Important considerations when design protection system

 
 
Important considerations when design protection system.
 
1. Types of fault and abnormal Conditions to be protected against
2. Quantities available for measurement
3. Types of protection available
4. Speed
5. Fault position discrimination
6. Dependability / reliability
7. Security / stability
8. Overlap of protections
9. Phase discrimination / selectivity
10. CT’s and VT’s ratio required
11. Auxiliary supplies
12. Back-up protection
13. Cost
14. Duplication of protection
Types of protection
A - Fuses
For LV Systems, Distribution Feeders and Transformers, VT’s, Auxiliary
Supplies
 
 
B - Over current and earth fault
       Widely used in All Power Systems
1. Non-Directional
2. Directional.
 
C - DIFFERENTIAL
For feeders, Bus-bars, Transformers, Generators etc
1. High Impedance
2. Low Impedance
3. Restricted E/F
4. Biased
5. Pilot Wire

 
 
D - Distance
For transmission and sub-transmission lines and distribution feeders, also used as back-up
protection for transformers and generators without signaling with signaling to provide unit
protection e.g.:
  
1. Time-stepped distance protection
 2. Permissive underreach protection (PUP)
3. Permissive overreach protection (POP)
4. Unblocking overreach protection (UOP)
5. Blocking overreach protection (BOP)
6. Power swing blocking
7. Phase comparison for transmission lines
8. Directional comparison for transmission lines
 
E - Miscellaneous:
1. Under and over voltage
2. Under and over frequency
3. A special relay for generators, transformers, motors etc.
4. Control relays: auto-reclose, tap change control, etc.
5. tripping and auxiliary relays
 
Speed
Fast operation: minimizes damage and danger
Very fast operation: minimizes system instability discrimination and security can be costly
to achieve.
Examples:
1. differential protection
2. differential protection with digital signaling
3. distance protection with signaling
4. directional comparison with signaling
 
Fault position discrimination
Power system divided into protected zones must isolate only the faulty equipment or section
 
Dependability / reliability
Protection must operate when required to Failure to operate can be extremely damaging and
disruptive Faults are rare. Protection must operate even after years of inactivity Improved by
use of:
1. Back-up Protection and
2. duplicate Protection
 
Security / Stability
Protection must not operate when not required to e.g. due to:
1. Load Switching
2. Faults on other parts of the system
3. Recoverable Power Swings
 
Overlap of protections
1. No blind spots
2. Where possible use overlapping CTs
Phase discrimination / selectivity
Correct indication of phases involved in the fault Important for Single Phase Tripping and
auto-Reclosing applications
 
Current and voltage transformers
These are an essential part of the Protection Scheme. They must be suitably specified to meet
the requirements of the protective relays.
1A and 5A secondary current ratings, Saturation of current transformers during heavy fault
conditions should not exceed the limits laid down by the relay manufacturer.
Current transformers for fast operating protections must allow for any offset in the current
waveform. Output rating under fault conditions must allow for maximum transient offset.
This is a function of the system X/R ratio.
Current Transformer Standards/Classes:
British Standards: 10P, 5P, X
IEC: 10P, SP, TPX, TPY, TPZ
American: C, T.
Location of CTs should, if possible, provide for overlap of protections. Correct connection of
CTs to the protection is important. In particular for directional, distance, phase comparison
and differential protections. VT’s may be Electromagnetic or Capacitor types. Busbar VT’s:
Special consideration needed when used for Line Protection.
 
Auxiliary supplies
 
Required for:
1. Tripping circuit breakers
2. Closing circuit breakers
3. Protection and trip relays
 AC. auxiliary supplies are only used on LV and MV systems.
 DC. auxiliary supplies are more secure than ac supplies.
  Separately fused supplies used for each protection.
 Duplicate batteries are occasionally provided for extra security.
 Modern protection relays need a continuous auxiliary supply.
 During operation, they draw a large current which increases due to operation
of output elements.
Relays are given a rated auxiliary voltage and an operative auxiliary voltage range.
the rated value is marked on the relay. Refer to relay documentation for details of operative
range. it is important to make sure that the range of voltages which can appear at the relay
auxiliary supply terminals is within the operative range.
IEC recommended values (IEC 255-6):
Rated battery voltages:
12, 24, 48, 60, 11 0, 125, 220, 250, 440
Preferred operative range of relays:
80 to 10% of voltage rated
AC. component ripple in the dc supply:
<10% of voltage rated
 
COST
The cost of protection is equivalent to insurance policy against damage to plant, and loss of
supply and customer goodwill.
Acceptable cost is based on a balance of economics and technical factors. Cost of protection
should be balanced against the cost of potential hazards there is an economic limit on what
can be spent.
 
Minimum cost:
Must ensure that all faulty equipment is isolated by protection
Other factors:
1. Speed
2. Security/Stability
3.  Sensitivity:
   Degree of risk in allowing a low level fault to develop into a more severe fault
4. Reliability
 
Total cost should take account of:
1. Relays, schemes and associated panels and panel wiring
2. Setting studies
3. Commissioning
4. CT’s and VT’s
5. Maintenance and repairs to relays
6. Damage repair if protection fails to operate
7. Lost revenue if protection operates unnecessarily
 
Distribution systems
1. Large number of switching and distribution points, transformers and feeders.
2. Economics often overrides technical issues
3. Protection may be the minimum consistent with - statutory safety regulations
4. Speed less important than on transmission systems
5. Back-up protection can be simple and is often inherent in the main protection.
6. Although important, the consequences of maloperation or failure to operate are less
    serious than for transmission systems.
 
Transmission systems
1. Emphasis is on technical considerations rather than economics
2. Economics cannot be ignored but is of secondary importance compared with the need
for  highly reliable, fully discriminative high speed protection
3. Higher protection costs justifiable by high capital cost of power system elements
protected.
4. Risk of security of supply should be reduced to the lowest practical levels
5. High speed protection requires unit protection
6. Duplicate protections used to improve reliability
7. Single phase tripping and auto-reclose may be required to maintain system stability
 
 
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 Basic of protection system
Introduction
The purpose of an electrical power generation system is to distribute energy to a
multiplicity of points for diverse applications.

The system should be designed and managed to deliver this energy to the utilization
points with both reliability and economy.

 As these two requirements are largely opposed, it is instructive to look at the
relationship between the reliability of a system and its cost and value to the consumer,
which is shown in Figure 1.
 

