
attempted corruption of a public official against complainant with the City Fiscal of Manila. In reply to the answer,
complainant denied that the several cases against respondent were motivated by revenge, malice or personal ill will.
He said that the investigating fiscal had recommended the dismissal of the charges filed by his business rival. In a
resolution dated December 23, 1971, this Court resolved to refer the disbarment case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. However, upon the adoption of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court,
the case was transferred to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and disposition. On March 15, 1993,
Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
recommended that respondent be disbarred.
ISSUE
Whether or not the extortion committed by Atty. Salavador Gaa shall be considered as a ground for
disbarment?
HELD
YES. The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a public official, which also constitutes
a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyers oath (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138, Section 18; People v. De
Luna, 102 Phil. 968 [1958]) imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyers
oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary
action. Where the misconduct of a lawyer as a government official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as
a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds
(Gonzales-Austria v. Abaya, 176 SCRA 634 [1989]). The respondent is DISBARRED and his name is ordered
STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys.
24. Ting-Dumali v. Torres
The parents of Isidra Ting-Dumali died intestate and they left several properties including two parcels of land Lot 1586
and Lot 1603 both in Malabon. Isidra has 5 other siblings.
In 1986 however, two of her siblings, Felicisima Ting-Torres and Miriam Ting-Saria, executed two Deeds of
Extrajudicial Settlement. They were assisted by Felicisimas husband, Atty. Rolando Torres who was also the
administrator of the Ting Estate. In the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement covering Lot 1586, they made it appear that

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Felicisima and Miriam were the only heirs of the Tings. Atty. In the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement covering Lot 1603,
the signature of Isidra was forged to make it appear that she was a party to the Deed. Torres then presented the
Deeds to the Registry of Deeds of Cavite for the purpose of transferring the titles into the name of Miriam and
Felicisima. Thereafter, Felicisima and Miriam sold the lands to a corporation.
Consequently, Isidra filed several complaints. One of the complaints is this disbarment case against Atty. Torres.
Torres, in his defense, averred that he acted in good faith in allowing his wife and Miriam to execute the Deeds; that he
thought that the Deeds were agreed to by the other siblings pursuant to a toka or verbal will left by Isidras mother and
as implemented by their eldest brother, Eliseo Ting; that the exclusion of the other heirs was merely an oversight.
Isidra denied the existence of the toka. Eliseo also said there was no such toka.
ISSUE: Whether or not Torres should be disbarred for allowing the exclusion of the other heirs from the Deeds of
Extrajudicial Settlement despite his knowledge of their presence.
HELD: Yes. He violated his oath as he engaged in deceitful conduct. He has committed falsehood. By letting his wife
and Miriam declare in a public document that they are the only heirs to the estate when in fact there are other
compulsory heirs and then later presenting these Deeds to the Registry of Deeds, Atty. Torres failed to advise that the
two were doing acts contrary to law. He participated in the making of these Deeds as well as to the subsequent
transactions involving the sale of the properties covered by the Deeds. His acts facilitated a wrong against the other
heirs.
25. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant vs.ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.
Facts;
Respondent was suspended for practicing his profession until further notice from the Supreme Court finding her guilty
of violating BP 22.
Atty. Tuanda is now appealing to the Supreme Court for her suspension to be lifted arguing that her suspension was a
penalty so harsh on top of the fines imposed to her in violation of the aforementioned law. Arguing further that she
intends no damage to the plaintiff-appellee (Herminia A. Marquez)and she is not guilty of the offense charged.
Issue;
WON the suspension of Atty. Fe Tuanda be lifted.
Ruling;
The Supreme Court ruled to DENY the respondent of his Motion to Lift Order of Suspension and affirmed the ruling of
the Court of Appeals regarding the suspension. The court found Atty. Fe Tuanda guilty of an offense involving moral
turpitude citing Secs 27 and 28 of the Rules of Court and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
26. In re: Elmo S Abad
FACTS: Court held respondent Elmo S. Abad a successful bar examinee but has not been admitted to the Philippine
Bar in contempt of Court for unauthorized practice of law and he was fined P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case he failed to pay the fine. (121 SCRA 217). He paid the fine. Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., the complainant, filed a
MOTION TO CIRCULARIZE TO ALL METRO MANILA COURTS THE FACT THAT ELMO S. ABAD IS NOT
AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE LAW. The Report has found as a fact, over the denials of the respondent under oath,
that he signed Exhibits B, C, and D, and that he made appearances in Metro Manila courts. This aspect opens the
respondent to a charge for perjury. The Report also reveals that Atty. Ruben A. Jacobe collaborated with the
respondent as counsels for Antonio S. Maravilla one of the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 26084, 26085 and 26086 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. (Exhibit D.) Atty. Jacobe should be called to account for his association with
the respondent.
Respondent, when asked about the aforesaid motions, Exhibits "B" and "D", and the signatures therein, denied that he
filed the same and that the signatures therein are his. He also denied that he appeared in the hearing in the afternoon
of December 8, 1983 in the said trial court. According to him, he was in Batangas at the time. He also testified that the
only explanation he could give regarding the signatures in the aforesaid exhibits is that the same could have been
effected by Atty. Beltran to show the Supreme Court that he (respondent) was still illegally practicing law. As to the
motion for examination and analysis of respondent's signature, the Investigator, to afford respondent full opportunity to
prove his defense, sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation to compare respondent's signature in
the aforesaid exhibits with the signatures appearing in the pleadings that he filed in the Supreme Court, which latter
signature he admits as genuine and as his own. The aforesaid documentary and testimonial evidence, as well as the
above report of the NBI, have clearly proved that respondent Abad is still practicing law despite the decision of this
Court of March 28, 1983.
ISSUES: Whether or not Abad can engage in practice of law.

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Whether or not Atty. Jacobe liable in his collaboration with the respondent.
HELD: No. Only those licensed by the Supreme Court may practice law in this country. The right to practice law is not
a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal
knowledge, educationalattainment and even public trust, since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does
not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can
be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seekingadmission had practiced law
without license. Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances which he has narrated do not constitute
his admissionto the Philippine Bar and the right to practice law thereafter. He should know that two essential requisites
for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and his
signature in the Roll of Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs. 17 and 19, Rules of Court.) The regulation of the practice of law is
unquestionably strict. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized
practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court. Mr. Elmo S. Abad is hereby fined Five Hundred (P500.00) pesos
payable to this Court within ten (10) days from notice failing which he shall serve twenty-five (25) days imprisonment.
Yes. He violated Canon 9 Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any
task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar. in good standing. A lawyer shall not assist anyone
who is not a member of the Bar to practice law in this country. Thus, he must not take as partner or associate in his law
firm a person who is not a lawyer, a lawyer who has been disbarred and a lawyer who has been suspended from
practice of law. The lawyer who assists in an unauthorized practice of law whether directly or indirectly is subject to
disciplinary action. Finally, Atty. Ruben A. Jacobe is required to explain within ten (10) days from notice why he should
not be disciplined for collaborating and associating in the practice of the law with the respondent who is not a member
of the bar.
27. AGUIRRE vs. RANA
FACTS: Respondent Edwin L. Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. Respondent, while not
yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election
Canvassers of Mandaon, Masbate and filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to
the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent
represented himself as "counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan," and signed the
pleading as counsel for George Bunan. Furthermore, respondent also signed as counsel for Emily Estipona-Hao on 19
May 2001 in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate
for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar
examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for
Denial of Admission to the Bar. On 22 May 2001, respondent was allowed to take the lawyers oath but was disallowed
from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent shall be denied Admission to the Bar.
RULING: Respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and
filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law.
Respondent called himself "counsel" knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out
as "counsel" knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member
of the Philippine Bar.
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral
character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes
possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of
the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The
practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person
seeking admission had practiced law without a license. True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and
took the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer.
The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be
performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.
28. In re: Atty. Marcial Edillion (see case #10 of Admission to Practice)
LAWYER'S DUTIES TO COURT
(1-5 Compiled by Hazel Aumentado)

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1. City Sheriff, Iligan City v. Fortunato 288 Scra 190 (1998)

