Finnegan V Myers Order

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION
ROMAN FINNEGAN, et al., )

)
Plaintiffs, )
)
vs. ) NO. 3:08-CV-503
)
LAUREL MYERS, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss or
Alternatively to Strike Plaintiffs’ Complaint, filed by Defendants,
Laurel Myers, Regina McAninch, Tracy Salyers, Reba James, James
Payne and Jennifer McDonald, on February 18, 2009. For the reasons
set forth below, the motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Laurel Myers, Regina McAninch, Tracy Salyers, Reba James,
James Payne and Jennifer McDonald (collectively “Defendants”), move
to dismiss the complaint filed by Plaintiffs, Roman Finnegan,
Lynnette Finnegan, individually and on behalf of Katelynn Salyer,
her minor child, and Tabitha Abair, arguing it fails to comport
with the short and plain statement of the claim required by Rule 8
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Alternatively, Defendants
ask that the Court strike the entire complaint pursuant to Rule
12(b) because it contains redundant and immaterial matters.
The facts of this case are many, but it is not necessary for
the Court to completely delve into the extensive record at this
time. Simply put, Plaintiffs have sued Defendants, Detective
Jennifer McDonald and workers from the Indiana Department of Child
Services (DCS), who Plaintiffs allege repeatedly and wrongfully
claimed that Roman and Lynnette Finnegan medically neglected or
murdered Lynnette’s 14-year old daughter, Jessica Salyer. The
events of this case span the course of three and a half years and
have been the subject of a coroner’s inquest, four Child in Need of
Services (“CHINS”) proceedings, criminal proceedings, and review
before an administrative law judge and Judge Patrick Blankenship,
Special Judge in the Pulaski County Superior Court.
DISCUSSION
Rule 8 provides that in order to state a proper claim for
relief, a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The main purpose of Rule 8 is rooted in fair
notice: a complaint “must be presented with intelligibility
sufficient for a court or opposing party to understand whether a
valid claim is alleged and if so what it is.” Wade v. Hopper, 993
F.2d 1246, 1249 (7th Cir. 1993) (quotation omitted). Additionally,
Rule 12(f) provides that a court may strike from a pleading “any
2
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(f).
Rule 8
First, Defendants ask the Court to dismiss the complaint under
Rule 8, complaining that it is “so long and complicated as to
render it basically useless as a tool for identifying the salient
facts upon which Plaintiffs base their sought-after relief.” (Mem.
In Supp. Of Mot. To Dismiss, p. 1.) Plaintiffs’ complaint in this
case is 63 pages long with 166 paragraphs. The facts section
covers 59 pages and 153 paragraphs. Defendants complain that the
sheer volume of the complaint renders it a virtual abuse of
process, and that it imposes a hardship on them to respond to such
a complaint. (Mem. In Supp. Of Mot. To Dismiss, p. 2.)
Plaintiffs’ action is brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983,
seeking redress for alleged violation of their civil rights under
state law, federal law, and the First, Fourth, Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. (Compl. ¶ 1.)
Following the lengthy fact section, the complaint clearly sets
forth five enumerated counts under the subheading “legal claims.”
(Compl., pp. 59-63.)
Plaintiffs respond that because Courts used to impose a
heightened pleading requirement for actions brought under section
1983, and because the Seventh Circuit still requires plaintiffs to
3
provide sufficient facts to support their claims (see Sims v.
County of Bureau et al., 506 F.3d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 2007)),
Plaintiffs considered it the best practice to provide facts to
address claims of immunity or lack of official position. (Resp. to
Mot. To Dismiss, p. 10.) Nevertheless, Plaintiffs’ complaint must
still comport with Rule 8(a).
The cases cited by Defendants in their memorandum are either
distinguishable or do not support their argument. For example, in
Vicom, Inc. v. Harbridge Merchant Services, Inc., 20 F.3d 771, 776
(7th Cir. 1994), although the Court frowned on the “confusing,
redundant, and seemingly interminable amended complaint,” the
district court decided not to dismiss it under Rule 8(a), and the
Seventh Circuit also analyzed the complaint on its merits in
determining whether it stated a proper claim. Several of the cases
cited by Defendants dismissed the complaints because of failure to
state a claim (not lack of a short and plain statement). See,
e.g., Richmond v. Nationwide Cassel, L.P., 52 F.3d 640, 645 (7th
Cir. 1995) (affirming dismissal of complaint where it failed to
satisfy RICO requirement of alleging persons separate from the
enterprises); McCready v. eBay, Inc., 453 F.3d 882, 888-91 (7th
Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) where plaintiff
failed to allege the statutory requirements under the FCRA and
FDCPA and failed to establish jurisdiction); Mann v. Boatright, 477
F.3d 1140, 1147-48 (10th Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal of nearly
4
all of plaintiff’s claims because they were barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, and mentioning that plaintiff’s complaint was
additionally unintelligible).
In Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374 (7th Cir.
2003), the Seventh Circuit did affirm dismissal of a complaint for
failure to plead fraud with particularity and for failure to comply
with Rule 8(a), but that case is quite different from this one.
First, the district court allowed the defendant multiple
opportunities, with specific instructions, to draft a pleading with
a concise statement of the claim. An example of what the Court got
in the third amended complaint under a paragraph entitled “more
definite statement” is as follows:
Claim for $2,584,926.04, MDS Ex. 1, TAC Ex. 47,