 
Figure 1 Relationship between reliability of supply,
its cost and value to the consumer.
         It is important to realize that the system is viable only between the cross-
over points A and B. The diagram illustrates the significance of reliability in system
design, and the necessity of achieving sufficient reliability.

On the other hand, high reliability should not be pursued as an end in itself,
regardless of cost, but should rather be balanced against economy, taking all factors into
account.

Security of supply can be bettered by improving plant design, increasing the

spare capacity margin and arranging alternative circuits to supply loads. Sub-division of
the system into zones, each controlled by switchgear in association with protective gear,
provides flexibility during normal operation and ensures a minimum of dislocation
following a breakdown.

The greatest threat to a secure supply is the shunt fault or short circuit, which
imposes a sudden and sometimes violent change on system operation.

The large current which then flows, accompanied by the localized release of a
considerable quantity of energy, can cause fire at the fault location, and mechanical
damage throughout the system, particularly to machine and transformer windings. Rapid
isolation of the fault by the nearest switch-gear will minimize the damage and disruption
caused to the system.

A power system represents a very large capital investment. To maximize the return on this
outlay, the system must be loaded as much as possible. For this reason it is necessary not
only to provide a supply of energy which is attractive to prospective users by operating
the system within the range AB (Figure 1.1), but also to keep the system in full operation
as far as possible continuously, so that it may give the best service to the consumer, and
earn the most.

Revenue for the supply authority. Absolute freedom from failure of the plant and
system network cannot be guaranteed.

The risk of a fault occurring, however slight for each item, is multiplied by the
number of such items which are closely associated in an extensive system, as any fault
produces repercussions throughout the net-work. When the system is large, the chance of
a fault occurring and the disturbance that a fault would bring are both so great that without
equipment to remove faults the system will become, in practical terms, inoperable.

The object of the system will be defeated if adequate provision for fault clearance
is not made. Nor is the installation of switchgear alone sufficient; discriminative
protective gear, designed according to the characteristics and requirements of the power
system, must be provided to control the switchgear.

A system is not properly designed and managed if it is not adequately protected.

This is the measure of the importance of protective systems in modern practice and of the
responsibility vested in the protection engineer.
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Fundamentals of protection practice

This is a collective term which covers all the equipment used for detecting, locating and
initiating the removal of a fault from the power system. Relays are extensively used for
major protective functions, But the term also covers direct-acting A.C. trips and fuses.

In addition to relays the term includes all accessories such as current and voltage
transformers, shunts, D.C. and A.C. wiring and any other devices relating to the
protective relays.

In general, the main switchgear, although fundamentally protective in its function,

is excluded from the term 'protective gear', as are also common services, such as the
station battery and any other equipment required to secure operation of the circuit
breaker.

In order to fulfil the requirements of discriminative protection with the optimum

speed for the many different configurations, operating conditions and construction
features of power systems, it has been necessary to develop many types of relay which
respond to various functions of the power system quantities.

For example, observation simply of the magnitude of the fault current suffices in
some cases but measurement of power or impedance may be necessary in others. Relays
frequently measure complex functions of the system quantities, which are only readily
expressible by mathematical or graphical means.

In many cases it is not feasible to protect against all hazards with any one relay.
Use is then made of a combination of different types of relay which individually protect
against different risks. Each individual protective arrangement is known as a 'protection
system'; while the whole coordinated combination of relays is called a 'protection scheme'.
      Reliability
The need for a high degree of reliability is discussed in Section 1. Incorrect operation can
be attributed to one of the following classifications:

a.        Incorrect design.

b.       Incorrect installation.
c.        Deterioration.
d.       Protection performance
 

 1. Design
This is of the highest importance. The nature of the power system condition which is
being guarded against must be thoroughly understood in order to make an adequate
design. Comprehensive testing is just as important, and this testing should cover all
aspects of the protection, as well as reproducing operational and environmental conditions
as closely as possible. For many protective systems, it is necessary to test the complete
assembly of relays, current transformers and other ancillary items, and the tests must
simulate fault conditions realistically.

  2.        Installation.
     The need for correct installation of protective equipment is obvious, but the complexity
of the interconnections of many systems and their relation-ship to the remainder of the
station may make.
 Difficult the checking of such correctness. Testing is therefore necessary; since it
will be difficult to reproduce all fault conditions correctly, these tests must be directed to
proving the installation. This is the function of site testing, which should be limited to
such simple and direct tests as will prove the correctness of the connections and freedom
from damage of the equipment.

No attempt should be made to 'type test' the equipment or to establish complex

aspects of its technical performance;
 
  3. Deterioration in service.
  After a piece of equipment has been installed in perfect condition, deterioration may take
place which, in time, could interfere with correct functioning. For example, contacts may
become rough or burnt owing to frequent operation, or tarnished owing to atmospheric
contamination; coils and other circuits may be open-circuited, auxiliary components may
fail, and mechanical parts may become clogged with dirt or corroded to an extent that may
interfere with movement.

One of the particular difficulties of protective relays is that the time between
operations may be measured in years, during which period defects may have developed
unnoticed until revealed by the failure of the protection to respond to a power system
fault. For this reason, relays should be given simple basic tests at suitable intervals in
order to check that their ability to operate has not deteriorated.
Testing should be carried out without disturbing permanent connections. This can
be achieved by the provision of test blocks or switches.
 Draw-out relays inherently provide this facility; a test plug can be inserted
between the relay and case contacts giving access to all relay input circuits for injection.
When temporary disconnection of panel wiring is necessary, mistakes in correct
restoration of connections can be avoided by using identity tags on leads and terminals,
clip-on leads for injection supplies, and easily visible double-ended clip-on leads where
'jumper connections' are required.
The quality of testing personnel is an essential feature when assessing reliability
and considering means for improvement. Staff must be technically competent and
adequately trained, as well as self-disciplined to proceed in a deliberate manner, in which
each step taken and quantity measured is checked before final acceptance.
Important circuits which are especially vulnerable can be provided with
continuous electrical super-vision; such arrangements are commonly applied to circuit
breaker trip circuits and to pilot circuits.

4. Protection performance
The performance of the protection applied to large power systems is frequently assessed
numerically. For this purpose each system fault is classed as an incident and those which
are cleared by the tripping of the correct circuit breakers and only those are classed as
'correct'.
The percentage of correct clearances can then be determined.
This principle of assessment gives an accurate evaluation of the protection of the system
as a whole, but it is severe in its judgment of relay performance, in that many relays are
called into operation for each system fault, and all must behave correctly for a correct
clearance to be recorded.

