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The anti-zombie argument

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Frankish, Keith (2007).

The anti-zombie argument.

Philosophical Quarterly, 57(229), pp.

650666.

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THE ANTI-ZOMBIE ARGUMENT

KEITH FRANKISH
Kline had mentioned several reports suggesting that a chemical antidote was
administered to the zombi victim in the graveyard at the time of his
resurrection.... When I asked [Marcel] if he would be able to prepare it for us,
he looked momentarily bewildered. Naturally, he replied, one would never
make the poison without making the antidote.
(W. Davis, The Serpent and the Rainbow, New York: Warner, 1987, p. 111)

In recent years the 'zombie argument' has come to occupy a central role in the
case against physicalist views of consciousness, in large part because of the
powerful advocacy it has received from David Chalmers.1 In this paper I seek
to neutralize it by showing that a parallel argument can be run for physicalism,
an argument turning on the conceivability of what I shall call anti-zombies. I
shall argue that the result is a stand-off, and that the zombie argument offers
no independent reason to reject physicalism.
I. ZOMBIES AND ANTI-ZOMBIES
I begin with a reminder of the zombie argument. The argument is often set out
using the framework of two-dimensional semantics, but I shall present it in a
simpler version here; nothing will turn on the complications omitted.
In broad terms, physicalism about consciousness is the view that
phenomenal properties are not extra features of the world distinct from those
that could be catalogued by a completed basic physics (the microphysical
features).2 There are many ways of spelling out this broad characterization, but
in all of them it follows that consciousness supervenes metaphysically on the

This is an e-print of an article published in The Philosophical Quarterly, 57 (229) 2007, pp. 651666. It may differ in minor ways from the print version. The definitive version is available at
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/117997329/issue.
1 D.J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: in Search of a Fundamental Theory (Oxford UP, 1996); 'Materialism and the
Metaphysics of Modality', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59 (1999), pp. 473-96; 'Consciousness and its Place in
Nature', in D.J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Oxford UP, 2002), pp. 247-72;
'Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?', in T.S. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds), Conceivability and Possibility (Oxford
UP, 2002), pp. 145-200; 'Phenomenal Concepts and the Knowledge Argument', in P. Ludlow, Y. Nagasawa and D.
Stoljar (eds), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument (MIT
Press, 2004), pp. 269-98; 'The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism', in his The Character of Consciousness
(Oxford UP, forthcoming; pre-publication version available at http://consc.net/papers/2dargument.html).
2
I assume that a completed basic physics will deal in micro-level laws and entities, but nothing hangs on this
assumption. If it should prove false, we might speak instead of the basic physical features.

microphysical: any world that has the same microphysical laws as ours and the
same distribution of microphysical properties will have the same distribution of
phenomenal properties too. (This is not, of course, to say that those
microphysical features are necessary for consciousness: a physicalist in the
present sense can allow that there are worlds where consciousness is nonphysically realized.) I shall assume that the converse entailment also holds: that
if consciousness supervenes metaphysically on the microphysical, then
physicalism is true. This is a widespread assumption on both sides of the
debate, and in the present context in particular it is unlikely to be challenged.
The only view admitting metaphysical supervenience without physicalism is
one which posits metaphysically necessary bridging laws linking microphysical
properties with distinct phenomenal ones, and this is not a view which
defenders of the zombie argument can consistently endorse. (To hold that the
laws of nature are metaphysically necessary is, in effect, to deny that whatever
is clearly conceivable is metaphysically possible, which is a key premise of the
zombie argument.) Thus, if we use the term 'physical' for properties that are
either microphysical or metaphysically supervenient on the microphysical,
then physicalism about consciousness can be conveniently expressed as
the view that consciousness is a physical phenomenon.
Dualism, in contrast, is the view that consciousness is not a physical
phenomenon phenomenal properties are extra features of the world, over
and above the microphysical ones, so consciousness does not supervene
metaphysically on the microphysical.
I shall call an object x a physical duplicate of an object y if x is a duplicate of y
in all microphysical respects, and hence in all physical ones. Then zombies are
beings which are physical duplicates of us, inhabiting a world which is a
physical duplicate of ours, but lacking consciousness. That is, zombies share all
of our physical properties, but are not conscious.3 The zombie argument for
dualism is this:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Zombies are conceivable

If zombies are conceivable, then zombies are metaphysically possible
If zombies are metaphysically possible, then consciousness is non-physical
So consciousness is non-physical.4

The sort of conceivability involved here is, in Chalmers' terms (see 'Does
Conceivability Entail Possibility?'), ideal and primary. A state of affairs is ideally
conceivable if its conceivability cannot be defeated by better reasoning. A state
3

See, e.g., Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, pp. 94-5.

