Victor Manuel Santamaria, A089 713 036 (BIA Dec. 30, 2015)
Victor Manuel Santamaria, A089 713 036 (BIA Dec. 30, 2015)
Victor Manuel Santamaria, A089 713 036 (BIA Dec. 30, 2015)
Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board ofImmigration Appeals
Office ofthe Clerk
5107 Leesburg Pike, Suite 2000
Falls Church, Virginia 22041
A 089-7'13-036
Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision and order in the above-referenced case.
Sincerely,
Donna Carr
Chief Clerk
Enclosure
Panel Members:
Wendtland, Linda S.
Greer, Anne J.
Pauley, Roger
Userteam: Docket
Nestor, Bruce
De Leon & Nestor, LLC
3547 Cedar Ave. S
Minneapolis, MN 55407
Date:
DEC 3 0 2015
APPEAL
ON BEHALF OF RE SPONDENT: Bruce D.Nestor, Esquire.
CHARGE:
Notice:
Sec.
212(a)(6)(A)(i), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)] Present without being admitted or paroled
The respondent appeals the Immigration Judge's decision, dated December 4, 2014, denying
his application for cancellation of removal. The appeal will be sustained.
The respondent admitted the factual allegations in the Notice to Appear and conceded
removability (Tr. at 5; I.J. at 1). The issue on appeal is whether the respondent's 2007
Minnesota conviction for misdemeanor domestic assault was for a crime of domestic violence
under section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
1227(a)(2)(E)(i), thus disqualifying him from cancellation of removal under section
240A(b)(l)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(l)(C). The Immigration Judge found that the
respondent's offense of conviction was categorically a crime of domestic violence (I.J. at 3). We
disagree.
The respondent's statute of conviction-Minn. Stat. 609.2242 subdiv. 1(1) (2006)-states
as follows, in relevant part:
Whoever does any of the following against a family or household
member as defined in section 518B.01, subdivision 2, commits an
assault and is guilty of a misdemeanor:
(1) commits an act with intent to cause fear m another of
immediate bodily harm or death ....
A "crime of domestic violence" means any "crime of violence," as that term is defined in
18 U.S.C. 16, that is committed by a specified person against one of a defined set of victims.
See section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Act. In turn, a crime of violence is defined at 18 U. S.C.
16 as follows:
Cite as: Victor Manuel Santamaria, A089 713 036 (BIA Dec. 30, 2015)
IN REMOVAL PROCEEDING S
The respondent's misdemeanor conviction can only qualify as a cnme of violence under
subsection (a).
Minnesota defines bodily harm as "physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of
physical condition." Minn. Rev. Stat. 609.02 subdiv. 7. We have previously held "that the
'physical force' necessary to establish that an offense is a 'crime of violence' for purposes of the
Act must be 'violent' force, that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another
person." Matter of Velasquez, 25 I&N Dec. 278, 283 (BIA 2010). Minnesota's definition of
bodily harm, which includes illness or any impairment of physical condition, appears
categorically overbroad in light of our holding in Matter of Velasquez.
Furthermore, the respondent has established a realistic probability that the operative phrase
"bodily harm " is in fact interpreted by the Minnesota courts to encompass some minimal harms
inflicted by non-violent means. In State v. Kelley, 734 N.W.2d 689, 693 (Minn. Ct.App. 2007),
the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that spitting "at or onto another can cause physical pain or
injury, illness, or otherwise impair one's physical condition." 1 In our view, spitting at someone
does not categorically amount to the violent force necessary to establish a crime of violence.
In concluding that the respondent's offense is a crime of violence, the Immigration Judge
relied on United States v. Salido-Rosas, 662 F.3d 1254, 1256 (8th Cir. 2011), which held that a
municipal ordinance prohibiting "knowingly or purposely . . . making another person fear
imminent bodily harm necessarily requires using, attempting to use, or threatening to use
physical force " (I.J.at 3). However, Salido-Rosas is distinguishable because the court there did
not indicate that the meaning of "bodily harm " under the municipal ordinance involved in that
case extends to the minimal harms, inflicted by non-violent means, that are encompassed by the
Minnesota domestic assault statute at issue here. Thus, even though both the Minnesota
domestic assault statute and the Omaha municipal provision in Salido-Rosas use the term bodily
harm, in light of Kelley, there is a realistic probability that Minnesota would prosecute conduct
not amounting to violent force under its domestic assault statute. See Moncrieffe v. Holder,
133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684 (2013) (courts must presume conviction rests on the least of the acts
1
Although Kelley was not a domestic assault case, the Minnesota Court of Appeals squarely
noted that "[i]ntentionally throwing or transferring bodily fluids ...at or onto another person ...
satisfies the requirements of simple, fifth-degree assault." Kelley, supra, at 693. The relevant
domestic assault provision, with the exception of the required victim, uses the same "bodily harm "
definition as fifth-degree assault. Compare Minn. Stat. 609.2242 subdiv. 1(1) (domestic
assault) with Minn. Stat. 609.224, subd. 1 (fifth-degree assault).
2
Cite as: Victor Manuel Santamaria, A089 713 036 (BIA Dec. 30, 2015)
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial
risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in
the course of committing the offense.
The Immigration Judge noted that she did not look to state law given her finding that domestic
assault is categorically a crime of violence (I. J. at 3 n. l ). However, we considered state law in
the course of evaluating the respondent's claim, because much of the claim is predicated upon
how Minnesota courts evaluate their criminal code.
3
Cite as: Victor Manuel Santamaria, A089 713 036 (BIA Dec. 30, 2015)