Basic Question of Philosophy, Martin Heidegger.

Martin Heidegger
BASIC QUESTIONS
OF PHILOSOPHY
Selected Problems of Logic
Studies in C o n tin en tal T h o u g h t
GENERAL EDITOR
JO HN
SALLIS
EDITORS
Robert B ern ascon i
W illiam L. M cB rid e
R u d o lf B e r n e t
J. N . M o h an ty
J o h n D. C a p u to
M ary Rawlinson
D avid C a rr
T o m Rockm ore
Edw ard S. Casey
C a lvin O . Schrg
H u b ert L. D reyfus
fR e in e r Schiirm ann
D on Ih d e
C h arles E. Scott
D avid Farrell Krell
T h o m a s Sheehan
L enore L a n g sd o r f
R obert Sokolowski
A lp h o n so L ingis
B ru ce W. Wilshire
W ood
Martin H eidegger
BASIC QUESTIONS
OF PHILOSOPHY
Selected Problems o f Logic
TRANSLATED BY
Richard Rojcewicz
AND
A n dr Schuwer
INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS

Bloomington & Indianapolis
Published in German as Grundfragen der Philosophie: Ausgewhlte

Probleme der Logik 1984 by Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt
am Main. Second edition 1992.
1994 by Indiana University Press
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Library Materials, A N SI Z39.48-1984.
Manufactured in the United States of America
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976.
[Grundfragen der Philosophie. English]
Basic questions o f philosophy : selected problems o f logic /
Martin Heidegger : transiated by Richard Rojcewicz and Andr
Schuwer.
p. cm. (Studies in Continental thought)
ISBN 0-253-32685-0
l.T ru th . I. Tide. II. Series.
B 3279H 48G 7713
*994
m .8 dc20
Contents
T RA N SLA TO R S F O R E W O R D
XX
PREPARATORY PART
The Essence o f Philosophy and the Question ofTruth

Chapter One
Prelim inary In terpretation o f the

Essence o f Philosophy
i. Futural philosophy; restraint as the basic

disposition o f the relatiopi to Being [Seyn]
2. Philosophy as the immediately useless, though
sovereign, knowledge o f the essence o f beings
3. Questioning the truth o f Being, as sovereign
knowledge
Chapter Two
T h e Q u estion o f T ru th as a Basic
Q u e stio n
4. Truth as a problem o f logic (correctness o f an

assertion) distorts every view o f the essence
o f truth
5. Discussion o f truth by asking the basic question o f
philosophy, including a historical confrontation
with Western philosophy. The need and the
necessity o f an original questioning
vi
Contents
RECAPITULATXON
*3
1) T h e question o f truth as the m ost necessary

philosophical question in an ag e that is totally
u n q u e sd o n in g
*3
2) W h at is w orthy o f qu estion in g in the

d eterm ination o f truth h ith erto (truth as the
correctness o f an assertion) as co m p ellin g us
toward the question o f truth
6. The traditionell determination o f truth as

correctness
7. The controversy between idealism and realism on
the common soil o f a conception o f truth as the
correctness o f a representation
8. The space o f the fourfold-unitary openness. First
directive toward what is worthy o f questioning in
the traditional determination o f truth as
correctness
9. The conception o f truth and o f the essence of
man. The basic question o f truth
*4
14
16
18
!9
a) T h e determ ination o f the essence o f truth as

con n ected to the d eterm in atio n o f the essence
o f m an
19
b) T h e question o f the g r o u n d o f the possibility

o f all correctness as the basic question o f
truth
R E C A P IT U L A T IO N
20
21
1) T h e relation betw een question and answer in

the d o m ain o f philosophy
21
2) T h e custom ary determ in atio n o f truth as

correctness o f representation, an d the
fou rfold-u n itary openness as the questionw orthy gro u n d o f the possibility o f the
correctness o f representation
22
vii
Contents
c) T h e question o f truth as the m ost
questionable o f ou r previous history and the
most w orthy o f qu estioning o f o u r futu re
history
23
M AIN PART
Foundational Issues in the Question o f Truth
Chapter One
25
T h e Basic Q u estion o f the Essence o f

T ru th as a Historical R eflection
10. The ambiguity o f the question o f truth: the search

for what is true reflection on the essence
of truth
11. The question o f truth as a question o f the essence
o f the true: not an inquiry into the universal
concept o f the true
12. The question o f the legitimacy o f the ordinary
determination o f truth, as point o f departure for a
retum to the ground o f the possibility o f
correctness
13. The foundation o f the traditional conception of
truth in the retum to its origin
27
27
28
3
32
a) T h e historiographical consideration o f the

past
32
b) H istorical reflection on the fu tu re, the future

as the b e g in n in g o f all h ap p en in gs
34
35
1) T h e am b igu ity o f the question o f truth. T h e

essence is n ot w hat is in d ifferen tly universal
but w hat is m ost essential
35
viii
Contents
2) T h e problem atic character o f the obviousness
o f the traditional con cep tio n o f truth, an d the
question o f its legitim acy
36
3) Tow ard the fou nd ation o f the custom ary

con cep tio n o f truth th r o u g h a historical
reflection on its origin. T h e distinction
betw een a historiographical consideration and
a historical reflection
c)
37
T h e acquisition o f the b e g in n in g in the

exp erie n ce o f its law. T h e historical as the
exten sin from the fu tu re in to the past and
from the past into the fu tu re
14. Retum to the Aristotelian doctrine o f the truth

o f the assertion as a historical reflection
15. The Aristotelian foundation o f the correctness o f
an assertion as the essence o f truth
16. The tuming o f the question o f the essence o f truth
into the question of the truth (essentiality) o f the
essence. The question o f the Aristotelian
conception o f the essentiality o f the essence
39
41
42
43
45
1) Rejection o f three m isinterpretations o f the

distinction betw een historiographical
consideration and historical reflection. Science
and historical reflection
45
2) T h e p ath from the question o f the essence o f

truth to the question o f the truth (essentiality)
o f the essence
Chapter Two
51
T h e Q uestion o f the T ru th
(Essentiality) o f the Essence
iy. Historical reflection on the Aristotelian-Platonic

determination o f the essentiality o f the essence
53
53
Contents
a) T h e fo u r characteristics o f the essentiality o f
the essence in A ristotle
b) T h e essence as the whatness o f a being.
W hatness as L8ea: the con stantly present,
what is in view in ad vanee, the look (a8o<?)
R E C A PIT U L A T IO N
1) Four characterizations o f the essentiality o f

the essence in Aristotle. T h e w hatness in
Plato: the ISa as w hat is sighted in advance,
the look
2) H ow to un derstan d the essence sighted in
advance
18. The Greek determination o f the essence (whatness)

in the horizon o f an understanding o f Being as
constant presence
a) T h e determ ination o f the essence (whatness)
as the beingness (oim a) o f beings. T h e
u n d erstan d in g o f B ein g as con stan t presence
is the g r o u n d for the interpretation o f
beingness (otxria) as ISoc
b) T h e G re e k u n derstan din g o f the l8ea
19. The absence o f a foundation for Aristotles

essential determination of truth as the
correctness o f an assertion. The question o f the
meaning o f foundation
RE C A P IT U L A T IO N
1) T h e con cep tio n o f the B e in g o f beings as

constant presence: the gr o u n d fo r the
determ in atio n o f the essence (l&a) as
whatness
2) T h e absence o f a fou nd ation fo r the positing
and for the characterization o f the essence o f
truth as th e correctness o f an assertion. T h e
m ean in g o f foundation
Contents
Chapter Three
T h e L ayin g o f the G r o u n d as the

Foundation for G rasp in g an Essence
20. The absurdity o f attempting to found an essential

Statement about truth as correctness by having
recourse to a factual Statement
21. Grasping the essence as bringing it forth. First
directive
22. The search for the ground o f the positing o f the
essence. Ordinariness o f an acquaintance ivith the
essence enigma o f a genuine knowledge o f the
essence (grasping of the essence) and its
foundation
23. The bringing o f the essence into view in advance
(the grasping o f the essence) as the bringing forth
o f the essence out of concealment into the light.
The productive seeing o f the essence
24. The productive seeing o f the essence as the laying
o f the ground. 'Y - j t o c o t s as f t o x s o f the
69
69
71
72
74
imoxeijJLvov
77
78
1) R en ew ed reflection on o u r proced ure as a

w hole: the necessity o f a historical relation to
the history o f the essence o f truth
78
2) T h e succession o f the steps m ade u p to now

from truth as the correctness o f an assertion
to the positing o f the essence as a productive
seein g an d a laying o f the gr o u n d
25.
The unconcealedness o f the whatness o f beings as

the truth pertaining to the grasping o f the essence.
The groundedness o f the correctness o f an
assertion in unconcealedness (a\YyeiaJ
81
84
Contents
XI
26. Unconcealedness and the openness o f beings. The

process o f the submergence o f the original Greek
essence o f truth in the sense o f the
unconcealedness o f beings
87
92
1) T h e produ ctive seeing o f the unconcealedness

o f b ein gs as the gro u n d o f the essence o f
truth as correctness
92
2) T h e G re e k Xrjdeta as openness. T h e
transform ation o f the con cep t o f truth from
unconcealedness to correctness
Chapter Four
92
T h e Necessity o f the Q u e stio n o f the

Essence o f T ruth, o n the Basis o f the
B e g in n in g o t the H istory o f Truth
95
2 y. The tum ing o f the critical question o f truth toward

the beginning o f the history o f truth as a leaping
ahead into the future. AXrj&eia as experienced by
the Greeks though not interrogated by them
95
28. Truth as correctness and its domination over its

own ground as an essential consequence o f the
absence o f a fathoming o f the ground. The
question o f openness as the question o f
V tfteia itself
98
29. The Greeks experience o f unconcealedness as the

basic character o f beings as such and their lack
o f inquiry into dt\r)-deioi
102
104
1) T h e g r o u n d o f the necessity o f the question

o f the essence o f truth
104
2) A\r|ftei,a as prim ordial for the G reeks yet

u n qu estion ed by them
105
xii
Contents
30. Their fidelity to the destiny meted out to thern as

the reason the Greeks did not ask about Xtêia.
Non-occurrence as what is necessarily detained
in and through the beginning
31. The end o f the first beginning and the
preparation for another beginning
107
108
a) O u r situation at the e n d o f the b e gin n in g and

the d e m a n d for a reflection o n the first
b e g in n in g as a preparation for another
b e gin n in g
108
b) T h e e xp erien ce o f the e n d by H lderlin and

N ietzsche an d their reflection on the
b e g in n in g o f W estern history
32. The destiny meted out to the Greeks: to begin

thinking as an inquiry into beings as such and in
terms o f an experience o f unconcealedness as the
basic character o f beings (a/rjfteia, ((nxris)
109
111
114
1) T h e lack o f an inquiry in to unconcealedness

on the part o f the G reeks an d the necessity o f
their task
114
2) N ietzsche an d H ld erlin as e n d an d as
transition, each in his ow n way
3) T h e task o f the Greeks: to sustain the first

b e gin n in g
33. The beginning o f thinking and the essential

determination o f man
118
" 9
a) T h e sustaining o f the reco gn itio n o f beings in

their beingness and the essential
d eterm ination o f m an as the perceiver o f
b ein gs as such (vots an d X.070S)
"9
xiii
Contents
b) T h e transform ation o f the prim ordial
determ ination o f the essence o f m an, as the
p erceiver o f beings, into th e determ ination o f
the essence o f m an as the rational animal
121
34- The need and the necessity o f our inquiry into

unconcealedness itself on the basis o f a more
original understanding o f the first beginning
123
125
1) T h e rigo r an d in ner ord er o f qu estion in g in

distinction to the system atization o f a system
125
2) H istorical reflection on the necessity o f the

first b e gin n in g; acquisition o f the norm s for
the necessity o f o u r ow n question o f truth
126
3) T h e origin o f the ap p reh en sion o f m an as the

rational anim al outôf an inability to sustain
the first b egin n in g
Chapter Hve
128
T h e N e ed and the N ecessity o f the First

B e g in n in g and the N e ed an d the
Necessity o f an O th e r Way to Q uestion
an d to B egin
13 1
35. The distress o f not knowing the way out or the way
in, as a mode o f Being. The untrodden time-space

o f the between
36. The need o f primordial thinking and how this need
compels man dispositionaUy into the basic
disposition o f wonder ('davjjidfeivj
37. The ordinary concept o f wonder as guideline for
a reflection on fton^cieiv as a basic disposition
131
133
133
a) A m a ze m e n t an d m arvelling
133
137
xiv
Contents
1) T h e n egativity o f the distress as a not
kn o w in g the way ou t o r the way in. T h e
w h en ce an d w hither as the o p e n betw een
o f th e undifferentiatedn ess o f beings and
n o n -b ein gs
13 7
2) T h e com p e llin g pow er o f the need , its

d isp osin g as displacing m an in to the
b e g in n in g o f a fou n d ation
o f hisessence
13g
3) 0oa)|xeiv as the basic disposition o f the

p rim ordial thin kin g o f th e O c cid e n t
140
b) A d m iration
142
c) A sto n ish m en t and awe
143
38. The essence o f wonder as the basic disposition

compelling us into the necessity o f primordial
thinking
143
a) In w o n d er w hat is m ost u sual itself becom es

the m ost unusual
144
b) In w o n d er w hat is m ost usual o f all and in all,

in w hatever m ann er this m ig h t be, becom es
the m ost unusual
144
c) T h e m ost extrem e w o n d er knows no way ou t

o f th e unusualness o f w h at is m ost usual
144
d) W on der knows no way in to the unusualness

o f w h at is most usual
145
e) W on d er as betw een the usual an d the

u n u su al
145
f) T h e eru p tio n o f the usualness o f the most

usual in the transition o f the m ost usual into
the m ost unusual. W h at alone is wondrous:
b ein gs as beings
145
g) W on der displaces m an into the perception o f

b ein gs as beings, into the sustaining o f
u ncon cealedn ess
146
xv
Contents
h) W on der as a basic disposition belongs to the
most unusual
!47
i) Analysis o f w onder as a retrospective sketch o f

the displacem ent o f m an into beings as such
147
j) T h e sustaining o f the disp lacem ent prevailing

in the basic disposition o f w o n d er in the
carryin g o u t o f the necessity o f the question o f
beings as such
1)
T h e basic disposition o f w o n d er versus related

kinds o f m arvelling
2)
148
Sequence o f steps in the characterization o f

w o n d er as a way toward the necessity o f the
prim ordial question
150
k) T h e carryin g ou t o f the necessity: a sufferin g

in the sense o f the Creative tolerance for the
u n con d ition ed
1) T ex vT) as the basic attitude tow ard (jiw is,

w here the preservation o f the w ondrous (the
beingness o f beings) unfolds an d is
established. T x v n m aintains the h o ld in g sway
o f 4)w l s in unconcealedness
153
m) T h e d a n g e r o f distu rbin g th e basic

disposition o f w onder in carryin g it out.
Txvr) as the gro u n d for the transform ation
o f Xfeeux into |xowais. T h e loss o f the
basic disposition and the absence o f the
original n eed an d necessity
!55
39. The need arising front the lack o f need. Truth as
correctness and philosophy (the question o f

truth) as without need and necessity
156
xvi
Contents
40. The abandonment o f beings by Being as the

concealed ground o f the still hidden basic
disposition. The compeUing o f this basic
disposition into another necessity o f another
questioning and beginning
158
4 1. The necessity held out fo r us: to bring upon its

ground openness as the Clearing o f the selfconcealing the question o f the essence o f man
as the custodian o f the truth o f Being
161
Appendices
T H E Q U E S T IO N O F T R U T H
FR O M T H E F IR S T D R A F T
I. F oundational issues in the q u estion o f truth
16 7
168
168
1. The compelling poiver o f the need arising from the

abandonment by Being; terror as the basic
disposition o f the other beginning
168
2. The question o f the essence o f truth as the necessity

o f the highest need arising from the abandonment
o f Being
3.
The question o f truth and the questiono f Being
169
170
a) T h e u n fo ld in g o f the question o f truth as a

reflection on the First b e gin n in g. T h e
r e o p e n in g o f the first b e g in n in g for the sake
o f an oth er b egin n in g
170
b) T h e question o f truth as a prelim inary

question on b e h a lf o f the basic question o f
B e in g
17 1
II. L e a p in g ah ead into the essentialization o f

truth
172
4. The question o f the essentialization o f truth as a

question that founds history originaUy
172
Contents
5 . Indication o f the essentialization o f truth through
critical reflection and historical recollection

a) Preparation for the leap by secu ring the
approach ru n and b y p red elin eatin g the
direction o f the leap. Correctness as the Start
o f the ap p roach run, openness as the
direction o f the leap
b) T h e exp erien ce o f openness as
unconcealedness (Xrideia) in the first
b egin n in g. T h e unqu estion ed character o f
u nconcealedness an d the task o f a m ore
original exp erien ce o f its essence on the basis
o f our n eed
6. The abandonment by Being as the need arising

from the lack o f need. The experience o f the
abandonment o f beings by Being as need in the
coming to light o f the belongingness o f Being to
beings and the distinction o f Being from beings
7. Directive sketch o f the essence o f truth on the basis
o f the need arising from the abandonment by

Being
a) O p en n ess as the Clearing fo r the vacillating
self-concealm ent. Vacillating self-concealm ent
as a first designation o f B e in g itself
b) T h e Clearing for self-concealm ent as the
su p p o rtin g gr o u n d o f hum anity. M an s
g r o u n d in g o f this su p p ortin g gr o u n d as
Da-sein
c) T h e question o f truth, an d the dislocation o f
h um an ity o u t o f its previous hom elessness
into the g r o u n d o f its essence, in order for
man to b ecom e the fo u n d e r an d the preserver
o f the truth o f B ein g
Contents
xviii
d)
T h e question o f the essentialization o f truth

as the question o f the essentialization o f
B e in g
III.
182
Recollection o f the first sh in in g forth o f the

essence o f truth as aVrjfteia (unconcealedness)
184
8. Recollection o f the first knowledge o f truth at the

beginning o f Western philosophy as an indication
o f the proper question o f the more original essence
o f truth as openness
184
9. Articulation o f the historical recollection in five
steps o f reflection
185
Supplement to 40
187
Supplement to 41
188
e d i t o r s a f t e r w o r d
189
TRANSLATORS FOREWORD
T h is book is a translation o f the text o f M artin H e id e g g e r s lecture course o f the sam e title from the W in ter sem ester
1938
1937-
at the U niversity o f Freiburg. T h e G erm a n original ap-
p eared posthum ously in

volu m e
45
1984
(with a second edition in
1992)
as
o f H e id e g g e r s C o llected W orks (Gesamtausgabe).
T h e volum es in the Gesamtausgabe are n ot a p p ea rin g as critical

editions. T h e reason is that it is their express intention to faciltate a direct con tact betw een the read er and
the w ork o f
H e id e g g e r and to allow, as m uch as is possible, n o th in g extraneous to intervene. T h u s , in particular, they in clude no interpretative or in troductory essays. A ll editorial m atter is kept to an ab solute m inim um , an d
there are n o in dexes. T h e words o f
H e id e g g e r are reconstructed with as m uch faithfulness as the e d itor can brin g to the task, and they are then sim ply left to speak
for them selves.
It is ou r b e lie f that this translation m ay speak for itself as well.
We have on occasion feit the need to interplate into ou r text
H e id e g g e r s ow n term inology, in ord er to alert the reader to
som e nuance we were u nable to capture. For the most part, how ever, we have fo u n d H e id e g g e r s la n g u a ge difficu lt to transate,
to be sure, but in d e e d translatable, an d we have endeavored to
express the sense o f his discourse in an En glish that is as flu en t
an d natural as possible.
O n e word o f caution: w ithout in any way presu m in g to preju d g e for the read er w hat she or he will fin d in these pages, we
feel it incu m bent o n us to no tify h er o r him that the title o f the
volum e is, on the surface o f it, som eth in g o f a misnomer. For
even a rather casual glance at the table o f contents will show that
the boo k does not treat the diverse topics that are ordinarily inclu d ed in a text on the Basic questions o f philosophy. A n d ind eed such a work w ould im m ediately b e m ost u n -H e id e gg e rian ,
since for this p h ilo so p h er there is b u t on e basic question o f p h ilosophy and the problem s o f logic as we know them are o n ly extrinsically related to it. N ow the title an d subtitle o f this volu m e
Translators Foreword
XX
are in fact qu ite significant, a lth o u g h not straightforw ardly so

(witness the im p ortan t quotation m arks in the subtitle), an d the
them e o f the b o o k is assuredly n ot extraneous to H e id e g g e r s
philosophical project b u t lies at its very heart.
Finally, this course was delivered at the time H e id e g g e r was
com p osin g o n e o f his most fam ou s p osthum ous texts, the currently m uch-discussed Beitrge zur Philosophie (C o n tribu tion s to
p hilosop hy),1 w hich dates from
1 9 3 6 - 1 9 3 8 . The
two works are
intim ately related, so m uch so that th e ed itor o f the two volum es

considers the b o o k in hand to be the m ost im p ortan t an d imm ediate preparation for u n d erstan d in g the Beitrge. 2 H enee,
this reason, as well as its ow n in heren t significance, m akes the
present volu m e required stud y fo r those w ho w ould travel
H e id e g g e r s path.
R.R.
A .S.
Sim on Silverm an P h en o m en o lo gy C e n te r
D uquesn e University
1. M artin Heidegger, Beitrge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), Frankfurt: V. Klosterm ann, 1989. Gesamtausgabe Bd. 65.
2. Ibid., p. 513, Afterword by the editor, Friedrich-Wilhelm von H errm ann.
See also the same editors afterword to the second edition of the present volume,
p. 192 below.
PREP A R A T O R Y P A R T
The Essence o f Philosophy

and, the Question o f Truth
Chapter One
Preliminary Interpretation o f the
Essence o f Philosophy
i. Futural philosophy; restraint as the basic disposition o f the

relation to Being [Seyn].
Basic questions o f p hilosop hy that seems to im ply th ere is
such a th in g as philo sop h y in itself, from whose dom ain basic
questions co u ld be draw n cfut. B u t such is n ot the case an d cannot be; on the contrary, it is on ly the very asking o f the basic
questions that first determ ines w hat philo sop h y is. Since that is
so, we need to indicate in advance how p hilosophy will reveal itself w hen we question: i.e., if we invest e v e ryth in g everyth in g
w ithout e x c e p tio n in this qu estion ing an d d o not m erely act as
if we were q u estion in g while still b elievin g we possess o u r rep u ted truths.
T h e task o f this b r ie f prelim inary interpretation o f the essence
o f philosophy will sim ply be to attun e o u r qu estioning attitu de to
the right basic disposition or, to p u t it m ore prudently, to allow
this basic disposition a first resonance. B u t, then, philosophy, the
most rigorous w ork o f abstract th o u g h t, a n d disposition? C a n
these two really g o together, p hilosop hy an d disposition? T o be
sure; for precisely w hen, and because, p hilosophy is the m ost r ig orous th in k in g in the purest dispassion, it originates from an d
rem ains w ithin a very h igh disposition. Pure dispassion is not
nothin g, certainly n ot the absence o f disposition, an d not the
sheer coldness o f the stark concept. O n the contrary, the pure
dispassion o f th o u g h t is at bottom o n ly the most rigorous m aintenance o f the h igh est disposition, the on e op en to the u n iq u ely
u ncan ny fact: that there are beings, rather than not.
Preliminary Interpretation [23]
I f we had to say som ething im m ed iately about this basic d isp osition of philosophy, i.e., o f futu ral philosophy, we m igh t call it
restraint [Verhaltenheit]. In it, two elem ents originally b e lo n g together an d are as one: terror in th e face o f w hat is closest and
m ost obtrusive, nam ely that beings are, an d awe in the face o f
w hat is rem otest, nam ely that in beings, and before each b ein g,
B ein g holds sway [das Seyn west]. R estraint is the disposition in
which this terror is not overcom e an d set aside b u t is precisely
preserved an d conserved th ro u g h awe. Restraint is the basic disposition o f the relation to B ein g, an d in it the con cealm en t o f the
essence o f B e in g becom es w hat is m ost w orthy o f questioning.
O n ly one w h o throws h im self into the all-consum ing fire o f the
question ing o f w hat is most w orthy o f qu estion ing has the right
to say m ore o f the basic disposition than its allusive nam e. Yet
once he has wrested for h im self this right, he will not em p lo y it
b u t will keep silent. For all the m ore reason, the basic disposition
should never b ecom e an object o f m ere talk, for e xam p le in the
p op ular an d rash claim that w hat we are now teachin g is a p h ilosophy o f restraint.
2. Philosophy as the immediately useless, though sovereign,
knowledge o f the essence o f beings.

D e p en d in g o n the d e p th o f the history o f a people, there will e x ist or will not exist, in the all-d eterm in in g b egin n in g, the poetizin g o f the p o e t an d the th in k in g o f the thinker, i.e., philosophy.
A historical p eo p le w ithout p h ilo sop h y is like an eagle w ithou t
the h igh exp an se o f the radiant aether, w here its fligh t reaches
the purest soaring.
Philosophy is com pletely d iffe re n t from w orld-view an d is
fun dam entally distinct from all science. Philosophy can n ot by
itself replace either world-view or science; or can it ever be appreciated by them . Philosophy can n ot at all be m easured by anyth in g eise b u t on ly by its ow n now shinin g, now hid d en , essence.
I f we attem p t to calclate w hether p hilosop hy has any im m ediate use and w hat that use m igh t be, we will find that p hilosop hy
accom plishes n othin g.
It belongs necessarily to the character o f ordinary o p in ion and
2. Philosophy as useless, sovereign know ledge [3-4]
practical th in k in g always to m isju dge philosophy, w h eth er by

overestim ating or u nderestim ating it. Philosophy is overestim ated if on e exp ects its th in k in g to have an im m ediately u sefu l
effect. Philosophy is underestim ated i f on e finds in its concepts
m erely abstract (rem te and w atered dow n) representations o f
things that have already been solidly secured in experien ce.
Yet gen uin e philosophical k n o w ledge is never the m ere ad dition o f the m ost gen eral representations, lim p in g b eh in d a b e in g
already know n anyway. Philosophy is rather the reverse, a kn o w le d g e that leaps ahead , o p e n in g u p new dom ains o f qu estion in g
and aspects o f qu estion in g about the essence o f things, an essence that constantly conceals itself anew. T h a t is precisely the
reason this k n o w led ge can never be m ad e useful. Philosophical
reflection has an effect, if it does, always on ly m ediately, by m akin g available new aspects for all com p ortm en t and new p rin cipies for all decisions. B u t philosophy has this pow er only w h en it
risks w hat is m ost p ro p er to it, nam ely to posit in a th o u g h tfu l
way for the existen ce o f manadas Dasein des Menschen] the goal o f
all reflection an d to establish thereby in th e history o f m an a hidd e n sovereignty. We m ust therefore say p hilosophy is the im m ediately useless, th o u g h sovereign, k n o w le d ge o f the essence o f
things.
T h e essence o f beings, however, is always the most w orthy o f
questioning. In so far as philosophy, in its incessant qu estioning,
m erely struggles to appreciate w hat is m ost w orthy o f q u estionin g and ap p aren tly never yields results, it will always an d necessarily seem strnge to a thin kin g p reo ccu p ied with calculation,
use, and ease o f learnin g. T h e sciences, an d in deed not o n ly the
natural sciences, m ust strive increasingly an d, it seems, irresistibly for a com p lete techn ologizin g in o rd er to p roceed to the
en d o f their course, laid dow n for th em so lo n g ago. A t the sam e
tim e, the sciences ap p ear to possess gen u in e k now ledge. For
these reasons, the sharpest possible alienation with regard to
philosophy an d at the same tim e a p resu m ed con vin cin g p r o o f
o f the futility o f p hilosophy occur in an d th ro u g h the sciences.
(Truth and science : if, and only if, we believe ourselves to be in

possession o f the tru th , d o we have science and its business. Yet
Science is the disavowal o f all k n o w led ge o f truth. To h old that
today science m eets with hostility is a basic error: never has sei-
Preliminary Interpretation [4-5]
ence fared b etter than it does today, an d it will fare still b etter in
the future. B u t n o on e w ho knows will e n v y seientists the m ost
miserable slaves o f m o d ern times.)
(T h e withdrawal o f science into w hat is w orthy o f qu estion in g
[Cf. T h e Self-D eterm in ation o f the G e rm a n U niversity] is the
dissolution o f m o d e rn science.)
3. Questioning the truth o f Being, as sovereign knowledge.

Philosophy is the useless th ou gh sovereign k n o w ledge o f the essence o f beings. T h e sovereignty is based on the goal established
by thin kin g for all reflection. B u t w hat goal does o u r th in k in g
posit? T h e p ositing o f the goal for all reflection possesses truth
only w here an d w h en such a goal is sought. W h en we G erm a n s
seek this goal, an d as lo n g as we d o so, we have also already
fou n d it. For our goal is the very seeking itself. W h at eise is the seekin g but the m ost constant b ein g-in -pro xim ity to what conceals itself, ou t o f w hich each need h ap p en s to com e to us an d every
jub ilation filis us with enthusiasm . T h e very seekin g is th e goal
and at the sam e tim e w hat is fou nd.
O bviou s m isgivings now arise. I f seek in g is supposed to be the
goal, then is n ot w hat is established as a goal actually the limitless
absence o f any goal? T h is is the way calculating reason thinks. I f
seekin g is su p p osed to be the very goal, then d o not restlessness
and dissatisfaction becom e p erp etu ated ? T h is is the op in ion o f
the feelin g that is avid for quick possessions. Yet we m aintain that
seeking
brings
into
existence
the
h igh est
constancy
an d
equanim ity th o u g h only w hen this seekin g genuinely seeks, i.e.,

exten ds into the farthest reaches o f w hat is most con cealed and
thereby leaves b eh in d all m ere curiosity. A n d w hat is m ore co n cealed than the gr o u n d o f what is so uncanny, nam ely that b e ings are rather th an are not? W h at withdraws from us m ore than
the essence o f B e in g , i.e., the essence o f that which, in all th e fabricated and disposed beings h o ld in g sway aroun d us an d b earin g
us on, is the closest b u t at the sam e tim e the m ost w orn ou t
(through con stan t handling) an d therefore the most u n grasp able?
To posit the very seekin g as a go al m eans to anchor the b e gin -
3- Questioning the truth o f Being [5-6]
n in g and the en d o f all reflection in the question o f the tr u th

n ot o f this o r that b e in g or even o f all beings, but o f B e in g itself.
T h e gran d eu r o f m an is m easured accord in g to w hat he seeks
an d according to th e u rge n cy by w hich he rem ains a seeker.
Such qu estion ing o f the truth o f B e in g is sovereign kn o w le d g e, philosophy. H ere question ing alread y counts as k now in g,
because no m atter how essential an d decisive an answer m ig h t
be, the answer can n ot be oth er than the pen ultim ate Step in the
lo n g series o f steps o f a qu estion ing fo u n d e d in itself. In the d o m ain o f gen u in e seeking, to find does n o t m ean to cease seek in g
b u t is the h igh est intensity o f seeking.
T h is prelim inary Interpretation o f the essence o f philo sop h y
will, to be sure, have m ean in g for us o n ly w hen we exp erie n ce
such k n o w ledge in the labor o f q u e stio n in g therefore Basic
questions o f philosophy. B u t which question will we raise?
Chapter Two
T h e Question o f Truth
as a Basic Q u estion 1
4. Truth as a problem o f logic (correctness o f an assertion)
distorts every view o f the essence o f truth.

The two titles announce the task o f our lectures in a double way,
though without making it clear what the content o f the discussions is to be. To learn that, let us take the subtitle as our point of
departure. Accordingly, the course will be about logic. Traditionally, this is a discipline, a branch o f philosophy, supposing that
philosophy itself is taken as a discipline, which scholasticism divides into individual branches: logic, ethics, aesthetics, etc., each
of which then encompasses a series o f concomitant problems.
Problems the word in quotation marks serves to name questions that are no longer truly asked. They have been frozen as
questions, and it is only a matter o f fmding the answer or, rather,
modifying answers already found, collating previous opinions
and reconciling them. Such problems are therefore particularly prone to conceal genuine questions and to dismiss out of
hand, as too strnge, certain questions that have never yet been
raised, indeed to misinterpret completely the essence o f questioning. Th e so-called problems can thus readily usurp the
place of the basic quesons o f philosophy. Such problems of
1. T he question o f the essence o f tru th is the casting o f the one and only goal
which by itself reaches out beyond itself, tru th understood here as the tru th of
Being, seen in term s o f the essence o f the appropriating event [vom Wesen des Ereignisses], W hat is at stke is not only the removal o f goal-lessness but, above all,
the overcoming o f the resistance against any search for a goal.
4- Truth as a problem o f logic [7-9]
philosophic learnedness then have, from the standpoint o f g e n uine philosophy, this rem arkable distinction that, u n d er the im pressive ap p earan ce o f problem s, they m ay sum m arily an d d e cisively prevent real questioning.
W h at we in ten d to discuss here is ju s t such a p roblem o f
logic. B u t that m eans we shall en d eavor to go forthwith b eyon d
the p roblem , the frozen question, an d likewise beyond lo gic
as a discipline o f scholastically d eg en erated philosophical lea rn edness, to a philosophical question ing that is basic, that p en e trates into the gro u n d . Yet we shall have to m ake the problem s
o u r poin t o f dep artu re, for on ly in this way can we see the traditional form o f the question, which we shall p u t into question, b u t
which also still rules us. B ecause w hat is traditional often has behind itself a very lo n g past, it is not som eth in g arbitrary b u t harbors in itself still the trace o f an erstwhile gen u in e necessity. T o
be sure, such traces can only be seen o n ce the traditional is set
back u po n its gro u n d .
We shall select a p roblem o f lo gic b e h in d which lies h id d e n a
still unasked basic question o f p hilosophy. L o g ic is o u r abbreviated expression for \071XTi
it i o t t i p-rj.
T h a t means know l-
e d g e about X070S, u n derstood as assertion. T o w hat exten t is assertion the th em e o f logic? A n d how does th e construction o f this
branch o f philo sop h y result from it? L e t us clarify this briefly
so that the am e lo gic does not rem ain an e m p ty tide.
W h at provides the assertion a statem ent o f the kind, T h e
stone is hard , T h e sky is covered such a rank that it is m ade
explicitly the object o f a branch o f k n o w led ge, namely, logic?
T h e assertion asserts som ething about a b e in g , that it is an d how
it is. In d o in g so, the assertion is directed to [richten auf] the b e ing, an d i f the assertion in its very asserting con form s to [sich richten nach] the b ein g, an d i f w hat it asserts m aintains this direction
[Richtung] and on that basis represents th e b ein g, then the assertion is correct [richtig]. T h e correctness o f an assertion that
m eans for us, an d has m ean t from tim e im m em orial, truth. T h e
assertion is henee the seat an d place o f tr u th b ut also o f u n truth, falsity and lies. T h e assertion is th e basic form o f those utterances that can b e e ith er true or false. It is not as a kind o f utterance and n ot as a verbal structure, b u t as the seat and place o f
correctness, i.e., o f truth, that the assertion, the \070s, is an em -
IO
T h e Question o f Truth [910]
inent object o f know ledge. T h e n again , as this place o f truth, it

claims special attention only because the truth an d the possession o f the truth attract excep tion al interest. We seek th e truth,
we speak o f the will to truth, we believe we possess the truth,
we prize the valu o f the truth. T h e truth and its possession, or
non-possession, are w hat m ake us uneasy, happy, or disapp oin ted, an d on ly for that reason does the assertion, as the place
o f truth, receive basically a special attention, an d furth erm o re,
only for that reason is there basically som eth in g like lo gic. I intentionally use the word basically, since matters have been
quite d iffe re n t for a lo n g tim e now, an d the situation has been
precisely the opposite. For a lo n g tim e there has b e en lo gic as a
discipline o f scholastic philosophy, an d in fact precisely since the
b e gin n in g o f Platos school, b u t in d e e d on ly since then. B ecause
logic exists as the exam ination o f A.070;, there is also the problem o f tru th , truth taken as th e distinctive p rop erty o f \070s.
T h e p roblem o f truth is therefore a problem o f lo gic or, as
we say in m ore m o dern times, theory o f k now ledge. T ru th is that
valu by w hich know ledge first counts as k now ledge. A n d the
basic fo rm o f k n o w ledge is the ju d g m e n t, the proposition, the
assertion, the \070s. T h e o r y o f k n o w led ge is therefore always
logic in the ju st-m en tio n ed essential sense.
E ven th o u g h it m igh t sound e x a g ge ra te d to say that the p rob lem o f truth exists as a p rob lem because there is lo gic and
because this discipline is from tim e to tim e taken u p on ce again
an d p resen ted u n d e r a new veneer, nevertheless it rem ains undebatable that since the tim e o f Plato and A ristotle the question
o f truth has b e en a question o f logic. T h is implies that the search
for w hat truth is moves alon g the paths an d in the perspectives
which were firm ly laid dow n by the approach and the ran ge o f
tasks o f logic an d its presuppositions. T o m ention on ly m ore
m odern thinkers, this fact can easily be substantiated on th e basis
o f the works o f K ant, H egel, an d N ietzsche. T h o u g h it is certain
that for these philosophers an d in gen eral for the entire tradition o f W estern philosophy, the question o f truth is a m editation
on th in k in g an d X.70S, an d henee is a question o f lo gic, yet it
w ould be com p letely superficial an d falsifyin g to claim th at these
thinkers have raised the question o f truth, an d con sequ ently
4- Truth as a problem o f logic [ 1 0 - 1 1]

sou ght an answer to it, only because logic exists and logic insists
on such a question. Presum ably the con cern that led these thinkers to the question o f truth was n ot m erely the one o f im p rovin g
an d reform in g logic b u t precisely that interest every m an has
in the truth, m an as on e w ho is exp o sed to beings an d thus is
h im self a being.
Nevertheless it m ay be that this interest in truth, which can
be alive even w here there is no interest in logic, can, in the
course o f tim e, still be forced by the dom in ation o f logic in to a
quite definite direction and stam ped with a w holly determ in ed
form . T h a t is in fact how matters stand. E ven w here the question
o f truth does not stem from an interest in logic, the treatm en t o f
the question still moves in the paths o f logic.
In brief, then, fro m tim e im m em orial truth has been a p ro b lem o f logic b u t not a basic question o f philosophy.
T h is fact even bears o n Nietzsche, an d in the sharpest way, i.e.,
precisely w here the question o f truth was especially raised in
O ccid en tal p h ilo sop h y in tKe m ost passionate manner.
For
N ietzsches starting p oin t is that we d o n ot possess the tru th ,

which obviously m akes the question o f truth most im perative;
secondly, he asks w hat truth m igh t b e w orth; thirdly, he qu estions the origin o f the will to truth. A n d yet, in spite o f this radicalism o f qu estion ing, ap p arently never to be surpassed, the
question o f truth rem ains cau ght, even for Nietzsche, in the
tram m els o f lo gic.
W h at is so w ro n g w ith that? For one, it cou ld be that the p erspective o f all logic as logic precisely distorts every view o f the
essence o f truth. It co u ld be that the presuppositions o f all logic
d o not perm it an original qu estion ing o f truth. It cou ld b e that
logic does not even attain the portico o f the question o f truth.
T h e se rem arks at least suggest that the problem o f tru th
stands within a lo n g tradition w hich has increasingly rem oved
the question o f truth from its root an d g r o u n d and in d eed that
the question o f truth has never yet b een raised originally. In so far
as m odern an d con tem p orary th o u g h t moves w holly within the
perspectives o f this tradition, an original qu estion ing o f truth becom es
accessible
on ly
with
difficulty,
strnge, if n o t d o w n righ t foolish.
in d eed
m ust
ap p ea r
T h e Question o f Truth [11-12 ]
12
5. Discussion o f truth by asking the basic question

o f philosophy, including a historical confrontation with
Western philosophy. The need and the necessity o f an
original questioning.
If, in w hat follows, we are not to discuss truth as a p roblem o f
logic b u t instead are to question it while asking the basic question o f philosophy, then at the very outset we will n eed to take
into accou nt these difficulties o f u n derstan din g, i.e., we will have
to recognize that today the question o f truth involves a co n fro n tation with the w hole o f W estern philo sop h y an d can n e ve r be
broached w ithou t this historical confrontation . A historical [ge-
schichtlich] confrontation , however, is essentially d iffe re n t from a

historiographical [historisch] reckoning o f and acquaintance with
the past. W h at a historical con fron tation m eans should b eco m e
clear in actually th in k in g th rou gh the question o f truth.
The
question
of
tru th even
if
the
answer
is
n ot
yet
fo rth co m in g already sounds, m erely as a question, very presum ptuous. For i f behind such qu estion in g there d id n o t lie the
claim to in d eed know the truth itself in som e sort o f way, th en all
this to-do w ould be a m ere gam e. A n d yet greater than this claim
is the h o ld in g back to which the question o f truth m u st b e attuned. For it is n ot a m atter o f tak in g u p again a w ell-established
problem ; on the contrary, the question o f truth is to b e raised
as a basic question. T h a t m eans truth m ust first be esteem ed as
basically w orthy o f questioning, that is, w orthy o f qu estio n in g in
its groun d. W h o e ve r holds h im self in this attitude, as esteem in g
som ething higher, will be free o f all presum ption. N evertheless,
seen from the outside, the question o f truth always retains the
appearan ce o f arrogance: to w ant to d ecide w hat is p rim ary and
what is ultm ate. H ere on ly the correct question ing itself an d the
e xp erien ce o f its necessity can forge the appropriate attitude.
B u t in view o f the tradition preserved th rou gh ou t two m illennia, how are we supposed to exp erien ce the necessity o f an o rig inal qu estioning, an d o f a step p in g ou t o f the circuit o f the traditional p roblem o f truth, and con sequ ently the n eed o f an oth er
sort o f question ing? W hy can we n ot an d should we not ad h ere
to the o d ; w hy does the determ ination o f truth h ith erto not
5- Discussion o f truth [12-13]
13
satisfy us? T h e answer to these questions is already n o th in g less

than a return in to th e m ore original essence o f truth, which in d e e d m ust first b e p u t o n its way by o u r very questioning. Sim ilarly, we can already con vince ourselves b y a sim ple reflection on
the traditional co n ce p t o f truth that h ere we have n han d som eth in g worthy o f qu estion in g which has rem ain ed unquestioned.
1) The question o f truth as the most necessary philosophical

question in an age that is totally unquestioning.
I f we try to determ ine the present situation o f m an on earth
m etaphysically thus not historiographically and not in terms o f
world-view then it m ust be said that m an is begin nin g to enter the
age o f the total unquestionableness o f all things and o f all contrivances. T h a t is truly an uncanny occurrence, whose orientation no
one can establish and whose beartng no one can evalate.
O n ly one thing is im m ediately clear: in this com pletely unquestioning age, philosophy, as the questioning that calis forth w hat is
most worthy o f questioning, becomes i n e v i t a b l y most S t r a n g e .
T h erefo re it is the most necessary. A n d necessity has its most powerful form in the simple. T h e simple, however, is our nam e for
w hat is inconspicuously the most difficult, which, when it occurs,
appears to everyone im m ediately and ever again as the easiest and
most accessible; yet it remains incontestably the most difficult. T h e
simple is the most difficult, for the m ultiple admits and favors dispersin, and all dispersin, as a counter-reaction to the unification
o f m an in his constant flight from him self i.e., from his relation to
B ein g itself confirm s and thereby alleviates and releases the
heavy burden o f existence. T h e m ultiple is the easy even where
concern over it seems toilsome. For progress from one thing to an other is always a relaxation, and it is precisely this progress that is
not allowed by the simple, which presses o n instead to a c o n s t a n t
return to the same in a constant self-enrichment. O n ly i f we risk the
simple d o we arrive within the arena o f the necessary. W hat is most
necessaiy in philo sop h y supposing that it m ust again becom e the
strngest is precisely that simple question by which it, in its questioning, is first b rou gh t to itself: namely, the question o f truth.
T h e Question o f Truth [14 -15 ]
14
?) What is worthy of questioning in the determination of

truth hitherto (truth as the correctness of an assertion) as
compelling us toward the question of truth.
T h e question o f truth, as it has b e en treated hitherto, is a p rob lem o f logic. I f from this p rob lem i.e., from the m oribun d
q u estion a living question is to arise, an d i f this is n ot to b e arbitrary an d artificial, b ut necessary in an original way, th en we
have to strive for a gen uin e exp erie n ce o f w hat is co m p e llin g us
toward the question o f truth.
T h e determ ination o f truth u p to now, an d still valid everyw here in the m ost varied trappin gs, runs as follows: truth is the
correctness o f a representation o f a bein g. A ll rep resen tin g o f
beings is a p red icatin g about them , alth o u gh this pred ication can
be accom plished silently an d does n o t n eed to be p ron ou n ced .
T h e most co m m o n form o f predication is the assertion, the sim ple proposition, the \ 70s, and therefore the correctness o f
representation tr u th is to be fo u n d there in the m ost im m ediate way. T ru th has its place an d seat in X70S. T h e m ore precise
determ ination o f truth then becom es the task o f a m editation on
\070s, a task o f logic.
W hat can n o w com p el us to turn the usual defin ition o f truth
as correctness o f representation into a question? T h is can in d eed
only be the circum stance, p erhaps still h idd en , that the unquestioned d eterm in a tio n o f truth as correctness contains som eth in g
w orthy o f q u e stio n in g which by itself requires b e in g p u t into
question. It c o u ld be objected that n ot everythin g questionable
needs to be m a d e the object o f a question. Perhaps; th erefore we
want to e xa m in e w hether and to w hat exten t there is in the usual
determ ination o f truth as correctness som ething w orthy o f qu estioning in the first place, and w hether, furtherm ore, it is o f such
a kind that we c a n n o t pass over it u n h e e d e d an d u n qu estion ed
supposin g th at w e claim to be in fo rm e d about the truth, in accord with o th ers an d with ourselves.
6. The truditional determination o f truth as correctness.