See, e.g., Chalmers, 'Consciousness and its Place in Nature', p. 249.

of affairs is primarily conceivable if for all we know a priori it might actually

obtain. Primary conceivability is thus an a priori matter, constrained only by
logic and the meanings of the terms involved. (In contrast, a state of affairs is
secondarily conceivable if it conceivably might have obtained, given how the
world actually is.)
The zombie argument has a good claim to soundness. Premise (1) is
plausible. As Chalmers puts it (The Conscious Mind, p. 96), his zombie twin is
'just something physically identical to me, but which has no conscious
experience all is dark inside', and this description seems coherent. (It may
be objected that the claim that zombies are conceivable begs the question
against interactionist forms of dualism: we can imagine subtracting
consciousness while leaving the physical world unchanged only if we assume
that consciousness does not affect the physical world. I shall address this point
later.)
Premise (2) is an instance of what I shall refer to as the CP thesis, the thesis
that if a situation is ideally conceivable, then it is metaphysically possible.
(Henceforth I shall write simply of possibility; the variety in question will
always be the metaphysical one.) The CP thesis is controversial, but a strong
case can be made for it. The most important objection to the thesis arises from
a posteriori necessities. Water is necessarily H2O, but this is not knowable a
priori, and it is primarily conceivable that water is something else. It is arguable,
however, that primary conceivability always corresponds to some genuine
possibility, reflecting the primary intensions of the concepts involved. (The
primary intension of a concept specifies what the concept refers to in the
actual world, or in any world considered as actual. It can roughly be thought of
as a description of the characteristic features by which we identify the
concept's referent.) Thus the primary conceivability of water's not being H2O
corresponds to the genuine possibility that a substance with the identifying
features of water (liquid, colourless, odourless, drinkable, etc.) is not H2O. We
are misled only if we wrongly describe this as the possibility that water is not
H2O. Moreover, it is arguable that in the case of consciousness we cannot be
misled in this way, since anything that possesses the identifying features of
consciousness is consciousness or at any rate something just as problematic
as consciousness.5
Premise (3) is uncontroversial. If it is possible for a creature to possess all
our physical properties without possessing our phenomenal properties, then
the latter are not among the former.

For detailed discussion and defence of the CP thesis, see Chalmers, 'Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?'.

Physicalist responses to the zombie argument usually attack one or other of

premises (1) and (2), the more radical physicalists denying (1), the more
conservative ones accepting (1) but denying (2). Chalmers dubs the former
'type-A' materialists, the latter 'type-B'.6
I shall adopt a different approach, showing that we can construct an exactly
parallel argument for physicalism. I begin by introducing the notion of an antizombie. I shall call an object x a bare physical duplicate of an object y if x is a
physical duplicate of y and has no further properties of a non-physical kind.
Then we can define anti-zombies as beings which are bare physical duplicates
of us, inhabiting a universe which is a bare physical duplicate of ours, but none
the less having exactly the same conscious experiences as we do. That is, in the
anti-zombie world consciousness is a physical phenomenon, supervening
metaphysically on the world's microphysical features in virtue of token
identities, say. (It is worth stressing that the anti-zombie world is one in which
consciousness is metaphysically, not merely nomologically, supervenient on the
microphysical. If the microphysical features were only causally sufficient for
the phenomenal ones, consciousness would not be a physical phenomenon in
the present sense.) Of course, if physicalists are right, then we are anti-zombies,
but to a dualist the notion of an anti-zombie will presumably seem as
outlandish as that of a zombie does to a physicalist.
The anti-zombie argument for physicalism is this (the notion of
conceivability involved is the same as in the zombie argument, and 'possible'
means metaphysically possible):
5.
6.
7.
8.

Anti-zombies are conceivable

If anti-zombies are conceivable, then anti-zombies are possible
If anti-zombies are possible, then consciousness is physical
So consciousness is physical.

Again the argument has a strong claim to soundness. Premise (5) is plausible.
My anti-zombie twin is just something which is physically identical with me,
and has no non-physical properties, but which has conscious experience the
lights are on inside. The description seems as coherent as that of a zombie. (As
with the parallel claim about zombies, there is an assumption here that
6
For type-A positions, see, e.g., D.M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind (London: Routledge, 1968); D.C.
Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little, Brown, 1991); R. Kirk, Zombies and Consciousness (Oxford UP, 2005);
D. Lewis, 'What Experience Teaches', in W. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), pp. 499-519.
For type-B positions, see, e.g., P. Carruthers, Phenomenal Consciousness: a Naturalistic Theory (Cambridge UP, 2000); C.S.
Hill, 'Imaginability, Conceivability and the Mind-Body Problem', Philosophical Studies, 87 (1997), pp. 61-85; J. Levine,
Purple Haze: the Puzzle of Consciousness (Oxford UP, 2001); B. Loar, 'Phenomenal States', in N. Block, O. Flanagan, and
G. Gzeldere (eds), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates (MIT Press, 1997), pp. 597-616; W.G. Lycan,
Consciousness and Experience (MIT Press, 1996); D. Papineau, Thinking about Consciousness (Oxford UP, 2002).

