9 People v. Corral, 62 Phil. 945 (1936)
9 People v. Corral, 62 Phil. 945 (1936)
9 People v. Corral, 62 Phil. 945 (1936)
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-42300
It is undisputed that appellant was sentenced by final judgment of this court promulgated on March
3, 1910,1 to suffer eight years and one day of presidio mayor. No evidence was presented to show
that prior to June 5, 1934, he had been granted a plenary pardon. It is likewise undisputed that at the
general elections held on June 5, 1934, the voted in election precinct No. 18 of the municipality of
Davao, Province of Davao.
The modern conception of the suffrage is that voting is a function of government. The right to vote is
not a natural right but is a right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege granted by the State to such
persons or classes as are most likely to exercise it for the public good. In the early stages of the
evolution of the representative system of government, the exercise of the right of suffrage was
limited to a small portion of the inhabitants. But with the spread of democratic ideas, the enjoyment
of the franchise in the modern states has come to embrace the mass of the audit classes of persons
are excluded from the franchise. Among the the generally excluded classes are minors idiots,
paupers, and convicts.
The right of the State to deprive persons to the right of suffrage by reason of their having been
convicted of crime, is beyond question. "The manifest purpose of such restrictions upon this right is
to preserve the purity of elections. The presumption is that one rendered infamous by conviction of
felony, or other base offense indicative of moral turpitude, is unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage
or to hold office. The exclusion must for this reason be adjudged a mere disqualification, imposed for
protection and not for punishment, the withholding of a privilege and not the denial of a personal
right. (9 R.C.L., 1042.)
Upon the facts established in this case, it seems clear that the appellant was not entitled to vote on
June 5 1934, because of section 432 of the Revised Administrative Code which disqualified from
voting any person who, since the 13th day of August, 1898, had been sentenced by final judgment to
offer not less than eighteen months of imprisonment, such disability not having been removed by
plenary pardon. As above stated, the appellant had been sentenced by final judgment to suffer eight
years and one day of presidio mayor, and had not been granted a plenary pardon.
Counsel for the appellant contend that inasmuch as the latter voted in 1928 his offense had already
prescribed, and he could no longer be prosecuted for illegal voting at the general election held on
June 5, 1934. This contention is clearly without merit. The disqualification for crime imposed under
section 432 of the Revised Administrative Code having once attached on the appellant and not
having been subsequently removed by a plenary pardon, continued and rendered it illegal for the
appellant to vote at the general elections of 1934.
Neither is there any merit in the contention advanced by counsel for the appellant that the
disqualification imposed on the latter must be considered as having been removed at the expiration
of his sentence. This claim is based upon an erroneous theory of the nature of the disqualification. It
regards it as a punishment when, as already indicated, the correct view is that it is imposed, "for
protection and not for punishment,. the withholding of a prvilege and not the denial of a personal
right." Judicial interpretation and long established administrative practice are against such a view.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Villa-Real, Vickers, Imperial, Butte, and Goddard, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
crime which bears no relation to the exercise of suffrage and which does not involve the degree of
moral turpitude as in the other case.
I am of the opinion that this anomaly can be avoided only by interpreting section 432 in the sense
that the disqualification referred to therein is merely during the term of the sentence.
RECTO, J.:
I concur in this dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Avancea.
I hereby certify that Hon. George A. Malcolm, Associate Justice, participated in this decision and
voted to affirm the judgment. AVANCEA, C.J.
Footnotes
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