We say that a n assertion, or the k n o w led ge e m b e d d ed in it, is
6. Truth as correctness [15-16 ]
*5
true insofar as it con form s to [sich richten nach] its object. T ru th is

correctness [Richtigkeit]. In the early m o d e rn age, th o u g h above
all in m edieval times, this rectitudo was also called adaequatio
(adequation), assimilatio (assimilation), o r convenientia (correspondence). T h e s e determ inations revert back to Aristotle, with
w hom the great G reek philosophy com es to its end. A ristotle
conceives o f truth, which has its h om e in \070s (assertion),
as |Ao)oxs (assimilation). T h e representation (vt^-oi) is assimilated to w hat is to be grasped. T h e representational assertion
about the hard stone, or representation in general, is o f course
som ething p ertain in g to the soul (i|ruxT|), som ething spiritual. A t any event, it is not o f the typ e o f the stone. T h e n how is
the representation supposed to assim ilate itself to the stone? T h e
representation is n ot supposed to, an d cannot, becom e stonelike, nor should it, in the co rresp o n d in g case o f an assertion
about the table, becom e woody, or in representing a stream b e com e liquid. N evertheless, the representation m ust m ake itself
similar to the b e in g at h a n d i i.e., as represen tin g [Vor-stellen], it
m ust posit the en cou n tered before us [vor uns hin-steilen] an d
m aintain it as so posited. T h e re-presenting, the p ositing-before
(i.e., the thinking), con form s to the b e in g so as to let it ap p ea r in
the assertion as it is.
T h e relation o f a representation to an object ( otvTixC|xevov) is
the most natural th in g in the w orld, so m uch so that we are almost asham ed to still speak explicitly o f it. T h ere fo re , the naive
view, not yet tainted by epistem ology, will not be able to see
w hat is sup p osed to be incorrect o r even m erely questionable in
the determ ination o f truth as correctness. A dm ittedly, th ro u g h ou t the m any endeavors o f m an to attain a know ledge o f beings,
it o ften h ap p en s u n fortun ately that we d o not grasp b ein gs as
they are an d are d e lu d e d about them . B u t even delusion occurs
on ly w here the in tention prevails o f co n fo rm in g to beings. We
can d elu d e others an d take them in o n ly i f the others, ju s t as we
ourselves, are in ad van ce in an attitu de o f con form in g to beings
an d aim ing at correctness. Correctness is the standard an d the
m easure even for incorrectness. T h u s the determ ination o f truth
as correctness, to ge th e r with its cou n terp art, nam ely in correctness (falsity), is in fact clear as day. B ecau se this con cep tio n o f
truth em erges, as is obvious, entirely fro m the natural way o f
T h e Q uestion o f Truth [16 -17 ]
i6
thinking, an d correspond s to it, it has lasted th ro u g h o u t the cen turies and has lo n g a g o been h ard e n e d in to som ething taken for
granted.
Truth is correctness, o r in the m ore usual form ula: truth is the
correspond en ce o f know ledge (representation, th o u gh t, ju d g m ent, assertion) with the object.
-*
Truth
correctness
rectitudo
adaequatio
assimilatio
convenientia
|XOUO%S
correspondence
The controversy between idealism and realism on the

common soil o f a conception o f truth as the correctness
o f a representation.
7.
T o be sure, in the course o f tim e objections arse again st this

con ception o f truth. T h e s e objections w ere based, specifically, on
do u b t as to w h eth er o u r representations reached the b e in g itself
in itself at all an d d id not rather rem ain enclosed within the circuit o f their ow n activity, henee in th e realm o f the soul, the
spirit, consciousness, the e g o . S u rren d er to this d o u b t
leads to the view that w hat we attain in o u r representing is always
only som ething re-presented by us, hen ee is itself a representation. C o n seq u en tly k n o w ledge an d assertions consist in th e rep resentation o f representations an d hen ee in a com bin ation o f
representations. T h is com b in in g is an activity an d a process takin g place m erely in ou r consciousness. T h e adherents o f this
doctrine believe th ey have critically p u rifie d an d surpassed the
usual determ in atio n o f truth as correctness. B u t this b e lie f is
mistaken. T h e do ctrin e that k n o w led ge relates only to represen tations (the represented) m erely restriets the reach o f a rep resen tation; yet it still claims that this restricted representation con form s to the represented an d only to th e represented. T h u s even
7- T h e controversy between idealism and realism [1718]
17
here a standard or m easure is presu p po sed , to which the representing conform s. E ven here truth is con ceived as correctness.
T h e doctrine that ou r representations relate only to the rep resented, the perceptum, the idea, is called idealism . T h e cou n terclaim, accord ing to which ou r representations reach the things
them selves (res) an d w hat belongs to th em (realia), has been
called, ever since the advance o f idealism , realism. T h u s these
hostile brothers, each o f w hom likes to think h im self superior to
the other, are u nw ittingly in com p lete accord with regard to the
essence, i.e., with regard to what provides the presupposition
an d the very possibility o f their controversy: that the relation to
beings is a represen tin g o f them and that the truth o f the re p re sentation consists in its correctness. A thinker such as K ant, w ho
fo u n d e d idealism an d strictly ad h ered to it, and w ho has m ost
p rofou n d ly th o u g h t it th rough , con cedes in advance that the
con ception o f truth as correctness o f a represen tation as correspondence with the o b je ct is inviolable. Realism, for its part, is
captive to a great error w hen *it claims that even Kant, the m ost
p rofou n d idealist, is a witness for the d efen se o f realism. O n
the contrary, the con sequ ence o f K an ts ad h eren ce to the traditional determ ination o f truth as correctness is sim ply the o p p o site, nam ely that realism , in its determ ination o f truth as correctness o f a representation, stands on the sam e gro u n d as idealism ,
an d is even itself idealism , accord ing to a m ore rigorous an d
m ore original co n ce p t o f idealism . For even according to the
doctrine o f realism the critical an d the naive the res, beings,
are attained by m eans o f the representation, the idea. Idealism
an d realism th erefore com prise the two most extrem e basic
positions as regards the relation o f m an to beings. A ll past theories
con cern in g
this
relation
an d
its
character truth
as
correctness are e ith er one-sided caricatures o f the extrem e p o sitions or diverse variations on the nu m erou s m ixtures an d distortions o f the two doctrines. T h e controversy am on g all these
opinions can still g o on endlessly, w ith ou t ever leadin g to g e n u ine reflection or to an insight, because it is characteristic o f this
sterile w ran glin g to ren o un ce in ad van ce the question o f the soil
u p o n which the com batants stand. In oth er words, the co n ce p tion o f truth as correctness o f representation is taken for gran ted
everywhere, in p h ilo sop h y ju s t as in extra-philosophical opinion.
T h e Q uestion o f Truth [1819]
i8
T h e m ore obvious an d the m ore unqu estion ed the usual d e term ination o f truth, the sim pler has to be w hat is w orthy o f
question in this determ ination, su p p o sin g som ething o f the sort
is in deed con cealed therein. Yet the m ore sim ple w h at is w orthy
o f qu estion ing proves to be, the m ore difficu lt it will be to grasp
this sim ple in its in ner fullness, i.e., to grasp it sim ply an d unitarily as w hat is w orthy o f question, i.e., p erp lexin g, an d to adhere to it in o rd er to u n fold its p ro p er essence and thus pose it
back u p o n its h id d e n groun d.
8. The space o f the fourfold-unitary openness. First directive
toward what is worthy o f questioning in the traditional

determination o f truth as correctness.
We m ust now seek a first directive toward w hat is w orthy o f qu estioning here, in o rd er to secure o u r qu estion in g in gen eral and,
even if on ly prelim inarily, assure ourselves o f its legitim acy. L et
us reflect: i f o u r representations an d assertions e.g., the Statem ent, T h e stone is h ard are sup p osed to con form to the o b je ct, then this b ein g, the stone itself, m ust be accessible in a d vance: in ord er to present itself as a standard and m easure for
the con form ity with it. In short, the b ein g, in this case the thing,
m ust be ou t in the open. E ven m ore: not only m ust the stone
itself in ord er to rem ain with o u r e x a m p le be out in the o p en
but so m ust the dom ain which the con form ity with the th in g has
to traverse in o rd e r to read o f f from it, in the m o de o f representing, w hat characterizes the b e in g in its b e in g thus and so. M oreover, the h u m an w ho is representing, an d w ho in his representin g con form s to the thing, m ust also b e open. H e m ust b e o p e n
for w hat encou nters him , so that it m ig h t encou nter him . Finally,
the person m ust also be op en to his fellows, so that, co-representin g w hat is com m un icated to him in their assertions, he can, togeth er with the others an d out o f a b eing-w ith them , c o n fo rm to
the same th in g an d be in agreem en t w ith them about the correctness o f the representing.
In the correctness o f the representational assertion there
holds sway con sequ ently a fou r-fold openness: (1) o f the thing,
9- Truth and the essence o f man [19-20]
!9
(2) o f the regin b etw een th in g and m an, (3) o f m an h im self with
regard to the th in g, an d (4) o f m an to fellow man.
T h is fou r-fold openn ess w ould not be w hat it is and w hat it has
to be if each o f these opennesses were separately encapsulated
from the others. T h is fou r-fold openn ess holds sway rather as
o n e an d unitary, an d in its com pass every con form ity to . . . an d
every correctness an d incorrectness o f representing com e into
play and m aintain them selves. I f we atten d to this m ultiple and
yet unitary openness then with on e stroke we find ourselves
transported into an oth er realm beyon d correctness and its con com itan t representational activity.
T h is m u ltiple-u nitary openness holds sway in correctness. T h e
openness is not first p ro d u ced by the correctness o f the rep resenting, b u t rather, ju s t the reverse, it is taken over as w hat was
always already h o ld in g sway. Correctness o f representation is
on ly possible i f it can establish itself in this openness which supports it and vaults it over. T h e openness is the grou n d an d the
soil and the arena o f all correctness. T h u s as lo n g as truth is conceived as correctness, an d correctness itself passes u nquestioned,
i.e., as som ething ultm ate and prim ary, this con ception o f
truth no m atter h ow lo n g a tradition has again an d again confirm ed it rem ains groundless. B ut, as soon as that openness, as
the possibility an d the gr o u n d o f correctness, com es into view,
even if unclearly, truth conceived as correctness becom es questionable.
9. The conception o f truth and o f the essence o f man.
The basic question o f truth.

a) The determination o f the essence o f truth as connected to
the determination of the essence of man.
We m igh t m arvel that u p to now the g r o u n d o f correctness has
n ever been seriously p u t into question. B u t this omission proves
to be less peculiar i f we consider that the relation o f m an to b e ings, u nderstood from tim e im m em orial as im m ediate re p re senting an d p erceivin g, seems to be the m ost ordinary aspect o f
h u m an exp erien ce an d therefore the m ost obvious. T h e dom i-
20
nation o f this relation o f m an to b ein gs soon becam e so insistent

that even the very essence o f m an was d eterm in ed in referen ce
to it. For w hat is the m ean in g o f the ancient, and still currently
valid, defin ition o f the essence o f m an: animal rationale (c)ov
X70V fe'xv)? T h is determ ination is translated, i.e., in terp reted,
as follows: m an is the rational livin g being; m an is an anim al, but
on e end ow ed with reason. W h at does reason, ratio, vovs, m ean?
I f we think m etaphysically, as is necessary here, an d n ot psychologically, th en reason m eans the im m ed ia te perception o f beings.
T h e fam iliar defin ition o f m an now has an altogeth er d ifferen t
ring: m an the b e in g that perceives beings. H ere we touch u p o n
an im portant, th o u g h still unclear, con n ecd on : the fam iliarity o f
the con cep tio n o f truth as correctness is as old as the fam iliarity
o f that d efin itio n o f the essence o f m an, an d con sequ ently the
determ ination o f the essence o f truth d ep en d s on w hat hap p en s
to be the determ in atio n o f the essence o f m an. O r shou ld we not
maintain the reverse, that the con cep tio n o f the essence o f m an
dep en d s u p o n the way truth is u n d erstood at any particular
time?
b) The question of the ground of the possibility o f all

correctness as the basic question of truth.
We are not yet in a position to d ecid e that question. A t th e mom ent it is e n o u g h for us to glim pse som ething w orthy o f questioning in the fam iliar theory o f truth as correctness. T h is questionable elem en t is again
o f such
a kind
that it m u st be
recognized an d displayed as the gr o u n d o f the possibility o f all

correctness. I f we interrgate this g r o u n d or basis o f correctness,
then we are ask in g about truth in the sense o f a basic question. It
is therefore not a m atter o f arbitrariness, and still less an e m p ty
passion, to revise, no m atter the cost, w hat has com e d o w n to us,
i.e., to take the traditional theory o f truth as correctness ultim ately for gran ted no longer, b u t to exp erien ce it instead as a
source o f uneasiness.
B u t the referen ce to openness as the gro u n d o f correctness is
still quite extrinsic: it can on ly intm ate, in a very prelim inary
way, that an d to w hat exten t som eth in g worthy o f qu estion in g
lies h id d en in the traditional th eo ry o f truth.
9- Truth and the essence o f man [2223]
21
W h at really is the gr o u n d o f correctness, and w here an d how

does this m ultiple an d yet unitary openn ess have its ow n essence
and c o n te n t all these things rem ain in the dark. T h e r e fo r e we
cannot explain w hy this gr o u n d is so rarely glim psed, an d then
on ly from afar. We can not even begin to estm ate what will h a p p en to m an w h en the exp erien ce o f this gr o u n d is b ro u gh t to
b ear in its full scope.
W hat we need to discuss above all, however, is why and w herefore we are raising the question that we are, since the fam iliar
con ception o f truth has satisfied two thousand years o f W estern
history.
1) The relation between question and ans wer

in the domaii of philosophy.
T h e s e lectures are proclaim in g no etern al truths. I say this to o b vate m isu nd erstan din gs which cou ld easily im p ed e ou r collaboration. I am not capable o f such a proclam ation, nor is it m y task.
Rather, w hat is at issue here is question ing, the exercise o f right
questioning, to be achieved in the actual p erform an ce o f it. T h is
seem s to be little e n o u g h for one w ho is pressing on to the possession o f answers. B u t in philosophy the relation o f question
an d answer is quite peculiar. To speak m etaphorically, it is like
clim bing a m oun tain. We will get now here by positioning ou rselves on the plane o f ordinary op in ion an d m erely talking about
the m ountain, in o rd e r to gain in that way a lived exp erien ce o f
it. N o, the clim b in g an d the approach to the p eak succeed on ly if
we b egin to m ount. T h e peak m igh t in d e e d be lost from view as
we climb, and ye t we keep com in g closer to it. Furtherm ore,
clim bing includes slip p in g and sliding back and, in philosophy,
even falling. O n ly on e w ho is truly clim bin g can fall down. W h at
i f those w ho fall d o w n exp erien ce the p eak, the m ountain, and
its height most profou nd ly, m ore p ro fo u n d ly an d m ore u n iqu ely
than the ones w ho ap p arently reach the top, which for th em
soon loses its h e igh t an d becom es a plan e an d som ething habitual? It is not possible to ju d g e and m easure either philosophy, or
22
art, or, in gen eral, any Creative d e a lin g with beings, with the aid
o f the facile b ureaucracy o f sou nd com m on sense an d a presum ably healthy instm ct (already distorted and m isled lo n g ago),
no m ore than with the em p ty sagacity o f a so-called intellectual.
H ere the w hole an d every single th in g within it can be exp erienced on ly in the actual p erfo rm an ce o f the p ain fu l w ork o f
clim bing.
A n y o n e h ere w ho is only snatching u p isolated propositions is
not clim bing alo n g with me. T h e task is to go alon g every single
step and the w hole series o f steps. O n ly in that way will there be
a disclosure o f the m atter we are m ed itatin g on an d o f the goal
we want to reach.
2) The customary determination o f truth as correctness

o f representation, and the fourfold-unitary openness
as the question-worthy ground of the possibility
of the correctness o f representation.
We are ask in g the question o f truth. T h e custom ary d eterm in ation o f truth runs: truth is the correctness o f a representation,
the co rrespo n d en ce o f an assertion (a proposition) with a thing.
A lth o u g h in the course o f the history o f W estern th in k in g, various opin ions about k n o w ledge an d representation have arisen
and have again and again deb ated each other an d in term in gled
with each other, yet the same con cep tio n o f truth as correctness
o f representation remains the standard. T h e two m ain theories
o f k n o w led ge an d representation, idealism and realism , are not
distinct w ith regard to their co n cep tio n o f truth: th ey are alike in
tak in g truth to be a determ in atio n o f a representation, o f an assertion. T h e y are distinct on ly w ith regard to their views about
the reach o f the representing: either the representation attains
the things th em selves res, realia (realism), or the representation always rem ains related m erely to the represented as su ch
perceptum, dea (idealism). T h u s in spite o f the a p p a re n t difference o f logical and epistem ological standpoints, th ere is an
overarching an d ru lin g a greem en t over w hat truth is: correctness o f representing.
B u t in this self-evident d e term in atio n o f truth as correctness
there lurks som ething w orthy o f questioning: that m u ltiple-uni-
9- Truth and the essence o f man [2425]
23
tary openness o f the things, o f the regi n betw een things an d

m an, o f m an him self, an d o f m an to fellow m an. I f it w ere not
for this penn ess, there cou ld never occur a representing that
conform s to a th in g. For this co n fo rm in g to . . . does n ot first create the openness o f the things and the openness o f m an for w hat
he m igh t encounter. O n the contrary, it settles into an openn ess
already h o ld in g sway and does so, as it were, each tim e anew.
T h is openness is therefore the gr o u n d o f the possibility o f correctness an d as this gro u n d it is som eth in g w orthy o f q u estion in g
and inquiry. A t first it is unclear w hat it really is that we are referrin g to here a n d are calling openness. A n d that cou ld o n ly be
one m ore reason to abandon the inquiry into w hat we say is w orthy o f qu estion ing, especially if we recall that for two thousand
years W estern history has been satisfied with the ord inary co n ception o f truth.
c) The question o f truth as the most questionable

of our previous history and the most worthy of
questioning of our future history.
A t this h ou r in th e history o f the w orld we can an d m ust ask
where the O c c id e n t has finally arrived with its con cep tio n o f
truth. W here d o we stand today? W h at an d w here is truth? In
spite o f e ve ryth in g correct, have we lost the truth? H as the West
not fallen into a situation w here all goals are dubious and w here
all bustle an d b o th e r m erely aim at fin d in g a m eans o f escape?
H ow eise are we su p p osed to u nderstan d metaphysically that W estern m an is driven either to the com p lete destruction o f w hat has
been h an d ed d o w n o r to w arding o f f this destruction?
T h e se m eans o f escape are not decisions. E xtrem e decisions
require the p ositin g o f goals that transcend all usefulness an d every p urpose an d therefore are alone p ow erfu l e n o u g h to instgate a new crea tin g and fou nd ing. Decisions, as such p ositing o f
goals, especially in th e situation we sketched, n eed th e gr o u n d in g o f the soil an d the installation o f the perspective with regard
to which an d in w hich they are sup p osed to be m ade.
A re we and fo r that decisin this is m ost decisive are we
w illfully an d k n o w in gly only at w hat lies closest, i.e., at the prep-
aration for this decisin?
24
T h e Question o f Truth [25-26]
In ligh t o f the task, is the question o f truth on ly a p rob lem o f

logic, or is th e question o f truth the m ost questionable on e o f
ou r past history an d the most w orthy o f question ing o f o u r future history? For everyone w ho has eyes to see, an d especially for
everyone w h o has torn h im self from the in dolence o f an u ncreative ad h eren ce to the p ast e.g., C h ristian ity an d from the
presum ption to possess the rem edy, for everyone w ho does not
want to g o back bu t to go forward, n o t toward p rogress b u t into
the con cealed fu tu re, for such ones the task is d ecided . It requires reflection as the first an d the m ost constant an d the u ltmate. W ith the question o f truth raised as it were in an academ ic le c tu r e we shall attem pt to take som e steps in such
reflection.
Now, since the m ost prelim inary qu estion in g about truth has
been con fu sed lo n g ago, thrown o f f the track an d d e p rive d o f
direction, we m ust reflect first o f all o n w hat is fou nd ation al with
regard to the question o f truth.
M A IN P A R T
Foundational Issues
the Question o f Truth
Chapter One
T h e Basic Question
o f the Essence o f Truth as a
Historical Reflection
10. The ambiguity o f the question o f truth: the search
fo r what is true reflection on the essence o f truth.

t
L et us b egin with a sim ple reflection. It will lead into a historical
reflection, an d this in turn will allow the u n fo ld in g o f the qu estion o f truth to becom e a reflection on its necessity and its u n iqu e
character.
T h e question o f truth asks about tru th . T h e question is so
straightforw ard that foundational deliberations rega rd in g the
question o f truth m ig h t ap pear superfluous. T o raise the qu estion o f truth surely m eans to seek the truth. A n d that m eans to
seek w hat is true, or, according to w hat has been clarifled above,
to establish an d ascertain w hat is correct about things an d ab o u t
all beings, w hereby the correct is to be u nderstood prim arily in
the sense o f aim s an d Standards to w hich all ou r actions an d behavior conform . T o raise the question o f truth m eans to seek
the true.
B u t the tru e, h ere bein g sou ght, certainly signifies m ore
than ju s t any correct statem ents ab o u t an y objects whatever. We
are seeking m ore th an m ere particular instructions for correct
action. T h e true to w hich we give that nam e, and which we p erhaps m ore desire th an seek, also does n ot m ean m erely the sum
o f all correct statem ents and instructions for correct action. T o
seek the true m eans to pursue w hat is correct in the sense o f that
28
T h e Essence o f Truth as Historical Reflection [2829]
to which all com m ission and om ission an d all ju d g m e n ts about

things are con n ected in advance, that to w hich ou r historical h u m anity is attached. T h e trae m eans for us here that for w hich we
live and die. This true is truth.
A lre a d y from these b r ie f reflections we can in fer that th e word
truth is not univocal. It m eans the true, first o f all w hatever is
at any given tim e correct in k n o w led ge and in action an d d isp osition, and then , m ore em phatically, that u p o n which everyth in g
dep en d s an d fro m which everyth in g is ru led an d decided .
B u t even i f we h e ed this plurivocity, in the con text o f sp ea k in g
about the true an d truth, we can nevertheless claim, an d in d eed
rightfully, that in this seeking o f the tr u e even i f we m ean w hat
is decisively tr u e we are still n o t ye t raising the question o f
truth: that is, in sofar as we con sider truth that which m akes
som ething true true and determ ines every single true th in g to be
the true th in g it is. Just as cleverness is w hat distinguishes all
clever p eo p le as such, so truth, rigorou sly th ou gh t, m eans w hat
determ ines all th at is true to b e so. For ages, that w hich u niversally determ ines every in dividual th in g has been called the essence. T h r o u g h it, an ything an d e veryth in g is delim ited in w hat
it is and is delin eated against oth er things. T ru th m eans n o th in g
b ut the essence o f the true. T ru th com prises that w hich distinguishes so m eth in g true as such, ju s t as speed indicates w hat d e term ines sp eed y things as such. T h u s to raise the question o f
truth does not m ean to seek a true o r the true but to seek the essence, i.e., to d e fin e the universal properties o f w hatever is true.
T h e r e b y we e n co u n ter for the first tim e the decisive am b igu ity in
talk o f the question o f truth.
11. The question o f truth as a question o f the essence o f the
true: not an inquiry into the universal concept o f the true.

T o raise the question o f truth can m ean: (1) to seek the true, (2)
to delim it the essence o f everyth in g true. It is easy to discover
which o f these two ways o f raising the question o f truth is the
m ore u rge n t an d the m ore im portan t. O bviously, it is the search
for the true an d above all in the sense o f the true that rules and
decides everythin g. In com parison, it appears that the question
11. Truth as question o f the essence o f the true [2930]
29
o f truth, i.e., o f the essence o f the true, is som ething m erely supplem entary, nay, even superfluous. For the essence in the sense
o f the universal w hich applies in each case to the m any particulars, as, e.g., the universal representation hou se applies to all
real and possible houses, this universal is grasped and form ulated in a concept. T o think the m ere con cep t o f som ething is
precisely to abstract from particular realities. T h u s i f we desire
the true and seek it, we will not strive for truth in the sense o f the
m ere concept, to which any th in g true as true is subordinated.
W h e n we seek the true, we w ant to gain possession o f that u p o n
which our historical hum an ity is posited an d b y which it is thoro u g h ly dom in ated an d th ro u gh which it is raised above itself. E very gen uin e attitu de o f m an, w ho dwells in th e real and wants to
transform w hat is real, rem ove it from its place an d liberate it to
h igh e r possibilities, will arrive at the univocal dem an d that can
be expressed briefly as follows: we desire w hat is true, w hy
should we be con cern ed with truth itself?
B u t insofar as we are here inqjuiring philosophically, and philoso p h y is the k n o w led ge o f the essence o f things, we already have
d ecid ed otherwise. In p hilosophizing, we reflect on the essence o f
the true, we abide by that which is precisely n ot a con cern for
ones w ho desire the true. A n d henee they, w ho desire the true,
m ust reject o u r in tention as som ething extrinsic and useless. It
was not in vain, b u t rather in anticipation o f this rejection o f o u r
proposal, that at the very outset we said p hilosophy is im m ediately useless k n o w ledge. O u r reflection o n correctness an d on
truth itself can accom plish n o th in g toward the correct solution
o f econom ic difficulties, o r toward the correct im provem ent and
assurance o f the public health, or can it con tribute an ything to
the correct increase o f the speed o f airplanes, or to the correct
im provem en t o f radio reception, an d likewise ju s t as little to the
correct design o f instructional projects in the schools. W ith re gard to all these u rg e n t matters o f daily life, philosophy fails.
Nay, even more: because it inquires on ly in to the essence o f truth
an d does not d eterm in e individual truths, p hilosophy will not be
able to settle an yth in g about the decisively true. Philosophy is imm ediately useless k n o w led ge and yet still som ething eise: sovere ign know ledge.
I f that is so, th en k n o w ledge o f the essence o f the true, i.e.,
30
know ledge o f the truth, could p erh ap s still bear a significance

and even on e th at reaches b eyon d e veryth in g useful. B u t h ow is
the essence, as a universal con cept, su p p osed to acquire a sovereign rank? W h at is m ore shadowy, an d therefore m ore im p otent,
than a m ere concept?
In this regard a question still remains, one that is perhaps most
intimately connected to the question o f truth as the question o f the
essence o f the true. H ave we determ ined the essence sufficiently in
identifying it with the concept? Perhaps the essence o f the true,
henee truth itself, is not grasped at all i f we merely represent in
general that which applies universally to everything true as such.
Perhaps the essence o f the true, henee truth itself, is not w hat ap plies indifferently with regard to the true b u t is the m ost essential
truth. In that case, the genuine and decisive truth, u po n which everything m ust be posited, would be precisely this essence o f the true,
the truth itself. In that case, the standpoint which pretends to care
so m uch about reality We desire the true, why should we be concerned with truth itself? would be a great error, the error o f errors, and u p to now the most en d u rin g o f all errors. Supposing
truth is this truth, then our inquiry into truth as the question o f the
essence o f all truths, provided we carry it out correctly, will n ot be
mere play with em pty concepts.
ia. The question o f the legitimacy o f the ordinary

determination o f truth, as point o f departure for a
retum to the ground o f the possibility o f correctness.
T h e fact that we are imm ediately leaving behind the customary
conception o f truth and are trying to attain the ground u p o n which
the determ ination o f truth as correctness is founded shows that we
are not entangled in an em pty squabble about the mere definition
o f the concept o f truth but that we want to touch som ething essential. T h r o u g h such a return to the g r o u n d to what is worthy o f
questioning we p u t into question the determ ination o f truth hitherto and in so d o in g make ourselves free o f it.
B u t d o we really m ake ourselves free? A r e we not b in d in g o u rselves all the m ore to this essential defin ition, to such an e xten t
that it becom es the obligatory one? L e t us not deceive ourselves.
12. T h e legitimacy o f truth [31-32]
31
W ith the return to that openness by which all correctness first becomes possible, we in fact presuppose that the determ ination o f
truth as correctness has indeed its ow n legitimacy. Is this then already proved? T h e characterization o f truth as correctness could
very well be an error. A t any rate, u p to now it has not been shown
that this characterization is not an error. B u t if the conception o f
truth as correctness is an error, what then about the positing o f the
groun d o f the possibility o f correctness? T o say the least, such a positing can in that case not claim to grasp the essence o f truth more
fundamentally. O n the contrary, we must concede that what supports an error and founds it is a fortiori erroneous.
W h at is the m e an in g o f the return to the m anifold-unitary
openness i f it is n ot proven in advance that w hat we take to be the
poin t o f dep artu re for the return, nam ely the ordinary d e te rm ination o f truth as correctness, has its ow n justification?
Now, in fact, the con ception o f truth as correctness is con firm ed th rou gh a lo n g tradition. B u t the ap p eal to tradition is
not ye t a fou n d ation an d safeg ard o f the truth o f an intuition.
For centuries, the tradition clu n g to the op in io n that the sun revolves aroun d the earth, and the eyes them selves even con firm ed
it. N evertheless, this o p in ion cou ld be shaken. Perhaps the traditional character o f an in sight is even an objection against its correctness. Is it n ot possible that w hat m ig h t in itself be an error
can becom e a tru th by b ein g believed lo n g enough? W hatever
m ay be the case here, the m ere lo n g du ration an d venerable
character o f a tradition are not, by them selves, a reliable gr o u n d
to prove the truth o f an essential determ ination.
B u t m ust we ap p eal to traditional opin ions in order to ascertain the legitim acy o f the determ ination o f truth as correctness?
A fte r all, we can fo rm for ourselves a ju d g m e n t about this leg itimacy. A n d that is n o t difficult, for the characterization o f truth
as the correspo n d en ce o f a representation with an object is selfevident. T h is obviousness has the ad van ta ge that it is relieved
from fu rth er fou n d ation . W hat we cali th e obvious is w hat is
clearly eviden t on its ow n, w ithout fu rth e r th ou gh t. Now, to be
sure, it has been show n conclusively e n o u g h that if we take truth
as correctness o f representation, we in fact avoid further th o u g h t
an d that here som eth in g is eviden t for us because we are ren o u n cin g every a ttem p t to elucdate it m ore closely an d m ore
32
genuinely. W h a t kind o f obviousness is it, however, w hich subsists on a c u ttin g o f f o f every in tention to u nderstand an d on an
avoidance o f every qu estion ing abo u t the grou n d ? C a n such an
obviousness pass as a substitute for a foundation ? N o. For w hat is
obvious in the gen u in e sense is o n ly w hat by itself p reclud es further inquiry as im possible, in such a way that thereby clarity
reigns co n ce rn in g the intelligibility o f the obviousness.
13. The foundation o f the traditional conception
o f truth in the retum to its origin.

O n ly on e way still rem ains for us to arrive at a fou n d ation o f the
traditional co n cep tio n o f truth as correctness. We will investgate
the origin o f this tradition and e xam in e how this determ ination
o f truth was gr o u n d e d w hen it was first established, nam ely in
the p hilosop hy o f A ristotle. I f we tu rn back there, o u r reflection
also gains the ad van tage o f b e in g able to b rin g to the in n er eyes,
in its prim ordial originality an d purity, the con ception o f truth
that has b een valid ever since. H en ee we are su d d en ly confron ted with the task o f a historiographical consideration o f the
theory o f truth an d ju d g m e n t in A ristotle, whose p hilosop hy
stems from th e fou rth Century b e fo re Christ.
Now, if we view this historiographical task in the larger and
p rop er perspective o f ou r question, we will becom e disconcerted. For the decisive in tention o f ou r question ing is precisely
to free us fro m the p ast not because it is past, b u t because it is
groundless. W e w ant to raise questions on the basis o f o u r ow n
present an d fu tu re necessities. Instead o f that, we are now p rep arin g to lose ourselves in a historiographical consideration o f
the past. T h a t m ust signify a renunciation and a fligh t in the face
o f w hat is n e e d e d , nam ely to ask questions ourselves instead o f
m erely r e p o rtin g the opinions o f b y g o n e ages. It seems that such
a historiographical consideration acts against ou r ow n intention.
T h ere fo re we n eed a clarification o f the foundation al issues
especially with referen ce to the fu rth e r course o f o u r lectures.
a) The historiographical consideration o f the past.

E n terin g into history is perhaps n o t always and necessarily such
13- T h e traditional conception o f truth [34-35]
33
a fligh t in face o f the tasks o f the present. It is certainly possible

to consider the past from the view points an d according to the
Standards o f the livin g present. In d o in g so, the past is loosen ed
from its frozen state and is related to the present and m ade
contem porary. Such a consideration o f the past becom es a veritable reconnaissance o f it; for that is the very m ean ing o f the
word historiography [Historie]:
oro p ev to explore. T o us,
therefore, historiography m eans an exp loration o f the past

from
the perspective
o f the present. T h is
perspective can
thereby becom e self-eviden t and standard. For exam ple, Ranke,

in conscious Opposition to the p resu m ed historical constructions
o f H egel, believes he is p resen tin g the past ju s t as it was, yet d e finite guidelines o f interpretation are directin g him to o it is ju s t
that these are o th e r than the H egelian . Conversely, the Standards m ay be taken from the present an d ap p lied expressly as
such, an d then the past is explicitly m ad e contem porary. T h e s e
two sorts o f historiographical consideration are not basically distinct.
'
T o be sure, a question remains: if the Standards and gu idelines

o f a historiographical consideration are tak en expressly or
n o t from w hat is th en the present, is it thereby already d e cid e d
that these Standards are sufflcient to grasp the past? T h e fact
that a present is present, and w hat is cu rren t is today, does not
gu arantee that the presen t Standards correspo n d to w hat m ay be
the greatness o f a past an d are com m ensurable with it. In d e ed ,
every past can be p resen ted as tim ely fo r any age. T h is is the
source o f the co n fu sio n o f all historiographical considerations.
B u t it cou ld also be that a present is as frozen as the past, an d
that the Standards o f a present are m erely b ad residues o f a past
n o lon ger u n derstood . It could be that a present is altogeth er
c a u g h t u p in itself an d therefore precisely closed and shut o f f
against w hat the past has to say. T h e m ere relating o f the past to
w hat is currently presen t can attain new results, an d even does so
necessarily, for a presen t is always d iffe re n t than the previous
one. B u t these new historiographical results, which intoxicate
p eo p le and m ake th em think them selves superior in relation to
earlier historiographical science, are also already antiquated before they becom e truly new, because the present soon again
turns into an other, an d timeliness is m ost inconstant. T h e r e fo r e
all historiographical considerations are snares.
34
b) Historical reflection on the future, the future as the

beginning of all happenings.
B u t a historiographical consideration does not e xh au st the possible relation to history; so far fro m d o in g so, it actually im pedes
such a relation and cuts it off. W h a t we are calling historical reflection is essentially d ifferen t fro m a historiographical con sid eration. I f we consciously elabrate the distinction betw een the historiographical an d the historical even linguistically, an d ad here
to it over an d against the ordinary con fusion o f the two terms,
then this precisin in the use o f w ords is fou n d ed on a basic attitude o f th ou gh t. T h e word historical [geschichtlich] m eans
h a p p e n in g [das Geschehen], history itself as a being. H istoriographical refers to a kind o f cognition . We will not speak o f historical consideration b ut reflectio n . For reflection [B esin -
nung\ is lo o k in g for the m ean in g [Sinn] o f a h a p p en in g , the

m ean ing o f history. M ea n in g refers h ere to the o p e n regi n o f
goals, standards, im pulses, decisive possibilities, and p o w ers all
these b e lo n g essentially to h ap p en in g .
H ap p en in g as a way to be is prop er only to humanity. M an has
history because he alone can be historical, i.e., can stand and does
stand in that op en regin o f goals, standards, drives, and powers,
by withstanding this regin and existing in the m ode o f form ing,
directing,
acting,
carrying out,
and
tolerating.
O n ly
m an
is
historical as that being which, exposed to beings as a whole, and

in com m erce with these beings, sets him self free in the midst o f necessity. A ll non-hu m an beings are history-less, though, in a derived
sense, they can be historical, and are even necessarily so, insofar as
they belong within the circuit o f the com m erce o f m an with beings.
For exam ple, a work o f art possesses its history as work. T h is implies, however, that it does so on the basis o f its being created by
man, or, m ore precisely, on the basis o f its openin g up, as work, and
keeping open, the world o f man.
It is now clear that h ap p en in gs an d history are not w hat is bygon e an d w hat is considered as such, i.e., the historiographical.
B u t ju s t as little is this h a p p e n in g the present. T h e h a p p e n in g
and the h ap p en in g s o f history are prim ordially an d always the
future, that w hich in a con cealed way com es toward us, a revela-
13- T h e traditional conception o f truth [36-37]
35
tory process th at puts us at risk, an d thus is com p ellin g in a d vance. T h e fu tu re is the be gin n in g o f all h ap p en in g. E veryth in g
is enclosed within the begin nin g. E ven i f w hat has already b e g u n
an d w hat has already becom e seem forthw ith to have go n e beyo n d their be gin n in g, yet the la tte r ap p arently h avin g b ecom e
the p ast rem ains in pow er and abides, an d everythin g futu ral
encounters it. In all gen u in e history, w hich is m ore than a m ere
sequence o f events, the fu tu re is decisive: i.e., w hat is decisive are
the goals o f Creative activity, their rank, an d their exten t. T h e
greatness o f Creative activity takes its m easure from the e xten t o f
its pow er to follow u p the in nerm ost h id d e n law o f the b e g in n in g
an d to carry the course o f this law to its en d . T h ere fo re the new,
the deviating, an d the elapsed are historically unessential th o u g h
nonetheless inevitable. B u t because th e b e gin n in g is always the
most concealed, because it is in exhaustible and withdraws, and
because on the oth er han d w hat has alread y been becom es im m ediately the habitual, and because this conceals the b e gin n in g
th rough its exten sin , therefore w hat has becom e habitual needs
transform ations, i.e., revolutions. T h u s the original an d gen u in e
relation to the b e gin n in g is the revolutionary, which, th ro u g h the
upheaval o f the habitual, once again liberates the h id d en law o f
the b egin n in g. H en ee the conservative does not preserve the
b e g in n in g it does not even reach the begin n in g. For the co n servative attitu de transform s w hat has alread y becom e in to the
regu lar an d the ideal, which is then so u gh t ever anew in historiographical considerations.
1) The ambiguity o f the question of truth. The essence is not

what is indifferently universal but what is most essential.
T h e question o f truth is am biguous. W e seek the tru th : that
m eans we w ant to know the true u p o n which ou r acting an d B e in g are posited. We are asking the question o f tru th : that
m eans we are en d ea v o rin g to fin d the essence o f w hat is true. Essence is u n d erstood here as that w hich makes w hatever is true
true. W h en we aim at the essence, in divid u al truths d o n ot m at-
36
ter. T h e r e fo r e the question o f truth, in the sense o f the question

o f its essence, im m ediately encou nters the deep est suspicion; for
we desire w hat is true, why should we b e con cerned with truth
itself? T o be sure, it is presu p posed h ere w ithout fu rth e r reflection that the essence is a universal w hich applies to every p articular instance in the same w ay indifferently. B u t this m ig h t be to
m isunderstand the essence. T h e r e fo r e o u r reflection m ust reach
the point, in d eed as soon as possible, w here the question o f w hat
the essence itself is becom es u navoidable. It m igh t turn o u t that
the essence o f som eth in g is not the in d ifferen t b u t w hat is m ost
essential. In that case we w ould have to reverse the ap p aren tly
obvious d e m a n d We desire w hat is true, w hy should we be
con cerned w ith truth itself? an d say instead: We desire truth,
w hy should we be co n cern ed with the true? For then precisely
truth, the essence o f the true, w o u ld be w hat is gen u in ely true,
that which is desired in the ju st-m e n tio n e d d em an d , th o u g h
sought on a by-way.
2) The problematic character o f the obviousness

of the traditional conception of truth, and the
question of its legitimacy.
T h e first steps o f o u r deliberations have already shown that we
are not striving for an in differen t defin ition o f the essence o f the
true, in o rd e r to be ap p eased by it. W e freed ourselves fro m the
custom ary determ ination o f truth as the correctness o f an assertion by show ing how this determ ination is based on a m ore o riginal one that constitutes the gr o u n d o f the possibility o f correctness.
B u t as u navo idably as we were led to acknow ledge an o p e n n ess as we called it that is precisely how dubious it has becom e w hether we have in deed liberated ourselves from the custom ary con cep tio n o f truth th ro u g h this return to openn ess as
the gr o u n d o f correctness. In fact we are relying precisely o n the
custom ary con cep tion, so m uch so th at we are seeking a fo u n d a tion for this reliance and con sequ en tly want to con firm it all the
more.
We rely o n the custom ary con cep tio n o f truth as correctness,
w ithout h avin g fo u n d e d this con cep tio n sufficiently. We com e by
13. T h e traditional conception o f truth [39-40]
37
it as som ething traditional. T h e appeal to w h at has been h an d e d

dow n, the so-called tradition, is not a fou nd ation . N ot even i f
the traditional has b ecom e obvious. O bviou sness is always a very
problem atic assurance o f the legitim acy o f an intuition. For, on
the one hand, it is questionable to w hat e x ten t that which is su p posed to be obvious to the u n d erstan d in g is really u nderstood or
w hether we have h ere precisely a renu nciation o f the will to u n derstand and the ap p eal to thoughtlessness elevated to a p rin cipie. O n the oth er h an d , it could be asked w hat kind o f intelligibility or u n d erstan d in g is provid ing the standard here. W h at
m igh t be very obvious on a certain level o f u n d e rstan d in g the
m ost superficial can be w holly u nintelligible on the plane o f
the will to gen u in e com prehension.
If, consequently, the custom ary d eterm in atio n o f truth as correctness appears to us correct precisely w h en we reflect n o fu r th er on it, then this obviousness is n ot ye t a sufficient fo u n d a tion for the delim itation o f the essence o f the true.
{
3) Toward the foundation o f the customary conception

o f truth through a historical reflection on its origin.
The distinction between a historiographical
consideration and a historical reflection.
T h ere fo re , in o rd er to gain the fou n d ation o f the custom ary
conception o f truth, we will question back an d exam ine how it
was fo u n d e d w h en it was first p u t forth. T h u s we are forced to
turn to the philo sop h y o f A ristotle. T h a t m eans that instead o f
actually askin g the question o f truth b y ourselves and for ou rselves, i.e., for the fu tu re, we will lose ourselves in historiographical considerations an d reports about the ancient past.
W hat is h a p p e n in g here? A re we really actin g contrary to o u r
ow n intentions by re tu rn in g to history? N o. B u t we can on ly u n derstand that a reflection on history b elo n gs precisely an d essentially to the will to shape the futu re i f we distinguish betw een a
historiographical consideration and a historical reflection.
T h e historiographical, as the word itself is supposed to indicate, refers to the past insofar as it is e x p lo red and presented,
either expressly or inexpressly, from the perspective o f w hat
hap p en s to b e the present. Every historiographical consideration
38
turns the past as such into an object. E ven w here a historiograp h y o f the presen t is p u t forth, the very present m ust alread y be
bygone. A ll historiography is retrospective, even w h en it m akes
the past timely.
T h e historical does not den ote a m an n er o f graspin g an d exp loring b u t th e very h a p p en in g itself. T h e historical is not the
past, not even the present, b u t the fu tu re, that which is com m en ded to the will, to expectation , to care. T h is does not allow
itself to be con sid ered ; instead, we m ust reflect on it. W e have
to be con cern ed with the m ean ing, the possible standards, the
necessary goals, the ineluctable pow ers, and that from w hich all
hum an h ap p en in gs begin . T h e s e goals an d powers can be such
that they have alread y com e to pass in a h id d en w a y lo n g ago
b ut are precisely therefore not the past b u t w hat still abides and
is aw aiting the liberation o f its in flu en ce. T h e fu tu re is the origin
o f history. W h at is m ost futural, however, is the great b e gin n in g,
that w h ich w ithd raw in g itself co n stan tly reaches back the farthest and at the sam e tim e reaches forw ard the farthest. T h e h id den destiny o f all begin nin gs, however, is to seem to b e thrust
aside, overcom e, an d refuted by w hat they them selves b e gin an d
by what follows them . T h e ordinary character o f w hat is henceforth the ord inary becom es the lord over w hat is for ever the e xtraordinary character o f the be gin n in g. T h ere fo re , in o rd e r to
rescue the be gin n in g, and con sequ ently the futu re as well, from
tim e to tim e the dom in ation o f the ord inary and all too ordinary
m ust be broken. A n upheaval is n e e d e d , in ord er that the extraordinary an d the forw ard-reaching m igh t be liberated and
com e to power. R evolution, the u p h eaval o f w hat is habitual, is
the gen u in e relation to the b e gin n in g. T h e conservative, o n the
contrary, the preserving, adheres to an d retains on ly w hat was
b e gu n in the wake o f the b e gin n in g an d w hat has com e forth
from it. T h e b e g in n in g can never b e grasped th ro u g h m ere preservation, because to begin m eans to th in k and to act fro m the
perspective o f the fu tu re and o f w hat is extraordinary, an d from
the renunciation o f the crutches an d evasions o f the habitual an d
the usual.
T o be sure, even the conservative, the ad heren ce to w h at has
becom e, an d the m ere preservation an d care for the hitherto,
13. T h e traditional conception o f truth [41-42]
39
needs, as a h u m an attitude, standards an d guidelines. B u t it

draws them fro m w hat has becom e an d sees therein the regu lar
or the rule, an d elevates this to an id e a l w hich is then retrieved
everyw here and required again, an d th ro u g h this ever again
gains an ap p aren tly supratem poral validity.
c) The acquisition of the beginning in the experience o f its

law. The historical as the extensin from the future into the
past and from the past into the future.
W h at is conservative rem ains b o g g e d d o w n in the h istoriograp h ical; only w hat is revolutionary attains the d e p th o f history. Revolution does not m ean here m ere subversin an d destruction b u t
an upheaval an d recreatin g o f the custom ary so that the b e g in n in g m igh t be restructured. A n d because the original belo n gs to
the b egin n in g, the restructuring o f the b e gin n in g is never the
p o o r im itation o f w hat was earlier; it is entirely other an d nevertheless the same.
<
T h e b e gin n in g never allows itself to b e represented or considered in historiography. For, in that way, i.e., historiographically
considered, it is d e g ra d ed into som eth in g which has alread y becom e and is no lo n g er begin n in g. T h e b e gin n in g is on ly acquired w hen we creatively exp erien ce its law, and this law can
never becom e a rule bu t remains specific and particular, the
uniqueness o f the necessary. T h e uniqueness o f the necessary is
that sim ple w hich, as the most difficu lt, m ust ever and again be
accom plished com p letely anew.
H istoriographical considerations attain
only the past an d
never reach the historical. For the latter goes beyon d e veryth in g
historiographical, ju s t as m uch in the direction o f the fu tu re as
with respect to the past, and all the m ore in relation to the
present.
T h e present, w ith the inevitable obtrusiveness o f its results,
certainly appears to o ffe r in the m ost im m ediate way that which
com es to pass, an d yet history is precisely in any present w hat
com es to pass m ost gen uin ely an d is thus the most h id d e n .
T h e r e fo r e a historiographical consideration an d presentation o f
the present is th e m ost blind over an d against history. T h is k in d
40
o f historiography touches only the forem ost o f the foregrou n d ,

which is, o f course, taken by the co m m o n u n d erstan d in g as w hat
gen u in ely com es to pass.
T h e historical is the super-historiographical but for that reason is precisely n ot the supra-tem poral, not the so-called eternal
or timeless, since the historiographical only reaches the past and
not the gen u in e ly tem poral. T h e p ro p erly tem poral is the stirring, excitin g, b u t at the same tim e con servin g an d preservin g
extensin an d stretch from the fu tu re in to the past an d fro m the
latter into the form er. In this exten sin , m an as historical is in
each case a sp read. T h e presen t is always later than the futu re;
it is the last. It springs from the stru ggle o f the fu tu re w ith the
past. T h a t the co m in g to pass o f history em erges o u t o f the fu ture does n ot m ean , however, th at history can be m ad e an d directed by p lan n in g. Rather, m a n precisely in Creative shapin g can pen etrate into the u n certain an d incalculable o n ly by
m eans o f the will to provide a direction within w hat is necessary
and ou t o f a k n o w led ge o f the law o f the begin nin g.
Historical reflections are fu n d a m en tally d ifferen t from historiographical considerations. H istoriograp h y has, however, its
own p ro p er usefulness as instruction, m ediation o f cognitions,
and as research an d presentation; an d accordingly it also has its
ow n limits. H istorical reflection, o n th e contrary, is pssible, and
in deed necessary, on ly w here history is grasped creatively and
c o -form atively in the creation o f the poet, the architect, the
thinker, the statesm an. T h e s e are never historiographers w hen
they reflect o n w hat com es to pass. Since they are not h istoriographers, th ey accom plish the o p e n in g u p an d the new fo u n d a tion o f history. H istorical reflection is never the exp lo ration o f
the past, even i f this past presents the spirit o f an age. A ll history o f the spirit is always o n ly historiography b u t easily creates
the im pression o f b e in g a reflection, since it does in vestigate the
spirit. B u t there the spirit is on ly an o b je c t set aside an d represented as so m eth in g that on ce was an d is now past an d perh aps
is still rom antically lon ged for. O n the oth er hand, Jako b Burckhardt, w ho at times seems to be an in exact h istoriographer o r a
p ed an t with literary am bitions, is an yth in g but a historiographer.
H e is a thinker o f history th ro u g h an d th rou gh , to w h o m histo-
14. Return to the Aristotelian doctrine [43-44]
41
riographical science an d p h ilo lo gy on ly provide auxiliary services.

So m uch for a first, th o u g h not yet decisive, clarification o f the
distinction betw een a historiographical consideration and a historical reflection.
14. Return to the Aristotelian doctrine o f the truth o f the

assertion as a historical reflection.
I f now, in the co n text o f an original p o sin g o f the basic question
o f truth, we refer back to A ristotle in o rd e r to reflect on the
fou nd ation o f the traditional con cep t o f truth follow ing the
gu id elin e o f his th eo ry o f the truth o f the assertion, then this has
n o th in g to d o with a historiographical consideration o f a past
doctrine o f an alleg e d ly antiquated G re e k philosophy. T h is is so
n ot only because the problem atic A ristotelian con ception o f
truth is not b ygo n e, an d still tfoday th o ro u gh ly determ ines o u r
k n o w ledge an d decisions, but also because we are qu estion ing
the inauguration an d preservation o f the ordinary W estern co n cep t o f truth at its very outset and are d o in g so only in term s o f
o u r aw akening the question o f truth for the fu tu re as a o r p erhaps the basic
question
o f philosophy. T h is
q u e stio n in g
should it su cce ed will itself stand within a history whose b e g in n in g reaches back tem porally behind A ristotle and whose fu tu re
reaches far b eyon d us. T h ere fo re , the philosophical th o u g h t o f
the Greeks that we are reflecting on is n o t som ething b ygo n e,
n or is it som ething o f today, m ade to fit th e times. It is futu ral
an d therefore super-historiographical; it is the historical.
T h e essence o f truth is not a m ere con cep t, carried ab o u t in
the head. O n the contrary, truth is alive; in the m om entary form
o f its essence it is th e pow er that determ in es everythin g true an d
u ntrue; it is w hat is so u gh t after, w hat is fo u g h t for, w hat is suffered for. T h e essence o f truth is a h a p p en in g , m ore real an d
m ore efficacious th an all historiographical occurrences an d
facts, because it is their groun d. W h at is historical in all history
com es to pass in that great silence for w hich m an only rarely has
the right ear. T h a t we know so little or even n o th in g o f this h id -
42
T h e Essence o f Truth as Historical Reflection [44-45]
d en history o f the essence o f truth is n o p r o o f o f its u nreality b ut

only evidence o f ou r lack o f reflective power. I f we now distinguish, in o u r representations, betw een a historiographical co n sideration an d a historical reflection, n o th in g is gain ed as lo n g as
we d o not carry ou t that distinction an d p u t it to the test in a real
historical reflection. Yet we had to provide this flrst referen ce to
the distinction, at least in order to obvate a m isinterpretation o f
what follows as a m ere report abo u t doctrines lo n g b ygon e.
15. The Aristotelian foundation o f the correctness o f an

assertion as the essence o f truth.
B ecause o u r discussion o f G re e k p hilosop hy is not a historiographical ad d e n d u m b u t belongs to the very course o f o u r qu estioning, this course m ust be constantly surveyed and dom in ated .
L et us therefore briefly repeat the task. T h r o u g h a first reflection, the traditional conception o f truth as correctness becam e
questionable. So m eth in g w orthy o f qu estion ing show ed itself:
that m u ltiple-u nitary openness o f beings, on the basis o f which a
con form ity to som ething in representation, and con sequ ently
correctness, first becom e possible. I f we conceive an d u nderstand this openn ess as the g r o u n d o f the possibility o f correctness, we touch u p o n truth in its origin al and prop er essence. B u t
the return to this openness leads to the original essence o f truth
only if it can be shown in ad van ce with g o o d fou n d ation that correctness already in som e way contains, even i f not originally, the
essence o f truth. W h at is the case here? Is the in terpretation o f
truth as the correctness o f a representation or assertion a
fou n d ed one, an d how so? In o rd er to gain som e clarity, we will
ask this question in view o f the prim ordial positing o f the d e finition o f truth in Aristotle. T h e retu rn to the A ristotelian d o c trine is not to b e a m ere historiographical consideration b ut a
historical reflection.
T h e first step w ould be to reco u n t A ristotles do ctrin e o f the
essence o f the true and the false, an d then discuss the ap p u rtenance o f truth an d falsity to the assertion (\070s) an d the structure o f the assertion itself. B u t because the con tem p orary theory
o f truth an d o f the assertion is n ot essentially distinct from A ris-
16. T h e turning o f the question [45-47]
43
totles and has alread y been m ore or less elucidated with the exam ple o f the proposition, T h e stone is h ard , we m ay here
forego an elabrate presentation o f A risto tles doctrine.
Instead, we will ask im m ediately: how does Aristotle gr o u n d
this determ ination o f the essence o f truth? W ith w hat legitim acy
is the essence o f truth d eterm in ed to b e the correctness o f an assertion? T h e fou n d ation for this essential determ ination appears
to be easy, since it is obvious. It can be show n that in an assertion
o f the type, T h e stone is hard , there occurs a conform ity o f the
representation to the object. B u t is th at ap p eal to the occurrence
o f correctness in this or in an other proposition a fou n d ation for
the essence o f truth as correctness? B y no m eans. Such references
to correct propositions only provide exam ples o f correctness but
n ot the legitim atin g fou n d ation for the essence and for an essential determ ination. T h e question is n ot w h eth er and how the essence o f truth cou ld be elucidated th ro u g h the exam ple o f a correct proposition, b u t w hether an d h ow the positing o f the
correctness o f the assertion a l the essence o f truth is fo u n d e d .
T h is includes the question o f how the essence o f som ething is to
be posited at all an d w here this positing o f the essence w ould
have its p rincipie an d groun d. O bviously, this question can be
answ ered on ly i f we have first clarified w h at essence is as such,
w hether it be the essence o f truth or the essence o f a plant o r the
essence o f a w ork o f art.
16. The turning o f the question o f the essence o f truth into the
question o f the truth (essentility) o f the essence. The question o f
the Aristotelian conception o f the essentility o f the essence.
W h at makes u p the essence o f the essence or, as we say, essentiality? Essentility indicates w hat the essence as such really is,
w hat it is in truth. It delim its the truth o f the essence. We lo o k in
vain for the fo u n d atio n o f an essential d eterm in a tio n in ou r
case, the determ ination o f the essence o f tru th if we d o not
truly know w hat in gen eral is to be d e te rm in e d here and is to be
fo u n d e d in its determ ination, nam ely the essence itself.
W here have we arrived? Perhaps we now have som e in klin g o f
the rem arkable character o f the way forced u p o n us by the ques-
44
tion o f truth itself, if we relentlessly e n o u g h raise questions in

order to create a free path for its in n erm ost mpetus. W e are askin g the question o f truth, i.e., we are ask in g about the essence o f
truth. We are not seekin g in dividual truths b u t th e essence o f
truth. In the u n fo ld in g o f this question we have now reached the
point o f h avin g to raise the question o f the truth o f essence. A ll
this is enigm atic: the question o f the essence o f truth is at the
same tim e an d in itself the question o f the truth o f the essence.
T h e question o f tru th asked as a basic q u e stio n turns itself in
itself against itself. T h is tu rn in g, w hich we have now ru n u p
against, is an intim ation o f the fact that we are en terin g the com pass o f a gen u in e philosophical question. We can n ot now say
what the tu rn in g means, w here it is fo u n d e d , since we have
hardly en tered the portico o f the regi n o f philosophical reflection. O n ly o n e th in g is clear: i f all philosophical th o u g h t m ust
m ore unavoidably m ove in this tu r n in g the m ore it thinks originally, i.e., the m ore it approaches w h at in philosophy is p rim ordially and always th o u g h t an d reflected u p o n , then the tu rn in g
m ust b e lo n g essentially to the single focus o f philosophical reflection (B ein g as the ap p ro p riatin g event).
Since it was necessary to b rin g a first clarity to the task o f the
question o f truth, the search for w h at is true, w hether it be in d ividual truths o r the decisive truth, was delim ited against a reflection on the essence o f truth. T h is delim itation seem ed u n equ ivocal, and the philosophical task th ereby seem ed clear. Now,
however, we have seen that in the question o f the essence o f truth
not on ly is truth as such questionable b ut so is the perspective
within which we are raising the question: w hat we so casually and
easily cali the essence. We speak o f the essence o f the State, the
essence o f Ufe, the essence o f technology, co n ced in g perh aps
that we d o n ot ye t know the essence o f the State, o f life, an d o f
technology, th o u g h silently claim in g to know the oth er side,
nam ely w hat essence is in general, w h eth er it be a m atter o f the
S t a t e , life, techn ology, etc. B u t as obvious, and questionable, as is
the determ ination o f truth as correctness, that is how q u estionable, and obvious, is ou r view o f the essentiality o f the essence,
sup p osin g that in the usual talk ab o u t the essence o f things we
d o in tend som eth in g determ nate in the w ord essence an d d o
not sim ply ab a n d o n ourselves to an u n d eterm in ed w ord-sound.
16. T h e turning o f the question [4849]
45
T h ere fo re in o rd e r to decide how A risto tle laid the fou nd ation

for the subsequent com m on in terpretation o f the essence o f
truth, we have to know how he conceived the essence as such, the
essentility o f the essence, especially since th e Aristotelian d e te rm ination o f the essentility o f the essence becam e the standard
on e for the times that followed an d rem ains valid, despite som e
m odifications, even today. B u t we m ust again renounce a detailed presentation o f the Aristotelian d o ctrin e o f the essentility
o f the essence. For to d o it satisfactorily, a far-reaching in terp retation, especially o f the seventh book o f the Metaphysics, w ould
have to be articulated. W ithin the con tex t o f o u r lectures w hat
m atters is only the basic thrust o f the A ristotelian determ ination
o f the essentility o f the essence, i.e., that w hich corresponds to,
an d springs forth as, the in ner law o f the b e gin n in g o f O c cid e n tal thinking, an d w hich received from Plato its decisive stam p for
all subsequent W estern thought.
?
R E C A P IT U L A R O N
1) Rejection of three misinterpretations of the distinction

between historiographical consideration and historical
reflection. Science and historical reflection.
T h e present discussions in the history o f philosophy, as well as
those to com e later in the lecture course, are to be u nderstood in
the ligh t o f the distinction betw een a historiographical con sideration and a historical reflection. A dm ittedly, the distinction an d
w hat is distin gu ished in it have not b e en e xam in ed here thoro u g h ly in every respect. T h e r e fo r e the possibility o f m isunderstan d in g will inevitably persist. Yet three conspicuous m isinterpretations should expressly be rejected:
1.
Since we said historical reflection is accom plished on ly by
Creative thinkers w ithin various dom ains, on e m igh t suppose

that it can treat the past with com p letely u n b o u n d ed freedom .
B u t historical reflection is in fact b o u n d to the past in an essentially m ore rigorous way than historiography is. For w hat historical reflection rem em bers in the past is on e an d the same as the
fu tu re, which the creators establish, an d grasp as law, in their de-
46
cisions c o n ce rn in g their tasks. C o n trary to this, the points o f view