consciousness has no physical effects; I shall discuss this shortly.) It might be

objected that there is an asymmetry between (1) and (5), in that the latter
requires us to embed a totality-clause ('no further properties of a non-physical
kind') under the conceivability-operator, whereas the former does not.
However, it is not clear that this makes (5) less plausible, and both premises are
on a par to the extent that they both require us to conceive of the absence of
something phenomenal properties in one case, non-physical properties in
the other.
The other premises are also plausible. The case for accepting (6) is the
same as that for accepting (2), namely, that it is an application of the CP thesis.
Premise (7) requires explanation, but, like (3), should be uncontroversial. In the
anti-zombie world consciousness is physical, so the microphysical features of
that world (the laws and distribution of properties) are metaphysically
sufficient for consciousness, and any world with the same microphysical
features will have the same distribution of phenomenal properties. But by
definition our world has the same microphysical features as the anti-zombie
one. Hence the microphysical features of our world are metaphysically
sufficient for the existence of consciousness. So the following is true:
9. If anti-zombies are possible, then the microphysical features of our world

are metaphysically sufficient for the existence of consciousness.

Given the assumption that metaphysical supervenience entails physicalism, this
is equivalent to (7). It might be objected that all this shows is that we have a
physical form of consciousness: it does not rule out the possibility that we have
a non-physical form as well. Perhaps we possess two otherwise identical sets of
phenomenal properties, one physical in character, the other non-physical. This
worry can be dismissed, however. Even if the suggestion is coherent (and it is
not clear that it is), there is absolutely no reason to suppose that it is true, and
considerations of simplicity tell overwhelmingly against it.
This, then, is the anti-zombie argument. It may seem strange to claim that
the mere conceivability of physicalism entails its truth, but the general strategy
is the same as that employed in the zombie argument. In each case the CP
thesis is used to move from a psychological claim to a metaphysical one. In the
zombie case we imagine subtracting our consciousness while leaving our
physical features intact, and conclude that consciousness is non-physical. In the
anti-zombie case we imagine subtracting our (putative) non-physical features

while leaving our consciousness intact, and conclude that consciousness is

physical. If the strategy is sound in the one case, then it is sound in the other.7
II. COMMENTS AND AN OBJECTION
I shall say more in defence of the anti-zombie argument shortly. Before doing
so, however, I shall add some points of clarification and comparison, and
address a possible objection.
First, the conclusion of the anti-zombie argument is that consciousness is
actually physical, not that it is necessarily physical. If sound, the argument
establishes that the microphysical features of our world are metaphysically
sufficient for consciousness, and thus that consciousness is physical in our
world. It does not show that those features are metaphysically necessary for
consciousness, and therefore does not rule out functionalist versions of
physicalism, according to which consciousness is in fact microphysically
realized but could have been realized in other ways.
Secondly, the effect of the argument is to put pressure on the CP thesis.
The zombie and anti-zombie arguments cannot both be sound, so if both
zombies and anti-zombies are conceivable, then (assuming (3) and (7) are
accepted) conceivability does not entail possibility. The argument is similar to
one advanced by Stephen Yablo, which turns on the conceivability of a
necessarily existing god.8 It seems that we can conceive both of the existence
of such a being and of its non-existence. But these conceptions cannot both
correspond with genuine possibilities, since a necessarily existing being exists in
all worlds if it exists in any. Again the CP thesis comes under pressure.
Thirdly, the anti-zombie argument should be distinguished from a
metamodal argument for physicalism, outlined by Chalmers (who does not, of
course, endorse it). Let p be the conjunction of all microphysical truths about
the world and q an arbitrary phenomenal truth. Then
11. It is conceivable that p q is necessary
12. If it is conceivable that p q is necessary, then it is possible that p q is

necessary [CP thesis]

13. If it is possible that p q is necessary, then p q is necessary [S5 principle
MLp Lp]
7

The idea that the zombists' weapons can be turned against themselves is not new, and both Peter Marton and
Scott Sturgeon have employed versions of the strategy: see P. Marton, 'Zombies versus Materialists: the Battle for
Conceivability', Southwest Philosophy Review, 14 (1998), pp. 131-8; S. Sturgeon, Matters of Mind: Consciousness, Reason and
Nature (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 115-16. However, their arguments, unlike the present one, take a metamodal
form.
8
S. Yablo, 'Concepts and Consciousness', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59 (1999), pp. 455-63.