submitted on August 9, 1993 and related payments by
T.A. Sieverson, Vice-President of Lockheed
Integrated Solutions Company, Lockheed Corporation
to VA Contracting Officer Steve Stapleton for
equipment and service provided during Phase I and
Phase II of the OA & MM/ISMS LAN/WAN PROJECT. See
TAC ¶¶ 141-181, 217-243, 252, 280-282, 291-295.
Id. at 77. The allegations in Garst were absolutely
indecipherable. To the contrary, in this case, the facts in
Plaintiffs’ complaint are intelligible. The facts are set forth
chronologically and clearly tell a comprehensible story.
As pointed out by Plaintiffs, two cases cited by Defendants
actually contradict their position. In Davis v. Ruby Foods, 269
F.3d 818, 819 (7th Cir. 2001), the Seventh Circuit declined to
dismiss a complaint under Rule 8 that was not short, concise, or
5
plain, but rather highly repetitious, and contained irrelevant and
“downright weird touches.” The Court declined to dismiss it,
finding the complaint performed the essential function of putting
the defendant on notice of plaintiff’s claim. Judge Posner went on
to analyze the question of:
whether a district court is authorized to dismiss a

complaint merely because it contains repetitious
and irrelevant matter, a disposable husk around a
core of proper pleading. As our use of the word
‘disposable’ implies, we think not, and therefore
that it is an abuse of discretion . . . to dismiss
a complaint merely because of the presence of
superfluous matter. That would cast district
judges in the role of editors, screening complaints
for brevity and focus; they have better things to
do with their time. In our many years of judging,
moreover, we cannot recall many complaints that
actually met the standard of chaste, Doric
simplicity implied by Rule 8 and the model
complaints in the Forms Appendix. Many lawyers
strongly believe that a complaint should be
comprehensive rather than brief and therefore
cryptic. They think the more comprehensive
pleading assists the judge in understanding the
case and provides a firmer basis for settlement
negotiations. This judgment by the bar has been
accepted to the extent that complaints signed by a
lawyer are never dismissed simply because they are
not short, concise, and plain.
Id. at 820 (citations omitted); see also Lindell v. McCallum, 352
F.3d 1107, 1110 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding district court’s choice
not to dismiss complaint “stuffed with material that is irrelevant
and difficult even to understand” because it stated a proper
claim). This Court completely concurs with Judge Posner’s eloquent
analysis of the exact issue in this case.
Here, the Court believes Plaintiffs’ complaint does meet the
6
requirements of Rule 8(a). It adequately performs the notice
function prescribed for by complaints by the civil rules, and the
mere presence of extraneous matter does not warrant dismissal.
Davis, 269 F.3d at 820.
Rule 12
Defendants’ request that the complaint be stricken in its
entirety under Rule 12(f) because “nearly the entire complaint
consists of redundant and immaterial matters” is also denied.
Defendants do not identify any specific redundant or immaterial
claim in the complaint. Judge Posner specifically warned litigants
against this in Davis:
We also take this opportunity to advise defense

