G.R. No.

L-32636

March 17, 1930

In the matter Estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased.

A.W. FLUEMER, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ANNIE COUSHING HIX, oppositor-appellee.
C.A. Sobral for appellant.
Harvey & O' Brien and Gibbs & McDonough for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix appeals from a decision of Judge of First
Instance Tuason denying the probate of the document alleged to by the last will and testament of the deceased.
Appellee is not authorized to carry on this appeal. We think, however, that the appellant, who appears to have
been the moving party in these proceedings, was a "person interested in the allowance or disallowance of a will
by a Court of First Instance," and so should be permitted to appeal to the Supreme Court from the disallowance
of the will (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 781, as amended; Villanueva vs. De Leon [1925], 42 Phil., 780).
It is theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia, on November 3, 1925,
by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Verginia Code, Annotated, by
Hogg, Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p. 1690, and as certified to by the Director of the National Library. But this was
far from a compliance with the law. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts.
the courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take American Union. Such laws must be proved as
facts. (In re Estate of Johnson [1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here the requirements of the law were not met. There was
no was printed or published under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having
charge of the original, under the sale of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in
force at the time the alleged will was executed.
In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. The only evidence on this point is to be found in
the testimony of the petitioner. Aside from this, there was nothing to indicate that the will was acknowledged
by the testator in the presence of two competent witnesses, of that these witnesses subscribed the will in the
presence of the testator and of each other as the law of West Virginia seems to require. On the supposition that
the witnesses to the will reside without the Philippine Islands, it would then the duty of the petitioner to prove
execution by some other means (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 633.)
It was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator had his domicile in West Virginia and not
establish this fact consisted of the recitals in the CATHY will and the testimony of the petitioner. Also in
beginning administration proceedings orginally in the Philippine Islands, the petitioner violated his own theory
by attempting to have the principal administration in the Philippine Islands.
While the appeal pending submission in this court, the attorney for the appellant presented an unverified
petition asking the court to accept as part of the evidence the documents attached to the petition. One of these
documents discloses that a paper writing purporting to be the was presented for probate on June 8, 1929, to the

clerk of Randolph Country, State of West Virginia, in vacation, and was duly proven by the oaths of Dana
Wamsley and Joseph L. MAdden, the subscribing witnesses thereto , and ordered to be recorded and filed. It
was shown by another document that, in vacation, on June 8, 1929, the clerk of court of Randolph Country,
West Virginia, appointed Claude W. Maxwell as administrator, cum testamento annexo, of the estate of Edward
Randolph Hix, deceased. In this connection, it is to be noted that the application for the probate of the will in
the Philippines was filed on February 20, 1929, while the proceedings in West Virginia appear to have been
initiated on June 8, 1929. These facts are strongly indicative of an intention to make the Philippines the
principal administration and West Virginia the ancillary administration. However this may be, no attempt has
been made to comply with Civil Procedure, for no hearing on the question of the allowance of a will said to
have been proved and allowed in West Virginia has been requested. There is no showing that the deceased left
any property at any place other than the Philippine Islands and no contention that he left any in West Virginia.
Reference has been made by the parties to a divorce purported to have been awarded Edward Randolph Hix
from Annie Cousins Hix on October 8, 1925, in the State of West specific pronouncements on the validity or
validity of this alleged divorce.
For all of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against
the appellant.
Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-22595

November 1, 1927

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the
deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of
the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by
the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the declaration that
the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of

partition and the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions
requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of
Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason
they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other things, provides the
following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the
amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the
property or the country in which it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in accordance with the
Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter,
and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines.
(Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he
desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of
the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony
requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error. It is
discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample
opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this
particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo
was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must
be complied with and executed.
lawphil.net

Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee,
inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into consideration that such
exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been
conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand,
having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in
acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and
everything in connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in
force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul
and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who
fail to comply with this request.

The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must
respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in
accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the herein
oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is
prevented from receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code
provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed
and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator
otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to
article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary
dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution
of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the
condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and
effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made
in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of
partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without any pronouncement
as to costs.
So ordered.
Street, Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor and Ostrand, JJ., concur.
G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088

July 31, 1954

In re: Testate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY. SILVINO SUNTAY, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
In re: Intestate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY,
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, administrator-appellee.
Claro M. Recto for appellant.
Sison and Aruego for appellee.

PADILLA, J.:
This is an appeal from a decree of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan disallowing the alleged will and
testament executed in Manila on November 1929, and the alleged last will and testament executed in
Kulangsu, Amoy, China, on 4 January 1931, by Jose B. Suntay. The value of the estate left by the deceased is
more than P50,000.
On 14 May 1934 Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines, died in the city of Amoy,
Fookien province, Republic of China, leaving real and personal properties in the Philippines and a house in
Amoy, Fookien province, China, and children by the first marriage had with the late Manuela T. Cruz namely,
Apolonio, Concepcion, Angel, Manuel, Federico, Ana, Aurora, Emiliano, and Jose, Jr. and a child named
Silvino by the second marriage had with Maria Natividad Lim Billian who survived him. Intestate proceedings
were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (special proceedings No. 4892) and after hearing
letters of administration were issued to Apolonio Suntay. After the latter's death Federico C. Suntay was
appointed administrator of the estate. On 15 October 1934 the surviving widow filed a petition in the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan for the probate of a last will and testament claimed to have been executed and signed
in the Philippines on November 1929 by the late Jose B. Suntay. This petition was denied because of the loss
of said will after the filing of the petition and before the hearing thereof and of the insufficiency of the
evidence to establish the loss of the said will. An appeal was taken from said order denying the probate of the
will and this Court held the evidence before the probate court sufficient to prove the loss of the will and
remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the further proceedings (63 Phil., 793). In spite
of the fact that a commission from the probate court was issued on 24 April 1937 for the taking of the
deposition of Go Toh, an attesting witness to the will, on 7 February 1938 the probate court denied a motion
for continuance of the hearing sent by cablegram from China by the surviving widow and dismissed the
petition. In the meantime the Pacific War supervened. After liberation, claiming that he had found among the
files, records and documents of his late father a will and testament in Chinese characters executed and signed
by the deceased on 4 January 1931 and that the same was filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district
court, Province of Fookien, China, Silvino Suntay filed a petition in the intestate proceedings praying for the
probate of the will executed in the Philippines on November 1929 (Exhibit B) or of the will executed in Amoy,
Fookien, China, on 4 January 1931 (Exhibit N).
There is no merit in the contention that the petitioner Silvino Suntay and his mother Maria Natividad Lim
Billian are estopped from asking for the probate of the lost will or of the foreign will because of the transfer or
assignment of their share right, title and interest in the estate of the late Jose B. Suntay to Jose G. Gutierrez and
the spouses Ricardo Gutierrez and Victoria Goo and the subsequent assignment thereof by the assignees to
Francisco Pascual and by the latter to Federico C. Suntay, for the validity and legality of such assignments
cannot be threshed out in this proceedings which is concerned only with the probate of the will and testament
executed in the Philippines on November 1929 or of the foreign will allegedly executed in Amoy on 4 January
1931 and claimed to have been probated in the municipal district court of Amoy, Fookien province, Republic
of China.
As to prescription, the dismissal of the petition for probate of the will on 7 February 1938 was no bar to the
filing of this petition on 18 June 1947, or before the expiration of ten years.
As to the lost will, section 6, Rule 77, provides:
No will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed will unless the execution and validity of the same be
established, and the will is proved to have been in existence at the time of the death of the testator, or
is shown to have been fraudulently or accidentally destroyed in the lifetime of the testator without his
knowledge, nor unless its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible
witnesses. When a lost will is proved, the provisions thereof must be distinctly stated and certified by

the judge, under the seal of the court, and the certificate must be filed and recorded as other wills are
filed and recorded.
The witnesses who testified to the provisions of the lost will are Go Toh, an attesting witness, Anastacio
Teodoro and Ana Suntay. Manuel Lopez, who was an attesting witness to the lost will, was dead at the time of
the hearing of this alternative petition. In his deposition Go Toh testifies that he was one of the witnesses to the
lost will consisting of twenty-three sheets signed by Jose B. Suntay at the bottom of the will and each and
every page thereof in the presence of Alberto Barretto, Manuel Lopez and himself and underneath the testator's
signature the attesting witnesses signed and each of them signed the attestation clause and each and every page
of the will in the presence of the testator and of the other witnesses (answers to the 31st, 41st, 42nd, 49th, 50th,
55th and 63rd interrogatories, Exhibit D-1), but did not take part in the drafting thereof (answer to the 11th
interrogatory,Id.); that he knew the contents of the will written in Spanish although he knew very little of that
language (answers to the 22nd and 23rd interrogatories and to X-2 cross-interrogatory, Id.) and all he knows
about the contends of the lost will was revealed to him by Jose B. Suntay at the time it was executed (answers
to the 25th interrogatory and to X-4 and X-8 cross-interrogatories, Id.); that Jose B. Suntay told him that the
contents thereof are the same as those of the draft (Exhibit B) (answers to the 33rd interrogatory and to X-8
cross-interrogatory, Id.) which he saw in the office of Alberto Barretto in November 1929 when the will was
signed (answers to the 69th, 72nd, and 74th interrogatories, Id); that Alberto Barretto handed the draft and said
to Jose B. Suntay: "You had better see if you want any correction" (answers to the 81st, 82nd and 83rd
interrogatories, Id.); that "after checking Jose B. Suntay put the "Exhibit B" in his pocket and had the original
signed and executed" (answers to the 91st interrogatory, and to X-18 cross-interrogatory, Id.); that Mrs. Suntay
had the draft of the will (Exhibit B) translated into Chinese and he read the translation (answers to the 67th
interrogatory, Id.); that he did not read the will and did not compare it (check it up) with the draft (Exhibit B)
(answers to X-6 and X-20 cross-interrogatories, Id.).
Ana Suntay testifies that sometime in September 1934 in the house of her brother Apolonio Suntay she learned
that her father left a will "because of the arrival of my brother Manuel Suntay, who was bringing along with
him certain document and he told us or he was telling us that it was the will of our father Jose B. Suntay which
was taken from Go Toh. ..." (p. 524, t. s. n., hearing of 24 February 1948); that she saw her brother Apolonio
Suntay read the document in her presence and of Manuel and learned of the adjudication made in the will by
her father of his estate, to wit: one-third to his children, one-third to Silvino and his mother and the other third
to Silvino, Apolonio, Concepcion and Jose, Jr. (pp. 526-8, 530-1, 542, t. s. n. Id.); that "after Apolonio read that
portion, then he turned over the document to Manuel, and he went away," (p. 528, t. s. n., Id.). On crossexamination, she testifies that she read the part of the will on adjudication to know what was the share of each
heir (pp. 530, 544, t. s. n., Id.) and on redirect she testifies that she saw the signature of her father, Go Toh,
Manuel Lopez and Alberto Barretto (p. 546, t. s. n., Id.).
Anastacio Teodoro testifies that one day in November 1934 (p. 273, t. s. n., hearing of 19 January 1948),
before the last postponement of the hearing granted by the Court, Go Toh arrived at his law office in the De los
Reyes Building and left an envelope wrapped in red handkerchief [Exhibit C] (p. 32, t. s. n., hearing of 13
October 1947); that he checked up the signatures on the envelope Exhibit A with those on the will placed in the
envelope (p. 33, t. s. n., Id.); that the will was exactly the same as the draft Exhibit B (pp. 32, 47, 50, t. s.
n., Id.).
If the will was snatched after the delivery thereof by Go Toh to Anastacio Teodoro And returned by the latter to
the former because they could not agree on the amount of fees, the former coming to the latter's office straight
from the boat (p. 315, t. s. n., hearing of 19 January 1948) that brought him to the Philippines from Amoy, and
that delivery took place in November 1934 (p. 273, t. s. n., Id.), then the testimony of Ana Suntay that she saw
and heard her brother Apolonio Suntay read the will sometime in September 1934 (p. 524, t. s. n., hearing of
24 February 1948), must not be true.

Although Ana Suntay would be a good witness because she was testifying against her own interest, still the
fact remains that she did not read the whole will but only the adjudication (pp. 526-8, 530-1, 542, t. s. n., Id.)
and saw only the signature, of her father and of the witnesses Go Toh, Manuel Lopez and Alberto Barretto (p.
546, t. s. n.,Id.). But her testimony on cross-examination that she read the part of the will on adjudication is
inconsistent with her testimony in chief that after Apolonio had read that part of the will he turned over or
handed the document to Manuel who went away (p. 528, t. s. n., Id.).
If it is true that Go Toh saw the draft Exhibit B in the office of Alberto Barretto in November 1929 when the
will was signed, then the part of his testimony that Alberto Barretto handed the draft to Jose B. Suntay to
whom he said: "You had better see if you want any correction" and that "after checking Jose B. Suntay put the
"Exhibit B" in his pocket and had the original signed and executed" cannot be true, for it was not the time for
correcting the draft of the will, because it must have been corrected before and all corrections and additions
written in lead pencil must have been inserted and copied in the final draft of the will which was signed on that
occasion. The bringing in for the draft (Exhibit B) on that occasion is just to fit it within the framework of the
appellant's theory. At any rate, all of Go Toh's testimony by deposition on the provisions of the alleged lost will
is hearsay, because he came to know or he learned to them from information given him by Jose B. Suntay and
from reading the translation of the draft (Exhibit B) into Chinese.
Much stress is laid upon the testimony of Federico C. Suntay who testifies that he read the supposed will or the
alleged will of his father and that the share of the surviving widow, according to the will, is two-thirds of the
estate (p. 229, t. s. n., hearing of 24 October 1947). But this witness testified to oppose the appointment of a
co-administrator of the estate, for the reason that he had acquired the interest of the surviving widow not only
in the estate of her deceased husband but also in the conjugal property (pp. 148, 205, 228, 229, 231, t. s. n., Id.)
Whether he read the original will or just the copy thereof (Exhibit B) is not clear. For him the important point
was that he had acquired all the share, participation and interest of the surviving widow and of the only child
by the second marriage in the estate of his deceased father. Be that as it may, his testimony that under the will
the surviving widow would take two-thirds of the estate of the late Jose B. Suntay is at variance with Exhibit B
and the testimony of Anastacio Teodoro. According to the latter, the third for strict legitime is for the ten
children; the third for betterment is for Silvino, Apolonio, Concepcion and Jose Jr.; and the third for free
disposal is for the surviving widow and her child Silvino.
Hence, granting that there was a will duly executed by Jose B. Suntay placed in the envelope (Exhibit A) and
that it was in existence at the time of, and not revoked before, his death, still the testimony of Anastacio
Teodoro alone falls short of the legal requirement that the provisions of the lost will must be "clearly and
distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses." Credible witnesses mean competent witnesses and those
who testify to facts from or upon hearsay are neither competent nor credible witnesses.
On the other hand, Alberto Barretto testifies that in the early part of 1929 he prepared or drew up two mills for
Jose B. Suntay at the latter's request, the rough draft of the first will was in his own handwriting, given to
Manuel Lopez for the final draft or typing and returned to him; that after checking up the final with the rough
draft he tore it and returned the final draft to Manuel Lopez; that this draft was in favor of all the children and
the widow (pp. 392-4, 449, t. s. n., hearing of 21 February 1948); that two months later Jose B. Suntay and
Manuel Lopez called on him and the former asked him to draw up another will favoring more his wife and
child Silvino; that he had the rough draft of the second will typed (pp. 395, 449 t. s. n., Id.) and gave it to
Manuel Lopez (p. 396, t. s. n., Id.); that he did not sign as witness the second will of Jose B. Suntay copied
from the typewritten draft [Exhibit B] (p. 420, t. s. n., Id.); that the handwritten insertions or additions in lead
pencil to Exhibit B are not his (pp. 415-7 435-6, 457, t. s. n., Id.); that the final draft of the first will made up of
four or five pages (p. 400, t. s. n., Id.) was signed and executed, two or three months after Suntay and Lopez
had called on him (pp. 397-8, 403, 449, t. s. n., Id.) in his office at the Cebu Portland Cement in the China
Banking Building on Dasmarias street by Jose B. Suntay, Manuel Lopez and a Chinaman who had all come
from Hagonoy (p. 398, t. s. n., Id.); that on that occasion they brought an envelope (Exhibit A) where the
following words were written: "Testamento de Jose B. Suntay" (pp. 399, 404, t. s. n., Id.); that after the signing

of the will it was placed inside the envelope (Exhibit A) together with an inventory of the properties of Jose B.
Suntay and the envelope was sealed by the signatures of the testator and the attesting witnesses (pp. 398, 401,
441, 443, 461, t. s. n., Id.); that he again saw the envelope (Exhibit A) in his house one Saturday in the later
part of August 1934, brought by Go Toh and it was then in perfect condition (pp. 405-6, 411, 440-2, t. s.
n., Id.); that on the following Monday Go Toh went to his law office bringing along with him the envelope
(Exhibit A) in the same condition; that he told Go Toh that he would charge P25,000 as fee for probating the
will (pp. 406, 440-2, Id.); that Go Toh did not leave the envelope (Exhibit A) either in his house or in his law
office (p. 407, t. s. n., Id.); that Go Toh said he wanted to keep it and on no occasion did Go Toh leave it to him
(pp. 409, 410, t. s. n., Id.).
The testimony of Go Toh taken and heard by Assistant Fiscal F. B. Albert in connection with the complaint for
estafa filed against Manuel Suntay for the alleged snatching of the envelope (Exhibit A), corroborates the
testimony of Alberto Barretto to the effect that only one will was signed by Jose B. Suntay at his office in
which he (Alberto Barretto), Manuel Lopez and Go Toh took part as attesting witnesses (p. 15, t. s. n., Exhibit
6). Go Toh testified before the same assistant fiscal that he did not leave the will in the hands of Anastacio
Teodoro (p. 26, t. s. n., Exhibit 6). He said, quoting his own words, "Because I can not give him this envelope
even though the contract (on fees) was signed. I have to bring that document to court or to anywhere else
myself." (p. 27, t. s. n., Exhibit 6).
As to the will claimed to have been executed on 4 January 1931 in Amoy, China, the law on the point in Rule
78. Section 1 of the rule provides:
Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such country, may be allowed,
filed, and recorded by the proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines.
Section 2 provides:
When a copy of such will and the allowance thereof, duly authenticated, is filed with a petition for
allowance in the Philippines, by the executor or other person interested, in the court having
jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for the hearing, and cause notice thereof to be given
as in case of an original will presented for allowance.
Section 3 provides:
If it appears at the hearing that the will should be allowed in the Philippines, the court shall so allow it,
and a certificate of its allowance, signed by the Judge, and attested by the seal of the courts, to which
shall be attached a copy of the will, shall be filed and recorded by the clerk, and the will shall have the
same effect as if originally proved and allowed in such court.
The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court must be proved. The law of China
on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal requirements for the
execution of a valid will in China in 1931 should also be established by competent evidence. There is no proof
on these points. The unverified answers to the questions propounded by counsel for the appellant to the Consul
General of the Republic of China set forth in Exhibits R-1 and R-2, objected to by counsel for the appellee, are
inadmissible, because apart from the fact that the office of Consul General does not qualify and make the
person who holds it an expert on the Chinese law on procedure in probate matters, if the same be admitted, the
adverse party would be deprived of his right to confront and cross-examine the witness. Consuls are appointed
to attend to trade matters. Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in the municipal district court of
Amoy were for the purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and that the order of
the municipal district court of Amoy does not purport to probate the will. In the absence of proof that the
municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it
may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are

the a deposition or to a perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so it does not measure same as those
provided for in our laws on the subject. It is a proceedings in rem and for the validity of such proceedings
personal notice or by publication or both to all interested parties must be made. The interested parties in the
case were known to reside in the Philippines. The evidence shows that no such notice was received by the
interested parties residing in the Philippines (pp. 474, 476, 481, 503-4, t. s. n., hearing of 24 February 1948).
The proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, may be likened toe or come up to the
standard of such proceedings in the Philippines for lack of notice to all interested parties and the proceedings
were held at the back of such interested parties.
The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China, which reads as follows:
ORDER:
SEE BELOW
The above minutes were satisfactorily confirmed by the interrogated parties, who declare that there are
no errors, after said minutes were loudly read and announced actually in the court.
Done and subscribed on the Nineteenth day of the English month of the 35th year of the Republic of
China in the Civil Section of the Municipal District Court of Amoy, China.

HUANG KUANG CHENG

Clerk of Court

CHIANG TENG HWA

Judge

(Exhibit N-13, p. 89 Folder of Exhibits.).

does not purport to probate or allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings. In view thereof, the will
and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and
fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the
authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed
and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate or allowance of a will and, therefore, the will referred to
therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of this country.
The decree appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Pablo, Bengzon, A. Reyes, Labrador and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Digest of PCIB vs. Escolin (Uberdigest)

56 SCRA 266 Civil Law Preliminary Title Application of Laws Nationality Principle

In November 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas made a will. In May 1957,
while she was domiciled here in the Philippines (Iloilo City), she died.
In her will, she left all her estate in favor of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges. Linnie however
also stated in her will that should her husband later die, said estate shall be turned over to her brother
and sister.
In December 1962, Charles died (it appears he was also domiciled here). Atty. Leon Gellada, the
lawyer of Charles filed a motion before the probate court (there was an ongoing probate on the will
of Linnie) so that a certain Avelina Magno may be appointed as the administratrix of the estate.
Magno was the trusted employee of the Hodges when they were alive. Atty. Gellada manifested that
Charles himself left a will but the same was in an iron trunk in Charles office. Hence, in the
meantime, hed like to have Magno appointed as administratrix. Judge Venicio Escolin approved the
motion.
Later, Charles will was found and so a new petition for probate was filed for the said will. Since said
will basically covers the same estate, Magno, as admininistratrix of Linnies estate opposed the said
petition. Eventually, the probate of Charles will was granted. Eventually still, the Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank was appointed as administrator. But Magno refused to turn over the
estate.
Magno contended that in her will, Linnie wanted Charles to turn over the property to Linnies brother
and sister and since that is her will, the same must be respected. Magno also contended that Linnie
was a Texan at the time of her death (an alien testator); that under Article 16 of the Civil Code,
successional rights are governed by Linnies national law; that under Texas law, Linnies will shall be
respected regardless of the presence of legitimes (Charles share in the estate).
PCIB argued that the law of Texas refers the matter back to Philippine laws because Linnie was
domiciled outside Texas at the time of her death (applying the renvoidoctrine).
ISSUE: Whether or not Texas Law should apply.
HELD: The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the lower court. Both parties failed to adduce
proof as to the law of Texas. The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is
a question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court. The
Supreme Court however emphasized that Texas law at the time of Linnies death is the law applicable
(and not said law at any other time). NOTE: Dynamics of law.

G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator of the Testate Estate of
Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo), petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
Branch II, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. L-27936 & L-27937 March 29, 1974
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE LINNIE JANE HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1307). TESTATE ESTATE
OF THE LATE CHARLES NEWTON HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1672). PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL
AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, administrator-appellant,
vs.
LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL, SALVADOR GUZMAN,
BELCESAR CAUSING, FLORENIA BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO, GRACIANO
LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MELQUIADES BATISANAN, PEPITO IYULORES,
ESPERIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO ESPADA, ROSARIO ALINGASA, ADELFA
PREMAYLON, SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, the last as Administratrix in Sp.
Proc. No. 1307, appellees, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, INC., movant-appellee.
San Juan, Africa, Gonzales and San Agustin for Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank.
Manglapus Law Office, Antonio Law Office and Rizal R. Quimpo for private respondents and appellees
Avelina A. Magno, etc., et al.

BARREDO, J.:p
Certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction; certiorari to "declare all acts of the respondent court in
the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo)
subsequent to the order of December 14, 1957 as null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction";
prohibition to enjoin the respondent court from allowing, tolerating, sanctioning, or abetting private respondent
Avelina A. Magno to perform or do any acts of administration, such as those enumerated in the petition, and
from exercising any authority or power as Regular Administratrix of above-named Testate Estate, by
entertaining manifestations, motion and pleadings filed by her and acting on them, and also to enjoin said court
from allowing said private respondent to interfere, meddle or take part in any manner in the administration of
the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the same court and branch); with prayer
for preliminary injunction, which was issued by this Court on August 8, 1967 upon a bond of P5,000; the
petition being particularly directed against the orders of the respondent court of October 12, 1966 denying
petitioner's motion of April 22, 1966 and its order of July 18, 1967 denying the motion for reconsideration of
said order.
Related to and involving basically the same main issue as the foregoing petition, thirty-three (33) appeals from
different orders of the same respondent court approving or otherwise sanctioning the acts of administration of
the respondent Magno on behalf of the testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges.
THE FACTS

On May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City leaving a will executed on November 22, 1952
pertinently providing as follows:
FIRST: I direct that all my just debts and funeral expenses be first paid out of my estate.
SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate,
both personal and real, wherever situated, or located, to my beloved husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, to have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime.
THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, shall have the
right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, and he is hereby given
the right to make any changes in the physical properties of said estate, by sale or any part
thereof which he may think best, and the purchase of any other or additional property as he
may think best; to execute conveyances with or without general or special warranty,
conveying in fee simple or for any other term or time, any property which he may deem
proper to dispose of; to lease any of the real property for oil, gas and/or other minerals, and all
such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee simple title to the interest so conveyed in such
property as he may elect to sell. All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall
belong to him, and he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he
may need or desire. It is provided herein, however, that he shall not sell or otherwise dispose
of any of the improved property now owned by us located at, in or near the City of Lubbock,
Texas, but he shall have the full right to lease, manage and enjoy the same during his lifetime,
above provided. He shall have the right to subdivide any farm land and sell lots therein. and
may sell unimproved town lots.
FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give, devise and
bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and personal, wherever
situated or located, to be equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share
alike, namely:
Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Saddie Rascoe, Era Roman and
Nimroy Higdon.
FIFTH: In case of the death of any of my brothers and/or sisters named in item Fourth, above,
prior to the death of my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, then it is my will and bequest that
the heirs of such deceased brother or sister shall take jointly the share which would have gone
to such brother or sister had she or he survived.
SIXTH: I nominate and appoint my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to be executor of
this, my last will and testament, and direct that no bond or other security be required of him as
such executor.
SEVENTH: It is my will and bequest that no action be had in the probate court, in the
administration of my estate, other than that necessary to prove and record this will and to
return an inventory and appraisement of my estate and list of claims. (Pp. 2-4, Petition.)
This will was subsequently probated in aforementioned Special Proceedings No. 1307 of respondent court on
June 28, 1957, with the widower Charles Newton Hodges being appointed as Executor, pursuant to the
provisions thereof.

Previously, on May 27, 1957, the said widower (hereafter to be referred to as Hodges) had been appointed
Special Administrator, in which capacity he filed a motion on the same date as follows:
URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION TO ALLOW OR AUTHORIZE PETITIONER TO CONTINUE
THE BUSINESS IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND TO PERFORM ACTS WHICH HE
HAD BEEN DOING WHILE DECEASED WAS LIVING
Come petitioner in the above-entitled special proceedings, thru his undersigned attorneys, to the Hon. Court,
most respectfully states:
1. That Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving her last will and testament, a copy of which is
attached to the petition for probate of the same.
2. That in said last will and testament herein petitioner Charles Newton Hodges is directed
to have the right to manage, control use and enjoy the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges,
in the same way, a provision was placed in paragraph two, the following: "I give, devise and
bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, to my beloved husband, Charles
Newton Hodges, to have and (to) hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural
lifetime."
3. That during the lifetime of Linnie Jane Hodges, herein petitioner was engaged in the
business of buying and selling personal and real properties, and do such acts which petitioner
may think best.
4. That deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no descendants or ascendants, except
brothers and sisters and herein petitioner as executor surviving spouse, to inherit the
properties of the decedent.
5. That the present motion is submitted in order not to paralyze the business of petitioner
and the deceased, especially in the purchase and sale of properties. That proper accounting
will be had also in all these transactions.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that, petitioner C. N. Hodges (Charles Newton
Hodges) be allowed or authorized to continue the business in which he was engaged and to
perform acts which he had been doing while deceased Linnie Jane Hodges was living.
City of Iloilo, May 27, 1957. (Annex "D", Petition.)
which the respondent court immediately granted in the following order:
It appearing in the urgent ex-parte motion filed by petitioner C. N. Hodges, that the business
in which said petitioner and the deceased were engaged will be paralyzed, unless and until the
Executor is named and appointed by the Court, the said petitioner is allowed or authorized to
continue the business in which he was engaged and to perform acts which he had been doing
while the deceased was living.
SO ORDERED.
City of Iloilo May 27, 1957. (Annex "E", Petition.)
Under date of December 11, 1957, Hodges filed as such Executor another motion thus:

MOTION TO APPROVE ALL SALES, CONVEYANCES, LEASES, MORTGAGES THAT

THE EXECUTOR HAD MADE FURTHER AND SUBSEQUENT TRANSACTIONS
WHICH THE EXECUTOR MAY DO IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAST WISH OF
THE DECEASED LINNIE JANE HODGES.
Comes the Executor in the above-entitled proceedings, thru his undersigned attorney, to the
Hon. Court, most respectfully states:
1. That according to the last will and testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, the
executor as the surviving spouse and legatee named in the will of the deceased; has the right
to dispose of all the properties left by the deceased, portion of which is quoted as follows:
Second: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both
personal and real, wherever situated, or located, to my beloved husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, to have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime.
Third: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, shall have the
right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, and he is hereby given
the right to make any changes in the physical properties of said estate, by sale or any part
thereof which he may think best, and the purchase of any other or additional property as he
may think best; to execute conveyances with or without general or special warranty,
conveying in fee simple or for any other term or time, any property which he may deem
proper to dispose of; to lease any of the real property for oil, gas and/or other minerals, and all
such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee simple title to the interest so conveyed in such
property as he may elect to sell. All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall
belong to him, and he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he
may need or desire. ...
2. That herein Executor, is not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also,
the successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges. That during the
lifetime of herein Executor, as Legatee has the right to sell, convey, lease or dispose of the
properties in the Philippines. That inasmuch as C.N. Hodges was and is engaged in the buy
and sell of real and personal properties, even before the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, a
motion to authorize said C.N. Hodges was filed in Court, to allow him to continue in the
business of buy and sell, which motion was favorably granted by the Honorable Court.
3. That since the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, Mr. C.N. Hodges had been buying and
selling real and personal properties, in accordance with the wishes of the late Linnie Jane
Hodges.
4. That the Register of Deeds for Iloilo, had required of late the herein Executor to have all
the sales, leases, conveyances or mortgages made by him, approved by the Hon. Court.
5. That it is respectfully requested, all the sales, conveyances leases and mortgages
executed by the Executor, be approved by the Hon. Court. and subsequent sales conveyances,
leases and mortgages in compliances with the wishes of the late Linnie Jane Hodges, and
within the scope of the terms of the last will and testament, also be approved;
6. That the Executor is under obligation to submit his yearly accounts, and the properties
conveyed can also be accounted for, especially the amounts received.

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that, all the sales, conveyances, leases, and
mortgages executed by the Executor, be approved by the Hon. Court, and also the subsequent
sales, conveyances, leases, and mortgages in consonance with the wishes of the deceased
contained in her last will and testament, be with authorization and approval of the Hon. Court.
City of Iloilo, December 11, 1967.
(Annex "G", Petition.)
which again was promptly granted by the respondent court on December 14, 1957 as follows:
ORDER
As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the Executor for the reasons stated in his
motion dated December 11, 1957, which the Court considers well taken all the sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges
executed by the Executor Charles N. Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said Executor is
further authorized to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the
properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes
conveyed in the last will and testament of the latter.
So ordered.
Iloilo City. December 14, 1957.
(Annex "H", Petition.)
On April 14, 1959, in submitting his first statement of account as Executor for approval, Hodges alleged:
Pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Court, herein executor of the deceased, renders the
following account of his administration covering the period from January 1, 1958 to
December 31, 1958, which account may be found in detail in the individual income tax return
filed for the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, to wit:
That a certified public accountant has examined the statement of net worth of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges, the assets and liabilities, as well as the income and expenses, copy of
which is hereto attached and made integral part of this statement of account as Annex "A".
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is most respectfully prayed that, the statement of net
worth of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, the assets and liabilities, income and expenses as
shown in the individual income tax return for the estate of the deceased and marked as Annex
"A", be approved by the Honorable Court, as substantial compliance with the requirements of
the Rules of Court.
That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining the herein
accounts be given notice, as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in
accordance with the last will and testament already probated by the Honorable court.
City of Iloilo April 14, 1959.
(Annex "I", Petition.)

The respondent court approved this statement of account on April 21, 1959 in its order worded thus:
Upon petition of Atty. Gellada, in representation of the Executor, the statement of net worth
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, assets and liabilities, income and expenses as shown in
the individual income tax return for the estate of the deceased and marked as Annex "A" is
approved.
SO ORDERED.
City of Iloilo April 21, 1959.
(Annex "J", Petition.)
His accounts for the periods January 1, 1959 to December 31, 1959 and January 1, 1960 to December 31, 1960
were submitted likewise accompanied by allegations identical mutatis mutandis to those of April 14, 1959,
quoted above; and the respective orders approving the same, dated July 30, 1960 and May 2, 1961, were
substantially identical to the above-quoted order of April 21, 1959. In connection with the statements of
account just mentioned, the following assertions related thereto made by respondent-appellee Magno in her
brief do not appear from all indications discernible in the record to be disputable:
Under date of April 14, 1959, C.N. Hodges filed his first "Account by the Executor" of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C.N. Hodges and the
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1958 annexed thereto, C.N. Hodges
reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net income of P328,402.62, divided
evenly between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an
"individual income tax return" for calendar year 1958 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned income of P164,201.31, exactly onehalf of the net income of his combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. (p. 91, Appellee's Brief.)
xxx xxx xxx
Under date of July 21, 1960, C.N. Hodges filed his second "Annual Statement of Account by
the Executor" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C.N.
Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1959 annexed thereto,
C.N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net income of P270,623.32,
divided evenly between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an
"individual income tax return" for calendar year 1959 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned income of P135,311.66, exactly onehalf of the net income of his combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. (pp. 91-92. Appellee's Brief.)
xxx xxx xxx
Under date of April 20, 1961, C.N. Hodges filed his third "Annual Statement of Account by
the Executor for the Year 1960" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Net
Worth of Mr. C.N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1960
annexed thereto, C.N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net income
of P314,857.94, divided evenly between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant
to this, he filed an "individual income tax return" for calendar year 1960 on the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned income of

P157,428.97, exactly one-half of the net income of his combined personal assets and that of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (Pp. 92-93, Appellee's Brief.)
Likewise the following:
In the petition for probate that he (Hodges) filed, he listed the seven brothers and sisters of
Linnie Jane as her "heirs" (see p. 2, Green ROA). The order of the court admitting the will to
probate unfortunately omitted one of the heirs, Roy Higdon (see p. 14, Green ROA).
Immediately, C.N. Hodges filed a verified motion to have Roy Higdon's name included as an
heir, stating that he wanted to straighten the records "in order the heirs of deceased Roy
Higdon may not think or believe they were omitted, and that they were really and are
interested in the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges. .
As an executor, he was bound to file tax returns for the estate he was administering under
American law. He did file such as estate tax return on August 8, 1958. In Schedule "M" of
such return, he answered "Yes" to the question as to whether he was contemplating
"renouncing the will". On the question as to what property interests passed to him as the
surviving spouse, he answered:
"None, except for purposes of administering the Estate, paying debts, taxes
and other legal charges. It is the intention of the surviving husband of
deceased to distribute the remaining property and interests of the deceased in
their Community estate to the devisees and legatees named in the will when
the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration are finally
determined and paid."
Again, on August 9, 1962, barely four months before his death, he executed an "affidavit"
wherein he ratified and confirmed all that he stated in Schedule "M" of his estate tax returns
as to his having renounced what was given him by his wife's will. 1
As appointed executor, C.N. Hodges filed an "Inventory" dated May 12, 1958. He listed all the
assets of his conjugal partnership with Linnie Jane Hodges on a separate balance sheet and then
stated expressly that her estate which has come into his possession as executor was "one-half of all
the items" listed in said balance sheet. (Pp. 89-90, Appellee's Brief.)

Parenthetically, it may be stated, at this juncture, that We are taking pains to quote wholly or at least,
extensively from some of the pleadings and orders whenever We feel that it is necessary to do so for a more
comprehensive and clearer view of the important and decisive issues raised by the parties and a more accurate
appraisal of their respective positions in regard thereto.
The records of these cases do not show that anything else was done in the above-mentioned Special
Proceedings No. 1307 until December 26, 1962, when on account of the death of Hodges the day before, the
same lawyer, Atty. Leon P. Gellada, who had been previously acting as counsel for Hodges in his capacity as
Executor of his wife's estate, and as such had filed the aforequoted motions and manifestations, filed the
following:
URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATRIX
COMES the undersigned attorney for the Executor in the above-entitled proceedings, to the
Honorable Court, most respectfully states:

1. That in accordance with the Last Will and Testament of Linnie Jane Hodges (deceased), her
husband, Charles Newton Hodges was to act as Executor, and in fact, in an order issued by
this Hon. Court dated June 28, 1957, the said Charles Newton Hodges was appointed
Executor and had performed the duties as such.
2. That last December 22, 1962, the said Charles Newton Hodges was stricken ill, and
brought to the Iloilo Mission Hospital for treatment, but unfortunately, he died on December
25, 1962, as shown by a copy of the death certificate hereto attached and marked as Annex
"A".
3. That in accordance with the provisions of the last will and testament of Linnie Jane
Hodges, whatever real and personal properties that may remain at the death of her husband
Charles Newton Hodges, the said properties shall be equally divided among their heirs. That
there are real and personal properties left by Charles Newton Hodges, which need to be
administered and taken care of.
4. That the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as that of Charles Newton Hodges,
have not as yet been determined or ascertained, and there is necessity for the appointment of a
general administrator to liquidate and distribute the residue of the estate to the heirs and
legatees of both spouses. That in accordance with the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 75 of
the Rules of Court, the conjugal partnership of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton
Hodges shall be liquidated in the testate proceedings of the wife.
5. That the undersigned counsel, has perfect personal knowledge of the existence of the last
will and testament of Charles Newton Hodges, with similar provisions as that contained in the
last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges. However, said last will and testament of
Charles Newton Hodges is kept inside the vault or iron safe in his office, and will be
presented in due time before this honorable Court.
6. That in the meantime, it is imperative and indispensable that, an Administratrix be
appointed for the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and a Special Administratrix for the estate of
Charles Newton Hodges, to perform the duties required by law, to administer, collect, and
take charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of both spouses, Charles Newton
Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges, as provided for in Section 1 and 2, Rule 81 of the Rules of
Court.
7. That there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration, because the last
will and testament of deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, is still kept in his safe or vault, and
in the meantime, unless an administratrix (and,) at the same time, a Special Administratrix is
appointed, the estate of both spouses are in danger of being lost, damaged or go to waste.
8. That the most trusted employee of both spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and C.N. Hodges, who
had been employed for around thirty (30) years, in the person of Miss Avelina Magno,
(should) be appointed Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and at the same time
Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges. That the said Miss Avelina
Magno is of legal age, a resident of the Philippines, the most fit, competent, trustworthy and
well-qualified person to serve the duties of Administratrix and Special Administratrix and is
willing to act as such.
9. That Miss Avelina Magno is also willing to file bond in such sum which the Hon. Court
believes reasonable.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, it is most respectfully prayed that, Miss
AVELINA A. MAGNO be immediately appointed Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and as Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, with powers
and duties provided for by law. That the Honorable Court fix the reasonable bond of
P1,000.00 to be filed by Avelina A. Magno.
(Annex "O", Petition.)
which respondent court readily acted on in its order of even date thus: .
For the reasons alleged in the Urgent Ex-parte Motion filed by counsel for the Executor dated
December 25, 1962, which the Court finds meritorious, Miss AVELINA A. MAGNO, is
hereby appointed Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and as Special
Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in the latter case, because the last will
of said Charles Newton Hodges is still kept in his vault or iron safe and that the real and
personal properties of both spouses may be lost, damaged or go to waste, unless a Special
Administratrix is appointed.
Miss Avelina A. Magno is required to file bond in the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00), and after having done so, let letters of Administration be issued to her." (Annex
"P", Petition.)
On December 29, 1962, however, upon urgent ex-parte petition of respondent Magno herself,
thru Atty. Gellada, Harold, R. Davies, "a representative of the heirs of deceased Charles
Newton Hodges (who had) arrived from the United States of America to help in the
administration of the estate of said deceased" was appointed as Co-Special Administrator of
the estate of Hodges, (pp. 29-33, Yellow - Record on Appeal) only to be replaced as such cospecial administrator on January 22, 1963 by Joe Hodges, who, according to the motion of the
same attorney, is "the nephew of the deceased (who had) arrived from the United States with
instructions from the other heirs of the deceased to administer the properties or estate of
Charles Newton Hodges in the Philippines, (Pp. 47-50, id.)
Meanwhile, under date of January 9, 1963, the same Atty. Gellada filed in Special Proceedings 1672 a petition
for the probate of the will of Hodges, 2 with a prayer for the issuance of letters of administration to the same Joe
Hodges, albeit the motion was followed on February 22, 1963 by a separate one asking that Atty. Fernando Mirasol
be appointed as his co-administrator. On the same date this latter motion was filed, the court issued the
corresponding order of probate and letters of administration to Joe Hodges and Atty. Mirasol, as prayed for.
At this juncture, again, it may also be explained that just as, in her will, Mrs. Hodges bequeathed her whole
estate to her husband "to have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime", she, at the
same time or in like manner, provided that "at the death of my said husband I give devise and bequeath all
of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be
equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share alike ". Accordingly, it became incumbent
upon Hodges, as executor of his wife's will, to duly liquidate the conjugal partnership, half of which
constituted her estate, in order that upon the eventuality of his death, "the rest, residue and remainder" thereof
could be determined and correspondingly distributed or divided among her brothers and sisters. And it was
precisely because no such liquidation was done, furthermore, there is the issue of whether the distribution of
her estate should be governed by the laws of the Philippines or those of Texas, of which State she was a
national, and, what is more, as already stated, Hodges made official and sworn statements or manifestations
indicating that as far as he was concerned no "property interests passed to him as surviving spouse "except
for purposes of administering the estate, paying debts, taxes and other legal charges" and it was the intention of
the surviving husband of the deceased to distribute the remaining property and interests of the deceased in their

Community Estate to the devisees and legatees named in the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses
of administration are finally determined and paid", that the incidents and controversies now before Us for
resolution arose. As may be observed, the situation that ensued upon the death of Hodges became rather
unusual and so, quite understandably, the lower court's actuations presently under review are apparently
wanting in consistency and seemingly lack proper orientation.
Thus, We cannot discern clearly from the record before Us the precise perspective from which the trial court
proceeded in issuing its questioned orders. And, regretably, none of the lengthy briefs submitted by the parties
is of valuable assistance in clearing up the matter.
To begin with, We gather from the two records on appeal filed by petitioner, as appellant in the appealed cases,
one with green cover and the other with a yellow cover, that at the outset, a sort of modus operandi had been
agreed upon by the parties under which the respective administrators of the two estates were supposed to act
conjointly, but since no copy of the said agreement can be found in the record before Us, We have no way of
knowing when exactly such agreement was entered into and under what specific terms. And while reference is
made to said modus operandi in the order of September 11, 1964, on pages 205-206 of the Green Record on
Appeal, reading thus:
The present incident is to hear the side of administratrix, Miss Avelina A. Magno, in answer
to the charges contained in the motion filed by Atty. Cesar Tirol on September 3, 1964. In
answer to the said charges, Miss Avelina A. Magno, through her counsel, Atty. Rizal Quimpo,
filed a written manifestation.
After reading the manifestation here of Atty. Quimpo, for and in behalf of the administratrix,
Miss Avelina A. Magno, the Court finds that everything that happened before September 3,
1964, which was resolved on September 8, 1964, to the satisfaction of parties, was simply due
to a misunderstanding between the representative of the Philippine Commercial and Industrial
Bank and Miss Magno and in order to restore the harmonious relations between the parties,
the Court ordered the parties to remain in status quo as to their modus operandi before
September 1, 1964, until after the Court can have a meeting with all the parties and their
counsels on October 3, as formerly agreed upon between counsels, Attys. Ozaeta, Gibbs and
Ozaeta, Attys. Tirol and Tirol and Atty. Rizal Quimpo.
In the meantime, the prayers of Atty. Quimpo as stated in his manifestation shall not be
resolved by this Court until October 3, 1964.
SO ORDERED.
there is nothing in the record indicating whatever happened to it afterwards, except that again, reference
thereto was made in the appealed order of October 27, 1965, on pages 292-295 of the Green Record on Appeal,
as follows:
On record is an urgent motion to allow PCIB to open all doors and locks in the Hodges Office
at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City, to take immediate and exclusive possession thereof and
to place its own locks and keys for security purposes of the PCIB dated October 27, 1965 thru
Atty. Cesar Tirol. It is alleged in said urgent motion that Administratrix Magno of the testate
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges refused to open the Hodges Office at 206-208 Guanco Street,
Iloilo City where PCIB holds office and therefore PCIB is suffering great moral damage and
prejudice as a result of said act. It is prayed that an order be issued authorizing it (PCIB) to
open all doors and locks in the said office, to take immediate and exclusive possession thereof
and place thereon its own locks and keys for security purposes; instructing the clerk of court

or any available deputy to witness and supervise the opening of all doors and locks and taking
possession of the PCIB.
A written opposition has been filed by Administratrix Magno of even date (Oct. 27) thru
counsel Rizal Quimpo stating therein that she was compelled to close the office for the reason
that the PCIB failed to comply with the order of this Court signed by Judge Anacleto I.
Bellosillo dated September 11, 1964 to the effect that both estates should remain in status
quo to their modus operandi as of September 1, 1964.
To arrive at a happy solution of the dispute and in order not to interrupt the operation of the
office of both estates, the Court aside from the reasons stated in the urgent motion and
opposition heard the verbal arguments of Atty. Cesar Tirol for the PCIB and Atty. Rizal
Quimpo for Administratix Magno.
After due consideration, the Court hereby orders Magno to open all doors and locks in the
Hodges Office at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City in the presence of the PCIB or its duly
authorized representative and deputy clerk of court Albis of this branch not later than 7:30
tomorrow morning October 28, 1965 in order that the office of said estates could operate for
business.
Pursuant to the order of this Court thru Judge Bellosillo dated September 11, 1964, it is
hereby ordered:
(a) That all cash collections should be deposited in the joint account of the estates of Linnie
Jane Hodges and estates of C.N. Hodges;
(b) That whatever cash collections that had been deposited in the account of either of the
estates should be withdrawn and since then deposited in the joint account of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges and the estate of C.N. Hodges;
(c) That the PCIB should countersign the check in the amount of P250 in favor of
Administratrix Avelina A. Magno as her compensation as administratrix of the Linnie Jane
Hodges estate chargeable to the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges only;
(d) That Administratrix Magno is hereby directed to allow the PCIB to inspect whatever
records, documents and papers she may have in her possession in the same manner that
Administrator PCIB is also directed to allow Administratrix Magno to inspect whatever
records, documents and papers it may have in its possession;
(e) That the accountant of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges shall have access to all records of
the transactions of both estates for the protection of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges; and in
like manner the accountant or any authorized representative of the estate of C.N. Hodges shall
have access to the records of transactions of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate for the protection
of the estate of C.N. Hodges.
Once the estates' office shall have been opened by Administratrix Magno in the presence of
the PCIB or its duly authorized representative and deputy clerk Albis or his duly authorized
representative, both estates or any of the estates should not close it without previous consent
and authority from this court.
SO ORDERED.

