Ynot v. Intermediate Apelate Court (1987)
Ynot v. Intermediate Apelate Court (1987)
Ynot v. Intermediate Apelate Court (1987)
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 74457
declare them so, then "will be the time to make the hammer fall, and
heavily," 8 to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise,
courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the
constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should
probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another
distinguished jurist, 9 and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there
should be no shirking of the task for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or
popular censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench,
especially this Court.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really
presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing
an existing law. It was issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of
taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his
legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder
that whenever in his judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or
imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or was unable to act
adequately on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action, he
could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of
instruction that were to have the force and effect of law. As there is no
showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary power
then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to question the validity of the
executive order. Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was
supposed to have been made by the President "in his judgment, " a phrase
that will lead to protracted discussion not really necessary at this time, we
reserve resolution of this matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the
nonce, we confine ourselves to the more fundamental question of due
process.
It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter
be cast in precise and unmistakable language to avoid controversies that
might arise on their correct interpretation. That is the Ideal. In the case of the
due process clause, however, this rule was deliberately not followed and the
wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it
more clearly was submitted in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it
was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the
Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued against it. He was sustained by the
body. 10
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also
conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary because due process is not, like
some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an
implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons.
Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the
due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation,
enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and
circumstances may require.
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific
description of due process lest they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket
that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning
of the clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have preferred to leave the
import of the protection open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually ascertained
by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decision of
cases as they arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme
Court, for example, would go no farther than to define due process and in
so doing sums it all up as nothing more and nothing less than "the
embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play." 12
When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the
reluctant promise that that Crown would thenceforth not proceed against the
life liberty or property of any of its subjects except by the lawful judgment of
his peers or the law of the land, they thereby won for themselves and their
progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of the
free society. The solemn vow that King John made at Runnymede in 1215 has
since then resounded through the ages, as a ringing reminder to all rulers,
benevolent or base, that every person, when confronted by the stern visage of
the law, is entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearing of his cause.
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting
Idea of fair play to hear "the other side" before an opinion is formed or a
decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only
one-half of the question; the other half must also be considered if an
impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the
issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides complement each
other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after
examination of the problem not from one or the other perspective only but in
its totality. A judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext
that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or
pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent
powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The
individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which
affects him even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead
from the womb to beyond the tomb in practically everything he does or
owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome
intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has some relevance
to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper
but necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin
maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit
of the greater number.
It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive
Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626,
prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The
original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its
Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the carabaos and the
buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them
for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. In the
face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our
farms on these traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been
remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps to protect and preserve them.
A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a
law regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle was
claimed to be a deprivation of property without due process of law. The
defendant had been convicted thereunder for having slaughtered his own
carabao without the required permit, and he appealed to the Supreme Court.
The conviction was affirmed. The law was sustained as a valid police measure
to prevent the indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were then badly
needed by farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of these animals and the
reduction of their number had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural
output, which in turn had caused an incipient famine. Furthermore, because
of the scarcity of the animals and the consequent increase in their price,
cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures
for the registration and branding of these animals. The Court held that the
questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police power and declared in
part as follows:
reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought
to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of
carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they
can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in
another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent
their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will
make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made
to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily
circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the
movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter
cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to
prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.
Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be
assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure
applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of
the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive
authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was
sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be
imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the
challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the
property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and
declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police
station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a
complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which
was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when
ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition,
convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was
carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the
petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the
centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and
hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual
requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also
conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative
proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. 20 In