Facts: Respondents Fortunado are the owners of a registered parcel of land. It was mortgaged to Traders Commercial
Bank by Arsenio Lopez, jr to secure a loan. Consequently, respondents sought the annulment of the real estate
mortgage before the Court of First Instance, which granted the same. However, on appeal, it was reversed by the
Court of Appeals which held the said mortgage valid. Traders Commercial Bank assigned its rights to petitioner Angel
Bautista, who requested the City Sheriff for the foreclosure of the mortgage. Thereafter, respondent filed a complaint
for preliminary injunction of the foreclosure because the mortgage was already extinguished by the payment of the
loan. It was granted after motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court.
We gave due course to the petition and required the contending parties to submit their respective Memoranda on
August 31, 1988. On January 30, 1995, respondents, through counsel Ramon A. Gonzales, filed a verified
Manifestation informing the Court that the subject real estate mortgage has already been released by the Traders
Royal Bank on December 23, 1983 as shown in the certified true copy of the Release of Real Estate Mortgage, 7 and
that the petitioner was killed in a robbery in his house. 8 Respondents therefore pray for the dismissal of the petition.
On February 20, 1995, this Court required petitioner's counsel Atty. Emilio Abrogena to comment on the said
Manifestation. However, the copy of the resolution of the Court addressed to Atty. Abrogena was returned unclaimed
after three notices, 9 with the postmaster's remark "moved." In view of this development, the Court considered the
resolution as served.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner's counsel violates his duties to the court?
Ruling: Yes. However, we take notice of the failure of petitioner's lawyer, Atty. Emilio Abrogena, to inform the trial court
of the death of petitioner, a duty mandated by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides in part,
to wit: Sec. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the
fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of the counsel to
comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action. xxx xxx xxx Hence, the proper substitution of the
deceased in accordance with the aforequoted provisions of Rule 3 could not be effected. We likewise note Atty.
Abrogena's failure to inform this Court of his change of address which accounts for his failure to comment on the
manifestation of respondents relative to the death of petitioner and the release of the subject real estate mortgage.
Atty. Abrogena should bear in mind that a lawyer is, first and foremost, an officer of the court. His duties to the court
are more significant than those which he owes to his client. His first duty is not to his client but to the administration of
justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be
scrupulously observant of the law and ethics of the profession. 12 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED
for being moot and academic. Atty. Emilio Abrogena, counsel for petitioner, is hereby REPRIMANDED for his failure to
inform this Court of the death of petitioner and to perform his duty under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court. He is further warned that a repetition of such omission in the future will be dealt with severely. SO ORDERED.
2. Occena v. Marquez 60 Scra 38 (1974)
Facts: The gross value of the estate of the late William C. Ogan subject matter of the probate proceeding in Sp. Proc.
No. 423 is more than P2 million. Petitioners, Atty. Jesus V. Occena and Atty. Samuel C. Occena, are the lawyers for
the estate executrix, Mrs. Necitas Ogan Occena, and they had been representing the said executrix since 1963,
defending the estate against claims and protecting the interests of the estate. In order to expedite the settlement of
their deceased father's estate, the seven instituted heirs decided to enter into compromise with the claimants, as a
result of which the total amount of P220,000.00 in cash was awarded to the claimants, including co-executor Atty.
Isabelo V. Binamira, his lawyers and his wife. Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Payment of Attorneys Fees in the
amount of 30,000 pesos. However, the trial court granted as total payment of attorney's fee the amount of 20,000
pesos. Thus, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with mandamus arguing that respondent Judge committed grave
abuse of discretion in making the said decision. On the arguments that he had opposed in the lower court petitioners'
motion for payment of partial attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00, and that since petitioners Samuel C.
Occena and Jesus V. Occena are the husband and father-in-law, respectively, of executrix Necitas Ogan Occena, the
latter cannot be expected to oppose petitioners' claims for attorney's fees, thus leaving the co-executor as the lone
party to represent and defend the interests of the estate, Atty. I. V. Binamira, who claims to be co-executor of the Ogan
estate, filed with this Court on July, 1967, a Motion for Leave to Intervene, which was granted in a resolution of August
9, 1967. Thereafter, Petitioners have filed petitions for indirect contempt of court against intervenor I. V. Binamira
charging the latter of having made false averments in this Court.
Issue: Whether or not intervenor Binamira is liable for contempt for making false averments?
Ruling: We conclude that intervenor I. V. Binamira has deliberately made false allegations before this Court which
tend to impede or obstruct the administration of justice x x x (See case for false averments) The foregoing are
only some of the twenty-one instances cited by petitioners which clearly show that intervenor had deliberately made
false allegations in his pleadings. We find no rule of law or of ethics which would justify the conduct of a lawyer in any

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case, whether civil or criminal, in endeavoring by dishonest means to mislead the court, even if to do so might work to
the advantage of his client. The conduct of the lawyer before the court and with other lawyers should be characterized
by candor and fairness. It is neither candid nor fair for a lawyer to knowingly make false allegations in a judicial
pleading or to misquote the contents of a document, the testimony of a witness, the argument of opposing counsel or
the contents of a decision. Before his admission to the practice of law, he took the solemn oath that he will do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court, nor wittingly or willingly promote or sue any false, groundless or
unlawful suit, and conduct himself as a lawyer with all good fidelity to courts as well as to his clients. We find that Atty.
Binamira, in having deliberately made these false allegations in his pleadings, has been recreant to his oath. The
charges contained in the counter-petition for indirect contempt of intervenor I. V. Binamira against petitioners have not
been substantiated by evidence, and they must, therefore, be dismissed. We note that no further action was taken on
the petition for contempt filed by petitioners against Generoso L. Pacquiao, who executed the affidavit attached to
intervenor's Answer to Supplemental Petition, the contents of which petitioners claim to be deliberate falsehoods. The
said respondent Pacquiao not having been afforded an opportunity to defend himself against the contempt charge, the
charge must be dismissed. WHEREFORE, (1) the petition for certiorari is granted, and the court a quo is directed to
hold a hearing to determine how much the total attorney's fees petitioners are entitled to, and (2) Atty. Isabelo V.
Binamira, who appeared as intervenor in this case, is hereby declared guilty of contempt and sentenced to pay to this
Court within ten (10) days from notice hereof a fine in the sum of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00). Costs against
intervenor.
3. Chavez v. Viola 196 Scra 10 (1991)
196 SCRA 10 Legal Ethics A lawyer shall do no falsehood
In 1966, Atty. Viola assisted Felicidad Alvendia et al in filing a petition against Teodoro Chavez where he sought to
have the Alvendias be declared as bona fide lessees in a land controversy. Said petition was dismissed because of
nonappearance by the Alvendias.
In 1977, Atty. Viola assisted same clients in applying for an original registration of title over the same land in
controversy in 1966. In said application, Atty. Viola insisted that his clients were the true owners of said land because
they acquired it by sale from Teresita Vistan way back in 1929.
Chavez then filed a disbarment case against Atty. Viola. Chavez said that because of the conflicting claims that Viola
prepared in behalf of his clients, he had willingly aided in and consented to the pursuit, promotion and prosecution of a
false and unlawful application for land registration, in violation of his oath of office as a member of the Bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Viola is in violation of the Lawyers Oath.
HELD: Yes. Viola alleged in an earlier pleading that his clients were merely lessees of the property involved. In his later
pleading, he stated that the very same clients were owners of the same property. One of these pleadings must have
been false; it matters not which one. Worse, he offered no explanation as regards the discrepancy.
A lawyer owes honesty and candor to the courts. It cannot be gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the courts,
is essential for the expeditious administration of justice. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and
honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. Atty. Viola was suspended for 5 months.
4. Chan Kian v. Angsin 53 Scra 295 (1972)
Facts: Plaintiff Kian filed a civil complaint against defendant. On the other hand, defendant filed a criminal complaint
against plaintiff. As a result thereof, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the civil case. Thereafter, the trial court
dismissed the civil case on the ground that, under the rules, after a criminal action has been commenced, no civil
action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted. It was appealed by the plaintiff to the Court of Appeals which
transmitted the same to the Supreme Court because only question of law was raised. The Court's examination, motu
proprio, of the record of said Criminal Case No. 67752 entitled "People vs. Chan Kian" has shown that the principal
issue raised on appeal by herein plaintiff-appellant that the lower court erred in issuing the order dismissing his civil
complaint against the complainant in the criminal case on its ruling that the trial of the criminal case should take
precedence over the civil case, has become moot and academic. This is so because in the meantime long before this
case was certified to this Court by the appellate court on September 19, 1967, the trial of the criminal case had
proceeded and terminated with a judgment of conviction rendered on July 9, 1964 by Judge Kapunan of Branch XVIII,
which in turn was reversed on appeal by the Court of Appeals as per its decision of June 18, 1965.
Issue: Whether or not the lawyers violated their duties to the court when they failed to notify the court about the finality
of the criminal case?
Ruling: The Court notes with regret that had the counsels, 10 as officers of the courts, but faithfully complied with their

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duty to deal with the courts in truth and candor, and promptly manifested to the appellate court the above
developments, all by June, 1965, which have made the principal issue at bar moot and academic, 11 this case would
then have been disposed of and need not have been certified to this Court, and the time needed by it to devote to the
prompt disposition of meritorious cases need not have been thus dissipated. 12 At any rate, it is clear that the civil
case filed by plaintiff-appellant should merely have been suspended, not dismissed although without prejudice, by the
lower court under the Rule invoked by it. 13 Appellee concedes as much, stating that the dismissal without prejudice is
in effect a suspension pending the outcome of the criminal case. Now that the criminal case has already been
resolved, the lower court's dismissal of the civil case should be set aside and the case accordingly remanded to it. On
March 12, 1969, the Court, upon motion of plaintiff-appellant, issued its Resolution authorizing plaintiff "to sell at the
best price obtainable, under the supervision of the Clerk of this Court or his representative, the 400 drums of
monosodium glutamate subject of this case, now stored in the bodega of the General Packing Corporation, and to
deposit with this Court the proceeds of such sale, after deducting the storage fees and other necessary expenses." As
per report of the Clerk of Court, this Resolution has not been implemented to date, due according to plaintiff's
explanation of December 9, 1971, to the very low price being offered for the article. With the present disposition of this
case, this matter has become moot, without prejudice to plaintiff's refiling his motion anew with the lower court.
ACCORDINGLY, for the reasons stated hereinabove, the appealed order of dismissal is hereby set aside and the case
is remanded to the lower court for proper trial and disposition on the merits. With costs against defendant-appellee.
5. Casals v. Cusi 52 Scra 295 (1972)
Facts: Upon the filing on November 2, 1972 of the petition at bar for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction, the Court as per its resolution of November 9, 1972 resolved, without giving due course to the
petition, to require respondents to comment thereon within ten days from notice and to issue a temporary restraining
order restraining respondent court inter alia from proceeding with the hearing of the case 1 pending before it below.
Despite notice and order of the court, Atty. Delante, as counsel for respondents, had repeatedly failed to file the
required comment, specifically, he failed three (3) times to file it.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Delante violated his duties to the court?
Ruling: The Court thus finds unsatisfactory Atty. Delante's explanation for his having allowed his extended period to
lapse without submitting the required comment nor extending to the Court the courtesy of any explanation or
manifestation for his failure to do so. His inaction unduly prevented and delayed for a considerable period the Court's
prompt disposition of the petition. Worse, when this was noted and the Court required his explanation, he gave an
explanation that is devious and unworthy of belief since it is contradicted by his own previous representations of record
as well as by the "supporting" documents submitted by him therewith, as shown hereinabove. Furthermore,
notwithstanding the lapse of over six months which he let pass without submitting the required comment which
according to his motion of December 28, 1972 was "already prepared" by him and was only to be typed in clean, Atty.
Delante in his explanation still brazenly asked the Court for a further period to submit respondents' comment which
supposedly had been readied by him for submittal six months ago. His cavalier actions and attitude manifest gross
disrespect for the Court's processes and tend to embarrass gravely the administration of justice. In Pajares vs. Abad
Santos 2 the Court reminded attorneys that "There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of
Court which provides that "the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading
and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not
interposed for delay" and expressly admonishes that "for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to
disciplinary action." It should also not be necessary to remind attorneys of their solemn oath upon their admission to
the Philippine Bar, that they will do no falsehood and conduct themselves as lawyers according to the best of their
knowledge and discretion good fidelity to the courts and their clients. The unsatisfactory explanation given by Atty.
Delante as against the pleadings of record in the case at bar evinces a willful disregard of his solemn duty as an
attorney to employ in the conduct of a case "such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek
to mislead" the courts "by an artifice or false statement of false statement of fact or law." 3 The Court has ever stressed
that a lawyer must do his best to honor his oath, as there would be a great detriment to, if not a failure of the
administration of justice if courts could not rely on the submissions and representations made by lawyers in the
conduct of a case. As stated by the Court in one case, "Time and time again, lawyers have been admonished to
remember that they are officers of the court, and that while they owe their clients the duty of complete fidelity and the
utmost diligence, they are likewise held to strict accountability insofar as candor and honesty towards the court is
concerned." 4 Hence, the Court has in several instances suspended lawyers from the practice of law for failure to file
appellants' briefs in criminal cases despite repeated extensions of time obtained by them, (except to file the missing
briefs), with the reminder that "the trust imposed on counsel in accordance not only with the canons of legal ethics but
with the soundest traditions of the profession would require fidelity on their part." Considering, however, that counsel's
record shows no previous infractions on his part since his admission to the Philippine Bar in 1959, the Court is inclined
to act in a spirit of leniency. ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby suspends Atty. Leonido C. Delante from the practice of
law for a period of three (3) months effective from his receipt of notice hereof, with the warning that repetition of the
same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. The clerk of court is directed to circularize notice of such
suspension to the Court of Appeals and all courts of first instance and other courts of similar rank.

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(6-11 Compiled by RJ Roldan)

6. COMELEC v. Noynoy 292 Scra 254 (1992)
FACTS: In 1996, the Commission on Elections filed criminal cases against certain individuals for violations of the
Omnibus Election Code. The cases were filed with a Regional Trial Court in Samar presided over by Judge Tomas
Noynay. Judge Noynay however dismissed the said cases as he ruled that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the said
cases because said criminal offenses were punishable with less than six years imprisonment. He said that said cases
should be filed with the MTC.
Atty. Jose Balbuena, member of COMELECs legal department, filed a motion for reconsideration. He cited a case
entitled: Alberto Naldeza vs Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., A.M No. MTJ-94-1009, March 5, 1996 (245 SCRA 286).
According to Atty. Balbuena, in the said case he cited, the Supreme Court has already settled the issue and Atty.
Balbuena even copied in toto the said ruling by the Supreme Court in his motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Tomas Noynay is correct in dismissing the case.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court admonished Judge Noynay for dismissing the case as the same was contrary to
Section 32 of B.P. 129 as well as Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that election cases are within the jurisdiction of the regional trial
courts except certain cases (which were not the cases filed by COMELEC in this case).
Section 32 of B.P. 129, on the other hand, provides that as a rule, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine EXCEPT otherwise provided by special law. The Omnibus
Election Code is a special law which provides that election offenses, regardless of penalties, are under the jurisdiction
of the regional trial courts.
Judge Noynay was not able to follow these rules. It is a judges duty to be studious of the principles of law, to
administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, to be faithful to the law, and to
maintain professional competence.
On the other hand, Atty. Balbuena is also admonished for being reckless in citing cases. The Supreme Court said that
the passage cited by Balbuena in his Motion was not the actual decision of the Supreme Court in the said case cited
but rather the memorandum of the court administrator which was quoted in the said case. Further, his citation of
Naldeza vs Lavilles, Jr. was wrong. Not only did he spell Naldeza wrong (as the correct spelling was NALDOZA), he
also cited the wrong SCRA. It should have been 254 SCRA 286 and not 245 SCRA 286.
Balbuena is reminded of Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires that a lawyer
shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision or authority.
7. MONTECILLO AND DEL MAR VS. FRANCISCO GICA et al
FACTS: Jorge Montecillo was accused by Francisco Gica of slander. Atty. Quirico del Mar represented Montecillo and
he successfully defended Monteceillo in the lower court. Del Mar was even able to win their counterclaim thus the
lower court ordered Gica to pay Montecillo the adjudged moral damages.
Gica appealed the award of damages to the Court of Appeals where the latter court reversed the same. Atty. Del Mar
then filed a motion for reconsideration where he made a veiled threat against the Court of Appeals judges intimating
that he thinks the CA justices knowingly rendered an unjust decision and judgment has been rendered through
negligence and that the CA allowed itself to be deceived.
The CA denied the MFR and it admonished Atty. Del Mar from using such tone with the court. Del Mar then filed a
second MFR where he again made threats. The CA then ordered del Mar to show cause as to why he should not be
punished for contempt.
Thereafter, del Mar sent the three CA justices a copy of a letter which he sent to the President of the Philippines asking
the said justices to consider the CA judgment. But the CA did not reverse its judgment. Del Mar then filed a civil case
against the three justices of the CA before a Cebu lower court but the civil case was eventually dismissed by reason of
a compromise agreement where del Mar agreed to pay damages to the justices. Eventually, the CA suspended Atty.
Del Mar from practice.
The issue reached the Supreme Court. Del Mar asked the SC to reverse his suspension as well as the CA decision as
to the Montecillo case. The SC denied both and this earned the ire of del Mar as he demanded from the Clerk of the
Supreme Court as to who were the judges who voted against him.
The Supreme Court then directed del Mar to submit an explanation as to why he should not be disciplined. Del Mar in
his explanation instead tried to justify his actions even stating that had he not been convinced that human efforts in
[pursuing the case] will be fruitless he would have continued with the civil case against the CA justices. In his
explanation, del Mar also intimated that even the Supreme Court is part among the corrupt, the grafters and those
allegedly committing injustice.
Del Mar even filed a civil case against some Supreme Court justices but the judge who handled the case dismissed
the same.

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ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Del Mar should be suspended.

HELD: Yes. Atty. Del Mar, by his contemptuous acts is in violation of his duties to the courts. As an officer of the court,
it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the
court so essential to the proper administration of justice.
It is manifest that del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged
error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly
rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance
of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.
Del Mar was then suspended indefinitely.
8. Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs Gaudencio Cloribel (1970)
FACTS: In 1968, the Supreme Court promulgated a unanimous decision (24 SCRA 491; G.R. No. L-27072) which was
not favorable to MacArthur International Minerals Co. The latters lawyer, Atty. Vicente Santiago then filed a motion for
reconsideration. Eventually, a third motion for reconsideration was submitted by him where the following paragraph
was stated:
6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of our judicial authorities believe that they are the chosen
messengers of God in all matters that come before them, and that no matter what the circumstances are, their
judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity. Some seem to be constitutionally incapable of considering that
any emanation from their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism
for a party or an issue. Witness the recent absurdity of Judge Alikpala daring to proceed to judge a motion to hold
himself in contempt of court seemingly totally oblivious or uncomprehending of the violation of moral principle
involved and also of Judge Geraldez who refuses to inhibit himself in judging a criminal case against an accused
who is also his correspondent in two other cases. What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty?
Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our government officials are just
amoral?
Scattered in his motion were other statements where he attacked the 1968 decision of the Supreme Court as false,
erroneous, and illegal.
In another motion, Atty. Santiago sought the inhibition of two Justices: Justice Fred Castro, because allegedly, he is the
brother of the vice president of the opposing party. And Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion because immediately after
the 1968 decision, his son was appointed to a significant position in the government. (Here Atty. Santiago implied that
the justices were not fair and that their decision was influenced).
In his defense, Atty. Santiago said that he originally deleted the above paragraph and was only included due to
inadvertence. But that any rate, he averred that the language he used was necessary to defend his client.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Vicente Santiago is guilty of contempt.
HELD: Yes. Lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients,
as many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their clients success is wholly subordinate; and their
conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. Thus, Santiagos defense is not tenable.
A lawyer must avoid language that tend to create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief in the judicial system.
A lawyers duties to the Court have become common place. Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses
in the observance thereof.
Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such duty: To observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.
Atty. Santiago was fined for his infractions.
9. DE GRACIA VS. WARDEN OF MAKATI
FACTS: It is settled law-that habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy for release from confinement of a person who
has served his sentence. It is on such a doctrine that reliance is placed by petitioner Manuel de Gracia in this
application for the issuance of such a writ. It is undisputed that while the information against petitioner charged him
with the commission of frustrated homicide to which he pleaded not guilty, it was later amended to one of serious
physical injuries. It is to such lesser offense that on September 10, 1971, he entered a plea of guilty. On the very same
day, respondent Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado imposed upon him the penalty of four months and one day of arrests
mayor without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. That period of confinement he had duly served by
November 10, 1975, considering that he had been under detention since July 18, 1975. 2 This notwithstanding, the
petition alleged that he was not set free, the reason being that on November 19, 1975, the last day of the prison term
imposed upon him, "respondent Assistant Provincial Fiscal Marciano P. Sta. Ana filed with the respondent Judge, in the
very same case where your petitioner was convicted and for which he served sentence, Criminal Case No. 15289, a
'Motion to Order the Warden to Hold the Release of Manuel de Gracia alleging as a ground that the 'father of the