As may be noted, in this order, the respondent court required that all collections from the properties in the
name of Hodges should be deposited in a joint account of the two estates, which indicates that seemingly the
so-calledmodus operandi was no longer operative, but again there is nothing to show when this situation
started.
Likewise, in paragraph 3 of the petitioner's motion of September 14, 1964, on pages 188-201 of the Green
Record on Appeal, (also found on pp. 83-91 of the Yellow Record on Appeal) it is alleged that:
3. On January 24, 1964 virtually all of the heirs of C.N. Hodges, Joe Hodges and Fernando P.
Mirasol acting as the two co-administrators of the estate of C.N. Hodges, Avelina A. Magno
acting as the administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Messrs. William Brown
and Ardell Young acting for all of the Higdon family who claim to be the sole beneficiaries of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and various legal counsel representing the aforementioned
parties entered into an amicable agreement, which was approved by this Honorable Court,
wherein the parties thereto agreed that certain sums of money were to be paid in settlement of
different claims against the two estates and that the assets (to the extent they existed) of both
estates would be administered jointly by the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C.N.
Hodges and Avelina A. Magno as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, subject,
however, to the aforesaid October 5, 1963 Motion, namely, the PCIB's claim to exclusive
possession and ownership of one hundred percent (100%) (or, in the alternative, seventy-five
percent (75%) of all assets owned by C.N. Hodges or Linnie Jane Hodges situated in the
Philippines. On February 1, 1964 (pp. 934-935, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672) this Honorable
Court amended its order of January 24, 1964 but in no way changed its recognition of the
afore-described basic demand by the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges to
one hundred percent (100%) of the assets claimed by both estates.
but no copy of the mentioned agreement of joint administration of the two estates exists in the record, and so,
We are not informed as to what exactly are the terms of the same which could be relevant in the resolution of
the issues herein.
On the other hand, the appealed order of November 3, 1965, on pages 313-320 of the Green Record on Appeal,
authorized payment by respondent Magno of, inter alia, her own fees as administratrix, the attorney's fees of
her lawyers, etc., as follows:
Administratrix Magno thru Attys. Raul S. Manglapus and Rizal. R. Quimpo filed a
Manifestation and Urgent Motion dated June 10, 1964 asking for the approval of the
Agreement dated June 6, 1964 which Agreement is for the purpose of retaining their services
to protect and defend the interest of the said Administratrix in these proceedings and the same
has been signed by and bears the express conformity of the attorney-in-fact of the late Linnie
Jane Hodges, Mr. James L. Sullivan. It is further prayed that the Administratrix of the Testate
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges be directed to pay the retailers fee of said lawyers, said fees
made chargeable as expenses for the administration of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp.
1641-1642, Vol. V, Sp. 1307).
An opposition has been filed by the Administrator PCIB thru Atty. Herminio Ozaeta dated
July 11, 1964, on the ground that payment of the retainers fee of Attys. Manglapus and
Quimpo as prayed for in said Manifestation and Urgent Motion is prejudicial to the 100%
claim of the estate of C. N. Hodges; employment of Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo is
premature and/or unnecessary; Attys. Quimpo and Manglapus are representing conflicting
interests and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges should be closed and terminated (pp. 16791684, Vol, V, Sp. 1307).

Atty. Leon P. Gellada filed a memorandum dated July 28, 1964 asking that the Manifestation
and Urgent Motion filed by Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo be denied because no evidence has
been presented in support thereof. Atty. Manglapus filed a reply to the opposition of counsel
for the Administrator of the C. N. Hodges estate wherein it is claimed that expenses of
administration include reasonable counsel or attorney's fees for services to the executor or
administrator. As a matter of fact the fee agreement dated February 27, 1964 between the
PCIB and the law firm of Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta as its counsel (Pp. 1280-1284, Vol. V, Sp.
1307) which stipulates the fees for said law firm has been approved by the Court in its order
dated March 31, 1964. If payment of the fees of the lawyers for the administratrix of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges will cause prejudice to the estate of C. N. Hodges, in like
manner the very agreement which provides for the payment of attorney's fees to the counsel
for the PCIB will also be prejudicial to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 1801-1814, Vol.
V, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Herminio Ozaeta filed a rejoinder dated August 10, 1964 to the reply to the opposition
to the Manifestation and Urgent Motion alleging principally that the estates of Linnie Jane
Hodges and C. N. Hodges are not similarly situated for the reason that C. N. Hodges is an heir
of Linnie Jane Hodges whereas the latter is not an heir of the former for the reason that Linnie
Jane Hodges predeceased C. N. Hodges (pp. 1839-1848, Vol. V, Sp. 1307); that Attys.
Manglapus and Quimpo formally entered their appearance in behalf of Administratrix of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on June 10, 1964 (pp. 1639-1640, Vol. V, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Manglapus filed a manifestation dated December 18, 1964 stating therein that Judge
Bellosillo issued an order requiring the parties to submit memorandum in support of their
respective contentions. It is prayed in this manifestation that the Manifestation and Urgent
Motion dated June 10, 1964 be resolved (pp. 6435-6439, Vol. VII, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a counter- manifestation dated January 5, 1965
asking that after the consideration by the court of all allegations and arguments and pleadings
of the PCIB in connection therewith (1) said manifestation and urgent motion of Attys.
Manglapus and Quimpo be denied (pp. 6442-6453, Vol. VII, Sp. 1307). Judge Querubin
issued an order dated January 4, 1965 approving the motion dated June 10, 1964 of the
attorneys for the administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and agreement annexed to
said motion. The said order further states: "The Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges is authorized to issue or sign whatever check or checks may be necessary for the
above purpose and the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges is ordered to countersign
the same. (pp. 6518-6523, Vol VII, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a manifestation and motion dated January 13,
1965 asking that the order of January 4, 1965 which was issued by Judge Querubin be
declared null and void and to enjoin the clerk of court and the administratrix and
administrator in these special proceedings from all proceedings and action to enforce or
comply with the provision of the aforesaid order of January 4, 1965. In support of said
manifestation and motion it is alleged that the order of January 4, 1965 is null and void
because the said order was never delivered to the deputy clerk Albis of Branch V (the sala of
Judge Querubin) and the alleged order was found in the drawer of the late Judge Querubin in
his office when said drawer was opened on January 13, 1965 after the death of Judge
Querubin by Perfecto Querubin, Jr., the son of the judge and in the presence of Executive
Judge Rovira and deputy clerk Albis (Sec. 1, Rule 36, New Civil Code) (Pp. 6600-6606, Vol.
VIII, Sp. 1307).

Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a motion for reconsideration dated February 23,
1965 asking that the order dated January 4, 1964 be reversed on the ground that:
1. Attorneys retained must render services to the estate not to the personal heir;
2. If services are rendered to both, fees should be pro-rated between them;
3. Attorneys retained should not represent conflicting interests; to the prejudice of the other
heirs not represented by said attorneys;
4. Fees must be commensurate to the actual services rendered to the estate;
5. There must be assets in the estate to pay for said fees (Pp. 6625-6636, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Quimpo for Administratrix Magno of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges filed a motion to
submit dated July 15, 1965 asking that the manifestation and urgent motion dated June 10,
1964 filed by Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo and other incidents directly appertaining thereto
be considered submitted for consideration and approval (pp. 6759-6765, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).
Considering the arguments and reasons in support to the pleadings of both the Administratrix
and the PCIB, and of Atty. Gellada, hereinbefore mentioned, the Court believes that the order
of January 4, 1965 is null and void for the reason that the said order has not been filed with
deputy clerk Albis of this court (Branch V) during the lifetime of Judge Querubin who signed
the said order. However, the said manifestation and urgent motion dated June 10, 1964 is
being treated and considered in this instant order. It is worthy to note that in the motion dated
January 24, 1964 (Pp. 1149- 1163, Vol. V, Sp. 1307) which has been filed by Atty. Gellada
and his associates and Atty. Gibbs and other lawyers in addition to the stipulated fees for
actual services rendered. However, the fee agreement dated February 27, 1964, between the
Administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges and Atty. Gibbs which provides for retainer fee of
P4,000 monthly in addition to specific fees for actual appearances, reimbursement for
expenditures and contingent fees has also been approved by the Court and said lawyers have
already been paid. (pp. 1273-1279, Vol. V, Sp. Proc. 1307 pp. 1372-1373, Vol. V, Sp. Proc.
1307).
WHEREFORE, the order dated January 4, 1965 is hereby declared null and void.
The manifestation and motion dated June 10, 1964 which was filed by the attorneys for the
administratrix of the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is granted and the agreement
annexed thereto is hereby approved.
The administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is hereby directed to be needed to
implement the approval of the agreement annexed to the motion and the administrator of the
estate of C. N. Hodges is directed to countersign the said check or checks as the case may be.
SO ORDERED.
thereby implying somehow that the court assumed the existence of independent but simultaneous
administrations.

Be that as it may, again, it appears that on August 6, 1965, the court, acting on a motion of petitioner for the
approval of deeds of sale executed by it as administrator of the estate of Hodges, issued the following order,
also on appeal herein:
Acting upon the motion for approval of deeds of sale for registered land of the PCIB,
Administrator of the Testate Estate of C. N. Hodges in Sp. Proc. 1672 (Vol. VII, pp. 22442245), dated July 16, 1965, filed by Atty. Cesar T. Tirol in representation of the law firms of
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta and Tirol and Tirol and the opposition thereto of Atty. Rizal R.
Quimpo (Vol. VIII, pp. 6811-6813) dated July 22, 1965 and considering the allegations and
reasons therein stated, the court believes that the deeds of sale should be signed jointly by the
PCIB, Administrator of the Testate Estate of C. N. Hodges and Avelina A. Magno,
Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and to this effect the PCIB should
take the necessary steps so that Administratrix Avelina A. Magno could sign the deeds of sale.
SO ORDERED. (p. 248, Green Record on Appeal.)
Notably this order required that even the deeds executed by petitioner, as administrator of the Estate of
Hodges, involving properties registered in his name, should be co-signed by respondent Magno. 3 And this was
not an isolated instance.
In her brief as appellee, respondent Magno states:
After the lower court had authorized appellee Avelina A. Magno to execute final deeds of sale
pursuant to contracts to sell executed by C. N. Hodges on February 20, 1963 (pp. 45-46,
Green ROA), motions for the approval of final deeds of sale (signed by appellee Avelina A.
Magno and the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, first Joe Hodges, then Atty.
Fernando Mirasol and later the appellant) were approved by the lower court upon petition of
appellee Magno's counsel, Atty. Leon P. Gellada, on the basis of section 8 of Rule 89 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Subsequently, the appellant, after it had taken over the bulk of the
assets of the two estates, started presenting these motions itself. The first such attempt was a
"Motion for Approval of Deeds of Sale for Registered Land and Cancellations of Mortgages"
dated July 21, 1964 filed by Atty. Cesar T. Tirol, counsel for the appellant, thereto annexing
two (2) final deeds of sale and two (2) cancellations of mortgages signed by appellee Avelina
A. Magno and D. R. Paulino, Assistant Vice-President and Manager of the appellant (CFI
Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Vol. V, pp. 1694-1701). This motion was approved by the lower
court on July 27, 1964. It was followed by another motion dated August 4, 1964 for the
approval of one final deed of sale again signed by appellee Avelina A. Magno and D. R.
Paulino (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307. Vol. V, pp. 1825-1828), which was again approved
by the lower court on August 7, 1964. The gates having been opened, a flood ensued: the
appellant subsequently filed similar motions for the approval of a multitude of deeds of sales
and cancellations of mortgages signed by both the appellee Avelina A. Magno and the
appellant.
A random check of the records of Special Proceeding No. 1307 alone will show Atty. Cesar T.
Tirol as having presented for court approval deeds of sale of real properties signed by both
appellee Avelina A. Magno and D. R. Paulino in the following numbers: (a) motion dated
September 21, 1964 6 deeds of sale; (b) motion dated November 4, 1964 1 deed of sale;
(c) motion dated December 1, 1964 4 deeds of sale; (d) motion dated February 3, 1965
8 deeds of sale; (f) motion dated May 7, 1965 9 deeds of sale. In view of the very
extensive landholdings of the Hodges spouses and the many motions filed concerning deeds
of sale of real properties executed by C. N. Hodges the lower court has had to constitute

special separate expedientes in Special Proceedings Nos. 1307 and 1672 to include mere
motions for the approval of deeds of sale of the conjugal properties of the Hodges spouses.
As an example, from among the very many, under date of February 3, 1965, Atty. Cesar T.
Tirol, as counsel for the appellant, filed "Motion for Approval of Deeds of Sale for Registered
Land and Cancellations of Mortgages" (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Vol. VIII, pp. 65706596) the allegations of which read:
"1. In his lifetime, the late C. N. Hodges executed "Contracts to Sell" real property, and the
prospective buyers under said contracts have already paid the price and complied with the
terms and conditions thereof;
"2. In the course of administration of both estates, mortgage debtors have already paid their
debts secured by chattel mortgages in favor of the late C. N. Hodges, and are now entitled to
release therefrom;
"3. There are attached hereto documents executed jointly by the Administratrix in Sp. Proc.
No. 1307 and the Administrator in Sp. Proc. No. 1672, consisting of deeds of sale in favor
Fernando Cano, Bacolod City, Occ. Negros
Fe Magbanua, Iloilo City
Policarpio M. Pareno, La Paz, Iloilo City
Rosario T. Libre, Jaro, Iloilo City
Federico B. Torres, Iloilo City
Reynaldo T. Lataquin, La Paz, Iloilo City
Anatolio T. Viray, Iloilo City
Benjamin Rolando, Jaro, Iloilo City
and cancellations of mortgages in favor of
Pablo Manzano, Oton, Iloilo
Ricardo M. Diana, Dao, San Jose, Antique
Simplicio Tingson, Iloilo City
Amado Magbanua, Pototan, Iloilo
Roselia M. Baes, Bolo, Roxas City
William Bayani, Rizal Estanzuela, Iloilo City
Elpidio Villarete, Molo, Iloilo City
Norma T. Ruiz, Jaro, Iloilo City
"4. That the approval of the aforesaid documents will not reduce the assets
of the estates so as to prevent any creditor from receiving his full debt or
diminish his dividend."
And the prayer of this motion is indeed very revealing:
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that, under Rule 89, Section 8 of the Rules of Court,
this honorable court approve the aforesaid deeds of sale and cancellations of mortgages." (Pp.
113-117, Appellee's Brief.)
None of these assertions is denied in Petitioner's reply brief.

Further indicating lack of concrete perspective or orientation on the part of the respondent court and its
hesitancy to clear up matters promptly, in its other appealed order of November 23, 1965, on pages 334-335 of
the Green Record on Appeal, said respondent court allowed the movant Ricardo Salas, President of appellee
Western Institute of Technology (successor of Panay Educational Institutions, Inc.), one of the parties with
whom Hodges had contracts that are in question in the appeals herein, to pay petitioner, as Administrator of the
estate of Hodges and/or respondent Magno, as Administrator of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, thus:
Considering that in both cases there is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution
of properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto, the Court believes that payment to both the
administrator of the testate estate of C. N. Hodges and the administratrix of the testate estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges or to either one of the two estates is proper and legal.
WHEREFORE, movant Ricardo T. Salas can pay to both estates or either of them.
SO ORDERED.
(Pp. 334-335, Green Record on Appeal.)
On the other hand, as stated earlier, there were instances when respondent Magno was given authority to act
alone. For instance, in the other appealed order of December 19, 1964, on page 221 of the Green Record on
Appeal, the respondent court approved payments made by her of overtime pay to some employees of the court
who had helped in gathering and preparing copies of parts of the records in both estates as follows:
Considering that the expenses subject of the motion to approve payment of overtime pay
dated December 10, 1964, are reasonable and are believed by this Court to be a proper charge
of administration chargeable to the testate estate of the late Linnie Jane Hodges, the said
expenses are hereby APPROVED and to be charged against the testate estate of the late
Linnie Jane Hodges. The administrator of the testate estate of the late Charles Newton Hodges
is hereby ordered to countersign the check or checks necessary to pay the said overtime pay
as shown by the bills marked Annex "A", "B" and "C" of the motion.
SO ORDERED.
(Pp. 221-222, Green Record on Appeal.)
Likewise, the respondent court approved deeds of sale executed by respondent Magno alone, as Administratrix
of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, covering properties in the name of Hodges, pursuant to "contracts to sell"
executed by Hodges, irrespective of whether they were executed by him before or after the death of his wife.
The orders of this nature which are also on appeal herein are the following:
1. Order of March 30, 1966, on p. 137 of the Green Record on Appeal, approving the deed of sale executed by
respondent Magno in favor of appellee Lorenzo Carles on February 24, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell"
signed by Hodges on June 17, 1958, after the death of his wife, which contract petitioner claims was cancelled
by it for failure of Carles to pay the installments due on January 7, 1965.
2. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 139-140, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in
favor of appellee Salvador Guzman on February 28, 1966 pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on
September 13, 1960, after the death of his wife, which contract petitioner claims it cancelled on March 3, 1965
in view of failure of said appellee to pay the installments on time.

3. Order of April 20, 1966, on pp. 167-168, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in
favor of appellee Purificacion Coronado on March 28, 1966 pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges
on August 14, 1961, after the death of his wife.
4. Order of April 20, 1966, on pp. 168-169, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in
favor of appellee Florenia Barrido on March 28, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on
February 21, 1958, after the death of his wife.
5. Order of June 7, 1966, on pp. 184-185, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in
favor of appellee Belcezar Causing on May 2, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on
February 10, 1959, after the death of his wife.
6. Order of June 21, 1966, on pp. 211-212, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in
favor of appellee Artheo Thomas Jamir on June 3, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on
May 26, 1961, after the death of his wife.
7. Order of June 21, 1966, on pp. 212-213, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in
favor of appellees Graciano Lucero and Melquiades Batisanan on June 6 and June 3, 1966, respectively,
pursuant to "contracts to sell" signed by Hodges on June 9, 1959 and November 27, 1961, respectively, after
the death of his wife.
8. Order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 303-304, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno
in favor of appellees Espiridion Partisala, Winifredo Espada and Rosario Alingasa on September 6, 1966,
August 17, 1966 and August 3, 1966, respectively, pursuant to "contracts to sell" signed by Hodges on April
20, 1960, April 18, 1960 and August 25, 1958, respectively, that is, after the death of his wife.
9. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 137-138, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in
favor of appellee Alfredo Catedral on March 2, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on May
29, 1954, before the death of his wife, which contract petitioner claims it had cancelled on February 16, 1966
for failure of appellee Catedral to pay the installments due on time.
10. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 138-139, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in
favor of appellee Jose Pablico on March 7, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on March 7,
1950, after the death of his wife, which contract petitioner claims it had cancelled on June 29, 1960, for failure
of appellee Pablico to pay the installments due on time.
11. Order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 303-304, id., insofar as it approved the deed of sale executed by
respondent Magno in favor of appellee Pepito Iyulores on September 6, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell"
signed by Hodges on February 5, 1951, before the death of his wife.
12. Order of January 3, 1967, on pp. 335-336, id., approving three deeds of sale executed by respondent
Magno, one in favor of appellees Santiago Pacaonsis and two in favor of appellee Adelfa Premaylon on
December 5, 1966 and November 3, 1966, respectively, pursuant to separate "promises to sell" signed
respectively by Hodges on May 26, 1955 and January 30, 1954, before the death of his wife, and October 31,
1959, after her death.
In like manner, there were also instances when respondent court approved deeds of sale executed by petitioner
alone and without the concurrence of respondent Magno, and such approvals have not been the subject of any
appeal. No less than petitioner points this out on pages 149-150 of its brief as appellant thus:

The points of fact and law pertaining to the two abovecited assignments of error have already
been discussed previously. In the first abovecited error, the order alluded to was general, and
as already explained before, it was, as admitted by the lower court itself, superseded by the
particular orders approving specific final deeds of sale executed by the appellee, Avelina A.
Magno, which are subject of this appeal, as well as the particular orders approving specific
final deeds of sale executed by the appellant, Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank,
which were never appealed by the appellee, Avelina A. Magno, nor by any party for that
matter, and which are now therefore final.
Now, simultaneously with the foregoing incidents, others of more fundamental and all embracing significance
developed. On October 5, 1963, over the signature of Atty. Allison J. Gibbs in representation of the law firm of
Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta, as counsel for the co-administrators Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol, the
following self-explanatory motion was filed:
URGENT MOTION FOR AN ACCOUNTING AND DELIVERY TO
ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE OF C. N. HODGES OF ALL OF THE
ASSETS OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE DECEASED
LINNIE JANE HODGES AND C N. HODGES EXISTING AS OF MAY 23,
1957 PLUS ALL THE RENTS, EMOLUMENTS AND INCOME
THEREFROM.
COMES NOW the co-administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, Joe Hodges, through his
undersigned attorneys in the above-entitled proceedings, and to this Honorable Court
respectfully alleges:
(1) On May 23, 1957 Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City.
(2) On June 28, 1957 this Honorable Court admitted to probate the Last Will and Testament of
the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed November 22, 1952 and appointed C. N. Hodges
as Executor of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 24-25, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).
(3) On July 1, 1957 this Honorable Court issued Letters Testamentary to C. N. Hodges in the
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 30, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).
(4) On December 14, 1957 this Honorable Court, on the basis of the following allegations in a
Motion dated December 11, 1957 filed by Leon P. Gellada as attorney for the executor C. N.
Hodges:
"That herein Executor, (is) not only part owner of the properties left as
conjugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left by the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges."
(p. 44, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)
issued the following order:
"As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the Executory, for the
reasons stated in his motion dated December 11, 1957 which the court
considers well taken, all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all
properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges are hereby APPROVED.
The said executor is further authorized to execute subsequent sales,

conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said

deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes contained in
the last will and testament of the latter."
(p. 46, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)
(5) On April 21, 1959 this Honorable Court approved the inventory and accounting submitted
by C. N. Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on April 14, 1959 wherein he alleged
among other things
"That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of
examining the herein account, be given notice, as herein executor is the only
devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last will and
testament already probated by the Honorable Court."
(pp. 77-78, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.).
(6) On July 30, 1960 this Honorable Court approved the "Annual Statement of Account"
submitted by C. N. Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on July 21, 1960 wherein he
alleged among other things:
"That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of
examining the herein account, be given notice as herein executor is the only
devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in accordance with
the last will and testament of the deceased, already probated by this
Honorable Court."
(pp. 81-82. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)
(7) On May 2, 1961 this Honorable court approved the "Annual Statement of Account By The
Executor for the Year 1960" submitted through Leon P. Gellada on April 20, 1961 wherein he
alleged:
That no person interested in the Philippines be given notice, of the time and
place of examining the herein account, as herein Executor is the only devisee
or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in accordance with the last
will and testament of the deceased, already probated by this Honorable
Court.
(pp. 90-91. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)
(8) On December 25, 1962, C.N. Hodges died.
(9) On December 25, 1962, on the Urgent Ex-parte Motion of Leon P. Gellada filed only in
Special Proceeding No. 1307, this Honorable Court appointed Avelina A. Magno
"Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and as Special Administratrix of the
estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in the latter case, because the last will of said Charles
Newton Hodges is still kept in his vault or iron safe and that the real and personal properties
of both spouses may be lost, damaged or go to waste, unless a Special Administratrix is
appointed."

(p. 100. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)

(10) On December 26, 1962 Letters of Administration were issued to Avelina Magno pursuant
to this Honorable Court's aforesaid Order of December 25, 1962
"With full authority to take possession of all the property of said deceased in
any province or provinces in which it may be situated and to perform all
other acts necessary for the preservation of said property, said Administratrix
and/or Special Administratrix having filed a bond satisfactory to the Court."
(p. 102, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
(11) On January 22, 1963 this Honorable Court on petition of Leon P. Gellada of January 21,
1963 issued Letters of Administration to:
(a) Avelina A. Magno as Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
(b) Avelina A. Magno as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Charles Newton Hodges; and
(c) Joe Hodges as Co-Special Administrator of the Estate of Charles Newton Hodges.
(p. 43, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
(12) On February 20, 1963 this Honorable Court on the basis of a motion filed by Leon P.
Gellada as legal counsel on February 16, 1963 for Avelina A. Magno acting as Administratrix
of the Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (pp. 114-116, Sp. Proc. 1307) issued the following
order:
"... se autoriza a aquella (Avelina A. Magno) a firmar escrituras de venta
definitiva de propiedades cubiertas por contratos para vender, firmados, en
vida, por el finado Charles Newton Hodges, cada vez que el precio
estipulado en cada contrato este totalmente pagado. Se autoriza igualmente a
la misma a firmar escrituras de cancelacion de hipoteca tanto de bienes
reales como personales cada vez que la consideracion de cada hipoteca este
totalmente pagada.
"Cada una de dichas escrituras que se otorguen debe ser sometida para la
aprobacion de este Juzgado."
(p. 117, Sp. Proc. 1307).
[Par 1 (c), Reply to Motion For Removal of Joe Hodges]
(13) On September l6, 1963 Leon P. Gellada, acting as attorney for Avelina A. Magno as
Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, alleges:
3. That since January, 1963, both estates of Linnie Jane Hodges and
Charles Newton Hodges have been receiving in full, payments for those
"contracts to sell" entered into by C. N. Hodges during his lifetime, and the
purchasers have been demanding the execution of definite deeds of sale in
their favor.

4. That hereto attached are thirteen (13) copies deeds of sale executed by
the Administratrix and by the co-administrator (Fernando P. Mirasol) of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges respectively, in
compliance with the terms and conditions of the respective "contracts to
sell" executed by the parties thereto."
(14) The properties involved in the aforesaid motion of September 16, 1963 are all registered
in the name of the deceased C. N. Hodges.
(15) Avelina A. Magno, it is alleged on information and belief, has been advertising in the
newspaper in Iloilo thusly:
For Sale
Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges.
All Real Estate or Personal Property will be sold on First Come First Served Basis.
Avelina
A.
Magno
Admini
stratrix
(16) Avelina A. Magno, it is alleged on information and belief, has paid and still is paying
sums of money to sundry persons.
(17) Joe Hodges through the undersigned attorneys manifested during the hearings before this
Honorable Court on September 5 and 6, 1963 that the estate of C. N. Hodges was claiming all
of the assets belonging to the deceased spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges
situated in Philippines because of the aforesaid election by C. N. Hodges wherein he claimed
and took possession as sole owner of all of said assets during the administration of the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges on the ground that he was the sole devisee and legatee under her Last
Will and Testament.
(18) Avelina A. Magno has submitted no inventory and accounting of her administration as
Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Special Administratrix of the estate of
C. N. Hodges. However, from manifestations made by Avelina A. Magno and her legal
counsel, Leon P. Gellada, there is no question she will claim that at least fifty per cent (50%)
of the conjugal assets of the deceased spouses and the rents, emoluments and income
therefrom belong to the Higdon family who are named in paragraphs Fourth and Fifth of the
Will of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 5, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, movant respectfully prays that this Honorable Court,
after due hearing, order:
(1) Avelina A. Magno to submit an inventory and accounting of all of the funds, properties
and assets of any character belonging to the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges
which have come into her possession, with full details of what she has done with them;

(2) Avelina A. Magno to turn over and deliver to the Administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges all of the funds, properties and assets of any character remaining in her possession;
(3) Pending this Honorable Court's adjudication of the aforesaid issues, Avelina A. Magno to
stop, unless she first secures the conformity of Joe Hodges (or his duly authorized
representative, such as the undersigned attorneys) as the Co-administrator and attorney-in-fact
of a majority of the beneficiaries of the estate of C. N. Hodges:
(a) Advertising the sale and the sale of the properties of the estates:
(b) Employing personnel and paying them any compensation.
(4) Such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in the premises.
(Annex "T", Petition.)
Almost a year thereafter, or on September 14, 1964, after the co-administrators Joe Hodges and Fernando P.
Mirasol were replaced by herein petitioner Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank as sole administrator,
pursuant to an agreement of all the heirs of Hodges approved by the court, and because the above motion of
October 5, 1963 had not yet been heard due to the absence from the country of Atty. Gibbs, petitioner filed the
following:
MANIFESTATION AND MOTION, INCLUDING MOTION TO SET FOR
HEARING AND RESOLVE "URGENT MOTION FOR AN ACCOUNTING
AND DELIVERY TO ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE OF C. N.
HODGES OF ALL THE ASSETS OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF
THE DECEASED LINNIE JANE HODGES AND C. N. HODGES
EXISTING AS OF MAY 23, 1957 PLUS ALL OF THE RENTS,
EMOLUMENTS AND INCOME THEREFROM OF OCTOBER 5, 1963.
COMES NOW Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (hereinafter referred to as PCIB),
the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, deceased, in Special Proceedings No. 1672,
through its undersigned counsel, and to this Honorable Court respectfully alleges that:
1. On October 5, 1963, Joe Hodges acting as the co-administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges filed, through the undersigned attorneys, an "Urgent Motion For An Accounting and
Delivery To Administrator of the Estate of C. N. Hodges of all Of The Assets Of The
Conjugal Partnership of The Deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges Existing as Of
May, 23, 1957 Plus All Of The Rents, Emoluments and Income Therefrom" (pp. 536-542, CFI
Rec. S. P. No. 1672).
2. On January 24, 1964 this Honorable Court, on the basis of an amicable agreement entered
into on January 23, 1964 by the two co-administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges and
virtually all of the heirs of C. N. Hodges (p. 912, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672), resolved the
dispute over who should act as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges by appointing the
PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges (pp. 905-906, CFI Rec. S. P. No. 1672)
and issuing letters of administration to the PCIB.
3. On January 24, 1964 virtually all of the heirs of C. N. Hodges, Joe Hodges and Fernando P.
Mirasol acting as the two co-administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges, Avelina A. Magno
acting as the administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, and Messrs. William Brown
and Ardel Young Acting for all of the Higdon family who claim to be the sole beneficiaries of

the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and various legal counsel representing the aforenamed
parties entered into an amicable agreement, which was approved by this Honorable Court,
wherein the parties thereto agreed that certain sums of money were to be paid in settlement of
different claims against the two estates andthat the assets (to the extent they existed)of both
estates would be administrated jointly by the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges and Avelina A. Magno as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, subject,
however, to the aforesaid October 5, 1963 Motion, namely, the PCIB's claim to exclusive
possession and ownership of one-hundred percent (10017,) (or, in the alternative, seventy-five
percent [75%] of all assets owned by C. N. Hodges or Linnie Jane Hodges situated in the
Philippines. On February 1, 1964 (pp. 934-935, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672) this Honorable
Court amended its order of January 24, 1964 but in no way changes its recognition of the
aforedescribed basic demand by the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges to
one hundred percent (100%) of the assets claimed by both estates.
4. On February 15, 1964 the PCIB filed a "Motion to Resolve" the aforesaid Motion of
October 5, 1963. This Honorable Court set for hearing on June 11, 1964 the Motion of
October 5, 1963.
5. On June 11, 1964, because the undersigned Allison J. Gibbs was absent in the United
States, this Honorable Court ordered the indefinite postponement of the hearing of the Motion
of October 5, 1963.
6. Since its appointment as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges the PCIB has not been
able to properly carry out its duties and obligations as administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges because of the following acts, among others, of Avelina A. Magno and those who
claim to act for her as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges:
(a) Avelina A. Magno illegally acts as if she is in exclusive control of all of
the assets in the Philippines of both estates including those claimed by the
estate of C. N. Hodges as evidenced in part by her locking the premises at
206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City on August 31, 1964 and refusing to
reopen same until ordered to do so by this Honorable Court on September 7,
1964.
(b) Avelina A. Magno illegally acts as though she alone may decide how the
assets of the estate of C.N. Hodges should be administered, who the PCIB
shall employ and how much they may be paid as evidenced in party by her
refusal to sign checks issued by the PCIB payable to the undersigned
counsel pursuant to their fee agreement approved by this Honorable Court in
its order dated March 31, 1964.
(c) Avelina A. Magno illegally gives access to and turns over possession of
the records and assets of the estate of C.N. Hodges to the attorney-in-fact of
the Higdon Family, Mr. James L. Sullivan, as evidenced in part by the
cashing of his personal checks.
(d) Avelina A. Magno illegally refuses to execute checks prepared by the
PCIB drawn to pay expenses of the estate of C. N. Hodges as evidenced in
part by the check drawn to reimburse the PCIB's advance of P48,445.50 to
pay the 1964 income taxes reported due and payable by the estate of C.N.
Hodges.

7. Under and pursuant to the orders of this Honorable Court, particularly those of January 24
and February 1, 1964, and the mandate contained in its Letters of Administration issued on
January 24, 1964 to the PCIB, it has
"full authority to take possession of all the property of the
deceased C. N. Hodges
"and to perform all other acts necessary for the preservation of said
property." (p. 914, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672.)
8. As administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, the PCIB claims the right to the immediate
exclusive possession and control of all of the properties, accounts receivables, court cases,
bank accounts and other assets, including the documentary records evidencing same, which
existed in the Philippines on the date of C. N. Hodges' death, December 25, 1962, and were in
his possession and registered in his name alone. The PCIB knows of no assets in the
Philippines registered in the name of Linnie Jane Hodges, the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges,
or, C. N. Hodges, Executor of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on December 25, 1962. All of
the assets of which the PCIB has knowledge are either registered in the name of C. N.
Hodges, alone or were derived therefrom since his death on December 25, 1962.
9. The PCIB as the current administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, deceased, succeeded
to all of the rights of the previously duly appointed administrators of the estate of C. N.
Hodges, to wit:
(a) On December 25, 1962, date of C. N. Hodges' death, this Honorable
Court appointed Miss Avelina A. Magno simultaneously as:
(i) Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 102, CFI Rec., S.P.
No. 1307) to replace the deceased C. N. Hodges who on May 28, 1957 was
appointed Special Administrator (p. 13. CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1307) and on July
1, 1957 Executor of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 30, CFI Rec., S. P.
No. 1307).
(ii) Special Administratrix of the estate of C. N. Hodges (p. 102, CFI Rec.,
S.P. No. 1307).
(b) On December 29, 1962 this Honorable Court appointed Harold K.
Davies as co-special administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges along with
Avelina A. Magno (pp. 108-111, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1307).
(c) On January 22, 1963, with the conformity of Avelina A. Magno, Harold
K. Davies resigned in favor of Joe Hodges (pp. 35-36, CFI Rec., S.P. No.
1672) who thereupon was appointed on January 22, 1963 by this Honorable
Court as special co-administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges (pp. 38-40 &
43, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1672) along with Miss Magno who at that time was
still acting as special co-administratrix of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
(d) On February 22, 1963, without objection on the part of Avelina A.
Magno, this Honorable Court appointed Joe Hodges and Fernando P.
Mirasol as co-administrators of the estate of C.N. Hodges (pp. 76-78, 81 &
85, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672).

10. Miss Avelina A. Magno, pursuant to the orders of this Honorable Court of December 25,
1962, took possession of all Philippine Assets now claimed by the two estates. Legally, Miss
Magno could take possession of the assets registered in the name of C. N. Hodges alone only
in her capacity as Special Administratrix of the Estate of C.N. Hodges. With the appointment
by this Honorable Court on February 22, 1963 of Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol as the
co-administrators of the estate of C.N. Hodges, they legally were entitled to take over from
Miss Magno the full and exclusive possession of all of the assets of the estate of C.N. Hodges.
With the appointment on January 24, 1964 of the PCIB as the sole administrator of the estate
of C.N. Hodges in substitution of Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol, the PCIB legally
became the only party entitled to the sole and exclusive possession of all of the assets of the
estate of C. N. Hodges.
11. The PCIB's predecessors submitted their accounting and this Honorable Court approved
same, to wit:
(a) The accounting of Harold K. Davies dated January 18, 1963 (pp. 16-33,
CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1672); which shows or its face the:
(i) Conformity of Avelina A. Magno acting as "Administratrix of the Estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges and Special Administratrix of the Estate of C. N.
Hodges";
(ii) Conformity of Leslie Echols, a Texas lawyer acting for the heirs of C.N.
Hodges; and
(iii) Conformity of William Brown, a Texas lawyer acting for the Higdon
family who claim to be the only heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 18, 25-33,
CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672).
Note: This accounting was approved by this Honorable Court on January 22, 1963 (p. 34, CFI
Rec., S. P. No. 1672).
(b) The accounting of Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol as of January 23,
1964, filed February 24, 1964 (pp. 990-1000, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1672 and
pp. 1806-1848, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1307).
Note: This accounting was approved by this Honorable Court on March 3, 1964.
(c) The PCIB and its undersigned lawyers are aware of no report or
accounting submitted by Avelina A. Magno of her acts as administratrix of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges or special administratrix of the estate of
C.N. Hodges, unless it is the accounting of Harold K. Davies as special coadministrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges dated January 18, 1963 to which
Miss Magno manifested her conformity (supra).
12. In the aforesaid agreement of January 24, 1964, Miss Avelina A. Magno agreed to receive P10,000.00
"for her services as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges"
and in addition she agreed to be employed, starting February 1, 1964, at

"a monthly salary of P500.00 for her services as an employee of both

estates."
24 ems.
13. Under the aforesaid agreement of January 24, 1964 and the orders of this Honorable Court
of same date, the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges is entitled to the
exclusive possession of all records, properties and assets in the name of C. N. Hodges as of
the date of his death on December 25, 1962 which were in the possession of the deceased C.
N. Hodges on that date and which then passed to the possession of Miss Magno in her
capacity as Special Co-Administratrix of the estate of C. N. Hodges or the possession of Joe
Hodges or Fernando P. Mirasol as co-administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
14. Because of Miss Magno's refusal to comply with the reasonable request of PCIB
concerning the assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges, the PCIB dismissed Miss Magno as an
employee of the estate of C. N. Hodges effective August 31, 1964. On September 1, 1964
Miss Magno locked the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street and denied the PCIB access
thereto. Upon the Urgent Motion of the PCIB dated September 3, 1964, this Honorable Court
on September 7, 1964 ordered Miss Magno to reopen the aforesaid premises at 206-208
Guanco Street and permit the PCIB access thereto no later than September 8, 1964.
15. The PCIB pursuant to the aforesaid orders of this Honorable Court is again in physical
possession of all of the assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges. However, the PCIB is not in
exclusive control of the aforesaid records, properties and assets because Miss Magno
continues to assert the claims hereinabove outlined in paragraph 6, continues to use her own
locks to the doors of the aforesaid premises at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City and
continues to deny the PCIB its right to know the combinations to the doors of the vault and
safes situated within the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street despite the fact that said
combinations were known to only C. N. Hodges during his lifetime.
16. The Philippine estate and inheritance taxes assessed the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges were
assessed and paid on the basis that C. N. Hodges is the sole beneficiary of the assets of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges situated in the Philippines. Avelina A. Magno and her legal
counsel at no time have questioned the validity of the aforesaid assessment and the payment
of the corresponding Philippine death taxes.
17. Nothing further remains to be done in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges except to resolve
the aforesaid Motion of October 5, 1963 and grant the PCIB the exclusive possession and
control of all of the records, properties and assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
18. Such assets as may have existed of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges were ordered by this
Honorable Court in special Proceedings No. 1307 to be turned over and delivered to C. N.
Hodges alone. He in fact took possession of them before his death and asserted and exercised
the right of exclusive ownership over the said assets as the sole beneficiary of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the PCIB respectfully petitions that this Honorable
court:
(1) Set the Motion of October 5, 1963 for hearing at the earliest possible date with notice to
all interested parties;

(2) Order Avelina A. Magno to submit an inventory and accounting as Administratrix of the
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Co-Administratrix of the Estate of C. N. Hodges of all of
the funds, properties and assets of any character belonging to the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges and C. N. Hodges which have come into her possession, with full details of what she
has done with them;
(3) Order Avelina A. Magno to turn over and deliver to the PCIB as administrator of the estate
of C. N. Hodges all of the funds, properties and assets of any character remaining in her
possession;
(4) Pending this Honorable Court's adjudication of the aforesaid issues, order Avelina A.
Magno and her representatives to stop interferring with the administration of the estate of C.
N. Hodges by the PCIB and its duly authorized representatives;
(5) Enjoin Avelina A. Magno from working in the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo
City as an employee of the estate of C. N. Hodges and approve her dismissal as such by the
PCIB effective August 31, 1964;
(6) Enjoin James L. Sullivan, Attorneys Manglapus and Quimpo and others allegedly
representing Miss Magno from entering the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City or
any other properties of C. N. Hodges without the express permission of the PCIB;
(7) Order such other relief as this Honorable Court finds just and equitable in the premises.
(Annex "U" Petition.)
On January 8, 1965, petitioner also filed a motion for "Official Declaration of Heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges
Estate" alleging:
COMES NOW Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (hereinafter referred to as PCIB), as administrator
of the estate of the late C. N. Hodges, through the undersigned counsel, and to this Honorable Court
respectfully alleges that:
1. During their marriage, spouses Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges, American
citizens originally from the State of Texas, U.S.A., acquired and accumulated considerable
assets and properties in the Philippines and in the States of Texas and Oklahoma, United
States of America. All said properties constituted their conjugal estate.
2. Although Texas was the domicile of origin of the Hodges spouses, this Honorable Court, in
its orders dated March 31 and December 12, 1964 (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. ----;
Sp. Proc. No. 1672, p. ----), conclusively found and categorically ruled that said spouses had
lived and worked for more than 50 years in Iloilo City and had, therefore, acquired a domicile
of choice in said city, which they retained until the time of their respective deaths.
3. On November 22, 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges executed in the City of Iloilo her Last Will
and Testament, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "A". The bequests in said will
pertinent to the present issue are the second, third, and fourth provisions, which we quote in
full hereunder.
SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder
of my estate, both personal and real, wherever situated, or located, to my

husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to hold unto him, my said
husband during his natural lifetime.
THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, shall have the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate
during his lifetime, and he is hereby given the right to make any changes in
the physical properties of said estate by sale of any part thereof which he
think best, and the purchase of any other or additional property as he may
think best; to execute conveyances with or without general or special
warranty, conveying in fee simple or for any other term or time, any property
which he may deem proper to dispose of; to lease any of the real property for
oil, gas and/or other minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass the
absolute fee simple title to the interest so conveyed in such property as he
may elect to sell. All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall
belong to him, and he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of
said estate as he may need or desire. It is provided herein, however, that he
shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of the improved property now
owned by us located at, in or near the City of Lubbock, Texas, but he shall
have the full right to lease, manage and enjoy the same during his lifetime,
as above provided. He shall have the right to sub-divide any farmland and
sell lots therein, and may sell unimproved town lots.
FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give,
devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate both
real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among
my brothers and sisters, share and share alike, namely:
"Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe,
Era Boman and Nimray Higdon."
4. On November 14, 1953, C. N. Hodges executed in the City of Iloilo his Last Will and
Testament, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "B ". In said Will, C. N. Hodges
designated his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, as his beneficiary using the identical language she
used in the second and third provisos of her Will, supra.
5. On May 23, 1957 Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City, predeceasing her husband by
more than five (5) years. At the time of her death, she had no forced or compulsory heir,
except her husband, C. N. Hodges. She was survived also by various brothers and sisters
mentioned in her Will (supra), which, for convenience, we shall refer to as the HIGDONS.
6. On June 28, 1957, this Honorable Court admitted to probate the Last Will and Testament of
the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges (Annex "A"), and appointed C. N. Hodges as executor of
her estate without bond. (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. 24-25). On July 1, 1957, this
Honorable Court issued letters testamentary to C. N. Hodges in the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 30.)
7. The Will of Linnie Jane Hodges, with respect to the order of succession, the amount of
successional rights, and the intrinsic of its testamentary provisions, should be governed by
Philippine laws because:
(a) The testatrix, Linnie Jane Hodges, intended Philippine laws to govern her
Will;

(b) Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that "the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found",
shall prevail. However, the Conflict of Law of Texas, which is the "national
law" of the testatrix, Linnie Jane Hodges, provide that the domiciliary law
(Philippine law see paragraph 2, supra) should govern the testamentary
dispositions and successional rights over movables (personal properties), and
the law of the situs of the property (also Philippine law as to properties
located in the Philippines) with regards immovable (real properties). Thus
applying the "Renvoi Doctrine", as approved and applied by our Supreme
Court in the case of "In The Matter Of The Testate Estate of Eduard E.
Christensen", G.R. No.
L-16749, promulgated January 31, 1963, Philippine law should apply to the
Will of Linnie Jane Hodges and to the successional rights to her estate
insofar as her movable andimmovable assets in the Philippines are
concerned. We shall not, at this stage, discuss what law should govern the
assets of Linnie Jane Hodges located in Oklahoma and Texas, because the
only assets in issue in this motion are those within the jurisdiction of this
motion Court in the two above-captioned Special Proceedings.
8. Under Philippine and Texas law, the conjugal or community estate of spouses shall, upon
dissolution, be divided equally between them. Thus, upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges on
May 23, 1957, one-half (1/2) of the entirety of the assets of the Hodges spouses constituting
their conjugal estate pertained automatically to Charles Newton Hodges, not by way of
inheritance, but in his own right as partner in the conjugal partnership. The other one-half
(1/2) portion of the conjugal estate constituted the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. This is the
only portion of the conjugal estate capable of inheritance by her heirs.
9. This one-half (1/2) portion of the conjugal assets pertaining to Linnie Jane Hodges cannot,
under a clear and specific provision of her Will, be enhanced or increased by income,
earnings, rents, or emoluments accruing after her death on May 23, 1957. Linnie Jane
Hodges' Will provides that "all rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to
him (C. N. Hodges) and he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate
as he may need or desire." (Paragraph 3, Annex "A".) Thus, by specific provision of Linnie
Jane Hodges' Will, "all rents, emoluments and income" must be credited to the one-half (1/2)
portion of the conjugal estate pertaining to C. N. Hodges. Clearly, therefore, the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges, capable of inheritance by her heirs, consisted exclusively of no more
than one-half (1/2) of the conjugal estate, computed as of the time of her death on May 23,
1957.
10. Articles 900, 995 and 1001 of the New Civil Code provide that the surviving spouse of a
deceased leaving no ascendants or descendants is entitled, as a matter of right and by way of
irrevocable legitime, to at least one-half (1/2) of the estate of the deceased, and no
testamentary disposition by the deceased can legally and validly affect this right of the
surviving spouse. In fact, her husband is entitled to said one-half (1/2) portion of her estate by
way of legitime. (Article 886, Civil Code.) Clearly, therefore, immediately upon the death of
Linnie Jane Hodges, C. N. Hodges was the owner of at least three-fourths (3/4) or seventyfive (75%) percent of all of the conjugal assets of the spouses, (1/2 or 50% by way of
conjugal partnership share and 1/4 or 25% by way of inheritance and legitime) plus all "rents,
emoluments and income" accruing to said conjugal estate from the moment of Linnie Jane
Hodges' death (see paragraph 9, supra).

11. The late Linnie Jane Hodges designated her husband C.N. Hodges as her sole and
exclusive heir with full authority to do what he pleased, as exclusive heir and owner of all the
assets constituting her estate, except only with regards certain properties "owned by us,
located at, in or near the City of Lubbock, Texas". Thus, even without relying on our laws of
succession and legitime, which we have cited above, C. N. Hodges, by specific testamentary
designation of his wife, was entitled to the entirely to his wife's estate in the Philippines.
12. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that "the rights of the successor are
transmitted from the death of the decedent". Thus, title to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
was transmitted to C. N. Hodges immediately upon her death on May 23, 1957. For the
convenience of this Honorable Court, we attached hereto as Annex "C" a graph of how the
conjugal estate of the spouses Hodges should be divided in accordance with Philippine law
and the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges.
13. In his capacity as sole heir and successor to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges as abovestated, C. N. Hodges, shortly after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, appropriated to himself
the entirety of her estate. He operated all the assets, engaged in business and performed all
acts in connection with the entirety of the conjugal estate, in his own name alone, just as he
had been operating, engaging and doing while the late Linnie Jane Hodges was still
alive. Upon his death on December 25, 1962, therefore, all said conjugal assets were in his
sole possession and control, and registered in his name alone, not as executor, but as
exclusive owner of all said assets.
14. All these acts of C. N. Hodges were authorized and sanctioned expressly and impliedly by
various orders of this Honorable Court, as follows:
(a) In an Order dated May 27, 1957, this Honorable Court ruled that C. N. Hodges "is allowed
or authorized to continue the business in which he was engaged, and to perform acts which he
had been doing while the deceased was living." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 11.)
(b) On December 14, 1957, this Honorable Court, on the basis of the following fact, alleged
in the verified Motion dated December 11, 1957 filed by Leon P. Gellada as attorney for the
executor C. N. Hodges:
That herein Executor, (is) not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the
successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.' (CFI Record, Sp.
Proc. No. 1307, p. 44; emphasis supplied.)
issued the following order:
"As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the Executor, for the reasons stated in his
motion dated December 11, 1957, which the Court considers well taken, all the sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges executed by the Executor, Charles Newton Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said
Executor is further authorized to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with
the wishes contained in the last will and testament of the latter." (CFI Record. Sp. Proc. No.
1307, p. 46; emphasis supplied.)
24 ems

(c) On April 21, 1959, this Honorable Court approved the verified inventory and accounting
submitted by C. N. Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on April 14, 1959 wherein he
alleged among other things,
"That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of
examining the herein account, be given notice, as herein executor is the only
devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last will and
testament already probated by the Honorable Court." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc.
No. 1307, pp. 77-78; emphasis supplied.)
(d) On July 20, 1960, this Honorable Court approved the verified "Annual Statement of
Account" submitted by C. N. Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on July 21, 1960
wherein he alleged, among other things.
"That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of
examining the herein account, be given notice as herein executor is the only
devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in accordance with
the last will and testament ofthe deceased, already probated by this
Honorable Court." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. 81-82; emphasis
supplied.)
(e) On May 2, 1961, this Honorable Court approved the verified "Annual Statement of
Account By The Executor For the Year 1960" submitted through Leon P. Gellada on April 20,
1961 wherein he alleged:
"That no person interested in the Philippines be given notice, ofthe time and place of
examining the herein account, as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in accordance with the last will and testament ofthe deceased,
already probated by this Honorable Court." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. 90-91;
emphasis supplied.)
15. Since C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of Linnie Jane Hodges, not only by
law, but in accordance with the dispositions of her will, there was, in fact, no need to liquidate
the conjugal estate of the spouses. The entirely of said conjugal estate pertained to him
exclusively, therefore this Honorable Court sanctioned and authorized, as above-stated, C. N.
Hodges to manage, operate and control all the conjugal assets as owner.
16. By expressly authorizing C. N. Hodges to act as he did in connection with the estate of his
wife, this Honorable Court has (1) declared C. N. Hodges as the sole heir of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges, and (2) delivered and distributed her estate to C. N. Hodges as sole heir
in accordance with the terms and conditions of her Will. Thus, although the "estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges" still exists as a legal and juridical personality, it had no assets or properties
located in the Philippines registered in its name whatsoever at the time of the death of C. N.
Hodges on December 25, 1962.
17. The Will of Linnie Jane Hodges (Annex "A"), fourth paragraph, provides as follows:
"At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give, devise
and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate both real and
personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my
brothers and sisters, share and share alike, namely:

"Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy

Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimray Higdon."
Because of the facts hereinabove set out there is no "rest, residue and remainder", at least to
the extent of the Philippine assets, which remains to vest in the HIGDONS, assuming this
proviso in Linnie Jane Hodges' Will is valid and binding against the estate of C. N. Hodges.
18. Any claims by the HIGDONS under the above-quoted provision of Linnie Jane Hodges'
Will is without merit because said provision is void and invalid at least as to the Philippine
assets. It should not, in anyway, affect the rights of the estate of C. N. Hodges or his heirs to
the properties, which C. N. Hodges acquired by way of inheritance from his wife Linnie Jane
Hodges upon her death.
(a) In spite of the above-mentioned provision in the Will of Linnie Jane
Hodges, C. N. Hodges acquired, not merely a usufructuary right, but
absolute title and ownership to her estate. In a recent case involving a very
similar testamentary provision, the Supreme Court held that the heir first
designated acquired full ownership of the property bequeathed by the will,
not mere usufructuary rights. (Consolacion Florentino de Crisologo, et al.,
vs. Manuel Singson, G. R. No. L-13876, February 28, 1962.)
(b) Article 864, 872 and 886 of the New Civil Code clearly provide that no
charge, condition or substitution whatsoever upon the legitime can be
imposed by a testator. Thus, under the provisions of Articles 900, 995 and
1001 of the New Civil Code, the legitime of a surviving spouse is 1/2 of the
estate of the deceased spouse. Consequently, the above-mentioned provision
in the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges is clearly invalid insofar as the legitime of
C. N. Hodges was concerned, which consisted of 1/2 of the 1/2 portion of
the conjugal estate, or 1/4 of the entire conjugal estate of the deceased.
(c) There are generally only two kinds of substitution provided for and
authorized by our Civil Code (Articles 857-870), namely, (1) simple or
common substitution, sometimes referred to as vulgar substitution (Article
859), and (2) fideicommissary substitution (Article 863). All other
substitutions are merely variations of these. The substitution provided for by
paragraph four of the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges is not fideicommissary
substitution, because there is clearly no obligation on the part of C. N.
Hodges as the first heir designated, to preserve the properties for the
substitute heirs. (Consolacion Florentino de Crisologo et al. vs. Manuel
Singson, G. R. No.
L-13876.) At most, it is a vulgar or simple substitution. However, in order
that a vulgar orsimple substitution can be valid, three alternative conditions
must be present, namely, that the first designated heir (1) should die before
the testator; or (2) should not wish to accept the inheritance; or (3) should be
incapacitated to do so. None of these conditions apply to C. N. Hodges, and,
therefore, the substitution provided for by the above-quoted provision of the
Will is not authorized by the Code, and, therefore, it is void. Manresa,
commenting on these kisses of substitution, meaningfully stated that: "...
cuando el testador instituyeun primer heredero, y por fallecimiento de este
nombra otro u otros, ha de entenderse que estas segundas designaciones solo
han de llegar a tener efectividad en el caso de que el primer instituido muera
antes que el testador, fuera o no esta su verdadera intencion. ...". (6 Manresa,

7 a ed., pag. 175.) In other words, when another heir is designated to inherit
upon the death of a first heir, the second designation can have effect only in
case the first instituted heir dies before the testator, whether or not that was
the true intention of said testator. Since C. N. Hodges did not die before
Linnie Jane Hodges, the provision for substitution contained in Linnie Jane
Hodges' Willis void.
(d) In view of the invalidity of the provision for substitution in the Will, C.
N. Hodges' inheritance to the entirety of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate is
irrevocable and final.
19. Be that as it may, at the time of C. N. Hodges' death, the entirety of the conjugal estate
appeared and was registered in him exclusively as owner. Thus, the presumption is that all
said assets constituted his estate. Therefore
(a) If the HIGDONS wish to enforce their dubious rights as substituted heirs to 1/4 of the
conjugal estate (the other 1/4 is covered by the legitime of C. N. Hodges which can not be
affected by any testamentary disposition), their remedy, if any, is to file their claim against the
estate of C. N. Hodges, which should be entitled at the present time to full custody and
control of all the conjugal estate of the spouses.
(b) The present proceedings, in which two estates exist under separate administration, where
the administratrix of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate exercises an officious right to object and
intervene in matters affecting exclusively the C. N. Hodges estate, is anomalous.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that after trial and reception of evidence, this
Honorable Court declare:
1. That the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges was and is composed exclusively of one-half (1/2)
share in the conjugal estate of the spouses Hodges, computed as of the date of her death on
May 23, 1957;
2. That the other half of the conjugal estate pertained exclusively to C. N. Hodges as his share
as partner in the conjugal partnership;
3. That all "rents, emoluments and income" of the conjugal estate accruing after Linnie Jane
Hodges' death pertains to C. N. Hodges;
4. That C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
5. That, therefore, the entire conjugal estate of the spouses located in the Philippines, plus all
the "rents, emoluments and income" above-mentioned, now constitutes the estate of C. N.
Hodges, capable of distribution to his heirs upon termination of Special Proceedings No.
1672;
6. That PCIB, as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, is entitled to full and exclusive
custody, control and management of all said properties; and
7. That Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as
the HIGDONS, has no right to intervene or participate in the administration of the C. N.
Hodges estate.

PCIB further prays for such and other relief as may be deemed just and equitable in the
premises."
(Record, pp. 265-277)
Before all of these motions of petitioner could be resolved, however, on December 21, 1965, private
respondent Magno filed her own "Motion for the Official Declaration of Heirs of the Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges" as follows:
COMES NOW the Administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and, through
undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable Court most respectfully states and manifests:
1. That the spouses Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges were American citizens
who died at the City of Iloilo after having amassed and accumulated extensive properties in
the Philippines;
2. That on November 22, 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges executed a last will and testament (the
original of this will now forms part of the records of these proceedings as Exhibit "C" and
appears as Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Folio I, pp. 17-18);
3. That on May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died at the City of Iloilo at the time survived by
her husband, Charles Newton Hodges, and several relatives named in her last will and
testament;
4. That on June 28, 1957, a petition therefor having been priorly filed and duly heard, this
Honorable Court issued an order admitting to probate the last will and testament of Linnie
Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Folio I, pp. 24-25, 26-28);
5. That the required notice to creditors and to all others who may have any claims against the
decedent, Linnie Jane Hodges has already been printed, published and posted (Sp. Proc. No.
1307, Folio I. pp. 34-40) and the reglamentary period for filing such claims has long ago
lapsed and expired without any claims having been asserted against the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, approved by the Administrator/Administratrix of the said estate, nor ratified by this
Honorable Court;
6. That the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges already admitted to probate contains
an institution of heirs in the following words:
"SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder
of my estate, both personal and real, wherever situated or located, to my
beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges to have and to hold unto him, my
said husband, during his natural lifetime.
THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, shall have the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate
during his lifetime, and, he is hereby given the right to make any changes in
the physical properties of said estate, by sale of any part thereof which he
may think best, and the purchase of any other or additional property as he
may think best; to execute conveyances with or without general or special
warranty, conveying in fee simple or for any other term or time, any property
which he may deem proper to dispose of; to lease any of the real property for

oil, gas and/or other minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass the
absolute fee simple title to the interest so conveyed in such property as he
elect to sell. All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall belong
to him, and he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of said
estate as he may need or desire. It is provided herein, however, that he shall
not sell or otherwise dispose of any of the improved property now owned by
us located at, in or near the City of Lubbock Texas, but he shall have the full
right to lease, manage and enjoy the same during his lifetime, above
provided. He shall have the right to subdivide any farm land and sell lots
therein, and may sell unimproved town lots.
FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give,
devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both
real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among
my brothers and sisters, share and share alike, namely:
Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe,
Era Boman and Nimroy Higdon.
FIFTH: In case of the death of any of my brothers and/or sisters named in
item Fourth, above, prior to the death of my husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, then it is my will and bequest that the heirs of such deceased
brother or sister shall take jointly the share which would have gone to such
brother or sister had she or he survived."
7. That under the provisions of the last will and testament already above-quoted, Linnie Jane
Hodges gave a life-estate or a usufruct over all her estate to her husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, and a vested remainder-estate or the naked title over the same estate to her relatives
named therein;
8. That after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges and after the admission to probate of her last
will and testament, but during the lifetime of Charles Newton Hodges, the said Charles
Newton Hodges with full and complete knowledge of the life-estate or usufruct conferred
upon him by the will since he was then acting as Administrator of the estate and later as
Executor of the will of Linnie Jane Hodges, unequivocably and clearly through oral and
written declarations and sworn public statements, renounced, disclaimed and repudiated his
life-estate and usufruct over the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
9. That, accordingly, the only heirs left to receive the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges pursuant to
her last will and testament, are her named brothers and sisters, or their heirs, to wit: Esta
Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Aline Higdon and David Higdon, the latter two
being the wife and son respectively of the deceased Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe Era Boman
and Nimroy Higdon, all of legal ages, American citizens, with residence at the State of Texas,
United States of America;
10. That at the time of the death of Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957, she was the coowner (together with her husband Charles Newton Hodges) of an undivided one-half interest
in their conjugal properties existing as of that date, May 23, 1957, which properties are now
being administered sometimes jointly and sometimes separately by the Administratrix of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and/or the Administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges but all of
which are under the control and supervision of this Honorable Court;

11. That because there was no separation or segregation of the interests of husband and wife
in the combined conjugal estate, as there has been no such separation or segregation up to the
present, both interests have continually earned exactly the same amount of "rents,
emoluments and income", the entire estate having been continually devoted to the business of
the spouses as if they were alive;
12. That the one-half interest of Linnie Jane Hodges in the combined conjugal estate was
earning "rents, emoluments and income" until her death on May 23, 1957, when it ceased to
be saddled with any more charges or expenditures which are purely personal to her in nature,
and her estate kept on earning such "rents, emoluments and income" by virtue of their having
been expressly renounced, disclaimed and repudiated by Charles Newton Hodges to whom
they were bequeathed for life under the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges;
13. That, on the other hand, the one-half interest of Charles Newton Hodges in the combined
conjugal estate existing as of May 23, 1957, while it may have earned exactly the same
amount of "rents, emoluments and income" as that of the share pertaining to Linnie Jane
Hodges, continued to be burdened by charges, expenditures, and other dispositions which are
purely personal to him in nature, until the death of Charles Newton Hodges himself on
December 25, 1962;
14. That of all the assets of the combined conjugal estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles
Newton Hodges as they exist today, the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is clearly entitled to a
portion more than fifty percent (50%) as compared to the portion to which the estate of
Charles Newton Hodges may be entitled, which portions can be exactly determined by the
following manner:
a. An inventory must be made of the assets of the combined conjugal estate
as they existed on the death of Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957 onehalf of these assets belong to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
b. An accounting must be made of the "rents, emoluments and income" of all
these assets again one-half of these belong to the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges;
c. Adjustments must be made, after making a deduction of charges,
disbursements and other dispositions made by Charles Newton Hodges
personally and for his own personal account from May 23, 1957 up to
December 25, 1962, as well as other charges, disbursements and other
dispositions made for him and in his behalf since December 25, 1962 up to
the present;
15. That there remains no other matter for disposition now insofar as the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges is concerned but to complete the liquidation of her estate, segregate them from the
conjugal estate, and distribute them to her heirs pursuant to her last will and testament.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully moved and prayed that this
Honorable Court, after a hearing on the factual matters raised by this motion, issue an order:
a. Declaring the following persons, to wit: Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon,
Aline Higdon, David Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimroy Higdon, as the sole heirs
under the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges and as the only persons entitled to her
estate;

b. Determining the exact value of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges in accordance with the
system enunciated in paragraph 14 of this motion;
c. After such determination ordering its segregation from the combined conjugal estate and its
delivery to the Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges for distribution to the heirs
to whom they properly belong and appertain.
(Green Record on Appeal, pp. 382-391)
whereupon, instead of further pressing on its motion of January 8, 1965 aforequoted, as it had been doing
before, petitioner withdrew the said motion and in addition to opposing the above motion of respondent
Magno, filed a motion on April 22, 1966 alleging in part that:
1. That it has received from the counsel for the administratrix of the supposed estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges a notice to set her "Motion for Official Declaration of Heirs of the Estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges";
2. That before the aforesaid motion could be heard, there are matters pending before this
Honorable Court, such as:
a. The examination already ordered by this Honorable Court of documents
relating to the allegation of Avelina Magno that Charles Newton Hodges
"through ... written declarations and sworn public statements, renounced,
disclaimed and repudiated life-estate and usufruct over the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges';
b. That "Urgent Motion for An Accounting and Delivery to the Estate of C.
N. Hodges of All the Assets of the Conjugal Partnership of the Deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges Existing as of May 23, 1957 Plus All
the Rents, Emoluments and Income Therefrom";
c. Various motions to resolve the aforesaid motion;
d. Manifestation of September 14, 1964, detailing acts of interference of
Avelina Magno under color of title as administratrix of the Estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges;
which are all prejudicial, and which involve no issues of fact, all facts involved therein being
matters of record, and therefore require only the resolution of questions of law;
3. That whatever claims any alleged heirs or other persons may have could be very easily
threshed out in the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges;
4. That the maintenance of two separate estate proceedings and two administrators only
results in confusion and is unduly burdensome upon the Testate Estate of Charles Newton
Hodges, particularly because the bond filed by Avelina Magno is grossly insufficient to
answer for the funds and property which she has inofficiously collected and held, as well as
those which she continues to inofficiously collect and hold;
5. That it is a matter of record that such state of affairs affects and inconveniences not only
the estate but also third-parties dealing with it;" (Annex "V", Petition.)

and then, after further reminding the court, by quoting them, of the relevant allegations of its earlier motion of
September 14, 1964, Annex U, prayed that:
1. Immediately order Avelina Magno to account for and deliver to the administrator of the
Estate of C. N. Hodges all the assets of the conjugal partnership of the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges and C. N. Hodges, plus all the rents, emoluments and income therefrom;
2. Pending the consideration of this motion, immediately order Avelina Magno to turn over all
her collections to the administrator Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank;
3. Declare the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) closed;
4. Defer the hearing and consideration of the motion for declaration of heirs in the Testate
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges until the matters hereinabove set forth are resolved.
(Prayer, Annex "V" of Petition.)
On October 12, 1966, as already indicated at the outset of this opinion, the respondent court denied the
foregoing motion, holding thus:
ORDER
On record is a motion (Vol. X, Sp. 1672, pp. 4379-4390) dated April 22, 1966 of
administrator PCIB praying that (1) Immediately order Avelina Magno to account for and
deliver to the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges all assets of the conjugal partnership
of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges, plus all the rents, emoluments and
income therefrom; (2) Pending the consideration of this motion, immediately order Avelina
Magno to turn over all her collections to the administrator PCIB; (3) Declare the Testate
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) closed; and (4) Defer the hearing and
consideration of the motion for declaration of heirs in the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges until the matters hereinabove set forth are resolved.
This motion is predicated on the fact that there are matters pending before this court such as
(a) the examination already ordered by this Honorable Court of documents relating to the
allegation of Avelina Magno that Charles Newton Hodges thru written declaration and sworn
public statements renounced, disclaimed and repudiated his life-estate and usufruct over the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (b) the urgent motion for accounting and delivery to the estate of
C. N. Hodges of all the assets of the conjugal partnership of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges
and C. N. Hodges existing as of May 23, 1957 plus all the rents, emoluments and income
therefrom; (c) various motions to resolve the aforesaid motion; and (d) manifestation of
September 14, 1964, detailing acts of interference of Avelina Magno under color of title as
administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
These matters, according to the instant motion, are all pre-judicial involving no issues of facts
and only require the resolution of question of law; that in the motion of October 5, 1963 it is
alleged that in a motion dated December 11, 1957 filed by Atty. Leon Gellada as attorney for
the executor C. N. Hodges, the said executor C. N. Hodges is not only part owner of the
properties left as conjugal but also the successor to all the properties left by the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges.
Said motion of December 11, 1957 was approved by the Court in consonance with the wishes
contained in the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges.

That on April 21, 1959 this Court approved the inventory and accounting submitted by C. N.
Hodges thru counsel Atty. Leon Gellada in a motion filed on April 14, 1959 stating therein
that executor C. N. Hodges is the only devisee or legatee of Linnie Jane Hodges in
accordance with the last will and testament already probated by the Court.
That on July 13, 1960 the Court approved the annual statement of accounts submitted by the
executor C. N. Hodges thru his counsel Atty. Gellada on July 21, 1960 wherein it is stated that
the executor, C. N. Hodges is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges;
that on May 2, 1961 the Court approved the annual statement of accounts submitted by
executor, C. N. Hodges for the year 1960 which was submitted by Atty. Gellada on April 20,
1961 wherein it is stated that executor Hodges is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges;
That during the hearing on September 5 and 6, 1963 the estate of C. N. Hodges claimed all
the assets belonging to the deceased spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges situated
in the Philippines; that administratrix Magno has executed illegal acts to the prejudice of the
testate estate of C. N. Hodges.
An opposition (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4415-4421) dated April 27, 1966 of administratrix
Magno has been filed asking that the motion be denied for lack of merit and that the motion
for the official declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges be set for presentation
and reception of evidence.
It is alleged in the aforesaid opposition that the examination of documents which are in the
possession of administratrix Magno can be made prior to the hearing of the motion for the
official declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, during said hearing.
That the matters raised in the PCIB's motion of October 5, 1963 (as well as the other motion)
dated September 14, 1964 have been consolidated for the purpose of presentation and
reception of evidence with the hearing on the determination of the heirs of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges. It is further alleged in the opposition that the motion for the official declaration
of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is the one that constitutes a prejudicial question to
the motions dated October 5 and September 14, 1964 because if said motion is found
meritorious and granted by the Court, the PCIB's motions of October 5, 1963 and September
14, 1964 will become moot and academic since they are premised on the assumption and
claim that the only heir of Linnie Jane Hodges was C. N. Hodges.
That the PCIB and counsel are estopped from further questioning the determination of heirs in
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges at this stage since it was PCIB as early as January 8, 1965
which filed a motion for official declaration of heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges that the claim of
any heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges can be determined only in the administration proceedings
over the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and not that of C. N. Hodges, since the heirs of Linnie
Jane Hodges are claiming her estate and not the estate of C. N. Hodges.
A reply (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4436-4444) dated May 11, 1966 of the PCIB has been filed
alleging that the motion dated April 22, 1966 of the PCIB is not to seek deferment of the
hearing and consideration of the motion for official declaration of heirs of Linnie Jane
Hodges but to declare the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges closed and for administratrix
Magno to account for and deliver to the PCIB all assets of the conjugal partnership of the
deceased spouses which has come to her possession plus all rents and income.

A rejoinder (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4458-4462) of administratrix Magno dated May 19, 1966
has been filed alleging that the motion dated December 11, 1957 only sought the approval of
all conveyances made by C. N. Hodges and requested the Court authority for all subsequent
conveyances that will be executed by C. N. Hodges; that the order dated December 14, 1957
only approved the conveyances made by C. N. Hodges; that C. N. Hodges represented by
counsel never made any claim in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and never filed a motion to
declare himself as the heir of the said Linnie Jane Hodges despite the lapse of more than five
(5) years after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges; that it is further alleged in the rejoinder that
there can be no order of adjudication of the estate unless there has been a prior express
declaration of heirs and so far no declaration of heirs in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp.
1307) has been made.
Considering the allegations and arguments in the motion and of the PCIB as well as those in
the opposition and rejoinder of administratrix Magno, the Court finds the opposition and
rejoinder to be well taken for the reason that so far there has been no official declaration of
heirs in the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and therefore no disposition of her estate.
WHEREFORE, the motion of the PCIB dated April 22, 1966 is hereby DENIED.
(Annex "W", Petition)
In its motion dated November 24, 1966 for the reconsideration of this order, petitioner alleged inter alia that:
It cannot be over-stressed that the motion of December 11, 1957 was based on the fact that:
a. Under the last will and testament of the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, the
late Charles Newton Hodges was the sole heir instituted insofar as her
properties in the Philippines are concerned;
b. Said last will and testament vested upon the said late Charles Newton
Hodges rights over said properties which, in sum, spell ownership, absolute
and in fee simple;
c. Said late Charles Newton Hodges was, therefore, "not only part owner of
the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left
by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.
Likewise, it cannot be over-stressed that the aforesaid motion was granted by this Honorable
Court "for the reasons stated" therein.
Again, the motion of December 11, 1957 prayed that not only "all the sales, conveyances,
leases, and mortgages executed by" the late Charles Newton Hodges, but also all "the
subsequent sales, conveyances, leases, and mortgages ..." be approved and authorized. This
Honorable Court, in its order of December 14, 1957, "for the reasons stated" in the aforesaid
motion, granted the same, and not only approved all the sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages of all properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the late
Charles Newton Hodges, but also authorized "all subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges. (Annex "X",
Petition)
and reiterated its fundamental pose that the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges had already been factually,
although not legally, closed with the virtual declaration of Hodges and adjudication to him, as sole universal

heir of all the properties of the estate of his wife, in the order of December 14, 1957, Annex G. Still
unpersuaded, on July 18, 1967, respondent court denied said motion for reconsideration and held that "the
court believes that there is no justification why the order of October 12, 1966 should be considered or
modified", and, on July 19, 1967, the motion of respondent Magno "for official declaration of heirs of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges", already referred to above, was set for hearing.
In consequence of all these developments, the present petition was filed on August 1, 1967 (albeit petitioner
had to pay another docketing fee on August 9, 1967, since the orders in question were issued in two separate
testate estate proceedings, Nos. 1307 and 1672, in the court below).
Together with such petition, there are now pending before Us for resolution herein, appeals from the following:
1. The order of December 19, 1964 authorizing payment by respondent Magno of overtime
pay, (pp. 221, Green Record on Appeal) together with the subsequent orders of January 9,
1965, (pp. 231-232, id.) October 27, 1965, (pp. 227, id.) and February 15, 1966 (pp. 455456, id.) repeatedly denying motions for reconsideration thereof.
2. The order of August 6, 1965 (pp. 248, id.) requiring that deeds executed by petitioner to be
co-signed by respondent Magno, as well as the order of October 27, 1965 (pp. 276-277)
denying reconsideration.
3. The order of October 27, 1965 (pp. 292-295, id.) enjoining the deposit of all collections in
a joint account and the same order of February 15, 1966 mentioned in No. 1 above which
included the denial of the reconsideration of this order of October 27, 1965.
4. The order of November 3, 1965 (pp. 313-320, id.) directing the payment of attorney's fees,
fees of the respondent administratrix, etc. and the order of February 16, 1966 denying
reconsideration thereof.
5. The order of November 23, 1965 (pp. 334-335, id.) allowing appellee Western Institute of
Technology to make payments to either one or both of the administrators of the two estates as
well as the order of March 7, 1966 (p. 462, id.) denying reconsideration.
6. The various orders hereinabove earlier enumerated approving deeds of sale executed by
respondent Magno in favor of appellees Carles, Catedral, Pablito, Guzman, Coronado,
Barrido, Causing, Javier, Lucero and Batisanan, (see pp. 35 to 37 of this opinion), together
with the two separate orders both dated December 2, 1966 (pp. 306-308, and pp. 308-309,
Yellow Record on Appeal) denying reconsideration of said approval.
7. The order of January 3, 1967, on pp. 335-336, Yellow Record on Appeal, approving similar
deeds of sale executed by respondent Magno, as those in No. 6, in favor of appellees
Pacaonsis and Premaylon, as to which no motion for reconsideration was filed.
8. Lastly, the order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 305-306, Yellow Record on Appeal, directing
petitioner to surrender to appellees Lucero, Batisanan, Javier, Pablito, Barrido, Catedral,
Causing, Guzman, and Coronado, the certificates of title covering the lands involved in the
approved sales, as to which no motion for reconsideration was filed either.
Strictly speaking, and considering that the above orders deal with different matters, just as they affect distinctly
different individuals or persons, as outlined by petitioner in its brief as appellant on pp. 12-20 thereof, there

are, therefore, thirty-three (33) appeals before Us, for which reason, petitioner has to pay also thirty-one (31)
more docket fees.
It is as well perhaps to state here as elsewhere in this opinion that in connection with these appeals, petitioner
has assigned a total of seventy-eight (LXXVIII) alleged errors, the respective discussions and arguments under
all of them covering also the fundamental issues raised in respect to the petition for certiorari and prohibition,
thus making it feasible and more practical for the Court to dispose of all these cases together. 4
The assignments of error read thus:
I to IV
THE ORDER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN
FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, PEPITO G. IYULORES, ESPIRIDION PARTISALA,
WINIFREDO C. ESPADA AND ROSARIO ALINGASA, EXECUTED BY THE
APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE
DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL
COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
V to VIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF
THE APPELLEES, PEPITO G. IYULORES, ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C.
ESPADA AND ROSARIO ALINGASA, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND FOR WHICH
THEY HAVE NEVER PAID IN FULL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORIGINAL
CONTRACTS TO SELL.
IX to XII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP
OVER REAL PROPERTY OF THE APPELLEES, PEPITO G. IYULORES, ESPIRIDION
PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C. ESPADA AND ROSARIO ALINGASA, WHILE ACTING
AS A PROBATE COURT.
XIII to XV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN
FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO
PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104), EXECUTED BY THE
APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE
DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL
COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
XVI to XVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF
THE APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO PACAONSIS,
AND ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104) COVERING PARCELS OF LAND FOR
WHICH THEY HAVE NEVER PAID IN FULL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORIGINAL
CONTRACTS TO SELL.

XIX to XXI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP
OVER REAL PROPERTY OF THE APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102),
SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104) WHILE
ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
XXII to XXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN
FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO
CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR S. GUZMAN, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE,
AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH
WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
XXVI to XXIX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEED OF SALE
EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO,
ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR S. GUZMAN PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS
TO SPELL WHICH WERE CANCELLED AND RESCINDED.
XXX to XXXIV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP
OVER REAL PROPERTY OF THE LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO
CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR S. GUZMAN, WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
XXXV to XXXVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN
FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO AND PURIFICACION
CORONADO, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING
PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES,
AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM
DURING HIS LIFETIME.
XXXVII to XXXVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF
THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO AND PURIFICACION CORONADO,
ALTHOUGH THEY WERE IN ARREARS IN THE PAYMENTS AGREED UPON IN THE
ORIGINAL CONTRACT TO SELL WHICH THEY EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, IN THE AMOUNT OF P10,680.00 and P4,428.90,
RESPECTIVELY.
XXXIX to XL
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON
HODGES, OF THE CONTRACTUAL RIGHT, EXERCISED THROUGH HIS

ADMINISTRATOR, THE INSTANT APPELLANT, TO CANCEL THE CONTRACTS TO

SELL OF THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO AND PURIFICACION CORONADO.
XLI to XLIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN
FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND
MELQUIADES BATISANAN, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO,
COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON
HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED
BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
XLIV to XLVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEED OF SALE IN FAVOR
OF THE APPELLEES, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND
MELQUIADES BATISANAN, PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO SELL EXECUTED BY
THEM WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, THE TERMS AND
CONDITIONS OF WHICH THEY HAVE NEVER COMPLIED WITH.
XLVII to XLIX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON
HODGES, OF HIS RIGHT, EXERCISED THROUGH HIS ADMINISTRATION, THE
INSTANT APPELLANT, TO CANCEL THE CONTRACTS TO SELL OF THE
APPELLEES, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES
BATISANAN, AND IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF THE SAID APPELLEES
OVER REAL PROPERTY WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
L
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN
FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE,
AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH
WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
LI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF
THE APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING, ALTHOUGH HE WAS IN ARREARS IN THE
PAYMENTS AGREED UPON IN THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT TO SELL WHICH HE
EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, IN THE
AMOUNT OF P2,337.50.
LII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEED OF SALE IN FAVOR OF
THE APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING, ALTHOUGH THE SAME WAS NOT
EXECUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES OF COURT.

LIII to LXI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK TO SURRENDER THE OWNER'S
DUPLICATE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE OVER THE RESPECTIVE LOTS COVERED BY
THE DEEDS OF SALE EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, IN
FAVOR OF THE OTHER APPELLEES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL,
SALVADOR S. GUZMAN, FLRENIA BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO,
BELCESAR CAUSING, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MAXIMA BATISANAN AND
GRACIANO L. LUCERO.
LXII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RESOLVING THE MOTION OF THE APPELLEE,
WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, DATED NOVEMBER 3, 1965, WITHOUT
ANY COPY THEREOF HAVING BEEN SERVED UPON THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL BANK.
LXIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HEARING AND CONSIDERING THE MOTION OF
THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, DATED NOVEMBER 3rd,
1965, ON NOVEMBER 23, 1965, WHEN THE NOTICE FOR THE HEARING THEREOF
WAS FOR NOVEMBER 20, 1965.
LXIV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY A RELIEF OTHER THAN THAT PRAYED FOR IN ITS MOTION,
DATED NOVEMBER 3, 1965, IN THE ABSENCE OF A PRAYER FOR GENERAL
RELIEF CONTAINED THEREIN.
LXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY, TO CONTINUE PAYMENTS UPON A CONTRACT TO SELL THE
TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF WHICH IT HAS FAILED TO FULFILL.
LXVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF THE APPELLEE,
WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY OVER THE REAL PROPERTY SUBJECT
MATTER OF THE CONTRACT TO SELL IT EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
LXVII
LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE CONTINUATION OF PAYMENTS BY
THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, UPON A CONTRACT TO
SELL EXECUTED BY IT AND THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, TO A
PERSON OTHER THAN HIS LAWFULLY APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR.

LXVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF RETAINER'S FEES
FROM THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, WHEN
THERE IS NEITHER SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
LXIX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF RETAINER'S FEES
OF LAWYERS OF ALLEGED HEIRS TO THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES.
LXX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPLEMENTING THE ALLEGED AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE HEIRS OF THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE
JANE HODGES, AND THEIR LAWYERS.
LXXI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PREMATURE DISTRIBUTION OF
ESTATE ASSETS TO ALLEGED HEIRS OR BENEFICIARIES THEREOF, BY WAY OF
RETAINER'S FEES.
LXXII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT ALL FINAL DEEDS OF SALE
EXECUTED PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO SELL ENTERED INTO BY THE
DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, DURING HIS LIFETIME, BE SIGNED
JOINTLY BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, AND THE APPELLANT,
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, AND NOT BY THE LATTER
ONLY AS THE LAWFULLY APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF HIS ESTATE.
LXXIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF LEGAL EXPENSES
FROM THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, WHEN
THERE IS NEITHER SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
LXXIV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF LEGAL EXPENSES
OF LAWYERS OF ALLEGED HEIRS TO THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES.
LXXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PREMATURE DISTRIBUTION OF
ESTATE ASSETS TO ALLEGED HEIRS OR BENEFICIARIES THEREOF, BY WAY OF
LEGAL EXPENSES.

LXXVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION TO
THE PURPORTED ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, THE INSTANT APPELLEE, AVELINA A.
MAGNO, WHEN THERE IS NEITHER SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
LXXVII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE FUNDS OF THE TESTATE
ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, BE PLACED IN A
JOINT ACCOUNT OF THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND
INDUSTRIAL BANK, AND THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, WHO IS A
COMPLETE STRANGER TO THE AFORESAID ESTATE.
LXXVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A.
MAGNO, BE GIVEN EQUAL ACCESS TO THE RECORDS OF THE TESTATE ESTATE
OF THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, WHEN SHE IS A COMPLETE
STRANGER TO THE AFORESAID ESTATE. (Pp. 73-83, Appellant's Brief.)
To complete this rather elaborate, and unavoidably extended narration of the factual setting of these cases, it
may also be mentioned that an attempt was made by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges to have respondent Magno
removed as administratrix, with the proposed appointment of Benito J. Lopez in her place, and that respondent
court did actually order such proposed replacement, but the Court declared the said order of respondent court
violative of its injunction of August 8, 1967, hence without force and effect (see Resolution of September 8,
1972 and February 1, 1973). Subsequently, Atty. Efrain B. Trenas, one of the lawyers of said heirs, appeared no
longer for the proposed administrator Lopez but for the heirs themselves, and in a motion dated October 26,
1972 informed the Court that a motion had been filed with respondent court for the removal of petitioner PCIB
as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges in Special Proceedings 1672, which removal motion alleged that
22.968149% of the share of C. N. Hodges had already been acquired by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges from certain
heirs of her husband. Further, in this connection, in the answer of PCIB to the motion of respondent Magno to
have it declared in contempt for disregarding the Court's resolution of September 8, 1972 modifying the
injunction of August 8, 1967, said petitioner annexed thereto a joint manifestation and motion, appearing to
have been filed with respondent court, informing said court that in addition to the fact that 22% of the share of
C. N. Hodges had already been bought by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, as already stated, certain other heirs of
Hodges representing 17.343750% of his estate were joining cause with the heirs of Mrs. Hodges as against
PCIB, thereby making somewhat precarious, if not possibly untenable, petitioners' continuation as
administrator of the Hodges estate.
RESOLUTION OF ISSUES IN THE CERTIORARI AND
PROHIBITION CASES
I
As to the Alleged Tardiness
of the Present Appeals
The priority question raised by respondent Magno relates to the alleged tardiness of all the aforementioned
thirty-three appeals of PCIB. Considering, however, that these appeals revolve around practically the same

main issues and that it is admitted that some of them have been timely taken, and, moreover, their final results
hereinbelow to be stated and explained make it of no consequence whether or not the orders concerned have
become final by the lapsing of the respective periods to appeal them, We do not deem it necessary to pass upon
the timeliness of any of said appeals.
II
The Propriety Here of Certiorari and
Prohibition instead of Appeal
The other preliminary point of the same respondent is alleged impropriety of the special civil action
of certiorariand prohibition in view of the existence of the remedy of appeal which it claims is proven by the
very appeals now before Us. Such contention fails to take into account that there is a common thread among
the basic issues involved in all these thirty-three appeals which, unless resolved in one single proceeding, will
inevitably cause the proliferation of more or less similar or closely related incidents and consequent eventual
appeals. If for this consideration alone, and without taking account anymore of the unnecessary additional
effort, expense and time which would be involved in as many individual appeals as the number of such
incidents, it is logical and proper to hold, as We do hold, that the remedy of appeal is not adequate in the
present cases. In determining whether or not a special civil action of certiorari or prohibition may be resorted
to in lieu of appeal, in instances wherein lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion is alleged, it
is not enough that the remedy of appeal exists or is possible. It is indispensable that taking all the relevant
circumstances of the given case, appeal would better serve the interests of justice. Obviously, the longer delay,
augmented expense and trouble and unnecessary repetition of the same work attendant to the present multiple
appeals, which, after all, deal with practically the same basic issues that can be more expeditiously resolved or
determined in a single special civil action, make the remedies of certiorari and prohibition, pursued by
petitioner, preferable, for purposes of resolving the common basic issues raised in all of them, despite the
conceded availability of appeal. Besides, the settling of such common fundamental issues would naturally
minimize the areas of conflict between the parties and render more simple the determination of the secondary
issues in each of them. Accordingly, respondent Magno's objection to the present remedy of certiorari and
prohibition must be overruled.
We come now to the errors assigned by petitioner-appellant, Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank, (PCIB,
for short) in the petition as well as in its main brief as appellant.
III
On Whether or Not There is Still Any Part of the Testate
Estate Mrs. Hodges that may be Adjudicated to her brothers
and sisters as her estate, of which respondent Magno is the
unquestioned Administratrix in special Proceedings 1307.
In the petition, it is the position of PCIB that the respondent court exceeded its jurisdiction or gravely abused
its discretion in further recognizing after December 14, 1957 the existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and in sanctioning purported acts of administration therein of respondent Magno. Main ground for
such posture is that by the aforequoted order of respondent court of said date, Hodges was already allowed to
assert and exercise all his rights as universal heir of his wife pursuant to the provisions of her will, quoted
earlier, hence, nothing else remains to be done in Special Proceedings 1307 except to formally close it. In other
words, the contention of PCIB is that in view of said order, nothing more than a formal declaration of Hodges
as sole and exclusive heir of his wife and the consequent formal unqualified adjudication to him of all her
estate remain to be done to completely close Special Proceedings 1307, hence respondent Magno should be
considered as having ceased to be Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges since then.

After carefully going over the record, We feel constrained to hold that such pose is patently untenable from
whatever angle it is examined.
To start with, We cannot find anywhere in respondent Order of December 14, 1957 the sense being read into it
by PCIB. The tenor of said order bears no suggestion at all to such effect. The declaration of heirs and
distribution by the probate court of the estate of a decedent is its most important function, and this Court is not
disposed to encourage judges of probate proceedings to be less than definite, plain and specific in making
orders in such regard, if for no other reason than that all parties concerned, like the heirs, the creditors, and
most of all the government, the devisees and legatees, should know with certainty what are and when their
respective rights and obligations ensuing from the inheritance or in relation thereto would begin or cease, as
the case may be, thereby avoiding precisely the legal complications and consequent litigations similar to those
that have developed unnecessarily in the present cases. While it is true that in instances wherein all the parties
interested in the estate of a deceased person have already actually distributed among themselves their
respective shares therein to the satisfaction of everyone concerned and no rights of creditors or third parties are
adversely affected, it would naturally be almost ministerial for the court to issue the final order of declaration
and distribution, still it is inconceivable that the special proceeding instituted for the purpose may be
considered terminated, the respective rights of all the parties concerned be deemed definitely settled, and the
executor or administrator thereof be regarded as automatically discharged and relieved already of all functions
and responsibilities without the corresponding definite orders of the probate court to such effect.
Indeed, the law on the matter is specific, categorical and unequivocal. Section 1 of Rule 90 provides:
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. When the debts, funeral
charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow and inheritance tax, if
any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law have been paid, the court, on the
application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after
hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same,
naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may
demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other
person having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who
are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each
person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary
cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has
been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them give a bond, in a sum to be
fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the
court directs.
These provisions cannot mean anything less than that in order that a proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of a deceased may be deemed ready for final closure, (1) there should have been issued already an order of
distribution or assignment of the estate of the decedent among or to those entitled thereto by will or by law, but
(2) such order shall not be issued until after it is shown that the "debts, funeral expenses, expenses of
administration, allowances, taxes, etc. chargeable to the estate" have been paid, which is but logical and proper.
(3) Besides, such an order is usually issued upon proper and specific application for the purpose of the
interested party or parties, and not of the court.
... it is only after, and not before, the payment of all debts, funeral charges, expenses of
administration, allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax shall have been effected that the
court should make a declaration of heirs or of such persons as are entitled by law to the
residue. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 2nd ed., Vol. II, p. 397, citing Capistrano

vs. Nadurata, 49 Phil., 726; Lopez vs. Lopez, 37 Off. Gaz., 3091.) (JIMOGA-ON v.
BELMONTE, 84 Phil. 545, 548) (p. 86, Appellee's Brief)
xxx xxx xxx
Under Section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure, (corresponding to Section 1, Rule 90)
what brings an intestate (or testate) proceeding to a close is the order of distribution directing
delivery of the residue to the persons entitled thereto after paying the indebtedness, if any, left
by the deceased. (Santiesteban vs. Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, 370.)
In the cases at bar, We cannot discern from the voluminous and varied facts, pleadings and orders before Us
that the above indispensable prerequisites for the declaration of heirs and the adjudication of the estate of Mrs.
Hodges had already been complied with when the order of December 14, 1957 was issued. As already stated,
We are not persuaded that the proceedings leading to the issuance of said order, constituting barely of the
motion of May 27, 1957, Annex D of the petition, the order of even date, Annex E, and the motion of
December 11, 1957, Annex H, all aforequoted, are what the law contemplates. We cannot see in the order of
December 14, 1957, so much relied upon by the petitioner, anything more than an explicit approval of "all the
sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges
executed by the Executor Charles N. Hodges" (after the death of his wife and prior to the date of the motion),
plus a general advance authorization to enable said "Executor to execute subsequent sales, conveyances,
leases and mortgages of the properties left the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with wishes
conveyed in the last will and testament of the latter", which, certainly, cannot amount to the order of
adjudication of the estate of the decedent to Hodges contemplated in the law. In fact, the motion of December
11, 1957 on which the court predicated the order in question did not pray for any such adjudication at all. What
is more, although said motion did allege that "herein Executor (Hodges) is not only part owner of the
properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges", it significantly added that "herein Executor, as Legatee (sic), has the right to sell, convey, lease or
dispose of the properties in the Philippines during his lifetime", thereby indicating that what said motion
contemplated was nothing more than either the enjoyment by Hodges of his rights under the particular portion
of the dispositions of his wife's will which were to be operative only during his lifetime or the use of his own
share of the conjugal estate, pending the termination of the proceedings. In other words, the authority referred
to in said motions and orders is in the nature of that contemplated either in Section 2 of Rule 109 which
permits, in appropriate cases, advance or partial implementation of the terms of a duly probated will before
final adjudication or distribution when the rights of third parties would not be adversely affected thereby or in
the established practice of allowing the surviving spouse to dispose of his own share of he conjugal estate,
pending its final liquidation, when it appears that no creditors of the conjugal partnership would be prejudiced
thereby, (see the Revised Rules of Court by Francisco, Vol. V-B, 1970 ed. p. 887) albeit, from the tenor of said
motions, We are more inclined to believe that Hodges meant to refer to the former. In any event, We are fully
persuaded that the quoted allegations of said motions read together cannot be construed as a repudiation of the
rights unequivocally established in the will in favor of Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters to whatever have not
been disposed of by him up to his death.
Indeed, nowhere in the record does it appear that the trial court subsequently acted upon the premise suggested
by petitioner. On the contrary, on November 23, 1965, when the court resolved the motion of appellee Western
Institute of Technology by its order We have quoted earlier, it categorically held that as of said date, November
23, 1965, "in both cases (Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672) there is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor
distribution of properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto." In this connection, it may be stated further
against petitioner, by way of some kind of estoppel, that in its own motion of January 8, 1965, already quoted
in full on pages 54-67 of this decision, it prayed inter alia that the court declare that "C. N. Hodges was the
sole and exclusive heir of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges", which it would not have done if it were really
convinced that the order of December 14, 1957 was already the order of adjudication and distribution of her
estate. That said motion was later withdrawn when Magno filed her own motion for determination and

adjudication of what should correspond to the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges does not alter the
indubitable implication of the prayer of the withdrawn motion.
It must be borne in mind that while it is true that Mrs. Hodges bequeathed her whole estate to her husband and
gave him what amounts to full powers of dominion over the same during his lifetime, she imposed at the same
time the condition that whatever should remain thereof upon his death should go to her brothers and sisters. In
effect, therefore, what was absolutely given to Hodges was only so much of his wife's estate as he might
possibly dispose of during his lifetime; hence, even assuming that by the allegations in his motion, he did
intend to adjudicate the whole estate to himself, as suggested by petitioner, such unilateral act could not have
affected or diminished in any degree or manner the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law over what would
remain thereof upon his death, for surely, no one can rightly contend that the testamentary provision in
question allowed him to so adjudicate any part of the estate to himself as to prejudice them. In other words,
irrespective of whatever might have been Hodges' intention in his motions, as Executor, of May 27, 1957 and
December 11, 1957, the trial court's orders granting said motions, even in the terms in which they have been
worded, could not have had the effect of an absolute and unconditional adjudication unto Hodges of the whole
estate of his wife. None of them could have deprived his brothers and sisters-in-law of their rights under said
will. And it may be added here that the fact that no one appeared to oppose the motions in question may only
be attributed, firstly, to the failure of Hodges to send notices to any of them, as admitted in the motion itself,
and, secondly, to the fact that even if they had been notified, they could not have taken said motions to be for
the final distribution and adjudication of the estate, but merely for him to be able, pending such final
distribution and adjudication, to either exercise during his lifetime rights of dominion over his wife's estate in
accordance with the bequest in his favor, which, as already observed, may be allowed under the broad terms of
Section 2 of Rule 109, or make use of his own share of the conjugal estate. In any event, We do not believe that
the trial court could have acted in the sense pretended by petitioner, not only because of the clear language of
the will but also because none of the interested parties had been duly notified of the motion and hearing
thereof. Stated differently, if the orders of May 27, 1957 and December 4, 1957 were really intended to be read
in the sense contended by petitioner, We would have no hesitancy in declaring them null and void.
Petitioner cites the case of Austria vs. Ventenilla, G. R. No. L-10018, September 19, 1956, (unreported but a
partial digest thereof appears in 99 Phil. 1069) in support of its insistence that with the orders of May 27 and
December 14, 1957, the closure of Mrs. Hodges' estate has become a mere formality, inasmuch as said orders
amounted to the order of adjudication and distribution ordained by Section 1 of Rule 90. But the parallel
attempted to be drawn between that case and the present one does not hold. There the trial court had in fact
issued a clear, distinct and express order of adjudication and distribution more than twenty years before the
other heirs of the deceased filed their motion asking that the administratrix be removed, etc. As quoted in that
decision, the order of the lower court in that respect read as follows:
En orden a la mocion de la administradora, el juzgado la encuentra procedente bajo la
condicion de que no se hara entrega ni adjudicacion de los bienes a los herederos antes de que
estos presten la fianza correspondiente y de acuerdo con lo prescrito en el Art. 754 del Codigo
de Procedimientos: pues, en autos no aparece que hayan sido nombrados comisionados de
avaluo y reclamaciones. Dicha fianza podra ser por un valor igual al de los bienes que
correspondan a cada heredero segun el testamento. Creo que no es obice para la terminacion
del expediente el hecho de que la administradora no ha presentado hasta ahora el inventario
de los bienes; pues, segun la ley, estan exentos de esta formalidad os administradores que son
legatarios del residuo o remanente de los bienes y hayan prestado fianza para responder de las
gestiones de su cargo, y aparece en el testamento que la administradora Alejandra Austria
reune dicha condicion.
POR TODO LO EXPUESTO, el juzgado declara, 1.o: no haber lugar a la mocion de Ramon
Ventenilla y otros; 2.o, declara asimismo que los unicos herederos del finado Antonio
Ventenilla son su esposa Alejandra Austria, Maria Ventenilla, hermana del testador, y Ramon

Ventenilla, Maria Ventenilla, Ramon Soriano, Eulalio Soriano, Jose Soriano, Gabriela
Ventenilla, Lorenzo Ventenilla, Felicitas Ventenilla, Eugenio Ventenilla y Alejandra
Ventenilla, en representacion de los difuntos Juan, Tomas, Catalino y Froilan, hermanos del
testador, declarando, ademas que la heredera Alejandra Austria tiene derecho al remanente de
todos los bienes dejados por el finado, despues de deducir de ellos la porcion que corresponde
a cada uno de sus coherederos, conforme esta mandado en las clausulas 8.a, 9.a, 10.a, 11.a,
12.a y 13.a del testamento; 3.o, se aprueba el pago hecho por la administradora de los gastos
de la ultima enfermedad y funerales del testador, de la donacion hecha por el testador a favor
de la Escuela a Publica del Municipio de Mangatarem, y de las misas en sufragio del alma del
finado; 4.o, que una vez prestada la fianza mencionada al principio de este auto, se haga la
entrega y adjudicacion de los bienes, conforme se dispone en el testamento y se acaba de
declarar en este auto; 5.o, y, finalmente, que verificada la adjudicacion, se dara por terminada
la administracion, revelandole toda responsabilidad a la administradora, y cancelando su
fianza.
ASI SE ORDENA.
Undoubtedly, after the issuance of an order of such tenor, the closure of any proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of a deceased person cannot be but perfunctory.
In the case at bar, as already pointed out above, the two orders relied upon by petitioner do not appear exfacieto be of the same tenor and nature as the order just quoted, and, what is more, the circumstances attendant
to its issuance do not suggest that such was the intention of the court, for nothing could have been more
violative of the will of Mrs. Hodges.
Indeed, to infer from Hodges' said motions and from his statements of accounts for the years 1958, 1959 and
1960, A Annexes I, K and M, respectively, wherein he repeatedly claimed that "herein executor (being) the
only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last will and testament already probated," there
is "no (other) person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining herein account to be
given notice", an intent to adjudicate unto himself the whole of his wife's estate in an absolute manner and
without regard to the contingent interests of her brothers and sisters, is to impute bad faith to him, an
imputation which is not legally permissible, much less warranted by the facts of record herein. Hodges knew or
ought to have known that, legally speaking, the terms of his wife's will did not give him such a right. Factually,
there are enough circumstances extant in the records of these cases indicating that he had no such intention to
ignore the rights of his co-heirs. In his very motions in question, Hodges alleged, thru counsel, that the
"deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no descendants and ascendants, except brothers and sisters and
herein petitioner, as surviving spouse, to inherit the properties of the decedent", and even promised that
"proper accounting will be had in all these transactions" which he had submitted for approval and
authorization by the court, thereby implying that he was aware of his responsibilities vis-a-vis his co-heirs. As
alleged by respondent Magno in her brief as appellee:
Under date of April 14, 1959, C. N. Hodges filed his first "Account by the Executor" of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and the
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1958 annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges
reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net income of P328,402.62, divided
evenly between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an
"individual income tax return" for calendar year 1958 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned income of P164,201.31, exactly onehalf of the net income of his combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. (p. 91, Appellee's Brief.)

Under date of July 21, 1960, C. N. Hodges filed his second "Annual Statement of Account by
the Executor" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C. N.
Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1959 annexed thereto, C.
N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net income of P270,623.32,
divided evenly between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an
"individual income tax return" for calendar year 1959 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned income of P135,311.66, exactly onehalf of the net income of his combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. (pp. 91-92, id.)
Under date of April 20, 1961, C. N. Hodges filed his third "Annual Statement of Account by
the Executor for the year 1960" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Net
Worth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1960
annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net
income of P314,857.94, divided of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an
"individual evenly between him and the estate income tax return" for calendar year 1960 on
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned
income of P157,428.97, exactly one-half of the net income of his combined personal assets
and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (pp. 92-93,id.)
In the petition for probate that he (Hodges) filed, he listed the seven brothers and sisters of
Linnie Jane as her "heirs" (see p. 2, Green ROA). The order of the court admitting the will to
probate unfortunately omitted one of the heirs, Roy Higdon (see p. 14, Green ROA).
Immediately, C. N. Hodges filed a verified motion to have Roy Higdon's name included as an
heir, stating that he wanted to straighten the records "in order (that) the heirs of deceased Roy
Higdon may not think or believe they were omitted, and that they were really and are
interested in the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges".
Thus, he recognized, if in his own way, the separate identity of his wife's estate from his own share of the
conjugal partnership up to the time of his death, more than five years after that of his wife. He never
considered the whole estate as a single one belonging exclusively to himself. The only conclusion one can
gather from this is that he could have been preparing the basis for the eventual transmission of his wife's estate,
or, at least, so much thereof as he would not have been able to dispose of during his lifetime, to her brothers
and sisters in accordance with her expressed desire, as intimated in his tax return in the United States to be
more extensively referred to anon. And assuming that he did pay the corresponding estate and inheritance taxes
in the Philippines on the basis of his being sole heir, such payment is not necessarily inconsistent with his
recognition of the rights of his co-heirs. Without purporting to rule definitely on the matter in these
proceedings, We might say here that We are inclined to the view that under the peculiar provisions of his wife's
will, and for purposes of the applicable inheritance tax laws, Hodges had to be considered as her sole heir,
pending the actual transmission of the remaining portion of her estate to her other heirs, upon the eventuality of
his death, and whatever adjustment might be warranted should there be any such remainder then is a matter
that could well be taken care of by the internal revenue authorities in due time.
It is to be noted that the lawyer, Atty. Leon P. Gellada, who signed the motions of May 27, 1957 and December
11, 1957 and the aforementioned statements of account was the very same one who also subsequently signed
and filed the motion of December 26, 1962 for the appointment of respondent Magno as "Administratrix of the
Estate of Mrs. Linnie Jane Hodges" wherein it was alleged that "in accordance with the provisions of the last
will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges, whatever real properties that may remain at the death of her
husband, Charles Newton Hodges, the said properties shall be equally divided among their heirs." And it
appearing that said attorney was Hodges' lawyer as Executor of the estate of his wife, it stands to reason that
his understanding of the situation, implicit in his allegations just quoted, could somehow be reflective of
Hodges' own understanding thereof.

As a matter of fact, the allegations in the motion of the same Atty. Gellada dated July 1, 1957, a "Request for
Inclusion of the Name of Roy Higdon in the Order of the Court dated July 19, 1957, etc.", reference to which
is made in the above quotation from respondent Magno's brief, are over the oath of Hodges himself, who
verified the motion. Said allegations read:
1. That the Hon. Court issued orders dated June 29, 1957, ordering the probate of the will.
2. That in said order of the Hon. Court, the relatives of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges
were enumerated. However, in the petition as well as in the testimony of Executor during the
hearing, the name Roy Higdon was mentioned, but deceased. It was unintentionally omitted
the heirs of said Roy Higdon who are his wife Aline Higdon and son David Higdon, all of
age, and residents of Quinlan, Texas, U.S.A.
3. That to straighten the records, and in order the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not
think or believe they were omitted, and that they were really and are interested in the estate of
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, it is requested of the Hon. Court to insert the names of Aline
Higdon and David Higdon, wife and son of deceased Roy Higdon in the said order of the
Hon. Court dated June 29, 1957. (pars. 1 to 3, Annex 2 of Magno's Answer Record, p. 260)
As can be seen, these italicized allegations indicate, more or less, the real attitude of Hodges in regard to the
testamentary dispositions of his wife.
In connection with this point of Hodges' intent, We note that there are documents, copies of which are annexed
to respondent Magno's answer, which purportedly contain Hodges' own solemn declarations recognizing the
right of his co-heirs, such as the alleged tax return he filed with the United States Taxation authorities,
identified as Schedule M, (Annex 4 of her answer) and his supposed affidavit of renunciation, Annex 5. In said
Schedule M, Hodges appears to have answered the pertinent question thus:
2a. Had the surviving spouse the right to declare an election between (1) the provisions made
in his or her favor by the will and (11) dower, curtesy or a statutory interest? (X) Yes ( ) No
2d. Does the surviving spouse contemplate renouncing the will and electing to take dower,
curtesy, or a statutory interest? (X) Yes ( ) No
3. According to the information and belief of the person or persons filing the return, is any
action described under question 1 designed or contemplated? ( ) Yes (X) No (Annex 4,
Answer Record, p. 263)
and to have further stated under the item, "Description of property interests passing to surviving spouse" the
following:
None, except for purposes of administering the Estate, paying debts, taxes and other legal
charges.It is the intention of the surviving husband of deceased to distribute the remaining
property and interests of the deceased in their Community Estate to the devisees and legatees
named in the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration are finally
determined and paid. (Annex 4, Answer Record, p. 263)
In addition, in the supposed affidavit of Hodges, Annex 5, it is stated:
I, C. N. Hodges, being duly sworn, on oath affirm that at the time the United States Estate Tax
Return was filed in the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on August 8, 1958, I renounced and

disclaimed any and all right to receive the rents, emoluments and income from said estate, as
shown by the statement contained in Schedule M at page 29 of said return, a copy of which
schedule is attached to this affidavit and made a part hereof.
The purpose of this affidavit is to ratify and confirm, and I do hereby ratify and confirm, the
declaration made in Schedule M of said return and hereby formally disclaim and renounce
any right on my part to receive any of the said rents, emoluments and income from the estate
of my deceased wife, Linnie Jane Hodges. This affidavit is made to absolve me or my estate
from any liability for the payment of income taxes on income which has accrued to the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges since the death of the said Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957.
(Annex 5, Answer Record, p. 264)
Although it appears that said documents were not duly presented as evidence in the court below, and We
cannot, therefore, rely on them for the purpose of the present proceedings, still, We cannot close our eyes to
their existence in the record nor fail to note that their tenor jibes with Our conclusion discussed above from the
circumstances related to the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957. 5 Somehow, these documents,
considering they are supposed to be copies of their originals found in the official files of the governments of
the United States and of the Philippines, serve to lessen any possible apprehension that Our conclusion from
the other evidence of Hodges' manifest intent vis-a-vis the rights of his co-heirs is without basis in fact.
Verily, with such eloquent manifestations of his good intentions towards the other heirs of his wife, We find it
very hard to believe that Hodges did ask the court and that the latter agreed that he be declared her sole heir
and that her whole estate be adjudicated to him without so much as just annotating the contingent interest of
her brothers and sisters in what would remain thereof upon his demise. On the contrary, it seems to us more
factual and fairer to assume that Hodges was well aware of his position as executor of the will of his wife and,
as such, had in mind the following admonition made by the Court in Pamittan vs. Lasam, et al., 60 Phil., 908,
at pp. 913-914:
Upon the death of Bernarda in September, 1908, said lands continued to be conjugal property
in the hands of the defendant Lasam. It is provided in article 1418 of the Civil Code that upon
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, an inventory shall immediately be made and this
court in construing this provision in connection with section 685 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (prior to its amendment by Act No. 3176 of November 24, 1924) has repeatedly
held that in the event of the death of the wife, the law imposes upon the husband the duty of
liquidating the affairs of the partnership without delay (desde luego) (Alfonso vs. Natividad, 6
Phil., 240; Prado vs. Lagera, 7 Phil., 395; De la Rama vs. De la Rama, 7 Phil., 745; Enriquez
vs. Victoria, 10 Phil., 10; Amancio vs. Pardo, 13 Phil., 297; Rojas vs. Singson Tongson, 17
Phil., 476; Sochayseng vs. Trujillo, 31 Phil., 153; Molera vs. Molera, 40 Phil., 566; Nable
Jose vs. Nable Jose, 41 Phil., 713.)
In the last mentioned case this court quoted with approval the case of Leatherwood vs.
Arnold (66 Texas, 414, 416, 417), in which that court discussed the powers of the surviving
spouse in the administration of the community property. Attention was called to the fact that
the surviving husband, in the management of the conjugal property after the death of the wife,
was a trustee of unique character who is liable for any fraud committed by him with relation
to the property while he is charged with its administration. In the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, he had wide powers (as the law stood prior to Act No. 3176) and the high degree
of trust reposed in him stands out more clearly in view of the fact that he was the owner of a
half interest in his own right of the conjugal estate which he was charged to administer. He
could therefore no more acquire a title by prescription against those for whom he was
administering the conjugal estate than could a guardian against his ward or a judicial
administrator against the heirs of estate. Section 38 of Chapter III of the Code of Civil

Procedure, with relation to prescription, provides that "this chapter shall not apply ... in the
case of a continuing and subsisting trust." The surviving husband in the administration and
liquidation of the conjugal estate occupies the position of a trustee of the highest order and is
not permitted by the law to hold that estate or any portion thereof adversely to those for
whose benefit the law imposes upon him the duty of administration and liquidation. No
liquidation was ever made by Lasam hence, the conjugal property which came into his
possession on the death of his wife in September, 1908, still remains conjugal property, a
continuing and subsisting trust. He should have made a liquidation immediately (desde
luego). He cannot now be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. One of the
conditions of title by prescription (section 41, Code of Civil Procedure) is possession "under a
claim of title exclusive of any other right". For a trustee to make such a claim would be a
manifest fraud.
And knowing thus his responsibilities in the premises, We are not convinced that Hodges arrogated everything
unto himself leaving nothing at all to be inherited by his wife's brothers and sisters.
PCIB insists, however, that to read the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957, not as adjudicatory, but
merely as approving past and authorizing future dispositions made by Hodges in a wholesale and general
manner, would necessarily render the said orders void for being violative of the provisions of Rule 89
governing the manner in which such dispositions may be made and how the authority therefor and approval
thereof by the probate court may be secured. If We sustained such a view, the result would only be that the said
orders should be declared ineffective either way they are understood, considering We have already seen it is
legally impossible to consider them as adjudicatory. As a matter of fact, however, what surges immediately to
the surface, relative to PCIB's observations based on Rule 89, is that from such point of view, the supposed
irregularity would involve no more than some non-jurisdictional technicalities of procedure, which have for
their evident fundamental purpose the protection of parties interested in the estate, such as the heirs, its
creditors, particularly the government on account of the taxes due it; and since it is apparent here that none of
such parties are objecting to said orders or would be prejudiced by the unobservance by the trial court of the
procedure pointed out by PCIB, We find no legal inconvenience in nor impediment to Our giving sanction to
the blanket approval and authority contained in said orders. This solution is definitely preferable in law and in
equity, for to view said orders in the sense suggested by PCIB would result in the deprivation of substantive
rights to the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, whereas reading them the other way will not cause any
prejudice to anyone, and, withal, will give peace of mind and stability of rights to the innocent parties who
relied on them in good faith, in the light of the peculiar pertinent provisions of the will of said decedent.
Now, the inventory submitted by Hodges on May 12, 1958 referred to the estate of his wife as consisting of
"One-half of all the items designated in the balance sheet, copy of which is hereto attached and marked as
"Annex A"." Although, regrettably, no copy of said Annex A appears in the records before Us, We take judicial
notice, on the basis of the undisputed facts in these cases, that the same consists of considerable real and other
personal kinds of properties. And since, according to her will, her husband was to be the sole owner thereof
during his lifetime, with full power and authority to dispose of any of them, provided that should there be any
remainder upon his death, such remainder would go to her brothers and sisters, and furthermore, there is no
pretension, much less any proof that Hodges had in fact disposed of all of them, and, on the contrary, the
indications are rather to the effect that he had kept them more or less intact, it cannot truthfully be said that,
upon the death of Hodges, there was no more estate of Mrs. Hodges to speak of. It is Our conclusion, therefore,
that properties do exist which constitute such estate, hence Special Proceedings 1307 should not yet be closed.
Neither is there basis for holding that respondent Magno has ceased to be the Administratrix in said
proceeding. There is no showing that she has ever been legally removed as such, the attempt to replace her
with Mr. Benito Lopez without authority from the Court having been expressly held ineffective by Our
resolution of September 8, 1972. Parenthetically, on this last point, PCIB itself is very emphatic in stressing
that it is not questioning said respondent's status as such administratrix. Indeed, it is not clear that PCIB has

any standing to raise any objection thereto, considering it is a complete stranger insofar as the estate of Mrs.
Hodges is concerned.
It is the contention of PCIB, however, that as things actually stood at the time of Hodges' death, their conjugal
partnership had not yet been liquidated and, inasmuch as the properties composing the same were thus
commingled pro indiviso and, consequently, the properties pertaining to the estate of each of the spouses are
not yet identifiable, it is PCIB alone, as administrator of the estate of Hodges, who should administer
everything, and all that respondent Magno can do for the time being is to wait until the properties constituting
the remaining estate of Mrs. Hodges have been duly segregated and delivered to her for her own
administration. Seemingly, PCIB would liken the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges to a party having a
claim of ownership to some properties included in the inventory of an administrator of the estate of a decedent,
(here that of Hodges) and who normally has no right to take part in the proceedings pending the establishment
of his right or title; for which as a rule it is required that an ordinary action should be filed, since the probate
court is without jurisdiction to pass with finality on questions of title between the estate of the deceased, on the
one hand, and a third party or even an heir claiming adversely against the estate, on the other.
We do not find such contention sufficiently persuasive. As We see it, the situation obtaining herein cannot be
compared with the claim of a third party the basis of which is alien to the pending probate proceedings. In the
present cases what gave rise to the claim of PCIB of exclusive ownership by the estate of Hodges over all the
properties of the Hodges spouses, including the share of Mrs. Hodges in the community properties, were the
orders of the trial court issued in the course of the very settlement proceedings themselves, more specifically,
the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957 so often mentioned above. In other words, the root of the issue of
title between the parties is something that the court itself has done in the exercise of its probate jurisdiction.
And since in the ultimate analysis, the question of whether or not all the properties herein involved pertain
exclusively to the estate of Hodges depends on the legal meaning and effect of said orders, the claim that
respondent court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and decide the said issue is incorrect. If it was within
the competence of the court to issue the root orders, why should it not be within its authority to declare their
true significance and intent, to the end that the parties may know whether or not the estate of Mrs. Hodges had
already been adjudicated by the court, upon the initiative of Hodges, in his favor, to the exclusion of the other
heirs of his wife instituted in her will?
At this point, it bears emphasis again that the main cause of all the present problems confronting the courts and
the parties in these cases was the failure of Hodges to secure, as executor of his wife's estate, from May, 1957
up to the time of his death in December, 1962, a period of more than five years, the final adjudication of her
estate and the closure of the proceedings. The record is bare of any showing that he ever exerted any effort
towards the early settlement of said estate. While, on the one hand, there are enough indications, as already
discuss that he had intentions of leaving intact her share of the conjugal properties so that it may pass wholly to
his co-heirs upon his death, pursuant to her will, on the other hand, by not terminating the proceedings, his
interests in his own half of the conjugal properties remained commingled pro-indiviso with those of his coheirs in the other half. Obviously, such a situation could not be conducive to ready ascertainment of the portion
of the inheritance that should appertain to his co-heirs upon his death. Having these considerations in mind, it
would be giving a premium for such procrastination and rather unfair to his co-heirs, if the administrator of his
estate were to be given exclusive administration of all the properties in question, which would necessarily
include the function of promptly liquidating the conjugal partnership, thereby identifying and segregating
without unnecessary loss of time which properties should be considered as constituting the estate of Mrs.
Hodges, the remainder of which her brothers and sisters are supposed to inherit equally among themselves.
To be sure, an administrator is not supposed to represent the interests of any particular party and his acts are
deemed to be objectively for the protection of the rights of everybody concerned with the estate of the
decedent, and from this point of view, it maybe said that even if PCIB were to act alone, there should be no
fear of undue disadvantage to anyone. On the other hand, however, it is evidently implicit in section 6 of Rule
78 fixing the priority among those to whom letters of administration should be granted that the criterion in the

selection of the administrator is not his impartiality alone but, more importantly, the extent of his interest in the
estate, so much so that the one assumed to have greater interest is preferred to another who has less. Taking
both of these considerations into account, inasmuch as, according to Hodges' own inventory submitted by him
as Executor of the estate of his wife, practically all their properties were conjugal which means that the spouses
have equal shares therein, it is but logical that both estates should be administered jointly by representatives of
both, pending their segregation from each other. Particularly is such an arrangement warranted because the
actuations so far of PCIB evince a determined, albeit groundless, intent to exclude the other heirs of Mrs.
Hodges from their inheritance. Besides, to allow PCIB, the administrator of his estate, to perform now what
Hodges was duty bound to do as executor is to violate the spirit, if not the letter, of Section 2 of Rule 78 which
expressly provides that "The executor of an executor shall not, as such, administer the estate of the first
testator." It goes without saying that this provision refers also to the administrator of an executor like PCIB
here.
We are not unmindful of the fact that under Section 2 of Rule 73, "When the marriage is dissolved by the death
of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the
debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the
conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either." Indeed, it is true that
the last sentence of this provision allows or permits the conjugal partnership of spouses who are both deceased
to be settled or liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either, but precisely because said sentence
allows or permits that the liquidation be made in either proceeding, it is a matter of sound judicial discretion in
which one it should be made. After all, the former rule referring to the administrator of the husband's estate in
respect to such liquidation was done away with by Act 3176, the pertinent provisions of which are now
embodied in the rule just cited.
Thus, it can be seen that at the time of the death of Hodges, there was already the pending judicial settlement
proceeding of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and, more importantly, that the former was the executor of the latter's
will who had, as such, failed for more than five years to see to it that the same was terminated earliest, which
was not difficult to do, since from ought that appears in the record, there were no serious obstacles on the way,
the estate not being indebted and there being no immediate heirs other than Hodges himself. Such dilatory or
indifferent attitude could only spell possible prejudice of his co-heirs, whose rights to inheritance depend
entirely on the existence of any remainder of Mrs. Hodges' share in the community properties, and who are
now faced with the pose of PCIB that there is no such remainder. Had Hodges secured as early as possible the
settlement of his wife's estate, this problem would not arisen. All things considered, We are fully convinced
that the interests of justice will be better served by not permitting or allowing PCIB or any administrator of the
estate of Hodges exclusive administration of all the properties in question. We are of the considered opinion
and so hold that what would be just and proper is for both administrators of the two estates to act conjointly
until after said estates have been segregated from each other.
At this juncture, it may be stated that we are not overlooking the fact that it is PCIB's contention that, viewed
as a substitution, the testamentary disposition in favor of Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters may not be given
effect. To a certain extent, this contention is correct. Indeed, legally speaking, Mrs. Hodges' will provides
neither for a simple or vulgar substitution under Article 859 of the Civil Code nor for a fideicommissary
substitution under Article 863 thereof. There is no vulgar substitution therein because there is no provision for
either (1) predecease of the testator by the designated heir or (2) refusal or (3) incapacity of the latter to accept
the inheritance, as required by Article 859; and neither is there a fideicommissary substitution therein because
no obligation is imposed thereby upon Hodges to preserve the estate or any part thereof for anyone else. But
from these premises, it is not correct to jump to the conclusion, as PCIB does, that the testamentary
dispositions in question are therefore inoperative and invalid.
The error in PCIB's position lies simply in the fact that it views the said disposition exclusively in the light of
substitutions covered by the Civil Code section on that subject, (Section 3, Chapter 2, Title IV, Book III) when
it is obvious that substitution occurs only when another heir is appointed in a will "so that he may enter into

inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted," (Article 857, id.) and, in the present case, no such
possible default is contemplated. The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not substitutes for Hodges
because, under her will, they are not to inherit what Hodges cannot, would not or may not inherit, but what he
would not dispose of from his inheritance; rather, therefore, they are also heirs instituted simultaneously with
Hodges, subject, however, to certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was concerned and
correspondingly suspensive with reference to his brothers and sisters-in-law. It is partially resolutory, since it
bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of her estate to be owned and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with
absolute dominion over them 6 only during his lifetime, which means that while he could completely and absolutely
dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he was not free to do so mortis causa, and all
his rights to what might remain upon his death would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency,
inasmuch as the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although vested already upon the death of
Mrs. Hodges, would automatically become operative upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of
actual existence of any remainder of her estate then.
Contrary to the view of respondent Magno, however, it was not the usufruct alone of her estate, as
contemplated in Article 869 of the Civil Code, that she bequeathed to Hodges during his lifetime, but the full
ownership thereof, although the same was to last also during his lifetime only, even as there was no restriction
whatsoever against his disposing or conveying the whole or any portion thereof to anybody other than himself.
The Court sees no legal impediment to this kind of institution, in this jurisdiction or under Philippine law,
except that it cannot apply to the legitime of Hodges as the surviving spouse, consisting of one-half of the
estate, considering that Mrs. Hodges had no surviving ascendants nor descendants. (Arts. 872, 900, and 904,
New Civil Code.)
But relative precisely to the question of how much of Mrs. Hodges' share of the conjugal partnership properties
may be considered as her estate, the parties are in disagreement as to how Article 16 of the Civil Code 7 should
be applied. On the one hand, petitioner claims that inasmuch as Mrs. Hodges was a resident of the Philippines at the
time of her death, under said Article 16, construed in relation to the pertinent laws of Texas and the principle
of renvoi, what should be applied here should be the rules of succession under the Civil Code of the Philippines,
and, therefore, her estate could consist of no more than one-fourth of the said conjugal properties, the other fourth
being, as already explained, the legitime of her husband (Art. 900, Civil Code) which she could not have disposed of
nor burdened with any condition (Art. 872, Civil Code). On the other hand, respondent Magno denies that Mrs.
Hodges died a resident of the Philippines, since allegedly she never changed nor intended to change her original
residence of birth in Texas, United States of America, and contends that, anyway, regardless of the question of her
residence, she being indisputably a citizen of Texas, under said Article 16 of the Civil Code, the distribution of her
estate is subject to the laws of said State which, according to her, do not provide for any legitime, hence, the brothers
and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are entitled to the remainder of the whole of her share of the conjugal partnership
properties consisting of one-half thereof. Respondent Magno further maintains that, in any event, Hodges had
renounced his rights under the will in favor of his co-heirs, as allegedly proven by the documents touching on the
point already mentioned earlier, the genuineness and legal significance of which petitioner seemingly questions.
Besides, the parties are disagreed as to what the pertinent laws of Texas provide. In the interest of settling the estates
herein involved soonest, it would be best, indeed, if these conflicting claims of the parties were determined in these
proceedings. The Court regrets, however, that it cannot do so, for the simple reason that neither the evidence
submitted by the parties in the court below nor their discussion, in their respective briefs and memoranda before Us,
of their respective contentions on the pertinent legal issues, of grave importance as they are, appear to Us to be
adequate enough to enable Us to render an intelligent comprehensive and just resolution. For one thing, there is no
clear and reliable proof of what in fact the possibly applicable laws of Texas are. 7* Then also, the genuineness of
documents relied upon by respondent Magno is disputed. And there are a number of still other conceivable related
issues which the parties may wish to raise but which it is not proper to mention here. In Justice, therefore, to all the
parties concerned, these and all other relevant matters should first be threshed out fully in the trial court in the
proceedings hereafter to be held therein for the purpose of ascertaining and adjudicating and/or distributing the
estate of Mrs. Hodges to her heirs in accordance with her duly probated will.
To be more explicit, all that We can and do decide in connection with the petition for certiorari and prohibition
are: (1) that regardless of which corresponding laws are applied, whether of the Philippines or of Texas, and

taking for granted either of the respective contentions of the parties as to provisions of the latter, 8 and regardless
also of whether or not it can be proven by competent evidence that Hodges renounced his inheritance in any degree,
it is easily and definitely discernible from the inventory submitted by Hodges himself, as Executor of his wife's
estate, that there are properties which should constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges and ought to be disposed of or
distributed among her heirs pursuant to her will in said Special Proceedings 1307; (2) that, more specifically,
inasmuch as the question of what are the pertinent laws of Texas applicable to the situation herein is basically one of
fact, and, considering that the sole difference in the positions of the parties as to the effect of said laws has reference
to the supposed legitime of Hodges it being the stand of PCIB that Hodges had such a legitime whereas Magno
claims the negative - it is now beyond controversy for all future purposes of these proceedings that whatever be the
provisions actually of the laws of Texas applicable hereto, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is at least, one-fourth of the
conjugal estate of the spouses; the existence and effects of foreign laws being questions of fact, and it being the
position now of PCIB that the estate of Mrs. Hodges, pursuant to the laws of Texas, should only be one-fourth of the
conjugal estate, such contention constitutes an admission of fact, and consequently, it would be in estoppel in any
further proceedings in these cases to claim that said estate could be less, irrespective of what might be proven later
to be actually the provisions of the applicable laws of Texas; (3) that Special Proceedings 1307 for the settlement of
the testate estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be closed at this stage and should proceed to its logical conclusion, there
having been no proper and legal adjudication or distribution yet of the estate therein involved; and (4) that
respondent Magno remains and continues to be the Administratrix therein. Hence, nothing in the foregoing opinion
is intended to resolve the issues which, as already stated, are not properly before the Court now, namely, (1) whether
or not Hodges had in fact and in law waived or renounced his inheritance from Mrs. Hodges, in whole or in part, and
(2) assuming there had been no such waiver, whether or not, by the application of Article 16 of the Civil Code, and
in the light of what might be the applicable laws of Texas on the matter, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is more than the
one-fourth declared above. As a matter of fact, even our finding above about the existence of properties constituting
the estate of Mrs. Hodges rests largely on a general appraisal of the size and extent of the conjugal partnership
gathered from reference made thereto by both parties in their briefs as well as in their pleadings included in the
records on appeal, and it should accordingly yield, as to which exactly those properties are, to the more concrete and
specific evidence which the parties are supposed to present in support of their respective positions in regard to the
foregoing main legal and factual issues. In the interest of justice, the parties should be allowed to present such
further evidence in relation to all these issues in a joint hearing of the two probate proceedings herein involved.
After all, the court a quo has not yet passed squarely on these issues, and it is best for all concerned that it should do
so in the first instance.
Relative to Our holding above that the estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be less than the remainder of one-fourth
of the conjugal partnership properties, it may be mentioned here that during the deliberations, the point was
raised as to whether or not said holding might be inconsistent with Our other ruling here also that, since there
is no reliable evidence as to what are the applicable laws of Texas, U.S.A. "with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights" that may be willed by a testator which, under Article 16 of
the Civil Code, are controlling in the instant cases, in view of the undisputed Texan nationality of the deceased
Mrs. Hodges, these cases should be returned to the court a quo, so that the parties may prove what said law
provides, it is premature for Us to make any specific ruling now on either the validity of the testamentary
dispositions herein involved or the amount of inheritance to which the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are
entitled. After nature reflection, We are of the considered view that, at this stage and in the state of the records
before Us, the feared inconsistency is more apparent than real. Withal, it no longer lies in the lips of petitioner
PCIB to make any claim that under the laws of Texas, the estate of Mrs. Hodges could in any event be less than
that We have fixed above.
It should be borne in mind that as above-indicated, the question of what are the laws of Texas governing the
matters herein issue is, in the first instance, one of fact, not of law. Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may
not be taken judicial notice of and have to be proven like any other fact in dispute between the parties in any
proceeding, with the rare exception in instances when the said laws are already within the actual knowledge of
the court, such as when they are well and generally known or they have been actually ruled upon in other cases
before it and none of the parties concerned do not claim otherwise. (5 Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, p. 41, 1970 ed.) In Fluemer vs. Hix, 54 Phil. 610, it was held:

It is the theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins West Virginia, on November 3,
1925, by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Virginia govern. To this end,
there was submitted a copy of section 3868 of Acts 1882, c. 84 as found in West Virginia Code, Annotated, by
Hogg Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p. 1960, and as certified to by the Director of the National Library. But this was
far from a compliance with the law. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts.
The courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various States
of the American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. (In re Estate of Johnson [1918], 39 Phil., 156.)
Here the requirements of the law were not met. There was no showing that the book from which an extract was
taken was printed or published under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having
charge of the original, under the seal of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in
force at the time the alleged will was executed."
No evidence of the nature thus suggested by the Court may be found in the records of the cases at bar. Quite to
the contrary, the parties herein have presented opposing versions in their respective pleadings and memoranda
regarding the matter. And even if We took into account that in Aznar vs. Garcia, the Court did make reference
to certain provisions regarding succession in the laws of Texas, the disparity in the material dates of that case
and the present ones would not permit Us to indulge in the hazardous conjecture that said provisions have not
been amended or changed in the meantime.
On the other hand, in In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156, We held:
Upon the other point as to whether the will was executed in conformity with the statutes of
the State of Illinois we note that it does not affirmatively appear from the transcription of
the testimony adduced in the trial court that any witness was examined with reference to the
law of Illinois on the subject of the execution of will. The trial judge no doubt was satisfied
that the will was properly executed by examining section 1874 of the Revised Statutes of
Illinois, as exhibited in volume 3 of Starr & Curtis's Annotated Illinois Statutes, 2nd ed., p.
426; and he may have assumed that he could take judicial notice of the laws of Illinois under
section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If so, he was in our opinion mistaken. That
section authorizes the courts here to take judicial notice, among other things, of the acts of the
legislative department of the United States. These words clearly have reference to Acts of the
Congress of the United States; and we would hesitate to hold that our courts can, under this
provision, take judicial notice of the multifarious laws of the various American States. Nor do
we think that any such authority can be derived from the broader language, used in the same
section, where it is said that our courts may take judicial notice of matters of public
knowledge "similar" to those therein enumerated. The proper rule we think is to require proof
of the statutes of the States of the American Union whenever their provisions are
determinative of the issues in any action litigated in the Philippine courts.
Nevertheless, even supposing that the trial court may have erred in taking judicial notice of
the law of Illinois on the point in question, such error is not now available to the petitioner,
first, because the petition does not state any fact from which it would appear that the law of
Illinois is different from what the court found, and, secondly, because the assignment of error
and argument for the appellant in this court raises no question based on such supposed error.
Though the trial court may have acted upon pure conjecture as to the law prevailing in the
State of Illinois, its judgment could not be set aside, even upon application made within six
months under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, unless it should be made to appear
affirmatively that the conjecture was wrong. The petitioner, it is true, states in general terms
that the will in question is invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal property in the
State of Illinois, but this is merely a conclusion of law. The affidavits by which the petition is

accompanied contain no reference to the subject, and we are cited to no authority in the
appellant's brief which might tend to raise a doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion of
the trial court. It is very clear, therefore, that this point cannot be urged as of serious moment.
It is implicit in the above ruling that when, with respect to certain aspects of the foreign laws concerned, the
parties in a given case do not have any controversy or are more or less in agreement, the Court may take it for
granted for the purposes of the particular case before it that the said laws are as such virtual agreement
indicates, without the need of requiring the presentation of what otherwise would be the competent evidence
on the point. Thus, in the instant cases wherein it results from the respective contentions of both parties that
even if the pertinent laws of Texas were known and to be applied, the amount of the inheritance pertaining to
the heirs of Mrs. Hodges is as We have fixed above, the absence of evidence to the effect that, actually and in
fact, under said laws, it could be otherwise is of no longer of any consequence, unless the purpose is to show
that it could be more. In other words, since PCIB, the petitioner-appellant, concedes that upon application of
Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, the amount of the estate in controversy is just as
We have determined it to be, and respondent-appellee is only claiming, on her part, that it could be more, PCIB
may not now or later pretend differently.
To be more concrete, on pages 20-21 of its petition herein, dated July 31, 1967, PCIB states categorically:
Inasmuch as Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that "intestate and testamentary
successions both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found",
while the law of Texas (the Hodges spouses being nationals of U.S.A., State of Texas), in its
conflicts of law rules, provides that the domiciliary law (in this case Philippine law) governs
the testamentary dispositions and successional rights over movables or personal properties,
while the law of the situs (in this case also Philippine law with respect to all Hodges
properties located in the Philippines), governs with respect to immovable properties, and
applying therefore the 'renvoi doctrine' as enunciated and applied by this Honorable Court in
the case of In re Estate of Christensen (G.R. No. L-16749, Jan. 31, 1963), there can be no
question that Philippine law governs the testamentary dispositions contained in the Last Will
and Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as the successional rights to her
estate, both with respect to movables, as well as to immovables situated in the Philippines.
In its main brief dated February 26, 1968, PCIB asserts:
The law governing successional rights.
As recited above, there is no question that the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, was an
American citizen. There is also no question that she was a national of the State of Texas,
U.S.A. Again, there is likewise no question that she had her domicile of choice in the City of
Iloilo, Philippines, as this has already been pronounced by the above-cited orders of the lower
court, pronouncements which are by now res adjudicata (par. [a], See. 49, Rule 39, Rules of
Court; In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156).
Article 16 of the Civil Code provides:
"Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found."
Thus the aforecited provision of the Civil Code points towards the national law of the
deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, which is the law of Texas, as governing succession "both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions ...". But the law of Texas, in its conflicts of law rules,
provides that the domiciliary law governs the testamentary dispositions and successional
rights over movables or personal property, while the law of the situs governs with respect to
immovable property. Such that with respect to both movable property, as well as immovable
property situated in the Philippines, the law of Texas points to the law of the Philippines.
Applying, therefore, the so-called "renvoi doctrine", as enunciated and applied by this
Honorable Court in the case of "In re Christensen" (G.R. No. L-16749, Jan. 31, 1963), there
can be no question that Philippine law governs the testamentary provisions in the Last Will
and Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as the successional rights to her
estate, both with respect to movables, as well as immovables situated in the Philippines.
The subject of successional rights.
Under Philippine law, as it is under the law of Texas, the conjugal or community property of
the spouses, Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges, upon the death of the latter, is
to be divided into two, one-half pertaining to each of the spouses, as his or her own property.
Thus, upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, one-half of the conjugal partnership property
immediately pertained to Charles Newton Hodges as his own share, and not by virtue of any
successional rights. There can be no question about this.
Again, Philippine law, or more specifically, Article 900 of the Civil Code provides:
If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to
one-half of the hereditary estate of the deceased spouse, and the testator may
freely dispose of the other half.
If the marriage between the surviving spouse and the testator was
solemnized in articulo mortis, and the testator died within three months from
the time of the marriage, the legitime of the surviving spouse as the sole heir
shall be one-third of the hereditary estate, except when they have been living
as husband and wife for more than five years. In the latter case, the legitime
of the surviving spouse shall be that specified in the preceding paragraph.
This legitime of the surviving spouse cannot be burdened by a fideicommisary substitution
(Art. 864, Civil code), nor by any charge, condition, or substitution (Art, 872, Civil code). It
is clear, therefore, that in addition to one-half of the conjugal partnership property as his own
conjugal share, Charles Newton Hodges was also immediately entitled to one-half of the half
conjugal share of the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, or one-fourth of the entire conjugal
property, as his legitime.
One-fourth of the conjugal property therefore remains at issue.

In the summary of its arguments in its memorandum dated April 30, 1968, the following appears:
Briefly, the position advanced by the petitioner is:
a. That the Hodges spouses were domiciled legally in the Philippines (pp. 19-20, petition).
This is now a matter of res adjudicata (p. 20, petition).
b. That under Philippine law, Texas law, and the renvoi doctrine, Philippine law governs the
successional rights over the properties left by the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 20-21,
petition).
c. That under Philippine as well as Texas law, one-half of the Hodges properties pertains to
the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges (p. 21, petition). This is not questioned by the
respondents.
d. That under Philippine law, the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, automatically inherited
one-half of the remaining one-half of the Hodges properties as his legitime (p. 21, petition).
e. That the remaining 25% of the Hodges properties was inherited by the deceased, Charles
Newton Hodges, under the will of his deceased spouse (pp. 22-23, petition). Upon the death
of Charles Newton Hodges, the substitution 'provision of the will of the deceased, Linnie Jane
Hodges, did not operate because the same is void (pp. 23-25, petition).
f. That the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, asserted his sole ownership of the Hodges
properties and the probate court sanctioned such assertion (pp. 25-29, petition). He in fact
assumed such ownership and such was the status of the properties as of the time of his death
(pp. 29-34, petition).
Of similar tenor are the allegations of PCIB in some of its pleadings quoted in the earlier part of this option.
On her part, it is respondent-appellee Magno's posture that under the laws of Texas, there is no system of
legitime, hence the estate of Mrs. Hodges should be one-half of all the conjugal properties.
It is thus unquestionable that as far as PCIB is concerned, the application to these cases of Article 16 of the
Civil Code in relation to the corresponding laws of Texas would result in that the Philippine laws on succession
should control. On that basis, as We have already explained above, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is the remainder
of one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, considering that We have found that there is no legal
impediment to the kind of disposition ordered by Mrs. Hodges in her will in favor of her brothers and sisters
and, further, that the contention of PCIB that the same constitutes an inoperative testamentary substitution is
untenable. As will be recalled, PCIB's position that there is no such estate of Mrs. Hodges is predicated
exclusively on two propositions, namely: (1) that the provision in question in Mrs. Hodges' testament violates
the rules on substitution of heirs under the Civil Code and (2) that, in any event, by the orders of the trial court
of May 27, and December 14, 1957, the trial court had already finally and irrevocably adjudicated to her
husband the whole free portion of her estate to the exclusion of her brothers and sisters, both of which poses,
We have overruled. Nowhere in its pleadings, briefs and memoranda does PCIB maintain that the application
of the laws of Texas would result in the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges not inheriting anything under her will. And
since PCIB's representations in regard to the laws of Texas virtually constitute admissions of fact which the
other parties and the Court are being made to rely and act upon, PCIB is "not permitted to contradict them or
subsequently take a position contradictory to or inconsistent with them." (5 Moran, id, p. 65, citing Cunanan
vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Sta. Ana vs. Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018).

Accordingly, the only question that remains to be settled in the further proceedings hereby ordered to be held
in the court below is how much more than as fixed above is the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and this would depend
on (1) whether or not the applicable laws of Texas do provide in effect for more, such as, when there is no
legitime provided therein, and (2) whether or not Hodges has validly waived his whole inheritance from Mrs.
Hodges.
In the course of the deliberations, it was brought out by some members of the Court that to avoid or, at least,
minimize further protracted legal controversies between the respective heirs of the Hodges spouses, it is
imperative to elucidate on the possible consequences of dispositions made by Hodges after the death of his
wife from the mass of the unpartitioned estates without any express indication in the pertinent documents as to
whether his intention is to dispose of part of his inheritance from his wife or part of his own share of the
conjugal estate as well as of those made by PCIB after the death of Hodges. After a long discussion, the
consensus arrived at was as follows: (1) any such dispositions made gratuitously in favor of third parties,
whether these be individuals, corporations or foundations, shall be considered as intended to be of properties
constituting part of Hodges' inheritance from his wife, it appearing from the tenor of his motions of May 27
and December 11, 1957 that in asking for general authority to make sales or other disposals of properties under
the jurisdiction of the court, which include his own share of the conjugal estate, he was not invoking
particularly his right over his own share, but rather his right to dispose of any part of his inheritance pursuant
to the will of his wife; (2) as regards sales, exchanges or other remunerative transfers, the proceeds of such
sales or the properties taken in by virtue of such exchanges, shall be considered as merely the products of
"physical changes" of the properties of her estate which the will expressly authorizes Hodges to make,
provided that whatever of said products should remain with the estate at the time of the death of Hodges should
go to her brothers and sisters; (3) the dispositions made by PCIB after the death of Hodges must naturally be
deemed as covering only the properties belonging to his estate considering that being only the administrator of
the estate of Hodges, PCIB could not have disposed of properties belonging to the estate of his wife. Neither
could such dispositions be considered as involving conjugal properties, for the simple reason that the conjugal
partnership automatically ceased when Mrs. Hodges died, and by the peculiar provision of her will, under
discussion, the remainder of her share descended also automatically upon the death of Hodges to her brothers
and sisters, thus outside of the scope of PCIB's administration. Accordingly, these construction of the will of
Mrs. Hodges should be adhered to by the trial court in its final order of adjudication and distribution and/or
partition of the two estates in question.
THE APPEALS
A cursory examination of the seventy-eight assignments of error in appellant PCIB's brief would readily reveal
that all of them are predicated mainly on the contention that inasmuch as Hodges had already adjudicated unto
himself all the properties constituting his wife's share of the conjugal partnership, allegedly with the sanction
of the trial court per its order of December 14, 1957, there has been, since said date, no longer any estate of
Mrs. Hodges of which appellee Magno could be administratrix, hence the various assailed orders sanctioning
her actuations as such are not in accordance with law. Such being the case, with the foregoing resolution
holding such posture to be untenable in fact and in law and that it is in the best interest of justice that for the
time being the two estates should be administered conjointly by the respective administrators of the two
estates, it should follow that said assignments of error have lost their fundamental reasons for being. There are
certain matters, however, relating peculiarly to the respective orders in question, if commonly among some of
them, which need further clarification. For instance, some of them authorized respondent Magno to act alone
or without concurrence of PCIB. And with respect to many of said orders, PCIB further claims that either the
matters involved were not properly within the probate jurisdiction of the trial court or that the procedure
followed was not in accordance with the rules. Hence, the necessity of dealing separately with the merits of
each of the appeals.
Indeed, inasmuch as the said two estates have until now remained commingled pro-indiviso, due to the failure
of Hodges and the lower court to liquidate the conjugal partnership, to recognize appellee Magno as

Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges which is still unsegregated from that of Hodges is not to
say, without any qualification, that she was therefore authorized to do and perform all her acts complained of
in these appeals, sanctioned though they might have been by the trial court. As a matter of fact, it is such
commingling pro-indivisoof the two estates that should deprive appellee of freedom to act independently from
PCIB, as administrator of the estate of Hodges, just as, for the same reason, the latter should not have authority
to act independently from her. And considering that the lower court failed to adhere consistently to this basic
point of view, by allowing the two administrators to act independently of each other, in the various instances
already noted in the narration of facts above, the Court has to look into the attendant circumstances of each of
the appealed orders to be able to determine whether any of them has to be set aside or they may all be legally
maintained notwithstanding the failure of the court a quo to observe the pertinent procedural technicalities, to
the end only that graver injury to the substantive rights of the parties concerned and unnecessary and
undesirable proliferation of incidents in the subject proceedings may be forestalled. In other words, We have to
determine, whether or not, in the light of the unusual circumstances extant in the record, there is need to be
more pragmatic and to adopt a rather unorthodox approach, so as to cause the least disturbance in rights
already being exercised by numerous innocent third parties, even if to do so may not appear to be strictly in
accordance with the letter of the applicable purely adjective rules.
Incidentally, it may be mentioned, at this point, that it was principally on account of the confusion that might
result later from PCIB's continuing to administer all the community properties, notwithstanding the certainty of
the existence of the separate estate of Mrs. Hodges, and to enable both estates to function in the meantime with
a relative degree of regularity, that the Court ordered in the resolution of September 8, 1972 the modification
of the injunction issued pursuant to the resolutions of August 8, October 4 and December 6, 1967, by virtue of
which respondent Magno was completely barred from any participation in the administration of the properties
herein involved. In the September 8 resolution, We ordered that, pending this decision, Special Proceedings
1307 and 1672 should proceed jointly and that the respective administrators therein "act conjointly none of
them to act singly and independently of each other for any purpose." Upon mature deliberation, We felt that to
allow PCIB to continue managing or administering all the said properties to the exclusion of the administratrix
of Mrs. Hodges' estate might place the heirs of Hodges at an unduly advantageous position which could result
in considerable, if not irreparable, damage or injury to the other parties concerned. It is indeed to be regretted
that apparently, up to this date, more than a year after said resolution, the same has not been given due regard,
as may be gleaned from the fact that recently, respondent Magno has filed in these proceedings a motion to
declare PCIB in contempt for alleged failure to abide therewith, notwithstanding that its repeated motions for
reconsideration thereof have all been denied soon after they were filed. 9
Going back to the appeals, it is perhaps best to begin first with what appears to Our mind to be the simplest,
and then proceed to the more complicated ones in that order, without regard to the numerical sequence of the
assignments of error in appellant's brief or to the order of the discussion thereof by counsel.
Assignments of error numbers
LXXII, LXXVII and LXXVIII.
These assignments of error relate to (1) the order of the trial court of August 6, 1965 providing that "the deeds
of sale (therein referred to involving properties in the name of Hodges) should be signed jointly by the PCIB,
as Administrator of Testate Estate of C.N. Hodges, and Avelina A. Magno, as Administratrix of the Testate
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, and to this effect, the PCIB should take the necessary steps so that
Administratrix Avelina A. Magno could sign the deeds of sale," (p. 248, Green Rec. on Appeal) (2) the order of
October 27, 1965 denying the motion for reconsideration of the foregoing order, (pp. 276-277, id.) (3) the other
order also dated October 27, 1965 enjoining inter alia, that "(a) all cash collections should be deposited in the
joint account of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and estate of C. N. Hodges, (b) that whatever cash collections
(that) had been deposited in the account of either of the estates should be withdrawn and since then (sic)
deposited in the joint account of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and the estate of C. N. Hodges; ... (d) (that)
Administratrix Magno allow the PCIB to inspect whatever records, documents and papers she may have in

her possession, in the same manner that Administrator PCIB is also directed to allow Administratrix Magno to
inspect whatever records, documents and papers it may have in its possession" and "(e) that the accountant of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges shall have access to all records of the transactions of both estates for the
protection of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges; and in like manner, the accountant or any authorized
representative of the estate of C. N. Hodges shall have access to the records of transactions of the Linnie Jane
Hodges estate for the protection of the estate of C. N. Hodges", (pp. 292-295, id.) and (4) the order of February
15, 1966, denying, among others, the motion for reconsideration of the order of October 27, 1965 last referred
to. (pp. 455-456, id.)
As may be readily seen, the thrust of all these four impugned orders is in line with the Court's abovementioned resolution of September 8, 1972 modifying the injunction previously issued on August 8, 1967, and,
more importantly, with what We have said the trial court should have always done pending the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership of the Hodges spouses. In fact, as already stated, that is the arrangement We are
ordering, by this decision, to be followed. Stated differently, since the questioned orders provide for joint
action by the two administrators, and that is precisely what We are holding out to have been done and should
be done until the two estates are separated from each other, the said orders must be affirmed. Accordingly the
foregoing assignments of error must be, as they are hereby overruled.
Assignments of error Numbers LXVIII
to LXXI and LXXIII to LXXVI.
The orders complained of under these assignments of error commonly deal with expenditures made by
appellee Magno, as Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs. Hodges, in connection with her administration thereof,
albeit additionally, assignments of error Numbers LXIX to LXXI put into question the payment of attorneys
fees provided for in the contract for the purpose, as constituting, in effect, premature advances to the heirs of
Mrs. Hodges.
More specifically, assignment Number LXXIII refers to reimbursement of overtime pay paid to six employees
of the court and three other persons for services in copying the court records to enable the lawyers of the
administration to be fully informed of all the incidents in the proceedings. The reimbursement was approved as
proper legal expenses of administration per the order of December 19, 1964, (pp. 221-222, id.) and repeated
motions for reconsideration thereof were denied by the orders of January 9, 1965, (pp. 231-232, id.) October
27, 1965, (p. 277, id.) and February 15, 1966. (pp. 455-456, id.) On the other hand, Assignments Numbers
LXVIII to LXXI, LXXIV and LXXV question the trial court's order of November 3, 1965 approving the
agreement of June 6, 1964 between Administratrix Magno and James L. Sullivan, attorney-in-fact of the heirs
of Mrs. Hodges, as Parties of the First Part, and Attorneys Raul Manglapus and Rizal R. Quimpo, as Parties of
the Second Part, regarding attorneys fees for said counsel who had agreed "to prosecute and defend their
interests (of the Parties of the First Part) in certain cases now pending litigation in the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo , more specifically in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672 " (pp. 126-129, id.) and directing
Administratrix Magno "to issue and sign whatever check or checks maybe needed to implement the approval
of the agreement annexed to the motion" as well as the "administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges to
countersign the said check or checks as the case maybe." (pp. 313-320, id.), reconsideration of which order of
approval was denied in the order of February 16, 1966, (p. 456, id.) Assignment Number LXXVI imputes error
to the lower court's order of October 27, 1965, already referred to above, insofar as it orders that "PCIB should
counter sign the check in the amount of P250 in favor of Administratrix Avelina A. Magno as her
compensation as administratrix of Linnie Jane Hodges estate chargeable to the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges only." (p. 294, id.)
Main contention again of appellant PCIB in regard to these eight assigned errors is that there is no such estate
as the estate of Mrs. Hodges for which the questioned expenditures were made, hence what were authorized
were in effect expenditures from the estate of Hodges. As We have already demonstrated in Our resolution
above of the petition for certiorari and prohibition, this posture is incorrect. Indeed, in whichever way the

remaining issues between the parties in these cases are ultimately resolved, 10 the final result will surely be that
there are properties constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges of which Magno is the current administratrix. It follows,
therefore, that said appellee had the right, as such administratrix, to hire the persons whom she paid overtime pay
and to be paid for her own services as administratrix. That she has not yet collected and is not collecting amounts as
substantial as that paid to or due appellant PCIB is to her credit.
Of course, she is also entitled to the services of counsel and to that end had the authority to enter into contracts
for attorney's fees in the manner she had done in the agreement of June 6, 1964. And as regards to the
reasonableness of the amount therein stipulated, We see no reason to disturb the discretion exercised by the
probate court in determining the same. We have gone over the agreement, and considering the obvious size of
the estate in question and the nature of the issues between the parties as well as the professional standing of
counsel, We cannot say that the fees agreed upon require the exercise by the Court of its inherent power to
reduce it.
PCIB insists, however, that said agreement of June 6, 1964 is not for legal services to the estate but to the heirs
of Mrs. Hodges, or, at most, to both of them, and such being the case, any payment under it, insofar as
counsels' services would redound to the benefit of the heirs, would be in the nature of advances to such heirs
and a premature distribution of the estate. Again, We hold that such posture cannot prevail.
Upon the premise We have found plausible that there is an existing estate of Mrs. Hodges, it results that
juridically and factually the interests involved in her estate are distinct and different from those involved in her
estate of Hodges and vice versa. Insofar as the matters related exclusively to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, PCIB,
as administrator of the estate of Hodges, is a complete stranger and it is without personality to question the
actuations of the administratrix thereof regarding matters not affecting the estate of Hodges. Actually,
considering the obviously considerable size of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, We see no possible cause for
apprehension that when the two estates are segregated from each other, the amount of attorney's fees stipulated
in the agreement in question will prejudice any portion that would correspond to Hodges' estate.
And as regards the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges who ought to be the ones who should have a say on the
attorney's fees and other expenses of administration assailed by PCIB, suffice it to say that they appear to have
been duly represented in the agreement itself by their attorney-in-fact, James L. Sullivan and have not
otherwise interposed any objection to any of the expenses incurred by Magno questioned by PCIB in these
appeals. As a matter of fact, as ordered by the trial court, all the expenses in question, including the attorney's
fees, may be paid without awaiting the determination and segregation of the estate of Mrs. Hodges.
Withal, the weightiest consideration in connection with the point under discussion is that at this stage of the
controversy among the parties herein, the vital issue refers to the existence or non-existence of the estate of
Mrs. Hodges. In this respect, the interest of respondent Magno, as the appointed administratrix of the said
estate, is to maintain that it exists, which is naturally common and identical with and inseparable from the
interest of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges. Thus, it should not be wondered why both Magno and these
heirs have seemingly agreed to retain but one counsel. In fact, such an arrangement should be more convenient
and economical to both. The possibility of conflict of interest between Magno and the heirs of Mrs. Hodges
would be, at this stage, quite remote and, in any event, rather insubstantial. Besides, should any substantial
conflict of interest between them arise in the future, the same would be a matter that the probate court can very
well take care of in the course of the independent proceedings in Case No. 1307 after the corresponding
segregation of the two subject estates. We cannot perceive any cogent reason why, at this stage, the estate and
the heirs of Mrs. Hodges cannot be represented by a common counsel.
Now, as to whether or not the portion of the fees in question that should correspond to the heirs constitutes
premature partial distribution of the estate of Mrs. Hodges is also a matter in which neither PCIB nor the heirs
of Hodges have any interest. In any event, since, as far as the records show, the estate has no creditors and the
corresponding estate and inheritance taxes, except those of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, have

already been paid, 11 no prejudice can caused to anyone by the comparatively small amount of attorney's fees in
question. And in this connection, it may be added that, although strictly speaking, the attorney's fees of the counsel
of an administrator is in the first instance his personal responsibility, reimbursable later on by the estate, in the final
analysis, when, as in the situation on hand, the attorney-in-fact of the heirs has given his conformity thereto, it
would be idle effort to inquire whether or not the sanction given to said fees by the probate court is proper.
For the foregoing reasons, Assignments of Error LXVIII to LXXI and LXXIII to LXXVI should be as they are
hereby overruled.
Assignments of error I to IV,
XIII to XV, XXII to XXV, XXXV
to XXX VI, XLI to XLIII and L.
These assignments of error deal with the approval by the trial court of various deeds of sale of real properties
registered in the name of Hodges but executed by appellee Magno, as Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs.
Hodges, purportedly in implementation of corresponding supposed written "Contracts to Sell" previously
executed by Hodges during the interim between May 23, 1957, when his wife died, and December 25, 1962,
the day he died. As stated on pp. 118-120 of appellant's main brief, "These are: the, contract to sell between the
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Pepito G. Iyulores executed on February 5, 1961; the
contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellant Esperidion Partisala,
executed on April 20, 1960; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the
appellee, Winifredo C. Espada, executed on April 18, 1960; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles
Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Rosario Alingasa, executed on August 25, 1958; the contract to sell between
the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Lorenzo Carles, executed on June 17, 1958; the
contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Salvador S. Guzman,
executed on September 13, 1960; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the
appellee, Florenia Barrido, executed on February 21, 1958; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles
Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Purificacion Coronado, executed on August 14, 1961; the contract to sell
between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Graciano Lucero, executed on November 27,
1961; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Ariteo Thomas
Jamir, executed on May 26, 1961; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the
appellee, Melquiades Batisanan, executed on June 9, 1959; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles
Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Belcezar Causing, executed on February 10, 1959 and the contract to sell
between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Adelfa Premaylon, executed on October 31,
1959, re Title No. 13815."
Relative to these sales, it is the position of appellant PCIB that, inasmuch as pursuant to the will of Mrs.
Hodges, her husband was to have dominion over all her estate during his lifetime, it was as absolute owner of
the properties respectively covered by said sales that he executed the aforementioned contracts to sell, and
consequently, upon his death, the implementation of said contracts may be undertaken only by the
administrator of his estate and not by the administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges. Basically, the same
theory is invoked with particular reference to five other sales, in which the respective "contracts to sell" in
favor of these appellees were executed by Hodges before the death of his wife, namely, those in favor of
appellee Santiago Pacaonsis, Alfredo Catedral, Jose Pablico, Western Institute of Technology and Adelfa
Premaylon.
Anent those deeds of sale based on promises or contracts to sell executed by Hodges after the death of his wife,
those enumerated in the quotation in the immediately preceding paragraph, it is quite obvious that PCIB's
contention cannot be sustained. As already explained earlier, 1 1* all proceeds of remunerative transfers or
dispositions made by Hodges after the death of his wife should be deemed as continuing to be parts of her estate
and, therefore, subject to the terms of her will in favor of her brothers and sisters, in the sense that should there be no
showing that such proceeds, whether in cash or property have been subsequently conveyed or assigned subsequently
by Hodges to any third party by acts inter vivos with the result that they could not thereby belong to him anymore at

the time of his death, they automatically became part of the inheritance of said brothers and sisters. The deeds here
in question involve transactions which are exactly of this nature. Consequently, the payments made by the appellees
should be considered as payments to the estate of Mrs. Hodges which is to be distributed and partitioned among her
heirs specified in the will.

The five deeds of sale predicated on contracts to sell executed Hodges during the lifetime of his wife, present a
different situation. At first blush, it would appear that as to them, PCIB's position has some degree of
plausibility. Considering, however, that the adoption of PCIB's theory would necessarily have tremendous
repercussions and would bring about considerable disturbance of property rights that have somehow accrued
already in favor of innocent third parties, the five purchasers aforenamed, the Court is inclined to take a
pragmatic and practical view of the legal situation involving them by overlooking the possible technicalities in
the way, the non-observance of which would not, after all, detract materially from what should substantially
correspond to each and all of the parties concerned.
To start with, these contracts can hardly be ignored. Bona fide third parties are involved; as much as possible,
they should not be made to suffer any prejudice on account of judicial controversies not of their own making.
What is more, the transactions they rely on were submitted by them to the probate court for approval, and from
already known and recorded actuations of said court then, they had reason to believe that it had authority to act
on their motions, since appellee Magno had, from time to time prior to their transactions with her, been
allowed to act in her capacity as administratrix of one of the subject estates either alone or conjointly with
PCIB. All the sales in question were executed by Magno in 1966 already, but before that, the court had
previously authorized or otherwise sanctioned expressly many of her act as administratrix involving
expenditures from the estate made by her either conjointly with or independently from PCIB, as Administrator
of the Estate of Hodges. Thus, it may be said that said buyers-appellees merely followed precedents in
previous orders of the court. Accordingly, unless the impugned orders approving those sales indubitably suffer
from some clearly fatal infirmity the Court would rather affirm them.
It is quite apparent from the record that the properties covered by said sales are equivalent only to a fraction of
what should constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges, even if it is assumed that the same would finally be held to
be only one-fourth of the conjugal properties of the spouses as of the time of her death or, to be more exact,
one-half of her estate as per the inventory submitted by Hodges as executor, on May 12, 1958. In none of its
numerous, varied and voluminous pleadings, motions and manifestations has PCIB claimed any possibility
otherwise. Such being the case, to avoid any conflict with the heirs of Hodges, the said properties covered by
the questioned deeds of sale executed by appellee Magno may be treated as among those corresponding to the
estate of Mrs. Hodges, which would have been actually under her control and administration had Hodges
complied with his duty to liquidate the conjugal partnership. Viewing the situation in that manner, the only
ones who could stand to be prejudiced by the appealed orders referred to in the assignment of errors under
discussion and who could, therefore, have the requisite interest to question them would be only the heirs of
Mrs. Hodges, definitely not PCIB.
It is of no moment in what capacity Hodges made the "contracts to sell' after the death of his wife. Even if he
had acted as executor of the will of his wife, he did not have to submit those contracts to the court nor follow
the provisions of the rules, (Sections 2, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9 of Rule 89 quoted by appellant on pp. 125 to 127 of its
brief) for the simple reason that by the very orders, much relied upon by appellant for other purposes, of May
27, 1957 and December 14, 1957, Hodges was "allowed or authorized" by the trial court "to continue the
business in which he was engaged and to perform acts which he had been doing while the deceased was
living", (Order of May 27) which according to the motion on which the court acted was "of buying and selling
personal and real properties", and "to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the
properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes conveyed in the last
will and testament of the latter." (Order of December 14) In other words, if Hodges acted then as executor, it
can be said that he had authority to do so by virtue of these blanket orders, and PCIB does not question the
legality of such grant of authority; on the contrary, it is relying on the terms of the order itself for its main

contention in these cases. On the other hand, if, as PCIB contends, he acted as heir-adjudicatee, the authority
given to him by the aforementioned orders would still suffice.
As can be seen, therefore, it is of no moment whether the "contracts to sell" upon which the deeds in question
were based were executed by Hodges before or after the death of his wife. In a word, We hold, for the reasons
already stated, that the properties covered by the deeds being assailed pertain or should be deemed as
pertaining to the estate of Mrs. Hodges; hence, any supposed irregularity attending the actuations of the trial
court may be invoked only by her heirs, not by PCIB, and since the said heirs are not objecting, and the defects
pointed out not being strictly jurisdictional in nature, all things considered, particularly the unnecessary
disturbance of rights already created in favor of innocent third parties, it is best that the impugned orders are
not disturbed.
In view of these considerations, We do not find sufficient merit in the assignments of error under discussion.
Assignments of error V to VIII,
XVI to XVIII, XXVI to XXIX, XXXVII
to XXXVIII, XLIV to XLVI and LI.
All these assignments of error commonly deal with alleged non-fulfillment by the respective vendees,
appellees herein, of the terms and conditions embodied in the deeds of sale referred to in the assignments of
error just discussed. It is claimed that some of them never made full payments in accordance with the
respective contracts to sell, while in the cases of the others, like Lorenzo Carles, Jose Pablico, Alfredo Catedral
and Salvador S. Guzman, the contracts with them had already been unilaterally cancelled by PCIB pursuant to
automatic rescission clauses contained in them, in view of the failure of said buyers to pay arrearages long
overdue. But PCIB's posture is again premised on its assumption that the properties covered by the deeds in
question could not pertain to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. We have already held above that, it being evident that
a considerable portion of the conjugal properties, much more than the properties covered by said deeds, would
inevitably constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges, to avoid unnecessary legal complications, it can be assumed
that said properties form part of such estate. From this point of view, it is apparent again that the questions,
whether or not it was proper for appellee Magno to have disregarded the cancellations made by PCIB, thereby
reviving the rights of the respective buyers-appellees, and, whether or not the rules governing new dispositions
of properties of the estate were strictly followed, may not be raised by PCIB but only by the heirs of Mrs.
Hodges as the persons designated to inherit the same, or perhaps the government because of the still unpaid
inheritance taxes. But, again, since there is no pretense that any objections were raised by said parties or that
they would necessarily be prejudiced, the contentions of PCIB under the instant assignments of error hardly
merit any consideration.
Assignments of error IX to XII, XIX
to XXI, XXX to XXIV, XXXIX to XL,
XLVII to XLIX, LII and LIII to LXI.
PCIB raises under these assignments of error two issues which according to it are fundamental, namely: (1)
that in approving the deeds executed by Magno pursuant to contracts to sell already cancelled by it in the
performance of its functions as administrator of the estate of Hodges, the trial court deprived the said estate of
the right to invoke such cancellations it (PCIB) had made and (2) that in so acting, the court "arrogated unto
itself, while acting as a probate court, the power to determine the contending claims of third parties against the
estate of Hodges over real property," since it has in effect determined whether or not all the terms and
conditions of the respective contracts to sell executed by Hodges in favor of the buyers-appellees concerned
were complied with by the latter. What is worse, in the view of PCIB, is that the court has taken the word of
the appellee Magno, "a total stranger to his estate as determinative of the issue".

Actually, contrary to the stand of PCIB, it is this last point regarding appellee Magno's having agreed to ignore
the cancellations made by PCIB and allowed the buyers-appellees to consummate the sales in their favor that is
decisive. Since We have already held that the properties covered by the contracts in question should be deemed
to be portions of the estate of Mrs. Hodges and not that of Hodges, it is PCIB that is a complete stranger in
these incidents. Considering, therefore, that the estate of Mrs. Hodges and her heirs who are the real parties in
interest having the right to oppose the consummation of the impugned sales are not objecting, and that they are
the ones who are precisely urging that said sales be sanctioned, the assignments of error under discussion have
no basis and must accordingly be as they are hereby overruled.
With particular reference to assignments LIII to LXI, assailing the orders of the trial court requiring PCIB to
surrender the respective owner's duplicate certificates of title over the properties covered by the sales in
question and otherwise directing the Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel said certificates and to issue new
transfer certificates of title in favor of the buyers-appellees, suffice it to say that in the light of the above
discussion, the trial court was within its rights to so require and direct, PCIB having refused to give way, by
withholding said owners' duplicate certificates, of the corresponding registration of the transfers duly and
legally approved by the court.
Assignments of error LXII to LXVII
All these assignments of error commonly deal with the appeal against orders favoring appellee Western
Institute of Technology. As will be recalled, said institute is one of the buyers of real property covered by a
contract to sell executed by Hodges prior to the death of his wife. As of October, 1965, it was in arrears in the
total amount of P92,691.00 in the payment of its installments on account of its purchase, hence it received
under date of October 4, 1965 and October 20, 1965, letters of collection, separately and respectively, from
PCIB and appellee Magno, in their respective capacities as administrators of the distinct estates of the Hodges
spouses, albeit, while in the case of PCIB it made known that "no other arrangement can be accepted except by
paying all your past due account", on the other hand, Magno merely said she would "appreciate very much if
you can make some remittance to bring this account up-to-date and to reduce the amount of the obligation."
(See pp. 295-311, Green R. on A.) On November 3, 1965, the Institute filed a motion which, after alleging that
it was ready and willing to pay P20,000 on account of its overdue installments but uncertain whether it should
pay PCIB or Magno, it prayed that it be "allowed to deposit the aforesaid amount with the court pending
resolution of the conflicting claims of the administrators." Acting on this motion, on November 23, 1965, the
trial court issued an order, already quoted in the narration of facts in this opinion, holding that payment to both
or either of the two administrators is "proper and legal", and so "movant can pay to both estates or either of
them", considering that "in both cases (Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672) there is as yet no judicial
declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto."
The arguments under the instant assignments of error revolve around said order. From the procedural
standpoint, it is claimed that PCIB was not served with a copy of the Institute's motion, that said motion was
heard, considered and resolved on November 23, 1965, whereas the date set for its hearing was November 20,
1965, and that what the order grants is different from what is prayed for in the motion. As to the substantive
aspect, it is contended that the matter treated in the motion is beyond the jurisdiction of the probate court and
that the order authorized payment to a person other than the administrator of the estate of Hodges with whom
the Institute had contracted.
The procedural points urged by appellant deserve scant consideration. We must assume, absent any clear proof
to the contrary, that the lower court had acted regularly by seeing to it that appellant was duly notified. On the
other hand, there is nothing irregular in the court's having resolved the motion three days after the date set for
hearing the same. Moreover, the record reveals that appellants' motion for reconsideration wherein it raised the
same points was denied by the trial court on March 7, 1966 (p. 462, Green R. on A.) Withal, We are not
convinced that the relief granted is not within the general intent of the Institute's motion.

Insofar as the substantive issues are concerned, all that need be said at this point is that they are mere
reiterations of contentions We have already resolved above adversely to appellants' position. Incidentally, We
may add, perhaps, to erase all doubts as to the propriety of not disturbing the lower court's orders sanctioning
the sales questioned in all these appeal s by PCIB, that it is only when one of the parties to a contract to convey
property executed by a deceased person raises substantial objections to its being implemented by the executor
or administrator of the decedent's estate that Section 8 of Rule 89 may not apply and, consequently, the matter
has, to be taken up in a separate action outside of the probate court; but where, as in the cases of the sales
herein involved, the interested parties are in agreement that the conveyance be made, it is properly within the
jurisdiction of the probate court to give its sanction thereto pursuant to the provisions of the rule just
mentioned. And with respect to the supposed automatic rescission clauses contained in the contracts to sell
executed by Hodges in favor of herein appellees, the effect of said clauses depend on the true nature of the said
contracts, despite the nomenclature appearing therein, which is not controlling, for if they amount to actual
contracts of sale instead of being mere unilateral accepted "promises to sell", (Art. 1479, Civil Code of the
Philippines, 2nd paragraph) thepactum commissorium or the automatic rescission provision would not operate,
as a matter of public policy, unless there has been a previous notarial or judicial demand by the seller (10
Manresa 263, 2nd ed.) neither of which have been shown to have been made in connection with the
transactions herein involved.
Consequently, We find no merit in the assignments of error
Number LXII to LXVII.
SUMMARY
Considering the fact that this decision is unusually extensive and that the issues herein taken up and resolved
are rather numerous and varied, what with appellant making seventy-eight assignments of error affecting no
less than thirty separate orders of the court a quo, if only to facilitate proper understanding of the import and
extent of our rulings herein contained, it is perhaps desirable that a brief restatement of the whole situation be
made together with our conclusions in regard to its various factual and legal aspects. .
The instant cases refer to the estate left by the late Charles Newton Hodges as well as that of his wife, Linnie
Jane Hodges, who predeceased him by about five years and a half. In their respective wills which were
executed on different occasions, each one of them provided mutually as follows: "I give, devise and bequeath
all of the rest, residue and remainder (after funeral and administration expenses, taxes and debts) of my estate,
both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to my beloved (spouse) to have and to hold unto (him/her)
during (his/her) natural lifetime", subject to the condition that upon the death of whoever of them survived
the other, the remainder of what he or she would inherit from the other is "give(n), devise(d) and bequeath(ed)"
to the brothers and sisters of the latter.
Mrs. Hodges died first, on May 23, 1957. Four days later, on May 27, Hodges was appointed special
administrator of her estate, and in a separate order of the same date, he was "allowed or authorized to continue
the business in which he was engaged, (buying and selling personal and real properties) and to perform acts
which he had been doing while the deceased was living." Subsequently, on December 14, 1957, after Mrs.
Hodges' will had been probated and Hodges had been appointed and had qualified as Executor thereof, upon
his motion in which he asserted that he was "not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the
successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges", the trial court ordered that "for the
reasons stated in his motion dated December 11, 1957, which the Court considers well taken, ... all the sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the
Executor, Charles Newton Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said Executor is further authorized to execute
subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges in consonance with the wishes contained in the last will and testament of the latter."