On this basis, a performance of 94 % is obtainable by standard techniques.

Complete reliability is unlikely ever to be achieved by further improvements in
construction. A very big step, however, can be taken by providing duplication of
equipment or 'redundancy '. Two complete sets of equipment are provided, and arranged so
that either by itself can carry out the required function. If the risk of an equipment failing
is x/unit, the resultant risk, allowing for redundancy, is x2. Where x is small the resultant
risk (x2) may be negligible.
It has long been the practice to apply duplicate protective systems to bus-bars, both
being required to operate to complete a tripping operation, that is, a 'two-out-of-two'
arrangement. In other cases, important circuits have been provided with duplicate main
protection schemes, either being able to trip independently, that is, a 'one-out-of-two'
arrangement. The former arrangement guards against unwanted operation, the latter
against failure to operate.
These two features can be obtained together by adopting a 'two-out-of-three'
arrangement in which three basic systems are used and are interconnected so that the
operation of any two will complete the tripping function.
 
Such schemes have already been used to a limited extent and application of the
principle will undoubtedly increase. Probability theory suggests that if a power network
were protected throughout on this basis, a protection performance of 99.98 % should be
attainable.

This performance figure requires that the separate protection systems be

completely independent; any common factors, such as, for instance, common current
transformers or tripping batteries, will reduce the overall performance to a certain extent.

       Selectivity.
Protection is arranged in zones, which should cover the power system completely, leaving
no part unprotected. When a fault occurs the protection is required to select and trip only
the nearest circuit breakers. This property of selective tripping is also called
'discrimination' and is achieved by two general methods:

1.  Time graded systems.

Protective systems in successive zones are arranged to operate in times which are graded
through the sequence of equipments so that upon the occurrence of a fault, although a
number of protective equipments respond, only those relevant to the faulty zone complete
the tripping function. The others make incomplete operations and then reset.

  2.     Unit systems.

It is possible to design protective systems which respond only to fault conditions lying
within a clearly defined zone. This 'unit protection' or 'restricted Protection' can be
applied throughout a power system and, since it does not involve time grading, can be
relatively fast in operation.

Unit protection is usually achieved by means of a comparison of quantities at the

boundaries of the zone. Certain protective systems derive their 'restricted ' property from
the configuration of the power system and may also be classed as unit protection.
Whichever method is used, it must be kept in mind that selectivity is not merely a
matter of relay design.
It is a function of the correct co-ordination of current transformers and relays with
a suitable choice of relay settings, taking into account the possible range of such
variables as fault currents, maximum load current, system impedances and so on, where
appropriate.

      Zones of protection

Ideally, the zones of protection should overlap across the circuit breaker as shown in
Figure 2, the circuit breaker being included in both zones.

Figure 2. Location of current

 transformers
on both sides of the circuit breaker.
For practical physical reasons, this ideal is not always achieved, accommodation
for current trans-formers being in some cases available only on one side of the circuit
breakers, as in Figure 3. This leaves a section between the current transformers and the
circuit breaker A within which a fault is not cleared by the operation of the protection
that responds. In Figure 3 a fault at F would cause the bus-bar protection to operate and
open the circuit breaker but the fault would continue to be fed through the feeder.
 

Figure 3 Location of current

transformers
on circuit side of the
circuit breaker.
The feeder protection, if of the unit type, would not operate, since the fault is
outside its zone. This problem is dealt. With by some form of zone extension, to operate
when opening the circuit breaker does not fully interrupt the flow of fault current. A time
delay is incurred in fault clearance, although by restricting this operation to occasions
when the bus-bar protection is operated the time delay can be reduced.
Figure 4 Overlapping zones of protection systems.
 
The point of connection of the protection with the power system usually defines the zone
and corresponds to the location of the current transformers. The protection may be of the
unit type, in which case the boundary will be a clearly defined and closed loop. Figure 4
illustrates a typical arrangement of overlapping zones.

Alternatively, the zone may be unrestricted; the start will be defined but the extent will
depend on measurement of the system quantities and will therefore be subject to variation,
owing to changes in system conditions and measurement errors.

     Stability.

This term, applied to protection as distinct from power networks, refers to the ability of
the system to remain inert to all load conditions and faults external to the relevant zone. It
is essentially a term which is applicable to unit systems; the term 'discrimination' is the
equivalent expression applicable to non-unit systems.

     Speed.
The function of automatic protection is to isolate faults from the power system in a very
much shorter time than could be achieved manually, even with a great deal of personal
supervision. The object is to safeguard continuity of supply by removing each disturbance
before it leads to widespread loss of synchronism, which would necessitate the shutting
down of plant.

Loading the system produces phase displacements between the voltages at

different points and therefore increases the probability that synchronism will be lost when
the system is disturbed by a fault. The shorter the time a fault is allowed to remain in the
system, the greater can be the loading of the system. Figure 1.5 shows typical relations
between system loading and fault clearance times for various types of fault.

It will be noted that phase faults have a more marked effect on the stability of the
system than does a simple earth fault and therefore require faster clearance.

It is not enough to maintain stability; unnecessary consequential damage must also

be avoided. The destructive power of a fault arc carrying a high current is very great; it
can burn through copper conductors or weld together core laminations in a transformer or
machine in a very short time. Even away from the fault arc itself, heavy fault currents can
cause damage to plant if they continue for more than a few seconds

 Figure 5 Typical values of power that can be

 transmitted as a function of fault clearance time.

It will be seen that protective gear must operate as quickly as possible; speed, however,
must be weighed against economy.

For this reason, distribution circuits for which the requirements for fast operation
are not very severe are usually protected by time-graded systems, but generating plant
and EHV systems require protective gear of the highest attainable speed; the only
limiting factor will be the necessity for correct operation.
     Sensitivity
Sensitivity is a term frequently used when referring to the minimum operating current of
a complete protective system. A protective system is said to be sensitive if the primary
operating current is low.
When the term is applied to an individual relay, it does not refer to a current or
voltage setting but to the volt-ampere consumption at the minimum operating current.
A given type of relay element can usually be wound for a wide range of setting
currents; the coil will have an impedance which is inversely proportional to the square of
the setting current value, so that the volt-ampere product at any setting is constant.          
This is the true measure of the input requirements of the relay, and so also of the
sensitivity. Relay power factor has some significance in the matter of transient
performance.
For D.C. relays the VA input also represents power consumption, and the burden is
therefore frequently quoted in watts.
   Previous Next  

Primary and back-up protection

The reliability of a power system has been discussed in earlier sections. Many factors may
cause protection failure and there is always some possibility of a circuit breaker failure.
For this reason, it is usual to supplement primary protection with other systems to 'back-
up' the operation of the main system and ensure that nothing can prevent the clearance of
a fault from the system.
 
