FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 124554. December 9, 1997.]

ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION , petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and NORTH PHILIPPINE UNION
MISSION OF THE SEVENTH DAY ADVENTISTS, respondents.

Ruperto G. Martin & Associates and Donardo R. Paglinawan for petitioner.

Quasha, Ancheta, Pea & Nolasco for NPUM.
SYNOPSIS
In a land development agreement, Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation
(EGMPC) undertook to develop a parcel of land owned by the North Philippine Union
Mission of the Seventh Day Adventists (NPUM) into a memorial park subdivided into
lots. Later, the Maysilo Estate and the heirs of Vicente Singson Encarnacion claimed
ownership over the land. EGMPC led an action for interpleader against Maysilo
Estate and NPUM before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, while the
Singson heirs led an action for quieting of title against EGMPC and NPUM before
the same court. In the consolidated cases. the trial court in the interpleader case
dismissed the claims of the intervenors and declared the titles of NPUM valid. On
review. before the Court of Appeals the trial court's decision in the interpleader case
was armed, and the trial court's decision in the quieting of title case in favor of
the Singson heirs was reversed and set aside. On petition for review, the Supreme
Court settled with nality the ownership of the property to NPUM and remanded
the case to the Court of Appeals for mutual accounting. The Court of Appeals
referred, with concurrence of the parties, the accounting of the parties' respective
obligations to its accountant. On January 15, 1996, the CA in a resolution approved
the report of the Court's accountant. EGMPC received a copy of this Resolution on
January 22, 1996. On February 2, 1996, EGMPC led its Motion for Reconsideration.
On April 18, 1996, EGMPC received the appellate court's resolution of April 12, 1996
denying its Motion for Reconsideration. On April 29, 1996, EGMPC led a motion for
extension of time to le its Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition' and concurrently
paid the legal fees. On May 27, 1996, EGMPC led the instant recourse contending
that the appellate court, in appointing an accountant to make the computations.
delegated judicial function. NPUM, on the other hand, questions the timeliness of
the petition.
EGMPC's Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition Review was timely led on
April 29, 1996, such motion having been led eleven days from receipt of the
appellate court's denial of its motion for reconsideration. Supreme Court Circular
No. 10 dated August 28, 1986 on modes and periods of appeal provides the in the
event a motion for reconsideration is led and denied, the period of fteen days
begins to run again from notice of denial.

No judicial function was exercised by the accountant who was designated by the
court "to receive, collate and analyze the documents to be led by the parties." She
was not asked to rule on the admissibility of the evidence. While it may be true the
report, when adopted by the appellate court, became part of its decision, judicial
power lies, not with the ocial who prepared the report, but with the court itself
which wields the power of approval or rejection.
SYLLABUS
1.
REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; APPEALS; PERIOD TO APPEAL WHERE A MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION IS FILED. Supreme Court Circular No. 10 dated August
28, 1986 on modes and periods of appeal provides thus: (5) APPEALS BY
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT. In an appeal by certiorari to this Court
under Rule 45 of the Rules Court, Section 25 of the Interim Rules and Section 7 of
PD 1606, a party may le a petition for review on certiorari of the judgment of a
regional trial court, the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan within fteen days
from notice of judgment or the denial of his motion for reconsideration led in due
time, and paying at the same time the corresponding docket fee (Section 1 of Rule
45). In other words, in the event a motion for reconsideration is led and denied,
the period of fteen days begins to run again from notice of denial (See Codilla vs.
Estenzo, 97 SCRA 351; Turingan vs. Cacdad, 122 SCRA 634). A motion for extension
of time to le a petition for review on certiorari may be led with the Supreme
Court within the reglementary period, paying at the same time the corresponding
docket fee.
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FILING OF PETITION ON THE ELEVENTH DAY FROM DENIAL
OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, TIMELY; CASE AT BAR. EGMPC received a
copy of the January 15, 1996 Resolution on January 22, 1996. Twelve days from
such receipt, or on February 2, 1996, EGMPC led its Motion for Reconsideration. On
April 18, 1996, EGMPC received the appellate court's Resolution of April 12, 1996
denying its Motion for Reconsideration. On April 29, 1996, or eleven days from its
receipt of the denial of its motion for reconsideration, EGMPC led a motion for
extension of time to le its "Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition" and concurrently
paid the legal fees. We nd that EGMPC's Motion for Extension of Time to File a
Petition for Review was timely led on April 29, 1996, such motion having been
led eleven days from receipt of the appellate court's denial of its motion for
reconsideration.
3.
ID.; RULES OF COURT; LIBERALLY CONSTRUED IN THE INTEREST OF
JUSTICE. As the Court stated in Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
where the Court was liberal in its application of the Rules of Court in the interest of
justice: "It cannot . . . be claimed that this petition is being used as a substitute for
appeal after that remedy has been lost through the fault of petitioner. Moreover,
stripped of allegations of grave abuse of discretion, the petition actually avers errors
of judgment rather than of jurisdiction which are the subject of a petition for
review."

4.
ID.; ID.; FORUM SHOPPING; ABSENT WHERE THE RELIEFS SOUGHT ARE NOT
IDENTICAL. We next consider whether, as asserted by NPUM, EGMPC's petition
must be summarily dismissed on the ground of forum shopping. NPUM points to
EGMPC's Opposition and/or Comment to the Report of the Court of Appeals dated
May 31, 1996 led in G.R. No. 73794 vis-a-vis its Petition for Review in the instant
case, and the two Urgent Motions for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
led in G.R. No. 73794 and in the instant case. NPUM asserts that the reliefs sought
by EGMPC in its opposition and in its petition are 'identical." We disagree. The
petition here seeks the setting aside of the Court of Appeals' January 15, 1996 and
April 12, 1996 Resolutions. The Opposition in G.R. No. 73794, on the other hand,
sought the nullication of the May 31, 1996 Report and as a corollary, for the
instant case to be "allowed or tolerated." The opposition and the petition do not
seek to provoke from this Court the resolution of a same issue, the evil which
Revised Circular No. 28-91 and its companion Administrative Circular No. 04-94
address. We read the opposition in G.R. No. 73794 as a complement to the petition
here, to which it makes categorical and express reference. We consider it as merely
a matter of discourse and emphasis that Eternal Gardens reiterated its case in the
later pleading. Regarding the motions for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order led by EGMPC on January 10, 1997 in the instant case and on January 17,
1997 in G.R. No. 73794, we consider the exigency which may have prompted
EGMPC to le the motions in both cases. The trial court in the case of origin, acted
favorably on NPUM's motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, the basis of
which is the alleged nality of the appellate court's January 15, 1996 Resolution.
The trial court ruled that the instant case denominated as an original action for
certiorari "does not interrupt the course of the principal action [G.R. No. 73794] nor
the running of the period in the proceeding." To not stay the execution considering
the trial court's ratiocination would render moot EGMPC's remedy in the instant
case.
5.
CRIMINAL LAW; PERJURY; CERTIFICATION UNDER OATH THAT THERE IS NO
OTHER CASE PENDING IN ANY COURT OR TRIBUNAL WITH THE SAME ISSUES IN
THIS CASE; NO CRIMINAL LIABILITY WHERE IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT THE PARTY
WAS TO PURSUE TWO CASES CONCURRENTLY. NPUM also contends that EGMPC
has committed perjury, pointing to the certication under oath led by EGMPC,
through its President Gabriel O. Vida, where he states "that there is no other case
pending in any court or tribunal in the Philippines, with the same issues in .this case
. . .." Again, we disagree. It does not appear that EGMPC was to pursue the two
cases concurrently. EGMPC led this new petition, and did not assail the appellate
court's resolution under G.R. No. 73794, as in fact the Court has informed the
parties that no further pleadings were to be entertained in G.R. No. 73794 after
remand to the Court of Appeals.
6.
REMEDIAL LAW; COURT OF APPEALS; WITH AUTHORITY TO DESIGNATE AN
ACCOUNTANT TO RECEIVE, COLLATE AND ANALYZE DOCUMENT TO BE SUBMITTED
BY THE PARTIES. Under the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, that
court has the authority to receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary
for the resolution of factual issues raised in cases falling within its original
jurisdiction. For the proper disposition of the case, the appellate court, under the

