l\epnblic of tbe ilbilippines

~uprtmt ~ourt
Jl!lanila
FIRST DIVISION
EDMUNDO ESCAMILLA y JUGO,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 188551

Present:
SERENO, CJ, Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DECASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
REYES,JJ

-versus-

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

Promulgated:

DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 dated 20 August 2009. It
seeks a review of the 10 June 2009 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 30456, which denied the Motion for
Reconsideration 3 of the 10 November 2008 CA Decision4 affirming the
conviction of Edmundo Escamilla (petitioner) for frustrated homicide.
BACKGROUND
The facts of this case, culled from the records, are as follows:
Petitioner has a house with a sari-sari store along Arellano Street,
Manila. 5 The victim, Virgilio Mendol (Mendol), is a tricycle driver whose
route traverses the road where petitioner's store is located. 6
Around 2:00 a.m. of 01 August 1999, a brawl ensued at the comer of
Estrada and Arellano Streets, Manila. 7 Mendol was about to ride his tricycle
1

Rollo, pp. 3-17.

ld. at 44-45.
3
ld. at 36-42.
4
ld. at 22-35.
5
ld. at 24.
6
ld.
2

Decision

G.R. No. 188551

at this intersection while facing Arellano Street.8 Petitioner, who was

standing in front of his store, 30 meters away from Mendol,9 shot the latter
four times, hitting him once in the upper right portion of his chest.10 The
victim was brought to Ospital ng Makati for treatment11 and survived
because of timely medical attention.12
The Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila filed an Information13 dated
01 December 1999 charging petitioner with frustrated homicide. The
Information reads:
That on or about August 1, 1999, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal
violence upon the person of one Virgilio Mendol, by then and there
shooting the latter with a .9mm Tekarev pistol with Serial No. 40283
hitting him on the upper right portion of his chest, thereby inflicting upon
him gunshot wound which is necessarily fatal and mortal, thus performing
all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of
Homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason
of causes, independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to said Virgilio Mendol which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.14 During trial, the

prosecution presented the testimonies of Mendol, Joseph Velasco (Velasco)
and Iluminado Garcelazo (Garcelazo), who all positively identified him as
the shooter of Mendol.15 The doctor who attended to the victim also
testified.16 The documentary evidence presented included a sketch of the
crime scene, the Medical Certificate issued by the physician, and receipts of
the medical expenses of Mendol when the latter was treated for the gunshot
wound.17 In the course of the presentation of the prosecution witnesses, the
defense requested an ocular inspection of the crime scene, a request that was
granted by the court.18 On the other hand, the defense witnesses are
petitioner himself, his wife, Velasco and Barangay Tanod George
Asumbrado (Asumbrado).19 The defense offered the results of the paraffin
test of petitioner and the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the
courts ocular inspection of the crime scene.20
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) held that the positive testimonies of
eyewitnesses deserve far more weight and credence than the defense of
8

TSN, 31 October 2000, p. 4.

Rollo, p. 57.
10
Id. at 31.
11
Id. at 24.
12
Records, p. 1.
13
Rollo, p. 23.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 23-25.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 25.
18
TSN, 10 July 2001, p. 10.
19
Rollo, pp. 23-29.
20
Id. at 29.
9

Decision

G.R. No. 188551

alibi.21 Thus, it found petitioner guilty of frustrated homicide.22 The

dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Edmund Escamilla Y
Jugo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated
Homicide under Articles 249 and 50 [sic] of the Revised Penal Code, and
hereby sentences the accused to suffer an indeterminate sentence of six (6)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Accused is hereby
ordered to indemnify complainant Virgilio Mendol the sum of 34,305.16
for actual damages, 30,000.00 for moral damages.
SO ORDERED.23