Back-up protection may be obtained automatically as an inherent feature of the
main protection scheme, or separately by means of additional equipment.
Time graded schemes such as over current or distance protection schemes are
examples of those providing inherent back-up protection; the faulty section is normally
isolated discriminatively by the time grading, but if the appropriate relay fails or the
circuit breaker fails to trip, the next relay in the grading sequence will complete its
operation and trip the associated circuit breaker, thereby interrupting the fault circuit one
section further back. In this way complete back-up cover is obtained; one more section is
isolated than is desirable but this is inevitable in the event of the failure of a circuit
breaker.
Where the system interconnection is more complex, the above operation will be
repeated so that all parallel infeeds are tripped.
 
If the power system is protected mainly by unit schemes, automatic back-up protection is
not obtained, and it is then normal to supplement the main protection with time graded
over current protection, which will provide local back-up cover if the main protective
relays have failed, and will trip further back in the event of circuit breaker failure.
Such back-up protection is inherently slower than the main protection and,
depending on the power system configuration, may be less discriminative. For the most
important circuits the performance may not be good enough, even as a back-up
protection, or, in some cases, not even possible, owing to the effect of multiple infeeds.
In these cases duplicate high speed protective systems may be installed. These provide
excellent mutual back-up cover against failure of the protective equipment, but either no
remote back-up protection against circuit breaker failure or, at best, time delayed cover.
 
Breaker fail protection can be obtained by checking that fault current ceases
within a brief time interval from the operation of the main protection. If this does not
occur, all other connections to the bus bar section are interrupted, the condition being
necessarily treated as a bus bar fault. This provides the required back-up protection with
the minimum of time delay, and confines the tripping operation to the one station, as
compared with the alternative of tripping the remote ends of all the relevant circuits.
The extent and type of back-up protection which is applied will naturally be
related to the failure risks and relative economic importance of the system. For
distribution systems where fault clearance
 
 Times are not critical, time delayed remote back-up protection is adequate but for
EHV systems, where system stability is at risk unless a fault is cleared quickly, local
back-up, as described above, should be chosen.
 
Ideal back-up protection would be completely independent of the main protection.
Current trans-formers, voltage transformers, auxiliary tripping relays, trip coils and D.C.
supplies would be duplicated. This ideal is rarely attained in practice. The following
compromises are typical:
a.   Separate current transformers (cores and secondary windings   only) are used
for each protective system, as this involves little extra cost or accommodation
compared with the use of common current transformers which would have to
be larger because of the combined burden.
b.   Common voltage transformers are used because duplication would involve a
considerable increase in cost, because of the voltage transformers them-selves,
and also because of the increased accommodation which would have to be
provided. Since security of the VT output is vital, it is desirable that the supply
to each protection should be separately fused and also continuously supervised
by a relay which will give an alarm on failure of the supply and, where
appropriate, prevent an unwanted operation of the protection.
c.  Trip supplies to the two protections should be separately fused. Duplication of
tripping batteries and of tripping coils on circuit breakers is sometimes
provided. Trip circuits should be continuously supervised.
d. It is desirable that the main and back-up protections (or duplicate main
protections) should operate on different principles, so that unusual events that
may cause failure of the one will be less likely to affect the other.

 
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Definitions and Terminology

   1. All-or-nothing relay
A relay which is not designed to have any specified accuracy as to its operating value.

  2.     Auxiliary relay.

An all-or-nothing relay used to supplement the performance of another relay, by modifying
contact performance for example, or by introducing time delays.

  3. Back-up protection.
A protective system intended to supplement the main protection in case the latter should be
in-effective, or to deal with faults in those parts of the power system that are not readily
included in the operating zones of the main protection.

  4. Biased relay.
A relay in which the characteristics are modified by the introduction of some quantity other
than the actuating quantity, and which is usually in opposition to the actuating quantity.

  5. Burden.
The loading imposed by the circuits of the relay on the energizing power source or sources,
expressed as the product of voltage and current (volt-amperes, or watts if D.C) for a given
condition, which may be either at 'setting' or at rated current or voltage.

The rated output of measuring transformers, expressed in VA, is always at rated current or
voltage and it is important, in assessing the burden imposed by a relay, to ensure that the
value of burden at rated current is used.

  6. Characteristic angle.
The phase angle at which the performance of the relay is declared. It is usually the angle at
which maximum sensitivity occurs.

7. Characteristic curve.
The curve showing the operating value of the characteristic quantity corresponding to
various values or combinations of the energizing quantities.

  8. Characteristic quantity.
A quantity, the value of which characterizes the operation of the relay, e.g. current for an
over current relay, voltage for a voltage relay, phase angle for a directional relay, time for
an independent time delay relay, impedance for an impedance relay.

  9. Characteristic impedance ratio (C.I. R.)

The maximum value of the System Impedance Ratio up to which the relay performance
remains within the prescribed limits of accuracy.
 
  10. Check protective system.
An auxiliary protective system intended to prevent tripping due to inadvertent operation of
the main protective system.

  11. Conjunctive test.

A test on a protective system including all relevant components and ancillary equipment
appropriately interconnected. The test may be parametric or specific.

     a. Parametric conjunctive test.

A test to ascertain the range of values that may be assigned to each parameter when considered
in combination with other parameters, while still complying with the relevant performance
requirements.

    b. Specific conjunctive test.

A test to prove the performance for a particular application, for which definite values are
assigned to each of the parameters.

  12. Dependent time delay relay.

A time delay relay in which the time delay varies with the value of the energizing quantity.

  13. Discrimination.
The quality whereby a protective system distinguishes between those conditions for which it
is intended to operate and those for which it shall not operate.

14. Drop-out.
A relay drops out when it moves from the energized position to the un-energized position.

15. Drop-out / pick ratio.

The ratio of the limiting values of the characteristic quantity at which the relay resets and
operates. This value is sometimes called the differential of the relay.

16. Earth fault protective system.

A protective system which is designed to respond only to faults to earth.

17. Earthing transformer.

A three-phase transformer intended essentially to provide a neutral point to a power system
for the purpose of Earthing.

  18. Effective range

The range of values of the characteristic quantity or quantities, or of the energizing quantities to
which the relay will respond and satisfy the requirements concerning it, in particular those
concerning precision.
 
