OBLICON - Contracts Case Digests

Download as docx, pdf, or txt
Download as docx, pdf, or txt
You are on page 1of 15

Pineda vs.

Heirs of Guevara
G.R. No. 143188/February 14, 2007
Tinga, J.:

FACTS:
The heirs of Guevara claimed that they were the co-owners of a property originally covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 386 issued in favor of the spouses Emiliano Guevara and Matilde Crimen.
The couple's son, and the Guevara heirs' predecessor-in-interest, Eliseo Guevara, purchased the
property in 1932 and had exercised ownership over the property since then by selling and donating
portions thereof to third persons. The sale of the property to Eliseo Guevara was annotated at the back of
OCT No. 386.
According to the Guevara heirs, the defendants illegally claimed ownership and possession over a certain
portion of the property. The defendants obtained title over that area in the form of Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 223361 issued to the estate of Pedro C. Gonzales.
TCT No. 223361 was derived from OCT No. 629, which the Guevara heirs described as fake, having
been issued only on January 26, 1912 or subsequent to the issuance of OCT No. 386 which was issued
on December 7, 1910.
On September 7, 1995, The heirs of Guevara filed an action in the RTC for the nullification of OCT No.
629 and its derivative titles, to wit, TCT Nos. 223361, 244447, 244448, 244449, and prayed that the
Guevara heirs be declared owners of the property and that a new certificate of title be issued in their
names.
Defendant Florentino Pineda filed an answer raising the defenses of lack of cause of action, prescription,
laches and estoppel. He averred that he was a buyer in good faith and had been in actual possession of
the land since 1970 initially as a lessor and subsequently as an owner. He registered the property in his
name and was issued TCT No. 257272.
The rest of the defendants also filed their respective answers, raising the same defenses of laches and
prescription and res judicata.
The RTC issued an Order dismissing the action of the Guevera heirs on the ground of laches. The Court
of Appeals (CA) set aside the RTC's order of dismissal and directed the reinstatement of the case. The
CA ruled that a complaint cannot be dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1of the Rules of Court based on
laches since laches is not one of the grounds enumerated under said provision.
Pineda filed a motion for reconsideration where he asserted that laches is analogous to prescription and,
therefore, can be a ground of dismissing a complaint as though a motion to dismiss is filed. Pineda also
raised the objection of improper appeal since he asserted that the existence of laches raises a pure a
question of law, thus, more properly raised with the Supreme Court via Rule 45 instead of with the Court
of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals denied Pineda's motion for reconsideration. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint against Pineda can be dismissed due to laches.

RULING:
Well-settled is the rule that the elements of laches must be proved positively. Laches is evidentiary in
naturewhich could not be established by mere allegations in the pleadings and can not be resolved in a
motion to dismiss. At this stage therefore, the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of laches is
premature. Those issues must be resolved at the trial of the case on the merits wherein both parties will
be given ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and defenses.
While the trial court correctly set the case for hearing as though a motion to dismiss had been filed, the
records do not reveal that it extended to the parties the opportunity to present evidence. For instance,
counsel for the heirs of Guevara filed and served written interrogatories on one of the defendants but the
trial court held in abeyance the resolution of the motion to order the defendant to submit answers to the
written interrogatories. The trial court likewise denied the Ex Parte Motion To Set Trial filed by the heirs of
Guevara. These were the instances which would have enabled the trial court to receive evidence on
which to anchor its factual findings.Although the trial court heard oral arguments and required the parties
to submit their respective memoranda, the presentation of evidence on the defenses which are grounds
for a motion to dismiss was not held at all. Otherwise, the oral arguments and memoranda submitted by
the parties would have enabled this Court to review the trial court's factual finding of laches instead of
remanding the case for trial on the merits.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals denying Pinedas motion for reconsideration and finding that the trial court incorrectly
ordered the dismissal of the complaint based on laches without conducting trial on the merits is therefore
affirmed.

Harold vs. Aliba


G.R. No. 130864/October 2, 2007
Quisumbing, J.:

FACTS:
Sometime in January 1993, Maria L. Harold engaged the services of respondent Agapito T. Aliba, a
geodetic engineer, to conduct a relocation survey and to execute a consolidation-subdivision of her
properties including that of her sister, Alice Laruan, located in Pico, La Trinidad, Benguet. After completing
his work, Aliba was paid P4,050 for his services, but he failed to return the certificates of title of the said
properties for more than one year, despite repeated demands to return them.
Sometime in January 1994, Aliba prevailed upon Harold and her husband to sign a document which was
supposedly needed to facilitate the consolidation-subdivision and the issuance of separate transfer
certificates of title over the properties. Harold and her husband signed the document without reading it.
Thereafter, on April 18, 1994, a truck loaded with G.I. sheets and construction materials came to the
subject lot owned by Harold.
It turned out that Aliba had sold the lot to a third person and the alleged deed of sale was the document
that Aliba caused Harold and her husband to sign in January 1994.
On several occasions, Aliba tried to convince Harold to accept the sum of P400,000 which was later on
increased to P500,000, as purchase price of the said lot. Harold agreed to accept the P500,000 from
Aliba but only as partial payment, considering that the lot has an aggregate value of P1,338,000. On the
same date, Harold was made to sign an acknowledgment receipt and other papers which were made to
appear that Harold accepted the sum of P480,000 as full and final payment for the lot.
The dispute between Harold and Aliba was referred to Punong Barangay Limson Ogas and the Lupong
Tagapamayapa. During the June 8, 1994 barangay conciliation proceedings, the parties agreed that Aliba
will pay an additional amount of P75,000 to the initial P500,000 Aliba had already given to Harold. In the
same proceedings, Aliba tendered P70,000 which was evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt signed
by the parties , attested to by the Lupon chairman, and witnessed by several barangay officials.
Aliba tendered the remaining P5,000 to Harold to complete their amicable settlement. Unfortunately,
Harold refused to accept the same, saying that P5,000 is not enough and insisted on the elevation of the
case to the court. Thus, a certification to file action was issued by the Office of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa.
Harold filed a Complaint against Aliba before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet.
The MTC issued an Order dismissing Harold's complaint. The court held that Mrs. Harold reneged on the
agreement, saying P75,000 is not enough, then insisted that the case be filed in court, but at the same
time refusing to return the P70,000, when defendant tried to collect it back. Consequently, the issuance of
the Certificate to File Action, is improper because no valid repudiation of the amicable settlement was
made.

On appeal, the RTC affirmed in toto the assailed Order of the MTC. The Court of Appeals denied the
appeal of Harold. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Harold is barred from pursuing her case against Aliba under the principle of
estoppels
RULING:
Under Article 1431 of the Civil Code, through estoppel, an admission or representation is
rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person
relying on it. Where a party, by his deed or conduct, has induced another to act in a particular manner,
estoppel effectively bars the former from adopting an inconsistent position, attitude or course of conduct
that causes loss or injury to the latter.
Harold expressly acknowledged that the offer made by Aliba to pay an additional P75,000 was
made in order for her to desist from pursuing her case against him. By reason of her unconditional
acceptance of the offer and the P70,000 tendered to her, Harold had already effectively waived whatever
claims she might have against Aliba regarding the subject lot. Moreover, she is likewise barred from
pursuing her case against Aliba under the principle of estoppel now.

Wherefore, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
denying Harolds appeal is hereby affirmed.

Vda. de Tirona v. Encarnacion


G.R. No. 168902/September 28, 2007
Nachura, J.:
FACTS:
Brothers Teodoro and Benjamin Tirona were co-owners of a tract of land consisting of 2 lots, Lots
965 and 966, which were apparently covered by only one Torrens Title. Teodoro Tirona, with the
conformity of his wife, petitioner Bartola, ceded to Cirilo Encarnacion, his one-half (1/2) undivided interest
in the said land. Upon execution of the Deed, respondent immediately took possession of one-half (1/2)
of the parcel of land. Encarnacion also occupied its other half by virtue of an Agreement with the other
brother, Benjamin. Eventually, Encarnacion became the owner of the entire property. After the death of
the Tironas, Cristina Dacanay, daughter of Teodoro, learned of the sale to Encarnacion. Dacanay alleged
that what was sold was her fathers share in Lot 965 only. Thus she and her relatives filed a suit for
forcible entry against Encarnacion over Lot 966. The CFI dismissed the complaint against Encarnacion on
procedural grounds. However, later on, Dacanay and her relatives were able to register the Lot 966 in
their name. Twenty years later, Dacanay and her relatives filed an accion publiciana over Lot 966.
ISSUE: Whether or not the equitable doctrine of laches defeats petitioners legal title over said Lot.
RULING:

We rule that albeit petitioners appear to be the legal owners of Lot. No. 966, they are barred from
recovering its possession by reason of laches. While jurisprudence is settled on the imprescriptibility and
indefeasibility of a Torrens title, there is equally an abundance of cases where we unequivocally ruled that
registered owners may lose their right to recover possession of property through the equitable principle of
laches. The elements of laches are present in the case. The first element is present. By filing the accion
publiciana, petitioners, in effect, restated their intent to recover possession of Lot No. 966, which is
currently occupied by respondent. For the second time, they try to assert ownership of the property by
virtue of TCT No. T-81513 which had been issued in their names sometime in 1976.