14. If p q is necessary, then consciousness is physical

15. So consciousness is physical.9

(A parallel argument for dualism can be obtained by substituting 'not necessary'

for 'necessary' and 'non-physical' for 'physical' throughout.) Closely related
metamodal arguments have also been outlined by Peter Marton and Scott
Sturgeon.10
Crucially, this argument differs from the anti-zombie argument in that it
involves conceiving of the truth of a modal claim about the space of possible
worlds. This feature may be a serious weakness, for it is arguable that the CP
thesis applies only to non-modal claims about the distribution of properties
within worlds; indeed, since the space of possible worlds is unique, conceiving
of different spaces is tantamount to conceiving of the falsity of the CP thesis,
as Chalmers points out.11 The anti-zombie argument, in contrast, does not
suffer from this weakness. To conceive of anti-zombies, we simply have to
imagine a world where the relation between a being's phenomenal properties
and its underlying microphysical ones is such that the former are not further
properties over and above the latter for example, where the relation is one
of token identity. If it is possible for such a relation to hold, then a modal
claim follows, as spelt out in (9), but the claim need not form part of the
original conception. Physicalism entails a modal thesis, but need not be
conceived as one.
Fourthly, the anti-zombie argument lacks a certain weakness possessed by
its opposite number. The problem is that it is arguable that microphysical
concepts pick out their referents by their causal roles, rather than by their
intrinsic natures. If so, then in conceiving of a microphysical duplicate of our
world, we shall be conceiving merely of a structural duplicate a world with
functionally identical microphysical properties, distributed in the same way.
And the primary conceivability of such a world can show only that
consciousness does not supervene on the microphysical structure of our world.
It leaves open the possibility that there is an a posteriori necessity linking
consciousness with the intrinsic nature of the microphysical properties
involved a view which is a form of Russellian monism rather than
dualism.12 No corresponding loophole exists in the anti-zombie argument.
Assuming that the CP thesis is sound, the primary conceivability of an anti9

Adapted from Chalmers, 'The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism', online pre-publication version,

8.
10

Marton, 'Zombies versus Materialists: the Battle for Conceivability'; Sturgeon, Matters of Mind, pp. 115-16.

11

See Chalmers, 'Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality' and 'The Two- Dimensional Argument
Against Materialism'.
12
See Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, pp. 134-6, and 'Consciousness and its Place in Nature', pp. 256-7, 265-7.

zombie world establishes that it is possible for consciousness to supervene

metaphysically on the microphysical structure of our world, which in turn
establishes that this structure is metaphysically sufficient for consciousness,
whatever the intrinsic nature of the microphysical properties involved.
With these points made, I turn to an objection. This is that the anti-zombie
argument begs the question against interactionist dualism.13 The thought is that
we can conceive of a (temporally extended) bare physical duplicate of the
actual world only if we assume that the actual world is physically closed under
causation. For if some physical events in the actual world are partially
determined by facts about a non-physical consciousness, then it is obvious that
in a purely physical world with the same microphysical laws and the same
initial distribution of microphysical properties, events would unfold
differently.14 At first sight, it might seem that this objection is innocuous, since
a very similar one applies to the zombie argument, which also requires us to
conceive of a physically identical world without consciousness. Both arguments
assume that interactionist dualism is false. This is not the end of the matter,
however. Begging the question against interactionist dualism is, arguably, a
more serious sin for an anti-dualist argument than for a pro-dualist one.
Moreover, the zombie argument can be modified so that it does not beg this
question, giving an argument which interactionist dualists could endorse. A
world superficially like ours and with the same distribution of phenomenal
properties, but physically closed under causation (any causal gaps being filled
by physical substitutes for what are actually non-physical processes), I shall call
wpc (for physically closed). This world wpc might still contain non-physical
properties, provided they are epiphenomenal. Beings that are physical
duplicates of the inhabitants of wpc but are not conscious are zombiespc. The
interactionist dualist can run a modified zombie argument to the conclusion
that consciousness is non-physical in wpc. (Zombiespc are conceivable and
therefore possible, so the microphysical features of wpc are not metaphysically
sufficient for consciousness.) Since physicalists will say that wpc is the actual
world, it follows that physicalism about consciousness is false.
Similarly, however, anti-zombiespc can be defined as beings that are bare
physical duplicates of the inhabitants of wpc but none the less have exactly the
same conscious experiences as they do. Then a modified anti-zombie argument
can support the conclusion that consciousness is physical in wpc. (Antizombiespc are conceivable and therefore possible, so the microphysical features
13

I am grateful to Bob Kirk for pressing me to address this objection, and for suggesting the modified version of
the zombie argument discussed below.
14
See J. Perry, Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness (MIT Press, 2001), pp. 72-7.

of wpc are metaphysically sufficient for consciousness.) This does not entail that
physicalism is true, of course; to reach that conclusion would need the
additional premise that the actual world is physically closed under causation.
However, it does cancel out whatever reason the modified version of the
zombie argument provides for thinking that physicalism is false, and
interactionist dualists must either refute it or cease to employ that argument.
In what follows I shall focus on the original versions of the two arguments.
Since those versions assume that the actual world is physically closed under
causation, there is no difference between zombies and zombiespc or between
anti-zombies and anti-zombiespc, and the central conceivability issues are the
same in both cases.
III. THE MORAL FOR ZOMBISTS
How should advocates of the zombie argument ('zombists') respond to the
anti-zombie argument? Since they endorse the CP thesis, they must accept (6),
and as I have shown, (7) is uncontroversial. Their only option, then, is to deny
(5), that anti-zombies are conceivable. The same conclusion can be reached by
a different route. Zombists maintain that zombies are possible. But the
possibility of zombies is incompatible with that of anti-zombies. For if there is
an anti-zombie world, then its microphysical features are metaphysically
sufficient for consciousness. Hence there is no world with the same
microphysical features but without consciousness, that is, no zombie world.
Another way of making the point is that the unique possible world which is a
bare physical duplicate of the actual world (wbp for bare physical; this will be the
actual world itself, if the actual world has no non-physical features) ought to be
a zombie world, if any is. But wbp is also the only candidate for an anti-zombie
world. In effect, then, the proponents of the two arguments disagree as to
whether the inhabitants of wbp are conscious. If they are not, then wbp is
properly described as a zombie world, and zombies are possible; if they are,
then wbp is properly described as an anti-zombie world, and anti-zombies are
possible. But of course the two sides cannot both be right. Either the
inhabitants of wbp are conscious or they are not. Thus the possibility of
zombies is incompatible with that of anti-zombies. And if conceivability entails
possibility, then it follows that the conceivability of zombies is incompatible
with that of anti-zombies.
In short, physicalists have been giving zombists too easy a ride. It seemed
that if the CP thesis were sound, all zombists had to do was to show that there
is no incoherence in the notion of a zombie. But in fact they also have to show

that there is an incoherence in the notion of an anti-zombie. This involves a

significant shift of the burden of proof. As Chalmers himself explains:
In general, a certain burden of proof lies on those who claim that a given
description is logically impossible.... If no reasonable analysis of the terms in
question points towards a contradiction, or even makes the existence of a
contradiction plausible, then there is a natural assumption in favour of logical
possibility.15

I shall now argue that zombists cannot shoulder this burden, and thus that the
zombie argument fails. I shall begin by making the case for the conceivability
of anti-zombies, and then deal with some possible counter-arguments. Most of
the issues are familiar from the literature, but the present context will cast them
in a different light.16
IV. CONCEIVING OF ANTI-ZOMBIES
As Chalmers notes in 'Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?', conceivability
can be either negative or positive. A state of affairs is negatively conceivable if the
hypothesis that it obtains cannot be ruled out a priori, i.e., if there is no
contradiction latent in it. A state of affairs is positively conceivable if we can
imagine a scenario in which the state of affairs holds, and we can flesh out this
scenario to an arbitrary degree of detail. Prima facie, anti-zombies are
conceivable in both senses. To claim that anti-zombies are negatively
conceivable is, in effect, to claim that for all we know a priori, the phenomenal
properties of experience might be physical ones, whether neurological or
functional. This claim involves no obvious contradiction. As Locke observed,
we cannot rule out a priori the possibility that God might, if he pleased, give
systems of matter the power to perceive and think.17
It might be suggested that on analysis, the concept of a phenomenal
property turns out to be that of a non-physical property (an essentially
subjective one, say), so that it is a priori that phenomenal concepts do not apply
to anything in the anti-zombie world. This is not persuasive, however. We may
have a concept like this (the traditional philosophical concept of qualia,
15

Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, p. 96. By 'logically impossible' he means 'inconceivable': see 'Materialism and the
Metaphysics of Modality', p. 477.
16
Peter Marton has also argued in his 'Zombies versus Materialists' that the CP thesis can be used to shift the
burden of proof onto the zombist. He points out that if physicalism is treated as a supervenience thesis, then if it is
false, it is necessarily false, and hence impossible. But given the CP thesis, if a state of affairs is impossible, then it is
inconceivable. Since zombists reject physicalism and endorse the CP thesis, they must therefore show that physicalism
is inconceivable.
17
Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 5th edn (London: Dent, 1961), Vol. II, pp. 146-7.

10

perhaps), but physicalists simply deny that consciousness is to be characterized

in terms of it. Instead, they define phenomenal properties in a more neutral
way, as those properties we refer to when we talk of what our experiences are
like, and on which we focus when we introspect our experiences. This
definition does not preclude physicality.
Nor is it obviously impossible to form a positive conception of how
consciousness could be physical. At its simplest, imagining an anti-zombie
involves conjoining the ideas of a bare physical duplicate and consciousness,
and on the face of it this is no harder than disjoining them in the case of
zombies. It is true that there is some imaginative resistance to the idea that
consciousness might be physical. 'How could this', people sometimes ask,
mentally indicating some experience, 'be just a neurological state?'.
Difficulty is irrelevant here, however. Conceivability is all or nothing, and one
state of affairs may be harder to imagine than another without being less
conceivable. (It is, for example, much harder to imagine Ronald Reagan and
Freddie Mercury being the same person than to imagine their being distinct,
but the two scenarios are on a par with respect to primary conceivability.)
Moreover, reluctance to think of consciousness as physical can be explained
away by reference to the features of phenomenal concepts. It is generally
agreed that these are not physical concepts (that is, they do not represent their
objects as physical), and that their cognitive role is very different from that of
physical concepts (unlike physical concepts, they are deployed in introspection,
tend to trigger sensory images, and can be acquired only by those who have
had appropriate sensory experiences). And this may suggest that the properties
they pick out cannot be physical. But that, of course, would be a fallacy. It
remains open that phenomenal concepts pick out neurological or functional
states of some kind.
Of course, this needs supplementing with some account of how
phenomenal concepts could refer to physical properties, but it is not clear that
this cannot be done. We need to imagine a creature subjectively just like us and
with exactly the same physical structure as ours, but whose phenomenal
concepts refer to physical features of its experiences. Exactly what would be
required for this depends on the nature of phenomenal concepts and the
means by which their reference is determined things which are matters of
considerable dispute. But I can at least sketch a plausible picture. It is widely
agreed that phenomenal concepts pick out their referents directly, rather than
by way of other properties contingently associated with them.18 And I can flesh

18
See, e.g., Chalmers, 'The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief', in Q. Smith and A. Jokic (eds),
Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives (Oxford UP, 2003), pp. 220-72; Loar, 'Phenomenal States'; Papineau,
Thinking about Consciousness; Perry, Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness; M. Tye, Consciousness, Color, and Content

11

out this view by combining it either with a causal theory of reference,

according to which phenomenal concept c refers to phenomenal property P if
there is the right sort of causal dependency between tokenings of c and
occurrences of P, or with a causal-historical theory, according to which c refers
to P if c-tokening has been selected to serve as an indicator of P. Such accounts
are compatible with physicalism indeed, they are incompatible with
anything other than physicalism if the physical world is causally closed. Of
course, at present we do not know whether the postulated causal dependencies
or selectional histories actually obtain, and so cannot be sure that the
corresponding conceptions are coherent. (Empirical information is relevant
here, even though we are concerned with primary conceivability, since the
question is whether it is conceivable that our actual physical properties should be
sufficient for consciousness, and to answer this question we need to know
what our actual physical properties are.) But equally we do not know that the
conceptions, or variants of them, are not coherent, so there is no argument here
for denying the conceivability of anti-zombies.
V. ZOMBIST RESPONSES
What can zombists say in response to this? Is there some non-obvious
incoherence in the description of an anti-zombie world? I can think of three
possible lines of argument.
First, zombists may query the coherence of the account of phenomenal
concepts just outlined. It is arguable that physicalists should accept the
following two claims: (i) phenomenal concepts and microphysical concepts
both pick out their referents directly, rather than via associated properties; (ii) it
is not a priori knowable that phenomenal concepts and microphysical concepts
co-refer. As I mentioned, there is a strong case for thinking that phenomenal
concepts refer directly, and physicalists will probably maintain that
microphysical concepts refer directly too; denying this merely opens the door
to Russellian monism. Claim (ii) is also plausible; it does not seem possible to
determine that phenomenal concepts co-refer with microphysical ones simply
by reflection on the concepts themselves. (It is true that if the anti-zombie
argument is sound, there is a non-obvious a priori argument for that
conclusion, but in the present context it would be question-begging to rely on
it.) But then it follows that in order to conceive of an anti-zombie world we
have to imagine not only that two sets of directly referring concepts co-refer,
but also that it is not a priori knowable that they do so. The objection is that
(MIT Press, 2000), and 'A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts', in A. O'Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons
(Cambridge UP, 2003), pp. 91-105.

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this cannot be done coherently. For the only explanation of how we can fail to
know that two concepts co-refer is that at least one of them refers indirectly
and we are ignorant of empirical facts linking the properties by which its
reference is mediated with the referent of the other concept.19 Thus if two
concepts co-refer, then either it is a priori knowable that they do so or it is the
case that at least one of them refers indirectly, by way of contingently
associated properties. Following Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness, p. 92), I
shall refer to this as the transparency thesis, since it is the thesis that if two directly
referring concepts co-refer, then it is transparent that they do so.
The objection touches on a large recent literature, but this will not be
crucial to the overall argument of this paper and I shall confine myself to two
brief comments. First, ad hominem, the transparency thesis has a consequence
which some dualists may find unattractive. For it entails that phenomenal
concepts do not co-refer with any directly-referring theoretical concepts,
including non-physical ones. This conclusion is unlikely to be welcomed by
those dualists who hope to develop a science of consciousness which does
more than merely tabulate psychophysical correlations (for example, one which
seeks to explain consciousness in terms of more basic, proto-phenomenal
properties.20 Secondly, and more importantly, if a causal or causal-cum-historical
theory of reference holds for phenomenal concepts, then the transparency
thesis looks very implausible. For in that case the reference of these concepts
will depend on causal and/or historical factors to which we have no a priori
access, and it is very hard to see how it could be a priori knowable that they corefer with certain other directly referring concepts.21 It might be replied that
this is not a response that advocates of the anti-zombie argument can make,
since the transparency thesis is entailed by the CP thesis, which they accept.
(The thought is that if the transparency thesis were false, then there would be
numerous exceptions to the CP thesis, since it would be conceivable, but
impossible, that identities involving directly referring terms should not hold.)
This point is irrelevant, however, since we are here concerned with the
argumentative burdens of zombists, not those of their opponents. The zombist
must show that anti-zombies are inconceivable, regardless of whether the antizombie argument is sound.
I think this reply is in essence a good one, though it would require more
work to establish the case. I shall not pursue the matter here, however, since
ultimately nothing will turn on it. (I shall explain why in a moment.)

19

See Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, pp. 141-2, and 'Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality', pp. 4878. See also M. Lockwood, Mind, Brain and the Quantum (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), pp. 136-7.
20
See, e.g., Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, p. 126.
21

Papineau, Thinking about Consciousness, pp. 91-3.

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The second option for zombists is to insist that since zombies are ideally
conceivable, it follows, given the CP thesis, that anti-zombies are not.
Chalmers (in 'The Two-Dimensional Argument against Materialism') takes this
line in response to the metamodal argument for physicalism outlined earlier.
The CP thesis is a priori, he argues, and it is conceivable that the microphysical
facts p might hold without any given phenomenal fact q; so it is a priori that p
q is not necessary. Hence it is not ideally conceivable that p q is necessary.
(He offers a similar response to Yablo's god argument, arguing that a
necessarily existing god is not ideally conceivable.) The problem with this
tactic, however, is that it simply pits one conceivability intuition against
another. The advocate of the anti-zombie argument can run an exactly parallel
argument for the view that zombies are not ideally conceivable. In the cases
discussed by Chalmers the issue is clouded by the presence of metamodal
claims, but these are absent in the anti-zombie case, and the argument is
straightforward. The CP thesis is a priori, anti-zombies are conceivable, so it is a
priori that anti-zombies are possible and that zombies are not (since the
possibility of one is incompatible with that of the other, as I showed above).
Hence zombies are not ideally conceivable. It might be replied that it is harder
to conceive of anti-zombies than of zombies, and thus that the zombie
intuition should take priority over the anti-zombie one. But as I have already
noted, difficulty is irrelevant here, and without some independent argument for
the inconceivability of anti-zombies, it is hard to see why the anti-zombie
intuition should be dismissed in this way. Chalmers himself proposes that
neither the conceivability of physicalism nor its inconceivability should be used
as a premise in argument, but I see no reason to accept this ban. If the claim
that zombies are conceivable is admissible as a premise, then why should the
parallel claim about anti-zombies not be admissible too?
A third option for zombists would be to appeal to an a priori argument for
the falsity of physicalism. The anti-zombie world is one in which physicalism is
true, so if it is a priori that physicalism is false, then the description of the antizombie world is incoherent. But what anti-physicalist argument are zombists to
draw on? They cannot invoke the zombie argument itself, on pain of begging
the question. The zombie argument is sound only if anti-zombies are not
conceivable, so we cannot appeal to the zombie argument in order to establish
the inconceivability of anti-zombies. Zombists must therefore appeal to an
independent anti-physicalist argument.
There are problems with this move, however. First, it is not clear that there
is an independent argument against physicalism. Arguably, all the major
arguments trade in one way or another on the conceivability of zombies. The
key premise in the knowledge argument, for example, is that the phenomenal
facts cannot be deduced from the physical ones which is to say that

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zombies cannot be ruled out a priori, and are thus negatively conceivable.
Secondly, and more importantly, the move would render the zombie argument
itself redundant. If the only way of defending the zombie argument is with an
independent argument for the same conclusion, then the zombie argument
confers no additional plausibility on that conclusion.
The point can be made more formally. Let i be the claim that anti-zombies are
inconceivable, d the claim that dualism is true, p1 the conjunction of the
premises of the zombie argument, and p2 the conjunction of the premises of
the independent argument for dualism. p1 entails i, as I showed earlier, and I
am supposing for the moment that the only reason we have to believe i is that
p2 entails d and d entails i. But then p1 will be only as plausible as p2. Given that
p2 itself entails d, this means that p1 cannot be more plausible than d
independently is, and so does not confer any additional plausibility on d.
The moral is that zombists need to identify grounds for thinking that antizombies are inconceivable, grounds which are (a) independent of the claim that
zombies are conceivable, and (b) not themselves sufficient to entail the falsity
of physicalism. It is now clear why the first response I considered, involving
the transparency thesis, cannot save the zombie argument. For even if sound, it
fails condition (b). The argument relies on three claims: (i) phenomenal
concepts and microphysical concepts refer directly; (ii) it is not a priori
knowable that phenomenal concepts and microphysical concepts co-refer; (iii)
the transparency thesis is true. But these claims jointly entail that phenomenal
concepts do not co-refer with microphysical ones that is, that physicalism is
false. So the argument does not meet condition (b) and is not available to
zombists.
I suspect that a similar problem would beset any other attempt to
demonstrate that the notion of an anti-zombie is incoherent. Even if a sound
argument could be found, the considerations involved would independently
entail the falsity of physicalism, making the zombie argument otiose. If this is
right, then the zombie argument is either unsound or redundant, and the
zombist's argumentative position is untenable.
VI. ENDORSING THE ARGUMENT?
The anti-zombie argument was conceived as a tactical device to neutralize the
zombie argument. Its primary function is to show that the CP thesis is a twoedged sword and should be rejected. The natural conclusion to draw is that
both the zombie argument and the anti-zombie argument are flawed, for the
same reason. This strategy should be congenial to type-B materialists, who
accept that zombies are conceivable while denying that they are possible.

15

But there is another option for the physicalist. One of the following three
claims must be rejected: (i) the CP thesis is true; (ii) zombies are conceivable;
(iii) anti-zombies are conceivable. And if one judges that the case for the CP
thesis is stronger than the case for the conceivability of zombies, then one
might decide to reject (ii) instead of (i), and endorse the anti-zombie argument.
This line might be taken by a type-A materialist.
Of course, in endorsing the anti-zombie argument, one would incur a
corresponding burden of proof. One would need to produce grounds for
thinking that zombies are inconceivable, grounds which are (a) independent of
the claim that anti-zombies are conceivable, and (b) not themselves sufficient
to entail the falsity of dualism. The prospects for doing this may actually be
rather better than those for establishing the same for anti-zombies. Prima facie,
a promising option would be to develop an argument for the view that
phenomenal properties are functional properties, perhaps representational
ones. This would entail the impossibility of zombies, which are supposed to be
functional but not phenomenal duplicates, without trading on the anti-zombie
intuition itself. And since functionalism does not entail physicalism, it would
satisfy (b) too. A further argument would be needed to establish that the
functional properties in question are in fact physically realized a need which
the anti-zombie argument might supply.
These are only prima facie considerations, of course, and in any case it is
unlikely that anyone would want to employ the anti-zombie argument in the
role suggested, since there is a much simpler inductive argument from
functionalism to physicalism. Given that all the other functional properties we
know of appear to be physically realized, it is reasonable to infer that
phenomenal ones will be, too, if they are functional.
VII. CONCLUSION
Dualists should not be zombists. The zombie argument is an elegant and
seductive piece of philosophical argumentation. But the idea that we can
determine the nature of consciousness by an exercise of the imagination seems
too good to be true, and the fact that we can construct an anti-zombie
argument suggests that it is not true. When zombies and anti-zombies meet,
they annihilate each other, and in so doing reveal that considerations of
conceivability have little role to play in debates about the nature of
consciousness.22

22
I am grateful to David Chalmers, Bob Kirk and anonymous referees for helpful comments on earlier
drafts. I have also benefited from advice from Peter Carruthers, Tim Chappell, Derek Matravers, David
Papineau and Carolyn Price.

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