19. Effective setting
The 'setting' of a protective system including the effects of current transformers. The effective
setting can be expressed in terms of primary current or secondary current from the current
transformers and is so designated as appropriate.
 
20. Electrical relay
A device designed to produce sudden predetermined changes in one or more electrical
circuits after the appearance of certain conditions in the electrical circuit or circuits
controlling it.
NOTE: The term 'relay' includes all the ancillary equipment calibrated with the device.
 
21. Energizing quantity.
The electrical quantity, either current or voltage, which alone or in combination with other
energizing quantities, must be applied to the relay to cause it to function.
 
  22. Independent time delay relay.
A time delay relay in which the time delay is independent of the energizing quantity.
 
  21. Instantaneous relay.
A relay which operates and resets with no intentional time delay.
NOTE: All relays require some time to operate; it is possible, within the above definition,
to discuss the operating time characteristics of an instantaneous relay.

  22. Inverse time delay relay.

A dependent time delay relay having an operating time which is an inverse function of the
electrical characteristic quantity.
 
23. Inverse time delay relay with definite minimum (I.D. M . T.)
A relay in which the time delay varies inversely with the characteristic quantity up to a
certain value, after which the time delay becomes substantially independent.

24. Knee-point e.m.f.

That sinusoidal e.m.f. applied to the secondary terminals of a current transformer, which,
when increased by 10 %, causes the exciting current to increase by 50%.

25. Main protection.

The protective system which is normally expected to operate in response to a fault in the
protected zone.
 
26. Measuring relay.
A relay intended to operate with a specified accuracy at one or more values of its
characteristic quantity.

27. Notching relay.

A relay which switches in response to a specific number of applied impulses.

28. Operating time.

With a relay de-energized and in its initial condition, the time which elapses between the
application of a characteristic quantity and the instant when the relay operates.

29. Operating time characteristic.

The curve depicting the relationship between different values of the characteristic quantity
applied to a relay and the corresponding values of operating time.

30. Operating value.

The limiting value of the characteristic quantity at which the relay actually operates.

31. Overshoot time.

The extent to which the condition that leads to final operation is advanced after the removal
of the energizing quantity, expressed as time at the rate of progress of the said condition
appropriate to the value of the energizing quantity that was initially applied.

32. Pick-up.
A relay is said to 'pick-up' when it changes from the un-energized position to the energized
position.

33. Pilot channel.

A means of interconnection between relaying points for the purpose of protection.

34. Protected zone.

The portion of a power system protected by a given protective system or a part of that
protective system.

35. Protective gear.

The apparatus, including protective relays, trans-formers and ancillary equipment, for use in
a protective system.

36. Protective relay.

A relay designed to initiate disconnection of a part of an electrical installation or to operate
a warning signal, in the case of a fault or other abnormal condition in the installation. A
protective relay may include more than one unit electrical relay and accessories.

37. Protective scheme.

The coordinated arrangements for the protection of one or more elements of a power
system.
A protective scheme may comprise several protective systems.

38. Protective system.

A combination of protective gear designed to secure, under predetermined conditions,
usually abnormal, the disconnection of an element of a power system, or to give an alarm
signal, or both.

39. Rating.
The nominal value of an energizing quantity which appears in the designation of a relay.
The nominal value usually corresponds to the CT and VT secondary ratings.

40. Resetting value.

The limiting value of the characteristic quantity at which the relay returns to its initial
position.

41. Residua/ current.

The algebraic sum, in a multi-phase system, of all the line currents.

42. Residua/ voltage.

The algebraic sum, in a multi-phase system, of all the line-to-earth voltages.

43. Setting.
The limiting value of a 'characteristic' or 'energizing' quantity at which the relay is designed
to operate under specified conditions.
Such values are usually marked on the relay and may be expressed as direct values,
percentages of rated values, or multiples.

44. Stability.
The quality whereby a protective system remains inoperative under all conditions other than
those for which it is specifically designed to operate.

45. Stability limits.

The R.M.S. value of the symmetrical component of the through fault current up to which the
protective system remains stable.
 
46. Starting relay.
A unit relay which responds to abnormal conditions and initiates the operation of other
elements of the protective system.

47. System impedance ratio (S./.R.).

The ratio of the power system source impedance to the impedance of the protected zone.

48. Through fault current.

The current flowing through a protected zone to a fault beyond that zone.
 
  49. Time delay.
A delay intentionally introduced into the operation of a relay system.

  50. Time delay relay.

A relay having an intentional delaying device.

  51. Unit electrical relay.

A single relay which can be used alone or in combinations with others.
 
52. Unit protection.
A protection system which is designed to operate only for abnormal conditions within a
clearly defined zone of the power system.
 
53. Unrestricted protection.
A protection system which has no clearly defined zone of operation and which achieves
selective operation only by time grading.

       Fault Definitions and:

For the purpose of this International Standard, the following definitions, some of them
based on IEC 60050(191), IEC 60050(212) and
IEC 60050(604) apply:
 
1- Fault
An unplanned occurrence or defect in an item which may result in one or more failures
of the item itself or of other associated equipment
[IEC 604-02-011
NOTE - In electrical equipment, a fault may or may not result in damage to the
insulation and failure of the equipment.
 
2- Non-damage fault
A fault which does not involve repair or replacement action at the point of the fault
NOTE - Typical examples are self-extinguishing arcs in switching equipment or general
overheating without paper carbonization.
[IEC 604-02-091
 
3- Damage fault
A fault which involves repair or replacement action at the point of the fault
[IEC 604-02-08, modified]
 
4- Incident
An event related to an internal fault which temporarily or permanently disturbs the normal
operation of an equipment [IEV 604-02-03, modified]
NOTE - Typical examples are gas alarms, equipment tripping or equipment leakage.
 
5- Failure
The termination of the ability of an item to perform a required function [IEC 191-04-01]
 
NOTE - In the electrical equipment, failure will result from a damage fault or incident
necessitating outage, repair or replacement of the equipment, such as internal
breakdown, rupture of tank, fire or explosion.
 
6- Electrical fault
a partial or disruptive discharge through the insulation.
 
7- Partial discharge
A discharge which only partially bridges the insulation between conductors. It may
occur inside the insulation or adjacent to a conductor
[IEC 212-01-34, modified]
 
NOTE 1 - Corona is a form of partial discharge that occurs in gaseous media around
conductors which are remote from solid or liquid insulation. This term is not to be used
as a general term for all forms of partial discharges.
 