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victim, Gilberts Valenzuela, informed the movant that the victim in the above-entitled case died and for this reason the
undersigned will file an amended information. Then came this paragraph in the petition: "That on the following day,
November 20, 1975, the respondent Judge, despite the clear and incontrovertible fact that he had no jurisdiction to act
on said motion because the case had long been terminated and his decision therein had already been executed, and,
further, even assuming that the respondent Judge could still act in the case, he could not and should not act on the
Fiscal's motion because the same was not set for hearing and no copy thereof was furnished to your petitioner whose
very liberty was being sought to be deprived, still he persisted in acting upon the Fiscal's motion and granted the same
'in the interest of justice,' not at all minding that your petitioner, while maybe a convict in the eyes of the respondent
Judge, is still entitled to due process of law and to some justice.
On the morning December 17, 1975, respondent Assistant Provincial Fiscal Marciano P. Sta. Ana, Jr. and the two
aforesaid wardens appeared. Neither petitioner nor his counsel, Salvador N. Beltran, was present. There was this
manifestation though: '[Petitioner thru counsel, respectfully manifests that he has already been released from
confinement, for which reason the present petition has been rendered moot and academic. It would appear, therefore,
that with the release of petitioner, the matter had indeed become moot and academic. That disposes of this petition,
except for one final note. There was a lapse in judicial propriety by counsel Salvador N. Beltran who did not even take
the trouble of appearing in Court on the very day his own petition was reset for hearing, a lapse explicable, it may be
assumed, by his comparative inexperience and paucity of practice before this Tribunal. It suffices to call his attention to
such failing by way of guidance for his future actuations as a member of the bar.
ISSUE: Whether the amending of the information by Marciano P. Sta. Ana, Jr is the proper remedy to address the
order of release of the petitioner.
HELD: After being able to study the applicable rule and jurisprudence, the undersigned concluded that the proper
remedy is not amendment of the information because judgment had already been rendered on the first information, but
the filing of a new information for homicide upon the authority of this Honorable Court's ruling in People v. Manolong,
and It is similar cases. 8
10. Brigida Buenaseda et al vs Juan Flavier et al
FACTS: In 1992, the NCMH Nurses Association (NCMH) filed a case of graft and corruption against Dr. Brigida
Buenaseda and several other government officials of the Department of Health (DOH). The Ombudsman (then
Conrado Vasquez), ordered the suspension of Buenaseda et al. The suspension was carried on by then DOH
Secretary Juan Flavier, being the officer in charge over Buenaseda et al. Buenaseda et al then filed with the Supreme
Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, questioning the suspension order. NCMH submitted its
Comment on the Petition where they attached a Motion for Disbarment against the lawyers of Buenaseda et al.
Allegedly, the lawyers of Buenaseda et al advised them not to obey the suspension order, which is a lawful order from
a duly constituted authority. NCMH maintains that such advice from the lawyers constitute a violation against the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
The Solicitor General, commenting on the case, agreed with Buenasedas lawyers as he maintained that all the
Ombudsman can do is to recommend suspensions not impose them. The Sol-Gen based his argument on Section 13
(3) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the Office of the Ombudsman shall have inter alia the power, function,
and duty to:
Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
ISSUES: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials. Whether or not a Motion for
Disbarment may be filed in a special civil action.
HELD: Yes, the Ombudsman may impose suspension orders. The Supreme Court clarifies that what the Ombudsman
issued is an order of preventive suspension pending the resolution of the case or investigation thereof. It is not
imposing suspension as a penalty (not punitive suspension). What the Constitution contemplates that the Ombudsman
may recommend are punitive suspensions.
Anent the issue of the Motion for Disbarment filed with the Ombudsman, the same is not proper. It cannot be filed in
this special civil action which is confined to questions of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion for the purpose of relieving
persons from the arbitrary acts of judges and quasi-judicial officers. There is a set of procedure for the discipline of
members of the bar separate and apart from the present special civil action. However, the lawyers of Buenaseda were
reminded not be carried away in espousing their clients cause. The language of a lawyer, both oral or written, must be
respectful and restrained in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession and with his behavioral attitude toward his
brethren in the profession.
11. PRIMITIVO SANTOS ET AL VS. MUNICIPAL JUDGE ARTURO E. CRUZ
FACTS: In a sworn-letter complaint dated November 16, 1972, addressed to the then Secretary of Justice, the
complainant, Primitivo Santos charged Municipal Judge Arturo E. Cruz of the Municipal Court of Bulacan with partiality

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and conduct unbecoming a judge for having intervened with and/or prevented the complainant in filing cases in the
Municipal Court of Bulacan. The complaint of Primitivo Santos, therefore, was the only one that stood for hearing.
On the letter it was adduced by the testimony of Roberto G. Garcia, a police corporal of Bulacan, Bulacan, who
brought the police blotter subpoenaed. And that as a standard operating procedure, he gave the statement to his Chief
and no other entry shows that the complainant returned to the Police Headquarters. Judge Cruz is here wrongfully
blamed for the failure of its filing, as the portion where a complainant's jurat should be, was not signed by Judge Cruz,
but complainant Primitivo Santos could not state that his wife ever appeared before Judge Cruz to execute the oath
nor was any evidence presented that the same was ever forwarded to Judge Cruz.
On the sixth paragraph of the letter-complaint, the only testimony of Primitivo Santos on which his suspicion that Judge
Cruz was interfering with a criminal case filed by Teresita Cruz was he saw Judge Cruz enter the room where an
investigation was being conducted \
The letter-complaint asks that Judge Cruz voluntarily inhibit himself from trying and allow another judge to hear it, and
Judge Cruz suspended the proceedings.
A careful review of the records of this case shows that the investigating Judge correctly found that the complainant was
not able to prove the charges of partiality and conduct unbecoming a judge.
However, the transcript of the stenographic notes shows that during the formal investigation conducted on February 9,
1973 6 the respondent judge, while cross-examining the witness, Alberto T. Cano, lost his temper and said: "You can
go to hell I don't care or where do you want to go Mr. Cano". This language of the Judge is unbecoming of a municipal
judge and deserves administrative penalty.
ISSUE: Whether Judge Cruz committed a conduct of unbecoming a municipal judge.
HELD: The respondent Judge is hereby EXONERATED of the charge of partiality but is found guilty of conduct
unbecoming a judge by uttering intemperate language during the trial of the case. The respondent judge is hereby
imposed a penalty of a fine equivalent to one (1) month salary and warned that a repetition of the same or similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely
(12-16 by Patrick Go)
12. People v. Taneo 284 Scra 251 (1998)
13. URBINA VS. MACERAN (57 SCRA 403 [1974])
57 SCRA 403 Legal Ethics Lawyer owes fidelity to the courts
Atty. Urbina and one Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo lost a case filed in the sala of Judge Maceren. The two lawyers then
filed a criminal case against Maceren for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. The fiscal dismissed the case as he
deemed the action to be inappropriate considering that the judgment issued by Maceren at that time was pending
appeal. Allegedly however, prior to dismissal by the fiscal, Urbina received a phone call from another lawyer (one Atty.
Esguerra) who threatened him that if he shall not withdraw the criminal case he filed against Maceren, he will be killed;
that said threat was made by Judge Maceren through Atty. Esguerra.
In his comment, Judge Maceren stated that he issued the judgment being complained of in good faith and he knew
that his judgment is not unjust and that he made no threats against Urbina for it would be useless to threaten him
considering that if Urbina did withdraw, there is still Atty. Gesmundo who can continue the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not Urbinas suit should prosper.
HELD: No. Ths Supreme Court gave credence to Macerens statement as opposed to Urbinas bare allegations which
were not supported by evidence. The Supreme Court also condemned Urbinas use of disrespectful language. A
lawyer owes fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients and that the filing on behalf of disgruntled litigants of
unfounded or frivolous charges against inferior court judges and the use of offensive and intemperate language as a
means of harassing judges whose decisions have not been to their liking (irrespective of the law and jurisprudence on
the matter) will subject said lawyer to appropriate disciplinary action as an officer of the Court. This only unduly
burdens the courts.
On the matter of Macerens judgment, the Supreme Court stated that judges will not be held administratively liable for
mere errors of judgment in their rulings or decisions absent a showing of malice or gross ignorance on their part
because to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming that
he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position unbearable.
14. CASTANEDA VS. AGO (65 SCRA 505 [1975])
FACTS
- 1955 Castaneda and Henson filed a replevin suit againstAgo in the CFI of Manila to recover certain machineries.1957 judgment in favor of Castaneda and Henson- 1961 SC affirmed the judgment; trial court issued writof
execution; Agos motion denied, levy was made on Agoshouse and lots; sheriff advertised the sale, Ago moved tostop

