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G.R. No. 153414

June 27, 2006

VICTORIA G. CALLANGAN, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,* Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the
January 10, 2002 decision of theRegional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 69, in
SCA No. 1933. The challenged decision dismissed petitioner Victoria G. Callangans
petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion to the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MTC) of Pasig City, Branch 68, for issuing an order on October 8, 1999 denying
petitioners motion for new trial in Criminal Case No. 38674.
On May 28, 1999, petitioner was found guilty of the crime of perjury in Criminal Case
No. 38674. On July 5, 1999, petitioner filed a timely motion for new trial on the ground
that she was deprived of her day in court because of the gross negligence of her
counsel, Atty. Ricardo C. Valmonte, and his utter lack of diligence in the performance of
his duty to represent her in every stage of the suit. She attributed the following
omissions to her counsel:
1. failure to file the demurrer to evidence despite leave of court previously
granted;
2. failure to inform his client of the April 14, 1999 order of the court considering
the intended demurrer to evidence as abandoned;
3. failure to attend the hearing for the reception of the evidence for the defense
(i.e., petitioner) despite notice, which failure was deemed by the MTC as a waiver
of petitioners right to present her evidence;
4. failure to seek proper relief from the adverse effects of said orders and
5. failure to appear on the promulgation of judgment.
On October 8, 1999, the MTC denied the motion for new trial. It held that the ground
invoked by petitioner was not among those provided in the Rules of Court for new trial
in criminal cases. Petitioner sought the reconsideration of the order but the same was
also denied in the MTCs December 27, 1999 order.
Aggrieved, petitioner questioned the October 8, 1999 and December 27, 1999 orders of
the MTC by filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the
RTC of Pasig City. It was docketed as SCA No. 1933.

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On January 10, 2002, the RTC rendered its decision. It dismissed the petition on the
ground that the remedy of appeal was still available to petitioner. It also ruled that the
MTC did not commit any abuse of discretion in issuing the orders assailed by petitioner.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied it. Hence, this petition.
The Court is called upon to resolve these issues: (a) whether a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, not appeal, is the proper remedy for relief from the
denial of a motion for new trial and (b) whether the MTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying the motion for new trial.
Petitioner insists that its resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to impugn the
order denying its motion for new trial was proper. She also claims that the RTC erred in
declaring that the MTC did not abuse its discretion when it denied her motion for new
trial.
The petition is meritorious.
Rule 41, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that no appeal may be taken from an
order denying a motion for new trial. Such final order is not appealable. In such a case,
the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. In Rivera v. Court of Appeals,1 the Court ruled that an order denying a
motion for new trial cannot be the subject of an appeal. The proper remedy against such
an order is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.2
While this rule pertains to civil cases, there is no cogent reason why the same principle
cannot be applied in criminal cases.3 Thus, in criminal cases, the special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 is a proper remedy to question an order denying a motion for
new trial.
True, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC when it issued the
order denying petitioners motion for new trial. The records of the case are bereft of any
indication that Judge Cornejo arbitrarily, despotically or deliberately failed to afford
petitioner her constitutionally mandated right to be heard. The cause of petitioners
travails and misfortune was the negligence of her own counsel.
However, in view of the circumstances of this case, outright deprivation of liberty will be
the consequence of petitioners criminal conviction based solely on the evidence for the
prosecution. Thus, to prevent a miscarriage of justice and to give meaning to the due
process clause of the Constitution, the Court deems it wise to allow petitioner to present
evidence in her defense.
The rule that the negligence of counsel binds the client admits of exceptions. The
recognized exceptions are: (1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives
the client of due process of law, (2) when its application will result in outright

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deprivation of the clients liberty or property or (3) where the interests of justice so
require.4 In such cases, courts must step in and accord relief to a party-litigant. 5
The omissions of petitioners counsel amounted to an abandonment or total disregard of
her case. They show conscious indifference to or utter disregard of the possible
repercussions to his client. Thus, the chronic inaction of petitioners counsel on
important incidents and stages of the criminal proceedings constituted gross
negligence.
The RTC itself found that petitioner never had the chance to present her defense
because of the nonfeasance (malfeasance, even) of her counsel. It also concluded that,
effectively, she was without counsel.6 Considering these findings, to deprive petitioner
of her liberty without affording her the right to be assisted by counsel is to deny her due
process.
In criminal cases, the right of the accused to be assisted by counsel is immutable. 7
Otherwise, there will be a grave denial of due process.8 The right to counsel proceeds
from the fundamental principle of due process which basically means that a person
must be heard before being condemned.9
In People v. Ferrer,10 the essence of the right to counsel was enunciated:
The right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance
extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts
accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the
proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the
basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the
fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an
accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn
duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive
legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation.11 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner was accorded grossly insufficient legal assistance by a counsel who did not
devote himself to the defense of her cause. Counsels utter lack of action after the
prosecution rested its case revealed an extreme shortcoming on his part. Such inaction
definitely proved infidelity to and abandonment of petitioners cause.
Considering that this case involved personal liberty, the gross negligence of counsel
shocks our sense of justice. It should not be allowed to prejudice petitioners
constitutional right to be heard.12 The Courts pronouncement in Reyes v. Court of
Appeals,13 applies strongly in this case:
The judicial conscience certainly cannot rest easy on a conviction based solely on the
evidence of the prosecution just because the presentation of the defense evidence had
been barred by technicality. Rigid application of rules must yield to the duty of courts to

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render justice where justice is due to secure to every individual all possible legal
means to prove his innocence of a crime with which he or she might be charged. 14
Otherwise, the likelihood of convicting and punishing an innocent man and of inflicting a
serious injustice on him becomes great.
In Reyes, the Court, after finding that the conviction of Zenaida Reyes had been caused
by the gross negligence of her counsel, reconsidered its earlier resolution which denied
the petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming her conviction.
The case was remanded to the trial court for the purpose of allowing Reyes to present
evidence in her defense.
In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,15 the Court also set aside its decision affirming
Domingo de Guzmans conviction by the Sandiganbayan, after being shown that his
conviction had been brought about by his counsels gross ignorance of law and
procedure. The case was then ordered remanded to the Sandiganbayan for reception
and appreciation of petitioners evidence.
Therefore, in consonance with the demands of justice and to prevent any outright
deprivation of liberty, the Court deems it best to give petitioner a chance to present
evidence in her defense. The case should be remanded to the MTC for acceptance and
appraisal of petitioners evidence.
Petitioner does not seek her exoneration but the opportunity to present evidence in her
defense. Considering the gross negligence of her counsel on whom she reposed her
trust to protect her rights, justice demands that she be given that chance.
In sum, it is better to allow petitioner another occasion to present her evidence than to
let her conviction stand based solely on the evidence of the prosecution. 16 In accordance
with Rule 121, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, the evidence of the prosecution shall be
understood preserved, subject to the right of the prosecution to supplement it and/or to
rebut the evidence which petitioner may present. 17
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The January 10, 2002 decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69, in SCA No. 1933 and the October 8, 1999
and December 27, 1999 orders of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 68 in
Criminal Case No. 38674 are SET ASIDE.
This case is hereby REMANDED to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City for a new
trial for the purpose of allowing petitioner to present evidence in her defense with
directive to the court to decide the case with deliberate speed.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for further investigation of Atty. Ricardo C. Valmontes
liability as a member of the bar.

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SO ORDERED.