NOTE 2 - X-wax is a solid material which is formed from mineral insulating oil as a
result of electrical discharges and which consists of polymerized fragments of the
molecules of the original liquid
[IEV 212-07-24, modified].
Comparable products may be formed from other liquids under similar conditions.
 
NOTE 3 - Sparking of low energy, for example because of metals or floating potentials,
is sometimes described as
Partial discharge but should rather be considered as a discharge of low energy.
 
8- Discharge (disruptive) .
The passage of an arc following the breakdown of the insulation
 [IEC 604-03-38, modified]
 
NOTE 1 - Discharges are often described as arcing, breakdown or short circuits.
The more specific following terms are also used:
- spark over (discharge through the oil);
- puncture (discharge through the solid insulation);
- Flashover (discharge at the surface of the solid insulation);
- tracking (the progressive degradation of the surface of solid insulation
   by local
  Discharges to form conducting or partially conducting paths);
- sparking discharges which, in the conventions of physics, are local
  Dielectric breakdowns of high ionization density or small arcs.
 
NOTE 2 - Depending on the amount of energy contained in the discharge, it will be
described as a discharge of low or high energy, based on the extent of damage observed
on the equipment .
 
9- Thermal fault
Excessive temperature rise in the insulation
 
NOTE - Typical causes are
- Insufficient cooling,
- Excessive currents circulating in adjacent metal parts (as a result of bad
  Contacts, eddy currents, stray losses or leakage flux),
- Excessive currents circulating through the insulation (as a result of high
  Dielectric losses), leading to a thermal runaway,
- overheating of internal winding or bushing connection lead.
 
10- Typical values of gas concentrations.
gas concentrations normally found in the equipment in service which have no symptoms
of failure, and which are over passed by only an arbitrary percentage of higher gas
contents, for example 10 % .
 
NOTE 1 - Typical values will differ in different types of equipment and in different
networks, depending on operating practices (load levels, climate, etc.).
 
NOTE 2 - Typical values, in many countries and by many users, are quoted as "normal
values", but this term has not been used here to avoid possible misinterpretations.
 
 LIST OF DEVICE NUMBERS
        2 Time delay starting or closing relay.
        3 Checking or interlocking relay
        21 Distance relay
        25 Synchronizing or synchronism check relay
        27 Under voltage relay
        30 Annunciator relay
        32 Directional power relay
        37 Undercurrent or under power relay
        40 Field failure relay
        46 Reverse phase or phase balance current relay
        49 Machine or transformer thermal relay
        50 Instantaneous over current or rate-of-rise relay
        51 A.c. time over current relay
        52 A.c. circuit breaker
        52a Circuit breaker auxiliary switch—normally open
        52b Circuit breaker auxiliary switch—normally closed
        55 Power factor relay
        56 Field_application relay
        59 Over voltage relay
        60 Voltage or current balance relay
        64 Earth fault protective relay
        67 A.c. directional over current relay
        68 Blocking relay
        74 Alarm relay
        76 D.c. over current relay
        78 Phase angle measuring or out-of-step protective relay
        79 A.c. reclosing relay
        81 Frequency relay
        83 Automatic selective control or transfer relay
         85 Carrier or pilot wire receive relay
        86 Locking-out relay
        87 Differential protective relay
        94 auxiliary tripping relay
 
 For Detail about LIST OF DEVICE NUMBERS
Click Here
 
  Previous Next  

     Relay contact systems

       Relay contact systems

 a.     Self-reset.
The contacts remain operated only while the controlling quantity is applied,
returning to their original condition when it is removed.
 
 b.     Hand or electrical reset.
These contacts remain in the operated position after the controlling quantity is
removed. They can be reset either by hand or by an auxiliary electromagnetic element.
 The majority of protective relay elements have self-reset contact systems, which,
if it is so desired, can be made to give hand reset output contacts by the use of auxiliary
elements.
Hand or electrically reset relays are used when it is necessary to maintain a signal
or a lock-out condition. Contacts are shown on diagrams in the position corresponding to
the un-operated or de-energized condition regardless of the continuous service condition
of the equipment. For example, a voltage supervising relay, which is continually picked-
up, would still be shown in the de-energized condition.
 A 'make' contact is one that closes when the relay picks up, whereas a 'break'
contact is one that is closed when the relay is un-energized and opens when the relay
picks up. Examples of these conventions and variations are shown in Figure 6.
 
 
Figure 6 indications of contacts on diagrams.
 
A protective relay is usually required to trip a circuit breaker, the tripping
mechanism of which may be a solenoid with a plunger acting directly on the mechanism
latch or, in the case of air-blast or pneumatically operated breakers, an electrically
operated valve. The relay may energize the tripping coil directly, or, according to the coil
rating, and the number of circuits to be energized, may do so through the agency of
another multi-channel auxiliary relay.
The power required by the trip coil of the circuit breaker may range from up to 50
watts, for a small 'distribution' circuit breaker, to 3000 watts for a large extra-high-voltage
circuit breaker.
The basic trip circuit is simple, being made up of a hand-trip control switch and the
contacts of the protective relays in parallel to energize the trip coil from a battery, through
a normally open auxiliary switch operated by the circuit breaker. This auxiliary switch is
needed to open the trip circuit when the circuit breaker opens, since the protective relay
contacts will usually be quite incapable of performing the interrupting duty. The auxiliary
switch will be adjusted to close as early as possible in the closing stroke, to make the
protection effective in case the breaker is being closed on to a fault.
 