above-quoted authority, designated an accountant "to receive, collate and analyze

the documents to be filed by the parties."
7.
ID.; ID.; ID.; COURT RETAINS JUDICIAL POWER. While it may be true that
the report, when adopted by the appellate court, became part of its decision, judicial
power lies, not with the ocial who prepared the report, but with the court itself
which wields the power of approval or rejection. Under American jurisprudence, the
rule is thus It would seem on principle that a commissioner, master or referee
appointed by a court to aid it in the adjudication of a particular case is not a court
when performing the functions assigned to him, although the court may adopt his
conclusions in its decision . . .. It has, for instance, been held that a statute giving
the Supreme Court of a state the power to appoint commissioners thereof whose
duty shall be, under such rules and regulations as the court may adopt, to assist it in
the performance of its functions, and in disposing of undetermined cases before it, is
not unconstitutional or open to the objection that the commissioners are vested
with judicial power, since the commissioners merely report facts found and
conclusions reached, and the court retains the power to decide which is the only
judicial power. It has also been pointed out that a chancellor does not, by referring a
matter to a commissioner, delegate his judicial function to him. The commissioner is
appointed for the purpose of assisting the chancellor, not to supplant or replace him,
and the ndings of a commissioner are merely advisory and not binding on the
court.

8.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS; NOT DENIED
WHERE A PARTY WAS GIVEN EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT ITS CASE.
EGMPC also contends that it was deprived of due process because it "was not given
reasonable opportunity to know and meet the claim of [NPUM] as its counsel was
not able to cross-examine the American Accountant of [NPUM]." The contention is
without merit. Contrary to EGMPC's claim, it was given every opportunity to
present its case. At the outset, the parties were asked by the appellate court to
submit documents for accounting. NPUM made full utilization of the modes of
discovery, asking the appellate court to subpoena documents and testimonies, and
requesting admissions from EGMPC regarding documents it (EGMPC) had in its
possession, documents which emanated from the corporation itself, and either sent
to NPUM as communiqus, such as the Letter of Mr. Vida dated April 4, 1980 to
Pastor Bienvenida Capule of NPUM stating inter alia that for 1978, EGMPC sold
2,805 memorial lots and that during the rst quarter of 1980 the corporation sold
2,418 lots, totalling 10,730, or documents available to the general public, as in the
Price Lists, or led with government oces, specically the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Bureau of Internal Revenue. EGMPC cannot claim that it was
denied the forum to confer with NPUM and NPUM's accountant. The appellate court
had arranged conferences for the parties and their accountants to allow them to
discuss with each other and with Ms. Angelo. Even Ms. Angelo in her Letter dated
November 10, 1995 covering her second and final report spoke of such a conference.
9.

CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; PARTIES BOUND BY THEIR

STIPULATIONS. EGMPC lastly contends that it is not liable for interest. It claims
that it was justied in withholding payment as there was still the unresolved issue
of ownership over the property subject of the Land Development Agreement of
October 6, 1976. The argument is without merit. EGMPC under the agreement had
the obligation to remit monthly to NPUM forty percent (40%) for its net gross
collection from the development of a memorial park on property owned by NPUM.
The same agreement provided for the designation of a depository/trustee bank to
act as the depository/trustee for all funds collected by EGMPC. There was no
obstacle, legal or otherwise, to the compliance by EGMPC of this provision in the
contract, even on the aectation that it did not know to whom payment was to be
made.
10.
ID.; ID.; CONSIGNATION; RATIONALE. Consignation produces the eect of
payment The rationale for consignation is to avoid the performance of an obligation
becoming more onerous to the debtor by reason of causes not imputable to him.
11.
ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO CONSIGN AMOUNTS DUE RENDER PARTY LIABLE
FOR INTEREST. For its failure to consign the amounts due, Eternal Gardens'
obligation to NPUM necessarily became more onerous as it became liable for
interest on the amounts it failed to remit.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J :
p

This case is the derivative of G.R. No. 73794, which was decided by the Second
Division of this Court on September 19, 1988. 1
The antecedents are as follows:

Petitioner EGMPC and private respondent NPUM entered into a Land Development
Agreement dated October 6, 1976. Under the agreement, EGMPC was to develop a
parcel of land owned by NPUM into a memorial park subdivided into lots. The parties
further agreed
(d)
THAT the FIRST PARTY shall receive forty (40%) percent of the gross
collection less Perpetual Care Fees (which in no case shall exceed 10% of the
price per lot unless otherwise agreed upon by both parties in writing) or Net
Gross Collection (NGC) from this project. This shall be remitted monthly by
the SECOND PARTY in the following manner: (i) Forty (40%) percent of the
NGC, plus (ii) if it becomes necessary for the FIRST PARTY to vacate the
property earlier than two years from the date of this agreement, at the
option of the FIRST PARTY, an additional amount equivalent to twenty (20%)
percent of the NGC as cash advance for the rst four (4) years with interest
at twelve (12%) percent per annum which cash advance shall be deductible
out of the proceeds from the FIRST PARTY's 40% from the 5th year onward.
The SECOND PARTY further agrees that if the FIRST PARTY shall desire to

have its projected receivables collected at the 5th year, the SECOND PARTY
shall assist in having the same discounted in advance.
cda

The P1.5 million initial payment mentioned in the Deed of Absolute Sale,
covering the rst phase of the project, shall be deducted out of the
proceeds from the FIRST PARTY's 40% at the end of the 5th year.
Subsequent payments made by the SECOND PARTY on account of the
stated purchase price in said Deed of Absolute Sale shall be charged against
what is due to the FIRST PARTY under this LAND DEVELOPMENT
AGREEMENT. 3

Later, two claimants of the parcel of land surfaced Maysilo Estate and the heirs of
a certain Vicente Singson Encarnacion. EGMPC thus led an action for interpleader
against Maysilo Estate and NPUM, docketed as Civil Case No. 9556 before the
Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 120. The Singson heirs in turn led an
action for quieting of title against EGMPC and NPUM, docketed as Civil Case No. C11836 before Branch 122 of the same court.
From these two cases, several proceedings ensued. One such case, from the
interpleader action, culminated in the ling and subsequent resolution of G.R. No.
73794. In G.R. No. 73794, EGMPC assailed the appellate court's resolution requiring
"petitioner Eternal Gardens [to] deposit whatever amounts are due from it under
the Land Development Agreement with a reputable bank to be designated by the
respondent court." 4
In the Decision of September 19, 1988, the court ruled thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, (a) the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit; (b)
this case (together with all the claims of the intervenors on the merits) is
REMANDED to the lower court for further proceedings; and (c) the
Resolution of the Third Division of this Court of July 8, 1987 requiring the
deposit by the petitioner (see footnote 6) 5 of the amounts contested in a
depository bank STANDS (the Motion for Reconsideration thereof being
hereby DENIED for reasons already discussed) until after the decision on the
merits shall have become final and executory.

Entry of judgment was made on April 24, 1989. 6

Sometime thereafter, the trial court rendered decisions in Civil Case Nos. 9556
(interpleader) and C-11836 (quieting of title). These decisions were appealed to the
Court of Appeals, and the appeals were consolidated.
The appellate court rendered judgment in the consolidated case on December 17,
1991 as follows: (a.) the trial court's decision in Civil Case No. 9556 was armed
insofar as it dismissed the claims of the intervenors, including the Maysilo Estate
and the titles of NPUM to the subject parcel of land were declared valid; and (b.) the
trial court's decision in Civil Case No. C-11836 in favor of the Singson heirs was
reversed and set aside. 7
From the consolidated decision, the Singson heirs, Maysilo Estate and EGMPC each

led with this Court their petitions for review on certiorari. The petition led by the
Singson heirs docketed as G.R. No. 103247-48 was denied for failure to comply with
Circular No. 28-91, 8 and entry of judgment made on July 27, 1992, G.R. No.
105159 led by the Maysilo Estate was denied for failure of petitioner to raise
substantial legal issues, 9 and entry of judgment made on August 19, 1992, G.R.
Nos. 103230-31 led by EGMPC was denied for failure to comply with Circular No.
19-91, 10 and entry of judgment made on July 20, 1993. EGMPC's other petition,
this time under Rule 65, docketed as G.R. Nos. 107646-47 was dismissed for having
been filed out of time and for lack of merit.
Following these, the Court, through the Third Division, issued a Resolution dated
December 1, 1993 in G.R. No. 73794, thus:
WHEREFORE, considering that the ownership of the property in dispute has
now been settled with nality, the Court sees no further legal obstacle in
carrying out the respective covenants of the parties to the Land
Development Agreement. . . . In respect to the mutual accounting required
to determine the remaining accrued rights and liabilities of said parties, the
case is hereby remanded to the Court of Appeals for proper determination
and disposition.
All other incidental motions involving G.R. No. 73794, still pending with this
Court, are hereby, declared MOOT and are NOTED WITHOUT ACTION. 11

In compliance with the Supreme Court resolution, the Court of Appeals proceeded
with the disposition of the case, docketed therein as CA G.R. SP No. 04869, and
required the parties to appear at a scheduled hearing on June 16, 1994, "with
counsel and accountants, as well as books of accounts and related records, to
determine the remaining accrued rights and liabilities of said parties." 12
Citing the following provision of the land development agreement:
(e)
THAT the SECOND PARTY shall keep proper books and accounting
records of all transactions aecting the sale of said memorial lots, which
records shall be open for inspection by the FIRST PARTY at any time during
usual oce hours. The SECOND PARTY shall also render to the FIRST PARTY
a monthly accounting report of all sales and cash collections eected the
preceding month. It is also understood that all nancial statements shall be
subject to annual audit by a reputable external accounting rm which should
be acceptable to the FIRST PARTY. 13

the appellate court required EGMPC to produce at the scheduled hearings the
following documents:
(a)

statements of monthly gross income from the year 1981, supported

by copies of the contracts/agreements of the sale of lots to
buyers/customers; and

(b)

summary statements, by month, of the forty per cent (40%) share in

the "net gross" income under the land development agreement
between the parties. 14

The accounting of the parties' respective obligations was referred to the Court's
Accountant, Ms Carmencita Angelo, with the concurrence of the parties, to whom
the documents were to be submitted. 15
NPUM prepared and submitted a Summary of Sales and Total Amounts Due based
on the following documents it likewise submitted to the court: 16
A-1

Land Development Agreement executed between NPUM and

EGMPC on October 6, 1976.

A-2

Submittal of requirements led by EGMPC to the Securities and

Exchange Commission dated July 26, 1976 re: its application to
develop, sell and maintain a rst class private cemetery part
situated in Baesa, Kalookan City on the 23 has property of PUC of
NPUM. EGMPC's application calls for the development of 31,326
lawn type memorial lots for underground and above ground
interment, and 20,808 garden and family/estates memorial lots
for above ground interment, or a total of 52,134 memorial lots.

A-3

EGMPC Daily Sales Report which shows that from 1978, 1979,
1980 and 1981 EGMPC has sold 19,237 memorial lots with gross
sales amounting to P52,421,879.70.

A-3a

Machine copy of EGMPC Daily Sales Report dated December

29, 1979 showing that in 1978 it sold 2,805 memorial lots
valued at P5,591,716.40 and in 1979 it sold 5,503 memorial lots
valued at P11,943,631.00.

A-3a-1
Weekly Sales Report of EGMPC corresponding to the period
December 26 to 31, 1979, showing cumulatively as of said date it
has sold a total of 5,503 memorial lots from January 1 to
December 29, 1979.
A-3a-2
Sales Report of EGMPC for the period February 12 to 18,
1980.
A-3a-4
Letter of Gabriel O. Vida, Executive Vice President and
General Manager of EGMPC, dated April 9, 1980, to Pastor
Bienvenido Capuli stating among others that for the year 1978,
EGMPC has sold 2,805 memorial lots and in the rst quarter of
1980 from January 1 to April 2, it has sold 2,418 memorial lots,
for a total gross sales of 10,730 memorial lots.
A-3b

EGMPC Daily Sales Report which show that from 1978 up to

December 9, 1980 it has sold a total of 15,253 memorial lots
with sales value of P38,085,299.40.

A-3b-1

Are supporting sales records and/or weekly sales

A-3b-2

reports of EGMPC in relation to Exhibit 'A-3b.'

A-3b-3
A-3b-4
A-3b-5
A-36-6
A-3b-7
A-4

Audited Financial Statement of EGMPC for 1985 which it led

with the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 16, 1986
pursuant to the reportorial requirements of the SEC, with
accompanying balance sheet and statement of income and
expenses, consisting of five (5) pages.

A-5

Actual Gross Prot Rate of EGMPC for the year 1985 which
shows that it sold 3,623 memorial lots valued at P25,299,601.20.

A-6

Machine copy of Assumptions to Projected Cash Flow and

Income Statements prepared by EGMPC with assumptions that
the 52,000 memorial lots would be sold and that 15% of total
sales per year are cash sales and 85% are on installment and that
installment sales are payable over a period of 60 months at 12%
interest per annum.

A-7

Formula for Computation of Interest Income for Lots Sold on

Installment.

A-8

Sales Price Analysis based on Lawn Class Memorial Lots for the
period 1978 to 1988, inclusive.

A-8a
A-9
A-9a

Price list issued by EGMPC effective December 1, 1977.

Computation of interest due for use of NPUM share.
Letter dated April 11, 1983 of Alfonso P. Roda, President of
PUC of NPUM showing summary of gross collections from
memorial lots sales starting January 1978 up to June 1982,
inclusive, per computation given to PUC by EGMPC.

A-9b

Are validating documents consisting of accounting ledgers

A-9c

in support of the computations given by EGMPC to PUC

A-9d

as mentioned in Dr. Roda's Letter dated April 11, 1983.

A-10

Promissory Note of EGMPC dated April 6, 1976 issued to NPUM

for a loan of P720,000 for which EGMPC agreed to pay 12%
interest per annum.

Price List of Memorial Lots of HIMLAYANG PILIPINO,

B-1
C
C-1

INC. effective February 3, 1981.

Price List of Memorial Lots of HIMLAYANG PILIPINO,
INC. effective March 15, 1982.

C-2
D
D-1

Price List of Memorial Lots of HIMLAYANG PILIPINO,

INC. effective February 18, 1983.