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal dated 14 July 2006.24 In the brief

that the CA required him to file,25 he questioned the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses over that of the defense.26 On the other hand, the
Appellees Brief27 posited that the prosecution witnesses were credible,
because there were no serious discrepancies in their testimonies.28
Petitioner, in his Reply brief,29 said that the prosecution witnesses did not
actually see him fire the gun.30 Furthermore, his paraffin test yielded a
negative result.31
The CA, ruling against petitioner, held that the issue of the credibility
of witnesses is within the domain of the trial court, which is in a better
position to observe their demeanor.32 Thus, the CA upheld the RTCs
appreciation of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses in the present
case.33 Also, the CA ruled that the victims positive and unequivocal
identification of petitioner totally destroyed his defense of alibi. Hence, it
found no reason to disbelieve Mendols testimony.34 In addition, it said that
a paraffin test is not a conclusive proof that a person has not fired a gun and
is inconsequential when there is a positive identification of petitioner.35
A Motion for Reconsideration36 dated 08 December 2008 was filed by
petitioner, who asserted that the defense was able to discredit the testimony
of the victim.37

21

Id.
Id.
23
CA rollo, pp. 29 and 39.
24
Id. at 41.
25
Id. at 57.
26
Rollo, pp. 30-31.
27
CA rollo, pp. 117-128.
28
Id. at 122-124.
29
Id. at 131-142.
30
Id. at 133-136.
31
Id. at 137.
32
Rollo, p. 31.
33
Id. at 32-33.
34
Id. at 31-32.
35
Id. at 31.
36
Id. at 36-42.
37
Id. at 37-39.
22

Decision

G.R. No. 188551

In its 10 June 2009 Resolution,38 the CA denied petitioners Motion

for Reconsideration for being without merit, because the matters discussed
therein had already been resolved in its 10 November 2008 Decision.39
Hence, this Petition40 assailing the application to this case of the rule
that the positive identification of the accused has more weight than the
defense of alibi.41 This Court resolved to require the prosecution to
comment on the Petition.42 In his Comment43 dated 15 December 2009, the
victim said that his positive identification of petitioner was a direct evidence
that the latter was the author of the crime.44 Furthermore, what petitioner
raised was allegedly a question of fact, which is proscribed by a Rule 45
petition.45 Thus, the victim alleged, there being no new or substantial matter
or question of law raised, the Petition should be denied.46
We then obliged petitioner to file a reply.47 In his Reply dated 01
March 2010,48 he assigned as an error the application by the CA of the rule
that the positive identification of the accused has more weight than the
defense of alibi.49 He posits that the lower court manifestly overlooked
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, but if properly considered would
justify a different conclusion.50 This Court, he said, should then admit an
exception to the general rule that the findings of fact of the CA are binding
upon the Supreme Court.51
ISSUES
The questions before us are as follows:

38

I.

Whether the prosecution established petitioners guilt

beyond reasonable doubt.52

II.

Whether a defense of alibi, when corroborated by a

disinterested party, overcomes the positive identification
by three witnesses.53

Id. at 44-45.
Id. at 45.
40
Id. at 3-17.
41
Id. at 8.
42
Id. at 100.
43
Id. at 106-114.
44
Id. at 110.
45
Id. at 112.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 115.
48
Id. at 118-124.
49
Id. at 119.
50
Id. at 121.
51
Id. at 120-122.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 8.
39