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the auction; CA dismissed the petition; SC ffirmeddismissal- Ago thrice attempted to obtain writ of preliminaryinjunction
to restrain sheriff from enforcing the writ ofexecution; his motions were denied- 1963 sheriff sold the house and lots
to Castaneda andHenson; Ago failed to redeem- 1964 sheriff executed final deed of sale; CFI issuedwrit of
possession to the properties- 1964 Ago filed a complaint upon the judgment renderedagainst him in the replevin suit
saying it was his personalobligation and that his wife share in their conjugal housecould not legally be reached by
the levy made; CFI of QCissued writ of preliminary injunction restraining Castanedathe Registed of Deeds and the
sheriff from registering thefinal deed of sale; the battle on the matter of lifting andrestoring the restraining order
continued- 1966 Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibitionto enjoin sheriff from enforcing writ of possession;
SCdismissed it; Agos filed a similar petition with the CA whichalso dismissed thepetition; Agos appealed to SC which
dismissed the petition- Agos filed another petition for certiorari and prohibitionwith the CA which gave due course to the
petition andgranted preliminary injunction.
ISSUE
WON the Agos lawyer, encourage his clients to avoidcontroversy
HELD
- No. Despite the pendency in the trial court of thecomplaint for the annulment of the sheriffs sale, justicedemands that
the petitioners, long denied the fruits oftheir victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for,the respondents Agos
abetted by their lawyer Atty. Luison,have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicialprocess to thwart the
satisfaction of the judgment, to theextended prejudice of the petitioners.- Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn
public servantand his exalted position as an officer of the court, Atty.Luison has allowed himself to become an
instigator ofcontroversy and a predator of conflict instead of amediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise,
avirtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation insteadof a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice.A counsels assertiveness in espousing with candor andhonesty his clients cause must be encouraged and is to
becommended; what the SC does not and cannot countenanceis a lawyers insistence despite the patent futility of
hisclients position.It is the duty of the counsel to advice his client on themerit or lack of his case. If he finds his clients
cause asdefenseless, then he is his duty to advice the latter toacquiesce and submit rather than traverse
theincontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims andcaprices of his client, and temper his clients propensity
tolitigate.
15. Austria v. Masanquel 20 Scra 1247 (1967)
FACTS Asturia was the plaintiff in a civil case involving 3 parcels of land in Pangasinan in which Judge Masaquel ruled
in his favor. Sometime later the defendant in the civil case hired a new lawyer in the person of Atty. Sicat, a former
associate of Judge Masaquel when he was still in the practice of law. Atty. Sicat then filed a superdeas bond to stay
the execution of the sheriff and a motion for new trial, all of which was granted by Judge Masaquel. Before the opening
of one of the court sessions, Atty Macaraeg, lawyer of Asturia saw Judge Masaquel to his chamber and verbally
transmitted to him the request that he inhibit himself on the ground that Atty. Sicat was his associate. The Judge
denied the request pointing out that it was not one of the grounds for disqualification of a judge as provided in the rules
of court. During the court session, he asked Asturia if he had authorized Atty. Macaraeg to approach him in his
chambers and whether he doubts the integrity of the judge to decide fairly and impartially because the lawyer of the
defending party was his associate, Asturia answered them all in the positive stating that he heard rumors that the
defendant was boasting that he would definitely win because of his lawyer. The Judge then declared Asturia in
contempt. The Judge considered his actuations offensive, insulting and lack of respect to the court. He was ordered to
pay 50 pesos. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE Whether or not it was proper for the judge to declare Asturia to be in contempt of court.
HELD NO. While the court consider it improper for a litigant or counsel to see a judge in chambers and talk to him
about a matter related to the case pending in the court of said judge, it is not an act of contempt of court to see the
judge in his chamber and requested him to disqualify himself on the ground which the respondent judge might consider
just and valid. The circumstances that led the respondent judge to declare the petitioner in direct contempt of court do
not indicate any deliberate design on the part of the petitioner to disrespect respondent judge. The petitioner has not
misbehaved in court or in the presence of the respondent judge so as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings. He
simply expressed his sincere feeling under the circumstances. Certainly, any person is entitled to his opinion about a
judge, whether that opinion is flattering or not. A judge as a public servant should not be so thinskinned or sensitive as
to feel hurt or offended if a citizen expresses an honest opinion about him.
16. MARTELINO VS. ALEJANDRO (32 SCRA 106 [1970])
NATURE AND CREATION OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
(1-9 By Hanna Desembrana)

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1. Regala vs Sandiganbayan, GR NO. 108939 September 20, 1996

Raul Roco and his colleagues from the ACCRA Law Office were charged together with EduardoConjuangco for
acquiring ill-gotten wealth. The PCGG based its charge from the refusal of thelaw firm to divulge information as to who
had been involved in PCGG Case No. 0033, despitethe nature of the services performed by ACCRA (e.g. the law firm
knows the assets, personaltransactions, and business dealings of their clients).Later, the PCGG amended the
complaint, resulting in the exclusion of Roco from the list of defendants. Such exclusion was based from the
manifestation of Roco that he would identifythe persons and stockholders involved in the said PCGG case. The law
firm petitioned for the PCGG to grant them the same treatment as what had beenaccorded to Roco. It was only at this
point that the PCGG answered with a set of requirementsand conditions for exclusion which were:1)disclosure of the
identity of the clients2)submission of documents purporting to the substantiation of the lawyer-client
relationship3)presentation of the deeds of assignments which the lawyers executed in favor of its clients,covering the
shareholdings of the latter To bolster this set-up, the PCGG presented supposed proof to the effect that Roco
hadcomplied with such conditions The 1st Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the petition of ACCRA.
Issue: Can the PCGG compel petitioners to divulge its clients name?
Held: NO.
As a matter of public policy, a clients identity should not be shrouded in mystery. The general is that a lawyer may not
invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client.
1) the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood.
2) the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established. The attorney-client
privilege does not attach until there is a client.
3) the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. A
party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is. He cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against
unknown forces.
Except:
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the clients name would implicate that
client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyers advice.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged.
3) Where the governments lawyers have no case against an attorneys client unless, by revealing the clients name,
the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a
crime, the clients name is privileged.
That client identity is privileged in those instances where a strong probability exists that the disclosure of the client's
identity would implicate the client in the very criminal activity for which the lawyers legal advice was obtained.
2. IN RE: SYCIP, 92 SCRA 1 (1979)
Facts:
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on
May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that
they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed away. In the
Court's Resolution of September 2, 1976, both Petitions were ordered consolidated.
Issue/s:
Whether the names of the deceased partners should be dropped.
Held:
Yes, the names should be dropped, but they may be included in the listings of individuals who have been partners in
their firms indicating the years which they served as such. The reason for this is, the names are being retained to
improperly exploit their advertisement value.
NOTE: I think the ruling in this case is no longer applicable because of Rule 3.02 which states, the deceased partners
name may still be used provided it is clearly communicated [to the clients/public]. The purpose of which is for law firms
to retain goodwill.
3. DAROY VS LAGASPI, 65 SCRA 304 (1975)

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4. HILADO VS DAVID, 84 PHIL 569 (1975)