o f historiography toward the past are very arbitrary, an d insofar
as historiography as a science is con cern ed , they are chosen an d
evaluated prim arily according to w hether, and how far, th ey p ro m ote new historiographical cognitions, i.e., insofar as th ey enhance the progress o f the science. A lth o u g h con tem p orary historiography has accom m od ated itself to an insistent tim eliness o f
viewpoints, yet, accord in g to the still u n broken idea o f science,
every historiographical constatation is im p ortan t and relevant as
a b u ild in g stone for historiographical overviews (syntheses). H istoriography is b o u n d by past facts, in terp reted in a certain way
each time; historical reflection, however, is b o u n d by that h a p p en in g on the basis o f which facts can arise and can be in the first
place. Historical reflection is subject to a h igh e r and m ore rigo rous law than historiography is, a lth o u g h it m igh t seem , ju d g in g
by appearances, that the reverse obtains.
2. Since historiographical considerations are always subordinated to historical reflections, the erron eo us opin ion can arise to
the effect that historiography is alto geth er superfluous for history. B u t from the ord er o f rank ju s t m en tio n ed the on ly co n clu sin to be draw n is this: historiographical considerations are essential on ly
in sofar
as they
are
su p p o rted
by
historical
reflection, are directed by it in their very way o f question ing, an d

are d eterm in ed b y it in the delim itation o f their tasks. B u t this
also im plies the converse, that historiographical considerations
and cognitions are in deed indispensable. A n d that holds all the
m ore for an age w hich has to set itself free from the tram m els o f
historiography an d its con fusion w ith history. T h is liberation is
necessary because a Creative era has to protect itself equally
against an o ften ign oran t an d w eak im itation o f the past, and
against an irreverent sub m ergin g o f th e p a st two attitudes, apparently m utu ally op p osed, which all too readily find them selves
unified, th o u g h in itself this u nity is th o ro u gh ly con fused.
3. Finally, on e m igh t think that this distinction betw een historiographical consideration and historical reflection is e m p ty co n ceptual hair-splitting, unnecessary an d a d ead letter. L e t us show
this is not the case th ro u g h a pecu liar an d apparently extraneous
exam ple.
It is a w ell-kn ow n fact that the natural sciences adm it a histo-
i6 . T h e turning o f the question [50-52]
47
riographical consideration o f their ow n past m erely as an a d d e n d u m , since for th em w hat is past is sim ply w hat is no longer. N atural science itself on ly deais with presen t nature. T h is attitu de
was expressed som e tim e ag o by a fam ou s m athem atician d u r in g
a debate over the occu p an cy o f a professorial chair in classical
philology. H e d eclared that this chair shou ld be replaced by on e
in physical science, an d his arg u m en t was the following: classical
p hilology always deais on ly with w hat has already been; the natural sciences, on the contrary, consider n ot on ly w hat is presently
real, bu t they can also predict, and can calclate in advance how
the real has to be, an d in that way can lay the foundations o f technology. T h u s, the historiography o f natural science m erely con sists in past discoveries and theories, ones that have been overem e lon g ag o th ro u g h progress. T h e history o f science is for
science itself its historiography, that w hich the science constantly
leaves behind in its progress to ever new results. T h e historiography o f natural science does not b e lo n g to it or to its m eth od ology. T h r o u g h historiograpHical considerations o f the sequen ce
o f earlier theories an d discoveries on e can at m ost clarify how
m agn ificen tly far we have com e an d h ow backward earlier times
h ad been, d o m in ated by philo sop h y an d speculation with
their u nbridled dream s, which have now finally been shattered
by the exact an d sober consideration o f the faets. In this way
historiography can establish that a philosopher, such as A ristotle,
was o f the o p in ion that heavy bodies fall faster than ligh t ones,
whereas the faets o f m odern science prove that all bodies fall
equally fast. A historiographical consideration o f such a kind is
therefore an accou n t o f a grow th in progress, whereby w hatever
h ap p en s to be new is in terpreted as m ore progressive.
B u t above an d b eyo n d historiography, we still claim that historical reflection is possible and will even on e day prove to b e indispensable. H istorical reflection will question the basic e x p e r ience and basic con cep tio n o f the G reeks, or o f A ristotle in
particular, about n atu re, the body, m otion, place, an d tim e.
A n d historical reflection will reco gn ize that the G reek an d the
A ristotelian basic exp erien ce o f nature was o f such a kin d that
the velocity o f the fall o f heavy an d ligh t bodies and their b elo n gin g to a certain place cou ld not have b e en seen otherwise or d e term ined d ifferen tly than they were. A historical reflection will
4 8
realize that the G re e k theory o f natural processes did n o t rest on

insufficient
observation
but
on
an
o th e r p erhaps
even
d e e p e r con cep tio n o f nature that p recedes all particular observations. For A ristotle, physics m eans precisely the m etaphysics
o f nature.
A historical reflection will discern that even the m o d e rn Science o f nature is gr o u n d e d on a m etap hysics in such an u n con ditional way an d so firm ly and so m u ch a m atter o f course that
m ost scientists d o n ot suspect it in the least. A historical reflection
on the foundation s o f m o dern natural science will perceive that
the m u ch-acclaim ed facts, which m o d e rn exp erim en tal science
accepts as the sol reality, becom e visible as facts an d can be
fou n d ed on ly in ligh t o f a w holly d e te rm in e d m etaphysics o f nature, a m etaphysics that is not less op erative because con tem p orary scientists are n o lon ger acqu ain ted with it. O n the oth er
hand, the great scientists w ho laid the fou ndation s o f m o dern
natural science w ere great precisely in that they possessed the
pow er and the passion o f fou nd ation al th in k in g an d had the education for it as well.
A historical reflection will acknow ledge that it m akes utterly
no sense to m easure the A ristotelian theory o f m otion straightforw ardly against the results o f the research o f G alileo an d to
ju d g e the fo rm er as antiquated, the latter as progressive; for in
these two cases nature m eans som eth in g entirely d ifferen t. A c cord in g to historiographical calculation, m o d ern natural science
is certainly m ore ad van ced than the G reek , assum ing the technological dom in ation , and thereby also the destruction, o f n ature is in d eed p ro gress versus the preservation o f natu re as a
m etaphysical power. From the stand point o f historical reflection,
the ad van ced m o d e rn science o f natu re is not a whit m ore true
than the G reek; o n the contrary, a t m ost it is m ore u n true, because it is alto geth er ca u gh t in the w eb o f its ow n m ethod ology,
and, notw ithstan din g all its discoveries, it lets escape w hat is g e n uinely the object o f these discoveries: nam ely nature, an d m an s
relation to it, an d m ans place in it.
T h e historiographical comparison and account o f the past and
the present conclude in the progressiveness o f the present. Historical reflection on the past and on the future leads to an insight into
the groundlessness o f the contem porary relation (or lack o f rea-
i6 . T h e turning o f the question [53-54]
49
tion) to nature; it leads to the insight that the natural sciences, as in

general all sciences, in spite o f their progress, or perhaps precisely
because o f this progress, find themselves in a crisis. Indeed, as we
hear today, T h e prattle about the crisis o f science should finally be
toned down (immatriculation discourse o f the present rector, December, 1937). T h e crisis o f science does certainly not consist in its
not allowing professorships in paleontology, ethnology, ethnography, etc., or does it consist in its not b ein g relevant en o u gh to
life that it is all too much. We would d o well to stop speaking o f
the crisis o f science in such terms. For these decriers o f the crisis are
in fact basically in com plete accord with contem porary science, em brace it, and even becom e its best defenders, as soon as they find a
satisfying position within it. T h e crisis is quite otherwise and stems
not from 1933, and not from 1918, and not even from the m uchcriticized nineteenth Century, but from the beginning o f the m o d e ra age, which was not a mistake but a fate, and only a fate will
overcome it.
T h e most acute crisis o f tod&ys science m igh t consist precisely
in havin g no suspicion o f the crisis in w hich it is involved: in
oth er words, in b elievin g that it has b een sufficiently con firm ed
by its successes an d its palpable results. B u t n o th in g spiritual,
an d n o th in g w hich is to dom inate as a spiritual pow er an d is su p posed to be m ore than a business, can ever be validated by success and usefulness.
Historical reflections question the presen t and futu re o f science itself an d h eap sham e on its b e lie f in progress, for such reflections show that in matters o f essence there is no progress b u t
on ly the transform ation o f the same. For natural science, an d for
any science, historiographical considerations are perhaps on ly
an extrinsic concession to let its own past b e seen as som ething to
overcom e. H istorical reflection, on the contrary, belongs to the
essence o f all the sciences, insofar as it claim s to prepare an d to
form for them , b eyo n d every u sefu l result, an essential kn o w le d g e o f their subject m atter and o f the concom itant regi n o f
B ein g.
T h e sciences an d certainly, in the u ltm ate analysis, their establishm ent today in their total adm inistrative organization (the
university) are far from suspecting a n yth in g o f the necessity o f
historical reflection. W hy? B ecause this presum ably on ly abstract
50
distinction b etw een historiographical consideration an d historical reflection is n either e x p erien ced or grasped an d for the
time b e in g will not be grasped. For we have lo n g ag o b ecom e
used to the fact that a scientist can refer to ackn o w ledged accom plishm ents in his field and at the sam e time, with a distu rbin g
u nsuspectin g innocence, m ay be b lin d to all that provides his Science fou n d ation an d legitim acy. We even think this to be wondrous. We have lo n g ago fallen in to the most silly A m ericanism ,
whose principie is that the true is w hat succeeds an d everyth in g
eise is sp ecu lation, i.e., a dream far rem oved from life. We wallow again a lr e a d y all those w ho a short time ag o were still facin g each oth er as hostile brothers b u t always b e lo n g ed fu n d a m entally to g e th e r in a jovial an d even tipsy optim ism w hich lets
com e to life again the Gaudeamus igitur and the Ergo bibamus as
the coronation o f academ ic life (im m atriculation discourse o f the
den o f the school o f m edicine). H ow o ften an d for how lon g
m ust we G erm a n s again and again be struck with blindness?
O p tim ism is a beautifu l thing; b u t it is only the repression o f
pessimism, an d both pessim ism an d its cou n terp art arise on ly on
the basis o f a con ception o f reality, an d consequently o f history,
in the sense o f a business, the prospects o f which now are calculated as h o p e fu l an d now as the opposite. O p tim ism an d pessim ism exist o n ly within the com pass o f a historiographical con sideration o f history. O ptim ists are n ot p eo ple w ho ge t rid o f
pessimism for w hat other reason w ould they have to be op timists? H istorical reflection, on the oth er hand, stands outside o f
this Opposition betw een optim ism an d pessimism, since it does
not cou n t on the bliss o f progress an d still less on an u n fortu n ate
arrest o f progress or even regress. Instead, historical reflection
works toward the preparation o f a historical existence w hich lives
u p to the greatness o f fate, to the p eak m om ents o f B ein g.
T h e s e rem arks have been in ten d ed to indcate that the distinction betw een historiographical consideration an d historical reflection
is n ot a
free-floatin g
sp ecu ladve construction
of
th o u g h t b u t represents the m ost stern necessity o f a decisin

w hose acceptan ce o r neglect is decisive for ourselves an d for ou r
destiny in history (and also for the G e rm a n university, in which
we are lo o k in g ahead , according to the op in ion o f the many, w ho
16. T h e turning o f the question [56-57]
51
are thoughtless by profession, to the m ost m arvelous times as in

the days o f W ilhelm II).
2) The path from the question of the essence o f truth to the

question o f the truth (essentility) o f the essence.
T h e task o f these lectures com pels us to historical reflection. We
are raising the question o f truth. We en tered into the ordinary
and lo n g-stan d in g traditional con cep tio n o f truth as the correctness o f an assertion. We fou n d in this con cep tio n som ething w orthy o f q u e stio n in g that openness o f b ein gs over and against
m an and o f m an for beings. We ap p ea le d to this openness as the
gro u n d o f the possibility o f correctness. T h e grou n d is the m ore
original. T h e r e fo r e the question-w orthy openness m ust com prise the m ore original essence o f truth. T o be sure, this is so on ly
u n d e r the presu pposition that the traditional con ception o f
truth for its p art expresses already in gen eral som ething o f the
essence o f truth an d does so \rith g o o d foundation . W h at is the
case here?
H ow and th ro u g h w hat was this con cep tio n o f the essence o f
truth as the correctness o f an assertion fo u n d e d w hen A ristotle
in troduced it? H o w can a claim about the essence be fo u n d e d in
the first place, w h eth er it be the essence o f the true, the essence
o f the beautifu l, the essence o f plants, the essence o f technology,
etc.? Just how are we to understan d the essence o f som ething?
W hat, in truth, d o we m ean by the w ord essence? In short,
w here does the truth o f the essence lie?
W hile we were ask in g about the essence o f truth and w anted to
lay the fou n d ation for a determ ination o f the essence o f truth,
we were driven to the question o f the truth o f the essence. T h a t
is quite in order, in sofar as a p hilosophical question is at stake.
B ecause in such q u estion in g n o th in g m ay rem ain u nquestioned.
I f we ask about the essence o f truth, an d m ake no attem pt to
clarify ou r u n d e rstan d in g o f w hat is m ean t by essence, th en we
are on ly h a lf asking; fro m a philosophical standpoint, we are not
qu estion ing at all.
Since we are now question ing how A risto tle fo u n d e d the d e term ination o f the essence o f the true, we m ust clarify w hat he
52
understood b y essence. T h a t is the m ore necessary since the

characterization o f the essentiality an d the truth o f the essence in
Aristotle an d Plato becam e for posterity, right u p to the present
m om ent, the standard one, as d id their determ ination o f the essence o f truth. A n d this con nection is not accidental.
Chapter Two
T h e Question o f
the Truth (Essentiality)
o f the Essence
17. Historical reflection on the

Aristotelian-Platonic determination o f the
essentiality f the essence.
a) The four characteristics o f the essentiality

o f the essence in Aristotle.
We will now attem pt to reflect on the A ristotelian-Platonic d e te rm ination o f the essentiality o f the essence. T h e essence o f a
thing, so it is said, is on e an d universal an d applies to the m any
particular instances. T h e essence table indicates w hat applies,
as som ething on e an d the same, to every table as table. T h e u n iversal is therefore a standard over the w hole exten t o f its real
an d possible particularizations. T h e G reeks use the word x a x
(cf. xotTiTYopia) to sign ify w hat exten d s over particulars and
holds for them from above. T h e w hole w hich includes every
particular within itself is called 8X.ov. A ccord ingly, the essence is
w hat holds for m any: t xa-oXou.
T h is essence, as it were, hovers over the particular an d is
therefore also con ceived as 7vos. We usually transate this as
gen u s or class : table in general is the class with regard to the
species: d in n er table, w riting table, sew ing table, which really
occur them selves first in their repeatedly varied particularizations. Tvos, however, in the m ore original sense o f the w ord,
54
T h e Question o f the Truth o f the Essence [5860]
m eans lineage, derivation, origin. O n ly by the p revailing dom ination o f logic d id 7vos as origin becom e 7vos as d a ss in the
sense o f the h ig h e r universality o f the typ e .
T h e essence is that from which a particular thing, an d in deed
in what it is, has its origin, w hen ce it derives. T h e r e fo r e the essence o f a th in g, o f any particular whatever, can be con ceived as
that w hich the th in g already in a certain sense was b efore it becam e the singular th in g it is. For if there were not already no
m atter h o w som eth in g like table in general, then never cou ld
any particular table be fabricated; w hat the particular table is
supposed to b e as a table w ould b e altogeth er lacking. T h e r e fo r e
A ristotle also conceived the essence as the B e in g (elvai) o f the
particular b ein g, w hat it the p a rticu la r already was (t t^p) b efore it becam e this particular. T h e essence was thus exp ressed accordingly: to t -qv etvai.
A ll these determ inations o f the essentility o f the essence, t
xaftXou (the general), to 7vos (the origin), to t t]v e lv a i (the
B e in g it was) con ceive the essence as that which lies in ad van ce o f
particular things an d so lies at their fo u n d a tio n in r o / x | X v o v .
We are now in a position to u n d erstan d the statem ent b y which
A ristotle b egin s his ow n p ro p er exam ination o f the essence as
such: X iytrai 8 tj otxrct, ei (ir| irXeovotx&s,
v Trrapor ye
(jLXiCTTa:1 T h e essence {prelim inary translation follow in g the

usual interpretation} is nam ed (and represented) p red om in ately
in fou r ways, i f not still m ore m anifoldly. x a i 701p t t t )v t t v a i
x a i t o xaftXau x a i t o 7evo<; oxwa Soxe etvoa
xarou, x a i
TTapTov t o t w v t o v7Toxe(Xvov:2 For the B e in g it was an d also

the gen eral an d likewise the origin seem to form th e essence o f
particular things, an d similarly the fou rth o f the characterizations: the u n d e rly in g fo u n d atio n .
T h a t A risto tle speaks here ab o u t Soxe (it seems so) indicates
that he h im se lf will not allow these fou r characterizations o f the
essence p red elin eated by Platonic philo sop h y as determ inations
o f essentility. H ow A ristotle specifically decides (elim inating
xaftXai) an d 7vos) will be show n in o u r discussion o f that part
o f his treatise (Met. Z).
1. Aristotle, Metaphysica. Ed. W. Christ, Leipzig 1886. Z 3, 1028b 33ff.

2. Ibid.
i7- Historical reflection [6061]
55
b) The essence as the whatness o f a being. Whatness

as i8ta: the constantly present, what is in view
in advance, the look (eios).
We are reflectin g on ly on w hat is fu n d a m en tal in the determ in ation o f the essentiality o f the essence, as it was stated on ce an d
for all in the Platonic-Aristotelian p hilo sop hy and becam e norm ative for posterity. T h a t is, we are reflectin g on w hat we o u rselves ordinarily m e a n even if in a very indeterm inate w a y
w hen we speak ab o u t the essence o f a th in g. Insofar as we are
successful in d e te rm in in g m ore precisely w hat we m ean by essence we will also be capable o f e xam in in g m ore exactly how the
essence o f so m e th in g e.g., the essence o f tru th is posited,
grasped, and fo u n d e d , and w hat sort o f fou nd ation b elongs to
truth itself, accord in g to its essence.
T h e first characterization A ristotle brings u p with regard to
the essence is that it contains the universal e.g., the essence table is that which is com m on to all in divid ual tables and therefore
in an assertion ab o u t them is valid for all tables. Plato h ad already characterized the essence as w hat is com m on over and
against the particularizations and h ad designated it with the
am e t o x o i v v
. E ver since then, this characterization o f th e es-
sence as the universal has rem ained the m ost usual one. B u t it is
also in fact the m ost superficial, for n o e x ten d e d deliberation is
need ed to see that the characterization o f the essence as xoivv,
as w hat is com m on to many, is not sufficient. T h e essence o f the
table is not the essence because it is valid for m any particular tables, real or possible, b u t the reverse: o n ly insofar as it is the essence can it ap p ly to the individual tables. T h e character o f the
xoivv cannot be the gen uin ely distinctive m ark o f the essence
b u t is only a possible consequence o f the essence. We m ust say
possible, because i f we ask about the essence o f Plato or o f Frederick the G reat, then we are certainly seekin g the essence o f
these individual m en , b u t here it is the essence o f som ething
which is, by its very natu re, precisely singular and u n iq u e a
kind o f essence th at precisely exclu des b e in g valid for many.
In this way it is clear that what is essential in the essence can not
be the xoivv b u t that which admits, or dem ands, that the essence be valid for the m any individuis. B u t w hat is that? W h at
56
T h e Question o f the Truth o f the Essence [61-62]
do these two thinkers say w ho have decisively d eterm in ed all

W estern speech an d th o u g h t ab o u t the essence o f things?
R eview ing the rest o f A ristotles characterizations o f the essence, we com e u p o n a determ ination that is so sim ple it says
n o th in g to us: the essence is w hat we seek w hen we ask t ccttiv:
what is this? W h at is this here an d that there? A plant, a house.

T h e essence is the t e lv a i the w hatness [Wassein] o f a b ein g. To
ask what som eth in g is is all too fam iliar to us and to earlier gen erations. W h a t som eth in g is is its essence. B u t w hat is this w hat
itself? Is there an answer? T o be sure. Plato provid ed it. W h at
som ething is, the whatness (to t e lv a i), e.g., o f a house o r a m an,
is what is con stan tly present in that som ething. In all ever so d ifferen t houses w hat is constant is what th ey are, h ou se, an d conversely, what they are, houses in all th eir variety and ch an ge, is the
constant. A hou se cou ld not collapse i f it were not a house.
T h is constant presence is w hat we have in view in advan ce,
th o u g h w ithou t con sid ering it explicitly, w h en we am e an d e x p erience w hatever we en cou n ter as w hat it is, e.g., as a house.
W h en we en ter a house we pay atten tion to the door, the staircase, the halls, an d the rooms, an d o n ly to these, for otherw ise
we cou ld n ot m ove aro un d in it at all. O n the oth er h an d , we d o
not pay attention explicitly and in the sam e way to w hat all th at is
in its unity, nam ely house. N evertheless, precisely w h at it is,
house, the essence, is always sighted in advance, th o u g h not e x plicitly considered. In fact, if we d id e n g a g e in such a con sid eration o f the essence we w ould never com e to enter the hou se an d
live in it. N evertheless, again, w hat the th in g is, the constantly
present, m ust b e sighted in ad van ce an d in d eed necessarily so.
T o see is in G re e k I8ev; w hat is in sight, precisely as sigh ted, is
8ea. W hat is sighted is what the b e in g is in ad van ce an d c o n stantly. T h e w hat it is, the w hatness, is the
8a; an d con-
versely, the id ea is the whatness, an d the latter is the essence.

M ore precisely, an d m ore in the G re e k vein, the ISea is the look
som ething offers, the aspect it has an d, as it were, shows o f itself,
the eBos. O n ly in ligh t o f w hat is seen in advance an d constantly,
yet not e xp licitly observed, e.g., house, can we e xp erien ce and
use this d o or as a door, this staircase as a staircase to this storey
with these room s. I f that were n ot in sight, how w ould m atters
then stand? You m ay think that o u t fo r yourselves.
17- Historical reflection [62-63]
57
Essence
t
xa-ciXou
T 7 VOS
t t T)v e tv a i (fl priori)
to tm oxeiêvov (subjectum)
T XOIVV
T Tt oTiv (quidditas)
TO 6 lOOS
ISa
otxrCa (essentia)
1) Four characterizations o f the essentility of the essence in

Aristotle. The whatness in Plato: the iBot as what is sighted
in adv^nce, the look.
We are a b id in g with the question: how does A risto tle i.e.,
G reek p hilosop hy in g e n e ra l fo u n d the essence o f truth and
the definition o f the essence o f truth as the correctness o f an assertion? T o gain the ans wer we m ust ask im m ediately an d before
all eise: how d o the Greeks conceive w hat we call essence? In
w hat consists for them the essentility o f the essence?
First o f all with referen ce to A ristotle, Metaphysics Z, we tried to
elucdate, in a few broad strokes, that an d how there can still be
decided som eth in g about the essentility o f the essence. T h e result was the follow ing: A risto de m entions prim arily fo u r characterizations o f the essentility o f the essence; these stand in a m aterial con nection an d can be synthesized in on e o f them .
1. T h e essence is w hat som ething is in general, w hat applies
over the entire e x ten t o f the particular instances: t xa'&A.ou.
2. T h e essence is that from which anything, in w hat it is as
such, has its origin, w hence it stems: t -yvos. A n in divid ual
house is o f the gen us: house in general.
3. T h e essence can therefore also b e designated as w hat som eth in g already was, before it becam e w hat it is as an individual. A n
individual hou se is n ot first a house as an individual th in g, b u t
w hat it is as this in divid ual thing, n am ely house, was already.
58
A n d that was, n o t because there w ere already oth er in divid ual

houses before this one, but because, in ord er for this o r that
house to beco m e an d be w hat it is, som eth in g like house in g e n eral m ust exist an d be given. Con sequ en tly, hou se is, with regard to the constructed in dividual house, w hat already w a s t o
t t |v
etvai. W ith this determ ination is con n ected the on e that be-
cam e usual in the subsequent th in k in g o f the West an d received

a special stam p in K ants philosophy: th e essence as w hat is prior
to the thing, d e riv in g from w hat is earlier: the a priori.
4.
In all these determ inations, the essence is w hat lies over or
before the in divid ual, or w hat lies u n d e r it as its gro u n d :
t o
VTToxefxevov.
A fte r this first perspective, it was th en o u r task to sketch m ore
precisely w hat we gen u in ely m ean by essence, especially since
o u r con cep t o f essence is still entirely fo u n d e d on the G re e k one.
T h e most fam iliar characterization o f the essence, the on e that
is still usual today, th o u g h also the m ost superficial, is the firstm entioned: the essence is t o xadX ov, conceived by Plato as t o
x o iv v
.A
m o m en ts reflection show ed, however, that the univer-
sality and its applicability to m any are n ot them selves the essentiality o f the essence b u t only its consequences. T h e universal table in gen eral is not the essence because it applies to m any
particular tables, b u t it applies to the m any and can d o so only
because there is in this universal, in w hat is com m on to all the
particularizations, som ething identical, an d that is w here the essence resides.
W h at th en is this identity taken in itself, abstracting fro m the
m erely subsequent applicability to the in dividual instances? We
said the essence is w hat som eth in g is, t o t c c t t i v (quidditas). A n d
w hat now is this, w hat som ething is, the whatness? N o fu rth er
answer seems possible. N evertheless Plato p rovided an answer,
an answer w hich becam e h en ceforth p erhaps the m ost consequential, in fluential, and disastrous philosophical defin ition in
W estern thinking: the essence is w hat som ething is, an d we encou nter w hat it is as that which we constantly have in sight in all
our com p ortm en t to the thing. W h e n we enter a house an d live
in it we constantly have hou se in sight, i.e., house-ness. I f this
were not seen, we cou ld never exp erie n ce and enter stairs, hall,
room , attic, or cellar. B u t this house-ness, which stands in view, is
17- Historical reflection [65-66]
59
not thereby con sidered an d observed the way the individual window is, toward w hich we walk in o rd er to close it. H ouse-ness is
not even observed incidentally. It is not observed at all; yet it is in
sight, and precisely in an em in en t way: it is sighted in advance.
T o see and to sight are in G re e k l8etv, an d w hat is in sight, in
its bein g sighted, is ISa. W h at is sighted is w hat som eth in g is,
the whatness, the essence. H enee the essence o f som ething is the
L8ot, and conversely the idea, w hat is sighted in this d e te rm nate sense, the aspect som ething offers in w hat it is, is the essence.
2) How to widerstand the essence sighted in advance.

If, in ou r im m ediate com p ortm en t tow ard individual beings, we
did not have the essence already in sight, or, Platonically expressed, i f we d id n ot have the ideas o f individual things in
view in advan ce, then we w ould be blind, and w ould rem ain
blind, to everyth in g these things are as individuis, i.e., as such
an d such, here an d now, in these o r those relations. A n d still
more: accord ing to the way and to the e xten t that we regard the
essence, we are also capable o f e x p erie n cin g and d eterm in in g
w hat is u niqu e in the things. W h at is view ed in advance an d how
it is in view are decisive for w hat we factually see in the in divid ual
thing. T h is basic rule, which is n ot at all considered by ordinary
th o u g h t an d is too rarely noticed in spite o f all the directives
p oin tin g toward it, becom es especially clear in a cou n ter-exam ple. W hat follows is a particular ly im pressive one.
In the course o f the battle aroun d the citadel o f V erdun, in the
sp rin g o f 1 9 16 , Fort V aux was to be storm ed. T h e com m an d er o f
the divisin selected for the attack was p rep arin g for it o n the
n ight o f M arch 8 -9 . D u rin g the night, a dispatch from a cavalry
officer arrived at the com m an d post o f the divisin: H ave
reached Fort V au x w ith three Com panies. T h e general transm itted the m essage that n igh t in the form : Fort V aux is taken. Im m ediately the w hole fron t knew: the fo rt is occupied b y us! A t
daw n, h u n d red s o f binoculars were trained on the fort. O u r
black-w hite-red banners could be seen w avin g over the fort; G e r m an soldiers w ere seen w alking on the ram parts; pyram ids o f
ou r rifles were seen Standing there. T h e crow n prince personally
6o
h an d ed ou t to the divisin com m an d e r the m edal Pour le m rite. B u t no sooner d id the crow n prince leave the divisin head quarters than a m essenger b ro u gh t th e news that e v e ryth in g was
in error, the fort was still in French han ds and in fact it was.
Were
the
black-w hite-red
banners,
the
soldiers
m archin g
around, an d the rifles optical illusions? N o the ones w h o were

lookin g th ro u g h the binoculars saw very well, and they co u ld not
see otherwise. T h e mistake lay n ot in the seeing b ut in w h at they
had in view in advance, the storm ed fort, on the basis o f w hich
fore-sight th ey then interpreted in such an d such a way w hat they
saw.
E veryth in g that we see in particulars is always d e te rm in e d by
w hat we have in view in advance. T h e mistake d id n ot reside in
the seeing b u t in the im precise dispatch o f the cavalry officer, or
in the fau lty interpretation by divisin headquarters. H ave
reached the fo rt m eant only I am stan d in g before the ram parts
o f the fort an d d id not m ean: I took it. T h is dispatch an d its
interpretation an d circulation created that fore-sight on th e fort
which then becam e the {moxei|xevov for the ap p arently incorrect seeing. W h a t is essential is n ot w hat we presum ably establish with exactness by m eans o f instrum ents an d gadgets; w hat is
essential is the view in advance which first opens u p the field for
an ything to b e established. So it h ap p en s that we, lost as we usually are in the activities o f observing an d establishing, believe we
see m any things an d yet d o not see w hat really is.
18. The Greek determination o f the essence (whatness) in the
horizon o f an understanding o f Being as constant presence.

a)
The determination of the essence (whatness) as the
beingness (owCa) of beings. The understanding o f Being
as constant presence is the ground for the interpretation o f
beingness (oixja) as ISa.
In Platonic term s, the view in ad van ce o f the aspect som eth in g
offers, the view o f its elSos, provides the
I8a, that w hich the
th in g is, its essence. H erew ith the essentility o f the essence is ind eed characterized quite u nequ ivocally an d beyon d m ere what-
18. T h e G reek determ ination o f the essence [67-68]
61
ness: the essence is the whatness o f som ething, and this is determ ined as the d o m in an t look, 8ea. B u t how does Plato com e to
this characterization o f the essentiality o f the essence? Is it obvious?
N ot in the least, alth o u gh we have lo n g ag o accustom ed o u rselves to m ore or less thoughtless talk ab o u t the Ideas. For if
the essence is id en tified with w hat som eth in g is, with the w hatness, then the essence characterizes w hat a b e in g is as such. In
the essence as w hatness or what-it-s, there resides therefore a
con ception o f the b e in g with regard to its B ein g. A bein g is in
G re e k t v , and w h at universally d eterm in es a bein g as a b e in g
is the xoivv, the b e in g in its beingness [Seiendheit], the 'v in its
o m a . B ecause the G reeks conceive the essence as the whatness
o f som ething an d in terp ret the latter as Id e a , therefore the essence m eans the sam e as the b e in g n m o f beings, oxra, an d
therefore the oxra o f the ov is the 8a, an d therefore we can
an d should transate oxra, which actually an d only denotes b e ingness, with essence. T h is, how ever, as the general op in ion
confirm s, is not at all obvious, and above all not for us m o dern
a n d con tem porary thinkers.
T h e reason the G reeks u nderstand essence as whatness is that
they in general u n d erstan d the B e in g o f b ein gs (oxra) as w hat is
constant and in its constancy is always present, and as present
shows itself, an d as self-show ing offers its lo o k in short, as look,
as 8a. O n ly on the basis o f this u n d e rstan d in g o f B ein g as co n stant self-o p e n in g an d self-show ing presen ce is the interpretation o f the beingness o f b e in g s hen ee the interpretation o f
oxra as L8a possible and necessary.
b) The Greek understanding o f the 8ea.

In ord er to ascertain the correct u n d erstan d in g, i.e., the G re e k
u n derstan din g, o f the
8a, we m ust em phasize once m ore:
the L8a eiSos is the look som ething offers in its w hat, the
look som ething exhibits o f itself. W hy d o we stress this?
A n objection cou ld im m ediately be m a d e especially o n the
basis o f the usual m o d e rn m odes o f th in k in g that the characterization o f the w hatness as 8a precisely does not fulfill w hat
w e desired, nam ely a determ ination o f the whatness in itself. For
62
if the whatness is characterized as som eth in g seen, th en it is only

determ ined w ith regard to the way we encou nter it an d grasp
it with regard to the way it stands over an d against us, an d not
as it is in itself. T h is possible objection m isunderstands the G re e k
concept o f B ein g, which is precisely self-em ergin g an d self-show in g presence. C ertain ly in the n otion o f the 8a there resides a
relation to 8etv as a m ode o f p ercep tio n . B u t the p erceivin g o f
beings as such is an
Sev only b ecause a b e in g as such is self-
showing: l&a.
A dm ittedly, we m ust note here that as soon as the G re e k co n ception o f b ein gs as such got lost, i.e., becam e u n d eterm in ed , ordinary, and
d isto r te d especially b y its translation in to the
Latin then the relation o f the L8a to 8ev p u sh ed itself into

the foregrou n d. T h e L8a was no lo n g e r u n derstood on the basis
o f beings an d their basic character o f presence, bu t as an im age,
the cou n terp art to, an d the result of, a particular ap p reh en sion
an d representation. T h e
L8a b ecam e a m ere representation
(percipere-perceptio-iha) and, at the sam e time, a generalization

from the p articular (Descartes, nom inalism ).
T h e in terpretation o f B e in g in term s o f presence is the sol
reason that for the G reeks the b eingness o f beings was prim arily
determ ined by the whatness. For w hat a table is as table b elongs
to every table, w h eth er it be on e actually there or on e only
th o u g h t o f an d w ished for. T h e w hatness is the constant. T h a t an
individual table, as we say today, exists, is actual and at han d,
this its reality or e xisten ce does n o t at all pertain to its essence. From a rigorous Platonic way o f thinking, the essence o f a
b e in g is impaired by its en tan glem en t w ith reality, it loses its p urity
and so in a certain sense its universality. For exam ple, w h en the
essence table is actualized here an d now in this specific kind o f
w ood and with these specific dim ensions an d shape, w hat is actual is on ly a particular table, an d the essence table is not
thereby fu lly actual in all its possibilities and variations b u t is restricted. T h o u g h t an d seen in the G reek-Platon ic way, the single
table here an d now is certainly not n o th in g and henee is a b e in g
(ov), bu t on e w hich, m easured against the essence, is a constriction and therefore p rop erly should n o t be (|xfj), a (ir) o v
. For the
Greeks, in the in dividual things su rro u n d in g us an d in their relations, w hat p ro p erly is is precisely n ot the here an d now, such
i8 . T h e G reek determ ination o f the essence [69-71]
63
an d such, the particular this b ut is, quite to the contrary, the

w hat o f the in divid ual thing, that w hich is sighted in advance,
the idea. Even A ristotle thinks in this Platon ic-G reek m o d e
despite certain m odiflcations.
Today, however, i f a table is real as here an d now, then we say
it is, it exists, w hereas the idea is for us som ething only rep resen ted and im agin ed, a m ere th ou gh t, an d precisely not p ro p erly real. T h e r e fo r e for us today ideas are worthless if they are
n ot realized. We are interested in realization an d success, to such
an exten t that in the pursuit o f success the ideas finally ge t lost.
Success as such, however, needs to be au gm en ted by m ore an d
m ore successes, hen ee by their n u m b er an d degree. T h e r e fo r e
m ore velocity is a success, whereas the idea velocity rem ains
the same, at m ost b e co m in g em ptier an d m ore worn out.
In G reek th o u g h t, this reality o f the p articular does not b e lo n g
to the p rop er an d first essence o f beings, for that is con ceived
on ly as the whatness. T h e single decisive question as regards the
essence is w hat som eth in g is, rfot w h eth er it exists at han d as an
individual. For, this B e in g as b e in g at h an d , real occurrence,
m eans, from the standpoint o f the w hatness as 8a, som ething
that only accedes to the idea, is accidental, and has no duration.
A n individual table can be destroyed, an d it did not at all exist
prior to its fabrication. Insofar as, for the G reeks, B ein g m eans
constant presence, the beingness o f beings (the oxra o f the 8v) is
determ inable on ly as the whatness in the sense o f 8a.
T h e con sequ ence o f this is com p letely strnge to our way o f
thinking, nam ely that for the Greeks the existence and reality
o f beings, henee precisely w hat we are w ont to den ote as the B e in g o f beings, does not at all b elo n g to the beingness o f beings.
H enee in the course o f W estern history since the time o f the
G reeks, there m ust have occurred a reversal in the con ception o f
B e in g , whose im p ort we still d o not suspect and appreciate, because we con tin u to stum ble on qu ite thoughtlessly in the afterm ath o f this reversal. T h e reversal in the con ception o f B e in g is
all the m ore en igm atic in that it carne to pass entirely within the
fram ew ork and o n the basis o f the in terpretation o f B e in g first
acquired by the G reeks themselves.
To the e xten t that even today we still ask about the essence in
the traditional way, we are asking abo u t the whatness and are ex-
T h e Question o f the Truth o f the Essence [71-72 ]
64
clu d in g the presen ce at hand, the reality, o f the in dividual being.

We are in a way th en asking ab o u t the 8a, th o u g h in th e sense
o f the xoivv, the universal. Yet even in this con ception o f the
essence there is im p lied an abstraction from the in dividual b ein g
as here an d now, such and such.
19. The absence of a foundation for Aristotle's essential

determination o f truth as the correctness o f an assertion. The
question o f the meaning o f foundation.
We are now better prepared for the question that occasioned these
deliberations about the essence as such. T h e questions is: how does
Aristotle fou n d the essential determ ination o f truth in the sense o f
the correctness o f an assertion? W hy does the whatness o f truth reside in the correctness o f an assertion? T o what extent is the correctness o f an assertion the idea o f truth and consequendy the
universal that pertains to everything true as such?
T h e first step will be to look ab o u t in A ristotle h im self a n d see
how he fou n d s this essence o f truth an d its positing. A n d here
a rem arkable th in g appears: no fou n d ation is given. T h e essential determ ination o f truth is sim ply proclaim ed. W h at is true
is that represen tin g and m ean in g an d saying which is |xoiov,
similar, correspo n d in g, to the -irpdryixaTa; and the false is w hat
is vavTws
t) Tot -ri'p'yfjurra.1 W h at can be true o r false, w hat
proves to be the seat o f this possibility an d consequently the locus

o f truth as con form ity and correctness, is the X'vos, the assertion, the asserting thought: ctu-yp ori t i|ie0 8 os x a i t Vrys v
akX kv 8iavoiQt.2 T h a t here it is said exp licairn kv to ls irp-yp-aatv [It is n ot in the
Tots 'irp'Yima-iv,. . .
itly o f the truth:
things Tr.] m ay be a hint that it does precisely b elo n g there in a

certain, an d p erh ap s m ore original, way.
O n e m ight try to vindcate this fact, that the essential determ ination o f truth as the correctness o f an assertion is not fou nd ed but
only proclaimed, by having recourse to the pretense that the trea-
1. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysica, 0 10. [At odds with the thingsTr.]

2. Aristotle, Metaphysica, E 4, 1027b 25ff. [For falsity and truth do not lie in
the things . . . but in the m ind-Tr.]
19. T h e absence o f a foundation [72-73]
65
tises containing the foundation have been lost. For it is certainly not
possible to assume a thinker o f Aristodes rank would simply proclaim arbitrarily an d without foundation such a decisive determ ination as that o f the essence o f truth. A n d yet no reference is ever
m ade to such treatises in which the foundation would be supplied.
Q uite to the contrary, the foundation we are seeking should be discovered, if anywhere, precisely where A ristode deais with truth as a
property o f the assertion (Met. E 4, Met.
10 , De anima I\ De inter-
pretatione), and it is exactly there that we look in vain.

Yet we will be able to think through an d appreciate the fll import o f the fact that there is no genuine foundation given to this
positing o f the essence o f truth as the correctness o f an assertion
only if we realize that since in general the traditional conception o f
truth is not fou nded, the State o f everything true that we seek, find,
and establish in the light o f this essential determ ination m ust be
very remarkable. A ll this is true and correct on the basis o f an unfounded opinion about truth: true on a basis which is not a basis at
all and which will one day com to light in its groundlessness, even
if only very slowly an d only visible for very few.
B u t before we d ecid e to draw such a conclusin, we m ust on ce
m ore critically e xam in e the question at stake here. T h e positing
o f the essence o f truth as the correctness o f an assertion is obviously only one essential determ ination a m o n g others. For P latos
philosophy, an d A risto tles, also d e te rm in e the essence o f the
soul, m otion, place, tim e, friendship, ju stice, the State, m an, etc.
W h at is at issue in each case is, Platonically speakin g, the d e te rm ination o f ideas, an d in each case a gen u in e fou n d ation is
lacking. Perhaps u n d e r the title fo u n d atio n we are seek in g
som ething which m ay n ot be sou gh t an d d em an d ed re ga rd in g
an essential determ ination. T h e n w ould w hat is essential in the
k n o w ledge o f an d com p ortm en t toward beings, the view in a d vance o f the
id e a , the determ ination o f the essence, be
groundless an d arbitrary?
So it is now tim e to ask precisely h ow we are to u n derstan d
fo u n d in g . T o fo u n d an assertion m eans to indcate its gr o u n d ,
to exhibit the basis o f its legitim acy, o f its correctness. C o n se quently, to fo u n d in the gen uin e sense is to exhibit and show that
about which the assertion says som ething. T h is m ust be the standard to m easure w h eth er w hat is said is ap p rop riate to the th in g
66
(correct). T h e assertion L ecture hall n u m ber five o f the classroom b u ild in g o f Freiburg is now o c c u p ie d is fo u n d e d in that
way only i f w e dem nstrate w hat is said th ro u g h im m ediate perception. T h is fact o f the occu p an cy o f the lecture hall is b ro u gh t
b efore ou r eyes, i.e., we brin g ourselves before it as that in
which the assertion has its support. T h e r e is certainly n o kin d o f
fou nd ation w ith a h igh er certitude, an d it is therefore th at each
factual p r o o f m akes an im pression on everyone. T h e assertion
T h e r e is now snow on the F eld berg will thus be dem onstrated
as correct by o u r w an d erin g u p there an d p erceivin g the fact
with ou r ow n eyes. B u t we can also let the w eather Station give us
the I n f o r m a t i o n . T h is fou n d ation is alread y a m ediate one, not
only because we are not ourselves ascertaining this claim by
m eans o f dem onstration, bu t because we m ust here presu p po se
that the w eather Station is p rovid in g correct in form ation, that we
ourselves are h e arin g correctly, th at in general th e telep h o n e
transmission is in order, etc. T h e s e are all presuppositions which
are by n o m eans self-evident, but which we tacitly assum e to be
reliable in o u r factual k now ledge. B u t o f course we know that
im m ediate p r o o f by m eans o f an object present at h an d is rightly
to be p referred.
Now, as we saw, a k n o w ledge o f th e essence precedes in a certain way all oth er cogn izin g, con firm in g, an d fou n d in g. T o walk
aroun d in a h o u s e u sin g this sim ple e xam p le a g a in an d the
particular m odes o f com p ortm en t in clu d ed in in hab itin g a
house w ould not b e possible at all i f we were not g u id ed by a cognition o f house-ness, i.e., o f what a hou se is. Consequ en tly, that
which sustains a n d gu id es all p articular cognitions and c o m p o rtm ent, nam ely the k n o w ledge o f the essence, must, in accord with
its sustaining an d g u id in g fun ction, b e fo u n d e d all the m ore. Its
fou n d in g, in con form ity with its rank, will claim the h igh est possible m o de o f foundation .
1)
The conception o f the Being o f beings as constant
presence: the ground for the determination of the essence
( ISa) as whatness.
We are asking: H o w does G reek philo sop h y fou n d that determ i-
19. T h e absence o f a foundation [74-75]
67
nation o f the essence o f truth which since the tim e o f the G reeks
has sustained an d gu id ed W estern th o u g h t and know ledge u p to
the present day? A s a preparation for the answer to this question
we need ed to elu cdate how the G reeks delim ited the essentility
o f the essence. T h e essence o f w hatever we encounter, o f w hatever is given, is the 8ot. W hat is p e r p le x in g in this characterization o f the essence as idea becom es m ore u nderstan dable i f we
consider that the essence o f som eth in g m eans what it is an d that
consequently a determ nate con cep tio n o f the B ein g o f b ein gs is
fo u n d in g an d m ust be so.
T h e G reeks u nderstan d by B e in g the constant presence o f
som ething. W h at is constant in any p articular b ein g is its w hatit-is, and w hat is present is precisely this w hat as the b e in g s
prevailing look, elos. T h u s it is also intelligible why reality, b e in g at hand, does n ot p roperly b e lo n g to beings, for w hat som eth in g is can also exist in possibility. A possible table is in d e e d a
table; it has this whatness even i f the table is not present at h an d.
T h e realization o f the essente is in a certain sense accidental to
the essence, an d at the same tim e is an im pairm ent o f the pure
essence, for in a real table only on e possibility is realized.
Insofar as we today are accustom ed to consider as a b e in g in
the most gen u in e sense precisely w hat hap p en s to be here an d
now, a particular in dividuation o r instance o f b ein g presen t at
hand, and a p p ly the word B e in g prim arily to reality an d presence at h an d, a transform ation m ust have been accom plished
over an d again st the G reek con ception o f B ein g, one to w hich in
this con text we can o n ly refer. In relation to the essence as w hatness, the presen ce at h an d o f a p articular individuation o f the
essence is o f n o im portan ce to the G reeks. T o keep this in m in d is
crucial for the follow in g question.
2) The absence o f a foundation for the positing and for the

characterization o f the essence of truth as the correctness of
an assertion. The meaning o f foundation.
We are now askin g how the G reeks, an d that also m eans later
thinking, fo u n d e d the positing o f the essence o f anything. M ore
precisely an d m o re closely related to o u r inquiry: how d id A ristod e fou n d his original characterization o f the essence o f truth as
the correctness o f an assertion? We lo o k in vain for a fou n d ation .
68
A n d because oth er essential assertions are ju s t as little fo u n d e d ,

the absence o f a fou n d ation for the defin itio n o f truth can n o t be
exp lain ed by saying that the p ertin en t treatise was perhaps not
h an ded d o w n to us.
B u t w hat sort o f perspective is o p e n e d u p here? A r e the essence o f truth an d the positing o f the essence supposed to be unfou n d ed , an d con sequ en tly is all con cern for truth basically
groundless? Is it a m ere accident th at the fou nd ation o f the essential determ in atio n o f truth is absent, o r is a fou n d ation impossible here? W h at does fo u n d in g m ean in this case an d in
general? We clarified what it first m eans with the exam p le o f an
assertion about som ething given h ere an d now. T h e lights in
this lecture hall are now on this assertion is fo u n d e d th ro u g h
perception, sim ply by referrin g to the fact. T h is kin d o f p r o o f
th rou gh the exh ibitio n o f the very presen ce o f w hat is n a m ed is
obviously the safest and most im m ed iate way by which we can
provide an assertion the gro u n d u p o n which w hat is said in it
rests, assum in g it does coincide with w hat is exhibited. A s we saw,
however, in sofar as the view in ad van ce o f the essence an d a
k n o w led ge o f the essence gu id e an d dom n ate all e xp erien ce
and all co m p o rtm en t to beings, this ru lin g k n o w ledge o f the essence, in accord w ith its rank, m ust also claim the h igh est possible m ode o f dem onstration. B u t there is no h igh e r m o d e o f
dem onstration than im m ediate referen ce to the co rresp o n d in g
given things.
Chapter Three
T h e Laying o f the G round
as the Foundation for Grasping
an Essence
20. The absurdity o f attempting to found an essential

Statement about truth as correctness by having recourse
to a factual Statement.
O u r concern is the founding o f the essential determ ination o f

truth as the correctness o f an assertion. T h e Statement Truth is
the correctness o f an assertion can be sufficiently proven only
by the exhibition o f an actual correct assertion, a true Statement,
as a fact, e.g., the Statement we gave about the lecture hall. T h is
Statement is a true one. T h ro u gh it, as a true Statement, the essence o f the truth must be demonstrable:
T h is lecture hall w ith the lights o n
Truth is the correctness o f an assertion

Essential determ ination
(Fact)
(Factual Statement)
(Fact)
(Essential Statement)
But we must have already realized that the appeal to the fact o f a
single correct assertion can never dem nstrate that the essence o f
truth is the correctness o f an assertion. A t most, it is the other
way around: we could get the idea o f offerin g a particular asser-
T h e Laying o f the Ground [77-79 ]
7o
tion as an e xam p le o f the essence o f truth, and henee as an instance o f tru th , on ly i f it was alread y established and fo u n d e d
in advance that truth m eans the correctness o f an assertion. We
are not seekin g h ere the fou n d ation o f an assertion ab o u t in d ividual faets (e.g., the present o ccu p an cy o f this lecture hall); we
are seeking the fou n d ation o f a d eterm in atio n o f the essence o f
truth. T h e essence does not m ean a single case; its distinction is
to be valid for many. T h e determ ination o f the essence o f truth
applies to all correct assertions. C o n seq u en tly the essential d e te rm ination o f truth as the correctness o f an assertion can o n ly be
dem onstrated by exh ib itin g all actual assertions, so that the accordance o f the essential delim itation w ould be dem onstrated
for each and every on e o f them .
B u t how in the w orld cou ld A ristotle present h im self w ith all
actually p erfo rm e d assertions his ow n as well as all those o f
others, past an d fu tu r e in ord er to dem nstrate thereby the legitim acy o f an essential determ ination o f truth? T h a t is obviously im possible. H en ee it follows that an essential d eterm in ation
cannot
be
proved
by
faets
(in
ou r
case
by
factually
p erfo rm ed correct assertions) in th e first place because these

faets can not at all be surveyed and exh ib ited . A n d even i f this fu tility were successful, the essential d eterm in atio n w ould still not
be gro u n d ed . For the essence applies not on ly to all actual assertions, b u t likewise an d a fortiori to all possible assertions, ones
which m igh t never be perform ed. B u t how cou ld anyone d e m nstrate the appropriaten ess o f the d efin itio n o f the essence o f
truth to possible cases o f correct assertions? T h ere fo re , the way
we fo u n d e d the assertion about this lecture hall (its factual o ccu pancy), as a factual Statement, is n ot how the essential Statement,
T ruth is the correctness o f an assertion, can be fo u n d ed . A n d
in deed this is so n ot on ly because n eith er the factual o r the p ossible cases can all b e exhibited w ith ou t excep tion , b ut prim arily
because this way o f fo u n d in g d em on stratin g an essential assertion by recourse to single co rresp o n d in g instances is altogeth er
absurd. S u p p o sin g we w anted to prove the essential assertion in
its legitim acy by a d d u cin g correct propositions, in ord er to m easure the appropriaten ess to them o f the essential assertion an d
to find that it corresponds to them , that truth is the correctness
o f a proposition, how cou ld we fin d those correct propositions
21. Grasping the essence [79-80]
71
w hich are su p p osed to serve as proofs for the legitim acy o f the
essential determ ination? In d eed , we co u ld d o so only if we separated them from false propositions, an d we could d o that o n ly i f
we already knew in advance w hat true propositions are, that is,
only if we alread y knew w hat their truth consists in. E very tim e
we attem pt to prove an essential determ ination th rou gh single,
or even all, actual an d possible facts, th ere results the rem arkable
state o f affairs that we have already p resu p po sed the legitim acy
o f the essential determ ination, in d eed m u st presuppose it, ju s t
in order to grasp an d produ ce the facts that are sup p osed to
serve as proof.
ai. Grasping the essence as bringing it forth. First directive.