Annually thereafter, Hodges submitted to the court the corresponding statements of account of his
administration, with the particularity that in all his motions, he always made it point to urge the that "no person
interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining the herein accounts be given notice as herein
executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased in accordance with the last will and testament already
probated by the Honorable Court." All said accounts approved as prayed for.
Nothing else appears to have been done either by the court a quo or Hodges until December 25, 1962.
Importantly to be the provision in the will of Mrs. Hodges that her share of the conjugal partnership was to be
inherited by her husband "to have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime" and that
"at the death of my said husband, I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate,
both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my brothers and sisters,
share and share alike", which provision naturally made it imperative that the conjugal partnership be promptly
liquidated, in order that the "rest, residue and remainder" of his wife's share thereof, as of the time of Hodges'
own death, may be readily known and identified, no such liquidation was ever undertaken. The record gives no
indication of the reason for such omission, although relatedly, it appears therein:
1. That in his annual statement submitted to the court of the net worth of C. N. Hodges and
the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, Hodges repeatedly and consistently reported the combined
income of the conjugal partnership and then merely divided the same equally between himself
and the estate of the deceased wife, and, more importantly, he also, as consistently, filed
corresponding separate income tax returns for each calendar year for each resulting half of
such combined income, thus reporting that the estate of Mrs. Hodges had its own income
distinct from his own.
2. That when the court a quo happened to inadvertently omit in its order probating the will of
Mrs. Hodges, the name of one of her brothers, Roy Higdon then already deceased, Hodges
lost no time in asking for the proper correction "in order that the heirs of deceased Roy
Higdon may not think or believe they were omitted, and that they were really interested in the
estate of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges".
3. That in his aforementioned motion of December 11, 1957, he expressly stated that
"deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no descendants or ascendants except brothers and
sisters and herein petitioner as the surviving spouse, to inherit the properties of the decedent",
thereby indicating that he was not excluding his wife's brothers and sisters from the
inheritance.
4. That Hodges allegedly made statements and manifestations to the United States inheritance
tax authorities indicating that he had renounced his inheritance from his wife in favor of her
other heirs, which attitude he is supposed to have reiterated or ratified in an alleged affidavit
subscribed and sworn to here in the Philippines and in which he even purportedly stated that
his reason for so disclaiming and renouncing his rights under his wife's will was to "absolve
(him) or (his) estate from any liability for the payment of income taxes on income which has
accrued to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges", his wife, since her death.
On said date, December 25, 1962, Hodges died. The very next day, upon motion of herein respondent and
appellee, Avelina A. Magno, she was appointed by the trial court as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges, in Special Proceedings No. 1307 and as Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles
Newton Hodges, "in the latter case, because the last will of said Charles Newton Hodges is still kept in his
vault or iron safe and that the real and personal properties of both spouses may be lost, damaged or go to
waste, unless Special Administratrix is appointed," (Order of December 26, 1962, p. 27, Yellow R. on A.)
although, soon enough, on December 29, 1962, a certain Harold K. Davies was appointed as her Co-Special
Administrator, and when Special Proceedings No. 1672, Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, was

opened, Joe Hodges, as next of kin of the deceased, was in due time appointed as Co-Administrator of said
estate together with Atty. Fernando P. Mirasol, to replace Magno and Davies, only to be in turn replaced
eventually by petitioner PCIB alone.
At the outset, the two probate proceedings appear to have been proceeding jointly, with each administrator
acting together with the other, under a sort of modus operandi. PCIB used to secure at the beginning the
conformity to and signature of Magno in transactions it wanted to enter into and submitted the same to the
court for approval as their joint acts. So did Magno do likewise. Somehow, however, differences seem to have
arisen, for which reason, each of them began acting later on separately and independently of each other, with
apparent sanction of the trial court. Thus, PCIB had its own lawyers whom it contracted and paid handsomely,
conducted the business of the estate independently of Magno and otherwise acted as if all the properties
appearing in the name of Charles Newton Hodges belonged solely and only to his estate, to the exclusion of
the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, without considering whether or not in fact any of said properties
corresponded to the portion of the conjugal partnership pertaining to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. On the other
hand, Magno made her own expenditures, hired her own lawyers, on the premise that there is such an estate of
Mrs. Hodges, and dealth with some of the properties, appearing in the name of Hodges, on the assumption that
they actually correspond to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. All of these independent and separate actuations of the
two administrators were invariably approved by the trial court upon submission. Eventually, the differences
reached a point wherein Magno, who was more cognizant than anyone else about the ins and outs of the
businesses and properties of the deceased spouses because of her long and intimate association with them,
made it difficult for PCIB to perform normally its functions as administrator separately from her. Thus, legal
complications arose and the present judicial controversies came about.
Predicating its position on the tenor of the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957 as well as the approval by
the court a quo of the annual statements of account of Hodges, PCIB holds to the view that the estate of Mrs.
Hodges has already been in effect closed with the virtual adjudication in the mentioned orders of her whole
estate to Hodges, and that, therefore, Magno had already ceased since then to have any estate to administer and
the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges have no interests whatsoever in the estate left by Hodges. Mainly upon
such theory, PCIB has come to this Court with a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that the lower
court's orders allowing respondent Magno to continue acting as administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges in
Special Proceedings 1307 in the manner she has been doing, as detailed earlier above, be set aside.
Additionally, PCIB maintains that the provision in Mrs. Hodges' will instituting her brothers and sisters in the
manner therein specified is in the nature of a testamentary substitution, but inasmuch as the purported
substitution is not, in its view, in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, it is ineffective
and may not be enforced. It is further contended that, in any event, inasmuch as the Hodges spouses were both
residents of the Philippines, following the decision of this Court in Aznar vs. Garcia, or the case of
Christensen, 7 SCRA 95, the estate left by Mrs. Hodges could not be more than one-half of her share of the
conjugal partnership, notwithstanding the fact that she was citizen of Texas, U.S.A., in accordance with Article
16 in relation to Articles 900 and 872 of the Civil Code. Initially, We issued a preliminary injunction against
Magno and allowed PCIB to act alone.
At the same time PCIB has appealed several separate orders of the trial court approving individual acts of
appellee Magno in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, such as, hiring of lawyers for
specified fees and incurring expenses of administration for different purposes and executing deeds of sale in
favor of her co-appellees covering properties which are still registered in the name of Hodges, purportedly
pursuant to corresponding "contracts to sell" executed by Hodges. The said orders are being questioned on
jurisdictional and procedural grounds directly or indirectly predicated on the principal theory of appellant that
all the properties of the two estates belong already to the estate of Hodges exclusively.
On the other hand, respondent-appellee Magno denies that the trial court's orders of May 27 and December 14,
1957 were meant to be finally adjudicatory of the hereditary rights of Hodges and contends that they were no
more than the court's general sanction of past and future acts of Hodges as executor of the will of his wife in

due course of administration. As to the point regarding substitution, her position is that what was given by Mrs.
Hodges to her husband under the provision in question was a lifetime usufruct of her share of the conjugal
partnership, with the naked ownership passing directly to her brothers and sisters. Anent the application of
Article 16 of the Civil Code, she claims that the applicable law to the will of Mrs. Hodges is that of Texas
under which, she alleges, there is no system of legitime, hence, the estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be less than
her share or one-half of the conjugal partnership properties. She further maintains that, in any event, Hodges
had as a matter of fact and of law renounced his inheritance from his wife and, therefore, her whole estate
passed directly to her brothers and sisters effective at the latest upon the death of Hodges.
In this decision, for the reasons discussed above, and upon the issues just summarized, We overrule PCIB's
contention that the orders of May 27, 1957 and December 14, 1957 amount to an adjudication to Hodges of the
estate of his wife, and We recognize the present existence of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, as consisting of
properties, which, while registered in that name of Hodges, do actually correspond to the remainder of the
share of Mrs. Hodges in the conjugal partnership, it appearing that pursuant to the pertinent provisions of her
will, any portion of said share still existing and undisposed of by her husband at the time of his death should go
to her brothers and sisters share and share alike. Factually, We find that the proven circumstances relevant to
the said orders do not warrant the conclusion that the court intended to make thereby such alleged final
adjudication. Legally, We hold that the tenor of said orders furnish no basis for such a conclusion, and what is
more, at the time said orders were issued, the proceedings had not yet reached the point when a final
distribution and adjudication could be made. Moreover, the interested parties were not duly notified that such
disposition of the estate would be done. At best, therefore, said orders merely allowed Hodges to dispose of
portions of his inheritance in advance of final adjudication, which is implicitly permitted under Section 2 of
Rule 109, there being no possible prejudice to third parties, inasmuch as Mrs. Hodges had no creditors and all
pertinent taxes have been paid.
More specifically, We hold that, on the basis of circumstances presently extant in the record, and on the
assumption that Hodges' purported renunciation should not be upheld, the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by
her brothers and sisters consists of one-fourth of the community estate of the spouses at the time of her death,
minus whatever Hodges had gratuitously disposed of therefrom during the period from, May 23, 1957, when
she died, to December 25, 1962, when he died provided, that with regard to remunerative dispositions made by
him during the same period, the proceeds thereof, whether in cash or property, should be deemed as continuing
to be part of his wife's estate, unless it can be shown that he had subsequently disposed of them gratuitously.
At this juncture, it may be reiterated that the question of what are the pertinent laws of Texas and what would
be the estate of Mrs. Hodges under them is basically one of fact, and considering the respective positions of the
parties in regard to said factual issue, it can already be deemed as settled for the purposes of these cases that,
indeed, the free portion of said estate that could possibly descend to her brothers and sisters by virtue of her
will may not be less than one-fourth of the conjugal estate, it appearing that the difference in the stands of the
parties has reference solely to the legitime of Hodges, PCIB being of the view that under the laws of Texas,
there is such a legitime of one-fourth of said conjugal estate and Magno contending, on the other hand, that
there is none. In other words, hereafter, whatever might ultimately appear, at the subsequent proceedings, to be
actually the laws of Texas on the matter would no longer be of any consequence, since PCIB would anyway be
in estoppel already to claim that the estate of Mrs. Hodges should be less than as contended by it now, for
admissions by a party related to the effects of foreign laws, which have to be proven in our courts like any
other controverted fact, create estoppel.
In the process, We overrule PCIB's contention that the provision in Mrs. Hodges' will in favor of her brothers
and sisters constitutes ineffective hereditary substitutions. But neither are We sustaining, on the other hand,
Magno's pose that it gave Hodges only a lifetime usufruct. We hold that by said provision, Mrs. Hodges
simultaneously instituted her brothers and sisters as co-heirs with her husband, with the condition, however,
that the latter would have complete rights of dominion over the whole estate during his lifetime and what
would go to the former would be only the remainder thereof at the time of Hodges' death. In other words,

whereas they are not to inherit only in case of default of Hodges, on the other hand, Hodges was not obliged to
preserve anything for them. Clearly then, the essential elements of testamentary substitution are absent; the
provision in question is a simple case of conditional simultaneous institution of heirs, whereby the institution
of Hodges is subject to a partial resolutory condition the operative contingency of which is coincidental with
that of the suspensive condition of the institution of his brothers and sisters-in-law, which manner of institution
is not prohibited by law.
We also hold, however, that the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and sisters could be more than
just stated, but this would depend on (1) whether upon the proper application of the principle of renvoi in
relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, it will appear that Hodges had no
legitime as contended by Magno, and (2) whether or not it can be held that Hodges had legally and effectively
renounced his inheritance from his wife. Under the circumstances presently obtaining and in the state of the
record of these cases, as of now, the Court is not in a position to make a final ruling, whether of fact or of law,
on any of these two issues, and We, therefore, reserve said issues for further proceedings and resolution in the
first instance by the court a quo, as hereinabove indicated. We reiterate, however, that pending such further
proceedings, as matters stand at this stage, Our considered opinion is that it is beyond cavil that since, under
the terms of the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband could not have anyway legally adjudicated or caused to be
adjudicated to himself her whole share of their conjugal partnership, albeit he could have disposed any part
thereof during his lifetime, the resulting estate of Mrs. Hodges, of which Magno is the uncontested
administratrix, cannot be less than one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, as of the time of her
death, minus what, as explained earlier, have beengratuitously disposed of therefrom, by Hodges in favor of
third persons since then, for even if it were assumed that, as contended by PCIB, under Article 16 of the Civil
Code and applying renvoi the laws of the Philippines are the ones ultimately applicable, such one-fourth share
would be her free disposable portion, taking into account already the legitime of her husband under Article 900
of the Civil Code.
The foregoing considerations leave the Court with no alternative than to conclude that in predicating its orders
on the assumption, albeit unexpressed therein, that there is an estate of Mrs. Hodges to be distributed among
her brothers and sisters and that respondent Magno is the legal administratrix thereof, the trial court acted
correctly and within its jurisdiction. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari and prohibition has to be denied.
The Court feels however, that pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership and the determination of the
specific properties constituting her estate, the two administrators should act conjointly as ordered in the Court's
resolution of September 8, 1972 and as further clarified in the dispositive portion of its decision.
Anent the appeals from the orders of the lower court sanctioning payment by appellee Magno, as
administratrix, of expenses of administration and attorney's fees, it is obvious that, with Our holding that there
is such an estate of Mrs. Hodges, and for the reasons stated in the body of this opinion, the said orders should
be affirmed. This We do on the assumption We find justified by the evidence of record, and seemingly agreed
to by appellant PCIB, that the size and value of the properties that should correspond to the estate of Mrs.
Hodges far exceed the total of the attorney's fees and administration expenses in question.
With respect to the appeals from the orders approving transactions made by appellee Magno, as administratrix,
covering properties registered in the name of Hodges, the details of which are related earlier above, a
distinction must be made between those predicated on contracts to sell executed by Hodges before the death of
his wife, on the one hand, and those premised on contracts to sell entered into by him after her death. As
regards the latter, We hold that inasmuch as the payments made by appellees constitute proceeds of sales of
properties belonging to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, as may be implied from the tenor of the motions of May 27
and December 14, 1957, said payments continue to pertain to said estate, pursuant to her intent obviously
reflected in the relevant provisions of her will, on the assumption that the size and value of the properties to
correspond to the estate of Mrs. Hodges would exceed the total value of all the properties covered by the
impugned deeds of sale, for which reason, said properties may be deemed as pertaining to the estate of Mrs.
Hodges. And there being no showing that thus viewing the situation, there would be prejudice to anyone,

including the government, the Court also holds that, disregarding procedural technicalities in favor of a
pragmatic and practical approach as discussed above, the assailed orders should be affirmed. Being a stranger
to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, PCIB has no personality to raise the procedural and jurisdictional issues raised by
it. And inasmuch as it does not appear that any of the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges or the government has
objected to any of the orders under appeal, even as to these parties, there exists no reason for said orders to be
set aside.
DISPOSITIVE PART
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the petition in
G. R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896, and AFFIRMING, in G. R. Nos. L-27936-37 and the other thirty-one
numbers hereunder ordered to be added after payment of the corresponding docket fees, all the orders of the
trial court under appeal enumerated in detail on pages 35 to 37 and 80 to 82 of this decision; the existence of
the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, with respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix
thereof is recognized, and it is declared that, until final judgment is ultimately rendered regarding (1) the
manner of applying Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines to the situation obtaining in these cases and
(2) the factual and legal issue of whether or not Charles Newton Hodges had effectively and legally renounced
his inheritance under the will of Linnie Jane Hodges, the said estate consists of one-fourth of the community
properties of the said spouses, as of the time of the death of the wife on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the
husband had already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from said date until his death, provided,
first, that with respect to remunerative dispositions, the proceeds thereof shall continue to be part of the wife's
estate, unless subsequently disposed of gratuitously to third parties by the husband, and second, that should the
purported renunciation be declared legally effective, no deductions whatsoever are to be made from said estate;
in consequence, the preliminary injunction of August 8, 1967, as amended on October 4 and December 6,
1967, is lifted, and the resolution of September 8, 1972, directing that petitioner-appellant PCIB, as
Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in Special Proceedings 1672, and respondentappellee Avelina A. Magno, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, in Special
Proceedings 1307, should act thenceforth always conjointly, never independently from each other, as such
administrators, is reiterated, and the same is made part of this judgment and shall continue in force, pending
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of the deceased spouses and the determination and segregation from
each other of their respective estates, provided, that upon the finality of this judgment, the trial court should
immediately proceed to the partition of the presently combined estates of the spouses, to the end that the onehalf share thereof of Mrs. Hodges may be properly and clearly identified; thereafter, the trial court should
forthwith segregate the remainder of the one-fourth herein adjudged to be her estate and cause the same to be
turned over or delivered to respondent for her exclusive administration in Special Proceedings 1307, while the
other one-fourth shall remain under the joint administration of said respondent and petitioner under a joint
proceedings in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672, whereas the half unquestionably pertaining to Hodges shall
be administered by petitioner exclusively in Special Proceedings 1672, without prejudice to the resolution by
the trial court of the pending motions for its removal as administrator12; and this arrangement shall be maintained
until the final resolution of the two issues of renvoi and renunciation hereby reserved for further hearing and
determination, and the corresponding complete segregation and partition of the two estates in the proportions that
may result from the said resolution.
Generally and in all other respects, the parties and the court a quo are directed to adhere henceforth, in all their
actuations in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672, to the views passed and ruled upon by the Court in the
foregoing opinion.
Appellant PCIB is ordered to pay, within five (5) days from notice hereof, thirty-one additional appeal docket
fees, but this decision shall nevertheless become final as to each of the parties herein after fifteen (15) days
from the respective notices to them hereof in accordance with the rules.
Costs against petitioner-appellant PCIB.

Zaldivar, Castro, Esguerra and Fernandez, JJ., concur.

Makasiar, Antonio, Muoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur in the result.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

I concur on the basis of the procedural pronouncements in the opinion.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur in the result of dismissal of the petition for certiorari and prohibition in Cases L-27860 and L-27896
and with the affirmance of the appealed orders of the probate court in Cases L-27936-37.
I also concur with the portion of the dispositive part of the judgment penned by Mr. Justice Barredo decreeing
thelifting of the Court's writ of preliminary injunction of August 8, 1967 as amended on October 4, and
December 6, 1967 1 and ordering in lieu thereof that the Court's resolution of September 8, 1972 2 which directed
that petitioner-appellantPCIB as administrator of C. N. (Charles Newton) Hodges' estate (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 and
respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno as administratrix of Linnie Jane Hodges' estate (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) should
act always conjointly never independently from each other, as such administrators, is reiterated and shall continue in
force and made part of the judgment.
It is manifest from the record that petitioner-appellant PCIB's primal contention in the cases at bar
belatedly filedby it with this Court on August 1, 1967 (over ten (10) years after Linnie Jane Hodges' death
on May 23, 1957 and (over five (5) years after her husband C.N. Hodges' death on December 25, 1962
during which time both estates have been pending settlement and distribution to the decedents' respective
rightful heirs all this time up to now) that the probate court per its order of December 14, 1957
(supplementing an earlier order of May 25, 1957) 3 in granting C. N. Hodges' motion as Executor of his wife
Linnie's estate to continue their "business of buying and selling personal and real properties" and approving "all
sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages" made and to be made by him as such executor under his obligation to
submit his yearly accounts in effect declared him as sole heir of his wife's estate and nothing remains to be done
except to formally close her estate (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) as her estate was thereby merged with his own so
that nothing remains of it that may be adjudicated to her brothers and sisters as her designated heirs after him, 4 is
wholly untenable and deserves scant consideration.
Aside from having been put forth as an obvious afterthought much too late in the day, this contention of PCIB
that there no longer exists any separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges after the probate court's order of
December 14, 1957 goes against the very acts and judicial admissions of C.N. Hodges as her executor whereby
he consistently recognized the separate existence and identity of his wife's estate apart from his own separate
estate and from his own share of their conjugal partnership and estate and "never considered the whole estate
as a single one belonging exclusively to himself" during the entire period that he survived her for over five (5)
years up to the time of his own death on December 25, 1962 5 and against the identical acts and

judicial admissions of PCIB as administrator of C.N. Hodges' estate until PCIB sought in 1966 to take
over both estates as pertaining to its sole administration.

PCIB is now barred and estopped from contradicting or taking a belated position contradictory to or
inconsistent with its previous admissions 6 (as well as those of C.N. Hodges himself in his lifetime and of
whose estate PCIB is merely an administrator) recognizing the existence and identity of Linnie Jane
Hodges' separate estate and the legal rights and interests therein of her brothers and sisters as her designated
heirs in her will.
PCIB's petition for certiorari and prohibition to declare all acts of the probate court in Linnie Jane Hodges'
estate subsequent to its order of December 14, 1957 as "null and void for having been issued without
jurisdiction" must therefore be dismissed with the rejection of its belated and untenable contention that there is
no longer any estate of Mrs. Hodges of which respondent Avelina Magno is the duly appointed and acting
administratrix.
PCIB's appeal 7 from the probate court's various orders recognizing respondent Magno as administratrix of Linnie's
estate (Sp. Proc No. 1307) and sanctioning her acts of administration of said estate and approving the sales contracts
executed by her with the various individual appellees, which involve basically the same primal issue raised in the
petition as to whether there still exists a separate estate of Linnie of which respondent-appellee Magno may continue
to be the administratrix, must necessarily fail a result of the Court's main opinion at bar that there does exist such
an estate and that the twoestates (husband's and wife's) must be administered cojointly by their respective
administrators (PCIB and Magno).
The dispositive portion of the main opinion
The main opinion disposes that:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES, judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING the petition in G. R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896, and AFFIRMING, in G. R.
Nos. L-27936-37 and the other thirty-one numbers hereunder ordered to be added after
payment of the corresponding docket fees, all the orders of the trial court under appeal
enumerated in detail on pages 35 to 37 and 80 to 82 of this decision:
The existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, with respondent-appellee Avelina
A. Magno, as administratrix thereof is recognized, and
It is declared that, until final judgment is ultimately rendered regarding (1) the manner of
applying Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines to the situation obtaining in these
cases and (2) the factual and legal issues of whether or not Charles Newton Hodges has
effectively and legally renounced his inheritance under the will of Linnie Jane Hodges, the
said estate consists of one-fourthof the community properties of the said spouses, as of the
time of the death of the wife on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had
already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from said date until his death,
provided, first, that with respect to remunerative dispositions, the proceeds thereof shall
continue to be part of the wife's estate, unless subsequently disposed ofgratuitously to third
parties by the husband, and second, that should the purported renunciation be declared legally
effective, no deduction whatsoever are to be made from said estate;
In consequence, the preliminary injunction of August 8, 1967, as amended on October 4 and
December 6, 1967, is lifted and the resolution of September 8, 1972, directing that petitionerappellant PCIB, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges in Special
Proceedings 1672, and respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, as Administratrix of the

Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges in Special Proceedings 1307, should act thenceforth
always conjointly, never independently from each other, as such administrators, is reiterated,
and the same is made part of this judgment and shall continue in
force, pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of the deceased spouses and
the determination and segregation from each other of their respective estates; provided, that
upon the finality of this judgment, the trial court should immediately proceed to
the partition of the presently combined estates of the spouses, to the end that the onehalf share thereof of Mrs. Hodges may be properly and clearly identified;
Thereafter, the trial court should forthwith segregate the remainder of the one-fourth herein
adjudged to be her estate and cause the same to be turned over or delivered to respondent for
her exclusive administration in Special Proceedings 1307, while the other one-fourth shall
remain under the joint administrative of said respondent and petitioner under a joint
proceedings in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672, whereas the half unquestionably
pertaining to Hodges shall be administered bypetitioner exclusively in Special Proceedings
1672, without prejudice to the resolution by the trial court of the pending motions for its
removal as administrator;
And this arrangement shall be maintained until the final resolution of the two issues
of renvoi andrenunciation hereby reserved for further hearing and determination, and the
corresponding completesegregation and partition of the two estates in the proportions that
may result from the said resolution.
Generally and in all other respects, the parties and the court a quo are directed to adhere
henceforth, in all their actuations in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672, to the views passed
and ruled upon by the Court in the foregoing opinion. 8
Minimum estimate of Mrs. Hodges' estate:
One-fourth of conjugal properties.
The main opinion in declaring the existence of a separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges which shall pass to her
brothers and sisters with right of representation (by their heirs) as her duly designated heirs declares that her
estate consists as a minimum (i.e. assuming (1) that under Article 16 of the Philippine Civil Code C. N. Hodges
as surviving husband was entitled to one-half of her estate as legitime and (2) that he had not effectively and
legallyrenounced his inheritance under her will) of "one-fourth of the community properties of the said
spouses, as of the time of the death of the wife on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had
already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from said date until his death," with the proviso that
proceeds of remunerativedispositions or sales for valuable consideration made by C. N. Hodges after his wife
Linnie's death shall continue to be part of her estate unless subsequently disposed of by him gratuitously to
third parties subject to the condition, however, that if he is held to have validly and effectively renounced his
inheritance under his wife's will,no deductions of any dispositions made by Hodges even if gratuitously are to
be made from his wife Linnie's estate which shall pass intact to her brothers and sisters as her designated heirs
called in her will to succeed to her estate upon the death of her husband C. N. Hodges.
Differences with the main opinion
I do not share the main opinion's view that Linnie Jane Hodges instituted her husband as her heir under her will
"to have dominion over all her estate during his lifetime ... as absolute owner of the properties ..." 9 and that she
bequeathed "the whole of her estate to be owned and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with absolute
dominion over them only during his lifetime, which means that while he could completely and absolutely dispose of
any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he was not free to do so mortis causa, and all his rights
to what might remain upon his death would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency, inasmuch as the

right of his brothers and sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges,
would automatically become operative upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of actual existence
of any remainder of her estate then." 10

As will be amplified hereinafter, I do not subscribe to such a view that Linnie Jane Hodges willed "full and
absolute ownership" and "absolute dominion" over her estate to her husband, but rather that she named her
husband C. N. Hodges and her brothers and sisters as instituted heirs with a term under Article 885 of our Civil
Code, to wit, Hodges as instituted heir with a resolutory term whereunder his right to the succession ceased
in diem upon arrival of the resolutory term of his death on December 25, 1962 and her brothers and sisters as
instituted heirs with a suspensive term whereunder their right to the succession commenced ex die upon arrival
of the suspensive term of the death of C. N. Hodges on December 25, 1962.
Hence, while agreeing with the main opinion that the proceeds of all remunerative dispositions made by C. N.
Hodges after his wife's death remain an integral part of his wife's estate which she willed to her brothers and
sisters, I submit that C. N. Hodges could not validly make gratuitous dispositions of any part or all of his
wife's estate "completely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than
himself" in the language of the main opinion, supra and thereby render ineffectual and nugatory her
institution of her brothers and sisters as her designated heirs to succeed to her whole estate "at the death of
(her) husband." If according to the main opinion, Hodges could not make such gratuitous "complete and
absolute dispositions" of his wife Linnie's estate "mortis causa," it would seem that by the same token and
rationale he was likewise proscribed by the will from making such dispositions of Linnie's estate inter vivos.
I believe that the two questions of renvoi and renunciation should be
resolved preferentially and expeditiously by the probate court ahead of the partition and segregation of
the minimum one-fourth of the conjugal or community properties constituting Linnie Jane
Hodges' separate estate, which task considering that it is now seventeen (17) years since Linnie Jane Hodges'
death and her conjugal estate with C. N. Hodges has remained unliquidated up to now might take a similar
number of years to unravel with the numerous items, transactions and details of the sizable estates involved.
Such partition of the minimum one-fourth would not be final, since if the two prejudicial questions
of renvoi andrenunciation were resolved favorably to Linnie's estate meaning to say that if it should be held
that C. N. Hodges is not entitled to any legitime of her estate and at any rate he had totally renounced his
inheritance under the will), then Linnie's estate would consist not only of the minimum one-fourth but onehalf of the conjugal or community properties of the Hodges spouses, which would require again the partition
and segregation of still another one-fourth of said. properties to complete Linnie's separate estate.
My differences with the main opinion involve further the legal concepts, effects and consequences of the
testamentary dispositions of Linnie Jane Hodges in her will and the question of the best to reach a solution of
the pressing question of expediting the closing of the estates which after all do not appear to involve any
outstanding debts nor any dispute between the heirs and should therefore be promptly settled now after all
these years without any further undue complications and delays and distributed to the heirs for their full
enjoyment and benefit. As no consensus appears to have been reached thereon by a majority of the Court, I
propose to state views as concisely as possible with the sole end in view that they may be of some assistance to
the probate court and the parties in reaching an expeditious closing and settlement of the estates of the Hodges
spouses.
Two Assumptions
As indicated above, the declaration of the minimum of Mrs. Hodges' estate as one-fourth of the conjugal
properties is based on two assumptions most favorable to C. N. Hodges' estate and his heirs, namely (1) that
the probate court must accept the renvoi or "reference back" 11 allegedly provided by the laws of the State of
Texas (of which state the Hodges spouses were citizens) whereby the civil laws of the Philippines as the domicile of

the Hodges spouses would govern their succession notwithstanding the provisions of Article 16 of our Civil Code
(which provides that the national law of the decedents, in this case, of Texas, shall govern their succession) with the
result that her estate would consist of no more than one-fourth of the conjugal properties since the legitime of her
husband (the other one-fourth of said conjugal properties or one-half of her estate, under Article 900 of our Civil
Code) could not then be disposed of nor burdened with any condition by her and (2) that C.N. Hodges
had not effectively and legally renounced his inheritance under his wife's will.

These two assumptions are of course flatly disputed by respondent-appellee Magno as Mrs. Hodges'
administratrix, who avers that the law of the State of Texas governs her succession and does not provide for
and legitime, hence, her brothers and sisters are entitled to succeed to the whole of her share of the conjugal
properties which is one-half thereof and that in any event, Hodges had totally renounced all his rights under the
will.
The main opinion concedes that "(I)n the interest of settling the estates herein involved soonest, it would be
best, indeed, if these conflicting claims of the parties were determined in these proceedings." It observes
however that this cannot be done due to the inadequacy of the evidence submitted by the parties in the probate
court and of the parties' discussion, viz, "there is no clear and reliable proof of what the possibly applicable
laws of Texas are. Then also, the genuineness of the documents relied upon by respondent Magno [re Hodges'
renunciation] is disputed." 12
Hence, the main opinion expressly reserves resolution and determination on these two conflicting claims and
issues which it deems "are not properly before the Court
now," 13 and specifically holds that "(A)ccordingly, the only question that remains to be settled in the further
proceedings hereby ordered to be held in the court below is how much more than as fixed above is the estate of Mrs.
Hodges, and this would depend on (1) whether or not the applicable laws of Texas do provide in effect for more,
such as, when there is nolegitime provided therein, and (2) whether or not Hodges has validly waived his whole
inheritance from Mrs. Hodges." 14
Suggested guidelines
Considering that the only unresolved issue has thus been narrowed down and in consonance with the ruling
spirit of our probate law calling for the prompt settlement of the estates of deceased persons for the benefit of
creditors and those entitled to the residue by way of inheritance considering that the estates have been long
pending settlement since 1957 and 1962, respectively it was felt that the Court should lay down specific
guidelines for the guidance of the probate court towards the end that it may expedite the closing of the
protracted estates proceedings below to the mutual satisfaction of the heirs and without need of a dissatisfied
party elevating its resolution of this only remaining issue once more to this Court and dragging out indefinitely
the proceedings.
After all, the only question that remains depends for its determination on the resolution of the two questions
ofrenvoi and renunciation, i.e. as to whether C. N. Hodges can claim a legitime and whether he
had renounced the inheritance. But as already indicated above, the Court without reaching a consensus which
would finally resolve the conflicting claims here and now in this case opted that "these and other relevant
matters should first be threshed out fully in the trial court in the proceedings hereinafter to be held for the
purpose of ascertaining and/or distributing the estate of Mrs. Hodges to her heirs in accordance with her duly
probated will." 15
The writer thus feels that laying down the premises and principles governing the nature, effects and
consequences of Linnie Jane Hodges' testamentary dispositions in relation to her conjugal partnership and coownership of properties with her husband C. N. Hodges and "thinking out" the end results, depending on
whether the evidence directed to be formally received by the probate court would bear out that under renvoi C.
N. Hodges was or was not entitled to claim a legitime of one-half of his wife Linnie's estate and/or that he had

or had not effectively and validly renounced his inheritance should help clear the decks, as it were, and assist
the probate court in resolving the only remaining question of how much more than the minimum one-fourth of
the community properties of the Hodges spouses herein finally determined should be awarded as the separate
estate of Linnie, particularly since the views expressed in the main opinion have not gained a consensus of the
Court. Hence, the following suggested guidelines, which needless to state, represent the personal opinion and
views of the writer:
1. To begin with, as pointed out in the main opinion, "according to Hodges' own inventory submitted by him as
executor of the estate of his wife, practically all their properties were conjugal which means that the spouses
haveequal shares therein." 16
2. Upon the death of Mrs. Hodges on May 23, 1957, and the dissolution thereby of the marriage, the law
imposed upon Hodges as surviving husband the duty of inventorying, administering and liquidating the
conjugal or community property. 17 Hodges failed to discharge this duty of liquidating the conjugal partnership and
estate. On the contrary, he sought and obtained authorization from the probate court
to continue the conjugal partnership's business of buying and selling real and personal properties.
In his annual accounts submitted to the probate court as executor of Mrs. Hodges' estate, Hodges
thusconsistently reported the considerable combined income (in six figures) of the conjugal partnership or
coownership and then divided the same equally between himself and Mrs. Hodges' estate and as consistently
filed separate income tax returns and paid the income taxes for each resulting half of such combined income
corresponding to his own and to Mrs. Hodges' estate. 18 (Parenthetically, he could not in law do this, had he
adjudicated Linnie's entire estate to himself, thus supporting the view advanced even in the main opinion that
"Hodges waived not only his rights to the fruits but to the properties themselves." 19
By operation of the law of trust 20 as well as by his own acknowledgment and acts, therefore, all transactions made
by Hodges after his wife's death were deemed for and on behalf of their unliquidated conjugal partnership
and community estate and were so reported and treated by him.
3. With this premise established that all transactions of Hodges after his wife's death were for and on behalf of
their unliquidated conjugal partnership and community estate, share and share alike, it should be clear that
nogratuitous dispositions, if any, made by C. N. Hodges from his wife Linnie's estate should be deducted from
herseparate estate as held in the main opinion. On the contrary, any such gratuitous dispositions should be
charged to his own share of the conjugal estate since he had no authority or right to make
any gratuitous dispositions of Linnie's properties to the prejudice of her brothers and sisters whom she called
to her succession upon his death, not to mention that the very authority obtained by him from the probate court
per its orders of May 25, and December 14, 1957 was to continue the conjugal partnership's business of buying
and selling real properties for the account of their unliquidated conjugal estate and co-ownership, share and
share alike and not to make anyfree dispositions of Linnie's estate.
4. All transactions as well after the death on December 25, 1962 of Hodges himself appear perforce and
necessarily to have been conducted, on the same premise, for and on behalf of their unliquidated conjugal
partnership and/or co-ownership, share and share alike since the conjugal partnership remained
unliquidated which is another way of saying that such transactions, purchases and sales, mostly the latter,
must be deemed in effect to have been made for the respective estates of C. N. Hodges and of his wife Linnie
Jane Hodges, as both estates continued to have an equal stake and share in the conjugal partnership which was
not only leftunliquidated but continued as a co-ownership or joint business with the probate court's approval by
Hodges during the five-year period that he survived his wife.
This explains the probate court's action of requiring that deeds of sale executed by PCIB as Hodges' estate's
administrator be "signed jointly" by respondent Magno as Mrs. Hodges' estate's administratrix, as well as its

order authorizing payment by lot purchasers from the Hodges to either estate, since "there is as yet no judicial
declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto." 22
And this equally furnishes the rationale of the main opinion for continued conjoint administration by the
administrators of the two estates of the deceased spouses, "pending the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership,"23 since "it is but logical that both estates should be administered jointly by the representatives of both,
pending their segregation from each other. Particularly ... because the actuations so far of PCIB evince a determined,
albeit groundless, intent to exclude the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges from their inheritance." 24 5. Antly by the
representatives of both, pending their segregation from each other. Particularly ... because the actuations so far of
PCIB evince a determined, albeit groundless, intent to exclude the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges from their
inheritance." 24
5. As stressed in the main opinion, the determination of the only unresolved issue of how much more than the
minimum of one-fourth of the community or conjugal properties of the Hodges spouses pertains to Mrs.
Hodges' estate depends on the twin questions of renunciation and renvoi. It directed consequently that "a joint
hearing of the two probate proceedings herein involved" be held by the probate court for the reception of
"further evidence" in order to finally resolved these twin questions. 25
(a) On the question of renunciation, it is believed that all that the probate court has to do is to receive formally
in evidence the various documents annexed to respondent Magno's answer at bar, 26 namely: Copy of the U.S.
Estate Tax Return filed on August 8, 1958 by C. N. Hodges for his wife Linnie's estate wherein he purportedly
declared that he wasrenouncing his inheritance under his wife's will in favor of her brothers and sisters as co-heirs
designated with him and that it was his "intention (as) surviving husband of the deceased to distribute the remaining
property and interests of the deceased in their community estate to the devisee and legatees named in the will when
the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration are finally determined and paid;" 27 and
The affidavit of ratification of such renunciation (which places him in estoppel) allegedly executed on August
9, 1962 by C. N. Hodges in Iloilo City wherein he reaffirmed that "... on August 8, 1958, I renounced and
disclaimed any and all right to receive the rents, emoluments and income from said estate" and further declared
that "(T)he purpose of this affidavit is to ratify and confirm, and I do hereby ratify and confirm, the declaration
made in schedule M of said return and hereby formally disclaim and renounce any right on my part to receive
any of the said rents, emoluments and income from the estate of my deceased wife, Linnie Jane Hodges. This
affidavit is made to absolve me or my estate from any liability for the payment of income taxes on income
which has accrued to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges since the death of the said Linnie Jane Hodges on May
23, 1957." 28
(b) On the question of renvoi, all that remains for the probate court to do is to formally receive in evidence
duly authenticated copies of the laws of the State of Texas governing the succession of Linnie Jane Hodges and
her husband C. N. Hodges as citizens of said State at the time of their respective deaths on May 23,
1957 andDecember 25, 1962. 29
6. The text and tenor of the declarations by C. N. Hodges of renunciation of his inheritance from his wife in
favor of her other named heirs in her will (her brothers and sisters and their respective heirs) as ratified and
reiteratedexpressly in his affidavit of renunciation executed four years later for the avowed purpose
of not being held liable for payment of income taxes on income which has accrued to his wife's estate since her
death indicate a valid and effective renunciation.
Once the evidence has been formally admitted and its genuineness and legal effectivity established by the
probate court, the renunciation by C. N. Hodges must be given due effect with the result that C. N. Hodges
therefore acquired no part of his wife's one-half share of the community properties since he removed himself
as an heir by virtue of his renunciation. By simple substitution then under Articles 857 and 859 of our Civil
Code 30and by virtue of the will's institution of heirs, since "the heir originally instituted C. N. Hodges) does not

become an heir" 31by force of his renunciation, Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters whom she designated as her heirs
upon her husband's death are called immediately to her succession.

Consequently, the said community and conjugal properties would then pertain pro indiviso share and
share alike to their respective estates, with each estate, however, shouldering its own expenses of
administration, estate and inheritance taxes, if any remain unpaid, attorneys' fees and other like expenses and
the net remainder to be adjudicated directly to the decedents' respective brothers and sisters (and their heirs) as
the heirs duly designated in their respective wills. The question of renvoi becomes immaterial since most laws
and our lawspermit such renunciation of inheritance.
7. If there were no renunciation (or the same may somehow be declared to have not been valid and effective)
by C. N. Hodges of his inheritance from his wife, however, what would be the consequence?
(a) If the laws on succession of the State of Texas do provide for renvoi or "reference back" to Philippine law
as the domiciliary law of the Hodges' spouses governing their succession, then petitioners' view that Mrs.
Hodges' estate would consist only of the minimum of "one-fourth of the community properties of the said
spouses, as of the time of (her) death on May 23, 1957" would have to be sustained and C. N. Hodges' estate
would consist ofthree-fourths of the community properties, comprising his own one-half (or two-fourths) share
and the other fourth of Mrs. Hodges' estate as the legitime granted him as surviving spouse by Philippine
law (Article 900 of the Civil Code) which could not be disposed of nor burdened with any condition by Mrs.
Hodges as testatrix.
(b) If the laws on succession of the State of Texas do not provide for such renvoi and respondent Magno's
assertion is correct that the Texas law which would then prevail, provides for no legitime for C. N. Hodges as
the surviving spouse, then respondent Magno's assertion that Mrs. Hodges' estate would consist of one-half of
the community properties (with the other half pertaining to C. N. Hodges) would have to be sustained. The
community and conjugal properties would then pertain share and share alike to their respective estates, with
each estate shouldering its own expenses of administration in the same manner stated in the last paragraph of
paragraph 6 hereof. .
8. As to the nature of the institution of heirs made by Mrs. Hodges in her will, the main opinion holds that
"(T)he brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not substitutes for Hodges; rather, they are also heirs
institutedsimultaneously with Hodges," but goes further and holds that "it was not the usufruct alone of her
estate ... that she bequeathed to Hodges during his lifetime, but the full ownership thereof, although the same
was to last also during his lifetime only, even as there was no restriction against his disposing or conveying the
whole or any portion thereof anybody other than himself" and describes Hodges "as universal and sole
heir with absolute dominion over Mrs. Hodges' estate (except over their Lubbock, Texas property ), 32 adding
that "Hodges was not obliged to preserve anything for them" (referring to Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters as
instituted co-heirs). 33
Contrary to this view of the main opinion, the writer submits that the provisions of Mrs. Hodges' will
did not grant to C.N. Hodges "full ownership" nor "absolute dominion" over her estate, such that he could as
"universal and sole heir" by the mere expedient of gratuitously disposing to third persons her whole estate
during his lifetime nullifyher institution of her brothers and sisters as his co-heirs to succeed to her whole estate
"at the death of (her) husband," deprive them of any inheritance and make his own brothers and sisters in
effect sole heirs not only of his own estate but of his wife's estate as well.
Thus, while Linnie Jane Hodges did not expressly name her brothers and sisters as substitutes for Hodges
because she willed that they would enter into the succession upon his death, still it cannot be gainsaid, as the
main opinion concedes, "that they are also heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges, subject however to
certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was concerned and correspondingly suspensive with
reference to his brothers and sisters-in-law." 34

Hence, if Hodges is found to have validly renounced his inheritance, there would be a substitution of heirs in
fact and in law since Linnie's brothers and sisters as the heirs "simultaneously instituted" with
a suspensive term would be called immediately to her succession instead of waiting for the arrival
of suspensive term of Hodges' death, since as the heir originally instituted he does not become an heir by force
of his renunciation and therefore they would "enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally
instituted" (Hodges) under the provisions of Article 857 and 859 of our Civil Code, supra, 35 thus accelerating
their succession to her estate as a consequence of Hodges' renunciation.
Consequently, Linnie Jane Hodges willed that her husband C.N. Hodges would "during his natural
lifetime ...manage, control, use and enjoy said estate" and that only "all rents,
emoluments and income" alone shall belong to him. She further willed that while he
could sell and purchase properties of her estate, and "use any part of the principal estate," such principal
notwithstanding "any changes in the physical properties of said estate"(i.e. new properties acquired or
exchanged) would still pertain to her estate, which at the time of his death would pass infull dominion to her
brothers and sisters as the ultimate sole and universal heirs of her estate. 36
The testatrix Linnie Jane Hodges in her will thus principally provided that "I give, devise and bequeath all of
the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both personal and real ... to my beloved husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, to have and to hold with him ... during his natural lifetime;" 37 that "(he) shall have the right to manage,
control, use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, ... to make any changes in the physical properties of said
estate, bysale ... and the purchase of any other or additional property as he may think best ... . All rents,
emoluments and incomefrom said estate shall belong to him and he is further authorized to use any part of the
principal of said estate as he may need or desire, ... he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of the improved
property now owned by us, located at ... City of Lubbock, Texas ... . He shall have the right
to subdivide any farm land and sell lots therein, and may sell unimproved town lots;" 38 that "(A)t the death of my
said husband, Charles Newton, I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both
personal and real, ... to be equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share alike, namely: Esta
Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Roman and Nimroy Higdon;" 39 and that
"(I)n case of the death of any of my brothers and/or sisters ... prior to the death of my husband ... the heirs of such
deceased brother or sister shall take jointly the share which would have gone to such brother or sister had she or he
survived." 40
Such provisions are wholly consistent with the view already fully expounded above that all transactions and
sales made by Hodges after his wife Linnie's death were by operation of the law of trust as well as
by his ownacknowledgment and acts deemed for and on behalf of their unliquidated conjugal partnership and
community estate, share and share alike, with the express authorization of the probate court per its orders of
May 25, and December 14, 1957 granting Hodges' motion to continue the conjugal partnership business of
buying and selling real estate even after her death. By the same token, Hodges could not conceivably be
deemed to have had any authority or right to dispose gratuitously of any portion of her estate to whose
succession she had called her brothers and sisters upon his death.
9. Such institutions of heirs with a term are expressly recognized and permitted under Book III, Chapter 2,
section 4 of our Civil Code dealing with "conditional testamentary dispositions and testamentary
dispositions with a term."41
Thus, Article 885 of our Civil Code expressly provides that:
ART 885. The designation of the day or time when the effects of the institution of an heir
shallcommence or cease shall be valid.
In both cases, the legal heir shall be considered as called to the succession until the arrival of
the period or its expiration. But in the first case he shall not enter into possession of the
property until after having given sufficient security, with the intervention of the instituted heir.

Accordingly, under the terms of Mrs. Hodges' will, her husband's right to the succession as the instituted heir
ceased in diem, i.e. upon the arrival of the resolutory term of his death on December 25, 1962, while her
brothers' and sisters' right to the succession also as instituted heirs commenced ex die, i.e. upon the expiration
of the suspensive term (as far as they were concerned) of the death of C. N. Hodges on December 25, 1962 . 42
As stated in Padilla's treatise on the Civil Code, "A term is a period whose arrival is certain although the exact
date thereof may be uncertain. A term may have either a suspensive or a resolutory effect. The designation of
the day when the legacy "shall commence" is ex die, or a term with a suspensive effect, from a certain day. The
designation of the day when the legacy "shall cease" is in diem or a term with a resolutory effect, until a certain
day." He adds that "A legacy based upon a certain age or upon the death of a person is not a condition but
aterm. If the arrival of the term would commence the right of the heir, it is suspensive. If the arrival of the term
would terminate his right, it is resolutory" and that "upon the arrival of the period, in case of a suspensive term,
the instituted heir is entitled to the succession, and in case of a resolutory term, his right terminates." 43
10. The sizable estates herein involved have now been pending settlement for a considerably protracted period
(of seventeen years counted from Linnie's death in 1957), and all that is left to be done is to resolve
the onlyremaining issue (involving the two questions of renunciation and renvoi) hereinabove discussed in
order to close up the estates and finally effect distribution to the deceased spouses' respective brothers and
sisters and their heirs as the heirs duly instituted in their wills long admitted to probate. Hence, it is advisable
for said instituted heirs and their heirs in turn 44 to come to terms for the adjudication and distribution to them proindiviso of the up to now unliquidated community properties of the estates of the Hodges spouses (derived from
their unliquidated conjugal partnership) rather than to get bogged down with the formidable task of physically
segregating and partitioning the two estates with the numerous transactions, items and details and physical changes
of properties involved. The estates proceedings would thus be closed and they could then name their respective
attorneys-in-fact to work out the details of segregating, dividing or partitioning the unliquidated community
properties or liquidating them which can be done then on their own without further need of intervention on the
part of the probate court as well as allow them meanwhile to enjoy and make use of the income and cash and liquid
assets of the estates in such manner as may be agreed upon between them.
Such a settlement or modus vivendi between the heirs of the unliquidated two estates for the mutual benefit of
all of them should not prove difficult, considering that it appears as stated in the main opinion that
22.968149% of the share or undivided estate of C. N. Hodges have already been acquired by the heirs of
Linnie Jane Hodges from certain heirs of her husband, while certain other heirs representing 17.34375% of
Hodges' estate were joining cause with Linnie's heirs in their pending and unresolved motion for the removal
of petitioner PCIB as administrator of Hodges' estate, 45 apparently impatient with the situation which has
apparently degenerated into a running battle between the administrators of the two estates to the common prejudice
of all the heirs.
11. As earlier stated, the writer has taken the pain of suggesting these guidelines which may serve to guide the
probate court as well as the parties towards expediting the winding up and closing of the estates and the
distribution of the net estates to the instituted heirs and their successors duly entitled thereto. The probate court
should exert all effort towards this desired objective pursuant to the mandate of our probate law, bearing in
mind the Court's admonition in previous cases that "courts of first instance should exert themselves to close up
estate within twelve months from the time they are presented, and they may refuse to allow any
compensation to executors and administrators who do not actively labor to that end, and they may even
adopt harsher measures."46
Timeliness of appeals and imposition of
thirty-one (31) additional docket fees
Two appeals were docketed with this Court, as per the two records on appeal submitted (one with a green
cover and the other with a yellow cover). As stated at the outset, these appeals involve basically the same
primal issue raised in the petition for certiorari as to whether there still exists a separate estate of Linnie Jane

Hodges which has to continue to be administered by respondent Magno. Considering the main opinion's ruling
in the affirmative and that her estate and that of her husband (since they jointly
comprise unliquidated community properties) must be administered conjointly by their respective
administrators (PCIB and Magno), the said appeals (involving thirty-three different orders of the probate court
approving sales contracts and other acts of administration executed and performed by respondent Magno on
behalf of Linnie's estate) have been necessarily overruled by the Court's decision at bar.
(a) The "priority question" raised by respondent Magno as to the patent failure of the two records on appeal to
show on their face and state the material data that the appeals were timely taken within the 30-day
reglamentary period as required by Rule 41, section 6 of the Rules of Court, has been brushed aside by the
main opinion with the statement that it is "not necessary to pass upon the timeliness of any of said appeals"
since they "revolve around practically the same main issues and ... it is admitted that some of them have been
timely taken." 47 The main opinion thus proceeded with the determination of the thirty-three appealed orders despite
the grave defect of the appellant PCIB's records on appeal and their failure to state the required material data
showing the timeliness of the appeals.
Such disposition of the question of timeliness deemed as "mandatory and jurisdictional" in a number of cases
merits the writer's concurrence in that the question raised has been subordinated to the paramount
considerations of substantial justice and a "liberal interpretation of the rules" applied so as not to derogate and
detract from the primary intent and purpose of the rules, viz "the proper and just determination of a
litigation" 48 which calls for "adherence to a liberal construction of the procedural rules in order to attain their
objective of substantial justice and of avoiding denials of substantial justice due to procedural technicalities." 49
Thus, the main opinion in consonance with the same paramount considerations of substantial justice has
likewise overruled respondents' objection to petitioner's taking the recourse of "the present remedy
of certiorari and prohibition" "despite the conceded availability of appeal" on the ground that "there is a
common thread among the basic issues involved in all these thirty-three appeals (which) deal with
practically the same basic issues that can be more expeditiously resolved or determined in a single special civil
action . . . " 50
(b) Since the basic issues have been in effect resolved in the special civil action at bar (as above stated) with
the dismissal of the petition by virtue of the Court's judgment as to the continued existence of a separate estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges and the affirmance as a necessary consequence of the appealed orders approving and
sanctioning respondent Magno's sales contracts and acts of administration, some doubt would arise as to the
propriety of the main opinion requiring the payment by PCIB of thirty-one (31) additional appeal docket fees.
This doubt is further enhanced by the question of whether it would make the cost of appeal unduly expensive
or prohibitive by requiring the payment of a separate appeal docket fee for each incidental order questioned
when the resolution of all such incidental questioned orders involve basically one and the same main issue (in
this case, the existence of a separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges) and can be more expeditiously resolved or
determined in a single special civil action" (for which a single docket fee is required) as stated in the main
opinion. 51Considering the importance of the basic issues and the magnitude of the estates involved, however, the
writer has pro hac vice given his concurrence to the assessment of the said thirty-one (31) additional appeal docket
fees.