Protective relays are precise measuring devices, the contacts of which should not
be expected to perform large making and breaking duties. Attracted armature relays,
which combine many of the characteristics of measuring devices and contactors,
Occupy an intermediate position and according to their design and consequent
closeness to one or other category, may have an appreciable contact capacity.
Most other types of relay develop an effort which is independent of the position of
the moving system.
At setting, the electromechanical effort is absorbed by the controlling force, the
margin for operating the contacts being negligibly small. Not only does this limit the
'making' capacity of the contacts, but if more than one contact pair is fitted any slight
misalignment may result in only one contact being closed at the minimum operating
value, there being insufficient force to compress the spring of the first contact to make,
by the small amount required to permit closure of the second.
For this reason, the provision of multiple contacts on such elements is undesirable.
Although two contacts can be fitted, care must be taken in their alignment, and a small
tolerance in the closing value of operating current may have to be allowed between them.
These effects can be reduced by providing a small amount of 'run-in' to contact make in
the relay behavior, by special shaping of the active parts.
For the above reasons it is often better to use inter-posing contactor type elements
which do not have the same limitations, although some measuring relay elements are
capable of tripping the smaller types of circuit breaker directly. These may be small
attracted armature type elements fitted in the same case as the measuring relay.
In general, static relays have discrete measuring and tripping circuits, or modules.
The functioning of the measuring modules will not react on the tripping modules. Such a
relay is equivalent to a sensitive electromechanical relay with a tripping contactor, so that
the number or rating of outputs has no more significance than the fact that they have been
provided.
For larger switchgear installations the tripping power requirement of each circuit
breaker is considerable, and, further, two or more breakers may have to be tripped by one
protective system.
There may also be remote signaling requirements, interlocking with other
functions (for example auto-reclosing arrangements), and other control functions to be
performed. These various operations are carried out by multi-contact tripping relays,
which are energized by the protection relays and provide the necessary number of
adequately rated output contacts.
      Operation indicators.
As a guide for power system operation staff, protective systems are invariably
provided with indicating devices. In British practice these are called 'flags', whereas in
America they are known as 'targets'. Not every component relay will have one, as
indicators are arranged to operate only if a trip operation is initiated. Indicators, with very
few exceptions, are bi-stable devices, and may be either mechanically or electrically
operated. A mechanical indicator consists of a small shutter which is
Released by the protective relay movement to expose the indicator pattern, which,
on GEC Measurements relays, consists of a red diagonal stripe on a white background.
Electrical indicators may be simple attracted armature elements either with or
without contacts. Operation of the armature releases a shutter to expose an indicator as
above.
An alternative type consists of a small cylindrical permanent magnet magnetized
across a diameter, and lying between the poles of an electromagnet. The magnet, which is
free to rotate, lines up its magnetic axis with the electromagnet poles, but can be made to
reverse its orientation by the application of a field. The edge of the magnet is colored to
give the indication.
 
     Relay tripping circuits.
Auxiliary contactors can be used to supplement protective relays in a number of ways:
   a.       Series sealing.
   b.       Shunt reinforcing.
   c.        Shunt reinforcement with sealing. These are illustrated   in
          Figure 7.
When such auxiliary elements are fitted, they can conveniently carry the operation
indicator, avoiding the need for indicators on the measuring elements.
Electrically operated indicators avoid imposing an additional friction load on the
measuring element, which would be a serious handicap for certain types. Another
advantage is that the indicator can operate only after the main contacts have closed.
 
Figure 7 Typical relay tripping circuits.
                                                                                      

 With indicators operated directly by the measuring elements, care must be taken to line
up their operation with the closure of the main contacts. The indicator must have operated
by the time the contacts make, but must not have done so more than marginally earlier.

This is to stop indication occurring when the tripping operation has not been
completed.
 
Ta.     Series sealing.
The coil of the series contactor carries the trip current initiated by the protective
relay, and the contactor closes a contact in parallel with the   protective relay contact.
This closure relieves the protective relay contact of further duty and keeps the tripping
circuit securely closed, even if chatter occurs at the main contact. Nothing is added to the
total tripping time, and the indicator does not operate until current is actually flowing
through the trip coil.
The main disadvantage of this method is that such series elements must have their
coils matched with the trip circuit with which they are associated.
The coils of these contactors must be of low impedance, with about
5 % of the trip supply voltage being dropped across them.
When used in association with high speed trip relays, which usually interrupt their own
coil current, the auxiliary elements must be fast enough to operate and release the flag
before their coil current is cut off.
This may pose a problem in design if a variable number of auxiliary elements (for
different phases and so on) may be required to operate in parallel to energize a common
tripping relay.
 
  b.     Shunt reinforcing.
 Here the sensitive contacts are arranged to trip the circuit breaker and
simultaneously to energize the auxiliary unit, which then reinforces the contact which is
energizing the trip coil.
It should be noted that two contacts are required on the protective relay, since it is
not permissible to energize the trip coil and the reinforcing contactor in parallel. If this
were done, and more than one protective relay were connected to trip the same circuit
breaker, all the auxiliary relays would be energized in parallel for each relay operation
and the indication would be confused. The duplicate main contacts are frequently
provided
As a three point arrangement to reduce the number of contact fingers.
 

Figure 8 Examples of trip circuit supervision.

 
  c.      Shunt reinforcement with sealing.
This is a development of the shunt reinforcing circuit to make it applicable to
relays with low torque movements or where there is a possibility of contact bounce for
any other reason.
Using the shunt reinforcing system under these circumstances would result in
chattering on the auxiliary unit, and the possible burning out of the contacts not only of
the sensitive element but also of the auxiliary unit. The chattering would only end when
the circuit breaker had finally tripped.
It will be seen that the effect of bounce is countered by means of a further contact
on the auxiliary unit connected as a retaining contact.
This means that provision must be made for releasing the sealing circuit when
tripping is complete; this is a disadvantage, because it is sometimes in-convenient to find
a suitable contact to use for this purpose.
 
     Supervision of   trip circuits.
The trip circuit extends beyond the relay enclosure and passes through more
components, such as fuses, links, relay contacts, auxiliary switch contacts and so on, and
in some cases through a considerable amount of circuit wiring with intermediate terminal
boards.
These complications, coupled with the importance of the circuit, have directed
attention to its supervision.
The simplest arrangement contains a healthy trip lamp, as shown in Figure 8(a).
The resistance in series with the lamp prevents the breaker being tripped by an
internal short circuit caused by failure of the lamp. This provides super-vision while the
circuit breaker is closed; a simple extension gives pre-closing supervision.
Figure 1.8(b) shows how, by the addition of a normally closed auxiliary switch
and a resistance unit, supervision can be obtained while the breaker is both open and
closed.
I n either case, the addition of a normally open push-button contact in series with
the lamp will make the supervision indication available only when required.
Schemes using a lamp to indicate continuity are suitable for locally controlled
installations, but when control is exercised from a distance it is necessary to use a relay
system. Figure 8(c) illustrates such a scheme, which is applicable wherever a remote
signal is required.
With the circuit healthy either or both of relays A and B are operated and energize relay
C. Both A and B must reset to allow C to drop-off. Relays A and C are time-delayed by
copper slugs to prevent spurious alarms during tripping or closing operations. The
resistors are mounted separately from the relays and their values are chosen such that if
any one component is inadvertently short-circuited, a tripping operation will not take
place.
The alarm supply should be independent of the tripping supply so that indication will be
obtained in the event of the failure of the tripping battery.
  Previous Next  

Classification and function of relays

A protection relay is a device that senses any change in the signal which it is receiving, usually
from a current and/or voltage source. If the magnitude of the incoming signal is outside a preset
range, the relay will operate, generally to close or open electrical contacts to initiate some further
operation, for example the tripping of a circuit breaker.
3.1 Classification:
Protection relays can be classified in accordance with the function which they carry out, their
construction, the incoming signal and the type of functioning.