The second element is three-tiered. There must be: (a) knowledge of defendants action; (b)
opportunity to sue defendant after obtaining such knowledge; and (c) delay in the filing of such suit .
In the instant case, petitioners long inaction or passivity in asserting their rights over Lot No. 966
despite adequate knowledge of respondents adverse possession and sufficient opportunity to contest the
same inevitably precludes them from recovering the property. Their failure to take concrete action against
respondents possession of Lot No. 966 in a span of more than thirty (30) years militates against their
claim of ownership.

Extant in the records are pieces of evidence that speak for themselves.
In his testimony, petitioner Emiliano Tirona III bared that neither he nor his siblings who are in
the Philippines have changed their residence in Cavite while those in the U.S.A. come home to visit the
family once in a while. This fact notwithstanding, Emiliano affirmed that since 1975 up to the filing of
the accion publiciana in October 1995, they had done nothing by way of instituting any complaint or action
against respondent.
Emilianos sister and one of the petitioners, Cristina Dacanay, was more straightforward to admit
that the last time she saw and talked to Atty. Cortez was in 1973 and that not one of her ten siblings
followed up the appealed case.

Wherefore, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The November 28, 2003 Decision of
the Court of Appeals dismissing the complaint due to laches is hereby AFFIRMED.

Permanent Savings Bank vs. Velarde


G.R. No. 140608/September 23, 2004
Austria-Martinez, J.:
FACTS:
Permanent Savings and Loan Bank filed a complaint for sum of money against respondent
Mariano Velarde to to recover the sum of P1,000,000.00 plus accrued interests and penalties, based on a
loan obtained by Velarde from petitioner bank as evidenced by a promissory note dated September 28,
1983;
Petitioner bank, represented by its Deputy Liquidator after it was placed under liquidation, sent a letter of
demand to Velarde on July 27, 1988, demanding full payment of the loan. Despite receipt of said demand
letter, Velarde failed to settle his account. Another letter of demand was sent on February 22, 1994, and
this time, Velarde's counsel replied, stating that the obligation "is not actually existing but covered by
contemporaneous or subsequent agreement between the parties ..."
In his Answer, Velarde disclaims any liability on the instrument. After petitioner bank rested its case,
Velarde filed with leave of court his demurrer to evidence, alleging that the action under the Promissory
Note has prescribed.
The RTC, finding merit in Velarde's demurrer, dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that (1) petitioner bank failed to present any evidence to prove
the existence of Velarde's loan obligations, considering that Velarde denied petitioner's allegations in its
complaint, and (2) petitioner bank's cause of action is already barred by prescription.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Permanent Savings Banks claim is barred by prescription.
RULING:
Velarde's obligation under the promissory note became due and demandable on October 13,
1983. On July 27, 1988, petitioner's counsel made a written demand for petitioner to settle his obligation.
From the time respondent's obligation became due and demandable on October 13, 1983, up to the time
the demand was made, only 4 years, 9 months and 14 days had elapsed. The prescriptive period then
commenced anew when respondent received the demand letter on August 5, 1988. Thus, when petitioner
sent another demand letter on February 22, 1994, the action still had not yet prescribed as only 5 years, 6
months and 17 days had lapsed. While the records do not show when respondent received the second

demand letter, nevertheless, it is still apparent that petitioner had the right to institute the complaint on
September 14, 1994, as it was filed before the lapse of the ten-year prescriptive period.
Wherefore, the petition is Granted. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals in finding the cause of action of Permanent Savings Bank barred by prescription is Set Aside.

Cando vs. Sps. Olazo


G.R. 160741/March 22, 2007
Tinga, J.:
FACTS:
On 27 April 1987, the spouses Aurora and Claudio Olazo (respondents) mortgaged to Herminia
Cando (petitioner) a parcel of land with improvements to secure the payment of their P240,000 loan. The
real estate mortgage was embodied in a written instrument titled "Mortgage of Realty" wherein the parties
agreed that should the mortgagors fail to pay the loan within one (1) year from the date of the execution of
the document, the mortgage shall be foreclosed.
Alleging that respondents failed to pay their obligation within the prescribed period despite demands,
petitioner filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure of mortgage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on
16 February 1998.
Respondent spouses Olazo moved for the dismissal of the complaint, arguing that the action for
foreclosure of the mortgage has already prescribed, that petitioner is barred from filing the complaint
under the principle of laches, and that they have already paid the mortgage obligation.
The RTC dismissed the petitioner's action on the ground of prescription. It held that under Article 1142 of
the Civil Code "the action for foreclosure of mortgage prescribes after ten (10) years" and the Complaint
was filed on February 16, 1998 after the expiration of the said period.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed the appeal on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. It found that the issue raised in the appeal is a pure question of law, that is, what is the proper
computation of the ten (10) year prescriptive period for filing an action for foreclosure of mortgage.
Hence, the present petition for review under Rule 45. Petitioner posits that the ten (10) year period for
foreclosure of the mortgaged property must be counted from the time the stipulated one (1) year period
within which to pay the loan elapsed. Thus, it should be reckoned from 27 April 1988, and not 27 April
1987, or the date of the mortgage instrument.
ISSUE: Whether or not the mortgage action has already prescribed