A ccordingly, the fou n d ation o f an essential Statement possesses
its own peculiarity an d its ow n difficulty. T h e graspin g o f the essence and con sequ ently the fu n d ation o f the positing o f the essence are o f an oth er kind than the cogn ition o f single facts an d
factual nexuses, an d correspon d in gly d iffe re n t from the fo u n d a tion o f such factual cognition. In o rd er to see m ore clearly here,
we will deliberate fu rth e r on a single case.
H ow cou ld the essence table, w hat a table is, be d eterm in ed
and set forth at all i f we d id not en cou n ter in advance at least on e
single real table, on the basis o f w h ich b y means o f so-called
abstraction we draw ou t and read o f f the general essence tab le and disregard the particularities o f an y individual table? B u t
then again, we have to ask, w here w ould this on e single ta b le as
ta b le com e fro m i f the idea o f w hat a table is in general w ere
not already g u id in g its very fabrication an d realization? M ust the
idea table n ot be b ro u gh t forth in ad van ce even for the first o f
all tables to be crafted ? O r d o both o f these g o han d in han d? In
any case, is the gr asp in g o f the essence n ot o f such a kind that, as
grasping, in a certain sense it first brings fo rth the essence an d
does not som ehow patch it togeth er subsequently, ou t o f alread y
present at h an d single cases?
B u t accord in g to w hat law and rule is the b rin gin g fo rth o f
the essence accom plished? Is it an arbitrary p rod u ct o f th o u g h t,
which is then su p p lied with a word? Is everyth in g a m atter o f
T h e Laying o f the G round [8081]
72
pure arbitrariness here? I f not, is it th en perhaps only a question

o f linguistic con ven tion? T h a t is, p erh a p s everyone agrees to use
certain words as signs for defin ite representations an d to con n ect
the word table with the representation o f this particular thing.
W h at is com m on is then only the sam eness o f the w ord table,
used to d e n o te any individual table. Furtherm ore, there is nothin g like the u n ity an d sam eness o f an essence co rre sp o n d in g to
the one w ord table ; the w hole question o f essence com es dow n
to a m atter o f gram m ar. T h e r e are on ly individual tables, and
beyond th em th ere is no such th in g as an essence table. W h a t is
called that way is, from a critical standpoint, only the sam eness o f
the sign for n a m in g individual tables, the on ly real ones.
B u t precisely that which characterizes the table as tab le that
which it is and distinguishes it in its whatness from the w indow is
in a certain m anner independent o f the word and the linguistic formations. For the word o f another language is different phonetically
and orthographically and yet it means the same thing, table. T h is
one and the sam e first provides purpose and consistency to the
agreem ent in linguistic usage. Accordingly, the essence m ust have
already been posited in advance, in order to be signifiable and expressible as the same in the same word. Perhaps genuine nam in g
and saying constitute an original positing o f the essence, al though
certainly not by means o f agreem ent an d convention but through
dominating speech, which provides the standard. A t all events, the essence does not at all tolerate a subsequent d ed u ction neither
from the agreem ent in linguistic usage or from a com parison o f
individual cases.
88. The search for the ground o f the positing o f the

essence. Ordinariness o f an acquaintance with the essence
enigma o f a genuine knowledge o f the essence (grasping
o f the essence) and its foundation.
We are seeking w hat gives the positing o f the essence its groun d
and its legitimacy, in order to rescue it from arbitrariness. In all
these reflections we encounter again an d again the same thing: that
a grasping o f the essence (as well as a m ere acquaintance with the
essence) is already what provides legitim acy and a standard; ac-
22. T h e search for the ground [81-82]
73
cordingly, it is som ething original, and thus, for ordinary thinking

and its dem ands for foundation, som ething uncom m on and
strnge.
We cannot dw ell o n this strangeness too often and too long.
T h ere fo re we will reflect anew on w hat occurs within the realm
o f our acquaintance w ith the essence. T o say it briefly in advance:
acquaintance with the essence is for us as ordinary and necessary
as gen u in e k n o w led ge o f the essence appears to be enigm atic
an d arbitrary. We are acquainted with the essence o f the things
su rro u n din g us: house, tree, bird, road, vehicle, m an, etc., an d
yet we have no k n o w led ge o f the essence. For we im m ediately
land in the uncertain, shifting, controversial, and groundless,
w h en we attem p t to d eterm in e m ore closely, and above all try to
gro u n d in its determ inateness, w hat is certainly th o u g h still indeterm inately k n ow n : namely, house-ness, tree-ness, birdness, hum anness. O n the other hand, we are able to distinguish
these things very well, so that we d o n o t con fuse a bird with a
house. T h is acquaintance witH the essence no m atter how p relim inary and u n d eterm in ed , no m atter how used u p and w orn it
m igh t be gu id es us constantly an d every w here at every step
an d every d w ellin g place in the m idst o f beings and in every
th o u g h t about them . T h is rem ar kable state o f affairs indicates
that it is not the im m ediately given fa c ts the individual real,
graspable, an d visible things, precisely those that are in ten d ed
and acqu ired that possess the decisive closeness to life.
M ore cise to life, to use this way o f speakin g, closer than socalled reality, is th e essence o f things, w hich we know an d yet
d o not know. W h at is cise and closest is not w hat the so-called
m an o f facts thinks he grasps; instead, the closest is th e essence, which ad m itted ly remains for the m any the farthest o f
a ll even w hen it is explicitly shown to them , insofar as it allows
itself to be show n in the usual way at all.
W h at kind o f e n ig m a are we e n co u n te rin g here? W hat sort o f
m ystery overtakes m an such that w hat to him seem to be beings
p u re and sim p le facts, so fam ously cise to reality are n ot
w hat beings are, that nevertheless this constant ign o rin g o f the
closeness o f the essence o f beings belo n gs p erhaps still to the essence o f m an, an d th at this ign o rin g precisely therefore m ay not
b e evaluated as a lack b u t m ust be u n d ersto o d as the necessary
74
T h e Laying o f the G round [82-83]
condition for the possible greatness o f m an: that he dwells in b e tween B e in g an d ap pearan ce and that for him w hat is closest is
the farthest an d w hat is farthest is closest? W h at kind o f great
upheaval h ere strikes m an an d his place within beings?
I f every relation o f man to the essence o f beings is so enigmatic,
it is no w onder that it is only in slow and ever slipping an d halting
steps that we com e to understand the grasping o f the essence, the
foundation o f the grasping o f the essence, and consequendy the
knowledge o f the essence and its relation to m ere acquaintance
with the essence. In view o f this great upheaval in m an we will see
more clearly that and why all great epochs o f history becam e great
and remained great because they possessed the strength to exp erience this upheaval and to sustain it, i.e., to collapse u nder it in such
a way that the fragm ents o f this collapse becam e nothing else than
the essential works and deeds o f these epochs. We must always
think out toward these things if we d o not want to lapse into the
catastrophical and usual error o f believing that the question H ow
do we grasp the essence and how d o we found the grasping o f it?
is an abstract and intellectual playing with concepts, for intellectualism consists precisely in the opinion that the faets are the
sol reality and the only beings.
23. The bringing o f the essence into view in advance

(the grasping o f the essence) as the bringing forth o f the
essence out o f concealment into the light. The productive
seeing o f the essence.
T h e result o f o u r reflection u p to now is that the essence is not
glean ed from faets and is never to b e fo u n d as a fact. I f the essence nevertheless stands before us in the view in advan ce, w hat
else can that m ean bu t that in som e way it is b rou gh t before us
and we b rin g ourselves before the essence?
T h e grasp in g o f the essence is a k in d o f brin gin g forth o f the
essence. T h e way o f fo u n d in g the essence and positing it m ust
also have a corresp o n d in g form . For if, in the graspin g o f the essence, that w hich is to be grasped is first b ro u gh t forth, an d if
con sequ en d y the graspin g as such is a b rin g in g forth, then the
fou n d ation o f the graspin g ca n n o t be an ap p eal to som ething
23. Bringing forth the essence [8384]
75
already present at han d to which the gr asp in g would be assimilated. C o m p ared to such a fo u n d a tio n i.e., the dem onstration
by m eans o f som eth in g already p regiven in the m anner o f the
fou nd ation o f all k n o w ledge o f facts the k n o w ledge o f the essence is therefore necessarily u n fo u n d e d . B u t are we then to
con clud e that the k n o w ledge o f the essence is groundless?
In order to com e to an answer here, we m ust try to d eterm in e
m ore precisely how the graspin g o f the essence, as a b r in g in g
forth o f the essence, com es to pass. C o rresp o n d in g to the d ire ction taken by ou r question about the essentiality o f the essence,
we m ust here again ask how the G reeks, follow ing their c o n ce p tion o f the essence, u nderstan d an d
m ust u nderstan d this
b rin g in g fo rth .
Plato characterizes the essence as the whatness o f a b e in g an d
the whatness as I8a, the look a b e in g shows o f itself. A n y in d ividual b ein g is p ro d u ced and com es p ro p erly to a stand in what it
is. T h e what it is posits the b e in g in itself and on itself; it is its
form . W h at an in divid u al beirfg, e .g., a table is its look, its form ,
an d henee its stru ctu re is not glean ed from already presen t at
han d individual tables, bu t rather the reverse, these in dividual
tables can be fabricated and be presen t at han d as ready-m ade,
on ly if, and insofar as, they are p ro d u ced follow in g the e xem p la r
o f som ething like a table in general. T h e exem p lar is the look
which is sighted in advance, the look o f that which makes u p the
ou ter aspect o f the ta b le the idea, the essence.
B u t is this ad van ce sight, the b r in g in g in to sight o f the essence,
supposed to be a b r in g in g forth ? E ve ryth in g speaks against it.
In ord er to b r in g som eth in g into sight, m u st not that w hich is to
be glim psed alread y exist? To be sure. T h u s at least the G reekPlatonic con cep tio n o f the essence as iSea excludes the notion
that the graspin g o f the essence is a b rin g in g forth o f the essence. It has b een well know n for ages that, according to the
usual con ception o f the Platonic doctrin e o f the ideas, Plato
tau g h t that the ideas w ould e xist u n to u ch ed by all ch an ge an d
p erish in g for them selves and in them selves, in a place above
the heavens, to the p o in t that it w ould be w holly u n -G re ek to say
that the ideas w o u ld be b ro u gh t forth.
Nevertheless, the graspin g o f the essence is in deed, even for
the G reeks, a b r in g in g forth. T o see th at we m ust on ly u n d e r-
76
stand b r in g in g fo rth in the G re e k m anner. T h e b r in g in g

forth o f the essence, accord in g to o u r p rece d in g reflecdons,
m eans first o f all an d polem ically that the essence is not glean ed
from the in divid ual cases as their universal; it has its ow n origin.
W hen we today speak o f b rin g in g forth, we think o f the m akin g
and fabricating o f an individual object. B u t this is precisely w hat
is
not
in ten d ed ;
b rin gin g
fo r th we
use
this
expression
intntion ally m ust be taken here qu ite literally. T h e essence is

b rou gh t forth, b ro u gh t ou t from its previous obscurity an d hiddenness. F o rth in to what? Into th e light; it is b ro u gh t in to view.
T h is b rin g in g into view is a peculiar seeing. T h is seein g do es not
see by m erely staring at w hat is presen t at han d or w hat is otherwise already accessible, bu t instead this seein g first b rin gs b e fore itself that w hich is to be seen. It is a seein g that draws som eth in g forth, n ot a m ere look in g at w hat is stan d in g about w aiting
for people to com e across as they g o their way. It is not a m ere
noticing o f som eth in g previously u n h e ed e d th o u g h otherw ise
observable w ith ou t fu rth er ado. T h e seein g o f the look th at is
called the idea is a seeing which draws forth, a seein g w hich in
the very act o f seein g com pels w hat is to be seen b efore itself.
T h e r e fo r e we cali this seeing, w hich first brings forth in to visibility that which is to be seen, an d p rodu ces it before itself, p ro ductive seein g [Er-sehen].1
T h is b r in g in g forth or p ro d u cin g is not a fabricating or a m aking; henee it is in d eed a co m in g across som ething. W h a t we can
com e across m ust already lie b efore us. For the G reeks, B e in g
m eans constant presence, and th erefore the essence, the w hatness, is the m ost gen u in e o f beings, the being-est o f beings,
vTODs v. T h e r e fo r e the ideas are; in d eed , they m ust be, as the
most p rop er beings o f all beings, in o rd er to be able to be
b ro u gh t forth an d p u t into the light, into the ligh t in w hich that
eye sees w hich casts views in advance. A n d it is in the circle o f
these views that we first grasp in divid u al beings. T h e produ ctive
seeing o f the essence is con sequ en d y n ot a con form ity to som e-
. [Productive is to be understood here in the sense in which, e.g., witnesses

are produced in co u rtthey are not created for the occasion bu t simply led
forth, literally pro-duced.Tr.]
24- T h e productive seeing o f the essence [8586]
77
th in g otherwise alread y available b u t the p u ttin g forth o f the

lo o k a produ ctive look in g in an em p hatic sense o f the word.
For the G reeks, the essence an d the p ositing o f the essence
thus stand within a peculiar twilight: the essence is n ot m anu factured, b ut it is also n o t sim ply en co u n tered like a th in g already
present at hand. Instead, it is b ro u gh t forth in a productive seeing. W hence an d w hither? O u t o f invisibility into the visible, ou t
o f w hat is u n th o u g h t into w hat is h en ceforth to be thought. T h e
p rodu ctive seein g o f the idea, o f the essence, is therefore an o r ig inal way o f graspin g, and to it m ust also correspond its ow n
p rop er way o f foundation .
24. The productive seeing o f the essence as the laying o f the
ground. 'Y n dd eoxs as ftcris o f the tm oxeiêvov.

T h e n w hat about the fou nd ation o f the gr asp in g o f the essence,
which is the actual focus o f od r question? I f this graspin g is a
produ ctive seeing, a b r in g in g forth, it can n o t con form itself to
som ething alread y presen t at han d in o rd er to glean inform ation
from it, because it is in d eed the p rod u ctive seeing that brings
forth the essence in the first place an d con sequ ently is that from
which the con form ity m ust take direction. In productive seeing,
a con form ity to so m eth in g p regiven is n ot possible, because the
produ ctive seein g itself first brings ab o u t th e pregivenness.
Since here an ad equatio n to w hat is p regiven is not possible,
an d is not necessary, there can also n o t be a fou nd ation in the
sense we spoke o f earlier. T h e produ ctive seein g o f the essence is
not fou n d ed , b u t it is gr o u n d e d , i.e., accom plished in such a way
that it brings itself u p o n the grou n d which it itself lays. T h e p ro ductive seeing o f the essence is itself the layin g o f the g r o u n d
the positing o f w hat is to be the gro u n d , imoxeCêvov. T h e p ro du ctive seein g as the foundation al b r in g in g forth o f the essence
as 8a is therefore virdecris positing the whatness itself as the
groun d.
'Yirflecn; m eans h ere the ftcris o f the vrrox|j,evov an d has
n o th in g in com m on with the later co n ce p t o f hypothesis,
nam ely an assum ption m ade to gu id e an e xp erim e n t and give it
a particular direction. A ll hypotheses in the m o d ern sense e.g.,
?8
w orking hypotheses in natural scien ce already presu p po se the

positing o f a determ inate essence o f the beings aim ed at, an d on
the grou n d o f this essence the w o rk in g hypotheses first ge t their
sense. Every hypothesis p resu pposes a m êais, a prior positin g o f the essence. T h e produ ctive seein g o f the essence is the
positing o f the gro u n d ; it groun ds itself in w hat it brings forth
and it brings forth that in which it grou n d s itself.
T h e positing o f the essence will th erefore always ap p ea r arbitrary and u n u su al if m easured again st the Standards o f the usual
and familiar. B u t this unfam iliarity is again not w hat is rem te
and peculiar; on the contrary, it is the sim p le which can never
be b ro u gh t closer, no m atter how m any dem onstrations are attem pted, i f it is n ot b ro u gh t forth an ew in produ ctive seeing, i.e.,
if the view o f the essence is not aw akened in man.
H ere we see som ething o f the u n fath om able distinction b e tween philosophy, as the k n o w ledge o f the essence, an d all Science. Scientific cognition needs, an d creates, distance from its
object, w hich is the reason a su bsequ en t technical-practical removal o f the distance is necessary. T h e k n o w ledge o f the essence,
conversely, creates precisely an a p p u rten an ce to B ein g, an d all
practical ap p lication com es too late an d rem ains b en eath the
rank o f this k now ledge.
T h e know ledge o f the essence, therefore, i f it is to be shared,
must itself be accomplished anew by the one w ho is to assume it.
M ore precisely, it cannot be com m unicated in the sense o f the passin g on o f a proposition, whose content is simply grasped w ithout its
foundation and its acquisition b ein g accomplished again. T h e
knowledge o f the essence must be accom plished anew by each one
who is to share it; it must genuinely b e co-accomplished.
i) Renewed reflection on our procedure as a whole:

the necessity o f a historical relation to the history
of the essence o f truth.
Before we briefly recall the previous course o f our questioning, in
order to carry it on, let us characterize anew our procedure as a
T h e productive seeing o f the essence [8889]
79
whole. I say anew, because a clarification o f it was already attem pted in what has p receded nam ely in the interpolated discussions o f the distinction between historiographical consideration
and historical reflection. W hy did we focus on precisely this distinction, one that concerns a basic attitude within history and toward
history? W hy did a discussion o f history an d historiography becom e
necessary at all for the sake o f a clarification o f our procedure?
W h y? because we are asking the question o f the essence o f truth.
Q uestions such as that one pertain to the construction o f a
system o f p h ilo sop h y and are called, accord in g to this origin,
system atic, in distinction to the historiographical reports
about the philosophical opinions o f oth er thinkers on an issue.
We are asking a system atic q u e stio n even if we have no system
in m ind insofar as we are asking fro m ourselves and for o u rselves, and for the future. We are q u estion in g system atically and
yet, after tak in g on ly a few steps with this intention, we have lost
ourselves in historiographical considerations. Is this not a du p licitous p rocedure, a detour, e\fen an avoidance o f the sim ple, im m ediate, and direct answ ering o f the question we raised: w hat is
the essence o f truth? O n e could perh aps understan d that o u r re sponse to this question m igh t necessitate a certain h istoriograp hical account o f the theories o f truth im m ed iately p rece d in g us,
for the purp ose o f critical analysis an d clarification. B u t w hy go
back so far an d so laboriously to the Greeks?
If, as appears to be the case, we are already raising the question
more originally than ever before and intend to answer in the same
way, why d o we not then leave behind everything bygone; w hy not
simply throw o f f the oppressing and con fusing burden o f the tradition, in order finally to begin for ourselves? T h is is certainly what
we intend and we must do so, since as will be show n there is a
necessity behind it. B u t what we m ust d o h e r e overcome the historiographical tradition we can do only on the basis o f the deep est and most gen uin e historical relation to w hat we have p u t into
question, nam ely truth and the history o f its essence.
L et us deliberate a m om ent: how cou ld it h ap p en that W estern
m an, and especially m odern m an, becam e so in un dated an d
shaken by the historiographical transm ission o f objectively an d
tem porally very diverse m odes o f th in k in g and evaluating, styles
o f creating, an d form s o f work that he becam e vacillating as to
8o
his essence an d is now the h o d g e p o d g e he is today? W h y is m an

so defenselessly exp o sed to the constant assault o f the historiographical? W h y ? because W estern m an is historical in his essence, i.e., he is fo u n d in g o f history an d at the same tim e destructive o f it. W h ere m an lives w ith ou t history, historiography
cannot b ecom e m ean in gfu l for him an d henee cannot possibly
gain pow er over him . H istoriography, however, did n ot gain this
con fu sin g ascendan cy over con tem p orary m an, to an e x ten t we
can hardly im agin e, because m an has b ecom e too historical, but,
quite to the contrary, it is because m an is no lon ger historical
en o u g h in an original way and so can n ot set limits to historiography and assign it its p rop er end.
We can therefore d e fe n d ourselves against the in un dation s o f
historiography (today the tide is rising h igh e r and higher) only
by, as it were, ju m p in g ou t o f history, a lth o u g h we will gain d o m ination over historiography solely by w in n in g back the p ow er to
take u p historical B ein g. T h e loss o f this pow er is neither accidental or an isolated process. Instead, it belongs to geth er most
intim ately with that event in W estern history which H ld erlin
was the first to su ffer and thereby gen u in ely exp erien ce, and
which N ietzsche subsequently exp ressed in his ow n way, by
p oin tin g o u t that W estern m an has, for the last two m illennia,
been unable to fashion for h im self a G o d . W hat is the m ean in g
o f this lack o f the pow er to fashion a G o d ? We d o not know. B u t
it w ould be a m u ch too cheap accou n t if we d e d u ce d from it already the decline o f W estern m an, even if it appears that all the
powers o f the West still at work, p erh ap s also those o f the earth,
are sub m erged in the pursuit an d p rodu ctio n o f w hat is closest
an d most palpable, i.e., o f w hat is u sefu l to the m any an d to the
life-will o f an yone at all. H istory does not w ithhold itself from
prediction b u t fro m calculating ju d g m e n t, especially if we understand history in its longest an d hen ee slowest and therefore
hardly graspable occurrence: nam ely, the approach an d distantiation o f the go d s in relation to b e in g s an event which lies far
beyond an d well on this side o f the facticities o f religions and
churches an d cults and which has as its concom itant op p osite
side w hat we are calling m ans stren gth or lack o f stren gth with
regard to history.
I f there once were gods, who are now in flight from man, as they
81
have been for ages, then this self-refusal o f the gods must be a terrible occurrence, which surely sets in m otion a singular event which
we may hardly risk naming. (Unsaid: the passing o f the last god. C f:
Vom Ereignis [O n the A ppropriatin g Event].) W hether we think

forth to this occurrence, or ponder the sagging strength o f m an
with regard to history, or think through both these in their original
connection in each case reflection encounters the one and only
basic character o f this most original and most concealed, b u t also
most genuine, history: that truth in its essence is no longer a question but instead possesses a prosaic obviousness and thereby uproots everything true and has no Creative power. Truth will never
again becom e a question arising out o f a genuine necessity as lon g
as we are unable to recall what its begin nin g essence was, i.e., where
its future essence m ust be decided.
T h e question o f the essence o f truth is a n in deed the u tterly
historical question, insofar as it asks abo u t w hat restores o u r history to its g r o u n d in the first place, i.e., asks about that from
which the un avo idable and tfie decidable gain the space o f their
conflict and o f their reciprocal self-surpassing.
O u r question ab o u t the essence o f truth im m ediately arrives
on the path o f a historical reflection, an d in d eed o f on e reaching
back very far, an d has therein, accord in g to the intention o f ou r
lectures,
its
g e n u in e
im port.
But
that
is
exactly
w hat
is
required i f we reflect on w hat has b een said by ou r inquiry

into the essence o f truth itself, which does not only have its history for itself b u t is in ever d ifferen t ways the grou n d an d the
absence o f g r o u n d o f o u r history an d o f o u r absence o f history.
In futu re th inking, the distinction betw een historiographical
and system atic considerations will lose all m e a n in g com p letely
d ifferen t from the case o f H egel, w ho on ly m ixed them u p an d
h ad to let th em b o th exist in disarray.
2) The succession of the steps made up to now from truth as

the correctness o f an assertion to the positing of the essence
as a productive seeing and a laying of the ground.
B u t because this historical interrogation is required by w hat is interrogated itself, we can and should arrive at the attem pted historical reflection o n ly by m eans o f a rigorou s sequence o f steps
82
o f gen uin e qu estioning. L et us on ce m ore b riefly characterize

the sequence o f steps taken u p to now.
O u r question about the essence o f truth b egan with the d eterm ination o f truth as the correctness o f an assertion or, in g e n eral, o f a representation, a determ in atio n which still today p ro vides the standard and has d o n e so for two m illennia. T h is
b e gin n in g was execu ted im m ediately in the form o f a critical reflection. T h e result was the follow ing: truth as correctness o f
representing presupposes, in o rd er to be w hat it is (assimilation
to the object), the openness o f beings by which they b ecom e capable o f b e in g ob-jects in the first place an d by which the re p re senting becom es a faculty o f p resen tin g som ething before itself
as such. T h is openness ap p eared co n seq u en d y as the g r o u n d o f
the possibility o f correctness. A ccord ingly, correctness can not
constitute the original essence o f truth if it itself is d e p e n d e n t on
som ething m ore original. T h e original essence o f truth m ust
then be so u gh t in a return to this openness.
B u t this sim ple critical reflection, w hich transcends the traditional con cep t o f truth, is tenable on ly i f correctness alread y contains in som e way, even if not originally, som ething o f the essence
o f truth. T h a t it does so was at first on ly tacitly p resu pposed.
W hat about this presupposition? H o w an d to w hat e xten t is the
traditional p ositing o f the essence o f truth as the correctness o f
an assertion fo u n d e d ? We will discover, i f at all, the fou n d ation
o f this essential determ ination o f truth in an im m ediate way
w here this essence o f truth was established for the first time.
T h a t h a p p en e d at the end o f the grea t philosophy o f the G reeks,
in the th in k in g o f Plato and in the doctrines o f A ristotle.
B u t in ord er now to interrgate with certitude the legitim acy
o f the essential determ ination o f truth as correctness, we have to
know w hat those thinkers in ten d ed by w hat we cali essence.
T h is led to the exposition o f w hat Plato u nderstood as 8a. T h e
essence is the whatness o f a bein g, u nderstood as its look or
counten an ce, w hich is kept in view in ad van ce for every com p ortm ent toward the individual bein g presen t at hand. I f now, after
this elucidation o f the G reek co n ce p t o f essence, we e xam in e in
which way the ju st-m e n d o n ed determ in atio n o f the essence o f
tru th as the correctness o f an assertion is fou n d ed , th en we
discover that a fou n d ation is lacking. T h e positings o f th e es-
83
sence ap pear to be arbitrary declarations, to which, however, we

acquiesce. T h e positings o f the essence are w ithou t fou n d ation if
we understan d b y fou n d ation the always subsequent referen ce
back o f w hat is asserted to som ething alread y p urely an d sim ply
present at h an d, even i f not always know n. T h e only k n o w ledge
that can be dem onstrated in such a way, henee that can be
fou n d ed , is on e w hich tries to know an d determ ine w hat is
p resent at h an d, i.e., a know ledge o f faets. In all factual kn o w le d g e, however, there already resides an essential k n o w ledge
g u id in g and su p p o rtin g it. T h e result o f these reflections was
that a graspin g o f the essence can never b e fou n d ed th ro u g h a
know ledge o f faets. For in the first place all real factual particu larizations o f the essence in q u e stio n e .g., the essence o f a
ta b le can never be collected, an d secondly, this ga th e rin g
w ould still be insufficient, since the essence also holds for possible
instances. T h ird ly, an d above all, the notion o f a fou nd ation o f
the essence an d o f the determ ination o f the essence by referen ce
to co rrespo n d in g real an d possible faets is in itself absurd. For in
ord er to discover the faets pertain ing to th e essence and to select
them and exhibit th em as justifications fo r the legitim acy o f this
positing o f the essence, the positing o f the essence m ust already
be presupposed.
Consequ en dy, the essence and the determ ination o f the essence d o not adm it any fou n d ation o f the kin d that we accom plish in the field o f factual know ledge. T h e essence o f som eth in g
is n ot at all to b e discovered sim ply like a fact; on the contrary, it
m ust be brought forth, since it is not directly present in the sphere
o f im m ediate represen tin g and in ten d in g. T o brin g forth is a
kind o f m aking, an d so there resides in all graspin g and p ositing
o f the essence som eth in g Creative. T h e Creative always appears
violent and arbitrary, as i f it should be con cealed that it is b o u n d
to a h igh er law fulness which m ust be p rotected against the in tru sin o f com m on op in ion . For the latter has its ow n rules, puts
them into play everyw here, and abhors the exception. I f we call
the positing o f the essence a b rin g in g -fo rth an d thereby first o f
all take essence acco rd in g to the G re e k con cep tio n ( L8a), th en
the b rin g in g -fo rth m ust also be u n d erstood in the G reek sense.
T o brin g forth m eans to b rin g o u t in to the light, to b r in g
som ething in sight w hich was u p to th en n ot seen at all, an d spe-
84
cifically such that the seeing o f it is n o t sim ply a g a p in g at som ethin g already lyin g there b u t a seein g which, in seein g, first
brings forth w hat is to be seen, i.e., a produ ctive seeing. T h e essence, i.e., the G reek-Platonic
8a, the look o f beings in w hat
they are, is grasped in such a p rodu ctive seeing. T h e p h ilo sop h er

is a thinker o n ly if he is this k in d o f seer an d not a g a p e r or a
calculator or a m ere babbler. E very fou n d ation in the sense we
discussed com es too late with regard to the positing o f the essence, because the productive seein g o f the essence is itself a p ro ductive seein g o f that in which the essence has its g r o u n d a
productive seein g o f w hat its g r o u n d is. K n ow led ge o f the essence is in itself a groun d-layin g. It is the positing o f w hat lies
u n d e r as gr o u n d , the positing o f the v 7Toxe|jievov ftcris and
henee is virofteoxs. It is not the su b sequ en t a d d in g o f a gr o u n d
for som ething already represented. W h en a th in g is d eterm in ed
as to its essence, then this essence itself is p roductively seen. T h e
productive seein g o f the essence brings som ething into view for
the essence an d claims it for the essence, ou t o f w hich it the
essen ce becom es visible for w hat it is.
*5 . The unconcealedness o f the whatness o f beings as the truth
pertaining to the grasping o f the essence. The groundedness o f

the correctness o f an assertion in unconcealedness (aVqfteux).
We now have to ap p ly w hat has b e en said to the question occup yin g us about the fou n d ation o f the traditional p ositing o f the
essence o f truth as the correctness o f an assertion.
K n ow led ge o f an essence can n ot be fo u n d e d in the strict sense
o f fou nd ation (dem onstration b y ap p ea l to som ething presen t at
hand). It is not, however, on that accou nt groundless b u t is itself
a grou n d-layin g. Consequently, it is no accident that we d o not
find in A risto tle a fou nd ation for the positing o f the essence o f
truth as the correctness o f an assertion; it is necessarily so, because there is n o fou nd ation for the positing o f an essence. O n
the other h an d , however, we can now at least sur mise that this
determ ination o f the essence o f truth as the correctness o f an assertion is n ot arbitrary and groun dless b ut is itself a g r o u n d in g,
the laying o f a gr o u n d and thereby a retu rn to the gro u n d . We
25- T h e unconcealedness o f the whatness o f beings [9596]
85
will therefore ask: W h at does this A ristotelian, and now usual,

determ ination o f truth as the correctness o f an assertion claim as
its groun d? W h a t does this determ ination o f the essence o f truth
see and have in view in advance as that w herein it fnds itself
grou n d ed ? T o arrive at the answer we will intentionally m ake a
b r ie f detour.
Earlier (pp.
28
ff.,
35
f.), we cam e to a poin t in ou r con sid er-
ations w here we h ad to say that the philosophical question about

the essence o f truth is at the same tim e an d in itself the question
o f the truth o f the essence. T h is relation also holds in the c o n verse: the question o f the truth o f the essence is at the same tim e
a question about the essence o f truth. T h e s e statem ents ap p ea r
at first to be m ere conjectures. B u t we have now progressed far
e n o u g h to m ake th em eviden t in their tr u th even if on ly in the
com pass o f a restricted field o f view.
We are askin g ab o u t the essence o f truth or, m ore precisely,
about the A ristotelian determ ination o f the essence o f truth as
the correctness o f a n assertion-. in what is this determ ination o f
the essence itself gro u n d e d ? T h e question o f the essence o f truth
is still con jectu rally the question o f the truth o f essence. T h e
result o f ou r q u estion in g the essentility o f the essence was that
the essence is the whatness o f som ething, the
iSa, the look
som ething offers, its appearance, the b e in g in its being-view ed. A

p rodu ctive seein g grasps the
8a. T h e produ ctive seein g is a
b rin gin g-forth , a b r in g in g into the light, a b rin g in g into visibility,

w hich is itself g r o u n d e d o n w hat it brin gs forth an d in that way
posits w hat is seen as g r o u n d nrdeo-is.
T h e produ ctive seein g o f the essence does n ot adm it any fo u n dation; that w ould be, so to say, b en eath its dignity. For w hat actually is fo u n d in g ? It is an ap p eal to som ething presen t at
hand, and that im plies the m easu ring o f the cognition or o f the
assertion against som eth in g pre-given, to which the assertion
and the representation are to con form . F ou n d in g is a con form ity
to . . . . F ou n d in g con sequ ently p resu p poses in itself an d for itse lf the possibility o f con form ity and correctness. F ou n d in g an d
the possibility o f b e in g fo u n d e d are tied to a determ inate kin d o f
truth, nam ely the correctness o f representation and assertion.
O n ly w hat is correct an d w hat claims correctness can be fo u n d e d
and is in n eed o f foundation .
86
Now if all grasp in g and p ositing o f the essence e xelu d e the

possibility o f b e in g fo u n d e d not because the fou n d ation can not be discovered, b u t because fo u n d in g as such is n ot sufficient
for the legitim ation o f the positing o f an essen ce i f the grasp in g o f the essence rejeets every attem p t at a fou n d ation in the
sense we discussed, then the truth w hich belongs to the gr asp in g
o f the essence an d which is stam ped on it can not be correctness.
T h ere fo re an o th er kind o f truth m ust b e lo n g to the grasp in g o f
the essence. T h u s a reflection on the truth o f essence, on w hat a
graspin g o f essence is, and w hat its ju stification is, becom es a reflection o n the essence o f truth.
T h e gr asp in g o f the essence is a b rin gin g-forth : specifically, in
the G reek sense o f a brin gin g o u t an d fetch in g forth. W hence?
From con cealm en t. W hither? In to unconcealedness, in o rd er to
posit it as the u nconcealed. T o see the essence in p rod u ctive seein g m eans to posit the u n con cealed o f beings, to posit b ein gs in
their unconcealedness, to take th em u p into the n a m in g w ord,
and in that way establish them an d thereby let them stand in the
visibility o f an essential cognition.
T h e u n con cealed is in G re e k to tXT|-0 s, and uncon cealedn ess
is Xrjfteia. For ages, this has been translated as ventas, tru th
[Wahrheit]. T h e tru th o f the gr asp in g o f the essence is, th o u g h t

in the G re e k m anner, the u ncon cealedn ess o f the w hatness o f
beings. U nconcealedness, the bein g-seen o f beings is, in Platonic
terms, L8a.
A b e in g in its beingness (o im a) is, b riefly and properly, the u n concealedness o f the b ein g itself. B ein gs, d eterm in ed with regard to their unconcealedness, are thereby grasped w ith respect
to their c o m in g forth and e m e rgin g, their cjnxns, i.e., as
i8a,
an d so are grasped as n o th in g o th e r than beings in their b e in gness. To p rodu ctively see a b e in g as such in its b e in g n e ss in
w hat it is as a b e in g m eans n o th in g else than to en cou n ter it
sim ply in its unconcealedness, an d, as A ristotle (Met.
10) says,
ftiryev, to feel it, sim ply touch u p o n it an d in touchin g it to push

it forw ard, to b rin g it before on eself, to produ ce an d see its look.
Since, in the G re e k exp erien ce, beings as such are <|)Wis, em ergence, there b elongs to beings as such a/Tifteia, u n co n ce ale d ness. T h e r e fo r e the graspin g o f beings as such m ust be a disclosin g (a tak in g o u t from concealm ent). We cannot now articlate
26. Unconcealedness and the openness o f beings [97-98]
87
m ore precisely w hat all this signifies in a m ore p rofou n d sense

an d in every on e o f its consequences, n am ely that for the G reeks
the truth is a in d eed , the character o f beings as such. W e will
on ly note that the graspin g o f the essence claims a special kind o f
truth : unconcealedness.
A s we have heard often en o u gh , all cogn ition and k n o w led ge
o f individual beings is gro u n d ed in an acquaintance with the essence. K n ow led ge as the representation o f individual beings is
fo u n d e d to the e xten t that it is correct. Now, however, i f the
know ledge o f in divid ual beings, the true representing o f facts, is
gro u n d ed in a k n o w led ge o f the essence, then the truth o f factual
know ledge, i.e., correctness, for its p art m ust also be g r o u n d e d
in the truth o f the k n o w ledge o f the essence. T ru th as correctness
( ofioiwoxs)
has
its
gro u n d
in
truth
as
unconcealedness
(otX.'fj'eia), the com in g-fo rth , and b e in g in view in advance, o f

the beingness (essence) o f beings. W h a t is seen in a produ ctive
seeing and claim ed as the gro u n d o f the positing o f truth as correctness is truth as
Xf|-ia (the unconcealedness o f
beings as such) is now the original an d gen u in e ly G reek nam e for

truth, because it am es the m ore original essence o f truth. N either the Latin w ord veritas nor o u r G e rm a n word Wahrheit
[truth] contain the least echo o f w hat the Greeks saw in a d vance and exp erie n ce d w hen they spoke about truth in their
sense: .T|fteta.
26. Unconcealedness and the openness o f beings. The process of
the submergence o f the original Greek essence o f truth in the

sense o f the unconcealedness o f beings.
W here do we now stand? We asked how the ordinary defin ition
o f truth, o f the essence o f the tr u e nam ely, the correctness o f
an assertion was fo u n d e d originally in A ristotle. We show ed
that because the p ositin g o f correctness as the essence o f truth
accom plishes an essential positing, there can be no question o f a
foundation , which is the reason we seek in vain for one. N evertheless, the p ositing o f the essence is n ot arbitrary but is the p ositing o f a gr o u n d , the taking u p o f that which makes possible
what is to be grasp ed in its essence an d gives it its groun d.
88
W hat then provides the gro u n d for truth conceived as correctness? T h e gr o u n d o f correctness (ojjlolwctls) is Xf|\)eio, th e u n concealedness o f beings. W h at does a-.r|fteia, the u n co n cealed ness o f beings, m ean? N oth in g else b u t that beings as such are
not concealed an d n o t closed, an d henee are open. T h e openness
o f beings proves to be the gro u n d o f the possibility o f correctness. A n d that is exactly w hat we b ro u g h t ou t at the b e g in n in g o f
ou r
inquiry.
We
showed
that
the
openness
of
beings
lies at the gr o u n d o f the ordinary con cep tio n o f truth as correctness, and we saw the n eed to question this openness as such
in order to grasp the essence o f truth originally. We con te n d e d
that this openn ess is w hat is p rop erly w orthy o f qu estion in g
in the question o f truth. A n d we saw that the Greeks alread y
knew this openn ess o f beings; in d eed , they took .fi'eioi, the
unconcealedness o f beings, as the p ro p er essence o f truth. Furtherm ore, for the G reeks the true is in ad van ce the u n con cealed,
an d truth is the sam e as the u ncon cealedn ess o f beings. O n ly
because o f such a produ ctive seein g o f truth on the p art o f
the Greeks cou ld the possibility o f the assim ilation to beings o f a
proposition or representation n ot b e a question for them an d
not at all b e in n eed o f a fou ndation ; on the contrary, with regard
to a.f|fteiot such an assimilation presents itself as self-evident.
Were the G reeks thus aware that the correctness o f an assertion
requires the openn ess o f beings as its essential grou n d ? I f so, our
referring to w hat is w orthy o f q u estion in g in the ord inary co n ception o f truth is w holly superflu ou s an d e xceed in gly belated.
T h e r e is no lo n g e r an yth in g to ask here because the G reeks have
already answ ered the question o f truth.
T h u s if we today want to rise above the ordinary con cep tio n
o f truth as correctness, and if we m u st d o so to grasp it in its
prop er essence an d groun d, and in that way answer the question
o f truth sufficiently, then there is obviously no need at all for toil
on ou r part; we sim ply have to retu rn to w hat G reek p hilosop hy
has already seen. A t most, we w ould n eed to recall som eth in g
forgotten. o r is this forgettin g itself very rem arkable, because
from the tim e o f A ristotle, or even since Plato, the con cep tio n o f
truth as the correctness o f an assertion has been the standard, and the o n ly standard, for the determ ination o f the essence o f truth, an d the am e X.f|>eia was then em p lo yed spontaneously to express the correctness o f an assertion, i.e., to
25 . T h e unconcealedness o f the whatness o f beings [100-101]
89
am e this standard determ ination o f the essence o f truth as

correctness. A n d w hen in the process o f recasting the G re e k
way o f speakin g, i.e., in the transform ation o f the G re e k way
o f thin kin g an d basic attitude toward beings into the R om an
an d later W estern m odes, otVrjfteia was translated as ventas, then
not on ly was the established con cep tio n o f truth as correctness transm itted, but, at the same tim e, th ro u g h the translation
o f \ f|d e ta as ventas every resonance o f the original essence
o f truth as
Xiqdeia, unconcealedness, was destroyed. T h is
resonance is also com p letely suppressed by ou r word tru th .

X.T|deia h en ceforth m eans, accord in g to the essential d e te rm ination o f truth, the sam e as the correctness o f an assertion. W h at
the Greeks on ce saw and exp erien ced as the original essence o f
truth no lo n g e r has any effect; it has b een subm erged. ( Vemm
nominat id. in quod tendit intellectus. . . . Veritas principaliter est in intellectu.y

T h is process h ad a still fu rth er consequence: to the e xten t that
later centuries u p to the m os recent tim es recalled the p hilosop h y o f the G reeks an d took pains to presen t their do ctrin e o f
truth, truth was th en o f course grasped in the sense o f veritas, as
the correctness o f an assertion o f ju d g in g reason. T h is later d e term ination o f the essence o f iX.f|deia as the on ly valid on e was
then sou gh t w ithin G reek philosophy, even w here a con cep tio n
o f truth as correctness was foreign, i.e., w here the original e x p e rience o f truth as uncon cealedn ess still prevailed. T h is led to the
ludicrous con ten tion that the early G re e k thinkers were dabblers
an d incapable o f clearly con ceivin g the essence o f truth an d the
p rob lem o f k n o w le d ge and ju d g m e n t, an d that only Plato an d
A ristotle succeed ed in d o in g so.
T h u s everyth in g was stood on its h ead . A n d this inversin still
rules the ordinary scholarly presentation o f G reek philosophy.
B u t still m ore essential than this in verted scholarship itself is
the fact that it has blocked ou r access to the original essence o f
truth. H ow so? From w hat we have said, d o we not m erely n eed
to ge t used to translating the G re e k w ord
0X.f|deia with o u r
word un con cealedn ess instead o f tru th in the sense o f cor-
1. Thom as Aquinas, Summa Theologica, vol. I, question XVI, article i. In Opera

Omnia, Parma, 1852. [T h e true ames that towards which the intellect tends . . .
T ruth is principally in the intellectTr.]
90
rectness? People have said b en ign ly th at the m erit o f the treatise
Being and Time was to have b ro u gh t back into circulation this literal translation o f t/rjfteia. Virêia is now translated as u n concealedness, an d everythin g rem ains as it was. For n o th in g
is gained by a m ere change in the way o f speaking, not even if,
beyond the literal translation o f Xri'&et.a, it is shown that the
Greeks alread y knew the u ncon cealedn ess o f beings to be the essence o f truth.
Such an im p rovem en t in the historiographical presentation
o f the G re e k con cep tio n o f truth is far rem oved from a historical
reflection on the question o f tr u th so far rem oved that the
im provem ent in the way o f sp eakin g actually fu rth er im p edes
this reflection an d its necessity. For it is now well know n that
the Greeks h ad alread y ap p ealed to the openness o f b ein gs as
truth. B u t m o d e rn and con tem p orary p hilosophy also know,
m ore than an yth in g else, that, in the progress o f philosophical
thinking, Plato an d A ristotle overcam e this early G reek c o n ce p tion o f truth. In the course o f m o dern th ou gh t, the doctrin e that
truth is the correctness o f the ju d g in g reason (intellectus) develop ed into such a m atter o f course that even the greatest an tagonist o f this th in k in g, N ietzsche, does n ot tam p er with the d o ctrine in the least b u t instead m akes it the fou n d ation o f his ow n
theory o f truth. In d o in g so, N ietzsche is u nw ittingly in p erfect
agreem ent w ith T h o m a s A quinas, w h o said, on the basis o f a p articular in terpretation o f A ristotle: veritas principaliter est in intellectu: truth has its place, above all an d originally, in ju d g in g reason.
Every con n ection
with the
early
G re e k con cep tion
of
tr u th truth as the unconcealedness o f b e in g s is therefore stigm atized as a relapse into a stand point that has been overcom e
lo n g ag o an d was valid only for the ru dim en tary b egin n in gs o f
W estern th ou gh t.
W h at has now been accom plished? W here have we arrived
since we d e fle cte d from ou r sim ply stated course o f qu estion in g
on to an ap p aren t side track? We qu estion ed back from the ord inary con cep tio n o f truth (truth as the correctness o f an assertion) into w hat we called o p e n n e ss w hich we in tro du ced as
b ein g gen u in e ly w orthy o f qu estioning. O p en ness, however, can
constitute the m ore original essence o f truth only if that o f which
25- The unconcealedness o f the whatness o f beings [102103]
91
it is the gro u n d , nam ely correctness, for its part touches u p o n

the essence o f truth in som e way, even i f n ot originally. D oes it
touch the essen ce i.e., is the usual con cep tio n o f truth fo u n d e d ,
an d i f so, how? We have seen that this con cep tion an d d e te rm ination o f the essence o f truth is in fact not fou nd ed, because,
as a positing o f essence, it cannot be fo u n d e d in the usual sense
at all. Yet it is not therefore w ithout gr o u n d ; on the contrary,
w hat is claim ed as the gro u n d o f the possibility o f correctness
is otX.f|ftia, an d that is for the G reeks th e essence o f truth. T h e
unconcealedness o f beings as such is the gr o u n d o f the possibility o f correctness. For the Greeks, it is even in a pre-em in en t
sense that uncon cealedn ess (t\f|deia) as the essence o f truth is
the gro u n d o f the possibility o f correctness (|jlolwctis). L e t us reflect: the G reeks d id not begin by p ositing correctness as the essence o f truth in o rd e r then to go back to unconcealedness as its
grou n d ; on the contrary, they first e x p erie n ce d the u n con cealed ness o f beings an d on the basis o f this exp erien ce determ in ed
truth abo as the correctness o f a n assertion, in that th e y in ligh t
o f .Tj>eio saw the possibility an d the necessity o f |xolojo-is.
H enee this subsequent con ception o f the essence o f truth as correctness, from w hich we began , is very well gro u n d ed and in d eed
gro u n d ed precisely in that w herein G re e k th o u g h t and know le d g e o f beings m ove in advance: in the unconcealedness o f b e ings. A n d thus it is gr o u n d e d in the sam e gro u n d to which o u r
critical reflection was referred back, nam ely the openness o f b e ings, as we called it. Consequently, the ap p roach o f ou r critical
reflectio n to b e gin with the ordinary con cep tio n o f truth as
correctness is ju stifie d . B u t at the sam e tim e it turns ou t that
this critical reflection is now superfluous, because what it discovers, the u ncon cealedn ess o f beings, was already exp erien ced by
the Greeks an d was taken u p by th em as the gro u n d o f the p ossibility o f correctness. T h e openness we fo u n d w orthy o f qu estion in g at the b e g in n in g o f ou r critical reflection was alread y appreciated by the G reeks, so m uch so that this unconcealedness o f
beings becam e for th em the prim ordial determ ination o f the essence o f truth. C onsequ en tly, the G reeks h ad already w orked ou t
exactly w hat we h ave b een trying to take u p as the m ore original
an d necessary task o f fu tu re philosophical inquiry.
92
1) The productive seeing of the unconcealedness o f beings as

the ground o f the essence o f truth as correctness.
O u r task was to answer this question: how is the essential determ ination o f truth as correctness fo u n d e d ? Since there is no fo u n dation for the positing o f an essence, the positing o f the essence
b ein g in itself the layin g o f a gr o u n d , we had to pose the question
o f fou n d ation in an other way. So we asked w hat is seen and
b rou gh t forth as the gro u n d o f that essence o f truth? W h at is
taken u p as that in w hich truth in th e sense o f correctness is
rooted an d o u t o f which it, so to say, blossoms forth? W h a t is the
reference back, w hat is the source, w hat is seen in ad van ce in the
case o f the p ositing o f the essence o f truth as correctness? T h e
truth w hose essence is subsequently d e term in ed as correctness was
called by the G reeks, prior to this determ ination, aVrydeia, u n concealedness. A n d w hat they m ean t was the u ncon cealedn ess o f
beings th em selves the u ncon cealedn ess o f beings as such. O r ig inally, there resides in this d e term in atio n o f truth as u n c o n cealedness n o th in g like correctness, but, instead, all correctness
o f assertions resides in the u ncon cealedn ess o f beings. For the
orientation o f representations tow ard b ein gs and th eir co n fo rm ity with beings are possible on ly i f beings dw ell in u n co n cealed ness. C o n sequ en d y, i f the correctness o f representing an d assertin g is posited for w hat it is, then a lo n g with it ct\f|d eia, the
unconcealedness o f beings, m ust also be posited an d be in view
as w hat provides this essence its gro u n d . In positing the essence
o f truth as the correctness o f an assertion, the G reeks alread y
had in view, th ey saw in advance an d b ro u gh t forth, the gr o u n d
o f this positing, i.e., tX.fi'&tia. In d iffe re n t term s, th e delim itation o f truth as correctness is a lim itin g con ception d e v e lo p ed in
only one d e te rm in e d respect an d hen ee is a lim ited grasp o f the
foundation al truth as the u ncon cealedn ess o f beings.
2) The Greek cuX.fi'&eia as openness. The transformation of

the concept o f truth from unconcealedness to correctness.
W here d o we th en stand? A t the start o f ou r in q u iry tak in g ou r
25. T h e unconcealedness o f the whatness o f beings [105-106]
93
dep arture fro m th e ordinary con cep t o f truth (correctness o f an

assertion) we carried ou t a critical reflection that poin ted back
to a m ore original essence o f truth, which we called openness.
B u t the source o f this critique, nam ely, that to which som eth in g
m ore original is assigned, was itself n ot im m ediately ju stified .
T h e reflection on justification , accom plished alon g with the first
positing o f the essence o f truth as correctness, showed, however,
that this justification o f the positing o f the essence derives its
righ t from the unconcealedness o f beings, consequently p recisely from that tow ard which ou r critical reflection on the ord inary con cept o f truth led back. W h at else is the
o f the
G reeks b u t w hat we cali openness? T h e r e fo r e w hat is n e e d e d

first is not at all a laborious critique o f the traditional con cep t o f
truth. W hat is required is sim ply that we rem em ber its historical
origin and its prim ordial justification, henee, that we cali back
som ething forgotten.
T h e fo rg e ttin g o f the grou n d o f th e traditional con cep t o f
truth, henee the fo rg e ttin g o f its original essence, which was once
revealed, is easily exp lain ed. B y the transform ation o f G re e k
thin kin g into R om an, Christian, an d m o d e rn concepts,
o \ t i& i o i
as jtoiwCTis, correctness, becam e veritas as adaequatio an d recti-
tudo, i.e., truth as ad equatio n and correctness. W h at was lost was

n ot only every resonance o f the m ean in g o f Xriêia, the G re e k
nam e for veritas an d truth, but, above all, every im pulse to gain
som e sort o f k n o w led ge o f the position o f G reek h um an ity
within beings an d toward beings, ou t o f w hich alone such essential words as aX/rêia cou ld be spoken. Instead, du e to the misu n derstan din g o f its essence,
XTjfteia was understood every-
w here as the correctness o f a representation.

A t the same tim e we m ust note well that in the history o f W estern philosophy since the Greeks, not o n ly did this fo rg e ttin g o f
their prim ordial co n ce p t o f truth com e to pass, b u t m ore h ap p en ed: on the basis o f this transform ed con cep t o f tr u th in the
sense o f the correctness o f an assertion o r a representation new
basic philosophical positions arse with Descartes and Leibniz,
with K ant an d the thinkers o f G e rm a n idealism , and lastly with
Nietzsche. A ll this occurred, to be sure, within a u nan im ity o f
th in k in g and in a u n iform ity o f the g u id in g lines o f inquiry, so
that, e.g., in spite o f the abysm al differen ces betw een the m ed ieval theologian T h o m a s Aquinas an d the last essential thinker o f
94
the West, N ietzsche, for both o f th em the same con cep tio n o f
truth, as a characteristic o f ju d g in g reason, was authoritative.
A n d this d id n ot at all occur on the basis o f an explicit reflection
bu t entirely as i f it were all b eyon d q u e stio n w here in d eed it
still stands today.
T h e result o f everyth in g here is th at o u r critical reflection is
superfluous, because it has already b een accom plished. Furtherm ore, this accom plishm ent has
lo n g
since been
overcom e.
T h ere fo re o u r presum ably m ore original question into the essence o f truth is w ithout necessity. In fact, everyth in g com es
dow n to this: D oes o u r inquiry arise m erely from an u n fo u n d e d
resistance against the past, henee in the en d from a blin d and
sim ple desire for n o v e lty or from a necessity? A n d if so, from
which one?
At
this
p oin t we
see at on ce
that
it is not possible
in
p h ilo so p h y as it is in science for a critical question to d e m n strate itself on the basis o f an objective state o f affairs. T h e p h ilo sophical question m ust bear its necessity within itself; it m u s t i f
sufflciently u n fo ld e d m ake this necessity itself visible. T h e r e fore, if now, after this first substantive clarification o f the d o m ain
o f the inquiry, we reflect on the necessity o f the question, we are
not thereby ab a n d o n in g the question o f truth, and are n ot leavin g it behind , b u t are p erfo rm in g the very first step lea d in g to its
u nfoldin g.
Chapter Four
T h e Necessity o f the Question
o f the Essence o f Truth,
on the Basis o f the B eginning
o f the History o f Truth
27. The tum ing o f the critical question o f truth toward
the beginning o f the history o f truth as a leaping ahead

into the future. XT)-&eta as experienced by the Greeks
though not interrogated by them.
First o f all, d o o u r previous discussions o f the question o f truth
con tribute toward exh ib itin g the necessity o f that question? T o
b e sure. T h u s the elucidation o f the G re e k con cep t o f truth was
in no way superfluous.
1. It showed that the Greeks were already acquainted with two
senses o f truth: first as unconcealedness (openness o f beings)
an d then as the assim ilation o f a representation to beings (correctness).
2. T h is observation protects us from the preposterous claim o f
h avin g raised a new question with o u r initial critique o f the o rd in ary con cep t o f truth. I f a recognition o f the greatness o f
G re e k thinking keeps us, at the very outset, free from such p reposterous notions an d fro m the desire for novelty, ou r discussion
o f the G reek notion o f truth will then have a special significance
for ou r inquiry, an d everyth in g com es d o w n to this:
3. O u r critical qu estion in g back from the ordinary con cep t o f
truth as the correctness o f an assertion to th e openness o f beings
96
T h e Necessity o f the Question [10810]
is not an arbitrary critique, stem m in g from em p ty hair-splitting,

but is the tu rn in g o f ou r th in k in g an d qu estion ing ab o u t truth
toward the b e g in n in g o f the history o f truth. A n d we today still
dwell in this history, in d eed precisely insofar as we u nw ittingly
and as a m atter o f course in all o u r th in k in g and actin g m ove
within the d o m ain o f the traditional co n ce p t o f truth.
Just w hat have we gained thereby? W h at else than the historiographical cogn ition that for us today, and for the West since
lo n g ago, the original essence o f truth has been lost because o f
the p red om in an ce o f truth as correctness. H enee we have gain ed
the recogn ition o f a loss. B u t it is n ot at all d ecided that we have
here a ge n u in e loss. For that w ould be the case only i f it co u ld be
shown that the not-losing, the preservation, o f the original essence o f truth (a\f|'ia) is a necessity an d that we con sequ ently
n eed to gain back w hat was lost.
Yet, even assum in g this were dem onstrated conclusively, can
we gain back w hat was lost? Is th e past not irreparably gone?
A n d even i f we w anted to ad h ere to this past in m em ory, w o u ld
that not lead to the opposite o f w hat is necessary? We d o not
want to turn back history, an d o f course we cannot; instead, we
m ust think an d act ou t o f ou r presen t (or future) necessity. For
the shocks (world war, world revolution) or, rather, that o f w hich
these shocks are m erely the historical consequences have forced
u s not any single individuis, or the still m ore arbitrary
many, an d n ot individual peoples or nations and states for
them selves, b u t the entire W est in to the question o f w h eth er or
not we are still in the truth, in deed w h eth er we still w ant an d can
w ant the truth at all.
In view o f this task, is not the m erely retrospective rem em berin g o f earlier tim es no m atter how essential these times m ay
have b e e n yet still historicism , an ad heren ce to the past from
som e sort o f ill-concealed rom anticism or from som e h u m an istic predilection, now basically an tiquated, for the G reeks and
the G reek w orld an d its philosophy? O r does the retrospection
orignate m erely in an antipathy toward the degen eration o f
w hat today, u n d e r the venerable am e o f philosophy, postures in
an unbridled an d u ninhibited w ritin g o f books and blabberin g,
the e xten t an d co n te n t o f which stand in a reverse relation to the
pow er to raise essential questions? B u t can we be p erm itted to
27 - Turning the critical question [1101 1]
97
base o u r entire ap p roach an d proced ure o n m ere antipathies? Is

this revival o f G re e k th in k in g not basically a fligh t from the necessities pressing hard u p o n us, a blindness in relation to the
present, and a shrinkin g back before th e futu re? Is this n ot always the case with such reversions to the early an d the earliest
an d the b e gin n in g ; d o they not show that o n es ow n pow er has
fla gg e d and all possibilities have been exhau sted ?
O u r discussions o f the G reek con cep t o f truth and the in sight
they provided, nam ely that o u r critical qu estion in g is a tu rn in g
back toward prim ordial G reek th o u g h t, m igh t be m ore than
free-floatin g historiographical considerations. T h e y m igh t con tain som ething o f a historical reflection, for they b rin g before
the inner eye the distance betw een the presen t an d the past. N evertheless, we can n ot rid ourselves o f the suspicion that in all this,
instead o f assum in g the tasks o f today, we are u n d ertak in g a
m ore or less well disguised scholarly stroll in to the harm less past,
p rovid in g us with m ere historiographical cognitions instead o f
in dicating w hat we ourselves shfould d o to throw o f f all the early
things o f the b e g in n in g an d leave th em behind .
B u t against all these obvious, and largely ju stified , objections
w e m ust reflect on w hat we said, p erh ap s on ly conjecturally,
about the b e gin n in g o f the history o f W estern thought: the b e gin n in g could b e som eth in g which, fu rle d
in its greatness,
reaches ahead in to th e futu re, and, accordingly, the return to the

b e gin n in g cou ld be a lea p in g ahead, in d e e d a gen u in e lea p in g
ah ead into the fu tu re, th o u g h to be sure o n ly u n d e r the co n d ition that we really d o b egin with the be gin n in g.
T h a t is now the decisive question, the question, whose answer
decides the necessity o r arbitrariness o f o u r proced ure an d con sequently decides the question o f truth as such. T h e p reced in g
discussion o f the history o f the G re e k n o tio n o f truth took us
back tem porally m o re than two m illennia, yet we have perh aps
not at all arrived at the b e gin n in g o f this h istory not because
ou r question has n o t g o n e back far e n o u g h in tim e b ut because
in this way we are n o t yet within history at all and again an d
again fall back in to historiographical considerations, reckoning
the present against the past, instead o f actually reflecting.
We have m ade th e historiographical constatation th at the
G reeks, at the b e g in n in g o f their th in k in g, conceived o f truth
T h e Necessity o f the Question [ 1 1 1 -1 2 ]
as A.fideiot, as the u ncon cealedn ess o f beings, an d o n ly very

m uch later, specifically at the e n d o f th eir great p h ilo so p h y in
the th o u g h t o f Plato an d in the doctrin es o f A risto tle passed on
to a determ in atio n o f truth as the correctness o f an assertion.
W ith this p ositing o f the essence th ey then took u p the earlier
and m ore original con ception o f truth as the natural g r o u n d o f
truth in the sense o f correctness. T h is historiographical constatation is indisputable. B u t it is by no m eans a historical reflection,
w h ich as we k n o w only springs forth o u t o f gen u in e q u estion in g on the p art o f the on e w ho is reflectin g and m ust also rem ain
sup p orted by it. H en ee we have to ask first o f all:
W h en the G reeks took u p Vrjfteia (unconcealedness) as the
gro u n d o f correctness, did they thereby posit this g r o u n d as
grou n d an d d id they gro u n d it as such? Furtherm ore, assum in g
they g r o u n d e d the unconcealedness o f beings as the g r o u n d o f
correctness, is this gro u n d
itself .f|fteia in its essence
thereby sufficiently d eterm in ed an d questioned? D id the Greeks

ever in terrgate
Xf|-eta as such; d id they d eem the u n c o n -
cealedness o f b ein gs as such w orthy o f questioning? T h e G reeks

exp erien ced the essence o f truth as uncon cealedn ess does that
m ean w ithou t fu rth e r ad o that for th em this very u n con cealedness was w orthy o f questioning? B y no means. T h e G reeks
once exp erie n ce d the u ncon cealedn ess o f beings an d took it
u p as truth, an d on this gro u n d th ey d eterm in ed truth as correctness an d p osited this gr o u n d an d gro u n d ed it, b u t they
did not g o fu rth e r an d explicitly in terrgate uncon cealedn ess itself. AX.fi'&eia rem ain ed for th em unqu estion ed. T h e ir th in k in g
did n ot p en etrate fu rth er into V rid eia as such, and they d id not
fathom
[er-grndet] it explicitly in its essence. Instead, they
m erely stood u n d e r the force o f the e m e rg in g but still fu rle d essence o f truth as unconcealedness.
*8. Truth as correctness and its domination over its

own ground as an essential consequence o f the absence o f a
fathoming o f the ground. The question o f openness as the
question o f Xri)eiot itself.
T h e positing o f som ething as the g r o u n d for som ething else, the
28. Truth as correctness [112 -13 ]
99
g r o u n d in g o f the grou n d , is not yet genuine g r o u n d in g in the

sense o f a fa th o m in g o f the groun d. W h at th en are we to m ake o f
this occurrence, nam ely that the G reeks exp erien ced
i\f|$eiot
precisely as the essence o f truth an d took it u p as the g r o u n d

o f correctness b u t did not them selves explicitly fath om this
groun d? W h at i f the e ffect was that h en ceforth truth as correctness acquired dom in ation over that in w hich it is rooted? W h at
i f this occurrence, that the th in k in g o f the Greeks did not m aster Xri'eia, led to the situation that this be gin n in g was subm erged in the following times and remains subm erged even today?
A n d what i f this occurren ce were thereby n ot som eth ing b yg o n e
b u t w ould now still be com in g to pass in sofar as we m ove in the
u n g ro u n d e d obviousness o f the traditional con cep t o f truth?
A n d in fact that is w hat is h ap p en in g . T h e know ledge o f the
essence o f aX.f|{>eia did n ot ge t lost because later on iXf|-&eta was
translated by ventas, rectitudo, an d tru th , an d was interp reted as
the correctness o f an assertion, b u t ju s t the opposite, this translation and this new interpretation co u ld b egin and cou ld gain
prevalence on ly because the essence o f
otXijfteia was n o t u n -
fold ed originally e n o u g h and its u n fo ld in g was not g r o u n d e d

strongly e n o u g h . T h e occurrence o f the subm ergence o f the prim ordial essence o f truth, uncon cealedn ess (<k\f|'&eia), is n o th in g
past and go n e b u t is im m ediately p resen t an d operative in the
basic fact it determ ines, nam ely the u nshaken dom ination o f the
traditional co n ce p t o f truth.
W ithin the realm o f the history o f w hat is essential, on ly rarely
does som ething occur. W hat does occu r there h ap p en s very
slowly and very silently, and its im m ed iate effect leaps over the
span o f m illennia. It does not n eed the crutches o f a con tin uous
chain o f cause an d effect, each e ffect b eco m in g the cause o f a
succeed ing one. I f historiographers w ere required to assum e the
task o f p resen tin g w hat is essential, th ey w ould flo u n d er in the
greatest em barrassm ent, not because th ey have too m uch at their
disposal b u t to o little. W h at w ould rem ain o f the w hole business
o f archives an d literature, w hat w ould rem ain o f the business o f
reviews an d dissertations, if by on e stroke w hat is unessential b e cam e ungraspable? B u t that will not h ap p en , for the unessential,
in very d ifferen t form s, is the lo n g shadow cast by the essential,
to en d u p m ostly overshadow ed by it. T h e occurrence o f th e sub-
T h e Necessity o f the Question [113 15]
lo o
m ergen ce o f prim ordial a\f|{>ia exists still, and it occurs wherever truth m eans correctness.
O n ly if we subm it to this k n o w led ge will we be on the p ath o f
historical reflection. O n ly in that way will we arrive historically
rather than historiograp h ically back at the b e gin n in g o f W estern reflection on truth, back at w hat occurred p rim ordially and
is still occurrin g. O n ly th rou gh such reflection will we p u t o u rselves in a position to b egin with the b egin n in g, and that m eans
to be futural in an original way instead o f m erely reckoning back
historiographically to the earliest past an d e xp o sin g its difference, or in d eed backwardness, in com parison with the present.
C o n sequ en tly o u r question ab o u t the gro u n d o f the possibility
o f correctness, henee the return to openness and above all the
question o f openn ess itself as the m ost w orthy o f question ing, is
not superfluous. It is so little sup erflu ou s that this interrogation
actually becom es the m akin g g o o d o f an earlier neglect, the m akin g go od o f the question o f w hat aX riêia itself is, the question
the Greeks never raised.
Now we em p hasize anew that the b e gin n in g is the greatest,
surpassing e veryth in g that com es afterw ard, even if this turns
against the be gin n in g, which it can d o on ly because the b e g in n in g is and m akes possible w hat succeeds it. So is it not p u re p ed antry w hen we say the Greeks have n e glected a question here? Is
it not a very arro gan t u n derestim ation o f the greatness o f their
thinking to say th ey did not m aster the question o f truth? T o be
sure, it is. T h u s even ou r attem pted reflection on the prim ordial
G reek th in k in g abo u t the essence o f truth is n ot yet sufficiently
reflective,
i.e.,
it will
not
attain
the
b e gin n in g
historically
en o u gh , so lo n g as this reflection term inates in the p resu m p tu ous superiority o f the epigon es over the fo u n d in g masters. A s
lon g as it does so, we are not ye t in the p ro p er position to begin
with the b e gin n in g, i.e., to be futu ral, to seize and p rep are ou r
futu re in th o u g h t an d questioning.
We m ust th erefore reflect on this occurrence, that the Greeks
did in d eed e xp erien ce the essence o f truth as unconcealedness,
took it u p, an d always had it available to them , b ut did n ot question it explicitly an d did not fath o m it. Was this event m ere neglect and the result o f an incapacity o f questioning, or does the
gen uin e greatness o f G reek th o u g h t consist precisely in this and
28. Truth as correctness [115 -16 ]
101
accom plish itself in it? T h e decisin h ere is not an attem pt to explain and rescue a past in cid en t the G re e k thinkers d o not
n eed th a t b u t is instead the delim itation o f the way we take a
stand toward truth an d stand in the truth. For w hat cam e to pass
at the b e gin n in g o f the history o f the essential fou n d ation o f
truth always rem ains for us still to b e d e c id e d a decisin ab o u t
w hat for us an d for the fu tu re can beco m e true and can be true.
T h e Greeks exp erie n ce d the essence o f truth originally as
a\f|>io, as the unconcealedness o f beings. T h is essence o f
truth, however, was n ot first cap tu red in a definition an d m ad e
available to know ledge. Definitions in p h ilo so p h y th o u g h not
in science always com e late and usually com e last. T h e know le d g e o f the essence o f truth as the unconcealedness o f beings
had originally, i.e., in its great epoch, this form , that all actin g
an d creating, all th in k in g and sp eakin g, all fo u n d in g an d proc ee d in g were d e term in ed by and th o ro u gh ly in accord with the
unconcealedness o f beings as som eth in g u ngrasped. W h o ever
does not see an d does not know this, an d can not learn to see an d
know it, will never divine an ything o f the original event o f the
be gin n in g o f W estern history, o f that b e g in n in g which really was
its begin n in g, inasm uch as we m ean the history o f the W est an d
not the m ere b io lo g y o f its p e o p le s ab o u t which we d o n ot
know an yth in g anyway, not only because the sources are m eager,
bu t because the p resupposition for in terp retin g it, ou r kn o w le d g e o f life, is so m iserable and con fused.
T h a t the G reeks were prim ordial in th o u g h t and poetry an d
politics is evid en t m ost starkly in the fact that the end in w hich
w e find ourselves today is n o th in g else than a decline from their
b egin n in g, an in creasin g inability to b e equal to the b egin n in g.
Yet this does n ot e xclu d e ou r ow n creatin g and w o rk in g in the
afterm ath an d tradition o f this b e gin n in g. T o be equal to requires a surpassing. B u t how can we e x p e c t such a th in g w h en we
can barely achieve the most w retched imitations? O n e m ig h t
think here o f the massive classical m o vem en t in art, which arose
ou t o f the void an d gapes into the void. T h e surpassing o f the
b egin n in g occurs o n ly within an other be gin n in g, one w hich recognizes that its surpassing m erely surpasses the afterm ath an d
the tradition o f the b e gin n in g an d can o n ly reach the level o f
the b egin n in g, for n o th in g h igh er can b e attained.
102
T h e Necessity o f the Question [116 17]
29. The Greeks experience o f unconcealedness
as the basic character o f beings as such and their

lack o f inquiry into /rdeia.
H ow are we to u n derstan d truth in the sense o f the u n co n cealed ness o f beings so that it m igh t allow us to see w hy the G reeks d id
not explicitly in terrgate unconcealedness, allow us to know how
to ju d g e this lack o f inquiry, and allow us to exp erien ce thereby
the necessities we ourselves are draw n into?
T h e e xp erien ce o f truth as the u ncon cealedn ess o f beings im plies first o f all that truth is to say it qu ite in d e te rm in ate ly a
character o f b ein gs them selves, an d not, as in the ordinary view
o f later times, a m atter o f assertions about beings. For the
Greeks, b ut o n ly for them , beings them selves are w h at can be
true or u ntrue, i.e., u ncon cealed o r dissem bled.
T o obvate m isunderstandings in this regard, a short excursus
is n eeded. In the follow ing times, every b ein g, ens, was in d eed
still con ceived as verum, and scholasticism as well as a p art o f
m odern p hilo sop hy spoke o f o n to lo gical truth in distinction to
the logical truth o f the intellect. N ow this doctrine does in fact
stem from a p articular ad h eren ce to the tradition o f G re e k p h ilosophy, b u t it is th o u g h t and in ten d ed w holly and u tterly in an
u n -G reek way. Verum does not m ean the u ncon cealed; on the
contrary, omne ens est verum E very b e in g is true because, as a
being, it is in ad van ce necessarily th o u g h t o f correctly by G o d or,
according to C hristian and O ld T estam en t thinking, by the creator, i.e., by the creator as the absolute spirit free from error. We
note this p arenthetically in order to avert the co m m in glin g an d
identification, attem p ted again an d again , o f T h o m istic th in k in g
with A ristotelian th o u g h t and G re e k th in k in g in general. T h is
identification is o ften advan ced n ot o n ly by representatives o f
T h o m ism b u t even by classical philologists. For exam ple, the th eory W erner J a e g e r has dissem inated ab o u t A ristotle is m uch
m ore m edieval an d scholastic than G reek. B o th m edieval an d
m o dern th in k in g m ove w holly w ithin a con ception o f tru th as
correctness, i.e., as a determ ination o f k n o w le d g e even w hen
they speak o f ontological truth. T h is on tological truth is
n o th in g else th an the correlate o f G o d s thinking, w hich is in itself absolutely correct. It is not the uncon cealed in the G re e k
29. T h e Greeks experience o f unconcealedness [11718] 103

sense b ut is the absolutely correct (intellectus divinus). A still d e e p e r
fou n d ation for this is the evidence that all traditional o n to lo gy
determ ines the ens qua ens u n d e r the gu id an ce o f the act o f
th in k in g and its truth, i.e., correctness.
I f the Greeks exp erie n ce d truth as a characteristic o f beings,
th en this truth m ust be fo u n d e d in beings them selves. O r should
we not rather say h ere that the truth as a characteristic o f beings
b elongs to these beings? Should the truth as exp erien ced b y the
Greeks characterize the essence o f beings them selves, i.e., o f b e ings them selves as u nderstood by the Greeks? T h e s e are not
questions posed to e m p ty possibilities; th ey are well w arranted,
for precisely w here an other con ception o f truth (as the correctness o f an assertion) h ad already d e v e lo p ed an d established itself
in G reek philosophy, nam ely in Plato an d Aristotle, beings an d
truth
were always
m en tioned
together:
aXTjfteia x a i
8v
unconcealedness: that is to say, beings as such. 1 B eyon d a d o u bt,

we are to un derstan d x a i here as an explication , in the sense o f
and that is to say, for o fte n irfstead o f even m en tionin g b'v, they
said sim ply i.f|deia o r
t o
X .T ) d s -
It goes so m uch against ou r habits to th in k o f u n con cealed ness, with com p lete decisiveness, as characteristic o f beings as
such that even w h en we have gain ed in sight into the distinction
betw een the u ncon cealedn ess o f beings an d the correctness o f an
assertion, we still too readily conceive o f unconcealedness as d e tached from beings, as i f it were an ad dition , accessory to beings.
B u t why did the G reeks not inquire in to Vrjfteia as such, i f it
does in deed b e lo n g to beings them selves, an d if in fact the qu estion o f beings as such was the prim ordial an d constant question
o f the G reek thinkers? W hy did ctA/rfteia rem ain precisely the
u nquestion ed? W h y d id it n ot becom e the m ost w orthy o f qu estioning? A n d w h en OXf|-frea was in terrogated explicitly, w hy did
the very way o f qu estion in g turn
\ f|fte ia as unconcealedness
into t.f|fteia as correctness? We today are hard ly able to m easure the fll con sequences o f this d eterm in atio n an d are likely to
take them , in spite o f everythin g, as historiographical subtleties
relating to w hat is lo n g past and go n e, rather than as directives to
a decisive event w hich is still decisive over us; nevertheless, we
m ust p u t this qu estio n in g aside now an d attem p t a first answer.
1. Cf. Plato, Republic VI.
104
T h e Necessity o f the Question [118-20]
W hy did the G reeks not m ake
tVrjdeia as such a question,
rather th a n i f we m ay say s o e x p erie n ce it as som eth in g o b vious? Was this lack o f inquiry a n eglect? D id it stem from impotence w ith regard to original question ing?
1) The ground o f the necessity o f the

question o f the essence o f truth.
Even w ithou t special reflection, the question o f truth seem s im portant e n o u g h . B u t alth ou gh we m ig h t take an em p h atic interest in truth, i.e., in w hat is true an d in the possession o f w h at is
true, that still does not qu alify as a sufficient gro u n d for the necessity o f the question o f the essence o f truth. For the history o f the
essence o f truth an d the still u n brok en obviousness o f the traditional con cep tio n o f truth testify qu ite clearly that the necessity
o f this question about the essence has b y no m eans b een e x p e r ienced and seen with insight. N ow the necessity o f a p hilosophical
question is as essential as the question itself is. For a p h ilo sop h ical question m ust, follow ing the sovereign character o f p h ilo sophy, bear in itself its necessity, i.e., it m ust poin t back to this n e cessity. T h e r e fo r e we could n ot have b e g u n with a reflection on
the necessity o f the question o f truth, b u t instead the First task
had to be to d e ve lo p this question accord in g to its initially graspable basic features, in ord er for this d evelop m en t itself to lead us
to the necessity o f the question.
H ereby a view is o p en ed u p o n the essence o f p hilo sop hy
which we can n o t fu rth er investgate now, b u t w hich m u st be
briefly noted , since it clarifies the g r o u n d o f the ap p u rten an ce o f
historical reflection to m editative qu estioning. T h e d o m ain o f
philosophy as the question o f beings as such and as a w hole, an d
consequently p hilosop hy itself, can n ot be m anu factu red an d d e term ined by h u m an products an d institutions an d claims. T h e
h um an o u tp u t an d w ork to be fo u n d u n d e r the am e philosophy, in any o f its form s, will never m ake visible w h at p hilosophy is. For philo sop h y belongs to th e truth o f B ein g. Philosophy
is and must be w h en ev er an d how ever B e in g itself presses toward
29. T h e Greeks experience o f unconcealedness [12021] 105

its truth, i.e., w h en the openness o f b ein gs them selves com es to
pass, w hen history is. Philosophy, i f it is, does not exist because
there are philosophers, or are there philosophers because p h ilosophy is taken u p. O n the contrary, p hilosop hy and p hilosophers exist on ly w h en an d how the truth o f B e in g itself com es to
pass, a history w hich is withdrawn from every hum an institution
an d plan, since it itself is the very g r o u n d for the possibility o f
h u m an historical B ein g. T h is may serve to indicate the direction
o u t o f which we m ust exp erien ce the necessity o f the question o f
the essence o f truth, assum ing we are able to an d want to e x p e rience it.
2) Xf|-frea as primordial for the Greeks

yet unquestioned by them.
T h e p reced in g p ath o f o u r reflections gave rise to the insight
that that toward w hich o u r critical deliberation had to question
back, nam ely the openn ess o f teings as the gr o u n d o f the possibility o f the correctness o f an assertion, was already know n in
G re e k th in k in g as
o Xt -frea,
the u ncon cealedn ess o f beings.
Consequ en dy, o u r critical reflections, an d thereby the question

o f truth itself, have n o original necessity. T h e y are superfluous,
because they o n ly b r in g back som ething already accom plished.
O u r critical reflection m ay in deed sign ify a tu rn in g in the direction o f the th in k in g o f G reek philosophy, b u t thereby it shows
itself in addition to b e in g su p erflu ou s as a fligh t into the past,
n o m atter how h ig h ly prized.
B u t as certain as it is that w hat we are callin g the openness o f
beings is con n ected to w hat the G reeks called Xiq-frea, that is
how u n d ecid ed it is w h eth er ou r question, its what and its how,
was also a question raised by the G reeks. T h a t alone matters
here. Now it has b een show n that the G reeks d id in deed prim ordially take u p
\f|-frea in the sense o f th e unconcealedness o f
beings as the essence o f truth and fo u n d e d u p o n it the d eterm ination o f X.f|deia as o i x o j c t i s b u t that th ey precisely did n ot
ask about \f|-frea itself and its essence. Furtherm ore, because
they did not raise this question o f the essence o f Xiq-frea, o f u n concealedness as such, because for the G reeks
Xf]-frea re-
m ained prim ordial an d u nquestioned, th erefore the determ ina-
T h e Necessity o f the Question [121-2 2]
io 6
tion o f truth as correctness, w hich was actually g r o u n d e d u p o n

it, could gain an ascendancy over .Tjfteia, cou ld thrust it aside,
and could by itself dom nate the subsequ en t history o f th ou gh t.
So if in fact the Greeks did not raise the question we are raising
in m akin g the openness o f beings w hat is m ost w orthy o f questioning, th en we are facin g an om ission an d a neglect, especially
in view o f the incontrovertible passion o f the Greeks to give a
reason an d an accou n tin g for w hat they thought: .70V SiSvai.
O n the oth er h an d, however, we fin d it difficu lt to in d u lg e in the
self-righteous p ed an try o f accusin g the prim ordial th in k in g o f
the G reeks, w hich, as the b e gin n in g, was the greatest, o f such a
lack.
The
question
therefore
is w hy
the
Greeks
d id
not
ask
about <x\ir'&eia itself. Is their lack o f inquiry a neglect? In ord er

to reach an answ er here we have to d eterm in e m ore closely the
Greeks prim ordial conception o f aXf|'&eua. We transate Xrj&eia
as the unconcealedness of beings and thereby already indcate that
unconcealedness (truth as understood by the Greeks) is a determ ination o f beings themselves and n o t as is correctness a character
o f assertions about beings.
Yet the m odes o f thinking an d sp ea k in g in G reek p hilo sop hy
com pel us still further. Plato an d A ristotle, precisely the two
thinkers w ho p rep ared the su b m ergen ce o f the prim ordial essence o f XT|-deia, still always m en tio n ed X.fi'&eux to ge th e r with
beings them selves:
V /jA eia x a i 'v u n con cealedn ess: that is
to say, beings in their beingness. O fte n
X/iqdeict even stood
alone in place o f 8v. T ru th and b ein gs in their beingness are the

same. T h e result o f all this is not sim ply that uncon cealedn ess is
related to beings them selves instead o f to assertions ab o u t b e ings, but that unconcealedness constitutes the basic character o f
beings them selves as such.
H ow are we to u nderstand that? A b ove all, how are we th en to
understand that the Greeks precisely did not ask about Xj'deioi?
For the m ost prim ordially p ro p er question o f their th ou gh t,
g u id in g all their reflection, was precisely the question o f beings
as such: w hat is a being? .f|ftia itself is a character o f beings.
It lay before the Greeks, as it were, in the imm ediate direction o f
the questioning that was most their own. Consequendy, i f otX.rjftux
in deed resided in the direction o f their questioning, was their
30. T h e Greeks fdelity to destiny [12223]
107
failure to question it n ot a neglect? In oth er words, did the thinkin g pow er o f the Greeks fall short here?
30. Their fdelity to the destiny meted out to them as the reason
the Greeks did not ask about X-rj-freia. Non-occurrence as what
is necessarily detained in and through the beginning.
No. T h e reason the G reeks did not inquire h ere is that this qu estion runs cou n ter to their ow nm ost task, an d therefore it cou ld
n ot at all enter their field o f view. T h e ir failure to question was
not a consequence o f a lack o f p ow er b u t was du e precisely to
their original pow er to rem ain faithful to the destiny m eted ou t
to them .
W h at was the task assigned them ? H o w can we teil? We are n ot
capable o f calcu lating it. I f we try to, w e e n d u p m erely w ith a list
o f their opinions, we en d u p with a rep o rt o n the views they held.
For the curious, for those w hd love to know a thinkers standp oin t, the views o f a p hilosopher are in d eed all that is desired;
for a philosophy, however, this is com p letely a m atter o f in difference. T h e task assigned to the prim ordial thinkers is accessible
on ly th rou gh a reflection on their prim ord ial questioning. T h e
past counts for n o th in g, the b e gin n in g for everything. H en ee
o u r ever m ore p en etra tin g inquiry back into the b egin n in g.
H en ee even ou r reflection con cern in g th e gro u n d for w hat did
not occur at the b e gin n in g. For w hat d id n o t h ap p en in history in

the essential m om ents o f history an d w hat w ould be m ore essential than a b e g in n in g ? m ust still com e to pass, not as a m ere
repetition b u t in the sense o f those jo lts, leaps, and b ou nd s, in
the sense o f that m o m en tary and sim ple, which we m ust co n cn trate u p o n an d be p rep ared for, i f we are really to exp ect o f fu ture history som eth in g essential.
In the realm o f w h at is essential, w hat does not occur is even
m ore essential than w hat does, for it can never becom e a m atter
o f in differen ce b u t instead always stands, an d ever m ore firm ly,
within the possibility o f b eco m in g m ore necessary and m ore
com pelling. O n the oth er hand, the occurren ce o f the essential is
alm ost inevitably follow ed by its b e in g covered over an d subm e rg ed by the unessential. A s is clear, then , the non-occurren ce
io 8
we are sp eakin g o f is by no m eans ju s t an y arbitrary th o u g h t, detached from all necessity. O n the contrary, the non-occurren ce
here is som ething necessarily held back an d detain ed in the begin n in g an d th ro u g h the b egin n in g, w hereby the b e g in n in g remains the u n fath om ab le, which ever anew instigates reflection
on itself with m ore difficulty, the fu rth e r the decline has progressed.
31. The end o f the first beginning and the

preparation for another beginning.
a) Our situation at the end o f the beginning and the demand

for a reflection on the first beginning as a preparation for
another beginning.
We need to reflect here on the b e g in n in g o f W estern th in k in g
and on w hat occurred in it an d d id not occur in it, because we
stand at the e n d at the end o f this b egin n in g. T h a t is, we are
Standing before the decisin betw een the en d (and its ru n n in g
out, which m ay still take centuries) an d an other b e gin n in g, on e
which can on ly be a m om ent, b u t w hose preparation requires the
patience optim ists are no m ore capable o f than pessim ists.
Yet it m igh t be said that h e r e as elsew h ere there is no n eed
for a special decisin betw een en d an d b egin n in g, since n o b o d y
wants the e n d righ t away, and everyon e altogether prefers the
b egin n in g an d its continuation. B u t this decisin is not m ad e in
the w ell-ten d ed ga rd e n o f ou r inclinations, wishes, an d intentions. I f the decisin is set there, it is n o decisin. It takes place in
the dom ain o f o u r preparedness o r u np rep ared ness for the fu ture. T h is d o m ain is o p en ed u p i f it does in d eed u n fu r l
according to the originality en ablin g us to fin d ourselves again in
w hat gen u in ely occurs, out o f lostness in o u r contrivances and
endeavors, o u t o f en tan glem en t in w hat is obvious an d w orn out.
B u t we will fin d ourselves there o n ly th ro u g h a reflection o n the
b egin n in g an d o n w hat was entrusted to it. For we are thoro u gh ly successors to an d heirs o f a lo n g history, an d w e are satisfied by an d avid for historiographical cognition and its accou n t
o f the past. H istoriograp hy is a narcotic averting us from history.
E ven i f we sim ply w ant to prepare th e oth er b egin n in g, we will
3 i. T h e end o f the first beginning [12526]
109
achieve that on ly i f we are m obilized for the extraordinary an d

for w hat is p erhaps still reserved and h eld o p e n for us, nam ely
the possibility o f b e g in n in g with the b e gin n in g, i.e., with the first
b egin n in g, while b r in g in g it beyon d itself into its fu tu r e ou t o f
another begin nin g.

We m ust reflect on the first b e gin n in g o f W estern th o u g h t because we stand at its en d . O u r use o f the w ord e n d is am bigu ous here. O n the on e hand, it m eans we stand in the dom ain o f
that end which is the en d of the first b e gin n in g. In this sense, end
does not m ean e ith er the m ere cessation or the w aning o f the
p ow er o f the begin n in g. O n the contrary, the end o f a real and
essential history can itself only be an essential one. It is in this
sense o f e n d that we have to un derstan d N ietzsches philosop h y and its astonishingly u niqu e greatness an d fo r m a philoso p h y whose essential in flu en ce has n ot yet even b egu n . T h e
greatness o f the e n d consists not on ly in the essentiality o f the
closure o f the great possibilities bu t also in the pow er to prepare
a transition to som eth in g w holly other.
A t the same tim e, however, e n d refers to the ru n n in g ou t
an d the dissipation o f all the effects o f the previous history o f
W estern thinking. T h a t is, it refers to a con fusion o f the traditional basic positions, valu concepts, an d propositions in the
usual interpretation o f beings, a con fusion that will presum ably
sm older for a lo n g tim e still and is alread y unrecogn izable as
such. We are Standing at the en d in this d o u b le sense. T h e r e fo r e
we m ust reflect on the begin nin g.
b) The experience o f the end by Hlderlin and Nietzsche and

their reflection on the beginning o f Western history.
D espite this b r ie f clarification, the d e m a n d ju s t articulated con cern in g a reflection on the b egin n in g w o u ld be entirely arbitrary
an d p resum ptuous if we did not know or, m ore prudently, if
we cou ld not k n o w that H lderlin an d N ietzsche, the two w ho
h ad the deepest e x p erie n ce o f the end o f the West in the d o u ble
sense (not as d eclin e), cou ld en d ure this exp erien ce an d cou ld
transform it in their Creative w ork on ly th ro u g h their concom itant reflection on the b e gin n in g o f W estern history, on w hat for
the Greeks was necessity. I f H lderlin an d Nietzsche did not
1 IO
stand ad m itted ly
in
way
still
w holly
u nm astered
and
m isunderstood in the course o f o u r history, then we w ould

have no righ t to the dem an d to b e gin with the b egin n in g.
T h a t these two knew the G reek be gin n in g, in a m ore original
way than all previous ages, has its gr o u n d u niquely in the fact
that they exp erie n ce d for the first tim e the en d o f the West. To
p u t it m ore sharply, they them selves, in their existence an d work,
becam e the end , each o f them in a d ifferen t way. Conversely, it
also holds that they exp erien ced the e n d and becam e the end
only because the b e gin n in g overaw ed th em and elevated them
into greatness. B o th the reflection on the first b e gin n in g an d the
fo u n d in g o f its en d , an en d equal to it and to its greatness, belo n g togeth er in the tuming.
T h e fact that b oth H lderlin an d N ietzsche have now becom e
so fashionable is surely no p r o o f that we u nderstand w hat it
signifies that they stand in ou r history as the end o f its first begin n in g an d therefore reach b eyo n d us. O n the contrary, all indications, especially the ever gr o w in g nu m ber o f books an d dissertations about them , testify that we are now on the ve rge o f
accou nting for H lderlin and N ietzsche historiographically an d
are thereby m a k in g each o f them historically a d ead letter.
T o m ention on ly the ill treatm en t o f H ld e rlin m ostly wellm eant, as is everyth in g we d o e ith er his w ork is th o u g h t to be
on b e h a lf o f the fatherlan d , an d excerp ts are m ade o f those
passages w here the words p eo p le , h e ro , and the like occur,
or he is o p e n ly or surreptitiously transposed into a C hristian
and then becom es a com p on en t o f a qu ite dubious ap ologetics.
O r else he is extolled as the m ediator betw een Classicism an d Romanticism. In each case, we som ehow catalog the poet as ju s t another com p oser o f poem s, dram as, an d novis, n e xt to authors
such as K lopstock, H erder, G oeth e, Schiller, and Kleist, instead
o f letting him be the decisin he is, a decisin whose fruitfulness
literary philistines will never sur m ise in the first place because
they do not w ant to be touched by it! It is a decisin over the final
flight or new a d ve n t o f the gods, a decisin which, like every one,
includes a pre-decision over o u r preparedness or u n p rep are d ness with regard to such decisions.
W hat is the p u rp ose o f this referen ce to H lderlin an d N ie tzsche? It is on ly m ean t to drive in this on e point, that w ith re-
32. T h e Greeks destiny [127-28]
111
gard to our d em an d to begin with the b e gin n in g even H lderlin

an d Nietzsche d o not provide any ju stification or assistance as
lo n g as we take th em historiographically, even if we do so accordin g to such h igh m easures as fath e rla n d and Christianity.
Even H lderlin an d N ietzsche, i.e., their work, m ust frst becom e
for us history, so that we m igh t e xp erien ce historically their historical reprodu ction o f the begin n in g. O n c e again, all o f this says
sim ply that they will n ot be historical for us i f we d o not ourselves
becom e Creative in the correspo n d in g dom ains or, m ore m odestly, becom e p reparatory and qu estioning. C o n ce rn in g the d e m and to b egin w ith the begin n in g, in o rd er to overcom e the end ,
the reference to H ld erlin an d N ietzsche cannot fun ction as an
ap p eal to authorities b ut only as a directive to u nm astered tasks,
ones not yet even recogn ized , an d thus o n ly as an intim ation that
we are by no m eans dogm atically p resen tin g a private philosop h y o f history.
38. The destiny meted out to the Greeks: to begin thinking

as an inquiry into beings as such and in terms o f an
experience o f unconcealedness as the basic character
o f beings (aXYj'deux,
In the course o f d e v e lo p in g the question o f truth, we reached the
point where we h ad to reflect o n the fact that the Greeks in d eed
e xp erien ced the m ore original essence o f truth (namely, the u n concealedness o f beings) b u t that they d id not deem truth itself
an d its essence w orthy o f any original question ing, in fact so little
that G reek philosophy, at the en d o f its go ld e n age, even carne to
forsake this original essence. In view o f th at event, we h ad to ask:
w hy did XTj'&eia itself and as such n ot b ecom e for the G reeks
w orthy o f q u estion in g and even the m ost w orthy o f questioning?
O u r answer lies first o f all in the form o f a conjecture: it was n ot
o u t o f a debility in the pow er o f th in k in g or even ou t o f forgetfulness and th e superficiality o f always pursu ing the new
and the latest that the Greeks om itted the m ore original question
o f /jfteia as such b u t ou t o f their p ow er to be equal to their
ow n destiny and to carry it out all the way to its farthest extremity.
W h at destiny was m eted out to their th ou gh t? W hat was the
112
task assigned to their thinking? C a n we be so presu m p tu ou s as to

dar to d ecid e this question? For even i f we sim ply invoke w hat
the Greeks accom plished in m atters o f thinking, this accom plishm ent m igh t have been a deviation fro m their actual destiny. Fortunately, w hat is at issue here is n ot the results o f their philosop hy b u t the very character o f th eir thinking, their way o f
questioning, the direction from w hich they p ursu ed an answ er to
their question ing. T h e ir destiny was som eth in g into which they
were com p elled ever anew, som eth in g their thinkers, desp ite bein g basically d ifferen t, nevertheless u nderstood as th e same,
som ething th at for th em was th erefore a necessity. E very necessity lays h old o f m an out o f a n eed. E very need becom es com p elling out of, an d within, a basic disposition.
T h e se directives delineate the p ath that m igh t lead us to reflect on w hat was m eted out to the G reeks as the task o f th in k in g
and m igh t th ereb y lead to a reflection on the b egin n in g.
T h e destiny an d task o f th o u g h t o f the Greeks was n ot to think
this or that b u t to begin th in k in g itself an d to establish it on its
groun d. T h in k in g , as the form o f the act o f philosophy, here
m eans that eru p tio n and that p ro ced u re o f m an thanks to which
he is established in the m idst o f beings, in face o f beings as a
whole, an d knows h im self as b e lo n g in g to these beings. T h e basic
work o f this th in k in g is therefore the question o f beings them selves, w hat they are as such and as a whole.
H ow did the Greeks answer this question? W hat sort o f basic
determ ination d id they forc u p o n b ein gs or, better, w hat character o f beings as such did the G reeks allow to be ascenden t over
them selves, so that these same G reeks m igh t em erge an d rise u p
in them selves?
In the c o n te xt o f the present lectures, we can speak about
these matters o n ly by way o f certain form ulas. B ein gs as such are
4 >wls.
N ow we m ust im m ediately p u t o u t o f play all later inter-
pretations an d translations o f this first, m ore reticent th an e x pressive, d esignation o f beings. T h a t is, we m ust set aside all
those
interpretations
that
u n derstan d
cjyms
as
n atu re,
w hereby nature itself, d e p e n d in g o n its sense in later antiquity,

in Christianity, or in m odernity, m eans quite d ifferen t things,
th o u g h always b e lo n g in g to on e single context.
B ein g, as such, im pressed the G reeks as the constant, that
T h e Greeks destiny [129-30]

which stands in itself over and against w hat falls and collapses.
B e in g the G reeks exp erien ced it as the constant, in the sense o f
the persistent, over and against th e ch a n g in g o f w hat m erely
arises and then again disappears. T h e beingness o f b e in g s that
m eans constancy in the double sense o f persistence an d du ration. B ein gs, as the constant, u n derstood in this way in Opposition to change an d decay, are therefore entirely what is present,
op p osed to e veryth in g absent an d all m ere dissolution. C o n stancy and especially presence posit back on itself w hatever
com es into existen ce as constant an d present, b u t they d o not
posit it aw ay; they install it in itself as the u prightn ess o f the form
versus the defo rm ity o f all con fusion . T h e constant, w hat is
present out o f itself and form ed in itself, unfolds ou t o f itself an d
for itself its co n to u r an d its limit, versus everyth in g m erely floatin g away an d limitless. Constancy, presence, form , and lim it all
these, especially in the sim plicity o f their reciprocal relations, belo n g to and d eterm in e w hat resounds in the G reek word c)>i x t is as
the designation o f beings in their beingness.
N evertheless, we have not yet m en tio n ed the most essential determ ination o f beings, most essential because it perm eates all the
other determ inations. T h e constant, as w hat stands in itself an d,
in en d u rin g, does not yield, stands o u t again st decay an d ch an g e
an d is elevated over them . W hat is present, as repu diatin g all disappearance, is w h at is self-representing. T h e form , that w hich
holds in check all con fusion , is the overw h elm in g and the im posing. T h e limit, as the defense again st the limitless, suspends
m ere progress an d rises above it. H enee, accord ing to the determinations we m en tio n ed, and in their m u tual b e lo n g in g together, a b e in g is in the first place an d entirely som ething that
stands ou t against an d is elevated over, som ething that represents
itself from
itself,
the
im p osin g
an d
w hat
has
risen
ab o ve in brief: the em ergin g, an d thus the u ncon cealed, over

an d against the con cealed and the w ithdraw ing. A ll d eterm in ations o f the beingness o f b ein gs the two senses o f constancy, as
well as presence, form , and lim it are p erva d ed and do m in ated
by the on e n am ed last, the determ ination that gen uin ely should
be nam ed first: unconcealedness, X'rjfteia.
W hat is the result o f all this?
Af|{>eia is for the G reeks
a in deed, the basic determ ination o f beings them selves. T h a t
ii4
T h e Necessity o f the Question [131-32 ]
will strike us today and in fact all n o n -G reek s as strnge, and

we will com p letely accept it on ly w ith d ifficu lty and very slowly.
Yet if we are able to repeat it, a plethora o f essential insights will
accom pany it. U nconcealedness that is the decisive answ er to
the single question o f the G re e k thinkers, whose q u estion in g
b egan the b e g in n in g o f thinking, n am ely the question, w hat are
beings?
Xri&eioi as unconcealedness gathers in itself the pri-
m ordial G re e k m e an in g o f the prim ord ial word
4> x tis .
For this
word designates that which em erges from itself and u n fold s itself and holds sway, such as the rose em erges an d in e m e r g in g is
w hat it is. It designates beings as such, ju s t as a great look o f the
eye opens itself, an d on ce o p e n e d an d h o ld in g sway, can be
fo u n d again o n ly in a look that perceives it itself.
T h e answer to a question o f th in k in g, and especially to the
question o f th in k in g, the on e that first establishes all th in k in g in
its b egin n in g, i.e., the answer to a philosophical question, is
never a result that can be d etached an d locked u p in a proposition. Such an answ er does not allow itself to be cu t o f f fro m the
question. O n the contrary, this answ er is an essential answ er only
if, and to the e x ten t that, it belongs to the very qu estion ing an d is
retained w ithin i t as its com pletion. W ith regard to the usual
way o f thinking, in ten d in g, and q u e stio n in g an d certainly altogeth er rightly s o the answer is that w hich elim inates the qu estion. T h e r e , to answ er is to satisfy an d elim inate the question.
B u t with the philosophical answer, B ein gs are u n co n cealed ness (<Jr>cri<;, a\f|-frea), the qu estio n in g does not stop b u t precisely begins an d u n folds itself as th e begin n in g. T h a t is to say, in
the light o f this interpretation o f beings as unconcealedness, it
was then the task o f the Greeks to ask w hat beings are, to ask this
m ore clearly, m ore foundationally, an d m ore m anifoldly.
1) The lack o f an inquiry into unconcealedness on the

part o f the Greeks and the necessity o f their task.
O u r inquiry in to the essence o f truth encou ntered , within a critique o f the traditional con cept o f truth, the openness o f beings.
T h e Greeks destiny [13233]
115
T h is openness was p resen ted as w hat is m ost questionable, as the

place w here the question o f the essence o f truth has to b egin , on
condition that the question o f truth bears within itself a necessity
p rop er to it, on e w hich unfolds itself as soon as the question is
raised. A t the sam e time, it tu rn ed o u t that the Greeks exp erienced originally the essence o f truth as ciVnfteia, as the u n con cealedness o f beings. O p en n ess as we in ten d it and u n con cealedness as spoken o f by the Greeks are, at least apparently, the same.
T h e r e is, however, an essential distinction: for the G reeks,
u nconcealedness rem ained unqu estion ed; for us it is w hat is
m ost worthy o f qu estioning. W hy d id the Greeks n ot inquire
into t\T)fteia itself? T h e ir lack o f inquiry cou ld leave us in d ifferent; in deed, m any m igh t rejoice that in this way som e questions are still left to us. B u t the lack o f inquiry on the part o f the
Greeks is not som eth in g in differen t. For we m ust bear in m in d
that to the G reeks tXTjfleia was a in d e e d the determ ination
of
beings
them selves
and
that
the
question
of
beings
them selves w hat th ey a r e ?became the philosophical question

o f the Greeks. T h u s the question o f the unconcealedness o f b e ings, and henee the question o f u ncon cealedn ess itself, rested d irectly in the p ath o f the m ost p ro p erly G re e k philosophical in quiry into beings! N evertheless, they d id n ot raise that question.
I f they om itted it, n ot out o f n egligen ce or som e other incapacity, b u t ou t o f a necessity in clud ed in their very task, th en we
must reflect on w hat kind o f task this was, in order to u n d erstand their lack o f inquiry and thus com e to know how o u r own
qu estioning is related to that task.
T h e task o f the G reeks was n o th in g less than the establishm ent
o f the b e gin n in g o f philosophy. T o u n derstan d this b e gin n in g is
for us perhaps m ost difficult, for we are stan d in g within the orbit
o f the end o f that b egin n in g.
a) Nietzsche and Hlderlin as end and as transition,

each in his own way.
We u nderstand e n d h ere in a d o u b le sense. T h e end, insofar as it
gathers into itself all essential possibilides o f the history o f a b e ginn ing, is n ot th e cessation o f som eth in g over and d o n e , but,
quite to the contrary, it is an affirm ation o f the b egin n in g b y way

o f a com p letion o f its possibilities, on es which grew o u t o f w hat
followed the begin n in g. T h is en d o f the first b e gin n in g o f the
history o f W estern p hilosophy is N ietzsche; in this sense an d on ly
in this sense m ust we interpret him in the fu tu re i f his w ork is to
be w hat it m ust also be as that e n d nam ely, a transition. A ll
ju d g m e n t an d evaluation o f N ietzsche w hich have an o th er orientation m ay very well have their d eterm in ed and conditional
usefulness, ye t th ey rem ain p hilosophically inessential an d erroneous. In this c o n te xt there is no n eed to speak o f the usual exploitation an d even p lu n d erin g o f N ietzsche. N ietzsche is in an
essential sense the en d o f W estern philosophy.
A t the sam e tim e, however, an d above all, we are Standing
within the tw ilight o f the en d o f W estern th in k in g especially in a
second sense, accord in g to which e n d m eans the ru n n in g out
and the ru n n in g astray o f the con fu sion o f the various basic positions, valuations, concepts, and system s as they have b een prepared an d fo rm ed th ro u g h o u t the centuries. T h is e n d the
p rodu ct o f an u p ro o ted and no lo n g e r even recognizable tradition o f frozen m odes o f th o u g h t has its ow n duration, presum ably on e w hich is still to last a lo n g tim e. It can yet dom n ate an d
persist, even if an oth er b e gin n in g has b e g u n lo n g ago. In the
protracted e xp iration o f the en d , fo rm er m odes o f th o u g h t
will presum ably b e taken u p again an d again, and the e n d will
characteristically be a succession o f renaissances.
T h e reception o f the work o f H lderlin throughout a whole

Century is historical p ro o f that the genuine end, i.e., the great
echo o f the greatness o f the beginning, can be put aside and remain without influence.
We con clu d e from this that history itself is not on ly m ulti-levelled, that in it n ot on ly d o successive epochs overlap, b u t that we
know alm ost n o th in g o f its gen uin e reality, above all because ou r
groun ds o f k n o w led ge here are in su fficien t an d are b e co m in g
m ore and m ore in sufficien t d u e to the news m edia. T h is scarcely
u nderstood Contem porary p h en o m en o n teils us in ad van ce w hat
we are sup p osed to want to know an d how we are to know it. In
a transform ed way, an d en h an ced in to gigantic p roportion s o f
ran ge an d speed, the news m edia accom plish w hat was on ce the
function o f lonropev, the exp loration o f rem arkable things.
We o f today sta n d for the m ost part, u n w ittin gly to a great
T h e Greeks destiny [13435]
117
exten t, in deed alm ost exclusively, in the tw ilight o f this e x p ir in g

e n d o f W estern th in k in g b u t not yet in the orbit o f the en d in the
first sense. For i f it carne to that, we w ould im m ediately p roceed
to a transition; b u t now here d o I see in the dom ain o f thinking,
insofar as we can speak o f it, a sign that a step has been taken on
the great span o f the b rid ge into the fu tu re, or in deed that such
a step is even w anted.
T h a t should n ot surprise us, as lo n g as H lderlin an d N ietzsche are m erely w ell-intentioned an d fam iliar am es an d epithets. We w ould today hardly know an yth in g o f the character
and the necessity o f a reflection on the first begin n in g, i f these
b o th each in a d iffe re n t way at once thinker and p o e t d id not
stand in the p ath o f o u r history, each, again , in a respectively d ifferen t historical place. Since both o f them , each in his ow n way,
are end and transition, the b e gin n in g h ad to ap p ea r prim ordially

to them , an d a k n o w led ge o f the en d h ad to awaken in them .
T h e r e b y H lderlin, alth o u gh fu rth er from us as reckoned historiographically, is the m ore fuural. T h a t is, he reaches b eyon d
Nietzsche, not because N ietzsche h im se lf knew H lderlin since
the en d o f his yo u th , b u t because H ld erlin , the poet, is fu rth er
ahead than N ietzsche, the thinker, w ho, in spite o f everythin g,
was not able to acknow ledge in an original way the prim ordial
question o f the G reeks an d to u n fold it. H e rem ained precisely in
this respect, m ore sternly than in any other, u n d e r the decisive
in flu en ce o f his epoch, on e which was d ecad en t in th in k in g an d
above all u n refin ed an d lacking style.
We am e an d refer to H lderlin here, as elsewhere, on ly
within the circu m feren ce o f the singular task o f a th o u g h tfu l reflection on the first, an d that m eans o n th e other, futu re, b e g in n in g o f W estern th inking. H enee we d o n ot take u p H ld erlin
ou t o f som e sort o f aesthetic p redilection for this poet over others, i.e., ou t o f som e sort o f (probably quite arbitrary) literaryhistoriographical evaluation o f H lderlin over and against oth er
poets. O n ce again, we n eed to stress that ou r point o f view on
H lderlin and the essence o f poetry is u n iq u e unique precisely
in that in itself it sets itself outside o f every com parison. O u r intention in m akin g visible the essence o f p oetry as H lderlin has
posited it in his w ork is not to im prove the con cept o f p oetry or
to change it, so that a new norm m ig h t b e available, with the h elp
118
o f which on e cou ld then also e xam in e oth er poets. Such a project

w ould at m ost reveal that this co n ce p t o f poetry is not ap p rop riate to oth er poets. H lderlin, or his work, the latter in its entire
fragm entary character, is b ein g view ed, within the com pass o f
ou r task, o n ly as a as the n ot ye t raised question o f the fu tu re
o f ou r history, an d this again o n ly u n d e r the p resupposition that
the question o f the essence o f truth is an essential on e for the
preparation o f this history. T h u s we are here not in th e least
com p etin g with the historiography o f literature or the history o f
the spirit, an d o u r project can not at all be assum ed therein.
O n ly i f we h old fast to the w ork o f H lderlin, on ly i f we survive the w ork o f N ietzsche, instead o f evad in g it, on ly th en will
ou r question be on its assigned path, an d on ly then will we understand this reflection on the first b e gin n in g and especially on
w hat did not occu r in it.
3) The task o f the Greeks: to sustain the first beginning.

We con ten d th at it was because the G reeks sustained their task
that they did n o t inquire into a X ^ e ia as such. T h e ir task was
the question: w hat are beings as such? T h e m anner in w hich they
asked (i.e., answered) this question m u st m ake evid en t w hy this
qu estioning o cclu d ed for them the question o f aXfi'&eia, and
why this occlusion was not a restriction o f their qu estion in g b u t
its com pletion, i.e., the sustaining o f the first begin n in g.
T h e G reeks exp erien ced beings as <|rxn<;. We attem p ted to
characterize, by way o f a m ere series o f form ulas, w hat resounds
in this den om in ation o f beings as such an d w hat was con ceived in
a unitary way in the various directions taken by the G re e k interpretadon o f beings as such. A
really sufficient presentation
would have to accom plish n o th in g less than an explication o f the

entire history o f the G reek question o f being, as it has been
transm itted to us in the sources: b e g in n in g with the fragm en ts o f
A n a x im a n d e r an d e n d in g with the Physics and Metaphysics o f A r istotle.
T h e G reeks e xp erien ced an d con ceived o f beings as such as
w hat is constant, in the sense o f w hat persists in itself as well as in
the sense o f th e en d u rin g. B ein gs are for the G reeks w hat is
present, irapev, over and against w hat is absent, irev. T h e y
33* T h e beginning o f thinking [136-38]

cali beings the form , over an d against the formless. B ein gs are
for them the self-lim iting, over an d again st the limitless an d the
dissolving. In these determ inations th ere resides, in d iffe re n t
ways and o ften h ard ly articulated, the basic character o f stan d in g
out and stan d in g over, em ergin g self-representin g and stan d in g
there, rising above, enclosing an d preserving. T h e basic character o f beings as such is this em ergin g, self-u n fold in g, an d ju tting-forth:
the
u nconcealed. T h e
fu n d a m en tal character o f
<t>WLS is Xinfteio, an d cfrixris, i f it is to be understood in the

G reek sense an d n ot m isinterpreted by later m odes o f th o u gh t,
m ust be d eterm in ed on the basis o f X-rideia.
T h e G reeks inquired into beings an d asked w hat they are as
such, and they answered: unconcealedness. B u t this answer is a
philosophical one. T h a t m eans it does n o t finish o f f the qu estioning but, on the contrary, requires that the question be p ursued and u n fo ld e d all the more: w hat are beings?
33. The beginning o f thinking and the
essential determination o f man.

a) The sustaining o f the recognition o f beings in their
beingness and the essential determination of man as the
perceiver o f beings as such (votis and Xôs).
In their great b e gin n in g, by m eans o f w hich they b egan thinking, i.e., b egan the interpretation o f beings as such, the G reeks
w ould have ren o u n ced their m ost p ro p er task if they h ad e xpressly question ed o\r|-frea itself. H o w so? T h e y w ould th en not
have been q u estion in g any longer, i.e., they w ould not have kept
them selves on the p ath o f their question ing, on e which com es to
com pletion precisely with that answer an d thereby is com p letely
consum m ated. For, in ord er to rem ain within the question o f b e ing, they h ad to rem ain on the p erip h e ry o f that which brings
this question to its final end, nam ely, the answer
v, X fjd e ia
since only in such a way w ould b ein gs as such be u n con cealed for
them as constancy, presence, form , an d limit. O n ly in such a way
did the Greeks preserve for them selves th e space w ithin w hich
120
the w hole richness o f their thinking, an d consequently the determ inations o f beings, could u nfold.
To inquire into
a\f|-frea, to question
itself within
the circuit an d in the direction o f p rim ordial questioning, w ould

m ean to debiltate the answer as well as the qu estion ing itself.
F or as strnge as it m ay sound the greatest debilitation o f essential qu estion in g does not consist in b ein g w ithdraw n into
som ething m ore original bu t in b e in g h ard en ed in its ow n obviousness, petrified, an d d e g rad ed into a m ere form ula by w hich it
may be passed on from everyone to everyone. A n d in fact, the
m om ent
ctX/rifteia b egan to relinquish its prim ordial essence,
i.e., unconcealedness, in favor o f the correctness it itself founds,

in this decisive m om ent, whose preparation takes place in Platos
thinking, the great philosophy o f the Greeks com es to an end.
T h e lack o f inquiry into \r|fte ia as such is not a n eglect but,
quite to the contrary, the secure ad h eren ce o f the G reeks to the
task m eted ou t to them . T h is lack o f in q u iry this no n -o ccurrence o f qu estion in g into X/rideia is the greatest. W hy? B ecause it requires perseverance in a necessity: that is, in the task o f
b rin gin g beings as such to a first recogn ition and thus to their
m ost sim ple interpretation. It is easy to steal away quickly from
som ething barely u nderstood to w hat is new and excitin g; it is
seductive an d effortless to evade w hat is simple in favor o f the
distractions o f the m ultifarious an d the novel. B u t to sustain that
first recogn ition o f beings as such in their beingness, as the
Greeks did, is the m ost difficult an d in its sim plicity the m ost uncanny. Yet it h ad to occur so that in the fu tu re there m ig h t arise
for the West a b e gin n in g to its th in k in g an d m an h im self cou ld
know h im self as a b e in g in the m idst o f beings.
For w hat is required to recognize beings as such in their basic
character o f <tn3crt<; and a.f|{)eia? N o th in g less than the basic attitude o f the sim ple p erception o f beings in their beingness and
thus in that single feature d e te rm in in g beings as such. C o n se quently, from this basic attitude o f m an toward beings as such,
the essence o f m an had to be d eterm in ed at the same tim e as that
b ein g which, in the m idst o f beings, lets these beings as a w hole
a p p ear before itself in ord er to p erceive an d preserve th em in
their constancy, presence, form , an d limit: in their u n con cealed ness. T h e r e fo r e it h ap p en e d that m an, b ou n d u p with this be-
33- T h e beginning o f thinking [13940]
121
gin n in g o f thinking, was d eterm in ed as that bein g whose distinctiveness consists in perceiving beings as such.
T h is perception is in G reek voetv-vovs, and this original tak in g
together an d ga th erin g o f beings ou t o f w hat they are in ad vanee
in the o n e , 'v, is in G reek i-yeiv, gath erin g together, and
xryos. T h is perception is the op p osite o f a m ere passive tak in g
in; it is rather the constant letting em e rge an d letting stand forth
in presence, by which beings are precisely posited back on th em selves. Perception, voev, is letting tjycris h old sway or, as we m ay
also say, the lettin g be o f beings in w hat th ey are. M an is the perceiver o f beings, the gu arantor o f their beingness, i.e., o f their
truth. A-yos, the tak in g togeth er an d ga th erin g o f beings in view
o f the one w hich th ey are as beings, is n ot a subsequent p iecin g
together o f in dividual beings but an original anticipatory g a th ering, o f all that can be encou ntered , in the one that beings are,
whereby in divid ual beings as such th en first becom e visible.
b) The transformation of the primordial determination o f the

essence o f man, as the perceiver of beings, into the
determination o f the essence of man as the rational animal.
Stan din g in the m idst o f beings an d b e lo n g in g to them , m an is
exp erien ced im m ed iately and prim arily as an animal, in G re e k
cgov, in Latin animal. B u t it appears m an is that animal w hose
distinguishing m ark is to perceive beings; his basic faculty is p erception and gath erin g, voOs and X70S, or, transposed into Latin,
ratio. Homo est animal rationale. We have been accustom ed for a

lo n g time now to the translation, M an is the rational an im al.
T h is is the con cep tio n o f m an w hich is still valid today; we still
envision a d o u b lin g with regard to m an. O n the one h an d , we
conceive o f m an biologically as an anim al, and on the oth er
han d we ap p eal to his reason and rationality and m ake reason,
logic, the n o rm o f his action. We consider m an sim ply as a
m em ber o f the h u m an race, yet we require his politics to be rational and logical. M an is the rational anim al. We accept that as
so obvious that it never occurs to us to think that this interpretation o f m an co u ld very well have its o rigin in a certain particular
b egin n in g, an d that m eans at the sam e tim e that it cou ld have
distanced itself in the m eanw hile very far from that origin an d
122
could actually b e som ething u tterly questionable instead o f obvious.
How far rem oved is this rational anim al, this u n d erstan d in g o f
m ans essence, from the prim ordial rank which th o u g h t at its b e gin n in g assigned to him? We can recapture n o th in g an ym ore o f
this b egin n in g, i.e., o f this necessity. For the prim ordial determ ination o f m an as the perceiver an d preserver o f beings was soon
abandoned. Perception becam e reason, an d this in tu rn becam e
a faculty o f a soul b elo n g in g to a body. A ll this itself becam e
m erely a p art o f beings and an occurren ce within beings. In
Christianity, the soul gradu ally becam e the soul o f the single in dividual, w hose otherw orldly salvation dom in ated everyth in g
else, a salvation w hich becom es certain only in faith an d n ot in
ratio. M an an d h u m an reason are n o t even any lon ger an occurrence within beings but, togeth er w ith beings them selves, are
now on ly creatures an d som ething created, delivered over to a
fleetin g and n ot gen u in e sojourn on earth. O f that p erceiver and
preserver o f beings, n o th in g m ore remains.
A n d yet, in its Separation from faith, reason once again m akes
itself au tonom ou s th ro u g h a self-interpretation, a new one, no
lon ger in the prim ordial m ann er b u t in a way d eterm in ed by
Christianity. R eason assumes for itself the plann ing, constructing, and m akin g o f the world. B ein gs are no lon ger (jjcris in the
G reek sense b u t n atu re, i.e., that w hich is cap tu red in the p lan n in g and projects o f calculation an d p laced in the chains o f anticipatory reckonings. Reason now becom es ever m ore rational,
and all beings turn ou t to be its contrivances, this w ord u n d erstood in an essential and not in a dero gatory way. M an becom es
ever m ore in ven tive and clever b u t at the same tim e m ore com m on an d smaller. T h e occasions an d the possibilities in which
m an brings his contrivances into play becom e limitless b y virtue
o f these very contrivances. A ll this does n ot exclu de, b u t precisely requires, that everythin g calcu lating reason posits over an d
against itself as limit, nam ely the a-rational, i.e., w hat can no
longer be calculated by it, gains validity in reasons ow n way, precisely w ithin the com pass o f its contrivances. T h e m ore frantic
the contrivances an d calculations o f reason, the stronger an d the
m ore w idespread is the cry for lived exp erien ce. B o th are excessive and are m utu ally exchangeable. W h at is m ore, the contriv-
34- T h e need and necessity o f inquiry [14 1-4 3]
123
anees, e.g., the gigan tic accom plishm ents o f technology, b ecom e
them selves the greatest lived exp erie n ce , and the lived e x p eriences seek the form o f a contrivance. A b o xin g m atch is a lived
exp erien ce, b u t surely not for the boxers them selves; th ey have
n o lived exp erien ce, b u t at the lim it th ey still box; the lived e x perience resides in the spectators, an d w hat is lived is the entire
display o f a gran d -p ro d u ctio n theater. T h e lived e xp erien ce becom es a contrivance; let us reflect a m o m en t on w hat has been
p u t togeth er in the term confessional fro n t, a term which is not
m erely d u e to the process o f fo rm in g it [denken ivir einmal einen
Augenblick nach, was im Wort Bekenntnisfront sich zusammengefunden hat, und dass es zu diesem Wort, nicht nur zum Vorgang kommt].
T h e lived e xp erien ce as ou r contrivance, and the latter itself as
a lived e x p e r ie n ce w hat arises in this process as a w hole can n o t
be attributed to any on e individual b u t is the process in w hich
m an, conscious o f him self, and op eratin g, as the rational anim al, draws the ultm ate consequences o f his culture an d civilization : the m ost extrem e distan cing fro m his prim ordially established position with regard to beings. It is one an d the sam e
process that the original essence o f truth cou ld not be retained
and that historical m an everyw here com es to his end alo n g with
his contrivances an d lived experiences. N o w onder that for us today only rarely an d with difficu lty does it becom e clear w hat occurred in the b e g in n in g o f W estern th in k in g as begin nin g.
34. The need and the necessity o f our inquiry into

unconcealedness itself on the basis o f a more original
understanding o f the first beginning.
T h e ad heren ce o f the Greeks to the b e gin n in g, to an inquiry into
beings as such, an d their adherence to the first answer, to the u n foldin g o f w hat it op ens up, henee their lack o f inquiry into
truth, are not om issions or failures b u t testim ony to the pow er o f
the Greeks to be equ al to a necessity. I f we now ask, an d p erh ap s
must ask, w hat this unconcealedness itself is, then o u r inquiry
cannot be a m ere m akin g u p for an om ission. T h e n w hat m ust it
be, if it is the preparation for the occurren ce o f som eth in g not
yet com e to pass? W h a t m ust o u r q u estion in g be at least an d at
124
first, and in d eed by necessity? It m ust again be a necessity and

even again a b egin n in g, but a d iffe re n t one.
W hy are we askin g the question o f the essence o f truth? O n ly
because there is som ething to criticize in the previous con cep tion o f truth? T h a t w ould be a shallow an d pitiful reason. B u t
then w here is the necessity, i.e., as we p u t it, where is the need?
T h e n eed an d the necessity are pecu liar and u nique precisely in
that they rem ain at first con cealed to us, m akin g it seem as if our
thin kin g w ere subject to no n eed at all, as if we cou ld an d should
continu to ram ble on blissfully in the previous philosophy, i.e.,
misuse it recklessly an d m ix it all u p , p rovid ed we now o n ly ap p ly
the racial to it an d give the w hole a correct political face. T h is is
not to say that these are inessential for o u r reflection, b u t w hat is
still m ore essential is that we know or learn to know that great
tasks require a great preparation an d a still greater in vestm ent if
they are to be preserved in their dignity.
We m ust b rin g ourselves explicitly into con frontation w ith ou r
need, which we can d o only if we face u p to an essential n eed and
its necessity an d for that purp ose first provide ou r eyes with visual power. I f we cannot su p p ly this from our ow n resources,
then we m ust seek it, and will b e able to fin d it, solely w here
once, and o n ly once, a be gin n in g h ad b egu n . We m ust try to understand the b e gin n in g o f W estern th in k in g in this regard in a
still m ore original way.

T h e prim ordial history o f the essence o f truth gives rise to
truth as the essence o f beings them selves, as unconcealedness.
T h is prim ordial positing o f the essence, which is the task assigned to the b e gin n in g o f the be gin n in g, exeludes an inquiry
into a.f|-&eia itself. It is now clear that this lack o f qu estion ing
originated ou t o f the necessity to present, to preserve, an d to unfold, once an d for all, beings in their beingness. W h at n eed gave
rise to this necessity? In any event, som eth in g necessary em e rge d
for the G reeks, h avin g n o th in g to d o with the com p ortm en t o f
som e in divid ual or other, or with the com p ortm en t o f a society,
but which ign ited the b egin n in g o f a history, in deed o f the history
in which we are still located.
T o be sure, it w ould be erron eous an d infantile to think that
the ones w ho h ad to b egin this b e g in n in g were aware o f it in the
same retrospective way as we w ho have com e after. For suppos-
34 - T h e need and necessity o f inquiry [144-45]
125
in g this k n o w ledge were alive then, even i f only in vagu e surmises, the necessity o f the task w ould have forfeited its greatness
an d its essentiality. For everythin g necessary that is su p p orted by
a know n goal is thereby already tainted in its u nconditionality
an d purity. T h e necessary, in its greatest form , always exists withou t the crutches o f the why and the w herefore and w ithout the
sup p ort o f the w h ereun to and the thereunto. In such necessity,
then, a pre-em in en t n eed m ust be pressing, so that w hat is n ecessary m ight be e xp erien ced and en d u red .
1) The rigor and inner order o f questioning in

distinction to the systematization o f a system.
In d evelop in g the question o f truth it is im p ortan t to stress again
an d again that everyth in g dep en d s on the course o f ou r procedure. B u t that is n ot m eant in the usual sense; i.e., it does n ot
m ean that the system atic con text is to be kept in view so that all
the particulars m ig h t be integrated correctly. For w hat is at issue
is not a systematic doctrin e o f truth o r a discussion o f theses on
the essence o f truth which are supposed to coalesce into a d o ctrinal system. T h e epo ch o f philosophical system s is g o n e for
e v e r not because the material o f k n o w led ge has swollen so
enorm ously that it can no longer be o rd ered or even surveyed,
b u t because the very essence o f k n o w led ge has been transform ed, above all in distinction an d Opposition to m o d ern
k now ledge, which alone in itself and for itself dem ands system atization. In the great be gin n in g o f O ccid en tal thinking, there
were (and this in d eed by necessity) n ot yet systems and after the
e n d o f this first b e g in n in g there will no lo n g e r b e systems. W hy?
B ecause a d e e p er necessity will rule th in k in g and question ing
an d because their in n er order and rigor will be concealed to the
seem ingly unsurpassable (because it is transparent) com p leteness o f a system. A system is the h igh est form o f know ledge on ly
u n d e r two conditions:
1.
if and as lo n g as all things that can be know n, beings as such,
are determ ined acco rd in g to the g u id in g Iine o f thinking;
126
2.
i f an d as lo n g as th in k in g fou n d s itself u p o n ultm ate p rin -
cipies co n ce rn in g itself an d determ in es all fou n d ation as a deduction from these principies.
Yet even i f b o th these conditions h ave already been shaken, the
rigor o f q u estion in g an d its course are by no m eans therefore
subm erged. It is ju s t that the rigor an d the way o f p roced u re can
now no lo n g e r b e ruled by the system atization o f a system.
In the u n fo ld in g o f the question o f truth, everythin g d e p e n d s
on the course o f o u r procedure. T h e consequential fact that for
centuries the con cep tion o f k n o w ledge was d eterm in ed in term s
o f m odern science is the reason that p hilosop hy can free itself
on ly with great d ifficu lty from the tram m eis o f scientific system atization. T h a t is to say, everythin g w hich does not ap p ea r to be a
scientific treatm en t o f an object or o f a ran ge o f objects is taken
to be psychology, i.e., a description o f the way p hilosophical
thinking is lived . T h e r e m ay very well b e such descriptions; the
philosophy o f N ietzsche, to a large e x ten t an d in alm ost everythin g he h im self published, can be m isinterpreted alo n g these
lines.
2) Historical reflection on the necessity of the first

beginning; acquisition of the norms for the necessity
o f our own question o f truth.
I f here in these lectures we say so little ab o u t the essence o f truth
itself and presen t n o theory o f truth b u t instead lin ger constantly
over the qu estion in g o f this question o f truth, then it seem s we
are d ealin g m ore with the lived e x p erie n ce o f the question o f
truth than with the essence o f truth. N evertheless, this course o f
o u r proced ure is n either a system atization o f the p roblem o f
truth or a p sych ology o f its problem atization. W hat is it then? A
designation will n ot accom plish an yth in g i f we d o not u n d erstand w hat is transpirin g here.
T h e short critical discussion o f the traditional con cept o f truth
passed over into a historical reflection on the b egin n in g o f W estern thought. T h is reflection sees itself now led to the p oin t o f
thin kin g th ro u g h the necessity o f that qu estion ing in the accom plishm ent o f w hich
Xrj'deia, the u ncon cealedn ess o f beings,
34- T h e need and necessity o f inquiry [146-47]
127
truth, once carne to k n o w ledge, w ithou t itself b eco m in g a qu estion. O u r historical reflection m ust p o n d e r the necessity o f the
question o f truth. T h is necessity is n ot an object o f psychology; it
is som ething else entirely. T h e necessity o f the question o f truth
is rather that w hich decides about the con ten t the essential d e term ination o f truth m ust have in the fu tu re. O u r reflection proceeds in a com p letely d ifferen t way than an y system ati/ation o f
the issues in the question o f truth.
T h e reflection on th e necessity o f the question o f truth decides
its originality an d essentiality. It decides whether, and how, that
w hich in the b e g in n in g blazed as \Tydia, to be extin gu ish ed
soon thereafter, can on ce m ore b ecom e th e glo w in g fire o f the
hearth o f ou r existen ce [Daseiri\. A p recon dition is that we b e capable o f th in k in g the essence o f tXtjdeia correctly. O u r historical reflection has therefore poin ted to som eth in g whose fll
b earin g we can n ot yet appreciate: nam ely, that truth was in the
b e gin n in g the basic character o f b ein gs
them selves. W hich
m eans at the sam e tim e that trith is to b e know n and th o u g h t in

con nection with the question o f beings as such. B u t this question
is the b e gin n in g o f W estern thought. A n d that implies that the
necessity o f the k n o w led ge o f truth go es h an d in han d with the
necessity o f this b e gin n in g. O n ly in reflection o n it d o we acquire
the sufficient norm s for the necessity w hich m ust d eterm in e our
question ing o f truth, i f this question ing is n ot to d egen erate im m ediately into an in d ifferen t d ism em berin g o f the con cep t o f
truth or into a m ere substitution o f a transform ed doctrine for
the traditional on e, w ithou t h avin g p rep ared w hat is m ost indispensable: a com p lete transform ation o f th e style o f th in k in g an d
questioning.
N ow it has b een show n finally that the question o f the G reeks,
the prim ordial question about beings as such, is o f such a kind
that it precludes an inquiry into ocV^fttta as such. For u n c o n cealedness is th e d eterm in atio n o f beings th at in general an d in
ad van ce constitutes th e field o f view w ithin which b ecom e possible the m anifestation o f the characters o f beings we m en tioned
a n d henee the fu lfillm en t o f the question o f beings. In o rd e r to
b rin g into view w hat resides in a visual field , the visual field itself
m ust precisely lig h t u p first, so that it m ig h t illum inate w hat re-
128
sides within it; however, it can not an d m ay n ot be seen explicitly.

T h e field o f view,
A.ri'eia, must in a certain sense b e over-
looked.
T h e first task was then to a p p reh e n d beings as beings, to install the p u re recogn ition o f beings as such, and n o th in g m ore.
T h is was quite e n o u g h i f we con sider w hat was sim ultaneously
grou n d ed with it: the prim ordial determ ination o f m an as that
b ein g which, in the m idst o f beings as a whole, lets beings hold
sway in their unconcealedness. T h is lettin g hold sway is accom plished by e xh ib itin g beings in their form s an d m odes o f presence and by preservin g beings th e r e in occurrences in which
poetry as well as p ain tin g and sculpture, the act that fo u n d s a
State, and the w o rshipp in g o f the go d s first obtain their essence,
b rin gin g these essences into b e in g historically and as history by
their words an d works, actions an d raptures, assaults an d dow nfalls.
3) The origin o f the apprehension o f man as the rational

animal out o f an inability to sustain the first beginning.
T h e b e gin n in g o f the determ ination o f m an on the basis o f his
relation to beings as such was on ly a first inception an d d id not
rem ain the begin n in g. W hat follow ed was incapable o f a d h e rin g
to this g r o u n d in g o f the essence o f m an in its prim ordiality, i.e.,
to create it ever m ore originally. T h e r e fo r e it had to be p oin ted
out briefly how the subsequent an d now ordinary ap p rehen sion
o f m an as rational anim al originated from an inability to sustain
that great b e g in n in g in which m an h ad to b rin g h im self before
beings as such an d had to be a b e in g in the m idst o f beings.
We have e xp o se d the m ost extrem e an d for us today the m ost
visible develop m en ts o f this history o f the determ ination o f the
essence o f m an n ot in order to b e gin a sterile critique o f cu lture o r the like, or even ju st to portray the con tem p orary situ ation o f m an. O n the contrary, it is entirely an d solely as c o n nected to the question o f truth an d the history o f its essence that
we have referred to the distance b etw een todays universally
com m on con cep tio n o f m an and its b egin n in g. For i f now o n the
basis o f a prep aration which has lasted centuries, and was especially accom plished in the m o d ern p eriod, beings have b eco m e a
34 - T h e need and necessity o f inquiry [14850]
129
contrivance o f reason, o f a reason w hich in principie n o th in g

m ay resist, an d if thereby this reason, as a bein g, appeals to lived
experien ce, and i f furtherm ore it sh ou ld h ap p en that the co n trivance fails an d cites destiny, then this reference to the c o n trivance and to the lived exp erien ce is n a m in g only the two poles
betw een which the ordinary con ception o f tr u th correctness
oscillates.
T h e determ ination o f truth as correctness is not the in d iffe re n t and innocuous theory o f a scholastic lo gic which has b een
obsolete for ages. Correctness is the calculable adjustm ent an d
adaptation o f all h u m an behavior to th e en d o f contrivances.
W hatever resists these contrivances will be crushed. Yet correctness, in its e ffect an d its success, is ap p rop riated , preserved as a
possession, an d carried over into use an d profit th rou gh lived
experience. A t the b e gin n in g o f m o d ern th ou gh t, Descartes for
the first tim e posited the certainty o f the e g o , a certainty in w hich
m an is m ade secure o f beings as the object o f his representations.
N ow this certainty is the geriA o f w hat today, as lived e x p e r ie n ce, constitutes the basic form o f b e in g hum an . It is on e o f the
ironies o f history that ou r age has d isco ve re d adm ittedly, very
la te the need to refu te Descartes, an d takes issue with him an d
his intellectualism by ap p ea lin g to lived exp erien ce, w hereas
lived exp erien ce is on ly a base d escen d en t o f the Cartesian cogito
ergo sum.
We con clude fro m this allusion that the con ception o f m an is
tied to his position w ithin truth and tow ard truth and that con versely the status o f the question o f truth, i.e., above all, the forg e ttin g and d isregard in g o f this question, always corresponds to
a determ ined self-com prehension o f m an an d o f his relation to
beings as such. A dm ittedly, this does n o t yet decide an yth in g
about the gen u in e character o f the essential relation b etw een
truth and m an. A b o ve all, we may n o t un derstan d the transform ation o f the self-u n d erstan din g o f m an psychologically or in
term s o f the history o f culture. T h e s e psychological, m oral, an d
cultural transform ations all m ove w ithin o n e single constant
com prehension o f m a n a constancy th at has now been shaken
an d requires a first great transform ation. T h is can only b e ap preciated on the basis o f the relation o f m an to beings as such
an d to their truth. It follows that this transform ation is rarer
*3
T h e Necessity o f the Q uestion [150]
than we m ig h t think and that it has its m ost con cealed b u t at the
same tim e m ost pow erful gr o u n d in the con ception o f beings as
such an d in the necessity o f this con ception.
A ssu m in g that we are facin g an essential transform ation o f the
essence o f truth an d, in unin w ith that, a transform ation o f the
position o f m an w ithin beings an d toward beings, th en this transform ation can on ly arise from a necessity, on e equal to the n e cessity o f the b e gin n in g. T h o s e w h o are p rep arin g this transformation m ust b e ready for such a necessity. T h is readiness can
only be ge n e rated th rou gh a k n o w le d ge o f the necessity. Such
know ledge, w hich is not a m ere h a n d lin g o f cognitions, has a
transform ative p ow er and grows o u t o f reflectio n for us here
ou t o f reflection on the necessity o f the qu estion ing in w hose
circuit an d as w hose visual field the essence o f truth first shone
as XTjfteux, i.e., o u t o f reflection o n the character o f th e necessity o f the b e g in n in g o f W estern th in k in g. E very necessity, how ever, em erges, accord in g to its typ e, o u t o f a need.
Chapter Five
T h e N eed and the Necessity
o f the First B eginning
and the Need and the
Necessity o f an O th er Way
to Q uestion and to Begin
35. The distress o f not knowing the way out or the way in, as a
rnode o f Being. The untrodden time-space o f the between.
W hat sort o f need held sway in the necessity to put in m otion the
beginning o f W estern thinking? A n d what do we understand
here by need ? N eed is redolent o f misery and complaint, it
connotes deprivation and requirem ent, and on the w hole it
means lack, absence, away, not. Not every negation is negative in a depreciatory sense. Silence, for exam ple, means the absence, the away, and the not o f noise and disturbance. B ut
here we are ju st interpreting something original as negative with
the aid o f the negative, namely, noise and disturbance, without
considering the essence o f not and no. Not everything negative needs to be deficient and certainly not miserable and lam entable. We have the habit o f interpreting need and care only on
the basis o f our everyday surrounding world o f what is disturbing, lamentable, and burdensome; i.e., we make our griefs and
afflictions the m easure o f things. This habit o f ours is so ineradicable that it apparently has an exclusive claim to justifcation, yet
we must ever anew attem pt to win back, or, perhaps, first develop, for our language a hidden power o f nam ing the essential.
132
T h e Need and the Necessity o f the First Beginning [151-53]
I f we speak o f need as that which makes needful the highest

form o f necessity, we are not referring to misery and lack. Nevertheless, we are thinking o f a not, a negative. B u t we know litde
enough o f the negadve and the no, for exam ple in form s o f refusal, deferm ent, and failure. Yet all that is not nothingness b u t is at
most (if not som ething higher still) its opposite. It never enters the
field o f view o f ou r calculating reason that a no and a not may arise
out o f a surplus or abundance, may be the highest gift, and as this
not and no m ay infinitely, i.e., essentially, surpass every ordinary
yes. A n d that is all to the good. For reason would explain it according to the principies o f logic, whereby both affirm ation and d enial exist, but the yes has the priority since it posits and thus acknowledges som ething present at hand. W hat is present and at
hand counts as a being. T herefore it is difficult for us, wherever we
encounter som ething apparendy negative, not only to see in it the
positive but also to conceive som ething more original, transcendin g that disdnction. Here, where we are reflecting on the need o f
the necessity o f the beginning, only the most profound understanding o f the essence o f need will suffice.
T h e need we have in mind arises from the distress o f not knowin g the way out or the way in; but that is by no means to be understood as a perplexity in some particular circumstances or other.
W hat then is it? N ot knowing the way out or the way in: that is to
say, out o f and into that which such know ing first opens u p as an
untrodden and u ngroun ded space. T h is space (time-space) if
we may so speak o f it h ere is that betw een where it has not yet
been determ ined what being is or w hat non-being is, th ough where
by the same token a total confusion and undifferentiation o f beings
and non-beings does not sweep everything away either, letting one
thing wander into another. T h is distress, as such a not know ing the
way out o f o r into this self-opening between, is a m ode o f B e ing, in which m an arrives or perhaps is thrown and for the first
time experiences but does not explicidy consider that which we
are calling the in the midst o f beings.
T h is distress e xp lo d es beings, still veiled as such, in o rd er to
m ake the space o f the in the m idst o f beings able to be occupied
an d
fo u n d e d
as a
possible
standpoint o f ,m an. T h is
distress here barely intim ated b y sp eakin g o f it as a n o t know in g the way o u t o r the way in is the casting asu nder o f w hat will
36. T h e need o f prim ordial thinking [153-54]
133
b e determ ined forthw ith as beings in their beingness over and

against non-beings, assum ing that the distress makes n e e d fu l in
m an a necessity correspo n d in g to it.
T h e distress we are sp eakin g o f is th erefore by no m eans ind eterm inate but is very d eterm in ed in its needfulness, in that it
provides to th in k in g its essential space, an d in d eed does n o th in g
else than that. For th in k in g m eans here to let beings em erge in
the decisiveness o f their B e in g and to let th em stand out before
oneself, to perceive them as such and th ereb y to am e them in
their beingness for the first time.
T h is distress the not knowing the way ou t o f or the way into the
in the midst, itself ungrounded, o f still undifferentiated beings
and non-beings is not a lack and not a deprivation but is the surplus o f a gift which, however, is more difficult to bear than any loss.
T h is distress we are saying is a character o f B ein g and not o f
m an, as if this distress could arise psychically in man as a lived
experience and have its proper place in him. O n the contrary, m an
him self first arises ou t o f this distifess, which is m ore essential than
he himself, for he is first determ ined by it.
T h is distress pertains to the truth o f B ein g itself. It possesses its
highest gift in being the groun d o f the necessity toward the highest
possibilities, on the path o f which m an in his creations surpasses
him self and returns through beings to the truth o f Being.
36. The need o f primordial thinking and how

this need compels man dispositionally into the
basic disposition o f wonder (daDfJieiv).
T h e distress we are sp ea k in g o f determ ines m an by determ in in g
him th ro u gh and th ro u g h . H ere, to be sure, a m isunderstan din g
im m ediately insinuates itself, to the e ffect that the dispositions
w ould be som ething m an has, d e p e n d e n t either on extern al
conditions and circum stances or on in n er states o f the body,
w hereas in truth, i.e., u nderstood on the basis o f the essence o f
B e in g (as ap p ro p riatin g event), the dispositions have m an an d
con sequ ently d eterm in e him in various ways, even in his corp oreality. A disposition can con fine m an in his corporeality as in a
prison. Yet it can also carry him th ro u gh corporeality as on e o f
134 T h e Need and the Necessity o f the First Beginning [154-55]

the paths lea d in g ou t o f it. In each case the w orld is b r o u g h t to
m an in a d iffe re n t way; in each case his se lf is d ifferen tly o p e n e d
up and resolved with regard to beings.
To say it still m ore essentially:1 the previous con cep tio n o f
man, i.e., the biological and psychological con ception, w ould
m isinterpret w hat we have ju s t said an d w ould m aintain that
disposition is b u t a hum an capacity, th o u g h to be sure a very im portant on e an d p erhaps one n ot yet sufficiently appreciated;
a correct u n d erstan d in g o f disposition, however, leads in fact
to a surpassing o f this very con cep tio n o f m an. We som etim es say
that we have b een tran sp o n e d into this or that disposition. In
truth, i.e., u n derstood on the basis o f the original essence o f
B ein g, it is rather the reverse: it is the disposition that transports,
transports us in to this or that basic relation to beings as such.
M ore precisely, disposition is w hat transports us in such a way
that it co-fou n d s the tim e-space o f the transportin g itself.
We can not yet ask how this tran sp ortin g is to be u nderstood.
B u t this question is an essential track within ou r question o f
openness as such (ex-istence) [(Da-sein)].
In view o f the essence o f ou r n eed, this is w hat we have to
think in the first place: as disposing, the distress, the not know in g the way o u t or the way in, do es not sim ply com p el us into
already d e te rm in e d relations to b eings, ones already o p e n e d u p
and in terp reted in their beingness; o n the contrary, it com p els us
first o f all in to that betw een, that in the m idst o f, in whose
space and tim e beings as a w hole can be d eterm in ed in their b eingness. T h is n eed o f prim ordial th inking, as we m ean it here,
can affectively com p el us only in an essential disposition, or, as
we say, in a basic one.
Finally, it m igh t be claim ed that o u r com m ents on n e e d and
disposition are m erely latter-day fantasies and ultim ately, in
spite o f everyth in g, m erely p sychological opinions ab o u t the
w holly u n k n o w n psychology o f the early G reek thinkers. T h e r e
is in deed n ot e n o u g h resistance to be fo u n d today against this
m isinterpretation, an d there will n o t b e e n o u g h even in the fu ture, for these m isinterpretations, w hich are always possible, will
1.
On the essence o f disposition see Sein und Zeit, Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 2, and
above all the lecture course on Hlderlin: Hlderlins Hymnen Germanien und
Der Rhein," Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 39.
36. T h e need o f prim ordial thinking [155-56 ]
135
becom e im possible o n ly on the basis o f an essential transform ation o f thinking an d questioning, an d the necessary carryin g ou t
o f that is now scarcely underway.
Yet our reflection on the necessity and the need o f the begin nin g
o f Western thinking m ight prove a little less fantastic if we recall
that
the
G reek
thinkers
themselves
say
that
the
origin
of
philosophy henee the origin o f what they b e g a n is dooi^êiv,

or, as we transate, wonder. jxXa yp 4 >iXoct4 >ou touto to irftos, to
'&av(xeiv o) ja p SXXt) apx') cf>i\o<ro<}>a<; rj aTT).1 8i 701p to

&ai>|xeiv o v'dpw'rroi x a i vuv x a i t TTpwTov rfpâvTO
<J)i,XoCTOct>ev.2 (<t>iX.oo'o<J)La: emarqixTi tjv irp&mov pxwv xai
aTiwv TêwpTiTixr)). T h u s the origin o f philosophy is a disposition?
B u t to what extent is w onder what disposes and determines, and
consequently the m ode o f com pelling o f the need we have spoken
of, and therefore the way this need itself exists and incorporates
man, in order to tran sp on him, through this incorporation, into a
basic disposition, into the not knowing the way out or the way in?
(This not know ing becam e, at th e end o f the great G reek philosophy, in Aristotle, a com ponent o f the process o f philosophizing,
and today we have m ade o f it an em pty form ula o f pedantry.) I f we
wish to understand flavp,eiv as this wonder, then we must in advance maintain stricy that the task is to clarify the basic disposition
o f the beginning o f thinking. T h erefore to adhere to the com m on
representation o f the m eaning o f daujjueiv cannot suffice; indeed, it will lead us into error.
It has lo n g b een know n that the G reeks recogn ized ikrup-ciêiv
as the b e g in n in g o f philosophy. B u t it is ju s t as certain th at we
have taken this
to be obvious an d ordinary, som eth in g
that can be accom plished w ithout d ifficu lty and can even be clarified w ithout fu rth e r reflection. For the m ost part, the usual presentations o f the origin o f philosophy o u t o f -davfjuêiv result in
the opin ion that p hilosop hy arises from curiosity. T h is is a w eak
an d pitiful d eterm in atio n o f origin, possible only w here there
1. Plato, Theatetus. Platonis Opera, ed. J. B urnet, vol. I, Oxford 1900. 155D 2ff.
[This is the great passion o f the philosopher: wonder. T h ere is no other beginning o f philosophy than this. Tr.]
2. Aristotle, Metaphysica, A 2, 982b n f f . [For it is precisely through w onder
that people today and at the beginning began to philosophizeTr.]
3. Cf. ibid., A 2, 982b 8ff. [Philosophy: theoretical knowledge o f the first
principies and causesTr.]
136 T h e Need and the Necessity o f the First Beginning [15657]

has never b een any reflection o n w hat is supposed to b e d e te rm ined here in its origin. In d e ed , we con sider ourselves relieved
o f such reflection, precisely because we think that the derivation
o f philosophy o u t o f curiosity also determ in es its essence. T h u s
we fail to realize how decisively the referen ce to ftoa>|xcteiv as the
origin o f p hilosop hy indicates precisely the inexplicability o f p h ilosophy, in explicability in the sense that here in gen eral to explain and the will to explain are mistakes.
A
principal reason for the ord inary
m isinterpretation o f
ftavfjwxei.v is again the usual p roced u re o f m akin g the com m on

u n derstan din g o f the m ean ing o f the w ord dofU(xeiv a n o rm
for interpretation. For in this word is th ou gh t, as in every essential word o f every lan g u a ge that creates history, a com m on as well
as a p re-em in en t con ten t and m e a n in g in this case a disposition
and an attitude. T o w hat exten t is doaj|xeiv, wonder, a basic
disposition on e that transports in to the b e gin n in g o f gen u in e
thin kin g an d th o ro u gh ly determ ines it? In order to have a g e n eral gu id elin e for o u r reflection on
as a basic disposi-
tion, we will in d e e d b egin with the ordinary concept. B u t o u r

purpose is not to distinguish lexically an d cou n t u p the various
m eanings o f the word. W hat we w ant to see instead is som eth in g
o f the inner m ultiplicity o f the disposition in question.
37. The ordinary concept o f wonder as guideline for a reflection
on
>oa>|i.eiv
as a basic disposition.
a) Amazement and marvelling.

We shall
not
b egin
with
w o n d er
but
with
the
w ondrous,
dav|xaorv. T h e w ondrous is for us in the first place som eth in g

that stands o u t an d therefore is rem arkable; for the m ost p art it
also has the character o f the excep tion al, u n e xp ected , surprising, and therefore exciting. A better am e for. this w ould be the
curious or the m arvelous, som eth in g that arouses the desire for
am azem ent, e n g ag es it, and sustains it, specifically in such a way
that it makes the search for ever new things o f this kin d m ore
ardent. T h e m arvelling an d the am azem en t always ad h ere to
som ething con spicuously unusual; this is extracted fro m the
usual and set over against it. T h u s th e known, the u nderstan d-
37 - T h e ordinary concept o f w onder [15758]
137
able, and the explicable here form a b ackgro un d not fu rth er atten ded to, from w hich the m arvelous em erges and is draw n
away. A m aze m e n t is a certain inability to exp lain and ign oran ce
o f the reason. T h is inability to exp lain , however, is not b y any
m eans equivalent to a determ ination an d a declaration that the
explanation an d the reason are not available. O n the contrary,
the not b e in g able to exp lain is first an d essentially a kind o f b e in g cau gh t u p in the inexplicable, b e in g struck by it; an d u p o n
closer inspection the am azem ent does precisely not want to have
the m arvelous exp la in e d b ut instead wants to be teased an d fascinated by the in explicable as w hat is other, surprising, an d uncom m on in Opposition to w hat is com m on ly known, borin g, an d
em pty. N evertheless, am azem ent is al way s a determ inate an d singu lar event, a p articular occurrence, a u n iqu e circum stance, an d
is always set o f f again st a do m in atin g d eterm in ate backgroun d o f
w hat is precisely fam iliar and ordinary.
A m azem en t an d m arveling have various degrees an d levels
an d discover w hat th ey seek fti the m ost diverse dom ains o f b e ings. T h e m ore arbitrary, changeable, an d even unessential,
th o u g h in deed striking, the m arvelous h ap p en s to be, the m ore
does it satisfy am azem ent, which is always vigilant for o p p o rtu nities and desires th em so as to be stim ulated in its very ow n passion. B e in g struck by w hat is u n com m on com es to pass here in
such a way that w hat is custom ary is set aside and the u n com m on
itself becom es som eth in g fam iliar that bewitches and encharm s.
T h e u n com m on thus obtains its ow n p erm an en t character, form ,
an d fashion. T o d o so it even requires an insidious habituality. We
m igh t think in passing o f all the extraord inary things the cinem a
m ust o ffe r continually; w hat is new every day and never h ap p en ed before becom es som ething habitual an d always the sam e.
RECAPXTULATION
1) The negativity of the distress as a not knowing

the way out or the way in. The whence and whither
as the open between of the undifferentiatedness of
beings and non-beings.
We are reflectin g o n the necessity o f the b e gin n in g o f O ccid en tal

thinking, a b e g in n in g in which the essence o f truth as the basic
character o f beings had to fam e u p , on ly to exp ire on ce again.
T h is reflection is a historical one. It has valu not in o u r a p p ly in g
the past to ourselves b ut only insofar as we enter into the history
o f the essence o f truth, i.e., insofar as we have an ear for the dem and o f this h id d e n history, for its futu re, by tu rn in g the essence o f truth into w hat is most w orthy o f qu estion ing an d d o in g
so on the basis o f a gen uin e necessity. T h e reflection addresses
the necessity o f o u r question o f truth, o u t o f which alone the direction and the dom ain o f the q u estion in g are d eterm in ed , as
well as w hat is to be fou n d ed as the essence o f truth. For the character o f the necessity o f such q u estion in g we require a sure eye.
We will procure it on ly th rou gh reflection on the b e gin n in g and
its necessity. T h is necessity springs forth o u t o f a need. T h e need
com pels in the m o d e o f a disposition.
T h e r e fo r e it was im portan t to say som eth in g in advance about
n eed and disposition, in order th en to characterize the basic disposition o f p rim ordial thin kin g as '&aup.ieiv, wonder. H e re we
are constantly subject to the d a n g e r o f m akin g a norm ou t o f our
ordinary, habitual, and everyday exp erien ces an d in terpretations o f need, necessity, and disposition. We are now seekin g
what these sam e words am e at the be gin n in g o f W estern
thought, an d that is always in com patible with ou r everyday understanding.
N eed is for us ordinarily a lack, som eth in g negative. We imm ediately ju d g e the negative, however, in a depreciatory way as
the adverse p u re an d simple. T h u s o u r only relation to it is d e fense and elim ination. N ow e veryth in g negative is in fact determ ined by a no an d a not. B u t not every no an d not, the negative,
is nothingness. N eed in the essential sense is in deed som eth in g
negative, an d yet n ot nothingness, w hich we can only be con ten t
with by elim inatin g or avoiding.
T h e need we have in m ind, the g r o u n d o f the necessity o f prim ordial qu estion ing, is a negativity in the sense o f the distress o f
not know in g the way ou t or the way in. T h is w hence an d whither,
as they exist in the begin n in g, d o n ot constitute som e defin ite,
determ nate situation, occasion, o r p erp lex ity as regards som e
particular com p ortm en t or relation to a determ nate object and
circum stance. O n the contrary, the w h en ce and w hither exist no
37 - T h e ordinary concept o f w onder [160-61]
J39
less than the o p e n b etw een , in w hich b ein gs and non-beings

stand forth as a w hole, th o u g h still in their undifferentiatedness.
Since the betw een is the whole o f these u n d ifferen tiated beings,
there is n o th in g outside to which an exit w ould be possible. A n d
because it is a w hole that is undifferentiated, there is n o th in g to
which a way m igh t lead to a standpoint inside. W h at here p ermits neither an o u t or an in oscillates back to itself in an extraordinary sense as this betw een . T h e r e fo r e this distress o f
n ot know ing the way o u t or the way in, this need, has an excess
which raises it above every lack and lets som eth in g be which we
have to express as the opposite o f a lack, an abundance. T h is is
the measurelessness o f the u ndifferentiatedn ess betw een w hat
beings as beings are as a w hole and that w hich presses forth as
inconstant, form less, an d carryin g away, w hich m eans here at the
sam e tim e w hat im m ediately withdraws.
) The compelling ppwer of the need, its

disposing as displacing man into the beginning
o f a foundation of his essence.
T h e need com pels in to the betw een o f this u n d ifferen tiated ness. It first casts asu n d er w hat can be d ifferen tiated within this
u ndifferentiatedn ess. Insofar as this n eed takes hold o f m an, it
displaces him into this u n d ecid ed betw een o f the still u n d iffe r entiated beings an d non-beings, as such an d as a whole. B y this
displacem ent, however, m an does not sim ply pass u n ch an ged
from a previous place to a new one, as i f m an were a th in g that
can b e shifted fro m on e place to another. Instead, this displacem en t places m an for the first time into th e decisin o f the m ost
decisive relations to beings and non-beings. T h e s e relations bestow on him the fou n d ation o f a new essence. T h is n eed displaces m an in to the b e gin n in g o f a fou n d ation o f his essence. I
say advisedly a fo u n d atio n for we can never say that it is the absolute one.
W h at we are now callin g displacem ent is the essential character o f what we know u n d e r the am e o f disposition or feelin g. A
d eep -ro o ted and very od habit o f e xp erien ce an d speech stipulates that we in terp ret feelin gs and disp osition s as well as willin g and th in k in g in a psychological-anthropological sense as

occurrences an d processes within an organism , as psychic lived
experiences, ones we either have o r d o not have. T h is also m eans
that we are subjects, present at h an d , w ho are displaced into
these or those dispositions by g e ttin g them . In truth, however,
it is the disposition that displaces us, displaces us in to such and
such a relation to the world, into this or that u n d erstan d in g or
disclosure o f the world, into such an d such a resol ve or occlusion
o f on es self, a s e lf which is essentially a being-in -the-w orld.
T h e n eed com p els by disposing, an d this disposing is a displacin g in such fashion that we find ourselves disposed (or n o t disposed) toward beings in a defin ite w ay.1 I f we in terpret this psychologically, as lived experien ce, th en everyth in g is lost. T h a t is
why it is so difficu lt for us to gain access to the G re e k w orld
especially its b e g in n in g for we im m ed iately seek lived e x p e r iences, personalities, and cu ltu re precisely w hat was not
there in this very great and equ ally short time. A n d that is w hy
we are com p letely exclu d ed from a real u n derstan din g of, e.g.,
G reek traged y or the poetry o f Pindar, for we read an d hear the
Greeks in psychological, even in Christian, terms. If, e.g., a
G reek speaks o f al8w s, awe, which affects ones w ho risk an d only
them , or o f x p is, the grace that d onates and protects, an d which
in itself is severity (all these translations are miserable failures),
then he is not n a m in g lived exp erien ces or feelings w hich arise in
an organism an d w hich a person m ig h t have. T h e G re e k indicates w hat he m eans by calling these godd esses, or d e m i-g o d desses. B u t h ere again we are read y with ou r psychological explanations insofar as we w ould say that these are precisely
mythical lived experiences. For m yth is a particular form o f lived
experien ce, nam ely the irrational.
3) 0oo)|xcteiv as the basic disposition of the

primordial thinking o f the Occident.
In view o f m o d e rn m ans intoxication w ith lived exp erien ce, it is
in the first place very d ifficu lt to cap tu re a basic disposition, the
basic disposition, which com p elled the prim ordial th in k in g o f
the O ccid e n t into its question and let it becom e a necessity. Prior
1. Cf. Being and, Time on finding oneself disposed [Befindlichkeit],
37 - T h e ordinary concept o f w onder [162-63]
141
to all theories an d all-encom passing system s and presentations

o f a futural philosophy, the task is sim ply to becom e p rep ared
for the necessity o f that question. T h e r e fo r e we have to attem pt
to clarify the prim ordial basic disposition, the disposing n eed,
even at the risk o f h avin g everythin g taken as a psychological explanation. For, in d eed , let us not deceive ourselves: n o th in g is
gain ed by m akin g a principie ou t o f the propositiori T h e disposition has us, we d o not have it. W h e th e r or not som ething
has been u nderstood here will be m anifest on ly in m ans action,
creation, and B ein g, an d not in the m ere pretensin to be the
cham pion o f a new op in ion about the essence o f disposition.
T h e Greeks am e the origin o f philo sop h y ftoa)|eiv, w hich
we transate as w ond er. T h is characterization o f the origin o f
p hilosophy ou t o f m arvellin g as it is also ca lle d is often
q u oted and readily cited in order to accou n t for the origin o f
p hilosophy psychologically and in that way to d ep rive philosophy
precisely o f the w ondrous. A ll p sychology intrudes in this way to
disenchant and dispossess. B u t w hat is at issue here is on ly to
raise p h ilo so p h y or any other essentially Creative p o w er u p
into its inexplicability an d to preserve it there, and only there, as
a possible acquisition against all trivialization. T o say p hilosophy
originates in w o n d er m eans philosophy is w ondrous in its essence and becom es m ore wondrous the m ore it becom es w hat it
really is.
In order now to cap tu re flou|iei,v as the basic disposition o f
the b egin n in g o f W estern philosophy, we are deliberately startin g with the ordinary experien ces and interpretations o f w hat is
called w onder o r m arvelling, so that we m ay expressly dispel
w hat is ordinary fro m o u r reflection on
T h e w ondrous is first o f all w hat is striking, rem arkable, an excep tion to the habitual. We cali it the curious or the am azing. T o
b e am azed is to fin d o n e self in face o f the inexplicable, an d ind e e d in such a way that in this disposition the inexplicability is
sustained. W here am azem en t disposes m an, he is transfixed by
the curious an d pursues its perpetu ation , i.e., pursues its continu e d change, alternation, and exaggeration . For that is w hat distinguishes
som eth in g
curious:
as a
determ inate,
individual
this, it falls outside o f every determ inate, in dividual sphere o f

the fam iliar and know n. B y the same token, the am azing is som e-
142 T h e Need and the Necessity o f the Prst Beginning [163-64]

th in g determ nate, individual, an d u nusual, set o f f against w hat
is determ nate an d usual. T o be am azed is to be carried away by
som ething particular an d unu su al an d henee is an ab a n d o n m en t
o f w hat in its ow n sphere is p articular an d usual.
b) Admiration.
A dm iration is d ifferen t from am azem en t an d m arvelling. T h e
adm ired is in d eed also som ething u nusual, and again is som eth in g in divid ual set o f f against the usual. Yet it is no lo n g e r
m erely that which captures curiosity an d surprise, o r w hich enthralls an d am azes. T h e unu su al th at provokes adm iration, the
adm ired, becom es objective exp licitly as the unusual. T h e production o f w hat is adm ired, the achievem ent by which it com es to
be in the way it com es to be, is exp licitly acknow ledged an d appreciated.
N o m atter how w holly and g e n u in e ly adm iration m ay be carried away b y w hat fulfills it, yet it always involves a certain freedom over an d against w hat is adm ired. T h is occurs to such a degree that all adm iration, despite its retreating in face o f the
adm ired, its self-d ep recatin g reco gn itio n o f the ad m ired, also
em bodies a kin d o f self-affirm ation. A dm iration claims the righ t
and the capacity to perform the evaluation which resides in the
adm iration an d to bestow it on the ad m ired person. T h e adm irer
knows h im se lf perhaps not in the ability to accom plish things,
th o u g h in d eed in the pow er to ju d g e th e m equal to the on e a d mired, if n ot even superior. T h e r e fo r e , conversely, everyon e w ho
allows h im se lf to be adm ired, an d precisely if the ad m iration is
justified, is o f a lower rank. For he subordinates h im se lf to the
view point an d to the norm s o f his admirer. To the truly noble
person, on the contrary, every adm iration is an offen se. T h is is
not m ean t to discredit adm iration itself. W ithin its p ro p er limits,
it is necessary. W ith ou t adm iration, w hat w ould becom e o f a ski
ju m p e r or a race driver, a boxer or an actor?
W h at is ad m ired isju st like the c u rio u s in each case som eth in g u n u su al ju x ta p o se d to the usual, i.e., near it an d over it,
such that there can be exch an ge, to an d fro, from on e to the
other, because, in this ju xtap o sitio n , each needs the other.
38. T h e essence o f w onder [16566]
143
c) Astonishment and awe.

A dm iration m ust be distinguished fro m astonishm ent an d awe.
In d eed , we find here, as in the case o f adm iration, a characteristic retreating in face o f the awesom e, u p to w hat is called d u m foundedness. B u t in astonishm ent this retreatin g in face o f the
extraordinary no lo n g e r postures as that fun dam entally arrogan t and self-referential evaluation an d patronization fo u n d
well- or ill-concealed in all adm iration. In adm iration there always resides an attitu de that knows itself as a p p ly in g to o n e self as
m uch as to the ad m ired. A stonishm en t includes a decisive suspensin o f position-taking. T h e unu su al is now no lon ger m erely
w hat is other, the e xcitin g opposite o f the usual, and it is also not
m erely w hat is ackn o w ledged as extraord in ary and m ade equal
in rank to the adm irer. A stonishm en t rather allows the unu su al
to grow, precisely as w hat is extraordinary, into w hat overgrow s
all usual powers an d bears in itself a claim to a rank all its own.
A stonishm en t is im b u ed with the awareness o f b ein g e x clu d ed
from w hat exists in the awesome. Yet even h ere the astonishm ent
is still in every case an encou nter with an d a b ein g struck b y a
determ inate in divid ual object o f awe. H en ee even astonishm ent
does not fulfill w hat we in tend with the word w onder an d w hat
we are trying to u n derstan d as the basic disposition, the on e that
transports us into the b egin n in g o f g e n u in e thinking.
38. The essence o f wonder as the basic disposition

compelling us into the necessity o f primordial thinking.
W h at we call, in an em phatic sense, w onder, and claim to b e the
essence o f ftoru(jueiv, is different, essentially different, from all
types and levels o f am azem ent, adm iration, and astonishm ent.
We will attem pt to clarify in thirteen points the essence o f w o n der, i.e., the basic disposition co m p ellin g us into the necessity o f
prim ordial question ing. A ll the previously m en tioned m odes o f
m arvellin g if we m ay collect them u n d e r this title have one
th in g in com m on th ro u g h o u t all their differentiations, nam ely

that in them a determ nate in divid ual object stands ou t as b e in g
unusual and distinguishes itself w ith regard to an equally determ nate sphere o f w hat is e xp erien ced precisely as usual. T h e u n usual, as other, is in each case o p p o se d to the usual, an d all
am azem ent, adm iration, and awe are a tu rn in g away from the
usual, thereby leavin g it alone an d byp assing it in its usualness.
Now w hat abo u t w onder?
a) In wonder what is most usual itself

becomes the most unusual.
T h e usual an d the most u su al precisely the m ost usual whose
usualness goes so far that it is n ot even know n or noticed in its
u sualness this m ost usual itself becom es in w o n d er w hat is most
unusual.
b) In wonder what is most usual of all and

in all, in whatever manner this might be, becomes
the most unusual.
T h e most usual, w hich arises in w o n d e r as the unusual, is n ot this
or that, som eth in g particular that has show n itself as objective
and determ nate in som e specific activity or in dividual consideration. In wonder, w hat is m ost usual o f all and in all, i.e., every-
thing, becom es the m ost unusual. E v e ryth in g has in e veryth in g at

first the m ost usual to which attention is n ot paid and w hich, if it
is glim psed, is n o t explicitly h eed ed . E veryth in g bears in everyth in g the m ost usual, for this exists everyw here, altogether, and
in every way. E veryth in g in w hat is m ost usual (beings) becom es
in w onder the m ost unusual in this on e respect: that it is w hat it
is. T h is implies:
c) The most extreme wonder knows no way

out of the unusualness o f what is most usual.
For the m ost extrem e wonder, an yth in g w hatsoever as such and
everythin g as everyth in g becom e the m ost unusual. T h u s this
w onder no lo n g e r adheres to this o r that, from w hich it cou ld
still explain the unusualness o f the usual an d thereby cou ld dispel its unusualness and turn it in to som eth in g ordinary. B u t by
38. T h e essence o f w onder [167-68]
145
e xten d in g into the m ost extrem e unusualness, w onder no lo n g e r

encounters an yth in g that cou ld o ffe r it an escape. It no lo n g e r
knows the way o u t b u t knows itself solely as b ein g relegated to
the most unusual o f the usual in everyth in g an d anything: beings
as beings.
d) Wonder knows no way into the unusualness

o f what is most usual.
W hile w onder m ust venture ou t into the m ost extrem e u n u su alness o f everythin g, it is at the same tim e cast back w holly on itself, know in g that it is incapable o f p en etratin g the unusualness
by way o f exp lanation , since that w ould precisely be to destroy it.
W onder knows no way into the unusualness o f what is m ost usual
o f all, as little as it knows a way o u t it is sim ply placed before the
unusualness o f the usual, in the m idst o f the usual in everything.
e) Wonder as between the usual and the unusual.

N ot know in g the way ou t or the way in, w o n d er dwells in a b e tween, betw een the m ost usual, beings, an d their unusualness,
their is. It is w o n d er that first liberates this betw een as the b e tween and separates it out. W o n d er u nderstood transtively
brings forth the show ing o f w hat is m ost usual in its unusualness.
N ot know in g the way ou t or the way in, betw een the usual an d
the unusual, is not helplessness, for w o n d er as such does not desire help b u t instead precisely opens u p this betw een, which is
im pervious to any entran ce or escape, an d m ust constantly occu p y it. W onder do es not divert itself fro m the usual b u t o n the
contrary adverts to it, precisely as w hat is the most unusual o f
everythin g an d in everythin g. Insofar as this disposition turns to
the w hole and stands in the whole, it is called a basic disposition.
f) The eruption o f the usualness o f the most usual in the

transition o f the most usual into the most unusual. What
alone is wondrous: beings as beings.
We said that in w o n d e r w hat is m ost usual o f everythin g an d o f
anything, thus e veryth in g itself, becom es the m ost unusual. T h is

makes it seem as i f the m ost usual were already som ehow e x p erienced in ad van ce an d know n in its usualness. B u t that is p recisely not the case, for then w hat is m ost usual w ould in d e e d no
lon ger be the m ost usual. T h e usualness o f the most usual first
erupts the m o m en t the m ost usual becom es the m ost u nusual. In
this transition the m ost usual first steps forth separately in its
usualness and in its unusualness, such that these th en ap p ea r
precisely as such. In this way, w o n d er now opens u p w hat alone is
wondrous in it: nam ely, the w hole as the whole, the w hole as b e ings, beings as a w hole, that they are an d w hat they are, b ein gs as
beings, ens qua ens, t o o ' v ^ v, W hat is m ean t here by the as, the
qua, the|), is the betw een that w o n d er separates out, the o p e n
o f a free space hard ly surm ised an d h eed ed , in w hich beings
com e into play as such, nam ely as th e beings they are, in the play
o f their B ein g.
g) Wonder displaces man into the perception of beings as

beings, into the sustaining o f unconcealedness.
W onder is the casting asunder o f this free space, such that at the
same time it displaces the w on d erer into the m idst o f w hat was
cast apart. W o n d erin g m an is the on e moved by wonder, i.e., displaced by this basic disposition into an essence d eterm in ed b y it.
W onder displaces m an ou t o f the c o n fu sin g irresolvability o f
the usual an d the unusual into the first resolution o f his essence.
A s disposed in wonder, he can perceive n o th in g else than beings
as beings. T h a t is to say, as m oved by wonder, m an m ust gain a
foothold in the acknow ledgm ent o f w hat has erup ted , an d he
m ust see it in a p rodu ctive seein g o f its inscrutable disclosure,
and m ust exp erie n ce and sustain oA/qêia, unconcealedness, as
the prim ordial essence o f beings. For w hat we m ust above all
com e to know is that aX/rjfteia, unconcealedness, is for p rim ordial G reek th in k in g the essence o f B e in g itself. U nconcealedness
m eans an e m e rge n t com in g forth, a co m in g to presence in the
open.
Xfi& eia, unconcealedness (we say m uch too em p tily
truth), does n ot first com e to beings insofar as we acknow ledge

them . O n the contrary, in uncon cealedn ess beings as beings, i.e.,
as op en presences, approach m an an d displace him in to the
o p en o f u ncon cealedn ess and thus place him into the essence o f
38. T h e essence o f w onder [170 -71]
147
on e w h o 1 perceives an d gathers in the o p e n an d thereby first experiences the h id d e n an d closed as such.
h) Wonder as a basic disposition belongs

to the most unusual.
W onder displaces m an into and before beings as such. Such disp lacin g is the p ro p er disposing o f the basic disposition. We cali it
the basic disposition because in disp osin g m an it displaces him
into that on w hich an d in which word, work, an d deed, as historical, can be based an d history can b egin . T h e basic disposition,
however, can neither be sim ply b ro u gh t about by m ans will or is
it the effect o f a cause issuing from beings and op eratin g on
m an. T h is disp lacem ent is beyon d exp lan ation , for all exp lan ad o n here necessarily falls short and com es too late, since it cou ld
on ly move within, an d w ould have to ap p ea l to, som ething that
was first en cou n tered as uncon cealed in the displacem ent that
casts asunder. A ll exp lan ation is directed to som e being, already
unconcealed, fro m which alone an e xp lan atory cause can be
drawn. T h e basic disposition o f w ond er displaces m an into the
realm w here the m ost usual, yet still as such u n th o u g h t (beings),
are established in their most p rop er unusualness, nam ely the
on e o f their B ein g, an d w here beings as such then b ecom e the
m ost worthy o f question ing. T h e basic disposition itself belongs
to w hat is most u n u su al and most rare. In so far as m an can at all
by h im self brin g abo u t a relation to it, he can m ake h im self ready
for the u n con dition al necessity that holds sway in this disposition
an d adm its o f no escape. W onder is the basic disposition that prim ordially disposes m an into the b e gin n in g o f thinking, because,
before all else, it displaces m an into that essence whereby he then
finds him self in the m idst o f beings as such and as a w hole and
finds h im self c a u g h t u p in them .
i) Analysis o f wonder as a retrospective sketch of the

displacement of man into beings as such.
T h is analysis o f w onder, as a basic disposition com p ellin g us into
the first b egin n in g, shou ld not be m isunderstood to the e ffect
that the disposition w ould be, in its prim ordiality, a conscious
1. [Reading der for das, following the second edition.Tr.]

one. O n the contrary, the uniqueness o f the u n con d ition ed do m ination o f this disposition an d o f its com p ellin g character involves, as is the case with every basic disposition, the h igh est simplicity o f co m p lete incom prehensibility an d its u n con d ition ed
expansin. O u r analysis should we w ant to am e it s u c h is
not a dissection in the sense o f an e xp lan atory dissolution into a
m anifold o f com pon ents. It is sim ply an attem pt at a retrospective sketch o f the sim plicity and incom prehensibility o f th at displacem ent o f m an, into beings as such, which com es to pass as
wonder. A n d the latter remains exactly as ungraspable as the b egin n in g itself, toward which it com pels.
T h e m isinterpretation o f this retrospective sketch as a dissection is, to be sure, all the m ore tem p tin g the lon ger we have been
habituated, even here, precisely in this pre-em in en t realm , to
take everyth in g psychologically, as occurrences o f lived e x p e r iences in the h u m an soul. W hereas, on the contrary, m an h im self is first disposed toward the b e g in n in g th ro u gh the occurrence o f this displacem ent an d is thereby d eterm in ed as a
prim ordial p erceiver o f beings as such.
j) The sustaining of the displacement prevailing in the basic

disposition o f wonder in the carrying out of the necessity of
the question o f beings as such.
A ll this contains a clue in dicating w h ere we m igh t fin d the n e cessity o f the attitu de o f prim ordial thinking. T h e basic disposition o f doaifAcêiv com pels us to a p u re acknow ledgm ent o f the
unusualness o f the usual. T h e purest ackn o w ledgm en t o f w hat is
most unusual is fulfilled , however, in the question ing that asks
w hat the m ost usual itself m igh t be, such that it can reveal itself
as w hat is m ost unusual.
B u t is this qu estion in g not precisely intrusiveness an d curiosity, henee that which m ost eludes all p u re acknow ledgm ent? T o
be sure it is, b u t o n ly if we un derstan d this qu estion ing as a part
o f ou r everyday com p ortm en t an d dealin gs and as a part o f the
rage to m ake exp lan ation the m easu rin g rod for the d eterm in ation o f the essence o f th o u g h tfu l questioning. B u t th o u g h tfu l
question ing is n o t the intrusive an d rash curiosity o f th e search
for explanations; it is the toleratin g an d sustaining o f the u n e x -
*49
plainable as such, despite b ein g overw helm ed b y the pressure o f

w hat reveis itself. T h e sustaining o f the u nexp lainable seeks to
perceive only that which the uncon cealed reveis in its u n c o n cealedness: nam ely, presence, constancy, self-installation in a
form , self-lim itation in a look. T h e sustaining o f the basic d isp o sition is not a m eltin g into or a vagu e an d e m p ty w allow ing in
feelin gs ; on the contrary, it is the carryin g o u t o f the necessity
o f the question o f beings as such in their regin.
R E C A P JT U L A TIO N
x) The basic disposition of wonder versus

related kinds o f marvelling.
We are reflectin g on the essence o f the basic disposition, the on e
that was com p ellin g at the b egin n in g o f W estern thinking. It let
the question o f beings as such bfecome a necessity, th o u gh in such
a way that it p reclu d ed a direct inquiry in to &Vrj&eia. T h is basic
disposition is wonder. We have been tryin g to clarify its essence,
its typ e o f disposing. T h e disposing o f a basic disposition is the
transform ative d isp lacin g o f m an into b ein gs and before them .
In order to draw o u t with sufficient clarity the m anner o f this
disposing in wonder, we attem pted to distinguish this basic disposition from related, th o u g h essentially d ifferen t, kinds o f m arvelling. We m en tio n ed an d clarified som e aspects o f am azem ent,
adm iration, an d awe. In each case the result was a d ifferen t p osition o f man: he m ay be captured by the am azin g and ge t lost in
it, he m ay posit h im se lf as free in relation to the adm ired, in a
certain sense equal to it if not even superior, o r he may subm it to
the awesome by h o ld in g h im self back. W h a t is com m on to all
these m odes o f m arvelling is that in each case, even if in d ifferen t
ways, a determ inate in dividual object as som eth in g unusual is set
o f f against a d eterm in ate sphere o f the usual an d the latter is p u t
aside and for the tim e b e in g ab an do n ed . H ow does w o n d er
stand versus all these?
It is precisely w ith regard to this relation toward the usual an d
the unusual that the basic disposition o f w o n d e r as som ething
entirely d iffe r e n t is easiest to clarify.
3) Sequence o f steps in the characterization of wonder as a

way toward the necessity o f the primordial question.
We are a ttem p tin g to characterize w o n d er in thirteen points. Reflection will show that it is not a m atter o f listing arbitrarily selected properties o f wonder, b u t rather th at it is a deliberate arran gem en t lea d in g to the goal o f o u r m editation: the necessity o f
prim ordial question ing, a necessity th at p reclud ed an inquiry
into /rj-frea. T h is im plies that o n ly a corresp o n d in g necessity
and n eed can b e com p ellin g tow ard the question o f truth and
henee can p red eterm in e the essential fou n d ation o f the m ore
original essence o f truth. We have g o n e th rou gh the first ten
points o f the characterization o f wonder. In wonder, som eth in g
unusual is not set o f f against the usual, b u t instead w o n d er sets
us before the usual itself precisely as w hat is the most unusual. B y

the same token, the usual is not this o r that or som e particular
dom ain, b u t because w onder places us before w hat is m ost usual
and the latter is constantly m anifest in everythin g an d an yth in g
in such a way that it is precisely overlooked, so everyth in g in everyth in g becom es the most unusual. T h u s there is no way o u t for
the w o n d er to escape in ord er fro m there to exp lain the most
unusual an d thereby m ake it again the usual. B u t ju s t as little
does w o n d er have available a way in; it can n o t penetrate in to and
dissolve the unu su al, for that w ould sim ply destroy the u n u su alness. W onder does n ot perm it a way ou t or a way in; instead, it
displaces us before an d into the unusualness o f everyth in g in its
usualness. T h e m ost usual as such first steps forth in its u n u su alness w hen the latter shines in wonder. W on der displaces us b e fore everyth in g in e v e ryth in g that it is an d is w hat it is in
other words, before beings as beings. W hile m an is displaced into
it, he h im self is transform ed into on e w ho, not know in g the way
ou t or the way in, has to hold fast to beings as beings in p u re acknow ledgm ent. T h is is the most sim ple an d is the greatest; it is
the all-decisive begin n in g, toward which the basic disposition
com pels. T h e ackn o w ledgm en t o f b ein gs as beings, however, is
only sustained in qu estion ing w hat beings as such are. T h is qu estion is not a desire for exp lan ation or for the elim ination o f the
most unusual, that beings are w hat th ey are. O n the contrary,

this question is an ever p urer ad heren ce to beings in their u n usualness, i.e., in prim ordial term s, in their p u re em ergen ce, in
their unconcealedness (ctXiqdeia), and in w hat belongs im m ediately to this and u n folds out o f it. T o sustain the basic disposition
m eans to carry out the necessity o f such questioning, toward
w hich the not k n o w in g the way ou t or the way in com pels us. B u t
w hat is m eant by this carryin g ou t as a sustaining o f the basic disposition?
k) The carrying out o f the necessity: a suffering in the sense

o f the Creative tolerance for the unconditioned.
W e m igh t first in terp ret the carryin g ou t o f the necessity as the
sim ple im p lem entation o f som ething required. We thereby u n derstand carryin g o u t as o u r accom plishm ent and the p rod u ct
o f o u r contrivances. C a rryin g out w ould thus be an activity o f
ou r ow n action. B u t the carryin g ou t o f the necessity into which
the n eed o f the basic dispositiorf com pels, the th o u g h tfu l question in g o f beings as such, is essentially su ffe rin g [Leiden]. Now
the m ere m ention o f this word will im m ed iately place us once
again within the sp here o f a com m on m isinterpretation. We will
think in a Christian-m oralistic-psychological way o f a submissive
acceptance, a m ere b earin g patiently, a renunciation o f all pride.
O r eise we will id en tify this su fferin g with inactivity and op p ose
it to action. T h e latter im m ediately refers to the fleld o f the im perial, especially i f action is set against m ere thought. B u t even if
we b rin g reflective t h in k in g into this distorted O p p o sitio n to action, for us th in k in g always remains a p erfo rm an ce and by no
m eans som ething suffered. So su fferin g has to m ean here som eth in g other than m ere Submission to woes. T o be sure, su fferin g
here refers to the acceptan ce o f what overgrow s m an and in that
way transform s him an d makes him ever m ore tolerant for w hat
h e is supposed to grasp w hen he has to grasp beings as such and
as a whole. T h e carryin g ou t o f the necessity is here a su fferin g
in the sense o f this k in d o f Creative tolerance for the u n co n d itioned. T h is su ffe rin g is beyond activity an d passivity as com m o n ly understood.
Perhaps we m ay interp ret a fragm en t o f the hym ns o f H lderlin s later poetry in term s o f this essential suffering; p er-
152 T h e Need and the Necessity o f the first Beginning [175-77]

haps for in d eed this frag m e n t m eans som ething still m ore
p rofou n d , to which we are n ot yet e q u a l.1 Von H ellin grath assigns this fra g m e n t to that larger fra g m e n t which he has entitled
O u t o f the rn ge o f m otives o f the T ita n s .2 It certainly b elongs
there, th o u g h n ot by reason o f som e special relation, b u t because
the frag m e n t we will cite nam es som eth in g that constitutes a if
not the essential determ ination o f the entire dom ain o f the
later hym ns.
T h e verse runs as follows:
For tremendous powers wander over the earth,
And their destiny touches the one
Who suffers it and looks upon it,
And it also touches the hearts o f the peoples.
For a demigod must grasp everything,
O r a man, in suffering,
Insofar as he hears, alone, or is himself
Transformed, surmising from afar the steed o f the lord,
R en ou ncing a fu ll interpretation, we will on ly provide a directive
to the con text. H ld erlin says e ith er a d em igo d or a m a n in
su ffe rin g m ust grasp everythin g. A n d the su fferin g is tw ofold:
hearing,
lookin g,
perception,
an d
lettin g o n e self be
trans-
form ed, w h ereby the distant surm ising o f the steed o f the lord,
the com in g o f the go d , is o p en ed u p . S u fferin g: a p ercep tion or
a tran sfo rm aro n ; the essential is the ad vertence in h e arin g an d,
together with that, a readiness for the transition into an o th er B ein g .3 In hearin g, we project and e x te n d ourselves over an d into
broad expanses, th o u g h in such a way that, com p lyin g w ith w hat
is heard, we b rin g ourselves back in to the ga th erin g o f o u r essence. Perception is som ething su ffe re d in the sense o f the m ost
expansive, an d at the same tim e the m ost intim ate, passion. A ll
graspin g is m easured accord ing to the standard o f the pow er for
such sufferin g.
T h e gr asp in g occurs on ly in su fferin g. H ere resides for H l-
1. Hlderlin, Bruchstcke und Entwrfe, No. 14. In: Smtliche Werke. Ed. N. v.
Hellingrath. Bd. IV, 2 ed. Berlin 1923. Pp. 247f., verses 18-27.
2. Ibid., pp. 215-218.
3. On suffering and the suffering o f the god, see the conclusion o f Wie
wenn am Feiertage," ibid., pp. I5 iff.
38. T h e essence o f w onder [17778]
153
d erlin above all the freed o m from everyth in g coerced, from all
coercion and calculation, from all m istaking o f time, o f the m om en t whose tim e has com e. For how eise than in the sense o f this
essential su fferin g cou ld som eone fro m a fa r surm ise the go d ,
w here it is said o f go d :
T h e reflective g o d hates all u ntim ely g r o w th .1
A fte r what we b riefly said earlier ab o u t H ld erlin in con nection
w ith the task o f reflectin g on the b e gin n in g, it is certainly not an
accident that we are referrin g to the p o e t in ord er to elucdate
w hat we m ean by su ffe rin g as the essential form o f the carryin g ou t o f the necessity.
1) Txvti as the basic attitude toward (wats, where the

preservation o f the wondrous (the beingness o f beings)
unfolds and is established.
maintains the holding sway
o f (Injers in unconcealedness.
T h e sustaining o f the com p ellin g basic disposition, as the carryin g ou t o f the necessity, is a su fferin g in the sense indicated, an d
that is the essence o f th o u g h tfu l question ing. In such su fferin g
there occurs a correspo n d en ce to w hat has to be grasped, while
the on e w ho grasps is transform ed acco rd in g to it. A cco rd in g to
it : that m eans that w hat is to be grasped (here, beings as such in
their beingness) constrains the one w ho is grasping, constrains
h im to a basic position, in virtue o f which the pure acknow ledgm en t o f the u ncon cealedn ess o f beings can u n fu rl. T h e on e w ho
is graspin g an d p erceivin g m ust accord with w hat is to be
grasped so that the latter, beings them selves, are in deed grasped,
th o u g h in such a way that thereby they are precisely released to
their ow n essence, in ord er to hold sway in them selves an d thus
to p ervade m an as well. B eings, w hich th e G reeks cali
m ust stand in tX.'fjeiot. H ere we again touch w hat is most con cealed: that the gr asp in g is a suffering.
H ow else cou ld we u nderstan d the e x te n t to which the two
greatest and m ost renow n ed thinkers o f the early G reek period,
1. Ibid., p. 218.

Heraclitus an d Parm enides, agree in their basic positions? H eraclitus claims that beings are on e in .70S in the anticipatory
g a th e r in g an d Parm enides teaches that beings are w h at is p erceived in v o e v in p ercep tio n an d this perceptual anticipatory
gath erin g indicates that the grasp in g is a su fferin g as a transform ation o f m an.
A ccord with w hat is original is therefore precisely n ot an assimilation in the sense that m an w o u ld sim ply be (frxris. O n the
contrary, he is to be distinguished from it, b ut in a way that accords with it, i.e., in a way that adheres to its m easure (adheres to
4>tms), com p orts itself accordingly, an d orders this com p ortm ent. E ven i f m an h im self is precisely n o t beings as a w hole, nevertheless he is the on e w ho is disp laced into the m idst o f beings
as the preserver o f their unconcealedness. So this p erceivin g and
preserving can n ot b e d eterm in ed as cjnkris b u t m ust b e other: in
accord with (fwcris, releasing it, an d yet graspin g it.
W h at then is it? W h at is the basic attitu de in which the preservation o f the w ondrous, the beingness o f beings, unfolds an d, at
the sam e tim e, defin es itself? We have to seek it in w hat the
Greeks cali t c x v t ). Yet we m ust divorce this G reek w ord from ou r
fam iliar term d erived from it, tech n ology, and fro m all nexuses o f m e an in g that are th o u g h t in the am e o f technology. T o
be
sure, that m o d ern
and
con tem p orary
tech n ology cou ld
em erge, an d h ad to em erge, has its gr o u n d in the b e gin n in g and

has its fou n d ation in an u navoidable in capacity to hold fast to the
b egin n in g. T h a t m eans that con tem p orary tec h n o lo g y as a
form o f total m obilization (Ernst J n g e r ) can on ly be u n d erstood on the basis o f the b e gin n in g o f the basic W estern position
toward beings as such an d as a w hole, assum ing that we are strivin g for a m etaphysical u n d erstan d in g and are n ot satisfied
with in tegra tin g techn ology into the goals o f politics.
Txvr) does n ot m ean tech n o lo gy in the sense o f the m echanical o rd erin g o f beings, or does it m ean art in the sense o f m ere
skill an d p roficien cy in procedures an d operations. T xvti m eans
know ledge: know -how in processes against beings (and in the encou nter with beings), i.e., against <Jrxris. T o be sure, h ere it is neither possible or necessary to en ter into the variations o f the
m ean in g o f the w ord Texviq, w hich are not accidental. W e only
have to be m in d fu l that this w ord still, precisely with Plato, at
155
times assumes the role o f d e n o tin g k n o w led ge pure and sim ple,
an d that m eans the percep tu al relation to beings as such. N ow it
is clear that this p erceivin g o f beings in their unconcealedness is
not a m ere g a p in g , that w onder is carried ou t rather in a procedu re against beings, b u t in such a way that these them selves precisely show them selves. For that is w hat Txvt) means: to grasp
beings as e m e rg in g o u t o f them selves in the way they show th em selves, in their outw ard look, eiSos,
L8ea, and, in accord with
this, to care for beings them selves an d to let them grow, i.e., to
o rd er o n eself w ithin beings as a w hole th ro u g h productions and
institutions. Texvri is a m ode o f p ro cee d in g against cJnxTi!, th o u g h
not yet in o rd er to overpow er it or e xp lo it it, and above all not in
o rd er to turn use an d calculation into principies, but, on the con trary, to retain the h o ld in g sway o f
4 ri3ox<;
in unconcealedness.
T h ere fo re , because the pure ack n o w ledgm en t o f beings as such,

the p erception o f (jrxns in its iX/rj&eia, is the disposing n eed in
the basic disposition o f wonder, Txvq an d its carryin g o u t becom e necessary as w hat is w hlly oth er than cfrkTis w holly oth er
yet b elo n g in g to <(rixns in the most essential way.
m) The danger o f disturbing the basic disposition

of wonder in carrying it out. Texv-q as the ground
for the transformation of X/r^{>eia into | o h tis . The
loss o f the basic disposition and the absence
o f the original need and necessity.
T h is basic attitu de toward cfrcris, tx vti, as the carryin g o u t o f
the necessity an d n eed o f wonder, is at th e same time, however,
the grou n d u p o n w hich arises
ôwctls, the transform ation
o f aX/q-frea as unconcealedness into correctness. In other words, in

carryin g ou t the basic disposition itself there resides the d a n g e r
o f its disturbance an d destruction. For in the essence o f Texviq, as
required by {rijis itself, as the occurren ce an d establishm ent o f
the uncon cealedn ess o f beings, there lies the possibility o f arbi-
trariness, o f an u n b rid led positing o f goals an d thereby the possibility o f escape o u t o f the necessity o f the prim ordial need.
I f this hap p en s, th en in place o f the basic disposition o f w o n der, the avidity for lea rn in g and calculation enters in. Philosophy
itself then becom es on e institution a m o n g others, it becom es

subjected to a go al which is all the m ore insidious the h ig h e r it
is e.g., Platos TTOuSea, a word we b ad ly transate as edu cation. E ven the fact that in the Republic philosophers are destined
to be aorXeis, the highest rulers, is alread y an essential d em o tion o f philosophy. W hile the gr asp in g o f beings, the acknowled g m e n t o f th em in their unconcealedness, u nfolds in to Texviq,
inevitably an d increasingly the aspects o f beings, the ideas,
which are b ro u g h t into view in such graspin g, becom e the on ly
standard. T h e grasp in g becom es a sort o f know -how with regard
to the ideas, an d that requires a constant assimilation to them . A t
bottom , however, it is a m ore p ro fo u n d an d m ore h id d e n process. It is the loss o f the basic disposition, the absence o f the o r ig inal need an d necessity, a process linked to the loss o f the o rig inal essence o f aX/rj'deia.
In this way, the b e gin n in g contains in itself the u navoidable
necessity that, in u n fo ld in g, it m ust su rren der its originality. T h is
does not speak against the greatness o f the b e gin n in g b u t in favor o f it. For, w ould w hat is great ever b e great if it d id n ot have
to face u p to the d a n g e r o f collapse an d did not have to succum b
in its historical consequences to this danger, on ly to rem ain all
the m ore illu m in atin g in its initial singularity? In the b e gin n in g,
the question o f beings stays within the clarity o f Xrjfteia as the
basic character o f beings. Xri'&eia itself, however, rem ains by
necessity u nqu estion ed. B u t the sustaining o f the b e g in n in g p osition in the sense o f Tlxp-q leads to a fallin g away from the b e ginn ing. B ein gs becom e, to e xaggerate som ew hat, objects o f representations co n fo rm in g to them . N ow
X/rjfteia itself is also
in terrogated, b u t h enceforth from the poin t o f view o f Ttxvr),

and
ot\f|-frea becom es the correctness o f representations an d
procedures.
39. The need arising from the lack o f need. Truth as
correctness and philosophy (the question o f truth) as

without need and necessity.
Ever since truth becam e correctness an d this essential determ ination o f truth, in all its m anifold variations, becam e k n ow n as
the only standard one, philosophy has lacked the m ost original
39- T h e need from the lack o f need [182-83]
157
need and necessity o f the begin n in g. A fte r h avin g been for a

tim e the h an d m aid en o f theology, philo sop h y was em an cipated
into that free d o m ain o f the d evelop m en t o f the se lf-p osid n g h u m an capacities w hose carryin g ou t creates, cultivates, and settles
w hat has been called cultu re ever since. Philosophy is a free
u n fo ld in g o f a h u m an capacity, that o f th inking, and henee is but
on e cultural asset a m o n g others. G rad u a lly the m odern p erio d
includ ed p hilosop hy u n d e r the con cep t o f a factor o f culture, a
notion in w hich an yone w ho has ears to h ear m ust hear calculations and contrivances d eterm in in g in ad van ce the B ein g o f m an
in the m idst o f beings. A n d , finally, to the exten t that the nineteen th Century h ad to m ake culture the object o f a cultural politics, philosophy becam e a curiosity, or w h at com es dow n to the
sam e thing: the essence o f truth becam e the m ost unqu estion ed
an d henee a m atter o f the highest in differen ce. T h e fact that in
all so-called cu ltu red countries o f the West an d o f the East professors teach philo sop h y in Colleges an d universities does n ot
contradict this state o f philosophy an d o f the question o f truth,
because it does not in the least touch it.
Now there are today everyw here daydream ers and sentim ental
p eo ple e n o u g h , w ho lam ent this situation o f philosophy an d
thereby posture as d efen d ers o f the e n d a n g e re d spirit. B u t w hat
they w ould like is sim ply that p hilosop hy becom e again a m ore
appreciated cultu ral asset. T h is con cern over p hilosophy is a
m ere desire to retu rn to the tranquility o f a previous age, an d it
is on the w hole an d essentially m ore p ernicious than the co m plete disdain an d disavowal o f philosophy. For this backw ardlook in g con cern leads into error, into m isconstruing the m o m en t
o f W estern history.
W h at is the significance o f the fact that philosophy b ecam e a
curiosity an d that the essence o f truth is unquestion ed an d an
inquiry into it w ith ou t necessity? A n d w hat does it m ean that p h ilosophy stands at the e n d o f its first b e gin n in g, in a state that corresponds to the b e g in n in g if only as a final state? O n ce philosop h y was the m ost strnge, the m ost rare, an d the most u nique;
now it is the sam e, b u t on ly in the form o f curiosity. O n ce , in the
b e gin n in g o f O ccid e n ta l thinking, truth was u nquestion ed, beyo n d question ing, b u t was so in virtue o f the highest n eed an d
necessity o f q u estion in g beings. N ow the essence o f truth is also

u nquestion ed, the m ost u nqu estion ed, b u t only as w hat is o f the
highest in d ifferen ce within the age o f the com p lete questionlessness o f the essential. T h e question o f truth is w ithout necessity.
T h is is an essential cognition which em erges only in ge n u in e reflection. T h is k n o w led ge, the tak in g seriously o f the situation o f
philosophy, is alone decisive. T h e con cern over p hilosop hy as a
cultural asset can b e left to itself.
T h e question o f truth is w ithout necessity. In view o f the reflection we have carried ou t on the b e gin n in g, that m eans that
the question o f truth is w ithout n eed; the basic disposition, w hich
w ould prim ordially displace m an again into beings as a w hole, is
absent an d is d e n ie d us.
Is the n eed absent, or is con tem p orary m an already so enchanted by his contrivances, and so carried away b y his lived experiences, that he is no lon ger equal to the n eed, assum in g the
essential n eed is n ot som ething m iserable, to which we cou ld
on ly be ill-disposed, but is precisely the greatest?
W hat i f the fact that we feel no n eed , this lack o f n eed, w ould
precisely express o u r need, one still d en ied us? W h at i f o u r n eed
arises ou t o f this lack o f need?
B u t these questions, which are n ot sup p osed to say an yth in g
and are th o u g h t rather to keep silent ab o u t everything, lead us
into the place o f o u r greatest dan ger: th at we today b rin g u p this
need in idle talk, scarcely h avin g m en tio n ed it, and even con vince ourselves that it is a lived e x p erie n ce , w ithou t ever havin g been co m p elled by it, let alone h avin g carried ou t its necessity. To en cou n ter this d a n ger here, we w ould have to reflect on
the necessity o f the b e gin n in g o f W estern th ou gh t, at w hose en d
we are now standing.
40. The abandonment of beings by Being as the concealed

ground o f the still hidden basic disposition. The compeUing o f
this basic disposition into another necessity o f another
questioning and beginning.
From this reflection we now know th at the essential need, w hich,
as a basic disposition, com pelled the prim ordial qu estioning,
sp ran g forth fro m beings them selves as a whole, insofar as be-
40. T h e abandonm ent by B eing [184-85]
159
ings had to be ack n o w ledged in their beingness an d had to be

preserved in their truth. I f for us n o th in g less is at stake than the
preparation for a transition from the en d o f the first b e gin n in g
into an other b e gin n in g, then the n eed w hich com pels us to this
necessity m ust again an d only com e ou t o f beings as a w hole, insofar as they b ecom e a question with regard to their B ein g.
B u t this already says that on the basis o f the transform ation o f
the essence o f truth into correctness, our basic position toward
beings is not any m ore an d never again will be that o f the first
b egin n in g, a lth o u g h it rem ains d e te rm in e d by it as a cou nterthrust. T h e r e fo r e the basic disposition can no lon ger be the on e
o f wonder, in which beings as such w ith regard to their B e in g
once em erged as the m ost unusual. H o w far we are rem oved
from the possibility o f bein g again disp laced toward beings by
this basic disposition o f the b e gin n in g can easily be m easured by
the fact that for cen turies the B e in g o f beings, which was for the
G reeks the m ost w ondrous, has passed as th e m ost obvious o f everyth in g obvious an d is for u* the m ost com m on: w hat everyb o d y always knows. For w ho is sup p osed not to know w h at he
m eans w hen he says the stone is, the sky is overcast?
Yet this m ay express som ething w hose con ten t and b earin g we
d o not at all yet surm ise, nam ely that we are d e a lin g with beings
as the object o f contrivances an d o f lived experien ces an d
thereby are not p a yin g attention to the B e in g o f these beings. O n
accou nt o f its obviousness, B e in g is som eth in g forgotten. T h e
forgottenness o f B e in g holds us in its grip , or, w hat com es d o w n
to the same th in g, p hilosophy as the qu estion o f beings as such is
now by necessity a m ere curiosity. T h e forgottenness o f B e in g
dom inates, i.e., it determ ines ou r reladon to beings, so that even
beings, that they are an d w hat they are, rem ain a m atter o f indifference. It is alm ost as if beings have b een aban do n ed by B e in g, and we are heedless o f it, and are m ore heedless the greater
becom es the insidious outcry over m etaphysics and ontology. For
that m erely expresses a desire to retu rn to the fam iliar past instead o f w o rk in g fo r the fu tu re even w ithou t b e in g able to see it.
B ein gs are, b u t the B e in g o f beings an d the truth o f B e in g an d
consequently the B e in g o f truth are d e n ie d to beings. B ein gs are,
yet they rem ain ab a n d o n e d by B e in g an d left to them selves, so as
to be m ere objects o f o u r contrivance. A ll goals beyon d m en an d
i6 o T h e Need and the Necessity o f the First Beginning [185-86]

peoples are go n e, and, above all, w hat is lacking is the Creative
pow er to create som ething b eyon d oneself. T h e e p o ch o f the
highest a b a n d o n m en t o f beings b y B e in g is the age o f the total
questionlessness o f B ein g.
B u t w hat i f this ab an d o n m en t o f beings by B e in g were an event
which proceeds from beings as a w h o le, in d eed in such a way that
precisely this even t is the least visible an d exp erien ceab le, because it is the best concealed? For precisely the progress o f all
contrivance an d the self-certainty o f all lived e xp erien ce know
them selves to be in such p roxim ity to reality and life th at a
greater p roxim ity can hardly be represented. W hat i f the aband o n m en t o f beings by B e in g w ere the m ost h id d en an d most
p rop er gr o u n d , an d the essence, o f w hat N ietzsche first recognized as nihilism and interp reted in term s o f m orality an d
the ideal, in the fashion o f the p hilosophy o f Plato and
Schopenhauer, b u t did not yet understand metaphyskally? (M etaphysically m eans: in the perspective o f the basic occurren ce o f
the prim ordial question, th^ g u id in g question o f W estern philosophy, an d con sequ en tly not yet in the perspective o f w hat originally points to the dom ain o f the gen u in e, renew ed surpassing
o f nihilism.) W h a t i f the ab a n d o n m en t o f beings by B ein g, that
beings still are an d yet B e in g an d its truth rem ain d e n ie d to
beings an d con sequ ently to m an (the den ial itself u n d ersto o d as
the essence o f B ein g), w hat if this even t which proceeds o u t o f
beings as a w hole were the con cealed g r o u n d o f the still veiled
basic disposition which com pels us into an other necessity o f an oth er original qu estion ing and b egin n in g? W h at if the aban d o n m ent o f beings b y B e in g were linked to the n eed arising fro m the
fact that for us th e essence o f truth an d the question o f tru th are
not yet necessary? W h at if the n eed arising from the lack o f n eed
and, on accou n t o f its h id d en do m in ation , the age o f com p lete
questionlessness, h ad its gr o u n d in the ab an d o n m en t o f beings
by B ein g?
We m ust pass th ro u g h this reflection in ord er to allow the
m editation on th e first be gin n in g to b eco m e w hat it is: the thrust
into the transtion. B u t p erhaps this reflection precisely shows
us, assum ing we have carried it o u t lo n g e n o u g h an d, above all,
with sufficient preparation an d insight, how little we are equal
to, o r can even exp ect, b e in g struck by the basic disposition,
4i- T h e necessity held out for us [18687]
161
which belongs to the need arising from the lack o f need, to the
aban do n m en t o f b ein gs by B ein g. We will n ot be equal to it as
lo n g as we d o n ot prep are ourselves for it an d instead take refu g e in the o p in ion that m etaphysical-historical reflection paralyzes and en d an gers action, whereas it is precisely the gen u in e
b egin n in g o f the fu tu re. For great surm ises enter into reflection
an d rem ain there. T o be sure, th ro u gh such reflection we arrive
at the entire am bigu ity p rop er to a historical transition: that we
have been thrust in to a futu re b u t we have n ot been em pow ered
to seize the thrust in a Creative way an d to transfer it into the
form o f the futu re, i.e., to prepare that b y w hich alone a b e g in n in g begins, the leap into another k now ledge.
41. The necessity held out for us: to bring upon its ground
openness as the Clearing o f the self-concealing the question o f
the essence o f man as the custodian o f the truth o f Being.
(
A s regards the question o f truth, this m eans that ou r discussion
is w ithout result. Since we steadfastly take in to account the poin t
o f view o f today an d o f the past, we are always w aiting to be told
w hat the essence o f truth is. We await it all the m ore, since ou r
discussion b egan with a critical reference to the openness lyin g at
the grou n d o f correctness and we called this openness the m ost
w orthy o f questioning.
O u r discussion is ad m itted ly w ithout result as lo n g as we ig nore everythin g eise that was said and o n ly look for a new declaration o f the essence o f truth and th ereb y determ ine that we
have profited n othin g.
B u t w hat has h a p p en e d ? T h e discussion was entitled, Foundational issues in the question of truth a reflection on the question in g o f this question. Soon we were m o vin g m ore an d m ore,
an d then exclusively, in a historical reflection o n the b e gin n in g
o f W estern th in k in g, on how there for th e first tim e the essence
o f truth shone as the basic character o f b ein gs as such, on w hich
n eed and basic disposition com p elled in to which necessity o f
questioning. Finally th e reflection lea p e d over to our need. D id
the reflection on ly lea p to this at the en d , or d id it not constantly
con cern us an d only us ourselves?
i 62
T h e Need and the Necessity o f the First Beginning [188-89]
T h e result o f ou r discussions i f we w ould speak o f it at

a ll consists, insofar as it consists in anything, precisely in ou r
relinquishing the search for a new doctrin e and first an d foremost ge ttin g to know and lea rn in g to question which historical
dim ensions an d inner presuppositions are contained in the question o f truth. Since the question o f truth is the pream ble for future thinking, it itself first determ in es the dom ain, the type, and
the disposition o f futu re k now ledge. T h e r e fo r e the first th in g we
have to d o is to p u t ourselves in a position that will never again
perm it us to insert ou r discussion o f the question o f truth into
the habitual realm s o f previous doctrines, theories, an d systems.
T h e result o f these basic discussions consists i f it m ust consist in so m e th in g in a transformation o f perspectives, norm s, and
claims, a transform ation which at the sam e time is n o th in g oth er
than a leap into a m ore original an d m ore sim ple course o f essential occurrences in the history o f W estern thinking, a history
we ourselves are. O n ly after ou r th in k in g has u n d e r g o n e this
transform ation o f attitude by m eans o f historical reflection, will
we surm ise, in an auspicious m o m en t, that already in o u r discussions an other essence o f truth, an d perhaps in deed on ly that,
was at issue. For if we had n ot alread y pen etrated to this point,
how else cou ld we know som eth in g o f the first b egin n in g, which
in the m ost extrem e case reveis itself on ly to a k n o w le d ge o f
w hat is least like it, i.e., the w holly other.
To be sure, we on ly hinted that the determ ination o f the
essence o f truth as the correctness o f an assertion, w hich has
been valid for ages, contains som eth in g u n g ro u n d e d at its Found a tio n : the openness o f beings. C ertain ly it was on ly a hint
to
otX.fi'eux, the unconcealedness o f beings, which, as was
shown, expresses less the essence o f truth than it does the essence o f beings. B u t why should Xri'deia not p re-an n oun ce that
openness w ithout, however, b e in g identical with it? For the o p e n ness we have in m in d can no lo n g e r be exp erien ced as a character o f the b ein gs Standing before us an d aroun d us, n ot to speak
o f the fact th at to us the u nique e xp erien ce o f the G reeks an d the
possible g r o u n d o f our fu tu re history rem ain den ied, precisely
th rou gh the history which lies betw een us and the G reeks.
B u t perh aps som ething else is h eld ou t to us as a necessity: to
brin g the openn ess itself, w hat com es to presence in it an d how
4i- T h e necessity held out for us [189-90]
163
that com es to presence, u p o n its gro u n d . O p en n ess is th en no

longer the basic character o f Jrixns as taken u p in simple acknowled gm en t, the <|>i3cris which makes it possible for tcxv] to grasp
beings as such. O p en n ess is also not only the condition o f the possibility o f the correctness o f an assertion. A s such a condition, it
appears m erely at first and prelim inarily in the field o f view o f
the critical retu rn from correctness. A fte r w hat we have exp erien ced about the necessity o f the question o f truth, this can not be
the original access to the essence o f truth. T h a t access m ust proceed ou t o f o u r need, o u r distress, ou t o f the aban do n m en t o f
beings by B ein g, while we take it seriously that B ein g is withd raw in g from beings, w hereby beings d eg en erate into m ere obje cts o f hum an contrivance and lived exp erien ce. W h at if this
withdrawal itself b elo n g ed to the essence o f B ein g? W hat if this
were the still u n reco gn ized truth, never to be exp erien ced or e xpressed, o f the w hole m etaphysics o f the West: namely, that B e in g is in its essence self-concealing? W h at i f the openness were
first and forem ost the Clearing*'in the m idst o f beings, in w hich
Clearing the self-con cealm en t o f B e in g w ould be manifest? H ow ever it may be with the answer to this, the question o f truth is
not one we can d ecid e by ourselves and in relation to ourselves
precisely as neutral spectators. It is rather the question that will
o n e day or an oth er betray itself as the question o f w ho we o u rselves are.
In ou r retrospective sketch o f the b e g in n in g o f W estern thinking, we said that m an will be d eterm in ed prim ordially as the custodian o f the uncon cealedn ess o f beings. In the progression
away from the b e gin n in g, m an becam e the animal rationale. In
the transition ou t o f the first end o f W estern thinking into its
o th er begin n in g, there has to be qu estion ed, in a still higher n ecessity, with the carryin g ou t o f the question o f truth, the qu estion o f w ho we are. T h is question will p o in t in the direction o f
the possibility o f w h eth er m an is not o n ly the preserver o f u n con cealed beings b u t is precisely the custod ian o f the openness
o f B ein g. O n ly i f we know that we d o n o t ye t know w ho we are d o
we gro u n d the o n e an d on ly gro u n d w hich m ay release the fu ture o f a simple, essential existence [Dasein\ o f historical m an
from itself.
T h is grou n d is the essence o f truth. T h is essence m ust be p re-
164
T h e Need and the Necessity o f the First Beginning [190]
pared in th o u g h t in the transition to an other begin n in g. For the

future, the situation o f the pow ers which gro u n d truth in the
first place, nam ely poetry (and con sequ en tly art in general) an d
thinking, will b e qu ite d ifferen t than it was in the first begin n in g.
Poetry will n ot b e first, b u t in the transition the foreru n n er will
have to be thin kin g. A rt, however, will be for the fu tu re the p uttin g into w ork o f truth (or it will b e nothin g), i.e., it will b e one
essential g r o u n d in g o f the essence o f truth. A cco rd in g to this
highest standard, an yth in g that w o u ld present itself as art m ust
be m easured as a way o f letting truth com e into b e in g in these
beings, which, as works, enchan tin gly transport m an into the intim acy o f B e in g while im posin g on him the lum inosity o f the u n concealed and disposin g him an d d e te rm in in g him to be the custodian o f the truth o f B eing.
A P P E N D IC E S
THE QUESTION OF TRUTH

I.
II.
III.
Foundational issues in the question o f truth.

Leaping ahead into the essentialization [die Wesung] o f truth.
Recollection of the first shining forth of the essence of truth, aArj-deux
(unconcealedness), as the basic character o f beings. (The history of
its flaming up and expiring from Anaximander to Aristode.)
IV.
The question o f truth as the unfolding o f the essentialization o f
Being, which comes to pass as the Clearing o f the in the midst o f
beings.
V.
The question o f truth as the grounding o f ex-istence [Da-sein],
VI. The essentialization o f truth as the truth o f Being in the abyss.
VII. The abyss as the space o f play o f time. (Space and time in the previous interpretation, one determined by metaphysics and its
guiding question).
VIII. The abyss and the strife. (Da-sein: earth and world).
IX.
Truth and its shelter in beings as the recasting o f beings into Being.
X.
The fll essentialization o f truth and the inclusin of correctness.
Preview o f the context for the discussion o f I :
In I., Da-sein can only be kept in silence, because in Da-sein, as occurring
through Being, the ground o f truth is grounded, such that this ground
becomes an abyss.
Here Da-sein cannot even be mentioned, because it would immediately be interpreted as an object and the determination o f the essence o f
truth would be denigrated into a mere new theory. Instead o f that, we
attempted to show the necessity o f the question o f truth out o f its necessary lack o f being questioned in the first beginning. But this leads to
the question o f the primordial need and its basic disposition. And all
this can be said only if Da-sein is already and steadily intended as the
ground of the C learin g for the self-concealing.
Everything will be misinterpreted if taken in terms o f lived experience. Thoughtful reflection on the essence o f truth as the C learin g
o f Being can only be preparatory, but this is a necessary preparation.
The overthrow can only be accomplished by an art compelled by
the most distant god, provided art is the putting into work o f the truth.
FROM THE FIRST DRAFT
I. Foundatonal issues in the question o f truth.
i. The compelling potver o f the need arisingfrom

the abandonment by Being; terror as the basic
disposition o f the other beginning.
It is transformed into mere curiosity within what is accessible to everyone.
Philosophy is still done, because it was once supposed to belong to the
assets o f culture, and caring for culture would presumably impede barbarism. The primordial questioning knowledge and the holding firm before
the concealed have been replaced by a domination over everything, since
everything has become obvious. That first luminosity of wonder, which had
knowledge only o f the darkness, has become the transparency o f all knowing and doing, accessible to everyone and satisfying everyone.
Beings are that is not worth a question, indeed it is not even worth
mentioning. And to say what beings are, precisely as beings, is empty
talk. For everyone knows what Being means, especially since it is the
most general and most empty determination o f everything. In this
wasteland o f utter indifference, what in the beginning produced the
highest wonder has been lost and the fact that here and there academic philosophy is still done diligently does not refute this loss but corroborates it.
There are only a very few who in the course o f this history o f the dissolution o f the beginning have remained awake and surmise what has
transpired. Insofar as they are still compelled to question, the compelling need must change in form and must be more undetermined, since
the uniqueness o f the first wonder has been lost and the subsequent tradition of questioning and thinking has forced itself in. What need compelled Kant to the Critique? What need compelled Hegel to the system
o f absolute knowledge? After even this questioning was abandoned and
everything was left to calculating experience, slowly and in certain
places something like the imminent irrelevance and meaninglessness of
all beings flared up. And when an attempt was ventured to think anew
(Nietzsche),1 starting from an admission o f this irrelevance, the former
i. Cf. W inter sem ester 1936-37 and Sum m er semester 1937. [I.e., Nietzsche:
Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst, GA, Bd. 43, and Nietzsches metaphysische Grundstellung
im abendlndischen Denken: Die Lehre von der ewigen Wiederkehr des Gleichen, GA, Bd.
4 4 -T r.]
From the first draft [19697]
169
greatness of thought, then it became clear that the beginning had

turned into the end and that the need and its compelling had to become
different, assuming that there is still supposed to be another beginning.
After Nietzsche, and in a certain way through him (for as truly as he
is the end, he is at the same time a transition), the other need comes into
play, and this again only, as in the case o f the first beginning, for a few
rare persons, to whom is meted out the power to question and the
power over declining in the transition.
The other need, that is, if we may say so, our need, has this peculiarity
that it is not experienced as a need. Everything has become calculable,
and consequently everything is understandable. There are no longer
any limits to our domination over beings, if only our will is great enough
and constant enough. Everything becomes obvious, without any impenetrable depths, and this transparency derives from a luminosity in
which the eye of knowledge is dazzled to the verge of blindness.
Questioning, at one time the primordial eruption into the open on
the part of what is concealed, and the pride in holding fast to what is
worthy o f questioning now succumb to the suspicion o f weakness and
insecurity. Questioning is a sign of a lack o f the power to act. Whoever
acknowledges and experiences this situation, one that has been becoming more acute for decades in tfye most varied forms, will find that beings are now taken for all that is, as if there were no such thing as Being
and the truth o f Being. Beings strut as beings and yet are abandoned by
Being. The nearly unacknowledged need arising from the abandonment by Being becomes compelling in the basic disposition o f terror.
One can no longer be struck by the miracle o f beings: that they are. For,
quite to the contrary, this has become obvious long ago. And it is a gaping abyss that beings, apparently closer to reality than ever before, can
be taken for all that is, while Being and the truth o f Being are forgotten.
In wonder, the basic disposition o f the first beginning, beings first
come to stand in their form. Terror, the basic disposition of the other
beginning, reveis behind all progress and all domination over beings a
dark emptiness o f irrelevance and a shrinking back in face o f the first
and last decisions.
ss. The question o f the essence o f truth as the necessity o f the

highest need arising front the abandonment o f Being.
It would be a very extrinsic conception o f these various basic dispositions if we would see in wonder only inflamed desire and jubilation and
seek terror in the nebulous realm of aversin, grief, and despair. Just as
wonder bears in itself its own son o f terror, so does terror involve its
own mode o f self-composure, calm steadfastness, and new wonder. T h e
quite different question, into which the basic disposition o f terror compels, concerns the abandonment by Being and the fact that beings can be
Appendices [197-99]
while the truth o f Being remains forgotten. It asks whether this abysmal
state o f affairs does not belong to beings themselves, and whether now,
after this experience with beings has been endured, the moment does
not arrive to raise the question o f beings again and indeed in a quite
different manner. This other question determines the epoch o f an other
beginning. This other question can no longer, just as in the case o f the
first dawn o f the day o f beings, turn to beings in order then, in face of
them, to ask what it means that beings are. T h e other question proceeds
from terror before the groundlessness o f beings: that no ground has
been laid for them, indeed that grounding itself is held to be superfluous. This terror becomes aware that truths are still claimed and yet no
one any longer knows or questions what truth itself is and how truth
might belong to beings as such, something that can be asked and decided only if beings as beings have not fallen into oblivion with regard to
their Being. Where, on the contrary, beings as beings have become obvious (and consequently the question o f Being is merely a pursuit o f
ontology as a fixed discipline), then no one thinks to ask how beings as
beings come into the open and what this opening might be, and how it
takes place, such that the usual representations can conform to appearing beings. T h e absence o f the question o f the essence o f truth becomes
the strongest support for the obviousness o f beings. The abandonment
by Being is consoled by the absence o f the question o f truth, without,
however, experiencing what bestows on it this consolation o f the obvious.
If the abandonment by Being produces the highest need, which
emerges as compelling in terror, then the question o f the essence of
what is true, the question o f truth, proves to be the necessity o f this
need, what has to be surmounted first, precisely before the proper experience o f the abandonment by Being. The truth itself its
essentialization is the first and highest truth, in which alone all further
truths, i.e., the founded relation to beings themselves, can find their
ground.
Thus when we raise the question o f truth, our motive is not a petty
and fortuitous desire to critique and reform the traditional concept of
truth. On the contrary, we are compelled by the most hidden and consequently the deepest need o f the age, and by that alone.
3. The question o f truth and the question o f Being.

a) The unfolding o f the question o f truth as a reflection on
the first beginning. The re-opening o f the first beginning for
the sake of another beginning.
Similarly, if the unfolding o f the question o f truth leads us to the history
171
o f truth, that does not happen from some sort o f historiographical interest, one desirous o f information about how things were in the past
and how the present is rooted therein. O n the contrary, the need arising
from the abandonment by Being is the distress that the first beginning
can no longer be mastered. This beginning is not something bygone but
is, in the form o f the end o f the history which has declined from it, more
contemporary and more pressing than ever, though also more concealed. If the question o f truth is needed out o f the deepest distress over
the abandonment by Being in our age, then conversely the asking o f
this question has to articlate that need and in order to overcome it
must first make sure that this need no longer remains extrinsic as the
need arising from the lack of need, which is the form adopted by the
most uncanny namely the semblance o f obviousness. The opening of
the need, in which the beginning still dwells in the form of its excess,
turns thereby into a reflection on the first beginning itself. This reflection
must show that the first beginning, in its uniqueness, can never be repeated in the sense o f a mere imitation, and that, on the other hand, it
remains the only thing repeatable in the sense o f a reopening o f that by
which the discussion has to commence if a beginning, and consequently
the other beginning, is to come to be historically. The other beginning is
not something withdrawn froiry the first beginning and from its
history as if the first beginning could cast the bygone behind itself
but precisely as the other beginning it is essentially related to the first,
and only, beginning. This occurs, however, in such a way that in the
other beginning the first is experienced more originally and is restored
to its greatness. Afterward, through the domination of what succeeded
it, still feeds upon it, and at the same time is declined from it, the first
beginning was falsified into the primitive, something that could not
attain the height o f the development and progress o f what carne later.
The need o f the first beginning has its own form, and as a consequence wonder is there the compelling basic disposition, and the primordial and lasting question is there the question o f beings: what are
beings? O n the other hand, the need o f the other beginning has the
form o f an abandonment by Being, to which corresponds the basic disposition o f terror. Therefore even the primordial question is different
in the other beginning: the question o f truth, the question o f the essentialization o f truth.
b) The question of truth as a preliminary question on behalf

of the basic question o f Being.
Truth, however, is the truth o f Being, and therefore the question of
truth is basically a preliminary question on behalf of the basic question
o f B eing the genuine question of Being in distinction to the previous
question of beings as the guiding question in the history of the first beginning. (Cf. the first unfolding of this question in Being and Time. The
172
Appendices [200202]
question o f the meaning o f Being. Meaning = regin o f projection,

the open ground o f Being itself and o f its essentialization. When, by
comparison, Nietzsche happens to say that we must first know what Being is, what he means is precisely beings, and he is moving within the
confusion o f beings and Being, a confusion still rampant today. T h e reason for this aberration, however, resides not only in the fact that the basic question has been passed over, but the old guiding question that has
been raised for centuries has not been unfolded as a question and thus
is unknown in its own conditions.)
These foundational reflections on the question o f truth and its necessity will have to make plain what is at stke in them. It should at least
now be clear that here the question o f truth is no longer a problem of
logic. All areas o f sclerotic, and therefore only semblant, questioning
have no need or necessity. All extrinsic attempts to found a new Science
now appear very traditional and flat even prescinding from the fact
that the question o f truth can not at all be founded sufficiently by Science, since every Science, especially modern Science, is a remte perversin o f a definite kind o f knowledge which has already decided on the
essence and the type o f truth normative for it (certitude).
II. Leaping ahead into the essentialization o f truth.
4. The question o f the essentialization o f truth as a
question that founds history originaUy.

The question o f truth, as was clarified above, originates from the innermost need o f our history and is the most genuine necessity o f the work
o f founding history. History does not mean for us here the simple gathering o f everyday public events, and a fortiori it is not such events as
bygone. All o f that certainly belongs to history and yet by no means
touches its essence. For history is the occurrence in which, through man,
beings become more being. This occurrence involves most intrinsically the coming forth o f beings as such into an openness which for its
part requires a grounding and shelter in beings. This occurrence o f the
opening up o f beings is, however, the essentialization o f truth itself. Examined in its origin and thought with regard to its future, truth has the
longest history because with it, following the character o f its essentialization, history begins and ends. The question o f the essentialization o f
truth is therefore the originally historical question, the question that
grounds history, and is therefore historically different according to the
respective historical moment.
We understand or, to put it more prudently, we surmise that our historical moment is that o f the preparation for the other beginning. Yet
this latter may also since every beginning is decisive to the highest
From the first draft [202-203]
*73
degree be the final end. If this possibility did not exist, the beginning
and its preparation would lose all trenchancy and uniqueness. T h e
question o f the essence o f truth, as the primordial question of the other
beginning, is different from that determination o f the essence o f truth
which throughout the history o f the first beginning could not be made
primordially but only ex post facto.
In every case, however, the determination o f the essence is apparently
arbitrary, and so little can it be derived from what is given, that it is, on
the contrary, the determinateness of the essence which first allows us to
grasp a given something as this and not that. And if what is at stake is
not only to represent ( 8a) the essence as whatness but to experience
the essentialization, the more original unity o f the what and the how, then
this does not mean that the how would now be represented in addition
to the what. We speak here about the experience o f the essentialization
and mean the conscious, willful, and affective entrance into the essence,
in order to stand in it and to withstand it.
5. Indication o f the essentialization o f truth through critical

reflection and historical recottection.
a) Preparation for the leap by securing the approach

run and by predelineating the direction of the leap.
Correctness as the start o f the approach run,
openness as the direction o f the leap.
Now if even the representation o f the essence ( L8a) cannot but appear
arbitrary and groundless, yet on the other hand is constantly carried out
without any strangeness, then this two-foldness will apply all the more to
our entrance into the essentialization. Access to the essence always has
about it something o f the immediate and partakes of the Creative, the
freely arisen. We therefore speak of a leap, a leap ahead into the essentialization o f truth. Admittedly, this terminology does not at first contribute a great deal toward the clarification or justification o f our procedure. But it does suggest that this procedure must in every case be
carried out by the individual expressly for himself. Whoever does not
take this leap will never experience what it opens up. Speaking o f a
leap is also meant to intmate, however, that a preparation is still possible and necessary here: the securing o f the approach run for the leap
and the predelineation o f its direction.
The question o f truth, which we can and must raise, no longer dwells
in its primordial State. Instead, there is behind it a rich tradition, one
that has come down to the obvious representation o f truth as correctness. We already know, or at all events believe we know, what truth is.
Thereby we possess a starting point for the approach run to the leap
174
A p p e n d ice s [20 3-20 5]
into the more original essence o f truth. In what sense this is the case was
already clarified in the first discussions. T h e reflection on what correctness genuinely is, and would be, leads us to that which makes it possible
in the first place and is the ground o f this possibility. For a representation to be able to conform to beings as normative, the beings must, prior
to this conformity and on behalf o f it, show themselves to it and thus
already stand in the open. The path or relation to beings must also be
open, and on it the conforming and correct representation will move
and will remain. Finally and above all, what must stand in the open is
that which the representation carries out in order to present to itself the
represented and to let the appearing beings show themselves. Correctness is what characterizes the conformity to
, and the latter must be
able to move in an openness, indeed in that openness wherein there
must be opened up that to which the representing conforms as well as
the representing itself in its representation of the object. This open regin and its openness constitute the ground of the possibility o f the correctness o f a representation. Consequently, if we take the usual determination o f truth as correctness as the starting point of the approach
run for the leap into our question o f truth, then we may at the same
time find therein an indication o f the direction o f the leap. T h e task is to
leap into this open regin itself and into its openness. The essentialization of this openness must be the essence o f the truth, no matter how
undeterminate and undeveloped it might now appear to us.
b) The experience of openness as unconcealedness (tXrifteia)

in the first beginning. The unquestioned character of
unconcealedness and the task of a more original experience
o f its essence on the basis of our need.
The start of our more original question is the determination o f truth as
correctness. We know, however, that this determination is an old one; it
was reached in Greek philosophy by Plato and above all by Aristode.
Now if correctness bears in itself openness as its ground and, as it were,
oscillates in it, and consequently cannot be grasped without reference to
it, then along with the positing o f the determination o f truth as correctness must not this openness also have been experienced? That is indeed
the case. T h e simplest evidence is provided by the word the Greeks used
in the beginning to ame what we call truth : Xri'eia, unconcealedness. T h e unconcealed stands and resides in the open. Henee the thinkers of the first beginning have also already experienced the original essence o f truth and have thought it in advance, and so we have no reason
to question more originally; indeed that would not even be possible.
To be sure, a distinction has to be made here. It is beyond discussion
that the Greek thinkers experienced the unconcealedness o f beings. But
it is also undeniable that they did not make unconcealedness itself
175
a question, or was it unfolded in its essence and brought upon its

ground. Instead, this experience of Xri'ei.oi got lost. T he proof for
this unique occurrence within the great Greek philosophy is the
fact that when it was imperative to raise the essence o f truth to knowledge, X'q'&eia became jimoxTis (correctness). Nevertheless a last echo
o f the original essence o f truth was always retained, without at all being
able to prevail in the subsequent history o f philosophy (cf. Aristotle,
Met. 0 10).
All the more pressing, then, is our task o f experiencing this original
essence o f truth explicitly and grounding it. T h e historical necessity o f
the question o f truth thus becomes surreptitiously richer in compelling
power, and the more original essence o f truth as openness loses more
and more its apparent arbitrariness. For reflection on the ground o f the
possibility o f correctness, as well as the recollection o f the origin o f the
determination o f truth as j j l o l o c t i i ; , both led us to this dark and freefloating openness itself, unconcealedness.
At the same time it is clear that the mere change of ame, speaking of
unconcealedness instead o f truth, gains us nothing, even if we were
to attempt what is intrinsically impossible, namely to rejuvenate the primordial Greek experiences from which this word arse, a word that,
at the same time, first allowed (hese experiences to be experienced.
Indeed it is certain that the essence o f truth shone to the Greeks
as Xrifteia; and it is equally certain that the Greek thinkers not only
were incapable o f mastering this essence o f truth in their thinking but
did not even put it into question. For Greek Dasein, Xfi'deioi remained
the most powerful and at the same time the most hidden.
That the Greek thinkers did not raise the question o f the essence and
the ground o f o t \ r | 0 e i G itself is not due to an incapacity of their thinking but, on the contrary, derives from the overpowering forc o f the primordial task: to speak for the first time o f beings themselves as such.
If we now have to raise the question o f truth in a more original way,
that does not mean we may boast o f a superiority. On the contrary. But
just as little does it mean that the task is simply to supply a fitting definition o f the Mj'&eia which for the Greeks remained unquestioned
and without further determination. Instead, notwithstanding all original adherence to the tradition, the task is to experience the essence o f
truth more originally on the basis of our need and to raise it to knowledge.
6. The abandonment by Being as the need arising from the ladt
o f need. The experience o f the abandonment o f beings by Being

as need in the coming to light o f the belongingness o f Being to
beings and the distinction o f Being from beings.
Our need is so deeply rooted that it is not feit by everyone. This lack o f
176
Appendices [206208]
need is the most striking character o f the unique need long ago prepared in history. Because this need is not feit by everyone, every reference to it is at first unintelligible or at least readily prone to misinterpretation. We have already spoken o f the need arising from the
abandonment by Being. We clarified this designation by saying that
historical man deais with, uses, and changes beings, and thereby experiences himself as a being and the Being o f beings does not concern
him, as if it were the most indifferent. As progress and success show, one
can certainly dispense with Being. Being will then once in a while, as the
last remnant o f a shadow, haunt mere representations, ones turned
away from doing and acting and therefore already unreal. If this Being,
compared to hefty and immediately pressing beings, is so negative and
keeps its distance from experience and calculation and therefore is dispensable, then this cannot at all be called abandonment by Being. For
abandonment exists only where what belongs indispensably has been
withdrawn.
As soon as we speak o f the abandonment by Being, we tacitly admit
that Being belongs to beings and has to belong to beings in order for
beings to be beings and for man to be a being in the midst o f beings.
The abandonment o f beings by Being is therefore experienced as giving
rise to need as soon as the belonging of Being to beings shines forth and
the mere fussing with beings becomes questionable. But then, it would
appear, the need is also already overcome, or at least the first step to
overcome it has been taken. No. Th e need has then merely developed to
a degree o f acuteness that renders a decisin, indeed the decisin, inevitable: either, despite the shining forth o f the belonging of Being to beings, the question o f Being is dismissed and instead the fussing with beings is enhanced to gigantic proportions, or that terror we spoke o f gains
power and space and from then on no longer allows the belonging of
Being to beings to be forgotten and takes as questionable all mere fussing over beings. T h e lack o f need is precisely indifference over this decisin.
Whether we are really questioning on the basis o f need, and henee
necessarily, in raising the question o f truth and whether and how we
thereby must already have traversed this decisin and how a decisiveness lies behind our questioning, all that cannot be demonstrated in
ad vanee indeed it cannot be demonstrated at all in the usual sense but
can only be experienced in the course o f reflection. If the question o f
truth, as we are putting it in train, is supposed to be nothing else than
primordial reflection on Being itself, then there would at least be the
possibility that we are questioning compelled by this need and that consequently the leaping ahead can become an mpetus to true reflection.
For where all roads are trodden and nothing more is left that could pass
as inaccessible, it is already a step toward reflection to learn that something worthy o f questioning has remained unquestioned.
This renewed reference to the enigmatic need arising from the lack
of need should make clear to us that even if we could question on the
177
basis of this need and enjoy the privilege o f being allowed to question in
such a way, yet at first and for the most part it would still appear that
here, as elsewhere, we were merely dissecting words and concepts and
were fabricating empty theories, perhaps ones even more intricate and
bizarre. But this too belongs to the enduring o f the need arising from
the lack o f need, namely that this appearance be taken over as inevitable.
7. Directive sketch o f the essence o f truth on the basis o f the need
arising from the abandonment by Being.

But how are we now supposed to set in motion the leap ahead into the
essentialization o f truth? Leap ahead is ambiguous: on the one hand,
it means that a sketch o f the approach run o f the genuine leap and o f its
direction would be given in advance, and on the other hand it means
that in all this an exemplary prior exercise o f the leap has already been
performed. At the beginning o f this leaping ahead we know two things:
(1) critical reflection and historical recollection direct us to the essentialization o f truth as the openness of beings; (2) we attain the essentialization o f the truth only by a leap, fn virtue o f which we come to stand in
the essentialization, which is not the same as thinking a concept o f the
essence o f truth under the guidance o f a definition.
We will initially carry out the leap ahead as a directive sketch o f the
essence o f truth on the basis of the need arising from the abandonment by Being. Even if we do not actually experience this and remain
insensitive to it, we can still gain in a roundabout fashion an initial
knowledge o f what comes to pass in it.
a) Openness as the Clearing for the vacillating selfconcealment. Vacillating self-concealment as a first
designation of Being itself.
We are always comporting ourselves to beings actual, possible, and
necessary. We ourselves, as beings, belong in this circuit o f beings. Beings as a whole are known and familiar to us in a definite way; even
where we do not turn to beings explicitly, they lie before us and surround us as accessible. We shall now deliberately attend to this obvious
state o f affairs that goes unnoticed in our everyday dealings. In so doing, we shall put aside all the theories and doctrines which might suggest themselves and which presumably have this State of affairs in view
in some manner or other: e.g., that we are conscious of objects, that a
subject, and several subjects together, relate to objects, etc. We shall now
attend only to what precedes all that, and our directive shall be that
beings and we ourselves in their midst lie in a certain sense open. In
beings, such an openness holds sway. Our first and only effort shall be to
178
Appendices [20911]
draw dose to this openness, without falling prey to the temptation to explain it prematurely, after scarcely perceiving it in the roughest manner.
In this openness, beings are familiar to us and known in different
ways according to their different regions. B eings stand in a luminosity
o f knowledge and o f sovereignty and afford ways and paths o f penetration for the most diverse ways o f being elaborated, formed, and considered. In every case, beings thereby prove to be independent and
grounded in themselves. Beings dwell in a luminosity and provide, in
very different degrees, free access to their autonomy. We may determ ine
this closer and recapitlate by saying that beings stand in a luminosity,
in a light, and allow free access and en tran ce they are lighted. We
speak o f a Clearing in the woods, a free lum inous place. T h e openness o f
beings is such a Clearing.
But at the same time beings are placed differendy, and indeed not only
by a being that is not accessible to us, and perhaps never will be, but by
something concealed which conceals itself precisely when we immerse ourselves in the Clearing, submit to the open beings, and are lost to them. T h a t
is exacdy when we heed the least and are most rarely touched by the fact
that these beings dwelling in the open are or, as we say, have a Being.
This latter, by which beings are distinguished from non-being, and owing
to which they are and are such and such, does not stand in the Clearing but
in hiddenness. Consequently, the attempt to grasp this Being as if it were a
being yields emptiness. Being is not merely hidden; it withdraws and conceals itself. From this we derive an essential insight: the Clearing, in which
beings are, is not simply bounded and delimited by something hidden but
by something self-concealing.
Now, however, i f B e in g is decisive for beings, and knowingly or not
presses all activity and developm ent o f beings, beings we ourselves are
not and ones we ourselves are, toward the B ein g o f beings, toward what
and how they are, then the Clearing not only proves to be delim ited by
the self-concealing but is fo r the self-concealing. We can and even must
understand this determ ination o f the self-concealing seen in terms o f
the Clearing o f b ein gs as a first essential designation o f B eing itself.
Since beings, and what is known as beings, stand in the Clearing, B eing reveis itself in a particular way. Its self-concealment is therefore
one primordially proper to it. It shows itself and withdraws at the same
time. T h is vacillating self-refusal is what is properly lighted u p in the
Clearing, and yet for the most part it goes unheeded corresponding to
our com portm ent in the midst o f beings. E.g., i f we stand in a Clearing
in the woods, we see only what can be fou nd within it: the free place, the
trees about and precisely not the luminosity o f the Clearing itself. As
little as the openness is simply the unconcealedness o f beings, but is the
Clearing fo r the self-concealing, so little is this self-concealment a mere
being-absent. It is rather a vacillating, hesitant refusal.
In our recollection and critical deliberation we found that the ground
o f the possibility o f correctness as the usual concept o f truth lies in an
openness o f beings, and that this openness was already experienced in
the beginning and was named Vr|'&eia. T h is openness o f beings has
From the first draft [2 11-12 ]
179
now shown itself to be the Clearing for the vacillating self-concealment,

which constantly points into the Clearing. Accordingly ,1truth is not simply the unconcealedness o f beings aXT-fteia but, more originally understood, is the Clearing for the vacillating self-concealment. T h e ame
vacillating self-concealment is a ame for B eing itself, and, by the
most preliminary allusion, it implies that the essence o f truth is in the
most intmate way related to B eing itself, so intimately that perhaps B e in g itself is in need o f truth for its own most proper essentialization, and
truth is not a mere Supplement to it.
b) The Clearing for self-concealment as the supporting

ground o f humanity. Mans grounding o f this supporting
ground as Da-sein.
A n essential step is still outstanding, a step that belongs intrinsically to
the fulfillm ent o f this preliminary directive sketch o f the essence o f
truth. We first characterized truth as the openness o f beings (unconcealedness). It m ight appear that the further determ ination o f truth in
terms o f the concealedness inherent in it was merely an ancillary representation on our part. B ut the Clearing is the Clearin g fo r the s e lf-co n cealing, and, above all, the Clearing o f beings is not something we ourselves merely think or represent. O n the contrary, it is som ething in
which we ourselves stand and apparently nothing o f our own doing. We
stand in this Clearing in such a way that it first opens for us a relation to
beings and to ourselves as well. It is the supporting ground o f our humanity, insofar as this is essentially determ ined through the distinctive
ability to relate to beings as such and henee to be determ ined by beings
as such. B ut the Clearing o f beings is this supporting ground only insofar as it is the Clearing for the vacillating self-concealment, for the en tram e o f B eing itself into what is lighted up. O n the other hand, it also
holds that if man would not be, then n e ith e r could this Clearing com e to
pass. T h e Clearing for the self-concealing truth is the supporting
ground o f humanity, and humanity comes to pass only by groun din g
and being exposed to the supporting ground as such. While man stands
as a being in the openness o f beings, he must also at the same time stand
in a relation to what is self-concealing. T h e ground o f hum anity must
therefore be groun d ed through humanity as ground.
Thus, if we would understand the essence o f truth in its essentialization,
we will have to see that a representation o f the correctness o f knowledge is
not sufficient indeed, even further, that a representation will never attain
the essentialization o f truth. For truth as the Clearing for the self-concealing is the ground o f hum anity something other than we ourselves are, and
to which we nevertheless belong and must belong, if we propose to know
truth originally. T h u s the essentialization o f truth will be attained only if
the usual everyday way o f being human is successfully dislocated, as it were,
1. [Reading demnach for dennoch, following the second edition.Tr.]
i8o
Appendices [212 -14 ]
and is then allowed to settle on its proper ground. Henee the need o f the
leap, which we can now prepare only as regards its direction.
Truth, however, is grounded as the ground through that which we call
Da-sein, that which sustains man and is entrusted to him only rarely, as both
donation and destiny, and only to those among men who are Creative and
are grounding. The Da [the there] refers to that Clearing in which beings stand as a whole, in such a way that in this Da" the Being [Sein] o f
open beings shows itself and at the same time withdraws. To be this D a is
a destiny of man, in correspondence to which he grounds that which is itself the ground o f the highest possibilities o f his Being.
Ever since man has componed himself to beings as such and formed
himself as a being on the basis of this relation, ever since man has been
historical, the Clearing for the self-concealing must have come to pass.
Which does not imply that since then this ground o f historical humanity
was experienced as ground and was grounded. It was not by accident
that this ground was surmised within the Greeks experience o f what
they called diXêia. But very soon, and again not accidentally, it was
misinterpreted and forced into oblivion. T h e representation o f man was
itself not determined originally, on the basis o f his most original essence, because that has remained concealed up to this very hour:
namely, that man is the being which, in the midst o f beings, bears the truth o f
Being. Instead, the concept o f man was constructed with reference to
animals and living things in general, i.e., with reference to something
other than man himself. Man was distinguished from the animal only
insofar as he was declared to be the rational animal, a determination
which is still, in different variations, powerful and respectable today.
And this non-original determination o f man is now also supposed to
represent the ground for the interpretation o f everything proper to
man as man his knowledge and his creations, his self-surpassing and
his self-destruction. T h e ground o f humanity and thereby the essence
o f truth thus remain hidden in their full essentialization.
It is as if the most extreme need into which man was pressed historically
the need arising from the lack of need, the pursuit o f truths without a
relation to truth itself it is as if this need had to compel him now to reflect
on the ground o f his essence. And should we then be surprised if this
ground supposing we could look into it would open itself up for us precisely as an abyss, since we still live all too much on the basis o f the habits of
a previous age and take the usual and the obvious for the essence?
c) The question of truth, and the dislocation of humanity

out o f its previous homelessness into the ground o f its
essence, in order for man to become the founder and the
preserver of the truth o f Being.
As inexorably as genuine questioning throws us back entirely upon our-
From the first draft [214 -15]
181
selves and will tolerate no dissent, and as certain as history is grounded

only in the overcoming o f the historiographical, that is how little we can
detach ourselves from all previous history and place ourselves, as it
were, in a void.
We must insist over and over that what is at stke in the question of
truth as raised here is not simply an alteration o f the previous concept
o f truth, or a supplementation o f the usual representation, but a transformation of humanity itself. This transformation is not the result o f
new psychological or biological insights. For man is not here the object
o f any sort o f anthropology. On the contrary, man is here in question in
the most profound and the most extensive respect, the one properly
foundational; i.e., we are questioning man in his relation to Being, or,
after the turning, we are questioning Being and its truth in relation to
man. The determination o f the essence o f truth is accompanied by a
necessary transformation of man. Both are the same. This transformation signifes the dislocation o f humanity out o f its previous home or,
better, from its homelessness into the ground o f its essence, in order
for man to become the founder and the preserver of the truth o f Being,
to be the there, as the ground employed by the essence o f Being itself.
The dislocation o f humanity to be this ground turns man away
from himself the furthest and ii^to a relation to Being itself. But only
out o f this furthest distance can man truly find himself back, i.e., be who
he is.
We have been speaking of man, expressing ourselves as concisely as
possible. But the man that concerns us is historical man, which means
the one who creates history, is sustained by history, and is beset by history. This historical man is not a separate individual, dragging his past
behind himself. or does it mean several individuis, belonging together in the form o f a society. Individuation and society are themselves
only possible and necessary modes of historical humanity and do not at
all exhaust it. Historical man: that shall mean for us the unexhausted
unique fullness o f essential human possibilities and necessities,
specifically which is decisive here ones arising from mans relation to
the truth o f Being itself. Questioning on the basis o f such a pre-view, we
would represent precisely the possibility o f the beginning of an entirely
different history, in which the destiny o f the single individual as well as
o f society would be determined differently, so differently that the previous representations could no longer suffice.
Thus the dislocation o f man back into his ground has to be carried
out in the first place by those few, solitary, and uncanny ones, who in
various ways as poets, thinkers, as builders and artists, as doers and actors, ground and shelter the truth of Being in beings through the transformation o f beings. Through the rigor o f the decisions which lie ahead,
they become, each in his way and unknown to the many, a silent sacrifice.
If we appraise the reflection on this dislocation [Verrckung] o f man
from the standpoint o f sound common sense and its predominance, we
l82
Appendices [2 15 -17 ]
will reject it as deranged [verrckt}, to play cleverly with a word, and

will not even take the pains to reject such reflection but will simply ridicule it.
But this will not mislead ones who know, to the extent that there are
any. For a case which has not yet been mastered is still in the air, the
latest in the history o f German thought, the case o f Nietzsche. Fortunately, we have the incontrovertible fact that this thinker lapsed into
madness. By means o f this circumstance it is possible to ward o ff his
most decisive meditation the thought o f the eternal recurrence o f the
same in its totally strnge character and in the inexorableness o f its
perspectives and questioning, by interpreting it as a precursor o f madness and an offspring o f despair. But what about that other one, still
greater, whose poetry was further in advance, namely Hlderlin?
Have we at all considered sufficiently that something miraculous
comes to pass whenever the history o f the West, in its most profound
meditations, surmises its unrolling to its end? T h e miracle is that the
ones who suffered such meditation, and created it, and henee bore the
knowledge o f what was entirely other, were prematurely torn away from
the sanity o f their Dasein and this in wholly different ways in their
own respective domains: Schiller, Hlderlin, Kierkegaard, van Gogh,
Nietzsche. Did they all merely break down, as an extrinsic calculadon
would perhaps ascertain, or was a new song sung to them, one that
never tolerates an and so forth but demands the sacrifice o f the
shortest path (Hlderlin)?
These ames are like enigmatic signs, inscribed in the most hidden
ground o f our history. We hardly give a thought to the sheer power of
this series of signs, which is not to say that we would be strong enough to
understand it. These signs are harbingers o f a change o f history, lying
deeper and reaching further than all revolutions within the compass
o f the activities o f men, o f peoples, and o f their contrivances. Here
something comes to pass, for which we have no measure and no
space at least not yet and we therefore force it into disfiguration and
disguise, if we speak about it by means o f language as constituted hitherto.
So if we are pointing to it in our sketch o f the question o f truth, then
that is only meant to indcate how far we are turned away from the real
path o f our history and how much there is need for even the most minor
power to prepare ourselves and future ones to enter into this path once
and for all. Such preparation requires, prior to all truths, that truth itself become a question and a necessity. Necessity arises only from original need. And this is exactly what we withdraw from the most when we
steal away on the exits to the past.
d) The question o f the essentialization of truth as the

question o f the essentialization o f Being.
T he question o f truth is fundamentally the question o f the openness for

the self-concealing. And what, in an exceptional and unique sense, ronceis itself in the domain of open beings is Being. We experience this in
the most prosaic and yet most enigmatic event, namely that beings most
immediately press upon us and impose themselves and that only beings
seem to be. But perhaps our seeming to manage, in the domain o f beings, with beings alone is the most uncanny semblance that plays with
us, a semblance that certainly prevails constandy and erupts, but which
can nevertheless be overcome. When we set forth on the path o f the
question o f truth, we take pains to overcome this semblance to the effect
that if beings are, then only beings are open. For openness is on behalf
o f self-concealment. And what conceals itself is Being. Insofar as selfconcealment requires openness, this latter belongs as well to the essentialization o f Being. T h e question of truth is the question o f the essentialization o f Being. Being, however, is that which needs man as the
founder and preserver o f its truth: man as this or that one, but not simply any man but only the one who bestows to truth its ground and
home, and who bears the openness for the self-concealing, who is the
there [Da]. That is how truth as the essentialization o f Being comes to
pass, founded in the Da-sein o f man, between Being [Seiw] and beingthe-there [Da-sein].
Truth belongs to the essentialization o f Being without exhausting its
essence. Truth belongs to the appropriating event, and truth belongs to
Being. That is why the Greeks experienced for the first time, in the
thinking o f beings as such, unconcealedness as the beingness o f beings.
But because they did not ask about Being itself, truth degenerated into
correctness, became something for itself, and lost the essential relation
to Being.
I f we now recollect the traditional and ordinary conception o f truth
as correctness and consider that it was finally determined as a relation
between subject and object, then we can recognize in the subject-object
relation a very remte layer o f that relation between Being and beingthe-there, a layer entirely ignorant o f its origin. T h e question about
truth begins with this view in order to unfold for the first time its fll
bearing and to lose completely the character o f an isolated question. Indeed still more: not only is it inserted into this most extreme and broadest realm o f thoughtful knowledge in general, but the question o f truth
becomes at the same time, in terms of the approach we characterized,
the first leap into the heart o f the basic question o f philosophy.
T herefore it should not be surprising that everything we say beyond
the ordinary concept o f truth will at first, and for a lon g time, seem very
Strange. Therefore we must all the more assure for ourselves what is already accessible in the tradition as an echo o f the original essence o f
truth and which is expressed in the word aA/ri-deu* (unconcealedness).
In this way our question o f truth will becom e historical in a double respect: on the one hand, insofar as there is prepared in it a transformation o f hum anity hitherto and its relation to beings (and consequently
the hitherto necessarily enters into the discussion) and on the other
hand, insofar as even the more original determ ination o f the essence o f
184
Appendices [219-20]
truth already and by necessity appears in the knowledge o f truth in the

first beginning, without being explicitly mastered. Thus what our question needs for its justification and elucidation, and at the same time for
the removal o f the suspicion o f arbitrariness, is an explicit carrying out
o f historical recollection. And only its actual execution will allow us to
see the extent to which this is distinct from historiographical acquaintance with past opinions on truth.
III. Recollection o f the first shining forth o f the essence

o f truth as ctXfj'deia (unconcealedness).
8 . Recollection o f the first knowledge o f truth at the beginning o f

Western philosophy as an indication o f the proper question o f the
more original essence o f truth as openness.
T he recollection o f the first knowledge o f truth at the beginning of
Western philosophy should serve to indcate what is announced in the
essence o f truth as openness regarding essential relations, even if there
they are undetermined and ungrounded. T h e carrying out o f this recollection is more difficult than might appear at first sight. What the
Greeks thought about truth has been known for a long time and has
been presented in a more or less fll account ever since there has been
historiographical research into the history o f philosophy. O f course,
these historiographical reports have been guided by the traditional concept o f truth as correctness. Thus we discover what the Greeks said
about truth in that sense, and we can observe how far they progressed in
the unfolding o f this concept o f truth and to what extent they feil short.
We find only what we seek, and in historiography we are seeking only
what we may know in relation to the guiding concept o f truth as correctness. We are thereby precisely not seeking unconcealedness.
To be at all able to carry out the recollection o f the first shining forth
o f the essence o f truth as otXTj'deiot, we ourselves must have already
asked about the more original essence o f truth as the openness o f beings. We are thus moving in the well-known circle o f all understanding
and interpretation. Conversely, one could now say that if we have already inquired into the original essence o f truth and consequently have
at our command a knowledge o f it, then it is superfluous to drag the
past back in. O ur foregoing considerations have already eliminated this
objection and its very foundations. From now on it is to be noted that we
can focus on the first shining forth o f diXri'eux only if we ourselves at
the same time, and above all, investgate the original essence. We will
better see the essential the more decisive our questioning is and in that
way encounters past history.
The carrying out o f the recollection o f the first shining forth
185
of Vrj-deLa comes down to a discussion o f the essential steps o f the basic movement o f the great Greek philosophy, whose beginning and end
are attached to the ames Anaximander and Aristode. What later arises
as so-called Greek philosophy has another character, no longer the
original; what we then have are either scholastic trends in the wake o f
Plato and Aristotle, or practical-moral philosophies like those o f the
Stoa and Epicurus, or even attempts at a renaissance o f the ancient
Greek philosophy under the influence o f Christian faith or the religious
systems o f later antiquity, renaissances which go by the ame o f Neoplatonism. Subsequently, all these philosophies became historically more
influential than the genuine and originally great Greek philosophy. T h e
ground o f this fact resides in the linkage with Christianity. T h e great
Greek philosophy fell more and more into oblivion, and when it was indeed sought out it was completely covered over. That Aristotle became
the principal master o f philosophy in the middle ages does not contradict this, for on the one hand what was called philosophy in medieval
times was not philosophy but only a preamble o f reason on behalf o f
theology, as required by faith. And, on the other hand, Aristotle was
precisely therefore not understood in the Greek way, i.e., on the basis of
the primordial thought and poetry o f Greek Dasein, but in a medieval
fashion, i.e., in an Arabic-Jewish-Christian way.
T h e first attempt at a philosophical reflection on the beginning o f
Western philosophy, and henee on the great philosophy o f the Greeks,
was carried out by Hegel on the basis o f the system he himself elaborated. The second attempt, entirely different in direction and character,
is the work o f Nietzsche. Yet neither o f these two attempts to restore the
broken bond with the Greeks employing a Creative recollection to
make essential for us what was essential for them, i.e., not merely imitating the Greeks or taking them over is original enough, because they
were not ignited or supported by the question, the one through which
the primordial Greek thinking must surpass itself and enter into another beginning.
g. Articulation o f the historical recollection
in five steps o f reflection.

T h e heart o f this question is the question o f truth as we have developed
it. T he carrying out o f the recollection o f the first shining forth
o f aXfcdeia in the sense o f a discussion o f the essential steps o f the
basic movement o f the great Greek philosophy between Anaximander
and Aristotle is impossible within the framework o f these lectures. To
be sure, neither can we take as a substitute the extensive scholarly research of the historiography o f philosophy. This research knows all the
ames and doctrines and writings and presents them time and again. It
can draw all the lines o f connection between the thinkers and all their
i8 6
Appendices [22223]
dependencies on one another, but philosophy itself does not thereby

make an appearance, for no real question is asked and that is because,
as ones who have come later, and specifically as people o f today, we can
claim to know better, and already do know everything much better, than
these old thinkers did.
T he recollection o f the first shining forth o f ctVrj'iteia, as we require
it and which we hold to be possible only on the basis o f the question o f
truth, may be articulated in five levels o f reflection:
1. The unexpressed flaming up o f A'rj'deia in the pronouncements
o f Anaximander.
2. The first unfoldings o f
though not ones explicitly directed to a foundation, in Heraclitus, Parmenides, the tragic poets, and
Pindar.
3. The last glimmering of X^deta within the question o f beings ( t
t v) as the basic philosophical question in Plato and Aristotle.
4 . The extinguishing o f a A ^ - d e i a and its transformation into ix o C x ti ;
(correctness).
5. T h e mediate and mediated transition from X.rj'deioi to fj.oi>crk<;
on the by-way over incorrectness (falsity v | 8 o s ) .
For the purpose o f these lectures, we will follow only the middle
of these five levels, the third, and even then only the last glimmering
of dtXirj&eux in Plato. We will do so, o f course, not in the mode o f an
empty survey o f Platonic philosophy but by participating in Platos philosophizing. All o f his dialogues, indeed nearly every Fragment o f his
dialogues, direct us mediately or immediately to the question of
XTjdeux. We will choose, however, a pre-eminent fragment from a dialogue, which not only deals explicitly with aX.ri eia, but also displays a
pre-eminent character in the very way o f dealing with it, insofar as Plato
there, as we say, speaks in an allegory.
SUPPLEMENT T O 40
Need (the need arising from the lack o f need: the abandonment o f beings by Being) determines the necessity (of the question of the truth of
Being); the necessity determines the direction o f the question (the question of the Being o f truth) as a preliminary question and henee determines the content o f truth, the sphere o f its essence.
Truth: as overcoming the end, not correctness; as a transition to another beginning, not X.f)iot. And yet only not; but Xfi'eia more
originally as such: openness; the openness in itself: as it holds sway originally: Da-sein.
It is not the mere critical exposition o f the prevailing concept o f
truth, but the necessity o f the present need, that determines the essential approach to truth. Therefore that critical discussion apparently
coming from nowhere like a bolt from the blue is already determined
from the experienced necessity of the question o f truth, which springs
forth from the end o f metaphysics to the beginning o f the truth o f Being (appropriating event).
T he displacement, according to which man is at once posited both into
the free space o f the daring act of creating and into the unprotectedness
o f the perseverance o f his dwelling. Both o f these belong to the essence
of the openness o f the in-between; both become especially important
in the question o f how this openness as such is supposed to be
grounded. But both are submerged, turned around, and distorted if,
out of that dislocation into the primordial essence, man issues forth as
the rational animal; and that is what actually happened.
SUPPLEMENT T O 41
Openness is not only the condition o f the possibility o f the correctness of

an assertion. As such a condition it appears for the first time only in the
subsequent critical reference. But to be such a condition does not exhaust
the essence o f openness, nor does it touch the heart of this essence. For
openness expresses something even more original than otX.fi'&cux, not only
the unconcealedness o f present beings, but also what is illuminated in the
Clearing and the Clearing itself, in which an unconcealed being can stand
forth in the first place.
What is this Clearing in the midst of beings? What must it be, so that in it
beings can encounter and belong to one another? Where is its ground and
how does this illuminated in the midst come to presence, into which man is
displaced by disposition and which he has to occupy and preserve in the forbearance of his Creative activity? The openness of the illuminated in-between, in which man comes to stand, reveis itself in this way as the ground of
humanity itself not of some sort of universal humanity, but of that man who
by means of the question of the essence o f truth as openness first raises the
question of who he is. In our retrospective sketch of the beginning of Western
thinking, we said that man was determined there as the custodian of the unconcealedness of beings and later declined into the rational animal. In asking
about the more original essence of truth as the openness of beings, the question o f who man is first attains its keen edge and its necessity. For this question
now asks whether man really is the Steward of the essence of truth and
whether all his truths and correctnesses do not remain fragmentary and preliminary, as long as and as often as he forgets this stewardship.
The essence o f openness is not exhausted there but is more original.
That is the reference o f what was said about disposition and its dislocating and casting asunder o f beings.
Openness is not only what makes this possible i.e., a particular human comportment, the predicating and judging about objects but is
what makes man himself possible in the first place, insofar as he is finally and genuinely understood in terms o f that which his Western history primordially throws him into, in order that, as it seems, at first he
would not grasp it but would only disfigure it by forgetting it.
And what is this? T h e fact that man is not only as we interpreted
him in our retrospective sketch the preserver o f the unconcealedness
of beings but is the Steward o f the openness o f Being itself, in whose
play of space and time beings first come to be beings (more so and less).
Then this would be the decisin o f future mankind and the preparation
o f the present, that man o f today might overcome himself and his truth,
and instead o f continuing on, i.e., continuously treading in the same
place, might find his essence out o f a more original ground and begin to
become that essence namely, the guardian o f the truth o f Being.
Openness comes to pass as the Clearing of self-concealment, as the there
[Da] in the grounding-there [Dargrndung\ o f being-the-there [Dasein],
EDITORS AFTERWORD
T h is volum e, n u m b er 45 in the series, is the text o f a lecture

course M artin H e id e g g e r presented on e h o u r p er w eek d u r in g
the W inter sem ester 19 3 71938 at the University o f Freiburg.
T h e course bore the same title as this b o o k an d is published here
for the first time.
T h e editor had available H eid egg ers ow n manuscript as well as
two different typ ed transcriptions o f it which H eidegger charged
Fritz H eidegger [his brother] to prepare and a third typescript by
H ildegard Feick. T h e manuscript at hand is in Germ an script and
presents the text o f the lectures fully elaborated and form ulated.
T h e manuscript begins with pages a th rough d and then contines
with sheets num bered 1 through 50; occasionally, a num ber is used
for more than on e page by virtue o f a small letter added to it. T h e
manuscript also includes the recapitulations. T h ese are on separate
pages
and
are
again
fully
elaborated
and
form ulated.
H eidegger annotated them with the p age num ber o f the m anu script to which they refer and inserted them him self in the appropriate places. T h e written text o f the lectures and recapitulations
proceeds without a break on the left-hand side o f the page, an d the
writing is crosswise. H eidegger reserved the right side for supplements, corrections, and marginal remarks.
T h e second transcription by Fritz H e id e g g e r followed the first
after som e tim e an d is distinguished fro m the earlier b y incorp oratin g the em end ation s H e id e g g e r h ad introduced into the
m anuscript. T h e first copy o f this second transcription is ex ta n t
in b ou n d form , an d, as the h an d -sig n e d dedication attests,
H e id e g g e r presen ted it to Vili Szilasi o n his sixtieth birthday.
The
han dw ritten
aocpcTctTTi x a l
title
p age
bears
the
m otto:
Atrr)
4 fUX^l
otpcrrq (H eraclitus 118 ): dispassionate so u l
wisest and m ost n o b le. T h e typ escrip t H e id e g g e r instructed

H ild ega rd Feick to prep are incorporates a n u m b er o f his h a n d written revisions o f this gift copy for W ilhelm Szilasi.
T h e editor worked entirely within the fram ework m arked ou t by
ig o
Editors A fterw ord
the directives H eid egg er him self gave for the proper preparation
o f his texts for publication. T h e transcriptions were checked several
times both against the original m anuscript and against one another.
Som e misreadings were discovered. Furtherm ore, beyond the first
handwritten em endation o f the manuscript, which was already incorporated into the second transcription o f Fritz H eidegger, the
manuscript o f the lecture was reworked by H eid egger once again,
this time m ore lightly and for the most part limited to matters o f
style, all in accord with the directives he him self conveyed to the editors o f his writings. T h is revisin was also incorporated into the
present volum e. In addition, the second transcription produced by
Fritz H eidegger was also subject to a few m inor handwritten corrections and a larger handwritten reworking o f that part o f the text
which comprises 3 6 -3 8 o f the present volum e. T h is reworking,
however, does not exceed the level o f the reflection inherent in the
lectures as delivered.
Since, on the w hole, the m anuscript o f the lectures, in clu d in g
the recapitulations, contains no divisions, the text was subsequ ently articulated m ean in gfu lly in to sections. H e id e g g e r h im se lf largely atten d ed to the n u m b e rin g o f the sections; w here
necessary, this was revised and m ade u n ifo rm by the editor. T h e
editor also d eleted the epithets an d interjections, characteristic
o f the lecture style b u t distu rbin g in a p rin ted text, to the e xten t
that they were not already stricken by H e id e g g e r him self.
T o present a detailed table o f contents, the text was thoro u gh ly articulated an d titles were given to each segm ent. A cc o r d in g to H e id e g g e r s directive, such a table was to substitute for an
in d ex o f am es an d subjects, som eth in g he did not at all want.
T h e m anuscript o f the lecture contains on ly two titles: that o f the
present second chap ter o f the prep aratory part as well as the title
o f the m ain part. T h e articulation o f the text into preparatory
an d main parts, the fu rth er partition into chapters an d sections,
the divisin o f the latter into subsections, and all the titles, with
the excep tion o f the two ju s t m en tio n ed, were the w ork o f the
editor. T h e s e titles were draw n exclusively from the words
H e id e g g e r h im se lf em p loyed in the respective segm ent.
T h e quotation marks surrounding m any words correspond
faithfully to their occurrence in the handw ritten manuscript. In Order not to interfere with the text by introducing an interpretation,
H eideggers distinctive way o f w riting Seyn [archaic form o f
Editors A fterw ord

Sein," B ein g] and Sein was also carried over from the m anuscript, even where a correction m ight have suggested itself from the
context.
T h e few footnotes in this volum e d erive w ithout excep tio n
from H e id e g g e r an d were only su p p lem en ted bibliographically.
In verifyin g the citations, H e id e g g e r s ow n copies o f the texts
were consulted.
Page 81 o f this volu m e contains a referen ce H e id e g g e r inserted in the con tin uous text o f the m anuscript and p u t in parentheses: (Unsaid: the passing o f the last go d . C f.: Vom Ereig-
nis). H e is re ferr in g here to his m ost com prehensive, still

u npublished, treatise from the years 19361938, which he h im s e lf relegated to the third m ain divisin o f his collected works.
T h e official title o f this m an u scrip t as H e id e g g e r says at the
b e gin n in g o f the treatise is Beitrge zur Philosophie [C o n trib u tions to P h ilosop h y], but its essential subtitle is Vom Ereignis
[O n the A p p r o p r ia tin g E vent]. E ver since that treatise, ap p rop riating event has been thd g u id in g term o f his th in k in g, as
H e id e g g e r notes in a m arginal rem ark to his L etter on h u m an ism (Cf. Wegmarken, GA 9, p. 316).
T h e first ap p en d ix o f the present volum e, T h e question o f
truth inserted in the manuscript before the beginning o f the
main p art bears, near the title, the parenthetical remark, N ot to
be delivered. T h e first draft o f the lectures was providing for them
to be worked ou t according to the ten divisions listed in that ou tline. T h is plan was stopped short and abandoned, and H eid egg er
decided to elabrate the main part o f the lectures exclusively u n d er
the title which stands first in the ouine, nam ely Foundational issues in the question o f truth. Pages 1936 o f the first draft are preserved, however, and they are printed here as the second appen dix.
T h is fragm entary text begins with the conclusin o f divisin I and
contines with the com plete divisin II an d the incom plete divisin
III. T h is fragm ent, too, is fully elaborated and form ulated in the
manuscript and was included in Fritz H e id e gg e rs first transcription. T h e articulation o f the divisions into sections with arabic n u meris and the form ulation o f the tides o f these sections are the
work o f the editor. B oth supplements, to 40 and 4 1, were inserted as such by H eid egg er into his handw ritten m anuscript and
were included in both typescripts o f Fritz H eidegger.
Editors A fterw ord
192
I owe great thanks to H erm an n H e id e gg e r, the adm inistrator

o f his fath ers literary remains by the latters ow n last will an d testam ent, for his con fidence, collaboration, an d the gen erou s d ialogu e w hich accom p an ied all m y editorial work.
I also express m y cordial thanks to H artm u t T ie tje n fo r his
h elp fu l assistance in the preparation o f this volum e. I th an k
Luise M ichaelsen for h er very th o ro u g h an d careful collaboration in read in g the proofs. I th an k H an s-H elm u th G a n d e r fo r a
large share o f the p ro o fre ad in g as well as for faith ful h elp in various stages o f the work; the repeated com parison o f the d iffe re n t
texts feil to him . I also express m y gratitu d e to Sonja W olf, o f the
Freiburg Sem in ar for Classical Philology, for the final inspection
o f the p ag e proofs.
Friedrich-W ilhelm von H e rrm an n
Freiburg i. Br., J u ly 1984
AFTERW O RD T O T H E SE C O N D E D IT IO N
T h is second edition has corrected the few typ ograph ical errors in the first.
U nder the tide, From a discussion o f the question o f truth,
Martin H eid egg er published a slighdy revised extract o f the text o f
the present lecture course (printed here on pages 7 8 -8 1) in a small
almanac o f Neske Publishers, on the occasion o f their tenth anniversary (Zehn Jahre Neske Verlag. Pfullingen, 1962, pp. 19 -2 3 ). T h e
editor neglected to include this inform adon in his afterword to the
first edition and hereby makes u p for that omission.
In his afterw ord to the first edition, (p. 19 1), the ed itor explained H e id e g g e r s reference (on p a g e 81 o f the presen t volum e) to the m anuscript Vom Ereignis by allu d in g to the m ajor
w ork Beitrge zur Philosophie, w hich was at that tim e still u n p u b lished. In the m eanw hile, this m anu script has com e out, m arkin g the on e h u n d re d th anniversary o f H e id e g g e r s birth, as the
third m ain divisin o f his collected works (Gesamtausgabe B d . 65).
For m ore particulars on the special relation the presen t lecture
ctHse from the W inter sem ester 1 9 3 7 - 1 9 3 8 has to the Beitrge
zur Philosophie, which was w orked o u t b etw een 1936 an d 1938,
ygf yie^pditors afterw ord to the latter volum e, p. 5 1 3 ^
Friedrich-W ilhelm von H e rrm an n
Freiburg i. Br., M arch 1992

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Martin Heidegger

Studies in C o n tin en tal T h o u g h t

Robert B ern ascon i

Edw ard S. Casey

D avid Farrell Krell

INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS

Published in German as Grundfragen der Philosophie: Ausgewhlte

Manufactured in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

The Essence o f Philosophy and the Question ofTruth

Prelim inary In terpretation o f the

i. Futural philosophy; restraint as the basic

4. Truth as a problem o f logic (correctness o f an

1) T h e question o f truth as the m ost necessary

2) W h at is w orthy o f qu estion in g in the

6. The traditionell determination o f truth as

a) T h e determ ination o f the essence o f truth as

b) T h e question o f the g r o u n d o f the possibility

1) T h e relation betw een question and answer in

2) T h e custom ary determ in atio n o f truth as

Foundational Issues in the Question o f Truth

T h e Basic Q u estion o f the Essence o f

10. The ambiguity o f the question o f truth: the search

a) T h e historiographical consideration o f the

b) H istorical reflection on the fu tu re, the future

1) T h e am b igu ity o f the question o f truth. T h e

3) Tow ard the fou nd ation o f the custom ary

T h e acquisition o f the b e g in n in g in the

14. Retum to the Aristotelian doctrine o f the truth

1) Rejection o f three m isinterpretations o f the

2) T h e p ath from the question o f the essence o f

iy. Historical reflection on the Aristotelian-Platonic

1) Four characterizations o f the essentiality o f

18. The Greek determination o f the essence (whatness)

19. The absence o f a foundation for Aristotles

1) T h e con cep tio n o f the B e in g o f beings as

T h e L ayin g o f the G r o u n d as the

20. The absurdity o f attempting to found an essential

1) R en ew ed reflection on o u r proced ure as a

2) T h e succession o f the steps m ade u p to now

The unconcealedness o f the whatness o f beings as

26. Unconcealedness and the openness o f beings. The

1) T h e produ ctive seeing o f the unconcealedness

T h e Necessity o f the Q u e stio n o f the

2 y. The tum ing o f the critical question o f truth toward

28. Truth as correctness and its domination over its

29. The Greeks experience o f unconcealedness as the

1) T h e g r o u n d o f the necessity o f the question

2) A\r|ftei,a as prim ordial for the G reeks yet

30. Their fidelity to the destiny meted out to thern as

a) O u r situation at the e n d o f the b e gin n in g and

b) T h e e xp erien ce o f the e n d by H lderlin and

32. The destiny meted out to the Greeks: to begin

1) T h e lack o f an inquiry in to unconcealedness

3) T h e task o f the Greeks: to sustain the first

33. The beginning o f thinking and the essential

a) T h e sustaining o f the reco gn itio n o f beings in

34- The need and the necessity o f our inquiry into

1) T h e rigo r an d in ner ord er o f qu estion in g in

2) H istorical reflection on the necessity o f the