Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-21381

April 5, 1924

SANTIAGO QUIMSON, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PABLO SUAREZ, defendant-appellant.
Camus and Delgado and Jose Serapio for appellant.
Jose Bernabe for appellee.
OSTRAND, J.:
This is an action of forcible entry and detainer, the plaintiff alleging that he is entitled to
the possession of the land in question under a lease from its owner and that the
defendant is wrongfully withholding it from him. The defendant maintains that he is
lawfully in possession under another lease of an earlier date from the same owner.
It appears from the evidence that on February 28, 1917, the deceased Pablo Tecson
leased a large fishpond situated in the municipality of Orani, Province of Bataan, to one
David Luna for the term of ten years at an annual rent of P900. Two months later Luna,
with the consent of Tecson, assigned the lease to Pablo Suarez, the defendant herein.
Shortly afterwards Tecson applied for the registration of the land under Act No. 496, but
died before the final disposal of the case and the final decree and corresponding
certificate of title were issued in the names of Esperanza Tongco de Trias, as
administratrix of Tecson's estate, and Maximiana Tongco, his widow, in equal shares.
Neither in the final decree nor in the certificate of title was any mention made of the
lease in favor of Suarez.
Esperanza Tongco de Trias appears to have been succeeded as administratrix by
Maximiana Tongco and the latter as such administratrix, and as guardian of the heirs of
Tecson, and also in her own behalf, granted a lease of the land to the plaintiff Quimson.
The lease is dated May 23, 1920, and is for the term of six years from May 1, 1921, the
rent for the entire term being fixed at P6,250, payable at the time of the execution of the
lease. This lease was at once entered by memorandum upon the certificate of title for
the land. At the time of the execution of the lease the plaintiff knew that the defendant
Suarez was in possession of the land as a tenant of Maximiana Tongco, by whom he
had been told that the term of Suarez' lease expired on March 1, 1921, and there is no
evidence showing that he had notice of the fact that the term extended beyond that date.
On November 15, 1920, Suarez brought an action in the Court of First Instance against
Quimson and Maximiana Tongco to have Quimson's lease set aside. As far as the record
shows the action may still be pending.
On May 1, 1921, Quimson made a formal demand upon Suarez for the surrender of the
possession and the demand not being complied with, the present action was brought in
the court of the justice of the peace of Orani, the complaint being filed May 6, 1921. The
defendant objected formally to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that the action
was in reality not one of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, and therefore not within the

jurisdiction of the justice of the peace. The court overruled the objection, took
cognizance of the case, and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff ordering the
defendant to vacate the land and to pay damages in the sum of P280.
The defendant appealed to the Court of First Instance where he appeared specially and
presented a motion for the dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds as those
urged in support of his objection to the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace. The motion
was denied.
The case was placed on the calendar for June 22, 1922, but was continued on motion of
the defendant. It was again set for trial on August 11, 1922, and plaintiff appeared
accompanied by his counsel; the defendant also appeared and presented another
motion for a continuance on the ground that his counsel had a case for trial in another
court and was unable to appear in the present case on that date. The court denied the
motion and proceeded with the trial, at which trial the defendant testified in his own
behalf. The court thereupon rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the possession
of the land and the sum of P590 in damages, with costs, and the case is now before us
upon appeal by the defendant from that judgment.
The appellant presents three assignments of error, viz.:
(a) The trial court erred in overstepping its discretionary powers by denying the
petition for postponement of the trial filed by the defendant on August 9, 1922.
(b) The trial court erred in overruling the motion for dismissal presented by the
defendant on the ground that the Court of First Instance of Bataan had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of this case on appeal.
(c) The trial court erred in holding that the right of possession of the defendant to
the land described in paragraph 1 of the complaint was extinguished on April 30,
1921; and in adjudging that the contract of lease, Exhibit 4 of the defendant, is
null and void for not having been noted on the corresponding certificate of title.
(1) There is no merit in the first assignment of error. The defendant had already
been granted a continuance of the case and failed to give plaintiff's counsel due
notice of the second motion for a continuance, thus causing the latter the
expense and trouble of going from Manila to Balanga. Under the circumstances,
the denial of the second motion certainly did not constitute abuse of discretion.
(2) Neither can the second assignment of error be sustained. The defendant
argues that the action is not one of forcible entry and detainer as defined in
section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The pertinent part of that section reads
as follows:
Anyone deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth, and any landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
determination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or
implied, and the legal representatives or assigns of any such landlord, vendor, vendee,
or other person, shall at any time within one year after such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession be entitled, as against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or against any person or persons claiming under