G.R. No. L-12767

November 16, 1918

In the matter of the estate of EMIL H. JOHNSON. EBBA INGEBORG JOHNSON, applicant-appellant,
Hartigan & Welch for applicant and appellant.
Hartford Beaumont for Victor Johnson and others as appellees.

Chas. E. Tenney for Alejandra Ibaez de Johnson, personally and as guardian,

and for Simeona Ibaez, appellees.

STREET, J.:
On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United States, died
in the city of Manila, leaving a will, dated September 9, 1915, by which he disposed of an estate, the value of
which, as estimated by him, was P231,800. This document is an holographic instrument, being written in the
testator's own handwriting, and is signed by himself and two witnesses only, instead of three witnesses
required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This will, therefore, was not executed in conformity
with the provisions of law generally applicable to wills executed by inhabitants of these Islands, and hence
could not have been proved under section 618.
On February 9, 1916, however, a petition was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for
the probate of this will, on the ground that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois,
United States of America; that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State; and hence
could properly be probated here pursuant to section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This section reads as
follows:
Will made here by alien. A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another
state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a
citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own state or country, may
be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if
executed according to the laws of these Islands.
The hearing on said application was set for March 6, 1916, and three weeks publication of notice was ordered
in the "Manila Daily Bulletin." Due publication was made pursuant to this order of the court. On March 6,
1916, witnesses were examined relative to the execution of the will; and upon March 16th thereafter the
document was declared to be legal and was admitted to probate. At the same time an order was made
nominating Victor Johnson and John T. Pickett as administrators of the estate, with the sill annexed. Shortly
thereafter Pickett signified his desire not to serve, and Victor Johnson was appointed sole administrator.
By the will in question the testator gives to his brother Victor one hundred shares of the corporate stock in the
Johnson-Pickett Rope Company; to his father and mother in Sweden, the sum of P20,000; to his daughter Ebba
Ingeborg, the sum of P5,000; to his wife, Alejandra Ibaez, the sum of P75 per month, if she remains single; to
Simeona Ibaez, spinster, P65 per month, if she remains single. The rest of the property is left to the testator's
five children Mercedes, Encarnacion, Victor, Eleonor and Alberto.
The biographical facts relative to the deceased necessary to an understanding of the case are these: Emil H.
Johnson was born in Sweden, May 25, 1877, from which country he emigrated to the United States and lived
in Chicago, Illinois, from 1893 to 1898. On May 9, 1898, at Chicago, he was married to Rosalie Ackeson, and
immediately thereafter embarked for the Philippine Islands as a soldier in the Army of the United States. As a
result of relations between Johnson and Rosalie Ackeson a daughter, named Ebba Ingeborg, was born a few

months after their marriage. This child was christened in Chicago by a pastor of the Swedish Lutheran Church
upon October 16, 1898.
After Johnson was discharged as a soldier from the service of the United States he continued to live in the
Philippine Islands, and on November 20, 1902, the wife, Rosalie Johnson, was granted a decree of divorce
from him in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, on the ground of desertion. A little later Johnson
appeared in the United States on a visit and on January 10, 1903, procured a certificate of naturalization at
Chicago. From Chicago he appears to have gone to Sweden, where a photograph, exhibited in evidence in this
case, was taken in which he appeared in a group with his father, mother, and the little daughter, Ebba Ingeborg,
who was then living with her grandparents in Sweden. When this visit was concluded, the deceased returned to
Manila, where he prospered in business and continued to live until his death.
In this city he appears to have entered into marital relations with Alejandra Ibaez, by whom he had three
children, to wit, Mercedes, baptized May 31, 1903; Encarnacion, baptized April 29, 1906; and Victor, baptized
December 9, 1907. The other two children mentioned in the will were borne to the deceased by Simeona
Ibaez.
On June 12, 1916, or about three months after the will had been probated, the attorneys for Ebba Ingeborg
Johnson entered an appearance in her behalf and noted an exception to the other admitting the will to probate.
On October 31, 1916, the same attorneys moved the court to vacate the order of March 16 and also various
other orders in the case. On February 20, 1917, this motion was denied, and from this action of the trial court
the present appeal has been perfected.
As will be discerned, the purpose of the proceeding on behalf of the petitioner is to annul the decree of probate
and put the estate into intestate administration, thus preparing the way for the establishment of the claim of the
petitioner as the sole legitimate heir of her father.
The grounds upon which the petitioner seeks to avoid the probate are four in number and may be stated, in the
same sequence in which they are set forth in the petition, as follows:
(1) Emil H. Johnson was a resident of the city of Manila and not a resident of the State of Illinois at the time
the will in question was executed;
(2) The will is invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal property in the State of Illinois;
(3) The order admitting the will to probate was made without notice to the petitioner; and
(4) The order in question was beyond the jurisdiction of the court.
It cannot of course be maintained that a court of first instance lacks essential jurisdiction over the probate of
wills. The fourth proposition above stated must, accordingly, be interpreted in relation with the third and must
be considered as a corollary deduced from the latter. Moreover, both the third and fourth grounds stated take
precedence, by reason of their more fundamental implications, over the first two; and a logical exposition of
the contentions of the petitioner is expressed in the two following propositions:

(I) The order admitting the will to probate was beyond the jurisdiction of the court and void because
made without notice to the petitioner;
(II) The judgment from which the petitioner seeks relief should be set aside because the testator was
not a resident of the State of Illinois and the will was not in conformity with the laws of that State.
In the discussion which is to follow we shall consider the problems arising in this cae in the order last above
indicated. Upon the question, then, of the jurisdiction of the court, it is apparent from an inspection of the
record of the proceedings in the court below that all the steps prescribed by law as prerequisites to the probate
of a will were complied with in every respect and that the probate was effected in external conformity with all
legal requirements. This much is unquestioned. It is, however, pointed out in the argument submitted in behalf
of the petitioner, that, at the time the court made the order of publication, it was apprised of the fact that the
petitioner lived in the United States and that as daughter and heir she was necessarily interested in the probate
of the will. It is, therefore, insisted that the court should have appointed a date for the probate of the will
sufficiently far in the future to permit the petitioner to be present either in person or by representation; and it is
said that the failure of the court thus to postpone the probate of the will constitutes an infringement of that
provision of the Philippine Bill which declared that property shall not be taken without due process of law.
On this point we are of the opinion that the proceedings for the probate of the will were regular and that the
publication was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and to allow the will to be
probated.
As was said in the case of In re Davis (136 Cal., 590, 596), "the proceeding as to the probate of a will is
essentially one in rem, and in the very nature of things the state is allowed a wide latitude in determining the
character of the constructive notice to be given to the world in a proceeding where it has absolute possession of
the res. It would be an exceptional case where a court would declare a statute void, as depriving a party of his
property without due process of law, the proceeding being strictly in rem, and the res within the state, upon the
ground that the constructive notice prescribed by the statute was unreasonably short."
In that case the petitioner had been domiciled in the Hawaiian Islands at the time of the testator's death; and it
was impossible, in view of the distance and means of communication then existing, for the petitioner to appear
and oppose the probate on the day set for the hearing in California. It was nevertheless held that publication in
the manner prescribed by statute constituted due process of law. (See Estate of Davis, 151 Cal., 318;
Tracy vs.Muir, 151 Cal., 363.)
In the Davis case (136 Cal., 590) the court commented upon the fact that, under the laws of California, the
petitioner had a full year within which she might have instituted a proceeding to contest the will; and this was
stated as one of the reasons for holding that publication in the manner provided by statute was sufficient. The
same circumstance was commented upon in O'Callaghan vs. O'Brien (199 U. S., 89), decided in the Supreme
Court of the United States. This case arose under the laws of the State of Washington, and it was alleged that a
will had been there probated without the notice of application for probate having been given as required by
law. It was insisted that this was an infringement of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States. This contention was, however, rejected and it was held that the statutory right to contest the will
within a year was a complete refutation of the argument founded on the idea of a violation of the due process
provision.

The laws of these Islands, in contrast with the laws in force in perhaps all of the States of the American Union,
contain no special provision, other than that allowing an appeal in the probate proceedings, under which relief
of any sort can be obtained from an order of a court of first instance improperly allowing or disallowing a will.
We do, however, have a provision of a general nature authorizing a court under certain circumstances to set
aside any judgment, order, or other proceeding whatever. This provision is found in section 113 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, which reads as follows:
Upon such terms as may be just the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a
judgment, order or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or
excusable neglect; Provided, That application therefor be made within a reasonable time, but in no
case exceeding six months after such judgment, order, or proceeding was taken.
The use of the word "judgment, order or other proceeding" in this section indicates an intention on the part of
the Legislature to give a wide latitude to the remedy here provided, and in our opinion its operation is not to be
restricted to judgments or orders entered in ordinary contentious litigation where a plaintiff impleads a
defendant and brings him into court by personal service of process. In other words the utility of the provision is
not limited to actions proper but extends to all sorts of judicial proceedings.
In the second section of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that the provisions of this Code shall be
liberally construed to promote its object and to assist the parties in obtaining speedy justice. We think that the
intention thus exhibited should be applied in the interpretation of section 113; and we hold that the word
"party," used in this section, means any person having an interest in the subject matter of the proceeding who is
in a position to be concluded by the judgment, order, to other proceeding taken.
The petitioner, therefore, in this case could have applied, under the section cited, at any time within six months
for March 16, 1916, and upon showing that she had been precluded from appearing in the probate proceedings
by conditions over which she had no control and that the order admitting the will to probate had been
erroneously entered upon insufficient proof or upon a supposed state of facts contrary to the truth, the court
would have been authorized to set the probate aside and grant a rehearing. It is no doubt true that six months
was, under the circumstances, a very short period of time within which to expect the petitioner to appear and
be prepared to contest the probate with the proof which she might have desired to collect from remote
countries. Nevertheless, although the time allowed for the making of such application was inconveniently
short, the remedy existed; and the possibility of its use is proved in this case by the circumstance that on June
12, 1916, she in fact here appeared in court by her attorneys and excepted to the order admitting the will to
probate.
It results that, in conformity with the doctrine announced in the Davis case, above cited, the proceedings in the
court below were conducted in such manner as to constitute due process of law. The law supplied a remedy by
which the petitioner might have gotten a hearing and have obtained relief from the order by which she is
supposed to have been injured; and though the period within which the application should have been made was
short, the remedy was both possible and practicable.
From what has been said it follows that the order of March 16, 1916, admitting the will of Emil H. Johnson to
probate cannot be declared null and void merely because the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from
appearing at the original hearing upon the matter of the probate of the will in question. Whether the result

would have been the same if our system of procedure had contained no such provision as that expressed in
section 113 is a matter which we need not here consider.
Intimately connected with the question of the jurisdiction of the court, is another matter which may be properly
discussed at this juncture. This relates to the interpretation to be placed upon section 636 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The position is taken by the appellant that this section is applicable only to wills of liens; and in this
connection attention is directed to the fact that the epigraph of this section speaks only of the will made here by
an alien and to the further fact that the word "state" in the body of the section is not capitalized. From this it is
argued that section 636 is not applicable to the will of a citizen of the United States residing in these Islands.
lawphil.net

We consider these suggestions of little weight and are of the opinion that, by the most reasonable interpretation
of the language used in the statute, the words "another state or country" include the United States and the
States of the American Union, and that the operation of the statute is not limited to wills of aliens. It is a rule of
hermeneutics that punctuation and capitalization are aids of low degree in interpreting the language of a statute
and can never control against the intelligible meaning of the written words. Furthermore, the epigraph, or
heading,, of a section, being nothing more than a convenient index to the contents of the provision, cannot
have the effect of limiting the operative words contained in the body of the text. It results that if Emil H.
Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the United States and of the State of Illinois, his will was
provable under this section in the courts of the Philippine Islands, provided the instrument was so executed as
to be admissible to probate under the laws of the State of Illinois.
We are thus brought to consider the second principal proposition stated at the outset of this discussion, which
raises the question whether the order f probate can be set aside in this proceeding on the other ground stated in
the petition, namely, that the testator was not a resident of the State of Illinois and that the will was not made in
conformity with the laws of that State.
The order of the Court of First Instance admitting the will to probate recites, among other things:
That upon the date when the will in question was executed Emil H. Johnson was a citizen of the
United States, naturalized in the State of Illinois, County of Cook, and that the will in question was
executed in conformity with the dispositions of the law f the State of Illinois.
We consider this equivalent to a finding that upon the date of the execution of the will the testator was a citizen
of the State of Illinois and that the will was executed in conformity with the laws of that State. Upon the last
point the finding is express; and in our opinion the statement that the testator was a citizen of the United States,
naturalized in the State of Illinois, should be taken to imply that he was a citizen of the State of Illinois, as well
as of the United States.
The naturalization laws of the United States require, as a condition precedent to the granting of the certificate
of naturalization, that the applicant should have resided at least five years in the United States and for one year
within the State or territory where the court granting the naturalization papers is held; and in the absence of
clear proof to the contrary it should be presumed that a person naturalized in a court of a certain State thereby
becomes a citizen of that State as well as of the United States.

In this connection it should be remembered that the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States declares, in its opening words, that all persons naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
It is noteworthy that the petition by which it is sought to annul the probate of this will does not assert that the
testator was not a citizen of Illinois at the date when the will was executed. The most that is said on this point
is he was "never a resident of the State of Illinois after the year 1898, but became and was a resident of the city
of Manila," etc. But residence in the Philippine Islands is compatible with citizenship in Illinois; and it must be
considered that the allegations of the petition on this point are, considered in their bearing as an attempt to
refute citizenship in Illinois, wholly insufficient.
As the Court of First Instance found that the testator was a citizen of the State of Illinois and that the will was
executed in conformity with the laws of that State, the will was necessarily and properly admitted to probate.
And how is it possible to evade the effect of these findings?
In Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that "the allowance by the court of a will of real or
personal property shall be conclusive as to its due execution."
The due execution of a will involves conditions relating to a number of matters, such as the age and mental
capacity of the testator, the signing of the document by the testator, or by someone in his behalf, and the
acknowledgment of the instrument by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses who affix their
signatures to the will to attest the act. The proof of all these requisites is involved in the probate; and as to each
and all of them the probate is conclusive. (Castaeda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil. Rep., 426; Pimentel vs. Palanca, 5
Phil. Rep., 436; Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Vao, 8 Phil. Rep., 119; Sanchez vs. Pascual, 11 Phil. Rep., 395;
Montaano vs.Suesa, 14 Phil. Rep., 676.)
Our reported cases do not contain the slightest intimation that a will which has been probated according to law,
and without fraud, can be annulled, in any other proceeding whatever, on account of any supposed irregularity
or defect in the execution of the will or on account of any error in the action of the court upon the proof
adduced before it. This court has never been called upon to decide whether, in case the probate of a will should
be procured by fraud, relief could be granted in some other proceeding; and no such question is now presented.
But it is readily seen that if fraud were alleged, this would introduce an entirely different factor in the cae. In
Austruavs. Ventenilla (21 Phil. Rep., 180, 184), it was suggested but not decided that relief might be granted in
case the probate of a will were procured by fraud.
The circumstance that the judgment of the trial court recites that the will was executed in conformity with the
law of Illinois and also, in effect, that the testator was a citizen of that State places the judgment upon an
unassailable basis so far as any supposed error apparent upon the fact of the judgment is concerned. It is,
however, probable that even if the judgment had not contained these recitals, there would have been a
presumption from the admission of the will to probate as the will of a citizen of Illinois that the facts were as
recited in the order of probate.
As was said by this court in the case of Banco Espaol-Filipino vs. Palanca (37 Phil. Rep., 921), "There is no
principle of law better settled than that after jurisdiction has once been acquired, every act of a court of general
jurisdiction shall be presumed to have been rightly done. This rule is applied to every judgment or decree
rendered in the various stages of the proceedings from their initiation to their completion (Voorhees vs. United

States Bank, 10 Pet., 314; 35 U. S., 449); and if the record is silent with respect to any fact which must have
established before the court could have rightly acted, it will be presumed that such fact was properly brought to
its knowledge."
The Court of First Instance is a court of original and general jurisdiction; and there is no difference in its
faculties in this respect whether exercised in matters of probate or exerted in ordinary contentious litigation.
The trial court therefore necessarily had the power to determine the facts upon which the propriety of admitting
the will to probate depended; and the recital of those facts in the judgment was probably not essential to its
validity. No express ruling is, however, necessary on this point.
What has been said effectually disposes of the petition considered in its aspect as an attack upon the order of
probate for error apparent on the face of the record. But the petitioner seeks to have the judgment reviewed, it
being asserted that the findings of the trial court especially on the question of the citizenship of the testator
are not supported by the evidence. It needs but a moment's reflection, however, to show that in such a
proceeding as this it is not possible to reverse the original order on the ground that the findings of the trial
court are unsupported by the proof adduced before that court. The only proceeding in which a review of the
evidence can be secured is by appeal, and the case is not before us upon appeal from the original order
admitting the will to probate. The present proceedings by petition to set aside the order of probate, and the
appeal herein is from the order denying this relief. It is obvious that on appeal from an order refusing to vacate
a judgment it is not possible to review the evidence upon which the original judgment was based. To permit
this would operate unduly to protract the right of appeal.
However, for the purpose of arriving at a just conception of the case from the point of view of the petitioner,
we propose to examine the evidence submitted upon the original hearing, in connection with the allegations of
the petition, in order to see, first, whether the evidence submitted to the trial court was sufficient to justify its
findings, and, secondly, whether the petition contains any matter which would justify the court in setting the
judgment, aside. In this connection we shall for a moment ignore the circumstance that the petition was filed
after the expiration of the six months allowed by section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The principal controversy is over the citizenship of the testator. The evidence adduced upon this point in the
trial court consists of the certificate of naturalization granted upon January 10, 1903, in the Circuit Court of
Cook County, Illinois, in connection with certain biographical facts contained in the oral evidence. The
certificate of naturalization supplies incontrovertible proof that upon the date stated the testator became a
citizen of the United States, and inferentially also a citizen of said State. In the testimony submitted to the trial
court it appears that, when Johnson first came to the United States as a boy, he took up his abode in the State of
Illinois and there remained until he came as a soldier in the United States Army to the Philippine Islands.
Although he remained in these Islands for sometime after receiving his discharge, no evidence was adduced
showing that at the time he returned to the United States, in the autumn of 1902, he had then abandoned
Illinois as the State of his permanent domicile, and on the contrary the certificate of naturalization itself recites
that at that time he claimed to be a resident of Illinois.
Now, if upon January 10, 1903, the testator became a citizen of the United States and of the State of Illinois,
how has he lost the character of citizen with respect to either of these jurisdictions? There is no law in force by
virtue of which any person of foreign nativity can become a naturalized citizen of the Philippine Islands; and it
was, therefore, impossible for the testator, even if he had so desired, to expatriate himself from the United
States and change his political status from a citizen of the United States to a citizen of these Islands. This being

true, it is to be presumed that he retained his citizenship in the State of Illinois along with his status as a citizen
of the United States. It would be novel doctrine to Americans living in the Philippine Islands to be told that by
living here they lose their citizenship in the State of their naturalization or nativity.
We are not unmindful of the fact that when a citizen of one State leaves it and takes up his abode in another
State with no intention of returning, he immediately acquires citizenship in the State of his new domicile. This
is in accordance with that provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
which says that every citizen of the United States is a citizen of the State where in he resides. The effect of this
provision necessarily is that a person transferring his domicile from one State to another loses his citizenship in
the State of his original above upon acquiring citizenship in the State of his new abode. The acquisition of the
new State citizenship extinguishes the old. That situation, in our opinion, has no analogy to that which arises
when a citizen of an American State comes to reside in the Philippine Islands. Here he cannot acquire a new
citizenship; nor by the mere change of domicile does he lose that which he brought with him.
The proof adduced before the trial court must therefore be taken as showing that, at the time the will was
executed, the testator was, as stated in the order of probate, a citizen of the State of Illinois. This, in connection
with the circumstance that the petition does not even so much as deny such citizenship but only asserts that the
testator was a resident of the Philippine Islands, demonstrates the impossibility of setting the probate aside for
lack of the necessary citizenship on the part of the testator. As already observed, the allegation of the petition
on this point is wholly insufficient to justify any relief whatever.
Upon the other point as to whether the will was executed in conformity with the statutes of the State of
Illinois we note that it does not affirmatively appear from the transaction of the testimony adduced in the
trial court that any witness was examined with reference to the law of Illinois on the subject of the execution of
will. The trial judge no doubt was satisfied that the will was properly executed by examining section 1874 of
the Revised Statutes of Illinois, as exhibited in volume 3 of Starr & Curtis's Annotated Illinois Statutes, 2nd
ed., p. 426; and he may have assumed that he could take judicial notice of the laws of Illinois under section
275 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If so, he was in our opinion mistaken. that section authorizes the courts
here to take judicial notice, among other things, of the acts of the legislative department of the United States.
These words clearly have reference to Acts of the Congress of the United States; and we would hesitate to hold
that our courts can, under this provision, take judicial notice of the multifarious laws of the various American
States. Nor do we think that any such authority can be derived from the broader language, used in the same
action, where it is said that our courts may take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge "similar" to
those therein enumerated. The proper rule we think is to require proof of the statutes of the States of the
American Union whenever their provisions are determinative of the issues in any action litigated in the
Philippine courts.
Nevertheless, even supposing that the trial court may have erred in taking judicial notice of the law of Illinois
on the point in question, such error is not now available to the petitioner, first, because the petition does not
state any fact from which it would appear that the law of Illinois is different from what the court found, and,
secondly, because the assignment of error and argument for the appellant in this court raises no question based
on such supposed error. Though the trial court may have acted upon pure conjecture as to the law prevailing in
the State of Illinois, its judgment could not be set aside, even upon application made within six months under
section 113 of the Code of Civil procedure, unless it should be made to appear affirmatively that the conjecture
was wrong. The petitioner, it is true, states in general terms that the will in question is invalid and inadequate to
pass real and personal property in the State of Illinois, but this is merely a conclusion of law. The affidavits by

which the petition is accompanied contain no reference to the subject, and we are cited to no authority in the
appellant's brief which might tent to raise a doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion of the trial court. It is
very clear, therefore, that this point cannot be urged as of serious moment.
But it is insisted in the brief for the appellant that the will in question was not properly admissible to probate
because it contains provisions which cannot be given effect consistently with the laws of the Philippine
Islands; and it is suggested that as the petitioner is a legitimate heir of the testator she cannot be deprived of the
legitime to which she is entitled under the law governing testamentary successions in these Islands. Upon this
point it is sufficient to say that the probate of the will does not affect the intrinsic validity of its provisions, the
decree of probate being conclusive only as regards the due execution of the will. (Code of Civil Procedure,
secs. 625, 614; Sahagun vs. De Gorostiza, 7 Phil. Rep., 347, 349; Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Vao, 8 Phil. Rep., 119,
121; Limjuco vs.Ganara, 11 Phil. Rep., 393, 395.)
If, therefore, upon the distribution of this estate, it should appear that any legacy given by the will or other
disposition made therein is contrary to the law applicable in such case, the will must necessarily yield upon
that point and the law must prevail. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of this will must be determined by the law of Illinois and not, as the appellant apparently assumes,
by the general provisions here applicable in such matters; for in the second paragraph of article 10 of the Civil
Code it is declared that "legal and testamentary successions, with regard to the order of succession, as well as
to the amount of the successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by
the laws of the nation of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the
property and the country where it may be situate."
From what has been said, it is, we think, manifest that the petition submitted to the court below on October 31,
1916, was entirely insufficient to warrant the setting aside of the other probating the will in question, whether
said petition be considered as an attack on the validity of the decree for error apparent, or whether it be
considered as an application for a rehearing based upon the new evidence submitted in the affidavits which
accompany the petition. And in this latter aspect the petition is subject to the further fatal defect that it was not
presented within the time allowed by law.
It follows that the trial court committed no error in denying the relief sought. The order appealed from is
accordingly affirmed with costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-11622

January 28, 1961

THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,

vs.
DOUGLAS FISHER AND BETTINA FISHER, and the COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-11668

January 28, 1961.

DOUGLAS FISHER AND BETTINA FISHER, petitioner,

vs.
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, and the COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.

BARRERA, J.:
This case relates to the determination and settlement of the hereditary estate left by the deceased Walter G.
Stevenson, and the laws applicable thereto. Walter G. Stevenson (born in the Philippines on August 9, 1874 of
British parents and married in the City of Manila on January 23, 1909 to Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson another
British subject) died on February 22, 1951 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. whereto he and his wife moved
and established their permanent residence since May 10, 1945. In his will executed in San Francisco on May
22, 1947, and which was duly probated in the Superior Court of California on April 11, 1951, Stevenson
instituted his wife Beatrice as his sole heiress to the following real and personal properties acquired by the
spouses while residing in the Philippines, described and preliminary assessed as follows:

Gross Estate

Real Property 2 parcels of land in Baguio,

covered by T.C.T. Nos. 378 and 379

P43,500.00

Personal Property

(1) 177 shares of stock of Canacao Estate at

P10.00 each

1,770.00

(2) 210,000 shares of stock of Mindanao

Mother Lode Mines, Inc. at P0.38 per share

79,800.00

(3) Cash credit with Canacao Estate Inc.

(4) Cash, with the Chartered Bank of India,

Australia & China

Total Gross Assets

4,870.88

851.97

P130,792.85

On May 22, 1951, ancillary administration proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila
for the settlement of the estate in the Philippines. In due time Stevenson's will was duly admitted to probate by
our court and Ian Murray Statt was appointed ancillary administrator of the estate, who on July 11, 1951, filed
a preliminary estate and inheritance tax return with the reservation of having the properties declared therein
finally appraised at their values six months after the death of Stevenson. Preliminary return was made by the
ancillary administrator in order to secure the waiver of the Collector of Internal Revenue on the inheritance tax
due on the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines Inc. which the estate then desired to

dispose in the United States. Acting upon said return, the Collector of Internal Revenue accepted the valuation
of the personal properties declared therein, but increased the appraisal of the two parcels of land located in
Baguio City by fixing their fair market value in the amount of P52.200.00, instead of P43,500.00. After
allowing the deductions claimed by the ancillary administrator for funeral expenses in the amount of P2,000.00
and for judicial and administration expenses in the sum of P5,500.00, the Collector assessed the state the
amount of P5,147.98 for estate tax and P10,875,26 or inheritance tax, or a total of P16,023.23. Both of these
assessments were paid by the estate on June 6, 1952.
On September 27, 1952, the ancillary administrator filed in amended estate and inheritance tax return in
pursuance f his reservation made at the time of filing of the preliminary return and for the purpose of availing
of the right granted by section 91 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
In this amended return the valuation of the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc.
was reduced from 0.38 per share, as originally declared, to P0.20 per share, or from a total valuation of
P79,800.00 to P42,000.00. This change in price per share of stock was based by the ancillary administrator on
the market notation of the stock obtaining at the San Francisco California) Stock Exchange six months from
the death of Stevenson, that is, As of August 22, 1931. In addition, the ancillary administrator made claim for
the following deductions:

Funeral expenses ($1,04326)

P2,086.52

Judicial Expenses:

(a) Administrator's Fee

P1,204.34

(b) Attorney's Fee

6.000.00

(c) Judicial and Administration expenses

as of August 9, 1952

1,400.05

8,604.39

Real Estate Tax for 1951 on Baguio real

properties (O.R. No. B-1 686836)

Claims against the estate:

($5,000.00) P10,000.00

652.50

P10,000.00

Plus: 4% int. p.a. from Feb. 2 to 22,

1951

Sub-Total

22.47

10,022.47

P21,365.88

In the meantime, on December 1, 1952, Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson assigned all her rights and interests in the
estate to the spouses, Douglas and Bettina Fisher, respondents herein.
On September 7, 1953, the ancillary administrator filed a second amended estate and inheritance tax return
(Exh. "M-N"). This return declared the same assets of the estate stated in the amended return of September 22,
1952, except that it contained new claims for additional exemption and deduction to wit: (1) deduction in the
amount of P4,000.00 from the gross estate of the decedent as provided for in Section 861 (4) of the U.S.
Federal Internal Revenue Code which the ancillary administrator averred was allowable by way of the
reciprocity granted by Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as then held by the Board of Tax
Appeals in case No. 71 entitled "Housman vs. Collector," August 14, 1952; and (2) exemption from the
imposition of estate and inheritance taxes on the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines,
Inc. also pursuant to the reciprocity proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. In this last
return, the estate claimed that it was liable only for the amount of P525.34 for estate tax and P238.06 for
inheritance tax and that, as a consequence, it had overpaid the government. The refund of the amount of
P15,259.83, allegedly overpaid, was accordingly requested by the estate. The Collector denied the claim. For
this reason, action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondents, as assignees of
Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson, for the recovery of said amount. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 1125, the case
was forwarded to the Court of Tax Appeals which court, after hearing, rendered decision the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:
In fine, we are of the opinion and so hold that: (a) the one-half () share of the surviving spouse in the
conjugal partnership property as diminished by the obligations properly chargeable to such property
should be deducted from the net estate of the deceased Walter G. Stevenson, pursuant to Section 89-C
of the National Internal Revenue Code; (b) the intangible personal property belonging to the estate of
said Stevenson is exempt from inheritance tax, pursuant to the provision of section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code in relation to the California Inheritance Tax Law but decedent's estate is not
entitled to an exemption of P4,000.00 in the computation of the estate tax; (c) for purposes of estate
and inheritance taxation the Baguio real estate of the spouses should be valued at P52,200.00, and
210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. should be appraised at P0.38 per
share; and (d) the estate shall be entitled to a deduction of P2,000.00 for funeral expenses and judicial
expenses of P8,604.39.
From this decision, both parties appealed.
The Collector of Internal Revenue, hereinafter called petitioner assigned four errors allegedly committed by
the trial court, while the assignees, Douglas and Bettina Fisher hereinafter called respondents, made six
assignments of error. Together, the assigned errors raise the following main issues for resolution by this Court:
(1) Whether or not, in determining the taxable net estate of the decedent, one-half () of the net estate should
be deducted therefrom as the share of tile surviving spouse in accordance with our law on conjugal partnership
and in relation to section 89 (c) of the National Internal revenue Code;

(2) Whether or not the estate can avail itself of the reciprocity proviso embodied in Section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code granting exemption from the payment of estate and inheritance taxes on the 210,000
shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines Inc.;
(3) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the deduction of P4,000.00 allowed by Section 861, U.S. Internal
Revenue Code in relation to section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code;
(4) Whether or not the real estate properties of the decedent located in Baguio City and the 210,000 shares of
stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc., were correctly appraised by the lower court;
(5) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the following deductions: P8,604.39 for judicial and administration
expenses; P2,086.52 for funeral expenses; P652.50 for real estate taxes; and P10,0,22.47 representing the
amount of indebtedness allegedly incurred by the decedent during his lifetime; and
(6) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the payment of interest on the amount it claims to have overpaid the
government and to be refundable to it.
In deciding the first issue, the lower court applied a well-known doctrine in our civil law that in the absence of
any ante-nuptial agreement, the contracting parties are presumed to have adopted the system of conjugal
partnership as to the properties acquired during their marriage. The application of this doctrine to the instant
case is being disputed, however, by petitioner Collector of Internal Revenue, who contends that pursuant to
Article 124 of the New Civil Code, the property relation of the spouses Stevensons ought not to be determined
by the Philippine law, but by the national law of the decedent husband, in this case, the law of England. It is
alleged by petitioner that English laws do not recognize legal partnership between spouses, and that what
obtains in that jurisdiction is another regime of property relation, wherein all properties acquired during the
marriage pertain and belong Exclusively to the husband. In further support of his stand, petitioner cites Article
16 of the New Civil Code (Art. 10 of the old) to the effect that in testate and intestate proceedings, the amount
of successional rights, among others, is to be determined by the national law of the decedent.
In this connection, let it be noted that since the mariage of the Stevensons in the Philippines took place in
1909, the applicable law is Article 1325 of the old Civil Code and not Article 124 of the New Civil Code which
became effective only in 1950. It is true that both articles adhere to the so-called nationality theory of
determining the property relation of spouses where one of them is a foreigner and they have made no prior
agreement as to the administration disposition, and ownership of their conjugal properties. In such a case, the
national law of the husband becomes the dominant law in determining the property relation of the spouses.
There is, however, a difference between the two articles in that Article 1241 of the new Civil Code expressly
provides that it shall be applicable regardless of whether the marriage was celebrated in the Philippines or
abroad while Article 13252 of the old Civil Code is limited to marriages contracted in a foreign land.
It must be noted, however, that what has just been said refers to mixed marriages between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner. In the instant case, both spouses are foreigners who married in the Philippines. Manresa, 3 in his
Commentaries, has this to say on this point:
La regla establecida en el art. 1.315, se refiere a las capitulaciones otorgadas en Espana y entre
espanoles. El 1.325, a las celebradas en el extranjero cuando alguno de los conyuges es espanol. En
cuanto a la regla procedente cuando dos extranjeros se casan en Espana, o dos espanoles en el
extranjero hay que atender en el primer caso a la legislacion de pais a que aquellos pertenezean, y en
el segundo, a las reglas generales consignadas en los articulos 9 y 10 de nuestro Codigo. (Emphasis
supplied.)
If we adopt the view of Manresa, the law determinative of the property relation of the Stevensons, married in
1909, would be the English law even if the marriage was celebrated in the Philippines, both of them being

foreigners. But, as correctly observed by the Tax Court, the pertinent English law that allegedly vests in the
decedent husband full ownership of the properties acquired during the marriage has not been proven by
petitioner. Except for a mere allegation in his answer, which is not sufficient, the record is bereft of any
evidence as to what English law says on the matter. In the absence of proof, the Court is justified, therefore, in
indulging in what Wharton calls "processual presumption," in presuming that the law of England on this matter
is the same as our law.4
Nor do we believe petitioner can make use of Article 16 of the New Civil Code (art. 10, old Civil Code) to
bolster his stand. A reading of Article 10 of the old Civil Code, which incidentally is the one applicable, shows
that it does not encompass or contemplate to govern the question of property relation between spouses. Said
article distinctly speaks of amount of successional rights and this term, in speaks in our opinion, properly
refers to the extent or amount of property that each heir is legally entitled to inherit from the estate available
for distribution. It needs to be pointed out that the property relation of spouses, as distinguished from their
successional rights, is governed differently by the specific and express provisions of Title VI, Chapter I of our
new Civil Code (Title III, Chapter I of the old Civil Code.) We, therefore, find that the lower court correctly
deducted the half of the conjugal property in determining the hereditary estate left by the deceased Stevenson.
On the second issue, petitioner disputes the action of the Tax Court in the exempting the respondents from
paying inheritance tax on the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. in virtue of the
reciprocity proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, in relation to Section 13851 of the
California Revenue and Taxation Code, on the ground that: (1) the said proviso of the California Revenue and
Taxation Code has not been duly proven by the respondents; (2) the reciprocity exemptions granted by section
122 of the National Internal Revenue Code can only be availed of by residents of foreign countries and not of
residents of a state in the United States; and (3) there is no "total" reciprocity between the Philippines and the
state of California in that while the former exempts payment of both estate and inheritance taxes on intangible
personal properties, the latter only exempts the payment of inheritance tax..
To prove the pertinent California law, Attorney Allison Gibbs, counsel for herein respondents, testified that as
an active member of the California Bar since 1931, he is familiar with the revenue and taxation laws of the
State of California. When asked by the lower court to state the pertinent California law as regards exemption of
intangible personal properties, the witness cited article 4, section 13851 (a) and (b) of the California Internal
and Revenue Code as published in Derring's California Code, a publication of the Bancroft-Whitney Company
inc. And as part of his testimony, a full quotation of the cited section was offered in evidence as Exhibits "V-2"
by the respondents.
It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized
to take judicial notice of them.5 Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.6
Section 41, Rule 123 of our Rules of Court prescribes the manner of proving foreign laws before our tribunals.
However, although we believe it desirable that these laws be proved in accordance with said rule, we held in
the case of Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471, that "a reading of sections 300 and 301 of
our Code of Civil Procedure (now section 41, Rule 123) will convince one that these sections do not exclude
the presentation of other competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law." In that case, we
considered the testimony of an attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California who quoted verbatim a section of
California Civil Code and who stated that the same was in force at the time the obligations were contracted, as
sufficient evidence to establish the existence of said law. In line with this view, we find no error, therefore, on
the part of the Tax Court in considering the pertinent California law as proved by respondents' witness.
We now take up the question of reciprocity in exemption from transfer or death taxes, between the State of
California and the Philippines.F
Section 122 of our National Internal Revenue Code, in pertinent part, provides:

... And, provided, further, That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of intangible
personal property (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign country which
at the time of his death did not impose a transfer of tax or death tax of any character in respect of
intangible personal property of citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if
the laws of the foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a
similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of intangible
personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country." (Emphasis
supplied).
On the other hand, Section 13851 of the California Inheritance Tax Law, insofar as pertinent, reads:.
"SEC. 13851, Intangibles of nonresident: Conditions. Intangible personal property is exempt from the
tax imposed by this part if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a territory or another
State of the United States or of a foreign state or country which then imposed a legacy, succession, or
death tax in respect to intangible personal property of its own residents, but either:.
(a) Did not impose a legacy, succession, or death tax of any character in respect to intangible personal
property of residents of this State, or
(b) Had in its laws a reciprocal provision under which intangible personal property of a non-resident
was exempt from legacy, succession, or death taxes of every character if the Territory or other State of
the United States or foreign state or country in which the nonresident resided allowed a similar
exemption in respect to intangible personal property of residents of the Territory or State of the United
States or foreign state or country of residence of the decedent." (Id.)
It is clear from both these quoted provisions that the reciprocity must be total, that is, with respect to transfer or
death taxes of any and every character, in the case of the Philippine law, and to legacy, succession, or death
taxes of any and every character, in the case of the California law. Therefore, if any of the two states collects or
imposes and does not exempt any transfer, death, legacy, or succession tax of any character, the reciprocity
does not work. This is the underlying principle of the reciprocity clauses in both laws.
In the Philippines, upon the death of any citizen or resident, or non-resident with properties therein, there are
imposed upon his estate and its settlement, both an estate and an inheritance tax. Under the laws of California,
only inheritance tax is imposed. On the other hand, the Federal Internal Revenue Code imposes an estate tax
on non-residents not citizens of the United States,7 but does not provide for any exemption on the basis of
reciprocity. Applying these laws in the manner the Court of Tax Appeals did in the instant case, we will have a
situation where a Californian, who is non-resident in the Philippines but has intangible personal properties
here, will the subject to the payment of an estate tax, although exempt from the payment of the inheritance tax.
This being the case, will a Filipino, non-resident of California, but with intangible personal properties there, be
entitled to the exemption clause of the California law, since the Californian has not been exempted from every
character of legacy, succession, or death tax because he is, under our law, under obligation to pay an estate tax?
Upon the other hand, if we exempt the Californian from paying the estate tax, we do not thereby entitle a
Filipino to be exempt from a similar estate tax in California because under the Federal Law, which is equally
enforceable in California he is bound to pay the same, there being no reciprocity recognized in respect thereto.
In both instances, the Filipino citizen is always at a disadvantage. We do not believe that our legislature has
intended such an unfair situation to the detriment of our own government and people. We, therefore, find and
declare that the lower court erred in exempting the estate in question from payment of the inheritance tax.
We are not unaware of our ruling in the case of Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Lara (G.R. Nos. L-9456 & L9481, prom. January 6, 1958, 54 O.G. 2881) exempting the estate of the deceased Hugo H. Miller from
payment of the inheritance tax imposed by the Collector of Internal Revenue. It will be noted, however, that
the issue of reciprocity between the pertinent provisions of our tax law and that of the State of California was

not there squarely raised, and the ruling therein cannot control the determination of the case at bar. Be that as it
may, we now declare that in view of the express provisions of both the Philippine and California laws that the
exemption would apply only if the law of the other grants an exemption from legacy, succession, or death taxes
of every character, there could not be partial reciprocity. It would have to be total or none at all.
With respect to the question of deduction or reduction in the amount of P4,000.00 based on the U.S. Federal
Estate Tax Law which is also being claimed by respondents, we uphold and adhere to our ruling in
the Lara case (supra) that the amount of $2,000.00 allowed under the Federal Estate Tax Law is in the nature
of a deduction and not of an exemption regarding which reciprocity cannot be claimed under the provision of
Section 122 of our National Internal Revenue Code. Nor is reciprocity authorized under the Federal Law. .
On the issue of the correctness of the appraisal of the two parcels of land situated in Baguio City, it is
contended that their assessed values, as appearing in the tax rolls 6 months after the death of Stevenson, ought
to have been considered by petitioner as their fair market value, pursuant to section 91 of the National Internal
Revenue Code. It should be pointed out, however, that in accordance with said proviso the properties are
required to be appraised at their fair market value and the assessed value thereof shall be considered as the fair
market value only when evidence to the contrary has not been shown. After all review of the record, we are
satisfied that such evidence exists to justify the valuation made by petitioner which was sustained by the tax
court, for as the tax court aptly observed:
"The two parcels of land containing 36,264 square meters were valued by the administrator of the
estate in the Estate and Inheritance tax returns filed by him at P43,500.00 which is the assessed value
of said properties. On the other hand, defendant appraised the same at P52,200.00. It is of common
knowledge, and this Court can take judicial notice of it, that assessments for real estate taxation
purposes are very much lower than the true and fair market value of the properties at a given time and
place. In fact one year after decedent's death or in 1952 the said properties were sold for a price of
P72,000.00 and there is no showing that special or extraordinary circumstances caused the sudden
increase from the price of P43,500.00, if we were to accept this value as a fair and reasonable one as
of 1951. Even more, the counsel for plaintiffs himself admitted in open court that he was willing to
purchase the said properties at P2.00 per square meter. In the light of these facts we believe and
therefore hold that the valuation of P52,200.00 of the real estate in Baguio made by defendant is fair,
reasonable and justified in the premises." (Decision, p. 19).
In respect to the valuation of the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc., (a
domestic corporation), respondents contend that their value should be fixed on the basis of the market
quotation obtaining at the San Francisco (California) Stock Exchange, on the theory that the certificates of
stocks were then held in that place and registered with the said stock exchange. We cannot agree with
respondents' argument. The situs of the shares of stock, for purposes of taxation, being located here in the
Philippines, as respondents themselves concede and considering that they are sought to be taxed in this
jurisdiction, consistent with the exercise of our government's taxing authority, their fair market value should be
taxed on the basis of the price prevailing in our country.
Upon the other hand, we find merit in respondents' other contention that the said shares of stock commanded a
lesser value at the Manila Stock Exchange six months after the death of Stevenson. Through Atty. Allison
Gibbs, respondents have shown that at that time a share of said stock was bid for at only P.325 (p. 103, t.s.n.).
Significantly, the testimony of Atty. Gibbs in this respect has never been questioned nor refuted by petitioner
either before this court or in the court below. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we are, therefore,
constrained to reverse the Tax Court on this point and to hold that the value of a share in the said mining
company on August 22, 1951 in the Philippine market was P.325 as claimed by respondents..
It should be noted that the petitioner and the Tax Court valued each share of stock of P.38 on the basis of the
declaration made by the estate in its preliminary return. Patently, this should not have been the case, in view of

the fact that the ancillary administrator had reserved and availed of his legal right to have the properties of the
estate declared at their fair market value as of six months from the time the decedent died..
On the fifth issue, we shall consider the various deductions, from the allowance or disallowance of which by
the Tax Court, both petitioner and respondents have appealed..
Petitioner, in this regard, contends that no evidence of record exists to support the allowance of the sum of
P8,604.39 for the following expenses:.