counsel against moving to strike extraneous matter
unless its presence in the complaint is actually
prejudicial to the defense. Such motions are what
give ‘motion practice’ a deservedly bad name.
Davis, 269 F.3d at 821 (citation omitted).
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, the Motion to Dismiss or
Alternatively to Strike Plaintiffs’ Complaint is DENIED.
DATED: April 7, 2009 /s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge

United States District Court

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

ROMAN FINNEGAN, et al., )

OPINION AND ORDER

Alternatively to Strike Plaintiffs’ Complaint, filed by Defendants,

Laurel Myers, Regina McAninch, Tracy Salyers, Reba James, James

set forth below, the motion is DENIED.

Laurel Myers, Regina McAninch, Tracy Salyers, Reba James,

James Payne and Jennifer McDonald (collectively “Defendants”), move

to dismiss the complaint filed by Plaintiffs, Roman Finnegan,

Lynnette Finnegan, individually and on behalf of Katelynn Salyer,

her minor child, and Tabitha Abair, arguing it fails to comport

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Alternatively, Defendants

the Court to completely delve into the extensive record at this

time. Simply put, Plaintiffs have sued Defendants, Detective

Jennifer McDonald and workers from the Indiana Department of Child

Services (DCS), who Plaintiffs allege repeatedly and wrongfully

claimed that Roman and Lynnette Finnegan medically neglected or

murdered Lynnette’s 14-year old daughter, Jessica Salyer. The

have been the subject of a coroner’s inquest, four Child in Need of

Services (“CHINS”) proceedings, criminal proceedings, and review

before an administrative law judge and Judge Patrick Blankenship,

Special Judge in the Pulaski County Superior Court.

Rule 8 provides that in order to state a proper claim for

relief, a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The main purpose of Rule 8 is rooted in fair

notice: a complaint “must be presented with intelligibility

sufficient for a court or opposing party to understand whether a

valid claim is alleged and if so what it is.” Wade v. Hopper, 993

F.2d 1246, 1249 (7th Cir. 1993) (quotation omitted). Additionally,

First, Defendants ask the Court to dismiss the complaint under

Rule 8, complaining that it is “so long and complicated as to

render it basically useless as a tool for identifying the salient

facts upon which Plaintiffs base their sought-after relief.” (Mem.

In Supp. Of Mot. To Dismiss, p. 1.) Plaintiffs’ complaint in this

case is 63 pages long with 166 paragraphs. The facts section

covers 59 pages and 153 paragraphs. Defendants complain that the

sheer volume of the complaint renders it a virtual abuse of

process, and that it imposes a hardship on them to respond to such

a complaint. (Mem. In Supp. Of Mot. To Dismiss, p. 2.)

Plaintiffs’ action is brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983,

seeking redress for alleged violation of their civil rights under

Amendments to the United States Constitution. (Compl. ¶ 1.)

Following the lengthy fact section, the complaint clearly sets

forth five enumerated counts under the subheading “legal claims.”

(Compl., pp. 59-63.)

Plaintiffs respond that because Courts used to impose a

heightened pleading requirement for actions brought under section

1983, and because the Seventh Circuit still requires plaintiffs to

Plaintiffs considered it the best practice to provide facts to

address claims of immunity or lack of official position. (Resp. to

Mot. To Dismiss, p. 10.) Nevertheless, Plaintiffs’ complaint must

still comport with Rule 8(a).

The cases cited by Defendants in their memorandum are either

distinguishable or do not support their argument. For example, in

Vicom, Inc. v. Harbridge Merchant Services, Inc., 20 F.3d 771, 776

(7th Cir. 1994), although the Court frowned on the “confusing,

redundant, and seemingly interminable amended complaint,” the