In April 1945, Blandina Hilado filed a complaint to have some deeds of sale annulled against Selim Assad. Attorney
Delgado Dizon represented Hilado. Assad was represented by a certain Atty. Ohnick.
In January 1946, Atty. Vicente Francisco replaced Atty. Ohnick as counsel for Assad and he thenafter entered his
appearance in court.
In May 1946 or four months later, Atty. Dizon filed a motion to have Atty. Francisco be disqualified because Atty. Dizon
found out that in June 1945, Hilado approached Atty. Francisco to ask for additional legal opinion regarding her case
and for which Atty. Francisco sent Hilado a legal opinion letter.
Atty. Francisco opposed the motion for his disqualification. In his opposition, he said that no material information was
relayed to him by Hilado; that in fact, upon hearing Hilados story, Atty. Francisco advised her that her case will not win
in court; but that later, Hilado returned with a copy of the Complaint prepared by Atty. Dizon; that however, when Hilado
returned, Atty. Francisco was not around but an associate in his firm was there (a certain Atty. Federico Agrava); that
Atty. Agrava attended to Hilado; that after Hilado left, leaving behind the legal documents, Atty. Agrava then prepared a
legal opinion letter where it was stated that Hilado has no cause of action to file suit; that Atty. Agrava had Atty.
Francisco sign the letter; that Atty. Francisco did not read the letter as Atty. Agrava said that it was merely a letter
explaining why the firm cannot take on Hilados case.
Atty. Francisco also pointed out that he was not paid for his advice; that no confidential information was relayed
because all Hilado brought was a copy of the Complaint which was already filed in court; and that, if any, Hilado
already waived her right to disqualify Atty. Francisco because he was already representing Assad in court for four
months in the said case.
Judge Jose Gutierrez David ruled in favor of Atty. Francisco.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Francisco should be disqualified in the said civil case.
HELD: Yes. There already existed an attorney-client relationship between Hilado and Atty. Francisco. Hence, Atty.
Francisco cannot act as counsel against Hilado without the latters consent.
As ruled by the Supreme Court, to constitute an attorney-client relationship, it is not necessary that any retainer should
have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake
the case about which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind,
consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and
the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment must be
regarded as established.
5. STONE VS BANK OF COMMERCE, 174 US 412 (1899)
6. GUERRERO VS HERNANDO 68 Scra 76 (1975)
7. UY VS GONZALES, A.C NO. 5208
FACTS:
Complainant engaged the services of respondent lawyer to prepare and file a petition for the issuance of a new
certificate of title. After confiding with respondent the circumstances surrounding the lost title and discussing the fees
and costs, respondent prepared, finalized and submitted to him a petition to be filed before the Regional Trial Court.
When the petition was about to be filed, respondent went to complainants office demanding a certain amount other
than what was previously agreed upon. Respondent left his office after reasoning with him. Expecting that said petition
would be filed, he was shocked to find out later that instead of filing the petition for the issuance of a new certificate of
title, respondent filed a letter-complaint against him with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for Falsification of
Public Documents. The letter-complaint contained facts and circumstances pertaining to the transfer certificate of title
that was the subject matter of the petition which respondent was supposed to have filed.
Respondent claims that he gave complainant a handwritten letter telling complainant that he is withdrawing the petition
he prepared and that complainant should get another lawyer to file the petition thereby terminating the lawyer-client
relationship between him and complainant; that there was no longer any professional relationship between the two of
them when he filed the letter-complaint for falsification of public document; that the facts and allegations contained in
the letter-complaint for falsification were culled from public documents procured from the Office of the Register of
Deeds.
The IBP found him guilty of violating Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility and
recommended for his suspension for 6 months.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated Canon 21 of the CPR?
HELD:
No. Evidently, the facts alleged in the complaint for Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents filed by
respondent against complainant were obtained by respondent due to his personal dealings with complainant.

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Respondent volunteered his service to hasten the issuance of the certificate of title of the land he has redeemed from
complainant. Clearly, there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent and complainant. The preparation
and the proposed filing of the petition was only incidental to their personal transaction.
Whatever facts alleged by respondent against complainant were not obtained by respondent in his professional
capacity but as a redemptioner of a property originally owned by his deceased son and therefore, when respondent
filed the complaint for estafa against herein complainant, which necessarily involved alleging facts that would
constitute estafa, respondent was not, in any way, violating Canon 21. There is no way we can equate the filing of the
affidavit-complaint against herein complainant to a misconduct that is wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity
and good demeanor or that renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. To hold otherwise would be
precluding any lawyer from instituting a case against anyone to protect his personal or proprietary interests.
PETITION DISMISSED for lack of merit.
8. RILLORAZA,ET AL VS EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATION PHIL.INC., 309 SCRA
FACTS: Eastern Telecommunications, Phils., Inc. (ETPI) represented by the law firm SAGA, filed with the Regional
Trial court a complaint for the recovery or revenue shares against PLDT. Atty. Rilloraza, a partner of the firm, appeared
for ETPI.
After ETPI rested its case, it paid SAGA the billed amount. The latter was dissolved and the junior partners formed
RADA, which took over as counsel in the case for ETPI. ETPI signed a retainer agreement with counsel wherein it was
stated that in cases of collection or judicial action, our attorneys fees shall be 15% of the amounts collected or the
value of the property acquired or liability saved. The retainer agreement was terminated in 1988. the next day, RADA
filed a notice of attorneys lien. In its notice, RADA informed the court that there were negotiations toward a
compromise between ETPI and PLDT. In 1990, the parties arrived at an amicable settlement and the same was
entered as a judgment. The petitioner (RADA) filed a motion for the enforcement of attorneys lien.
ISSUE: Is RADA entitled to the awards of attorneys fees they are claiming?
HELD: RADA is entitled to attorneys fees but the Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of origin for the
determination of the amount of attorneys fees to which the petitioner is entitled. Atty. Rilloraza handled the case from
its inception until ETPI terminated the law firms services in 1988. Petitioners claim for attorneys fees hinges on two
grounds: first, the fact that Atty. Rilloraza personally handled the case when he was working for SAGA, and second,
the retainer agreement. Whether there is an agreement or not, the courts shall fix a reasonable compensation which
lawyers may receive for their professional services. A lawyer has the right to be paid for the legal services he has
extended to his client, which compensation must be reasonable. A lawyer would be entitled to receive what he merits
for his services. Otherwise stated, the amount must be determined on a quantum meruit basis
9. GOVT VS WAGNER, 54 PHIL 132 (1929)
THE LAWYERS DUTIES TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION
(1-5 Compiled by Hanna Desembrana)
1. RIVERA VS ANGELES, 339 SCRA 149 (2000)
Facts: Atty. Sergio Angeles was the legal counsel of Teodoro Rivera and 2 others in a civil case. Rivera and his 2 coplaintiffs received a favorable decision. Atty. Angeles received almost PhP 50,000 from one of the defendants in the
case as partial fulfillment of the judgement against the latter. Atty. Angeles, however, never told his clients of the
amount he had received and never remitted the same to him, leaving them to discover such fact on their own. Rivera
and his co-plaintiffs filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Angeles.
Held: GUILTY. Atty. Angeles was not disbarred but the Court ruled that his act amounted to serious misconduct. The
Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyers equipment in
the practice of his profession. For it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably
diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence. The Court is not oblivious of the right of
a lawyer to be paid for the legal services he has extended to his client but such right should not be exercised
whimsically by appropriating to himself the money intended for his clients. There should never be an instance where
the victor in litigation loses everything he won to the fees of his own lawyer. For deceit in dealing with his client, Atty.
Angeles was suspended from the practice of law for 1 year.
2. DUCAT,JR. VS VILLALON,JR. 337 SCRA 622 (2000)

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3. TAN VS SABANDAL, 126 SCRA 60 (1993)

DOCTRINES:
The practice of law is not a matter of right.
No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness or candor.
FACTS:
Respondent Sabandal passed the 1978 Bar Examinations but was denied to take his oath in view of the finding of the
Court that he was guilty of unauthorized practice of law. Since then, he had filed numerous petitions for him to be
allowed to take his lawyer's oath.
Acting to his 1989 petition, the Court directed the executive judge of the province where Sabandal is domiciled to
submit a comment on respondent's moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. In compliance therewith, the executive
judge stated in his comment that he is not aware of any acts committed by the respondent as would disqualify him to
from admission to the Bar. However, he added that respondent has a pending civil case before his court for
cancellation/reversion proceedings, in which respondent, then working as Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands, is
alleged to have secured a free patent and later a certificate of title to a parcel of land which, upon investigation, turned
out to be a swampland and not susceptible of acquisition under a free patent, and which he later mortgaged to the
bank. The mortgage was later foreclosed and the land subsequently sold at public auction and respondent has not
redeemed the land since then.
The case was however been settled through amicable settlement. The said amicable settlement canceled the OCT
under Free Patent in the name of Sabandal and his mortgage in the bank; provided for the surrender of the certificate
of title to the RD for proper annotation; reverted to the mass of public domain the land covered by the aforesaid
certificate of title with respondent refraining from exercising acts of possession or ownership over the said land.
Respondent also paid the bank a certain sum for the loan and interest.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent may be admitted to the practice of law considering that he already submitted three (3)
testimonials regarding his good moral character, and his pending civil case has been terminated.
HELD:
His petition must be denied.
Time and again, it has been held that practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed upon individuals
who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character.
It should be recalled that respondent worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands. Said employment facilitated
his procurement of the free patent title over the property which he could not but have known was a public land. This
was manipulative on his part and does not speak well of his moral character. It is a manifestation of gross dishonesty
while in the public service, which cannot be erased by the termination of the case and where no determination of guilt
or innocence was made because the suit has been compromised. This is a sad reflection of his sense of honor and fair
dealings.
Moreover, his failure to reveal to the Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed against him during the
period that he was submitting several petitions and motions for reconsiderations reveal his lack of candor and
truthfulness.
Although, the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it has been defined as "including at least
common dishonesty." It has also been held that no moral qualification for membership is more important than
truthfulness or candor.
4. IN RE:PARAZO 82 PHIL 230
Facts:Investigation of ANGEL J. PARAZO for alleged leakage of questions in some subjects in the 1948
BarExaminations
Issue:WON the bar takers violated the CPR.
Held:Yes. Supreme Court as representative of the Judicial Department, to adopt proper and adequate measures to
preserve their integrity, and render possible and facilitate the exercise of their functions, including, as in the present
case, the investigation of charges of error, abuse or misconduct of their officials and subordinates, including
lawyers,who are officers of the Court.The Court and the licensed lawyers themselves are vitally interested in keeping
this high standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only
those persons who are known to be honest, possess good moral character, and show proficiency in and knowledge of
the law by the standard set by.

