High Court at Nairobi
High Court at Nairobi
High Court at Nairobi
i.
The plaintiff did on various dates in the year 2011, develop a cash
advance service which would be operated on the mobile telephony platform
and where its clients would be able to apply for, receive and, make payments
through the mobile phone network operated by a mobile phone service
provider.
ii.
The distinct features of the product were that it would target customers
would have to be subscribed to a mobile phone network and who would on
their mobile phone handsets accessa provided interface which would be
reduced into a menu and on which they would apply for and receive the cash
advance for an agreed consideration from the plaintiff.
iii. The plaintiff is already using this product in partnership with the Airtel
Networks Kenya Limited under the bank name KipaChapaa cash advance
services and which has been approved for offering to the public as a money
product, by the Central Bank of Kenya.
iv.
The plaintiff proposed to the defendant to partner with it in offering the
same product on its mobile phone network and on its money transactions
functionality being the Mpesa platform and presented thereby a concept
paper that incorporated the detail and information on the cash advance
product.
v.
The plaintiff further executed a non-disclosure agreement with the
defendant to restrain either party from disclosing any information on the
plaintiffs cash advance product and related information, to any third party
and/or using such information to compete or obtain any competitive or other
advantage over the other party.
vi.
The plaintiff states that the defendant in breach of the terms of the
non-disclosure agreement aforesaid and in breach of the plaintiffs
confidence and further in contravention of the plaintiffs trade secrets and
copyright, has now presented a similar product called M-Shwari and offered it
to its customers, purporting it to be its own.
vii. The Defendants actions are most injurious to the plaintiff and unless
restrained by an order of this court, the plaintiff will suffer irreparable loss
and damage to the integrity and value of its products which will stand to lose
its commercial viability.
viii. This honourbale court has jurisdiction to make the orders sought.
ix.
The plaintiffs suit has a high probability of success on a prima facie
basis.
x.
In view of the foregoing, it is in the interest of justice and fairness that
the prayers sought herein are allowed.
High Court at Nairobi (Milimani Commercial Courts)
Civil Case 258 of 2012
RHODA ONDENG WILHELMSEN............PLAINTIFF
VERSUS
DR. SARAH A. CHUCHU............................................................DEFENDANT
under various trademark provisions, or under the tort of passing of, but
could a company's name be protected under copyright?
The case which dealt with this question was Exxon Corporation v Exxon
Insurance Consultants International Ltd back in 1982. The case
concerned the name "Exxon" used by the well-known fuel company. The
name was registered as a trademark by the company, which formerly traded
under the name Standard Oil (also Esso in other countries); of which a
passing off claim was also put forth in the proceedings. Although the
question of passing off was of full relevance in the case, of interest in this
particular case is the fact whether the name "Exxon" would be a literary work
under the then in-force UK Copyright Act 1956 or not. Subsequently Exxon
Corporation sued Exxon Insurance Consultants International for copyright
infringement and passing off for the use of the word Exxon in theirs.
"Exxon" had been fully created by the company, being a word not existing
prior to its creation in the English language. Evidence was put forth as to its
careful creation and selection in this process through a large time,
expenditure and labor investment in the word's creation, potentially
indicating it is an original literary work within the Act. At first instance Justice
Graham rejected Exxon's argument as to the word being a literary work, on
the basis that "[i]t is a word which, though invented and therefore
original, has no meaning and suggests nothing in itself. To give it
substance and meaning, it must be accompanied by other words or
used in a particular context or juxtaposition"; a position which the
Court of Appeal fully accepted.
The latter court did accept that the word was indeed original and originated
from an author, due to the effort and research that was put into the creation
of the word. Several cases were brought before the court in argument over
both sides; however the Court particularly used the case of Hollinrake v
Truswell in its considerations. In the case Lord Justice Davey set out what in
his mind a literary work means: "...a literary work is intended to afford
either information and instruction, or pleasure, in the form of
literary enjoyment", also mentioning a possible contribution to the stock of
human knowledge. Lord Justice Stephens, in the present case, fully accepted
this definition to be applicable under the Copyright Act 1956. The Court
decided on the basis of this that the word Exxon would not afford any
information or instruction, nor would it provide pleasure through literary
enjoyment by itself; therefore not being a literary work under the 1956 Act
and there was subsequently no infringement of copyright.
Clearly names are not afforded copyright protection by themselves, but they
could be protected should they be a part of a larger piece, such as being
mentioned in a book. That would not apply to the name in itself, but as a part
of the larger work itself. Arguably the proper route to protect names would
be under trademark or the tort of passing off, through which Exxon was
afforded relief in the aforementioned case. The line of argumentation by
Exxon was interesting, and goes to show just how flexible intellectual
property law could potentially be.