1) Administrator's fee

P1,204.34

2) Attorney's fee

6,000.00

3) Judicial and Administrative expenses

2,052.55

Total Deductions

P8,604.39

An examination of the record discloses, however, that the foregoing items were considered deductible by the
Tax Court on the basis of their approval by the probate court to which said expenses, we may presume, had
also been presented for consideration. It is to be supposed that the probate court would not have approved said
items were they not supported by evidence presented by the estate. In allowing the items in question, the Tax
Court had before it the pertinent order of the probate court which was submitted in evidence by respondents.
(Exh. "AA-2", p. 100, record). As the Tax Court said, it found no basis for departing from the findings of the
probate court, as it must have been satisfied that those expenses were actually incurred. Under the
circumstances, we see no ground to reverse this finding of fact which, under Republic Act of California
National Association, which it would appear, that while still living, Walter G. Stevenson obtained we are not
inclined to pass upon the claim of respondents in respect to the additional amount of P86.52 for funeral
expenses which was disapproved by the court a quo for lack of evidence.
In connection with the deduction of P652.50 representing the amount of realty taxes paid in 1951 on the
decedent's two parcels of land in Baguio City, which respondents claim was disallowed by the Tax Court, we
find that this claim has in fact been allowed. What happened here, which a careful review of the record will
reveal, was that the Tax Court, in itemizing the liabilities of the estate, viz:

1) Administrator's fee

P1,204.34

2) Attorney's fee

6,000.00

3) Judicial and Administration expenses as of August 9,

2,052.55

1952

Total

P9,256.89

added the P652.50 for realty taxes as a liability of the estate, to the P1,400.05 for judicial and administration
expenses approved by the court, making a total of P2,052.55, exactly the same figure which was arrived at by
the Tax Court for judicial and administration expenses. Hence, the difference between the total of P9,256.98
allowed by the Tax Court as deductions, and the P8,604.39 as found by the probate court, which is P652.50,
the same amount allowed for realty taxes. An evident oversight has involuntarily been made in omitting the
P2,000.00 for funeral expenses in the final computation. This amount has been expressly allowed by the lower
court and there is no reason why it should not be. .
We come now to the other claim of respondents that pursuant to section 89(b) (1) in relation to section 89(a)
(1) (E) and section 89(d), National Internal Revenue Code, the amount of P10,022.47 should have been
allowed the estate as a deduction, because it represented an indebtedness of the decedent incurred during his
lifetime. In support thereof, they offered in evidence a duly certified claim, presented to the probate court in
California by the Bank of California National Association, which it would appear, that while still living, Walter
G. Stevenson obtained a loan of $5,000.00 secured by pledge on 140,000 of his shares of stock in the
Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. (Exhs. "Q-Q4", pp. 53-59, record). The Tax Court disallowed this item on
the ground that the local probate court had not approved the same as a valid claim against the estate and
because it constituted an indebtedness in respect to intangible personal property which the Tax Court held to be
exempt from inheritance tax.
For two reasons, we uphold the action of the lower court in disallowing the deduction.
Firstly, we believe that the approval of the Philippine probate court of this particular indebtedness of the
decedent is necessary. This is so although the same, it is averred has been already admitted and approved by
the corresponding probate court in California, situs of the principal or domiciliary administration. It is true that
we have here in the Philippines only an ancillary administration in this case, but, it has been held, the
distinction between domiciliary or principal administration and ancillary administration serves only to
distinguish one administration from the other, for the two proceedings are separate and independent. 8 The
reason for the ancillary administration is that, a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore, have any
effect beyond the limits of the country in which it was granted. Hence, we have the requirement that before a
will duly probated outside of the Philippines can have effect here, it must first be proved and allowed before
our courts, in much the same manner as wills originally presented for allowance therein. 9 And the estate shall
be administered under letters testamentary, or letters of administration granted by the court, and disposed of
according to the will as probated, after payment of just debts and expenses of administration. 10 In other words,
there is a regular administration under the control of the court, where claims must be presented and approved,
and expenses of administration allowed before deductions from the estate can be authorized. Otherwise, we
would have the actuations of our own probate court, in the settlement and distribution of the estate situated
here, subject to the proceedings before the foreign court over which our courts have no control. We do not
believe such a procedure is countenanced or contemplated in the Rules of Court.
Another reason for the disallowance of this indebtedness as a deduction, springs from the provisions of Section
89, letter (d), number (1), of the National Internal Revenue Code which reads:
(d) Miscellaneous provisions (1) No deductions shall be allowed in the case of a non-resident not a
citizen of the Philippines unless the executor, administrator or anyone of the heirs, as the case may be,

includes in the return required to be filed under section ninety-three the value at the time of his death
of that part of the gross estate of the non-resident not situated in the Philippines."
In the case at bar, no such statement of the gross estate of the non-resident Stevenson not situated in the
Philippines appears in the three returns submitted to the court or to the office of the petitioner Collector of
Internal Revenue. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the revenue officer to determine how much of
the indebtedness may be allowed to be deducted, pursuant to (b), number (1) of the same section 89 of the
Internal Revenue Code which provides:
(b) Deductions allowed to non-resident estates. In the case of a non-resident not a citizen of the
Philippines, by deducting from the value of that part of his gross estate which at the time of his death
is situated in the Philippines
(1) Expenses, losses, indebtedness, and taxes. That proportion of the deductions specified in
paragraph (1) of subjection (a) of this section11 which the value of such part bears the value of his
entire gross estate wherever situated;"
In other words, the allowable deduction is only to the extent of the portion of the indebtedness which is
equivalent to the proportion that the estate in the Philippines bears to the total estate wherever situated. Stated
differently, if the properties in the Philippines constitute but 1/5 of the entire assets wherever situated, then
only 1/5 of the indebtedness may be deducted. But since, as heretofore adverted to, there is no statement of the
value of the estate situated outside the Philippines, no part of the indebtedness can be allowed to be deducted,
pursuant to Section 89, letter (d), number (1) of the Internal Revenue Code.
For the reasons thus stated, we affirm the ruling of the lower court disallowing the deduction of the alleged
indebtedness in the sum of P10,022.47.
In recapitulation, we hold and declare that:
(a) only the one-half (1/2) share of the decedent Stevenson in the conjugal partnership property
constitutes his hereditary estate subject to the estate and inheritance taxes;
(b) the intangible personal property is not exempt from inheritance tax, there existing no complete
total reciprocity as required in section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, nor is the
decedent's estate entitled to an exemption of P4,000.00 in the computation of the estate tax;
(c) for the purpose of the estate and inheritance taxes, the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao
Mother Lode Mines, Inc. are to be appraised at P0.325 per share; and
(d) the P2,000.00 for funeral expenses should be deducted in the determination of the net asset of the
deceased Stevenson.
In all other respects, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is affirmed.
Respondent's claim for interest on the amount allegedly overpaid, if any actually results after a recomputation
on the basis of this decision is hereby denied in line with our recent decision in Collector of Internal Revenue
v. St. Paul's Hospital (G.R. No. L-12127, May 29, 1959) wherein we held that, "in the absence of a statutory
provision clearly or expressly directing or authorizing such payment, and none has been cited by respondents,
the National Government cannot be required to pay interest."

WHEREFORE, as modified in the manner heretofore indicated, the judgment of the lower court is hereby
affirmed in all other respects not inconsistent herewith. No costs. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Gutierrez David, Paredes and
Dizon, JJ., concur.
G.R. Nos. 95122-23

May 31, 1991

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION),

BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE
COMMISSIONER JORGE V. SARMIENTO, ACTING ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER REGINO R.
SANTIAGO, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO
MAGAHOM and BENJAMIN KALAW, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA, Presiding Judge, RTC Manila, Branch 29, WILLIAM T.
GATCHALIAN,respondents.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION),
BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE
COMMISSIONER JORGE V. SARMIENTO, ACTING ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER REGINO R.
SANTIAGO, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO
MAGAHOM and BENJAMIN KALAW, petitioners,
vs.
HON. TERESITA DIZON CAPULONG, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
DEE HUA T. GATCHALIAN, SHERWING T. GATCHALIAN, KENNETH T. GATCHALIAN,
REXLON T. GATCHALIAN, and WESLIE T. GATCHALIAN, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 95612-13

May 31, 1991

WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN, petitioner,

vs.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), et
al., respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
edesma, Saludo & Associates for respondent William Gatchalian.
Cervo and Tanay Law Office for respondent T.D. Capulong, D.H.T. Gatchalian, et al.

BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the Solicitor General seeking 1) to set aside the
Resolution/Temporary Restraining Order dated September 7, 1990, issued by respondent Judge de la Rosa in
Civil Case No. 90-54214 which denied petitioners' motion to dismiss and restrained petitioners from
commencing or continuing with any of the proceedings which would lead to the deportation of respondent
William Gatchalian, docketed as D.C. No. 90-523, as well as the Order of respondent Judge Capulong dated
September 6, 1990 in Civil Case No. 3431-V-90 which likewise enjoined petitioners from proceeding with the
deportation charges against respondent Gatchalian, and 2) to prohibit respondent judges from further acting in
the aforesaid civil cases.

On October 23, 1990, respondent Gatchalian filed his Comment with Counter-Petition, docketed as G.R. Nos.
96512-13, alleging lack of jurisdiction on the part of respondent Board of Commissioners, et al., over his
person with prayer that he be declared a Filipino citizen, or in the alternative, to remand the case to the trial
court for further proceedings.
On December 13, 1990, petitioners filed their comment to respondent Gatchalian's counter-petition. The Court
considers the comment filed by respondent Gatchalian as answer to the petition and petitioners' comment as
answer to the counter-petition and gives due course to the petitions.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of his natural mother, Marciana
Gatchalian (Annex "1", counter-petition). Before the Citizenship Evaluation Board, Santiago Gatchalian
testified that he has five (5) children with his wife Chu Gim Tee, namely: Jose Gatchalian, Gloria Gatchalian,
Francisco Gatchalian, Elena Gatchalian and Benjamin Gatchalian (Annex "2", counter-petition).
On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian, then a twelve-year old minor, arrived in Manila from Hongkong
together with Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson, all surnamed Gatchalian. They had with them Certificates of
Registration and Identity issued by the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the
signature of the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino
citizens. Gloria and Francisco are the daughter and son, respectively, of Santiago Gatchalian; while William
and Johnson are the sons of Francisco.
After investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision dated July 6, 1961, admitting
William Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino citizens (Annex "C", petition). As a consequence thereof,
William Gatchalian was issued Identification Certificate No. 16135 by the immigration authorities on August
16, 1961 (Annex "D", petition).
On January 24, 1962, the then Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all decisions
purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal or on review motu proprio of
decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry. The same memorandum directed the Board of Commissioners to
review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Philippine citizen. Among those
cases was that of William and others.
On July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners, after a review motu proprio of the proceedings had in the
Board of Special Inquiry, reversed the decision of the latter and ordered the exclusion of, among others,
respondent Gatchalian (Annex "E", petition). A warrant of exclusion also dated July 6, 1962 was issued
alleging that "the decision of the Board of Commissioners dated July 6, 1962 . . . has now become final and
executory (Annex "F", petition).
The actual date of rendition of said decision by the Board of Commissioners (whether on July 6, 1962 or July
20, 1962) became the subject of controversy in the 1967 case of Arocha vs. Vivo (21 SCRA 532) wherein this
Court sustained the validity of the decision of the new Board of Commissioners having been promulgated on
July 6, 1962, or within the reglementary period for review.
Sometime in 1973, respondent Gatchalian, as well as the others covered by the July 6, 1962 warrant of
exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board of Special Inquiry where the deportion case against
them was assigned.

On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry recommended to the then Acting Commissioner Victor
Nituda the reversal of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board of Commissioners and the recall of the
warrants of arrest issued therein (Annex "5", counter-petition).
On March 15, 1973, Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an order reaffirming the July 6, 1961 decision of the
Board of Special Inquiry thereby admitting respondent Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen and recalled the warrant
of arrest issued against him (Annex "6", counter-petition).
On June 7, 1990, the acting director of the National Bureau of Investigation wrote the Secretary of Justice
recommending that respondent Gatchalian along with the other applicants covered by the warrant of exclusion
dated July 6, 1962 be charged with violation of Sec. 37 (a), pars. 1 and 2, in relation to Secs. 45 (c), and (d)
and (e) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, also known as the Immigration Act of 1940 (Annex "G",
petition).
On August 1, 1990, the Secretary of Justice indorsed the recommendation of the NBI to the Commissioner of
Immigration for investigation and immediate action (Annex "20", counter-petition).
On August 15, 1990, petitioner Commissioner Domingo of the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation *issued a mission order commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian (Annex "18",
counter-petition). The latter appeared before Commissioner Domingo on August 20, 1990 and was released on
the same day upon posting P200,000.00 cash bond.
On August 29, 1990, William Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 29, presided by respondent Judge dela Rosa, docketed as Civil Case
No. 90-54214.
On September 4, 1990, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 90-54214 alleging that respondent
judge has no jurisdiction over the Board of Commissioners and/or the Board of Special Inquiry. Nonetheless,
respondent judge dela Rosa issued the assailed order dated September 7, 1990, denying the motion to dismiss.
Meanwhile, on September 6, 1990, respondent Gatchalian's wife and minor children filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Br. 172, presided by respondent judge Capulong Civil Case No.
3431-V-90 for injunction with writ of preliminary injunction. The complaint alleged, among others, that
petitioners acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in the institution of deportation proceedings against
William. On the same day, respondent Capulong issued the questioned temporary restraining order restraining
petitioners from continuing with the deportation proceedings against William Gatchalian.
The petition is anchored on the following propositions: 1) respondent judges have no jurisdiction over
petitioners (Board of Commissioners, et al.,) and the subject matter of the case, appellate jurisdiction being
vested by BP 129 with the Court of Appeals; 2) assuming respondent judges have jurisdiction, they acted with
grave abuse of discretion in preempting petitioners in the exercise of the authority and jurisdiction to hear and
determine the deportation case against respondent Gatchalian, and in the process determine also his
citizenship; 3) respondent judge dela Rosa gravely abused his discretion in ruling that the issues raised in the
deportation proceedings are beyond the competence and jurisdiction of petitioners, thereby disregarding the
cases of Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca (supra), which put finality to the July 6, 1962 decision of the Board
of Commissioners that respondent Gatchalian is a Chinese citizen; and 4) respondent judge Capulong should
have dismissed Civil Case No. 3431-V-90 for forum-shopping.
In his counter-petition, William Gatchalian alleges among others that: 1) assuming that the evidence on record
is not sufficient to declare him a Filipino citizen, petitioners have no jurisdiction to proceed with the
deportation case until the courts shall have finally resolved the question of his citizenship; 2) petitioners can no
longer judiciously and fairly resolve the question of respondent's citizenship in the deportation case because of

their bias, pre-judgment and prejudice against him; and 3) the ground for which he is sought to be deported has
already prescribed.
For purposes of uniformity, the parties herein will be referred to in the order the petitions were filed.
Petitioners argue that under Sec. 9 (3) of BP 129, it is the Court of Appeals which has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgments or orders of quasi-judicial agencies, boards or commissions, such as the
Board of Commissioners and the Board of Special Inquiry.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that petitioners are not quasi-judicial agencies and are not in equal
rank with Regional Trial Courts.
Under Sec. 21 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction with this
Court and the Court of Appeals to issue "writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpusand injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions, . . ." Thus, the RTCs are
vested with the power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government.
It is true that under Sec. 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Court of Appeals is vested with
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, order, or awards of
Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, board or commission, except
those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1) of the third paragraph of and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
It does not provide, however, that said exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals extends
to all quasi-judicial agencies. The quasi-judicial bodies whose decisions are exclusively appealable to the
Court of Appeals are those which under the law, Republic Act No. 5434, or their enabling acts, are specifically
appealable to the Court of Appeals (Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. Court of Appeals, 171
SCRA 348 [1989]; Lupangco vs. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 848 [1988]). Thus, under Republic Act No.
5434, it is specifically provided that the decisions of the Land Registration Commission (LRC), the Social
Security Commission (SSC), Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), the Patent Office and the Agricultural Invention
Board are appealable to the Court of Appeals.
In the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force (supra), this Court clarified the matter when We ruled:
Under our Resolution dated January 11, 1983:
. . . The appeals to the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) from quasijudicial bodies shall continue to be governed by the provisions of Republic Act No. 5434
insofar as the same is not inconsistent with the provisions of B.P. Blg. 129.
The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 are as follows:
Sec. 1. Appeals from specified agencies. Any provision of existing law or Rules of Court to
the contrary notwithstanding, parties aggrieved by a final ruling, award, order, or decision, or
judgment of the Court of Agrarian Relations; the Secretary of Labor under Section 7 of
Republic Act Numbered Six hundred and two, also known as the "Minimum Wage Law"; the
Department of Labor under Section 23 of Republic Act Numbered Eight hundred seventyfive, also known as the "Industrial Peace Act"; the Land Registration Commission; the Social

Security Commission; the Civil Aeronautics Board; the Patent Office and the Agricultural
Inventions Board, may appeal therefrom to the Court of Appeals, within the period and in the
manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, mixed questions of
fact and law, or questions of law, or all three kinds of questions. From final judgments or
decisions of the Court of Appeals, the aggrieved party may appeal by certiorari to the
Supreme Court as provided under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Because of subsequent amendments, including the abolition of various special courts, jurisdiction over
quasi-judicial bodies has to be, consequently, determined by the corresponding amendatory statutes.
Under the Labor Code, decisions and awards of the National Labor Relations Commission are final
and executory, but, nevertheless, reviewable by this Court through a petition for certiorari and not by
way of appeal.
Under the Property Registration Decree, decision of the Commission of Land Registration, en
consulta, are appealable to the Court of Appeals.
The decisions of the Securities and Exchange Commission are likewise appealable to the Appellate
Court, and so are decisions of the Social Security Commission.
As a rule, where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of certain administrative bodies to
the Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts, in terms
of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter. (Emphasis supplied)
There are quasi-judicial agencies, as the National Labor Relations Commissions, whose decisions are directly
appealable to this Court. It is only when a specific law, as Republic Act No. 5434, provides appeal from certain
bodies or commissions to the Court of Appeals as the Land Registration Commission (LRC), Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and others, that the said commissions or boards may be considered co-equal
with the RTCs in terms of rank, stature and are logically beyond the control of the latter.
However, the Bureau of Immigration (or CID) is not among those quasi-judicial agencies specified by law
whose decisions, orders, and resolutions are directly appealable to the Court of Appeals. In fact, its decisions
are subject to judicial review in accordance with Sec. 25, Chapter 4, Book VII of the 1987 Administrative
Code, which provides as follows:
Sec. 25. Judicial Review.(1) Agency decisions shall be subject to judicial review in accordance with
this chapter and applicable laws.
xxx

xxx

xxx

(6) The review proceeding shall be filed in the court specified in the statute or, in the absence thereof,
in any court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of the Rules of
Court.
Said provision of the Administrative Code, which is subsequent to B.P. Blg. 129 and which thus modifies the
latter, provides that the decision of an agency like the Bureau of Immigration should be subject to review by
the court specified by the statute or in the absence thereof, it is subject to review by any court of competent
jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of the Rules of Court.
B.P. Blg. 129 did not intend to raise all quasi-judicial bodies to the same level or rank of the RTC except those
specifically provided for under the law as aforestated. As the Bureau of Immigration is not of equal rank as the

RTC, its decisions may be appealable to, and may be reviewed through a special civil action for certiorari by,
the RTC (Sec. 21, (1) BP 129).
True, it is beyond cavil that the Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and
hear cases against an alleged alien, and in the process, determine also their citizenship (Lao Gi vs. Court of
Appeals, 180 SCRA 756 [1989]). And a mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest the Board of
Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation proceedings (Miranda vs. Deportation Board, 94 Phil. 531
[1954]).
However, the rule enunciated in the above-cases admits of an exception, at least insofar as deportation
proceedings are concerned. Thus, what if the claim to citizenship of the alleged deportee is satisfactory?
Should the deportation proceedings be allowed to continue or should the question of citizenship be ventilated
in a judicial proceeding? In Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board (96 Phil. 665 [1955]), this Court answered the
question in the affirmative, and We quote:
When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate
review should also be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings.
A citizen is entitled to live in peace, without molestation from any official or authority, and if he is
disturbed by a deportation proceeding, he has the unquestionable right to resort to the courts for his
protection, either by a writ of habeas corpus or of prohibition, on the legal ground that the Board lacks
jurisdiction. If he is a citizen and evidence thereof is satisfactory, there is no sense nor justice in
allowing the deportation proceedings to continue, granting him the remedy only after the Board has
finished its investigation of his undesirability.
. . . And if the right (to peace) is precious and valuable at all, it must also be protected on time, to
prevent undue harassment at the hands of ill-meaning or misinformed administrative officials. Of what
use is this much boasted right to peace and liberty if it can be availed of only after the Deportation
Board has unjustly trampled upon it, besmirching the citizen's name before the bar of public
opinion? (Emphasis supplied)
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction of petitioners Board of Commissioners over deportation proceedings is,
therefore, not without exception (Calacday vs. Vivo, 33 SCRA 413 [1970]; Vivo vs. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155
[1967]). Judicial intervention, however, should be granted only in cases where the "claim of citizenship is so
substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct. In other words, the remedy
should be allowed only on sound discretion of a competent court in a proper proceeding (Chua Hiong vs.
Deportation Board, supra; Co. vs. Deportation Board, 78 SCRA 107 [1977]). It appearing from the records that
respondent's claim of citizenship is substantial, as We shall show later, judicial intervention should be allowed.
In the case at bar, the competent court which could properly take cognizance of the proceedings instituted by
respondent Gatchalian would nonetheless be the Regional Trial Court and not the Court of Appeals in view of
Sec. 21 (1), BP 129, which confers upon the former jurisdiction over actions for prohibition concurrently with
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court and in line with the pronouncements of this Court in Chua
Hiong and Cocases.
Ordinarily, the case would then be remanded to the Regional Trial Court. But not in the case at
bar. Considering the voluminous pleadings submitted by the parties and the evidence presented, We deem it
proper to decide the controversy right at this instance. And this course of action is not without precedent for "it
is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single
proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful purpose will be served if
this case is remanded to the trial court only to have its decision raised again to the Court of Appeals and from
there to this Court" (Marquez vs. Marquez, 73 Phil. 74; Keramic Industries, Inc. vs. Guerrero, 61 SCRA 265
1wphi1

[1974]) Alger Electric, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (135 SCRA 37 [1985]), citing Gayos vs. Gayos (67 SCRA
146 [1975]).
In Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 357 [1988]), We also stated:
Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the
court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many occasions, the
Court, in the public interest and the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the
merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as where the ends of
justice would not be subserved by the remand of the case or when public interest demands an early
disposition of the case or where the trial court had already received all the evidence of the parties
(Quisumbing vs. CA, 112 SCRA 703; Francisco, et al., vs. The City of Davao, et al., supra; Republic
vs. Security Credit & Acceptance Corp., et al., 19 SCRA 58; Samal vs. CA, supra; Republic vs.
Central Surety & Insurance Co., 25 SCRA 641).
Likewise in Tejones vs. Gironella (159 SCRA 100 [1988]), We said:
Sound practice seeks to accommodate the theory which avoids waste of time, effort and expense, both
to the parties and the government, not to speak of delay in the disposal of the case (cf. Fernandez vs.
Garcia, 92 Phil. 592, 297). A marked characterstic of our judicial set-up is that where the dictates of
justice so demand . . . the Supreme Court should act, and act with finality (Li Siu Liat vs. Republic, 21
SCRA 1039, 1046, citing Samal vs. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and US vs. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74.) (Beautifont,
Inc. vs. Court of appeals, et al., Jan. 29, 1988; See also Labo vs. Commission on Elections, 176 SCRA
1 [1989]).
Respondent Gatchalian has adduced evidence not only before the Regional Trial Court but also before Us in
the form of public documents attached to his pleadings. On the other hand, Special Prosecutor Renato Mabolo
in his Manifestation (dated September 6, 1990; Rollo, p. 298, counter-petition) before the Bureau of
Immigration already stated that there is no longer a need to adduce evidence in support of the deportation
charges against respondent. In addition, petitioners invoke that this Court's decision in Arocha vs.
Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca (supra), has already settled respondent's alienage. Hence, the need for a judicial
determination of respondent's citizenship specially so where the latter is not seeking admission, but is already
in the Philippines (for the past thirty [30] years) and is being expelled (Chua Hiong vs. Deportation
Board, supra).
According to petitioners, respondent's alienage has been conclusively settled by this Court in
the Arocha and Vivocases, We disagree. It must be noted that in said cases, the sole issue resolved therein was
the actual date of rendition of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then board of Commissioners, i.e., whether the
decision was rendered on July 6, 1962 or on July 20, 1962 it appearing that the figure (date) "20" was erased
and over it was superimposed the figure "6" thereby making the decision fall within the one-year reglementary
period from July 6, 1961 within which the decision may be reviewed. This Court did not squarely pass upon
any question of citizenship, much less that of respondent's who was not a party in the aforesaid cases. The said
cases originated from a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on July 21, 1965 by Macario Arocha in behalf
of Pedro Gatchalian. Well settled is the rule that a person not party to a case cannot be bound by a decision
rendered therein.
Neither can it be argued that the Board of Commissioners' decision (dated July 6, 1962) finding respondent's
claim to Philippine citizenship not satisfactorily proved, constitute res judicata. For one thing, said decision
did not make any categorical statement that respondent Gatchalian is a Chinese. Secondly, the doctrine of res
judicatadoes not apply to questions of citizenship (Labo vs. Commission on Elections (supra); citing Soria vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, 37 SCRA 213; Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 42 SCRA 561 [1971];
Sia Reyes vs. Deportation Board, 122 SCRA 478 [1983]).

In Moy Ya Lim vs. Commissioner of Immigration (41 SCRA 292 [1971]) and in Lee vs. Commissioner of
Immigration (supra), this Court declared that:
(e)verytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,
whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the
occasion may demand.
An exception to the above rule was laid by this Court in Burca vs. Republic (51 SCRA 248 [1973]), viz:
We declare it to be a sound rule that where the citizenship of a party in a case is definitely resolved by
a court or by an administrative agency, as a material issue in the controversy, after a full-blown
hearing with the active participation of the Solicitor General or his authorized representative, and this
finding or the citizenship of the party is affirmed by this Court, the decision on the matter shall
constitute conclusive proof of such party's citizenship in any other case or proceeding. But it is made
clear that in no instance will a decision on the question of citizenship in such cases be considered
conclusive or binding in any other case or proceeding, unless obtained in accordance with the
procedure herein stated.
Thus, in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be
present: 1) a person's citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a
party; 2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof, and 3)
the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Gauged by the foregoing, We find the pre-conditions set forth in Burca inexistent in the Arocha and Vivo cases
relied upon by petitioners. Indeed, respondent William Gatchalian was not even a party in said cases.
Coming now to the contention of petitioners that the arrest of respondent follows as a matter of consequence
based on the warrant of exclusion issued on July 6, 1962, coupled with the Arocha and Vivo cases (Rollo, pp.
33), the Court finds the same devoid of merit.
Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise known as the Immigration Act of 1940,
reads:
Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant
of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioner of the
existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien. (Emphasis supplied)
From a perusal of the above provision, it is clear that in matters of implementing the Immigration Act insofar
as deportation of aliens are concerned, the Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only
after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged
against the alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid,
must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the
Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and void for
being unconstitutional (Ang Ngo Chiong vs. Galang, 67 SCRA 338 [1975] citing Po Siok Pin vs. Vivo, 62
SCRA 363 [1975]; Vivo vs. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155; Morano vs. Vivo, 20 SCRA 562; Qua Chee Gan vs.
Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 [1963]; Ng Hua To vs. Galang, 10 SCRA 411; see also Santos vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, 74 SCRA 96 [1976]).

As We held in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board (supra), "(t)he constitution does not distinguish warrants
between a criminal case and administrative proceedings. And if one suspected of having committed a crime is
entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a
violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee?" It is not indispensable that the alleged alien be
arrested for purposes of investigation. If the purpose of the issuance of the warrant of arrest is to determine the
existence of probable cause, surely, it cannot pass the test of constitutionality for only judges can issue the
same (Sec. 2, Art. III, Constitution).
A reading of the mission order/warrant of arrest (dated August 15, 1990; Rollo, p. 183, counter-petition) issued
by the Commissioner of Immigration, clearly indicates that the same was issued only for purposes of
investigation of the suspects, William Gatchalian included. Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the mission order directs the
Intelligence Agents/Officers to:
xxx

xxx

xxx

1. Make a warrantless arrest under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 113, Sec. 5, for violation of
the Immigration Act, Sec. 37, para. a; Secs. 45 and 46 Administrative Code;
xxx

xxx

xxx

3. Deliver the suspect to the Intelligence Division and immediately conduct custodial interrogation,
after warning the suspect that he has a right to remain silent and a right to counsel; . . .
Hence, petitioners' argument that the arrest of respondent was based, ostensibly, on the July 6, 1962 warrant of
exclusion has obviously no leg to stand on. The mission order/warrant of arrest made no mention that the same
was issued pursuant to a final order of deportation or warrant of exclusion.
But there is one more thing that militates against petitioners' cause. As records indicate, which petitioners
conveniently omitted to state either in their petition or comment to the counter-petition of respondent,
respondent Gatchalian, along with others previously covered by the 1962 warrant of exclusion, filed a motion
for re-hearing before the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) sometime in 1973.
On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry, after giving due course to the motion for re-hearing,
submitted a memorandum to the then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda (Annex "5", counter-petition)
recommending 1 the reconsideration of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board of Commissioners which
reversed the July 6, 1961 decision of the then Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 and 2 the lifting of the warrants
of arrest issued against applicants. The memorandum inferred that the "very basis of the Board of
Commissioners in reversing the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry was due to a forged cablegram by the
then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, . . ., which was dispatched to the Philippine Consulate in Hong Kong
authorizing the registration of applicants as P.I. citizens." The Board of Special Inquiry concluded that "(i)f at
all, the cablegram only led to the issuance of their Certificate(s) of Identity which took the place of a passport
for their authorized travel to the Philippines. It being so, even if the applicants could have entered illegally, the
mere fact that they are citizens of the Philippines entitles them to remain in the country."
On March 15, 1973, then Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an Order (Annex "6", counter-petition) which
affirmed the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 decision dated July 6, 1961 admitting respondent Gatchalian and
others as Filipino citizens; recalled the July 6, 1962 warrant of arrest and revalidated their Identification
Certificates.

The above order admitting respondent as a Filipino citizen is the last official act of the government on the basis
of which respondent William Gatchalian continually exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to the present.
Consequently, the presumption of citizenship lies in favor of respondent William Gatchalian.
There should be no question that Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, is a Filipino citizen.
As a matter of fact, in the very order of the BOC of July 6, 1962, which reversed the July 6, 1961 BSI order, it
is an accepted fact that Santiago Gatchalian is a Filipino. The opening paragraph of said order states:
The claim to Filipino citizenship of abovenamed applicants is based on the citizenship of one Santiago
Gatchalian whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an Order
dated July 12, 1960. (Annex "37", Comment with Counter-Petition).
Nonetheless, in said order it was found that the applicants therein have not satisfactorily proven that they are
the children and/or grandchildren of Santiago Gatchalian. The status of Santiago Gatchalian as a Filipino was
reiterated in Arocha and Arca (supra) where advertence is made to the "applicants being the descendants of
one Santiago Gatchalian, a Filipino." (at p. 539).
In the sworn statement of Santiago Gatchalian before the Philippine Consul in Hongkong in 1961 (Annex "1"
to the Comment of petitioners to Counter-Petition), he reiterated his status as a Philippine citizen being the
illegitimate child of Pablo Pacheco and Marciana Gatchalian, the latter being a Filipino; that he was born in
Manila on July 25, 1905; and that he was issued Philippine Passport No. 28160 (PA-No. A91196) on
November 18, 1960 by the Department of Foreign Affairs in Manila. In his affidavit of January 23, 1961
(Annex "5", counter-petition), Santiago reiterated his claim of Philippine citizenship as a consequence of his
petition for cancellation of his alien registry which was granted on February 18, 1960 in C.E.B. No. 3660-L;
and that on July 20, 1960, he was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a Filipino and was issued
Certificate No. 1-2123.
The dissenting opinions of my esteemed brethrens, Messrs. Justices F.P. Feliciano and H.G. Davide, Jr.,
proposing to re-open the question of citizenship of Santiago Gatchalian at this stage of the case, where it is not
even put in issue, is quite much to late. As stated above, the records of the Bureau of Immigration show that as
of July 20, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian had been declared to be a Filipino citizen. It is a final decision that
forecloses a re-opening of the same 30 years later. Petitioners do not even question Santiago Gatchalian's
Philippine citizenship. It is the citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian that is in issue and addressed for
determination of the Court in this case.
Furthermore, petitioners' position is not enhanced by the fact that respondent's arrest came twenty-eight (28)
years after the alleged cause of deportation arose. Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that deportation
"shall not be effected . . . unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years after the
cause of deportation arises." In Lam Shee vs. Bengzon (93 Phil. 1065 [1953]), We laid down the consequences
of such inaction, thus:
There is however an important circumstance which places this case beyond the reach of the resultant
consequence of the fraudulent act committed by the mother of the minor when she admitted that she
gained entrance into the Philippines by making use of the name of a Chinese resident merchant other
than that of her lawful husband, and that is, that the mother can no longer be the subject of
deportation proceedings for the simple reason that more than 5 years had elapsed from the date of her
admission. Note that the above irregularity was divulged by the mother herself, who in a gesture of
sincerity, made an spontaneous admission before the immigration officials in the investigation
conducted in connection with the landing of the minor on September 24, 1947, and not through any
effort on the part of the immigration authorities. And considering this frank admission, plus the fact
that the mother was found to be married to another Chinese resident merchant, now deceased, who
owned a restaurant in the Philippines valued at P15,000 and which gives a net profit of P500 a month,

the immigration officials then must have considered the irregularity not serious enough when, inspire
of that finding, they decided to land said minor "as a properly documented preference quota
immigrant" (Exhibit D). We cannot therefore but wonder why two years later the immigration officials
would reverse their attitude and would take steps to institute deportation proceedings against the
minor.
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we believe that much as the attitude of the mother
would be condemned for having made use of an improper means to gain entrance into the Philippines
and acquire permanent residence there, it is now too late, not to say unchristian, to deport the minor
after having allowed the mother to remain even illegally to the extent of validating her residence by
inaction, thus allowing the period of prescription to set in and to elapse in her favor. To permit his
deportation at this late hour would be to condemn him to live separately from his mother through no
fault of his thereby leaving him to a life of insecurity resulting from lack of support and protection of
his family. This inaction or oversight on the part of immigration officials has created an anomalous
situation which, for reasons of equity, should be resolved in favor of the minor herein involved.
(Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, petitioners' alleged cause of action and deportation against herein respondent arose in 1962.
However, the warrant of arrest of respondent was issued by Commissioner Domingo only on August 15, 1990
28 long years after. It is clear that petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed and by their inaction
could not now be validly enforced by petitioners against respondent William Gatchalian. Furthermore, the
warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 was already recalled and the Identification certificate of respondent,
among others, was revalidated on March 15, 1973 by the then Acting Commissioner Nituda.
It is also proposed in the dissenting opinions of Messrs. Justices Feliciano and Davide, Jr., that the BOC
decision dated July 6, 1962 and the warrant of exclusion which was found to be valid in Arocha should be
applicable to respondent William Gatchalian even if the latter was not a party to said case. They also opined
that under Sec. 37 (b) of the Immigration Act, the five (5) years limitation is applicable only where the
deportation is sought to be effected under clauses of Sec. 37 (b) other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 and that
no period of limitation is applicable in deportations under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12.
The Court disagrees. Under Sec. 39 of the Immigration Act, it is reiterated that such deportation proceedings
should be instituted within five (5) years. Section 45 of the same Act provides penal sanctions for violations of
the offenses therein enumerated with a fine of "not more than P1,000.00 and imprisonment for not more than
two (2) years and deportation if he is an alien." Thus:
Penal Provisions
Sec. 45. Any individual who
(a) When applying for an immigration document personates another individual, or falsely appears in
the name of deceased individual, or evades the immigration laws by appearing under an assumed
name; fictitious name; or
(b) Issues or otherwise disposes of an immigration document, to any person not authorized by law to
receive such document; or
(c) Obtains, accepts or uses any immigration document, knowing it to be false; or

(d) Being an alien, enters the Philippines without inspection and admission by the immigration
officials, or obtains entry into the Philippines by wilful, false, or misleading representation or wilful
concealment of a material fact; or
(e) Being an alien shall for any fraudulent purpose represent himself to be a Philippine citizen in order
to evade any requirement of the immigration laws; or
(f) In any immigration matter shall knowingly make under oath any false statement or representations;
or
(g) Being an alien, shall depart from the Philippines without first securing an immigration clearance
certificates required by section twenty-two of this Act; or
(h) Attempts or conspires with another to commit any of the foregoing acts, shall be guilty of an
offense, and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than one thousand pesos, and
imprisoned for not more than two years, and deported if he is an alien. (Emphasis supplied)
Such offenses punishable by correctional penalty prescribe in 10 years (Art. 90, Revised Penal Code);
correctional penalties also prescribe in 10 years (Art. 92, Revised Penal Code).
It must be noted, however, that under Sec. 1, Act No. 3326 [1926], as amended, (Prescription for Violations
Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances) "violations penalized by special acts shall, unless
otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: . . .c) after eight years for
those punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; . . ."
Consequently, no prosecution and consequent deportation for violation of the offenses enumerated in the
Immigration Act can be initiated beyond the eight-year prescriptive period, the Immigration Act being a special
legislation.
The Court, therefore, holds that the period of effecting deportation of an alien after entry or a warrant of
exclusion based on a final order of the BSI or BOC are not imprescriptible. The law itself provides for a period
of prescription. Prescription of the crime is forfeiture or loss of the rights of the State to prosecute the offender
after the lapse of a certain time, while prescription of the penalty is the loss or forfeiture by the government of
the right to execute the final sentence after the lapse of a certain time (Padilla, Criminal Law, Vol. 1, 1974, at p.
855).
"Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, however, considering
that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the
constitutional right of such person to due process should not be denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of
Court of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to deportation proceedings." (Lao Gi
vs. Court of Appeals, supra). Under Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a final judgment may not be
executed after the lapse of five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and
executory. Thereafter, it may be enforced only by a separate action subject to the statute of limitations. Under
Art. 1144 (3) of the Civil Code, an action based on judgment must be brought within 10 years from the time
the right of action accrues.
In relation to Sec. 37 (b) of the Immigration Act, the rule, therefore, is:
1. Deportation or exclusion proceedings should be initiated within five (5) years after the cause of deportation
or exclusion arises when effected under any other clauses other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 and of paragraph
(a) of Sec. 37 of the Immigration Act; and

2. When deportation or exclusion is effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of Sec. 37, the
prescriptive period of the deportation or exclusion proceedings is eight (8) years.
In the case at bar, it took petitioners 28 years since the BOC decision was rendered on July 6, 1962 before they
commenced deportation or exclusion proceedings against respondent William Gatchalian in 1990.
Undoubtedly, petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed. Neither may an action to revive and/or
enforce the decision dated July 6, 1962 be instituted after ten (10) years (Art. 1144 [3], Civil Code).
Since his admission as a Filipino citizen in 1961, respondent William Gatchalian has continuously resided in
the Philippines. He married Ting Dee Hua on July 1, 1973 (Annex "8", counter-petition) with whom he has
four (4) minor children. The marriage contract shows that said respondent is a Filipino (Annex "8"). He holds
passports and earlier passports as a Filipino (Annexes "9", "10" & "11", counter-petition). He is a registered
voter of Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he has long resided and exercised his right of suffrage (Annex 12,
counter-petition). He engaged in business in the Philippines since 1973 and is the director/officer of the
International Polymer Corp. and Ropeman International Corp. as a Filipino (Annexes, "13" & "14", counterpetition). He is a taxpayer. Respondent claims that the companies he runs and in which he has a controlling
investment provides livelihood to 4,000 employees and approximately 25,000 dependents. He continuously
enjoyed the status of Filipino citizenship and discharged his responsibility as such until petitioners initiated the
deportation proceedings against him.
"The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act by or under the authority of the sovereign
power. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is found to be injurious
to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people" (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, supra). How could
one who has helped the economy of the country by providing employment to some 4,000 people be considered
undesirable and be summarily deported when the government, in its concerted drive to attract foreign
investors, grants Special Resident Visa to any alien who invest at least US$50,000.00 in the country? Even
assuming arguendo that respondent is an alien, his deportation under the circumstances is unjust and unfair, if
not downright illegal. The action taken by petitioners in the case at bar is diametrically opposed to settled
government policy.
Petitioners, on the other hand, claim that respondent is an alien. In support of their position, petitioners point
out that Santiago Gatchalian's marriage with Chu Gim Tee in China as well as the marriage of Francisco (father
of William) Gatchalian to Ong Chiu Kiok, likewise in China, were not supported by any evidence other than
their own self-serving testimony nor was there any showing what the laws of China were. It is the postulate
advanced by petitioners that for the said marriages to be valid in this country, it should have been shown that
they were valid by the laws of China wherein the same were contracted. There being none, petitioners
conclude that the aforesaid marriages cannot be considered valid. Hence, Santiago's children, including
Francisco, followed the citizenship of their mother, having been born outside of a valid marriage. Similarly, the
validity of the Francisco's marriage not having been demonstrated, William and Johnson followed the
citizenship of their mother, a Chinese national.
After a careful consideration of petitioner's argument, We find that it cannot be sustained.
In Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil. 867 [1924]; Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 472; Yam Ka Lim
vs. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46 [1915]), this Court held that in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. In the case at bar,
there being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises the presumption that it is the same as that
of Philippine law.
The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed on Santiago Gatchalian much more on
respondent William Gatchalian who was then a twelve-year old minor. The fact is, as records indicate,
Santiago was not pressed by the Citizenship Investigation Board to prove the laws of China relating to

marriage, having been content with the testimony of Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was lost or
destroyed during the Japanese occupation of China. Neither was Francisco Gatchalian's testimony subjected to
the same scrutiny by the Board of Special Inquiry. Nevertheless, the testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and
Francisco Gatchalian before the Philippine consular and immigration authorities regarding their marriages,
birth and relationship to each other are not self-serving but are admissible in evidence as statements or
declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree (Sec. 34, Rule 130). Furtheremore,
this salutary rule of evidence finds support in substantive law. Thus, Art. 267 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of
status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws. (See also Art. 172 of the Family Code)
Consequently, the testimonies/affidavits of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian aforementioned are
not self-serving but are competent proof of filiation (Art. 172 [2], Family Code).
Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid where
celebrated is valid everywhere. Referring to marriages contracted abroad, Art. 71 of the Civil Code (now Art.
26 of the Family Code) provides that "(a)ll marriages performed outside of the Philippines in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country . . ." And any doubt as to the validity of the matrimonial unity and the extent as to how far the validity
of such marriage may be extended to the consequences of the coverture is answered by Art. 220 of the Civil
Code in this manner: "In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every
intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the
legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children,
and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression." (Emphasis supplied).
Bearing in mind the "processual presumption" enunciated in Miciano and other cases, he who asserts that the
marriage is not valid under our law bears the burden of proof to present the foreign law.
Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his
father Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter. Francisco, in turn is likewise a Filipino being the
legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who (the latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose Philippine
citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an order dated July 12, 1960.
Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens contemplated under Sec. 1,
Article IV of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. . . .
This forecloses any further question about the Philippine citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian.
The Court is not unaware of Woong Woo Yiu vs. Vivo (13 SCRA 552 [1965]) relied upon by petitioners. The
ruling arrived thereat, however, cannot apply in the case at bar for the simple reason that the parties therein
testified to have been married in China by a village leader, which undoubtedly is not among those authorized
to solemnize marriage as provided in Art. 56 of the Civil Code (now Art. 7, Family Code).
Premises considered, the Court deems it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by the parties.
WHEREFORE, G.R. Nos. 95122-23 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; G.R. Nos. 95612-13 is hereby
GRANTED and respondent William Gatchalian is declared a Filipino citizen. Petitioners are hereby

permanently enjoined from continuing with the deportation proceedings docketed as DC No. 90-523 for lack
of jurisdiction over respondent Gatchalian, he being a Filipino citizen; Civil Cases No. 90-54214 and 3431-V90 pending before respondent judges are likewise DISMISSED. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Gancayco, Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., and Narvasa, J., concur in the result.