them, to restitution of the land, building, and premises possession of which is unlawfully
withheld, together with damages and costs. . . .
The complaint alleges that the plaintiff has been entitled to the possession of the land
since May, 1921; that the defendant's right of possession expired April 30, 1921; and that
the defendant is illegally withholding the possession from the plaintiff. These allegations
bring the case squarely within the section quoted and, if so, the justice of the peace had
original jurisdiction. The authorities cited by the defendant in support of his contention
are so clearly inapplicable to this case that a discussion of them seems unnecessary.
(3) The third assignment of error relates to the principal question in the case, i.e.,
the determination of the legal effect of the two leases and of their relative priority.
As we have already stated, the land in question is registered under Act No. 496.
The plaintiff's lease is duly entered upon the certificate of title; the defendant's
lease, though prior in date, has never been registered, nor is any intimation of its
existence to be found upon the certificate of title. At the time the plaintiff entered
into his contract of lease, he had knowledge of the fact that the defendant was in
physical possession of the land and if the land were unregistered this would be
sufficient to put him upon inquiry and charge him with constructive notice of the
defendant's rights.
But here the land is registered and in regard to such lands as unrecorded lease operates
only as a contract between the parties and does not affect the rights of third parties in
the absence of fraud on their part. Inasmuch as sales, mortgages and leases stand on
the same footing in this respect, the following quotation from Niblack on the Torrens
System, p. 222, citing Independent Lumber Co. vs. Gardiner (3 Sask., 140), is in point:
The rule relative to the protection which will be afforded by a new registration is
that a purchaser for value will be protected in his registered interests unless
actual and moral fraud on his part is to be inferred from the circumstances under
which he obtained them. A person taking a mortgage from a registered owner of
land is not affected by notice of an unregistered interest in another person,
whereby such person is the owner of an undivided one-half of the land, but if the
mortgagor, when he executed it, expressly told the mortgagee that he owned
only an undivided one-half of the land, that he only intended to mortgage his onehalf, and that he intended to exempt the interest of his cotenant, the mortgagee is
guilty of fraud against the unregistered owner in attempting to enforce the
mortgage against the whole land. Fraud on the part of a vendor in acquiring his
title cannot affect the statutory protection and indefeasibility of title given to a
registered purchaser for value, who had no part in or knowledge of the fraud.
This rule is the same as in case of original registration.
One of the principal features of the Torrens System of registration is that all
incumbrances on the land or special estates therein shall be shown, or, at least,
intimated upon the certificate of title and a person dealing with the owner of the
registered land is not bound to go behind the certificate and inquire into transactions, the
existence of which is not there intimated. There being in the present case not indication
on the certificate of title of the existence of the defendant's lease, and the certificate
therefore showing a clear title and right of possession in favor of the lessor, the plaintiff
had a perfect right to rely on the lessor's statement that defendant's right of possession
terminated on April 30, 1921, and was not bound to make further inquiries. He can,
therefore, not be charged with fraud neither actual nor constructive.

The disadvantages of adopting the rule suggested by the appellant would far outweigh
the advantages, would be out of harmony with the underlying principles of the Torrens
System of registration and would tend to impair the value of registered titles.
The judgment appealed from is therefore affirmed, with the costs against the appellant.
So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Avancea and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Street, J., dissents.

Separate Opinions
JOHNS, J., dissenting:
I dissent.
At the time the plaintiff took his lease, he personally knew that the defendant was in the
actual physical possession of the property, and had been for a number of years. The fact
that the plaintiff had personal knowledge of such fact was sufficient to put him upon
notice of defendant's rights, and to legally charge him with knowledge of any information,
which he might received upon inquiry from the defendant as to the tenure of his lease.
The only object of the registration law is to give a party notice of the rights of third
parties, and if he has personal knowledge of such rights, or such notice as to put him
upon inquiry, as in this case, he is not in a position to say that he took the lease without
knowledge of defendant's rights.
Upon