D-2
E
E-1

Price List of Memorial Lots of HIMLAYANG PILIPINO,

INC. effective January 23, 1984.

E-2
F
F-1

Price List of Memorial Lots of HIMLAYANG PILIPINO,

INC. effective July 9, 1984.

F-2
G
G-1

Price List of Memorial Lots of HIMLAYANG PILIPINO,

INC. effective March 1, 1985.

G-2
H

Price List of Memorial Lots of HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC. eective

July 1, 1987.

Price List of Memorial Lots of HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC. eective

January 4, 1989.

Price List of Memorial Lots of HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC. eective

August 2, 1989.

Price List of Memorial Lots of HIMLAYANG PILIPINO,

K-I
L

INC. effective February 4, 1990.

Price List of Memorial Lots of HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC. eective

February 2, 1991.
M
M-1
N
N-1

Price List of Memorial Lots of HIMLAYANG PILIPINO,

INC. effective October 2, 1991.
Price List of Memorial Lots of HIMLAYANG PILIPINO,
INC. effective February 5, 1992.

Price List of Memorial Lots of HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC. eective

October 9, 1992.

Price List of Memorial Lots of HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC. eective

January 15, 1993.

Price List of Memorial Lots of HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC. eective

February 16, 1993.

Price List of Memorial Lots of HIMLAYANG PILIPINO,

R-1
S
S-1
T
T-1

INC. effective March 16, 1993.

Price List of Memorial Lots of HIMLAYANG PILIPINO,
INC. effective September 15, 1993.
Price List of Memorial Lots of MANILA MEMORIAL
PARK effective January 1, 1985.

T-2
T-3
T-4
U
U-1

Price List of Memorial Lots of MANILA MEMORIAL

PARK effective June 1, 1991.

U-2
U-3
U-4
V
V-1
V-2

Price List of Memorial Lots of MANILA MEMORIAL

PARK effective November 2, 1991.

V-3
V-4
W
W-1

Price List of Memorial Lots of HOLY CROSS

MEMORIAL PARK effective December 1, 1987.

W-2
W-3
It appears that EGMPC did not submit any document whatsoever to aid the
appellate court in its mandated task. Thus, in a Resolution dated January 19, 1995,
the appellate court declared:
. . . (1) that Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation has waived its rights
to present the records and documents necessarily for accounting, which
records they were specically required to preserve under the parties' Land
Development Agreement; and (2) that it will now proceed "to the mutual
accounting required to determine the remaining accrued rights and liabilities
of the said parties . . ." ordered by the Supreme Court in its Resolution of
December 1, 1993 (p. 7, rec.), and that the Court will proceed to do what it
is required to do on the basis of the documents submitted by the North
Philippine Union Mission of the Seventh Day Adventists only. 17

Ms. Angelo submitted her Report dated January 31, 1995, to which the appellate
court required the parties to comment on. 18
EGMPC took exception to the appellate court's having considered it to have waived
its right to present documents. 19 Considering EGMPC's arguments, the court set a
hearing date where NPUM would present its documents "according to the Rules [of
Court], and giving the private respondent [EGMPC] the opportunity to object
thereto." 20
Subsequently, NPUM asked for and the appellate court issued a subpoena duces
tecum and subpoena ad testicandum to EGMPC's President, Mr. Gabriel O. Vida
requiring him to produce the following documents:
1.

Copies of Deeds of Sale corresponding to each memorial lot sold

subject of the Land Development Agreement between the
parties;

2.

Lists of all memorial lots sold under or aecting the said Land
Development Agreement with an indication of the types/kinds of
memorial lots and the corresponding prices at which each was
sold and the dates when each lot was sold;

3.

Lists of all the owners of the memorial lots aected by the Land
Development Agreement;

4.

Copies of all the annual audits made by the external accounting

rm pursuant to provision (a) of the Land Development
Agreement;

5.

Copies of all audited nancial statements of ETERNAL from 1978

to the present;

6.

Copies of all monthly accounting reports of all sales and cash

collections regarding all the memorial lots sold under the Land
Development Agreement pursuant to provision (e) of the said
Land Development Agreement;

7.

The name/s of the Depository/Trustee Bank/s which acted as the

depository/trustee of funds collected by ETERNAL pursuant to
provision (f) of the subject Land Development Agreement;

8.

All other accounting books and records on all transactions

aecting all the memorial lots covered under the Land
Development Agreement;

9.

List of all the corporate ocers and employees of ETERNAL from

1975 up to the present whose duties and responsibilities involved
the recording of all sales and other transactions and the
safekeeping of such records relating to the sale of the memorial
lots subject of the Land Development Agreement. 21

NPUM also led a Request for Admission of the documents it had earlier submitted
to the Court annexed to the Summary of Sales and Total Amounts Due, addressed
to Mr. Vida. 22 EGMPC, however, led a Denial to the Request for Admission,
alleging that it was without knowledge or information of the documents, except for
the Land Development Agreement of October 6, 1976. 23
NPUM then reiterated its request for and was granted by the appellate court, a
subpoena duces tecum and subpoena ad testicandum , this time addressed to the
Chief of the Records Division of EGMPC. 24 NPUM further led a Motion for
Production, Inspection and Photocopying of Documents and Books of Accounts of
EGMPC, in particular:
1.

Master Development and/or Operational Plan of Eternal Gardens

for Memorial Park at Baesa, Metro Manila subject of the Land
Development Agreement.

2.

Inventory of memorial lots developed and sold by Eternal under

the Land Development Agreement and the type of memorial lots
developed and sold, i.e., whether lawn type, family estate type,
garden estate type and the number of each type developed and
sold.

3.

List of buyers and owners of memorial lots sold under the Land
Development Agreement and the corresponding sales contracts.

4.

Records of number of memorial lots sold on installment terms,

and those sold on cash basis.

5.

Sales and marketing records as to the number of memorial lots

eected by the Land Development Agreement sold in each of the
following years: 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984,
1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994
and 1995.

6.

Monthly accounting records of collections from sales of memorial

lots under the Land Development Agreement from 1978 to 1995,
inclusive.

7.

Year-end audited nancial statements of Eternal Gardens

Memorial Park Corporation from 1977 to 1995, inclusive.

8.

Price list of Eternal's memorial plot lots aected by the Land

Development Agreement covering the period 1977 to 1995.

9.

List of accredited and/or authorized agents, brokers, salesmen,

and sales counsellors of Eternal from 1977 to 1995 and their
addresses.

10.

Records of collections representing 10% of the gross collections

on each memorial lot sold under the Land Development
Agreement, for perpetual care fees and constituting a trust fund
to secure perpetual care of the memorial park aected by the
Land Development Agreement. 25

Later, NPUM led a second Request for Admissions addressed to Mr. Vida. He was
asked to make the following admissions:
1.

That the auditor retained by Eternal Gardens Memorial Park

Corp. to audit and examine its nancial position, and which
prepared Eternal's audited nancial statements, for the years
1982, 1983 and 1984 was the auditing and accounting rms of
Josue, Arceo & Co., CPAs, with oce at the 2nd Floor, Roman R.
Santos Building, Plaza Goeti, Manila.

2.

That the auditor retained by Eternal Gardens Memorial Park

Corp. to audit and examine its nancial position, and which
prepared Eternal's audited nancial statement for the Fiscal
years 1985 and 1986 was Roseller A. Ditangco, CPA, with oces
at No. 6, Plata Street, Tugatog, Malabon, Metro Manila.

3.

That the auditor retained by Eternal Gardens Memorial Park

Corp. to audit and examine its nancial position, and which

prepared Eternal's audited nancial statements for the Fiscal

years 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992 and 1993, was
Bernardino T. Dela Cruz, CPA with oces at No. 9, Interior II, K8th Street, Kamuning, Quezon City.
4.

That true and faithful copies of the audited nancial statements

of Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. for the Fiscal years 1981
to 1993, inclusive, specifically those referred to in paragraphs 1, 2
and 3 of this Request, were submitted to and led with the
Bureau of Internal Revenue as an integral part of Eternal's
Income Tax Returns, as well as with the Securities and Exchange
Commission in compliance with the reportorial requirements of
the said Securities and Exchange Commission.

5.

That each of the following documents, exhibited with and

attached to this request, are true and faithful copies of the
original and genuine documents, thus:
a.

Annex "A" (inclusive of sub-markings from Annexes "A-1"

to "A-9") is the audit report prepared by the accounting rm
of Josue, Arceo & Co., (CPAs), of the nancial position of
Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. at 3, December 1982;

b.

Annex "B" (inclusive of sub-markings from Annexes "B-1"

to "B-3") is the audit report prepared by the accounting firm
of Josue, Arceo & Co., (CPAs) of the nancial position of
Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. at 31 December
1983;

c.

Annex "C" (inclusive of sub-markings from Annexes "C-1"

to "C-6") is the audit report prepared by the accounting firm
of Josue, Arceo & Co. (CPAs) of the nancial position of
Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. at 31 December
1984;

d.

Annex "D" (inclusive of sub-markings from Annexes "D-1"

to "D-3") is the audit report prepared by Roseller A.
Ditangco, CPA of the nancial position of Eternal Gardens
Memorial Park Corp. at 31 December 1985;

e.

Annex "E" (inclusive of sub-markings from Annexes "E-1"

to "E-8") is the audit report prepared by Bernardino T. Dela
Cruz, CPA; of the nancial position of Eternal Gardens
Memorial Park Corp. at 31 December 1987;

f.

Annex "F" (inclusive of sub-markings from Annexes "F-1" to

"F-7") is the audit report prepared by Bernardino E. Dela
Cruz, CPA, of the nancial position of Eternal Gardens
Memorial Park Corp. at 31 December 1989;

g.

Annex "G" (inclusive of sub-markings from Annexes "G-1"

to "G-9") is the audit report prepared by Bernardino T. Dela
Cruz, CPA, of the nancial position of Eternal Gardens
Memorial Park Corp., at 31 December 1990;

h.

Annex "H" (inclusive of sub-markings from Annexes "H-1"

to "H-13") is the audit report prepared by Bernardino T.
Dela Cruz, CPA, of the nancial position of Eternal Gardens
Memorial Park Corp., at 31 December 1991;

i.

Annex "I" (inclusive of sub-markings from Annexes "I-1" to

"I-8") is the audit report prepared by Bernardino T. Dela
Cruz, CPA, of the nancial position of Eternal Gardens
Memorial Park Corp. at 31 December 1992;

j.

Annex "J" (inclusive of sub-markings from Annexes "J-1" to

"J-7") is the audit report prepared by Bernardino T. Dela
Cruz, CPA, of the nancial position of Eternal Gardens
Memorial Park Corp. at 31 December 1993. 26

Meanwhile, EGMPC failed to present the documents required by the subpoena. It

further led a Denial and/or Objection to the Requests for Admission on the ground
that it could not make comparison of the documents with the originals thereof. 27
On November 10, 1995, Ms. Angelo submitted her Report. 28
In a Resolution dated January 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals approved the report of
Ms. Angelo, nding this "to be a just and fair account of what Eternal Gardens and
Memorial Park owes to the petitioner North Philippine Union Mission of the
Seventh-Day Adventists, and accordingly orders the former to pay and turn over to
the latter the amounts of P167,065,195.00 as principal and P167,235,451.00 in
interest . . ." 29
EGMPC led a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied for lack of merit by the
appellate court in a Resolution dated April 12, 1996. 30
On April 29, 1996, EGMPC led a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 124554, seeking the
review of the appellate court's Resolutions dated January 15, 1996 and April 12,
1996. 31 The Court granted this motion for extension, 32 and on May 27, 1996,
EGMPC filed the instant petition. 33
It appears, however, that in a Report dated May 31, 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No. 04869,
the Court of Appeals informed the parties that its January 15, 1996 Resolution had
attained finality considering the following:
The respondent Eternal Gardens Memorial Park received copy of the
[January 15, 1996] resolution on January 22, 1996 and, after twelve (12)
days from its receipt or on February 2, 1996, led a motion for
reconsideration thereof. This Court denied Eternal Garden's motion for

reconsideration in a resolution promulgated April 12, 1996, a copy of which

it received on April 18, 1996. After eleven (11) days from receipt of the
resolution denying its motion for reconsideration, or on April 12, 1996 (sic),
it led a motion for extension to le a petition for review with the Supreme
Court.
It is quite clear that after the denial of its motion for reconsideration, Eternal
Gardens had only three (3) days left of the reglementary period to le a
petition for review, or only up to April 12, 1996, but Eternal Gardens allowed
that period to lapse, and then led its motion to extend to le its petition on
April 29, 1996 which is eight (8) days beyond the period of nality of the
resolution sought to be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Consequently, the
resolution of January 15, 1996 had attained nality before Eternal Gardens
filed its motion to extend before this Honorable Court. 34

Entry of judgment was made on June 6, 1996. 35

Following the above incidents, on June 20, 1996, EGMPC led in G.R. No. 73794 an
"Opposition and/or Comment to the Report of the Court of Appeals dated 31 May
1996" with the prayer:
. . . to disregard and nullify the Report of the Court of Appeals dated May 31,
1996 and at the same time allow or tolerate the First Division of the
Honorable Supreme Court to resolved (sic) the petitioner Eternal Gardens
Petition for Certiorari against the Court of Appeals and NPUM with G.R. No.
124554. 36

In retort to EGMPC's opposition, also in G.R. No. 73794, NPUM led on June 11,
1996 an Omnibus Motion (a) to dismiss the petition in G.R. No. 124554, or (b) to
consolidate the two petitions, and (c) for the issuance of a writ of execution. NPUM
contended that as a consequence of the appellate court's resolutions in CA G.R. SP
No. 04869 having attained nality, a writ of execution may be issued under G.R.
No. 73794, and EGMPC could no longer le a separate petition such as that
docketed as G.R. No. 124554. 37
In its Comment led on July 17, 1996, in G.R. No. 124554, NPUM prayed for the
denial of the petition for "being frivolous and dilatory", citing EGMPC's violation of
Circular No. 04-94 on forum shopping, in reference to its (EGMPC's) pleadings led
in G.R. No. 73794. NPUM pointed out that the reliefs sought by EGMPC in G.R. No.
124554 were "identical" to those in its Opposition And/Or Comment to the Report
of the Court of Appeals dated 31 May 1996 filed in G.R. No. 73794. 38
On December 26, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Kaloocan City, Branch 120,
issued an Order in the case of origin, Civil Case No. 9556, granting NPUM's motion
for execution of judgment. 39 A writ of execution was subsequently issued by that
trial court on January 7, 1997. 40
Because of the trial court's issuance of the writ of execution, on January 10, 1997,
EGMPC led in G.R. No. 124554 an Urgent Motion for Restraining Order And/Or
Injunction and Motion for Contempt of Court. EGMPC prayed that "pending

resolution of the petition to promptly issue a restraining order and/or injunction

against Judge Jaime Discaya of the RTC Br. 120 of Kalookan City in Civil Case No.
9556 . . ." 41