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5. PANGAN VS RAMOS
In 1979, a pending administrative case filed by Santa Pangan against Atty. Dionisio Ramos was delayed because Atty.
Ramos allegedly appeared before a court in Manila. When the records of the said case was checked (one which Atty.
Ramos appeared in), it was found that he used the name Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos. In his defense, Atty. Ramos said
he has the right to use such name because in his birth certificate, his name listed was Pedro Dionisio Ramos. D.D.
stands for Dionisio Dayaw with Dayaw being his mothers surname. However, in the roll of attorneys, his name listed
was Dionisio D. Ramos.
ISSUE: Whether or not what Atty. Ramos did was correct.
HELD: No. The attorneys roll or register is the official record containing the names and signatures of those who are
authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of
Attorneys in his practice of law. The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he will do no falsehood. As
an officer in the temple of justice, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of truthfulness, candor and frankness. In
representing himself to the court as Pedro D.D. Ramos instead of Dionisio D. Ramos, respondent has violated his
solemn oath and has resorted to deception. The Supreme Court hence severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned
that a similar infraction will warrant suspension or disbarment.
(6-14 by Khristine Arellano)
6. In re: Gutierrez 5 Scra 661 (1962)
Facts: Attorney Diosdado Gutierrez was convicted for the murder of one Filemon Samaco in 1956. He was sentenced
to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In 1958, after serving a portion of the penalty, he was granted a conditional
pardon by the President. He was released on the condition that he shall not commit any crime. Subsequently, the
widow of Samaco filed a disbarment case against Gutierrez by reason of the latters conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude. Murder, is without a doubt, such a crime.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gutierrez may be disbarred considering the fact that he was granted pardon.
HELD: Yes. The pardon granted to Gutierrez is not absolute but conditional. It merely remitted his sentence. It does not
reach the offense itself. Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the
pardon (which he invoked in defense). The crime was actually qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having
been committed in hand, by taking advantage of his official position (Gutierrez being municipal mayor at the time) and
with the use of motor vehicle. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged from the
profession.
7. Narido vs. Linsangan, 58 SCRA 85 (1974)
Mutual Bickering Between Opposing Counsels
This case arose from a labor dispute where Atty. Rufino Risma represented Flora Narido, an indigent client against her
employer Vergel De Dios, the client of Atty. Jaime Linsangan. During the proceedings in the trial court, Atty. Risma
vehemently opposed the submission of a certain affidavit executed by De Dios because, in the belief of Risma, said
affidavit is perjured. He threatened Atty. Linsangan that if said affidavit is submitted in court, they shall file a disbarment
case against him. The affidavit was filed and so Risma and Narido filed an administrative case against Linsangan.
Linsangan on the other hand filed a separate administrative case against Risma where he accused Risma of
instigating his client to file an administrative case against him; that said administrative case is groundless; that it was
only filed to spite him and is just a mere scheme to threaten him and to ensure that Risma and Narido has an edge
over the labor case.
ISSUE: Whether or not both administrative cases should prosper.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court adopted the findings of the Solicitor General where it was recommended that both
administrative cases are not well merited.
In the administrative case against Linsangan, it was found out that there is no sufficient evidence to prove that De
Dios affidavit is perjured. Or if even so, there is no showing that Linsangan was in bad faith for it was not proven that
he has the intention of misleading the court.
In the administrative case against Risma, it was not proven that he instigated Narido. It was Rismas zeal in protecting
his clients interest that made him to convince Narido to file an administrative case against Linsangan. There was no
bad faith on the part of Risma. He even advanced the expenses because Narido is indigent.
HOWEVER, it was found that Risma made an arrangement with Narido that he shall collect 15% from whatever
amount they shall collect from De Dios as a result of the labor case. Risma was admonished for this; that under the
Workmens Compensation Act, hes only allowed to collect a maximum of 10%. Hes advised to keep abreast of said
law.

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8. Laput vs. Remotigue 18 Phil 121 (1911)

FACTS:
ATTY. CASIANO U. LAPUT charge respondents ATTY. FRANCISCO E.F.REMOTIGUE and ATTY. FORTUNATO P.
PATALINGHUG with unprofessional and unethicalconduct in soliciting cases and intriguing against a brother lawyer. In
May 1952, Nieves RillasVda. de Barrera retained petitioner Atty. Laput to handle her "Testate Estate of
MacarioBarrera" case in CFI-Cebu. By Jan. 1955, petitioner had prepared two pleadings: (1) closing of administration
proceedings, and (2) rendering of final accounting and partition of said estate.Mrs. Barrera did not countersign both
pleadings. Petitioner found out later that respondentAtty. Patalinghug had filed on 11 Jan. 1955 a written appearance
as the new counsel for Mrs.Barrera. On 5 Feb. 1955, petitioner voluntarily asked the court to be relieved as Mrs.
Barrerascounsel.Petitioner alleged that: (1) respondents appearances were unethical and improper; (2) theymade
Mrs. Barrera sign documents revoking the petitioners Power of Attorney" purportedly todisauthorize him from further
collecting and receiving dividends of the estate from Mr. MacarioBarreras corporations, and make him appear as a
dishonest lawyer and no longer trusted byhis client; and (3) Atty. Patalinghug entered his appearance without notice to
petitioner.Respondent Atty. Patalinghug answered that when he entered his appearance on 11 Jan. 1955Mrs. Barrera
had already lost confidence in her lawyer, and had already filed a pleadingdischarging his services. The other
respondent Atty. Remotigue answered that when he filedhis appearance on 7 Feb. 1955, the petitioner had already
withdrawn as counsel.The SC referred the case to the SolGen for investigation, report and recommendation. Thelatter
recommended the complete exoneration of respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Remotigue and Atty Patalinghug are guilty of unprofessional andunethical conduct in soliciting
cases.
HELD:
No. The SC found no irregularity in the appearance of Atty. Patalinghug as counselfor Mrs. Barrera; and there was no
actual grabbing of a case from petitioner because Atty.Patalinghug's professional services were contracted by the
widow. Besides, the petitioner'svoluntary withdrawal on 5 Feb. 1955, and his filing almost simultaneously of a motion
for thepayment of his attorney's fees, amounted to consent to the appearance of Atty. Patalinghug ascounsel for the
widow.The SC also held that respondent Atty. Remotigue was also not guilty of unprofessionalconduct inasmuch as he
entered his appearance, dated 5 Feb. 1955, only on 7 February 1955,after Mrs. Barrera had dispensed with
petitioner's professional services, and after petitionerhad voluntarily withdrawn his appearance.As to Atty.
Patalinghugs preparation of documents revoking the petitioners power of attorney,the SolGen found that the same
does not appear to be prompted by malice or intended to hurtpetitioner's feelings, but purely to safeguard the interest
of the administratrix.Case dismissed and closed for no sufficient evidence submitted to sustain the charges.
This case has a sequel under A.M. No. 434, 29 Sept. 1962 wherein complainant-petitioner Atty. LAPUT charged
respondent Atty. REMOTIGUE with malice, bad faith, and misrepresentation when the latter allegedly committed unfair
and unethical practices bordering on dishonesty. The SC approved the Solicitor Generals recommendation for
respondent's complete exoneration.
9. Camacho vs. Pangulayan, 328 SCRA 631 (2000)
NATURE
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Violation of the Code of Professional Ethics
FACTS
- 9 students from the AMA Computer College (AMACC), all members of the Editorial Board of DATALINE, allegedly
published certainobjectionable features- the Student Disciplinary Tribunal found them guilty and the students were
expelled- the 9 students appealed but were denied by the AMACC President giving rise to a civil case calling for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with Camacho as their counsel and Pangulayan and associates
representing the defendant,AMACC- while the case was pending, letters of apology and re-admission agreements
were separately executed by and/or in behalf of thestudents by their parents- following this, the Pangulayan Law
Offices filed a Manifestation stating, among other things, that 4 of the students hadacknowledged their guilt and agreed
to terminate all proceedings- apparently, Pangulayan procured and effected the re-admission agreements through
negotiations with said students and theirparents without communicating with Camacho
ISSUE
WON Pangulayan is guilty of disregarding professional ethics
HELD
YES, this action violates Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics which states:
A lawyer should not in anyway communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel,
much
less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is
incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by
counsel and he should not undertake to

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advise him as to law.