Decision

G.R. No. 188551

COURTS RULING
We deny the Petition.
I.
The
prosecution
proved
petitioners guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
A. Petitioner was positively identified by
three witnesses.
Petitioner argues that there was reasonable doubt as to the identity of
the shooter.54 He is wrong. As correctly held by the RTC and affirmed by
the CA, the identity of the assailant was proved with moral certainty by the
prosecution, which presented three witnesses the victim Mendol, Velasco,
and Garcelazo who all positively identified him as the shooter.55 We have
held that a categorical and consistently positive identification of the accused,
without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses, prevails
over denial.56 All the three witnesses were unswerving in their testimonies
pointing to him as the shooter. None of them had any ulterior motive to
testify against him.
Mendol said that he was about to ride his tricycle at the corner of
Arellano and Estrada Streets, when petitioner, who was in front of the
formers store, shot him.57 The first shot hit its target, but petitioner
continued to fire at the victim three more times, and the latter then started to
run away.58
Velasco, who was also at the corner of Estrada and Arellano Streets,
heard the first shot, looked around, then saw petitioner firing at Mendol
three more times.59
Lastly, Garcelazo testified that while he was buying bread from a
bakery at that same street corner, he heard three shots before he turned his
head and saw petitioner pointing a gun at the direction of the victim, who
was bloodied in the right chest.60 Garcelazo was just an arms length away
from him.61
The three witnesses had a front view of the face of petitioner, because
they were all facing Arellano Street from its intersection with Estrada Street,
which was the locus criminis.62 Although the crime happened in the wee
54

Rollo, p. 10.
Id. at 32-33.
56
Anilao v. People, G.R. No. 149681, 15 October 2007, 536 SCRA 98.
57
TSN, 31 October 2000, p. 4.
58
TSN, 02 April 2002, p. 8.
59
TSN, 08 March 2004, p. 13.
60
TSN, 11 August 2003, pp. 5-9.
61
Id. at 10.
62
TSN, 31 October 2000, pp. 4-6; 22 April 2002, pp. 5-6; and 11 August 2003, pp. 5-6.
55

Decision

G.R. No. 188551

hours of the morning, there was a street lamp five meters from where
petitioner was standing when he shot the victim, thus allowing a clear view
of the assailants face.63 They all knew petitioner, because they either
bought from or passed by his store.64
B. The intent to kill was shown by the
continuous firing at the victim even
after he was hit.
Petitioner claims that the prosecution was unable to prove his intent to
kill. He is mistaken. The intent to kill, as an essential element of homicide
at whatever stage, may be before or simultaneous with the infliction of
injuries.66 The evidence to prove intent to kill may consist of, inter alia, the
means used; the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the
victim; and the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or
immediately after the killing of the victim.67
65

Petitioners intent to kill was simultaneous with the infliction of

injuries. Using a gun,68 he shot the victim in the chest. 69 Despite a bloodied
right upper torso, the latter still managed to run towards his house to ask for
help. 70 Nonetheless, petitioner continued to shoot at him three more times,71
albeit unsuccessfully.72 While running, the victim saw his nephew in front
of the house and asked for help.73 The victim was immediately brought to
the hospital on board an owner-type jeep.74 The attending physician, finding
that the bullet had no point of exit, did not attempt to extract it; its extraction
would just have caused further damage.75 The doctor further said that the
victim would have died if the latter were not brought immediately to the
hospital.76 All these facts belie the absence of petitioners intent to kill the
victim.
II. Denial and alibi were not proven.
In order for alibi to prosper, petitioner must establish by clear and
convincing evidence that, first, he was in another place at the time of the
offense; and, second, it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene
of the crime. 77 The appreciation of the defense of alibi is pegged against
this standard and nothing else. Petitioner, as found by both the RTC and
63

Rollo, p. 57.
TSN, 31 October 2000, p. 6; 22 April 2002, p. 9; and 11 August 2003, p. 7.
65
Rollo, p. 12.
66
Mahawan v. People, G.R. No. 176609, 18 December 2008, 574 SCRA 737.
67
Id.
68
TSN, 02 April 2002. p. 9.
69
Id. at 8.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 8-9.
73
TSN, 31 October 2000, p.10.
74
TSN, 02 April 2002, p.10.
75
TSN, 14 January 2003, p. 13.
76
Id. at 13-14.
77
People v. Erguiza, G.R. 171348, 26 November 2008, 571 SCRA 634.
64