RULING:
The trial court committed an appalling blunder when it ruled that an action for foreclosure of
mortgage prescribes after ten (10) years from the date of the mortgage contract. Under Article 1142 of the
Civil Code, a mortgage action prescribes after ten (10) years. Jurisprudence, however, has clarified this
rule by holding that a mortgage action prescribes after ten (10) years from the time the right of action
accrued, which is obviously not the same as the date of the mortgage contract. The right of action
accrues when the mortgagor defaults in the payment of his obligation to the mortgagee.
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition of Cando due to
prescription is Reversed and Set Aside. Let the case be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City for further proceedings with deliberate dispatch.

Ampeloquio, Sr. v. Napiza


G.R. No. 167071/October 31, 2006
Chico-Nazario, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Romeo Napiza, with 12 others, are the owners of a 23,030 square meter land in
Lucban, Quezon referred to as Lot No. 3424 with Tax Declaration No. 4675 (Palolang Malapit property).
They are also co-owners of another parcel of land known as Lot No. 3445 with Tax Declaration No. 4630
(Palolang Malayo property).
Andalicia Maderal, one of the co-owners, invited petitioner Rudy Ampeloquio, Sr., a real estate developer,
to her house where she, along with Luisa Maderal and respondent Napiza, discussed the development of
the Palolang Malapit property into a residential subdivision. It was agreed upon that the landowners would
retain 45% of the lot area while 55% would go to petitioner as developer. This agreement was put into
writing in an unnotarized handwritten instrument denominated as "Kasunduan sa Pagde-develop ng Lupa
na natatayo sa Palolang Malapit Lot No. 3424, Title No. P-10786" signed by Andalicia Maderal, Luisa
Maderal and respondent Romeo Napiza.
To facilitate the early development of the property identified as Lot No. 4685, petitioner Ampeloquio, Sr.
allegedly sought the help of respondent Napiza. They executed a written contract known as Assignment
of Rights dated September 11, 1981, whereby Napiza would persuade and induce his co-owners to agree
to the development of the property in consideration of which he shall be given 5% of the disposable
portion appertaining to petitioner's share as developer.
On October 20, 1981, Napiza was able to persuade his co-owners with the proposed development of the
PalolangMalapit property which culminated in the execution of an Extra-judicial Partition with Waiver by
the co-owners thereof. They further assigned their rights and interests over a 12,666 sqm portion of the
subject property to petitioner in consideration of the latter's services in the development and improvement
of said property.
On October 26, 1981, the co-owners and petitioner formalized the "Kasunduan sa Pagde-develop and
executed a notarized "Contract of Development" which reiterated the terms of the Kasunduan.
By way of commission, petitioner gave Napiza P20,000 together with a land title registered in petitioner's

name. No formal deed of conveyance, however, was executed in Napiza's favor.


Respondent Napiza made numerous demands, both verbal and written, for the settlement of petitioner's
undertaking under the Assignment of Rights. Petitioner denied having any unpaid obligation to
respondent. Napiza wrote Ampeloquio a Final Demand Letter dated March 2, 1995.
On June 22, 1995, Napiza filed a complaint for "Specific Performance" against petitioner before the RTC
alleging that he was entitled to 5% commission from petitioner which constituted 891.4 sqm portion of the
Palolang Malapit valued at P1,335,000.
Petitoner averred that the undertaking of Napiza under the Assignment of Rights was to convince his coowners to award to petitioner the development of the Palolang Malayo property, which respondent Napiza
failed to do, hence, the latter has no cause of action against him. He stressed that if it was really their
intention to make the Assignment of Rights apply to Palolang Malapit property, they should have
mentioned the same in the Contract of Development. Petitioner further proffered the defense of
prescription of action. The prescriptive period to enforce a written contract is 10 years. Since the
Assignment of Rights from which respondent based his claim was executed on 11 September 1981 and
the demand was made only on 2 March 1995, any action based on the assignment contract is barred by
prescription and/or laches.
The RTC ruled that Napiza's cause of action has not yet prescribed and that laches has not yet set in
against him. the RTC also held that the subject matter of the Assignment of Rights was not the Palolang
Malayo property but the Palolang Malapit property. Although the instrument mentioned Lot No. 4685,
respondent was able to explain that said number was a mere typographical error and it should be read as
Lot No. 4675 representing the Tax Declaration of the Palolang Malapit property. It also clarified that the
non-inclusion of the Assignment of Rights to the subsequent Contract of Development was due to the fact
that the former agreement was a secret one which must not be revealed to the other co-owners of the
Palolang Malapit property
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision and dismissed petitioner's appeal. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the the action of Napiza has already prescribed
RULING:

Actions based upon a written contract should be brought within 10 years from the time the right of
action accrues. This accrual refers to the cause of action, which is defined as the act or the omission by
which a party violates the right of another. The period of prescription commences not from the date of the
execution of the contract, but from the occurrence of the breach.
Prescription of actions, however, is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is
a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors and when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt
by the debtor. A written extrajudicial demand wipes out the period that has already elapsed and starts
anew the prescriptive period.
The ten-year period is to be reckoned not from the date of execution of the Assignment of Rights, i.e., on
11 September 1981, but only in March 1995 when petitioner in a Reply Letter categorically denied any
obligation to respondent and refused to make good his obligation thereby violating the latter's right to be
entitled to the commission as agreed by them. Thus, when respondent filed a complaint against petitioner
before the RTC on 22 June 1995, the former's action had not yet prescribed.
Wherefore, the petition is denied. The decision of the Court of Appeals finding that Napizas claim
has not prescribed yet is therefore Affirmed.

Spouses Borbe et. al., vs. Calalo


G.R. 152572/October 5, 2007
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.:
FACTS:
Rosita Lajarca-Borbe, petitioner, and Violeta Calalo, respondent, executed an agreement or "Kasunduan"
which provides that petitioner purchased a 400-square meter lot inherited by respondent Calalo from her
late husband Jose Palo. Petitioner shall pay P3,000 as down payment and the balance of P3,000 the
moment a new TCT shall have been issued in the name of respondent Calalo. The Kasunduan was also
signed by respondent's three children.
Petitioner later paid respondent Calalo in various amounts totaling P2,500, leaving an unpaid balance of
P500.
On September 22, 1982, or one year after the parties executed the Kasunduan, TCT No. T-51153 was
issued by the Register of Deeds of Lipa City in respondent Calalo's name.
After 13 years or in April 1995, petitioner spouses presented a prepared deed of sale in Filipino indicating
that respondent is selling to petitioners the subject lot covered by TCT No. T-51153 in her name. However,
respondent and her children refused to sign the document, asking a higher price for the lot.
As efforts to settle the dispute before the barangay authorities failed, petitioners, on August 15, 1995, filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Lipa City, a complaint for specific performance against
respondent.
The trial court found in favor of the petitioners and ordered the respondent to execute a deed of sale over
the property upon payment of P500 by the petitioner.
However, the the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and dismissed the action on the ground that it
was filed beyond the ten-year prescriptive period under Art. 1144(1) of the Civil Code. The period must be
counted from the day on which the action could have been instituted, or the legal possibility of bringing the
action. In the case of petitioner, that period should be computed from the date of the issuance of the TCT
No. T-51153 which was on September 22, 1982.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action of the Spouses Borbe has already prescribed
RULING:
Under the terms of the "Kasunduan," petitioners would pay the balance of P3,000 once the land
sold will be titled in the name of respondent. TCT No. T-51153 covering the subject lot was issued in
respondent's name on September 22, 1982. From this day, petitioners could have asked respondent to
accept the remaining balance of P500.00 and execute a new deed of sale in their favor.

Unfortunately, it was only in 1995 when petitioners attempted to pay the remaining balance of P500 And it
was only on August 15, 1995, or 13 years after the lot was registered in respondent's name, that
petitioners filed the complaint for specific performance. Clearly by then, petitioners' cause of action had
prescribed.

Petitioners contend that they filed the action only in 1995 because respondent did not inform them of the
issuance of TCT No. T-51153 in her name. We are not convinced. The issuance of TCT No. T-51153 on
September 22, 1982 was a constructive notice to the whole world that respondent has become the owner
of the lot described therein. Petitioners are thus barred from claiming that they were not notified thereof.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
reversing the trial courts judgement and dismissing the complaint due to prescription is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

You might also like