- respondent violated professional ethics and disregarded a duty owing to his colleague- the Board of Governors of the
IBP passed a resolution suspending Pangulayan for 6 months and dismissed the case against theother respondents
since they took no part in itthe court concurred with IBPs findings but reduced the suspension to 3 months
10. Robinson vs. Villafuerte 18 Phil 121 (1911)
FACTS:
April 30, 1908, W. W. Robinson entered suit in CFI Tayabas against Marcelino Villafuerte y Raola, alleging: That the
plaintiff was engaged, in Manila and at the time specified further on, in the importation and sale of flour and other
products from abroad, with an office in Manila, a business which he still continued, through the agency of Castle
Brothers, Wolf & Sons, established therein; that the defendant, a resident of Lucena, Tayabas, by an instrument duly
executed (October 19, 1906), by his attorney in fact and legal representative, Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, who was
fully empowered and authorized for the purpose, and ratified on the same date before the notary public of Manila, D.R.
Williams, acknowledged and confessed that he owed the plaintiff the net sum of P3,852.50; that by the said instrument
duly executed the defendant bound and pledged himself to pay to the plaintiff the said sum in four monthly installments
from that date, at the rate of P1,000 for each of the first three installments and P852.50 for the last one, and likewise
the interest thereon at the rate of 8% per annum, to be adjusted and paid at the time of paying each of the installments
fixed; that in the said instrument the defendant moreover bound himself to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P500 for costs
and expenses, in case the latter should recur to judicial process for the collection of the aforementioned debt; and that,
as security for the payment of the said debt, of the interest thereon and of the amount for costs and expenses, the
defendant voluntarily executed, by means of the said instrument and in favor of the plaintiff, a special mortgage upon
the properties of his absolute ownership and control (11 Rural estates in Lucena). It was stated in the instrument, as an
express condition, that default of payment of any of the installments specified in the fourth preceding paragraph would
cause the entire obligation to mature and would entitle the plaintiff (it says "defendant") to require the payment of the
same in its totality and forthwith to institute foreclosure proceedings against any and all of the mortgage properties.
The complaint further alleged, that, notwithstanding the repeated demands made upon the defendant, the latter had
not paid his debt nor the interest thereon, excepting the sum of P550.
As a second cause of action, the complaint alleged, among other things: That the defendant, by means of an
instrument duly executed on December 21, 1906, by his attorney in fact and legal representative, Vicente Marcelo
Concepcion, who was fully empowered and authorized an instrument ratified on the same date before the notary
Daniel R. Williams and in consideration of the credit which the plaintiff agreed to allow the said defendant up to the
sum of P3,560, executed a special voluntary mortgage of the properties of his absolute ownership and control. The
mortgage was executed as security for the payment to the plaintiff of the sum or sums which the defendant might owe
him by reason of the said credit, which was granted.
The defendant, in his answer, alleged: That the defendant did not execute, consent to, nor authorize the execution of a
power of attorney of any kind whatsoever in favor of Vicente Marcelo Concepcion; that the defendant received no sum
whatever from the plaintiff nor was he in the latter's debt for the amount claimed in the complaint, nor for any other sum
of money; that he did not give his consent to all of to any one of the mortgages alleged in the complaint, and that all
the said mortgages on the properties were founded on a supposed power of attorney said to have been executed by
the defendant in favor of Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, which power of attorney was fictitious, false, fraudulent, null
and void, that it was not executed by the defendant, nor did the latter intervene therein and that the said power of
attorney had no true reason for existence; wherefore the defendant asked that judgment be rendered absolving him
from the complaint with the costs against the plaintiff, by annulling each and all of the mortgages alleged in the
complaint and the inscription of each of them in the office of the register of property of Tayabas, and by ordering the
cancellation of all the inscriptions of the said mortgages and encumbrances of the aforementioned properties.
The purpose of the suit filed by the plaintiff, W. W. Robinson, is the collection of various sums owed by the defendant,
Marcelino Villafuerte y Raola, the payment of which is secured by a mortgage on the real properties set out in the two
notarial documents evidencing the debt, exhibited under letter A and B, and inscribed in the property registry of the
Province of Tayabas.
ISSUE: Whether a Law Clerk, Jose Moreno Lacalle, should be permitted to examine witnesses during the hearing of
the case
RULING: With regard to the first two alleged errors, relative to Jose Moreno Lacalle being permitted to address
questions to some of the witnesses during the hearing of the case, notwithstanding the presence of Attorney Agustin
Alvarez, who represented the plaintiff, it is unquestionable that the intervention of the said law clerk and employee of
Messrs. Haussermann, Cohn & Williams, the plaintiff's attorneys in this suit, was improperly admitted; it was not
authorized by any law, for the reason that the said Lacalle did not have the capacity and qualifications of a lawyer
admitted under oath to practice his profession before the courts of these Islands, and therefore, on objection being
made to his present at the hearing of the case, the judge should have sustained such objection and should have
excluded Lacalle and not permitted him to address questions to the plaintiff's witnesses, notwithstanding the fact that

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Attorney Agustin Alvares, designated in substitution of the said Haussermann, Cohn & Williams as the plaintiff's
representative in CFI Tayabas, was present. Notwithstanding this, the acts performed in the course of some of the
proceedings under the direction of Jose Moreno Lacalle are not subject to annulment, as no positive detriment was
caused to the defendant, although such intervention is in no manner permitted by the law of procedure.
However, even though the questions addressed by Lacalle to the plaintiff's witnesses and the presentation of
documents of various kinds exhibited at the trial be stricken out for the reason that they were made by a person who
was neither a party to the suit nor counsel for the plaintiff, yet we do not find any reason, based upon any positive
prohibition of the law, to authorize the striking out to the answers given by the witnesses interrogated by Lacalle, even
though the said answers may have been evoked by questions addressed by a person not authorized by law, and there
is much less reason for rejecting the cross-questions addressed to the same witnesses by the defendant's attorney,
and the answers thereto. Although the presentation of the documents which support the claims of the plaintiff party be
deemed to be improper, on account of their having been made by a person who had not the qualifications of a
practicing attorney it is nevertheless true that their presentation was authorized by the attorney Alvarez and the
documents exhibited continued to be united to the record and were not stricken out therefrom on motion by the other
side, but, on the contrary, the attorney for the defendant or his counsel discussed the authenticity and validity of the
said documents, made allegations against the same and concluded by asking that these documents, and also the
inscription of those designated under letters A and B, be declared null and void.
From the preceding statements it is concluded that the intervention of Jose Moreno Lacalle in the present suit has in
no manner prejudiced the rights and interests of the defendant and that, if judgment was rendered against him and in
favor of the plaintiff, it was in consequence of the merits of the evidence adduced by the plaintiff and of the inefficacy
and worthlessness of the testimony given by the defendant. If the defendant Marcelino Villafuerte had presented
substantial, strong and convincing evidence of the falsity of the two powers of attorney executed in favor of Vicente
Marcelo Concepcion, the plaintiff's documentary evidence would have been totally invalidated and annulled, and this
suit would have had a different ending.
11. Tan Tek Beng vs. David 126 SCRA 389
Case: Administrative case filed in the Supreme Court
126 SCRA 389 Legal Ethics Malpractice Solicitation of Cases
In 1970, Atty. David and Tan Tek Beng, a non-lawyer, entered into an agreement whereby Tan Tek Beng will supply
clients to Atty. David and in exchange thereof, Atty. David shall give Tan Tek Beng 50% of the attorneys fees collected
as the latters commission. Atty. David also agreed not to deal with clients supplied by Tan Tek Beng directly without
the latters consent. The agreement went sour due to allegations of double-cross from both sides. Tan Tek Beng
denounced Atty. David before the Supreme Court but did not seek the enforcement of their agreement.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. David is guilty of Malpractice.
HELD: Yes. The agreement between Atty. David and Tan Tek Beng is void because it was tantamount to malpractice
which is the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court). Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty
committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term malpractice.
That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a profession, not a business. The
lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional.
On the agreement to divide the attorneys fees, the Supreme Court noted: No division of fees for legal services is
proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility.
On the agreement that Atty. David shall not deal with clients supplied by Beng directly: The professional services of a
lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by any law agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client
and lawyer. A lawyers responsibilities and qualifications are individual. He should avoid all relations which direct the
performance of his duties by or in the interest of such intermediary. A lawyers relation to his client should be personal,
and the responsibility should be direct to the client. . . .
12. THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS vs Bayot
74 Phil 579 Legal Ethics Malpractice
In June 1943, Bayot advertised in a newspaper that he helps people in securing marriage licenses; that he does so
avoiding delays and publicity; that he also makes marriage arrangements; that legal consultations are free for the poor;
and that everything is confidential. The Director of Religious Affairs took notice of the ad and so he sued Bayot for
Malpractice.
Bayot initially denied having published the advertisement. But later, he admitted the same and asked for the courts
mercy as he promised to never repeat the act again.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bayot is guilty of Malpractice.
HELD: Yes. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that the practice of soliciting cases at law

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for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. The advertisement
he caused to be published is a brazen solicitation of business from the public. . It is highly unethical for an attorney to
advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. The Supreme Court again emphasized that best
advertisement for a lawyer is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to
trust. But because of Bayots plea for leniency and his promise and the fact that he did not earn any case by reason of
the ad, the Supreme Court merely reprimanded him.
13. Ulep vs Legal clinic, Inc. 223 SCRA 378 (1993)
FACTS: The petitioner contends that the advertisements reproduced by the respondents are champertous, unethical,
demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of
the bar and that, to which as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the following
advertisements:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call:521-0767,
LEGAL 5217232,5222041
CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday
during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's
Visa. Declaration of Absence Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Force Visa for
Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.,
LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251;
522-2041; 521-0767
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its instance, but claims
that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the
use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services
advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the
case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by the United States Supreme
Court on June 7, 1977.
ISSUE: Whether or not, the advertised services offered by the Legal Clinic, Inc., constitutes practice of law and
whether the same are in violation of the Code of Professional responsibility
RULING: The advertisement of the respondent is covered in the term practice of law as defined in the case of
Cayetano vs. Monsod. There is a restricted concept and limited acceptance of paralegal services in the Philippines. It
is allowed that some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been permitted with a limited representation
in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law,
rules or regulations granting permission therefore. Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or
statement of facts. Canon 3.01 adds that he is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services. Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in
return for, publicity to attract legal business (Canon 3.04). The Canons of Professional Ethics, before the adoption of
the CPR, had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such
as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes
in which the lawyer have been engaged of concerning the manner of the conduct, the magnitude of the interest
involved, the importance the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. There are existing exceptions under the
law on the rule prohibiting the advertisement of a lawyers services. However, taking into consideration the nature and
contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees

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charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered, the court found and held that the same definitely do not
and conclusively cannot fall under any of the exceptions. The respondents defense with the case of Bates vs. State
Bar applies only when there is an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a
statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an
estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly
whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even
the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stand therein are "not applicable in any
state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state. The Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and
ENJOIN The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any
form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting,
directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as
indicated herein.
14. In re: Sycip 92 Scra 1 (1979) (see case #2 of Nature and Creation of Atty-Client Relationship)