EGMPC also led in G.R. No. 73794 on January 17, 1997 an Urgent Motion for
Restraining Order And/Or Injunctive Relief with the same prayer as in its Urgent
Motion filed in G.R. No. 124554. 42
In G.R. No. 124554, the Court granted EGMPC's motion and issued a temporary
restraining order against the trial court's order dated December 16, 1996 and writ
of execution dated January 7, 1997. 43
In a Resolution dated January 27, 1997 issued in G.R. No. 73794, the Court denied
for lack of merit EGMPC's Urgent Motion. 44
The threshold question here is whether Eternal Gardens timely led its petition for
review from the Court of Appeals' January 15, 1996 and April 12, 1996 Resolutions.
We restate the material dates thus:
EGMPC received a copy of the January 15, 1996 Resolution on January 22, 1996.
Twelve days from such receipt, or on February 2, 1996, EGMPC led its Motion for
Reconsideration. On April 18, 1996, EGMPC received the appellate court's
Resolution of April 12, 1996 denying its Motion for Reconsideration. On April 29,
1996, or eleven days from its receipt of the denial of its motion for reconsideration,
EGMPC led a motion for extension of time to le its "Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition" and concurrently paid the legal fees.
LibLex

We find that EGMPC's Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Review was
timely led on April 29, 1996, such motion having been led eleven days from
receipt of the appellate court's denial of its motion for reconsideration. Supreme
Court Circular No. 10 dated August 28, 1986 on modes and periods of appeal
provides thus:
(5)

APPEALS BY CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT

In an appeal by certiorari to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,

Section 25 of the Interim Rules and Section 7 of PD 1606, a party may le a
petition for review on certiorari of the judgment of a regional trial court, the
Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan within fteen days from notice of
judgment or of the denial of his motion for reconsideration led in due time,
and paying at the same time the corresponding docket fee (Section 1 of Rule
45). In other words, in the event a motion for reconsideration is led and
denied, the period of fteen days begins to run again from notice of denial
(See Codilla vs. Estenzo, 97 SCRA 351; Turingan vs. Cacdad, 122 SCRA
634).
A motion for extension of time to le a petition for review on certiorari may

be led with the Supreme Court within the reglementary period, paying at
the same time the corresponding docket fee. 45

While the petition led by EGMPC purports to be one of certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court, we shall treat it as having been led under Rule 45,
considering that it was filed within the 15-day reglementary period for the filing of a
petition for review on certiorari. As the Court stated in Delsan Transport Lines, Inc .
vs. Court of Appeals, where the Court was liberal in its application of the Rules of
Court in the interest of justice. "It cannot . . . be claimed that this petition is being
used as a substitute for appeal after that remedy has been lost through the fault of
petitioner. Moreover, stripped of allegations of 'grave abuse of discretion,' the
petition actually avers errors of judgment rather than of jurisdiction which are the
subject of a petition for review." 46
The May 31, 1996 Report of the Court of Appeals informed the parties that the
January 15, 1996 Resolution had attained nality, erroneously applying the rule
applicable to petitions for review led with the Court of Appeals from a nal
judgment or order of the regional trial court. 47
We cannot and do not in the instant case vacate and set aside the May 31, 1996
Report. The report is not before this Court on review. We must however, within the
milieu of this case, regard the report impertinent by the fact of EGMPC having
timely filed its motion for extension of time to file its petition on April 29, 1996.
cdrep

We also consider that the consequences of the issuance of the report, that is, the
entry of judgment in the appellate court and the writ of execution issued by the trial
court in the case of origin, inextricably aect the resolution of the instant case.
Hence, the rationale for our restraining order of January 15, 1997.
We next consider whether, as asserted by NPUM, EGMPC's petition must be
summarily dismissed on the ground of forum shopping. NPUM points to EGMPC's
Opposition and/or Comment to the Report of the Court of Appeals dated May 31,
1996 led in G.R. No. 73794 vis-a-vis its Petition for Review in the instant case, and
the two Urgent Motions for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order led in
G.R. No. 73794 and in the instant case.
NPUM asserts that the reliefs sought by EGMPC in its opposition and in its petition
are "identical." We disagree. The petition here seeks the setting aside of the Court
of Appeals' January 15, 1996 and April 12, 1996 Resolutions.
The Opposition in G.R. No. 73794, on the other hand, sought the nullication of the
May 31, 1996 Report and as a corollary, for the instant case to be "allowed or
tolerated."
The opposition and the petition do not seek to provoke from this Court the
resolution of a same issue, the evil which Revised Circular No. 28-91 and its
companion Administrative Circular No. 04-94 address. We read the opposition in
G.R. No. 73794 as a complement to the petition here, to which it makes categorical
and express reference. 48 We consider it as merely a matter of discourse and

emphasis that Eternal Gardens reiterated its case in the later pleading.
Regarding the motions for the issuance of a temporary restraining order led by
EGMPC on January 10, 1997 in the instant case and on January 17, 1997 in G.R. No.
73794, we consider the exigency which may have prompted EGMPC to le the
motions in both cases. The trial court in the case of origin, acted favorably on
NPUM's motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, the basis of which is the
alleged nality of the appellate court's January 15, 1996 Resolution. The trial court
ruled that the instant case denominated as an original action for certiorari "does not
interrupt the course of the principal action [G.R. No. 73794] nor the running of the
period in the proceeding." 49 To not stay the execution considering the trial court's
ratiocination would render moot EGMPC's remedy in the instant case.
NPUM also contends that EGMPC has committed perjury, pointing to the
certication under oath led by EGMPC, through its President Gabriel O. Vida, where
he states "that there is no other case pending in any court or tribunal in the
Philippines, with the same issues in this case . . ." 50
Again, we disagree. It does not appear that EGMPC was to pursue the two cases
concurrently. EGMPC led this new petition, and did not assail the appellate court's
resolution under G.R. No. 73794, as in fact the Court has informed the parties that
no further pleadings were to be entertained in G.R. No. 73794 after remand to the
Court of Appeals. 51
EGMPC next asserts that the Resolution of the Third Division dated December 1,
1993 ordering the remand to the Court of Appeals of the case for accounting
"changed, modied and reversed" the September 19, 1988 Decision of the Second
Division which ordered the remand of the case to the trial court. EGMPC contends
that the Third Division "is in violation of the constitution which provides that no
doctrine or principle of law laid down in a decision en banc or in division may be
changed, modified or revised by the Court except when sitting en banc." 52
EGMPC had raised the very same issue in its Motion for Reconsideration 53 of the
December 1, 1993 Resolution. The Court, in its Resolution dated February 14, 1994
had denied the motion with finality for lack of merit.
Needless to say, the argument raised by EGMPC is utterly without consequence. At
the time the September 19, 1988 Decision was rendered, the two civil cases
interpleader and quieting of title were still pending. What was brought before the
appellate courts and subject of G.R. No. 73794 were mere incidents, and not the
judgment of the trial court; thus, the remand to the trial court for further
proceedings on the merits of the case. The December 1, 1993 Resolution was issued
after the issue of ownership of the subject parcel of land was already resolved with
nality. What was left for the courts to do was to have an accounting done of the
rights and liabilities of EGMPC and NPUM, thus, the remand to the Court of Appeals.
We now consider the merits of the case.
The gist of EGMPC's contentions is that it owes the amount of only P35,000,000.00

less advances and not P167,065,195.00 as principal and P167,235,451.00 in

interest as computed by Court Accountant Carmencita C. Angelo. 54
EGMPC rst contends that the appellate court, in appointing an accountant to make
the computations, delegated judicial function, such as to determine the admissibility
of evidence. 55
Under the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, that court has the
d.
Authority to receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary
for the resolution of factual issues raised in cases falling within its original
jurisdiction.

For the proper disposition of the case, the appellate court, under the above-quoted
authority, designated an accountant "to receive, collate and analyze the documents
to be filed by the parties." 56
No judicial function was exercised by Ms. Angelo. She was not asked to rule on the
admissibility of the evidence. The documents were duly marked during the hearing
of July 19, 1995, for the consideration of the appellate court, which alone had the
power to decide. Ms. Angelo's role in the proceedings was to prepare a report, which
she did, culling from the documents submitted to her. While it may be true that the
report, when adopted by the appellate court, became part of its decision, judicial
power lies, not with the ocial who prepared the report, but with the court itself
which wields the power of approval or rejection. Under American jurisprudence, the
rule is thus

It would seem on principle that a commissioner, master or referee appointed

by a court to aid it in the adjudication of a particular case is not a court when
performing the functions assigned to him, although the court may adopt his
conclusions in its decision . . . It has, for instance, been held that a statute
giving the supreme court of a state the power to appoint commissioners
thereof whose duty shall be, under such rules and regulations as the Court
may adopt, to assist it in the performance of its functions, and in disposing
of undetermined cases before it, is not unconstitutional or open to the
objection that the commissioners are vested with judicial power, since the
commissioners merely report facts found and conclusions reached, and the
court retains the power to decide which is the only judicial power. It has also
been pointed out that a chancellor does not, by referring a matter to a
commissioner, delegate his judicial function to him. The commissioner is
appointed for the purpose of assisting the chancellor, not to supplant or
replace him, and the ndings of a commissioner are merely advisory and not
binding on the court. 57

EGMPC also contends that it was deprived of due process because it "was not given
reasonable opportunity to know and meet the claim of [NPUM] as its counsel was
not able to cross-examine the American Accountant of [NPUM]. 58

The contention is without merit.

Contrary to EGMPC's claim, it was given every opportunity to present its case. At
the outset, the parties were asked by the appellate court to submit documents for
accounting. NPUM made full utilization of the modes of discovery, asking the
appellate court to subpoena documents and testimonies, and requesting admissions
from EGMPC regarding documents it (EGMPC) had in its possession, documents
which emanated from the corporation itself and either sent to NPUM as
communiqus, such as the Letter of Mr. Vida dated April 4, 1980 to Pastor
Bienvenido Capule of NPUM stating inter alia that for 1978, EGMPC sold 2,805
memorial lots and that during the rst quarter of 1980 the corporation sold 2,418
lots, totalling 10,730, 59 or documents available to the general public, as in the Price
Lists, or led with government oces, specically the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
EGMPC cannot claim that it was denied the forum to confer with NPUM and NPUM's
accountant. The appellate court had arranged conferences for the parties and their
accountants to allow them to discuss with each other and with Ms. Angelo. Even Ms.
Angelo, in her Letter dated November 10, 1995 covering her second and nal report
spoke of such a conference, to wit:
In compliance with your instructions in the last conference-meeting with the
party-litigants in Case CA-G.R. No. SP No. 04869 held last August 30, 1995,
the undersigned together with the representatives of the North Philippine
Union Mission (NPUM) and the Eternal Gardens Memorial, Inc. had a
discussion on the computations made by each of the party of the amount
due to the North Philippine Union Mission which were submitted to the
Court. 60

It was not even imperative that EGMPC cross-examine the accountant who
prepared EGMPC's computation, and there was no denial of due process without
such cross-examination. This computation was merely to aid Ms. Angelo, who was to
make her own independent computation from the documents submitted to her.
EGMPC also asserts that "substantially if not all records, documents and papers
submitted by the private respondent NPUM to the Court's Accountant which
eventually became the basis of the report and Resolution of January 15, 1996 of the
public respondent Court, were not genuine and not properly identied by the
persons who were supposed to have executed the same including the alleged
nancial statement of Eternal Gardens allegedly issued by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC)." 61
From the transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings in the appellate court,
we nd that EGMPC acquiesced to the use of the documents submitted by NPUM,
including the nancial statements, even actively participating in the discussion of
the contents of such documents. EGMPC's main objection was only on how the
entries in these documents were to be interpreted, for example, on how payments
towards the perpetual care fund would be credited. 62 EGMPC did not object even
when counsel for NPUM read into the records the contents of the documents. 63

It even appears that after Ms. Angelo came up with her rst report, EGMPC's
counsel expressed that it was "amenable to that computation." 64 In that report, Ms.
Angelo had stressed that "[s]ince the Eternal Gardens Memorial Park, Inc. did not
submit to the Court any documents pertaining to the computations of the 40%
share of the North Philippine Union Mission of the Seventh Day Adventists, then we
have no other recourse but to base the computation on the available gures and on
the other documents as presented by the petitioner [NPUM]." 65
EGMPC lastly contends that it is not liable for interest. It claims that it was justied
in withholding payment as there was still the unresolved issue of ownership over
the property subject of the Land Development Agreement of October 6, 1976. 66
The argument is without merit. EGMPC under the agreement had the obligation to
remit monthly to NPUM forty percent (40%) of its net gross collection from the
development of a memorial park on property owned by NPUM. The same agreement
provided for the designation of a depository/trustee bank to act as the
depository/trustee for all funds collected by EGMPC. 67 There was no obstacle, legal
or otherwise, to the compliance by EGMPC of this provision in the contract, even on
the affectation that it did not know to whom payment was to be made.
Even disregarding the agreement, EGMPC cannot "suspend" payment on the
pretext that it did not know who among the subject property's claimants was the
rightful owner. It had a remedy under the New Civil Code of the Philippines to
give in consignation the amounts due, as these fell due. 68 Consignation produces
the effect of payment. 69
The rationale for consignation is to avoid the performance of an obligation becoming
more onerous to the debtor by reason of causes not imputable to him. 70 For its
failure to consign the amounts due, Eternal Gardens' obligation to NPUM necessarily
became more onerous as it became liable for interest on the amounts it failed to
remit.
Notably, EGMPC led an interpleader action, "the essence of which, aside from the
disavowal of interest in the property in litigation on the part of the petitioner, is the
deposit of the property or funds in controversy with the court." Yet from the outset,
EGMPC had assailed any court ruling ordering the deposit with a reputable bank of
the amounts due from it under the Land Development Agreement. In G.R. No.
73794, 71 the Court made the following discourse on the disavowal of EGMPC of its
obligations, thus:
In the case at bar, a careful analysis of the records will show that petitioner
admitted among others in its complaint in Interpleader that it is still obligated
to pay certain amounts to private respondent; that it claims no interest in
such amounts due and is willing to pay whoever is declared entitled to said
amounts. Such admissions in the complaint were rearmed in open court
before the Court of Appeals as stated in the latter court's resolution dated
September 5, 1985 in C.A. G.R. No. 04869 which states:
'The private respondent (MEMORIAL) then rearms before the Court

its original position that it is a disinterested party with respect to the

property now the subject of the interpleader case.
prLL

'In the light of the willingness, expressly made before the court,
arming the complaint led below, that the private respondent
(MEMORIAL) will pay whatever is due on the Land Development
Agreement to the rightful owner/owners, there is no reason why the
amount due on subject agreement has not been placed in the custody
of the Court.'
Under the circumstances, there appears to be no plausible reason for
petitioner's objections to the deposit of the amounts in litigation after having
asked for the assistance of the lower court by ling a complaint for
interpleader where the deposit of aforesaid amounts is not only required by
the nature of the action but is a contractual obligation of the petitioner under
the Land Development Program.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the essence of an
interpleader, aside from the disavowal of interest in the property in litigation
on the part of the petitioner, is the deposit of the property or funds in
controversy with the court, it is a rule founded on justice and equity: 'that
the plainti may not continue to benet from the property or funds in
litigation during the pendency of the suit at the expense of whoever will
ultimately be decided as entitled thereto.'
The case at bar was elevated to the Court of Appeals on certiorari with
prohibitory and mandatory injunction. Said appellate court found that more
than twenty million pesos are involved; so that on interest alone for savings
or time deposit would be considerable, now accruing in favor of the Eternal
Gardens. Finding that such is violative of the very essence of the complaint
for interpleader as it clearly runs against the interest of justice in this case,
the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for nding that the lower court
committed a grave abuse of discretion which requires correction by the
requirement that a deposit of said amounts should be made to a bank
approved by the Court.
Petitioner would now compound the issue by its obvious turnabout,
presently claiming in its memorandum that there is a novation of contract so
that the amounts due under the Land Development Agreement were
allegedly extinguished, and the requirement to make a deposit of said
amounts in a depository bank should be held in abeyance until after the
conicting claims of ownership now on trial before Branch CXXII RTCCaloocan City, has finally been resolved.

All these notwithstanding, the need for the deposit in question has been
established, not only in the lower courts and in the Court of Appeals but also
in the Supreme Court where such deposit was required in the resolution of
July 8, 1987 to avoid wastage of funds.

Even during the pendency of G.R. No. 73794, EGMPC was required to deposit the
accruing interests with a reputable commercial bank "to avoid possible wastage of
funds" when the case was given due course. 72 Yet, EGMPC hedged in depositing the
amounts due and made obvious attempts to stay payment by ling sundry motions
and pleadings.
We thus nd that the Court of Appeals correctly held Eternal Gardens liable for
interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%). The withholding of the amounts due
under the agreement was tantamount to a forbearance of money. 73
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolved to DENY the petition. The
Resolutions dated January 15, 1996 and April 12, 1996 are AFFIRMED. The
temporary restraining order issued by this Court on January 15, 1997 is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Vitug, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes
1.

165 SCRA 439.

2.

See the September 19, 1988 Decision and the Resolution of the Third Division
dated December 1, 1993 in the same case.

3.

Rollo, CA G.R. SP No. 04869, p. 194.

4.

See note 1, p. 448.

5.

The pertinent parts of the resolution referred to reads:

". . . the Court RESOLVED to give due course to this petition and requires
the parties to file memoranda.
In the meantime, to avoid possible wastage of funds, the Court RESOLVED
to require private respondents, [now the petitioner EGMPC in G.R. No. 124554]
to DEPOSIT its accruing installments within ten (10) days from notice with a
reputable commercial bank in a savings deposit account, in the name of the
Supreme Court of the Philippines, with the details to be reported or manifested to
this Court within (10) days from the time the deposit/deposits are made, such
deposits not to be withdrawn without authority of this Court. (Rollo, G.R. No.
73794, p. 162).

6.

Rollo, G.R. No. 73794, p. 708.

7.

Rollo, G.R. No. 73794, p. 1699, Resolution dated December 1, 1993.

8.

Id., at 1700.

9.

Ibid.

10.

Ibid.

11.

Id., at 1701.

12.

Rollo, CA G.R. SP No. 04869 p. 61, Resolution dated May 31, 1994.

13.

Id., at 194, Resolution dated November 11, 1994.

14.

Id., at 172, Resolution dated October 4, 1994.

15.

Id., at 175, Resolution dated November 11, 1994, TSN, November 4, 1994, pp.
33-38.

16.

Id., at 180-185.

17.

Id., at 323-324.

18.

Id., at 350, Resolution dated February 8, 1995.

19.

Id., at 361, Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution dated January 19, 1995; See
also p. 412; Comment And/Or Objection to the Court Accountant's Report.

20.

Id., at 480, Resolution dated May 10, 1995.

21.

Id., at 483-484; cf . 489-490, 502-503, and 697.

22.

Id., at 504.

23.

Id., at 620.

24.

Id., at 636.

25.

Id., at 657.

26.

Id., at 699-702.

27.

Id., at 795.

28.

Id., at 952.

29.

Id., at 993, 1002.

30.

Id., at 1053.

31.

Rollo, p. 3.

32.

Id., at 6.

33.

Id., at 8.

34.

Rollo, CA GR SP No. 04869, pp. 1062-1063.

35.

Id., at 1067.

36.

Rollo, G.R. No. 73794 p. 1847.

37.

Id., at 1882.

38.

Rollo, p. 69.

39.

Id., at 162.

40.

Id., at 166.

41.

Id., at 159.

42.

Rollo, G.R. No. 73794, p. 1949.

43.

Rollo, p. 171.

44.

Rollo, G.R. No. 73794, p. 2003.

45.

See also 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 45 sections 1 and 2.

46.

G.R. No. 112288, February 20, 1997.

47.

See 1987 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 42, section 1.

48.

The prayer in the Opposition reads.

WHEREFORE, premises considered it is respectfully prayed of this
Honorable Court to disregard and nullify the Report of the Court of Appeals
dated May 31, 1996 and at the same time allow or tolerate the First Division of
the Honorable Court to resolved (sic) the petitioner Eternal Gardens Petition for
Certiorari against the Court of Appeals and NPUM with G.R. No. 124554.
Petitioner further prays for such other reliefs warranted under the
premises (Rollo, G.R. No. 73794, pp. 1847-1848).

49.

Rollo, p. 64.

50.

Id., at 22.

51.

Rollo, G.R. No. 73794, p. 1809.

52.

Rollo, p. 10.

53.

Filed in G.R. No. 73794 on January 3, 1994.

54.

Rollo, p. 15.

55.

Id., at 18.

56.

Id., at 28.

57.

20 Am Jur 2d. Costs 4.

58.

Rollo, p. 17.

59.

Rollo, CA G.R. SP No. 04869, Exhibit "A-3a-4." p. 214.

60.

Id., at 948.

61.

Rollo, p. 17.

62.

TSN, August 29, 1995, pp. 16-17.

63.

Id., at 40.

64.

Id., at 44.

65.

Rollo, CA G.R. SP No. 04869 p. 356.

66.

Rollo, p 19.

67.

(1) THAT a Depository/Trustee Bank(s) shall likewise be designated by both

parties to act as the Depository/Trustee for all funds collected by the SECOND
PARTY on this project, which Bank(s) shall likewise be charged with the remittance
monthly of all payments due to the FIRST PARTY, under the terms and conditions
of this Development Agreement. (Rollo, CA G.R. SP No. 04869, p. 194).

68.

Article 1256. If the creditor to whom tender of payment has been made refuses
without just cause to accept it, the debtor shall be released from responsibility by
the consignation of the thing of sum due.
Consignation alone shall produce the same effect in the following cases:
(1)

69.
70.

When the creditor is absent or unknown, or does not appear at the place
of payment;

(2)

When he is incapacitated to receive the payment at the time it is due;

(3)

When, without just cause, he refuses to give a receipt;

(4)

When two or more persons claim the same right to collect;

(5)

When the title of the obligation has been lost. (1176a)

219 SCRA 480 (1993).

Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Vol. IV,
p. 325.

71.

Rollo, G.R. No. 73794. pp. 427-430.

72.

Id., at 162.

73.

Article 2209, Civil Code of the Philippines; 244 SCRA 180 (1995); G.R. No.
120097, September 23, 1996.