3.1.1 General function:

   Auxiliary.
   Protection.
   Monitoring.
   Control.

 3.1.2 Construction:
   Electromagnetic.
   Solid state.
   Microprocessor.
   Computerized.
   Nonelectric (thermal, pressure ......etc.).
 
3.1.3 Incoming signal:
   Current.
   Voltage.
   Frequency.
 Temperature.
 Pressure.
 Velocity.
 Others.
3.1.4 Type of protection
   Over current.
   Directional over current.
   Distance.
   Over voltage.
   Differential.
   Reverse power.
   Other.
 Figure 1 Armature-type relay
In some cases a letter is added to the number associated with the protection in order to
specify its place of location, for example G for generator, Τ for transformer etc.
Nonelectric relays are outside the scope of this book and therefore are not referred to.

3.2 Electromagnetic relays

Electromagnetic relays are constructed with electrical, magnetic and mechanical
components, have an operating coil and various contacts and are very robust and
reliable. The construction characteristics can be classified in three groups, as detailed
below.

3 . 2 . 1 Attraction relays
Attraction relays can be supplied by AC or DC, and operate by the movement of
a piece of metal when it is attracted by the magnetic field produced by a coil. There are
two main types of relay in this class.
The attracted armature relay, which is shown in figure 1, consists of a bar or plate
of metal which pivots when it is attr acted towards the coil.
The armature carries the moving part of the contact, which is closed or opened
according to the design when the armature is attracted to the coil. The other type is the piston
or solenoid relay, illustrated in Figure 2, in which α bar or piston is attracted axially within the
field of the solenoid. In this case, the piston also carries the operating contacts.
It can be shown that the force of attraction is equal to K1I2 - K2, where Κ1 depends upon the
number of turns on the operating solenoid, the air gap, the effective area and the reluctance of
the magnetic circuit, among other factors. K2 is the restraining force, usually produced by a
spring. When the relay is balanced, the resultant force is zero and therefore Κ112 = K2,

So that   
I  K 2 / K 1 constant .
 In order to control the value at which the relay starts to operate, the restraining tension
of the spring or the resistance of the solenoid circuit can be varied, thus modifying the
restricting force. Attraction relays effectively have no time delay and, for that reason, are
widely used when instantaneous operations are required.

 3 . 2 . 2 Relays with moveable coils

This type of relay consists of a rotating movement with a small coil suspended or pivoted
with the freedom to rotate between the poles of a permanent magnet. The coil is restrained by
two springs which also serve as connections to carry the current to the coil.
The torque produced in the coil is given by:

T = B.l.a.N.i

Where:

  T= torque
B = flux density
L =length of the coil
a = diameter of the coil
N = number of turns on the coil
  i = current flowing through the coil

Figure 2 Solenoid-type relay

 
 Figure 3 Inverse time characteristic
From the above equation it will be noted that the torque developed is proportional to the
current. The speed of movement is controlled by the damping action, which is proportional to
the torque. It thus follows that the relay has an inverse time characteristic similar to that
illustrated in Figure 3. The relay can be designed so that the coil makes a large angular
movement, for example 80º.

3 . 2 . 3 Induction relays
An induction relay works only with alternating current. It consists of an electromagnetic system
which operates on a moving conductor, generally in the form of a disc or cup, and functions
through the interaction of electromagnetic fluxes with the parasitic Fault currents which are
induced in the rotor by these fluxes. These two fluxes, which are mutually displaced both in
angle and in position, produce a torque that can be expressed by

T= Κ1.Φ1.Φ2 .sin θ,

Where Φ1 and Φ2 are the interacting fluxes and θ is the phase angle between Φ1 and Φ2. It
should be noted that the torque is a maximum when the fluxes are out of phase by 90º, and
zero when they are in phase.

Figure 4 Electromagnetic forces in induction

 relays
It can be shown that Φ1= Φ1sin ωt, and Φ2= Φ2 sin (ωt+ θ ) , where θ is the angle by
which Φ2 leads Φ1. Then:
 

d1
i1   1 cos t
dt
And
 
d 1
i 1    1 cos ( t   )
dt
Figure 4 shows the interrelationship between the currents and the opposing forces. Thus:

F = ( F 1 - F 2 ) α (Φ2 iΦ1+ Φ1 iΦ2 )

     F α Φ2 Φ1 sin θ α T

Induction relays can be grouped into three classes as set out below.

        Shaded-pole relay

In this case a portion of the electromagnetic section is short-circuited by means of a
copper ring or coil. This creates a flux in the area influenced by the short circuited section
(the so-called shaded section) which lags the flux in the nonshaded section, see Figure 5.

Figure 5 Shaded-pole relay

Figure 6 Wattmetric-type relay
In its more common form, this type of relay uses an arrangement of coils above and below the disc
with the upper and lower coils fed by different values or, in some cases, with just one supply for the
top coil, which induces an out-of-phase flux in the lower coil because of the air gap. Figure 6
illust r ates a typical arrangement.

        Cup-type relay

This type of relay has a cylinder similar to a cu which can rotate in the annular air gap between the
poles of the coils, and has a fixed central core, see Figure 7. The operation of this relay is very
similar to that

Figure 7Cup-type relay

Of an induction motor with salient poles for the windings of the stator. Configurations with
four or eight poles spaced symmetrically around the circumference of the cup are often used.
The movement of the cylinder is limited to a small amount by the contact and the stops. Α
special spring provides the restraining torque.

The torque is a function of the product of the two currents through the coils and the cosine
of the angle between them. The torque equation is

T= ( KI1I2 cos (θ12 – Φ) – Ks ),

Where K, .Κs and Φ are design constants, Ι1 and I2 are the currents through the two coils
and θ12 is the angle between I1 and I2.

In the first two types of relay mentioned above, which are provided with a disc, the inertia
of the disc provides the time-delay characteristic. The time delay can be increased by the
addition of a permanent magnet. The cup-type relay has a small inertia and is therefore
principally used when high speed operation is required, for example in instantaneous units.
  Previous