Decision

G.R. No. 188551

CA, failed to prove the presence of these two requisite conditions. Hence,
he was wrong in asserting that alibi, when corroborated by other witnesses,
succeeds as a defense over positive identification.78
A. Petitioner was unable to establish that
he was at home at the time of the
offense.
The alibi of petitioner was that he was at home asleep with his wife
when Mendol was shot.79 To support his claim, petitioner presented the
testimonies of his wife and Asumbrado.80
1. The wife of petitioner did not know
if he was at home when the
shooting happened.
The wife of petitioner testified that both of them went to sleep at 9:00
p.m. and were awakened at 3:00 a.m. by the banging on their door.81
However, she also said that she did not know if petitioner stayed inside their
house, or if he went somewhere else during the entire time she was asleep.82
Her testimony does not show that he was indeed at home when the crime
happened. At the most, it only establishes that he was at home before and
after the shooting. Her lack of knowledge regarding his whereabouts
between 1:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. belies the credibility of his alibi. Even so,
the testimonies of relatives deserve scant consideration, especially when
there is positive identification83 by three witnesses.
2. Asumbrano did not see the entire
face of the shooter.
Petitioner is questioning why neither the RTC nor the CA took into
account the testimony of Asumbrado, the Barangay Tanod on duty that
night.84 Both courts were correct in not giving weight to his testimony.
Asumbrado said that he was there when the victim was shot, not by
appellant, but by a big man who was in his twenties.85 This assertion was
based only on a back view of the man who fired the gun 12 meters away
from Asumbrado.86 The latter never saw the shooters entire face.87 Neither
did the witness see the victim when the latter was hit.88 Asumbrado also
78

Rollo, p. 9.
Id.
80
Id.
81
TSN, 08 March 2004, pp. 4-5.
82
Id. at 6.
83
People v. Lucas, 260 Phil. 334 (1990).
84
Rollo, p. 9.
85
TSN, 18 May 2004, pp. 4-5.
86
Rollo, p. 72.
87
TSN, 18 May 2004, p. 14.
88
Rollo, p. 65.
79

Decision

G.R. No. 188551

affirmed that he was hiding when the riot took place. 89 These declarations
question his competence to unequivocally state that indeed it was not
petitioner who fired at Mendol.
B. Petitioner's home was just in front of
the street where the shooting occurred.
Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where
the accused was when the crime transpired and the place where it was
committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places. 90
Petitioner failed to prove the physical impossibility of his being at the scene
of the crime at the time in question.
Both the prosecution and the defense witnesses referred to the front of
appellant's house or store whenever they testified on the location of the
shooter. Petitioner was in front of his house when he shot the victim,
according to Velasco's testimony. 91 Meanwhile the statement of Asumbrado
that the gate of the store of the petitioner was closed when the shooting
happened 92 can only mean that the latter's house and store were both located
in front of the scene of the crime.
Petitioner proffers the alibi that he was at home, instead of showing
the impossibility of his authorship of the crime. His alibi actually bolsters
the prosecution's claim that he was the shooter, because it placed him just a
few steps away from the scene of the crime. The charge is further bolstered
by the testimony of his wife, who could not say with certainty that he was at
home at 2:00a.m.- the approximate time when the victim was shot.
Based on the foregoing, it cannot be said that the lower courts
overlooked any fact that could have justified a different conclusion. Hence,
the CA was correct in affirming the RTC 's Decision that petitioner, beyond
reasonable doubt, was the assailant.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED.
The 10 June 2009 Resolution93 and 10 November 2008 Decision94 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 30456 are hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson
89
90
91

92
93

!d. at 76-77.
Esqueda v. People, G.R. No. 170222, 18 June 2009, 589 SCRA 489.
TSN, 22 April 2002, p. 4.
TSN, 18 May 2004, p. I 0.
Rollo, pp. 44-45.

94 I rl

<>t

TL 1. <;

Decision

G.R. No. 188551

WE CONCUR:

~~it/~

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

~VILLARA

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that

the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice