A Review Report on book

What is this thing called Science?

Submitted to
Dr. A.V. Ravishankar Sarma
Department of Humanities and Social Sciences

Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur

From:
Shashank Bhushan (13645)
Vaibhav Vaidya (13762)
Ujagar Negi (13751)

Content
Page 2

Review

Page 3

Summary

Work Distribution
`
Shashank Bhushan: Summarized the introduction to the history of science before
and after involvement with the philosophy. (Chapter 1-5)
Vaibhav Vaidya: Reviewed the book, summarized Poppers Falsification, Kuhns
Paradigms and Feyerabends anarchist theory of Science. (Chapter 6-10)
Ujagar Negi: Summarized Bayesian approach, methodical changes in method, new
experimentalism and Realism and Anti-realism. (Chapter 11-15)

Review:
The title of the book implies a wish to explain the concept of science. After an introduction filled
with odd rhetoric about our misconceptions in the image of science as something that is
trustworthy, four chapters follow that describes big problems, that actually are found in the
concept of absolutely certain knowledge but that the author instead claim concerns the concept
of science. The main message is that we certainly cannot trust science at all. When Chalmers
discusses these epistemological problems, as they should concern science, he is not credible;
scientific methodology is the non-dogmatic answer to the problems of absolutely certain
knowledge. These problems have been known since the Greek antiquity, and you are within
science well and sometimes painfully aware of that absolutely certain knowledge is not a useful
concept, and that it very soon may come new scientific reports that questions what you yourself
recently has published.
Chalmers considers firstly the viability of the argument that science is based on firm observable
facts. He considers the role of perception and then of the role of the theoretical structure from
which the facts are interpreted. Both of these considerations bring us back not just to the observer
but to the observers inner subjective experience. Next he considers the experimental design and
here the reader is able to see how many other factors are able to interfere with the sound
interpretation of experimentally derived facts. He goes on to demonstrate some of the difficulties
with an inductive approach when it uses a combination of deduction, induction and observable
facts alone before turning to the issue of falsifiability. He illustrates a theory that is not easily
falsifiable by referring to an Adlerian interpretation of behavior in two situations (Popper who
suggested the benefits of falsifiability had trained under Adler in Vienna and so the use of this
example is an interesting one). Chalmers then looks at Kuhn and the nature of scientific
revolutions with paradigmatic shifts in the underlying theoretical structures. Kuhns arguments
include an acknowledgement of the practical aspects of the scientist such as the apprenticeship
model of learning which is needed to understand the complex paradigms in which they are
working and which are much more than the immediate theoretical structures which can be
explicitly stated. At the end of his discussion on Kuhn, Chalmers notes that there are issues here
which are important and need to be addressed in order to gain a better understanding of the
processes involved in scientific progress. Interesting readings about how astrology and astronomy
were used as contrasting subjects to test philosophical explanations of science are provided in the
book. He then covers Lakatos who developed a theory of the research program in which
progression in science rests in a system which is able to generate novel predictions about
phenomenon and where the central hypothesis is surrounded by secondary hypotheses which act
as a buffer. He then covers a number of other subjects including Feyereband on anarchy in
science (i.e. against method), experimentalism and the bayesian approach. Explanation of theories
are simple and arguments are easily understandable. He then covers Robert Ackermans new
experimentalism and lastly Realism and Anti-realism pointing out that Anti-realists are often
called Instrumentalists.

Summary of the content:

Science as knowledge derived from the facts of experience
A widely held common sense view of Science- According to common-sense, science begins with
observations: all scientific knowledge come from the facts of experience. Theories are produced by
observation of these facts and are then tested by prediction. This naive conception is not held by many
philosophers today. For one thing, it sees science as a one-way engine from 'facts' (what are they?) to
theories and predictions. As shown by the Einstein example, where a theory led the other way round, the
model does not fit much of science. In fact, the relationship between the parts of a scientific philosophy are
extremely complex.
Seeing is believing- Scientific and medical illustration is often characterized by a twofold need: for accuracy
and for clarity in presenting information. It would be more appropriate, however, to say that such
illustration is utilized in assisting the reader in "seeing" information within the context of a particular
theory or scientific reality
Visual experiences not determined solely by the object viewed- There are two important assumptions
involved in the naive inductivist position with respect to observation. One is that science starts with
observation. The other is that observation yields a secure basis from which knowledge can be derived. In
the present chapter, both of these assumptions will be criticized in a variety of ways and rejected for a
variety of reasons. But first of all, I will sketch an account of observation that I think it is fair to say is a
commonly held one in modern times, and which lends plausibility to the naive inductivist position.
Observable facts expressed as statements- Facts, in the sense of datum on which we might base theories or
make other conjectures, exist to us as facts only in so far as they have already qualified as facts according to
some set of criteria. In a very primitive way, facts rely very strongly on our opinion of what reliably reflects
reality. Take any device for measurement and show that it us unreliable and any "facts" which had come
from its use stop being facts at all. Take any person that reports on facts and undermine their credibility,
and their facts fall by the wayside.

Observation as practical intervention

It is usual to say that the two sources of experience are Observation and Experiment. When we merely note
and record the phenomena which occur around us in the ordinary course of nature we are said to observe.
When we change the course of nature by the intervention of our will and muscular powers, and thus
produce unusual combinations and conditions of phenomena, we are said to experiment. [Sir John]
Herschel has justly remarked that we might properly call these two modes of experience passive and active
observation. In both cases we must certainly employ our senses to observe, and an experiment differs from
a mere observation in the fact that we more or less influence the character of the events which we observe.
Experiment is thus observation plus alteration of conditions.

Experiment
Experiment as an adequate basis for science-The scientific method is an ongoing process, which usually
begins with observations about the natural world. Human beings are naturally inquisitive, so they often
come up with questions about things they see or hear and often develop ideas (hypotheses) about why
things are the way they are. The best hypotheses lead to predictions that can be tested in various ways,
including making further observations about nature. In general, the strongest tests of hypotheses come
from carefully controlled and replicated experiments that gather empirical data. Depending on how well
the tests match the predictions, the original hypothesis may require refinement, alteration, expansion or
even rejection. If a particular hypothesis becomes very well supported a general theory may be developed.

Deriving theories from the facts: Induction

Baby logic-"Baby logic" is the somewhat deprecatory name given by philosophers to the courses they teach
in introductory formal logic. Though these often contain an informal component, they typically focus on
the propositional calculus and first-order predicate calculus. Standard content would be translations of
English sentences into symbolism, differences between the logical connectives and their English colleagues
(including the paradoxes of material implication), the notion of an axiomatic system, axioms and theorems,
derivations (often by a natural deduction system), and such semantic tools as truth-tables and truth-trees.
Some courses go as far as completeness and consistency proofs for propositional calculus, though such
metalogical excursions are rare. Modal logic is also unusual in this context.
Can scientific laws be derived from the facts? Laws differ from scientific theories in that they do not posit a
mechanism or explanation of phenomena: they are merely distillations of the results of repeated
observation. As such, a law is limited in applicability to circumstances resembling those already observed,
and may be found false when extrapolated. Ohm's law only applies to linear networks, Newton's law of
universal gravitation only applies in weak gravitational fields, the early laws of aerodynamic such as
Bernoulli's principle do not apply in case of compressible flow such as occurs in transonic and supersonic
flight, Hooke's law only applies to strain below the elastic limit, etc. These laws remain useful, but only
under the conditions where they apply.
Problems with inductivism: The original problem of induction can be simply put. It concerns the support or
justification of inductive methods; methods that predict or infer, in Hume's words, that instances of which
we have had no experience resemble those of which we have had experience (THN, 89). Such methods are
clearly essential in scientific reasoning as well as in the conduct of our everyday affairs. The problem is how
to support or justify them and it leads to a dilemma: the principle cannot be proved deductively, for it is
contingent, and only necessary truths can be proved deductively. Nor can it be supported inductivelyby
arguing that it has always or usually been reliable in the pastfor that would beg the question by assuming
just what is to be proved.
The appeal of inductivism-The appeal of inductivist accounts is that it provides a clear indication of the
superiority of scientific knowledge through its emphasis on the objective nature of perceptual experience.
That it can account for the explanatory and predictive power of science in this way has sustained it as the
essence of scientific method through most of the history of science. Inductivism can be interpreted liberally
or conservatively. The liberal view suggests that the inductive method justifies claims to truth and
knowledge for statements about a mind-independent reality. The conservative approach argues that
inductivism justifies only statements about the immediate data of experience. In this latter sense,
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empiricism leads to radical skepticism of many common sense knowledge claims. This view predominates
amongst logical positivists.

Introducing falsificationism
A logical point in favor of falsificationism - The group of philosophers united under what we have called the
"Empiricist Consensus" were most strongly influenced by the development of logical positivism, but there
was at least one rather large group who could be fairly said to lie within the consensus but who presented
themselves as opponents to the logical positivists; they were (and still are) followers of the philosophy of
science of Karl R. Popper, known generally as "falsificationism."
Falsifiability as a criterion for theories - a standard of evaluation of putatively scientific theories, according
to which a theory is genuinely scientific only if it is possible in principle to establish that it is false. The
British Philosopher Sir Karl (190294) proposed the criterion as a foundational method of the empirical
sciences. He held that genuinely scientific theories are never finally confirmed, because disconfirming
observations (observations that are inconsistent with the empirical predictions of the theory) are always
possible no matter how many confirming observations have been made.
Degree of falsifiability, clarity and precision-A falsifiable hypothesis is one which can be put to a test by
which it could conceivably be refuted. The concept is important in Karl Poppers philosophy of science,
according to which the distinctive feature of any scientific theory is that its hypotheses can be put to a test.
The distinctive feature of a good scientific theory is that its hypotheses pass the test. The contrast is with
pseudo-science. The adherents of a pseudo-science are able to cling to its hypotheses no matter how events
turn out, because the hypotheses are not testable.

Sophisticated falsificationism, novel predictions and the growth of science

Chalmers points out the view of popper in this chapter by saying that a hypothesis should be falsifiable the
more falsifiable the better, and yet should not be falsified. More sophisticated falsificationists realize that
those conditions alone are insufficient. As an absolute measure of falsifiability cannot be defined the
hypothesis should be more falsifiable than the one for which it is offered as a replacement. He defines a
modification in a theory that has no testable consequences the unmodified theory will be called ad hoc
modifications. The falsificationists rejects such actions. Further he argues that science should progress by
the proposal of bold, highly falsifiable conjectures as attempts to solve problems. Also significant advances
will be marked by the confirmation of bold conjectures or the falsification of cautious conjectures. By
contrast, little is learnt from the falsification of a bold conjecture or confirmation of cautious conjecture. He
claims a conjecture to be bold if its claims are unlikely in the light of background knowledge of the time. He
shows the advantage of falsification over induction by saying that inductivists have trouble characterizing
and justifying the inductive inferences that are meant to show theories to be true or probably true.

Limitations of falsificationism
In this chapter of Poppers theses, Chalmers discreetly says that nothing in the logic of a situation requires
that it is always the law or theory that should be rejected on the occasion of a clash with observation or
with experiment. On the contrary. This would be highly dangerous since it could kill promising theories.
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Also conclusive falsifications of theories by observation is not achievable. Falsificationism has been
inadequate on historical grounds. Many theories have been preserved despite being falsified. We did not
abandon Newton just because some of his results were wrong. We can always deflect falsification to some
other part of our large web of assumptions. If we would have applied falsificationism on the work
described in history, we would never had achieved any scientific results as we would have discarded many
theories just because some of their assumptions were falsified. In this way neither inductivists nor
falsificationists give an account of science that is compatible with it. Popper admits that it is often necessary
to retain theories in spite of apparent falsifications. So although ruthless criticism is recommended, what
would appear to be its opposite, dogmatism, has a positive role to play too.

Theories as structures - I: Kuhn's paradigms

Chalmers in this chapter introduces Thomas Kuhns theory. A key feature of his theory is the emphasis
placed on the revolutionary character of scientific progress, where a revolution involves the abandonment
of one theoretical structure and its replacement by another, incompatible one. Another important feature is
the important role played by the sociological characteristics of scientific communities. Kuhn's picture of the
way a science progresses can be summarized by the following open-ended scheme:
pre-science - normal science - crisis - revolution - new normal science - new crisis
According to Kuhn, the existence of a paradigm capable of supporting a normal science tradition is the
characteristic that distinguishes science from non-science. Kuhn portrays normal science as a puzzlesolving activity governed by the rules of a paradigm. The puzzles will be of both a theoretical and an
experimental nature. Chalmers insists that all the paradigms will contain some anomalies but this does not
mean that the paradigm should be falsified. There will always be anomalies and they will be regarded as
particularly serious if it is seen as striking at the very fundamentals of a paradigm and yet persistently
resists attempts by the members of the normal scientific community to remove it. Citing an example of
astrology, Chalmers points out that it is Kuhns views which are more convincing rather than Poppers
views. The weakness of Kuhn is that it is not possible to find out whether one paradigm is better than
another and depends on the values of the individual group or culture that makes the judgement.

Theories as structures - II: Research Program

Chalmers introduces the views of Imre Lakatos in this chapter according to which a research should follow
positive and negative heuristics. A heuristic is a set of rules or hints to aid discovery or invention. Chalmers
shows an example when Thomas Young's theories of wave won few supporters but the same theory as
presented by Fresnel won many supporters. The difference was the positive heuristics that surrounded
Fresnel. Lakatoss view is that a research program must be given a chance to realize its full potential. A
suitable sophisticated and adequate protective belt must be constructed. When a program has been
developed to the stage where it is appropriate to subject it to experimental tests, it is confirmations rather
than falsifications that are of paramount significance, according to Lakatos. Also the worth of a research
program is indicated by the extent to which it leads to novel predictions that are confirmed. Science should
be carried out as a competition between programs. Lakatos made a distinction between appraisal of
research programs which can only be done with a historical hindsight and advice to scientists. He also
claimed that there is no instant rationality in science. Lakatos shared Kuhn's concern with the history of
science. He believed it to be desirable that any theory of science be able to make sense of the history of
science. Thus theories should be tested against the history of science. Chalmers also points out the
problems with Lakatos s methodology. The weakness of Lakatos theories is that it is very difficult to
identify the hard core of a science. Especially when it concerns new hypotheses. If a hard core is needed no
6

progress will be made. Lakatos seemed to base all his views on physics and claimed that science must share
the basic characteristic of physics.

Feyerabends anarchistic theory of science

Chalmers recalls the story so far as he says that Science is special because it is derived from facts. This was
false since facts are theory dependent. Falsification failed since science it not able to locate the cause of a
faulty prediction. Then Kuhn and Lakatos tried to solve the problem by focusing on the theoretical
framework in which the scientist work, but Kuhns theory failed since it is difficult to compare which
program is better than another and Lakatoss view failed because no intellectual pursuits can be ruled out
in it. Paul Feyerabend claimed that there exists nothing like scientific method that is useful for scientists. He
showed that all progress in science has not been the results from following any type of scientific method.
Feyerabend criticized Kuhns proposal about consensus as criteria since it did not rule out politicking or
crime. He claimed that holding the scientific method as a morel is dangerous because this would inhibit
more than it would help. He proposed a humanitarian attitude, the cultivation of individuality which alone
can produce well developed human beings. Another point is that the state must be free from science just
like the state is free from church. Free society from the strangling hold of an ideologically petrifying
science. Feyerabend can be criticized for not counting with the active role of society in creating individuals.
Individuals are created into the society that pre-exists them.

Methodical changes in method

Chalmers agrees with Feyerabend regarding the idea of universal and ahistorical method as highly
implausible and even absurd. According to Feyerabend the idea that science can and should, be run
according to fixed and universal rules is both unrealistic and pernicious. This ideal is also detrimental to
science for it neglects the complex physical and historical conditions which influence scientific change and
makes science less adaptable and more dogmatic.
Galileo made the first step in what was to be a common trend in science, the replacement of naked-eye data
by data acquired by way of instruments, and in doing so violated, and brought about a change in, the
criterion of science itself.
Chalmers proposes the idea that any part of the web of aims, methods, standards theories and
observational facts that constitute a science at a particular time can be progressively changed, and the
remaining part of the web will provide the background against which a case for the change can be made.
Chalmers proposes that there is a universal method seen from a common-sense:
Take argument and the available evidence seriously and do not aim for a kind of
knowledge or a level of confirmation that is beyond the reach of available methods
He called this as the commonsense version of scientific method.

The Bayesian approach

Thomas Bayes suggested a method to estimate how probabilities are changed as new evidence is added.
The Bayesians regard it as inappropriate to ascribe zero probability to a well confirmed theory, and they
seek some kind of inductive inference that will yield non-zero probabilities for them. Bayes theorem is
about conditional probabilities, probabilities that depend on the evidence bearing on those propositions.
The Bayes theorem is written as:
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P(h/e) = P(h) * P(e/h)/P(e)

where P(h) = prior probability, e = evidence, P(h/e) = posterior probability after the evidence e is taken
into the account and P(e/h) denotes the probability to be ascribed to the evidence e on the assumption that
the hypothesis h is correct.
Bayesians seem to have a counter to the Popperian claim that the probability of all theories must be zero,
insofar as they identify probabilities with the degrees of belief that scientists happen, as a matter of fact, to
possess.
The Bayesian calculus is portrayed as an objective mode of inference that serves to transform prior
probabilities into posterior probabilities in the light of given evidence. The criticism against Bayesian
approach is that the reasoning often is based on subjective interpretations and thus we do not get the hard
core of classical experimental results as we do in physics. However, according to the "Bayesians" we can
start with low probabilities and then successively get higher and higher probabilities until we have
knowledge enough to perform experiments of a more classical type.

The new experimentalism

In this chapter it is acknowledged that observations are not always following from theories. Popper posed
problems for positivism and inductivism by stressing the theory dependence of observation and the extent
to which theories always transcend, and so can never be derived from, the evidence. Poppers account of
science was based on the idea that the best theories are those that survive the severest tests. However, his
account was unable to say something sufficiently positive about theories that happen to have survived
tests.
According to Robert Ackerman experiments can have a "life of their own" independent of large scale
theory. Science could be based on practical strategies to retrieve more relevant information to proceed
with experiments. Experiments are not based on paradigms or theory but on previous experiments, and are
independent of high level theory. This is shown by the fact that Galileo did not have a theory about the
moons of Jupiter when he turned his telescope skywards.
Experimentalist can point to a range of strategies available to experimenters for establishing their claims
that do not involve appeal to high-level theory. Deborah is a philosopher of science who has attempted to
capture the implications of the new experimentalism in a philosophically rigorous way. A key idea
underlying her treatment is that a claim can only be said to be supported by experiment if the various ways
in which the claim could be at fault have been investigated and eliminated.

Why should the world obey laws?

In the following chapter Chalmers tries to answer to the question- What makes matter conform to laws?
From the Humean standpoint laws take the form Events of type A are invariably accompanied by events of
type B. This is so called regularity view of laws. It can be shown from many examples that there is
something more to a law of nature than mere regularity. Another difficulty with the regularity view is that
it fails to identify the direction of causal dependency.
Another view sees laws as characterizations of powers or dispositions. According to it things happen in the
world of their own accord, and they happen because entities in the world possess the capacity or power or
disposition or tendency to act or behave in the way that they do.
Chalmers concludes that a wide range of laws within physics can be understood as causal laws. When this
is possible, it is the operation of the causal powers and capacities characterized by laws that make systems
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obey them. However, we have seen that there are fundamental laws in physics that cannot be construed as
causal laws. In these cases, there is no ready answer to the above question.

Realism and anti-realism

Science describes not just the observable world but also the world that lies behind the appearances. This is
a rough statement of realism with respect to science. The anti-realist, in response, stresses the
inconclusiveness of the evidence for the theoretical part of science and points out that, just as theories in
the past proved successful in spite of the fact that they were not correct descriptions of reality, so it is
reasonable to assume the same about contemporary ones.
Global anti-realism denies we have access to reality in a way, and not just within science. It raises the
question of how language of any kind, including scientific knowledge, can engage with, or hook onto, the
world. A realist claims that science aims at theories that are true of the world, both observable and
unobservable whereas anti-realist maintains that the content of a scientific theory involves nothing more
than the set of claims that can be sustained by observation and experiment.
Realism in a very strong form is called scientific realism. According to scientific realism, science aims at
true statements about what there is in the world and how it behaves, at all levels, not just the level of
observation. The brand of realism advocated by Popper and his followers is of referred to as conjectural
realism. It does not claim that current theories can be known to be true or approximately true. It simply
claims that science aims to achieve such things, and that there are ways of recognizing when science falls
short of this aim.
Duhem raised objection to realism by stating that theories cannot be taken as literal descriptions of reality
because theoretical descriptions are idealized in a way that the world is not. According to Chalmers
idealization does not pose difficulties for realism. He argues that inaccuracy of all experimental
measurements does not proves that quantities measured do not possess precise values. Chalmers
concludes by saying that science is realist, in the sense that it attempts to characterize the structure of
reality, and has made steady progress so far as it has succeeded in doing so to an increasingly accurate
degree.