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    Luneta Motor V Abad

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    This document summarizes a Philippine Supreme Court case from 1939 regarding a promissory note dispute. The plaintiff sued to recover a debt from promissory notes after the defendant died. The court upheld the dismissal of the case in accordance with a legal code requiring discontinuation of money recovery actions when the defendant dies. The court also found that the obligation of sureties from a counterbond dissolving an attachment was extinguished since no judgment could be issued against a deceased defendant. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed.

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    Luneta Motor V Abad

    Uploaded by

    fjl_302711
    195 views2 pages
    This document summarizes a Philippine Supreme Court case from 1939 regarding a promissory note dispute. The plaintiff sued to recover a debt from promissory notes after the defendant died. The court upheld the dismissal of the case in accordance with a legal code requiring discontinuation of money recovery actions when the defendant dies. The court also found that the obligation of sureties from a counterbond dissolving an attachment was extinguished since no judgment could be issued against a deceased defendant. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed.

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    Luneta Motor v Abad

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    Luneta Motor v Abad

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    This document summarizes a Philippine Supreme Court case from 1939 regarding a promissory note dispute. The plaintiff sued to recover a debt from promissory notes after the defendant died. The court upheld the dismissal of the case in accordance with a legal code requiring discontinuation of money recovery actions when the defendant dies. The court also found that the obligation of sureties from a counterbond dissolving an attachment was extinguished since no judgment could be issued against a deceased defendant. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    195 views2 pages

    Luneta Motor V Abad

    Uploaded by

    fjl_302711
    This document summarizes a Philippine Supreme Court case from 1939 regarding a promissory note dispute. The plaintiff sued to recover a debt from promissory notes after the defendant died. The court upheld the dismissal of the case in accordance with a legal code requiring discontinuation of money recovery actions when the defendant dies. The court also found that the obligation of sureties from a counterbond dissolving an attachment was extinguished since no judgment could be issued against a deceased defendant. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed.

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    of 2

    67 Phil.

    236

    [ G.R. No. 45273, April 10, 1939 ]


    LUNETA MOTOR CO., PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. FEDERICO ABAD,
    DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.
    DECISION
    MORAN, J.:
    Plaintiff sought recovery of the sum of P2,674.05 with accrued stipulated interest and attorney's
    fees for balance due on four promissory notes executed by the defendant on March 12, 1931. The
    complaint sued for a writ of attachment which was issued. Defendant, in his answer, petitioned, for
    reasons therein stated, that the attachment be lifted, and to that effect a counterbond was
    tendered by the terms of which the sureties "jointly and severally bind themselves in the sum of
    P2,600, under the condition that in case the plaintiff recovered judgment in the action the
    defendant will on demand redeliver the attached property so released to the officer of the court to
    be applied to the payment of the judgment or in default thereof that the defendant and sureties will
    on demand pay the plaintiff the full value of the property released." The lower court granted this
    petition and issued an order for the dissolution of the writ. Thereafter, defendand died;
    whereupon, his attorney moved for the dismissal of the case. The trial court acceded to this
    motion, and plaintiff's motion for reconsideration thereof having been denied, the instant appeal
    was taken.
    The case was rightly dismissed in accordance with section 119 of Act No. 190, the action being for
    money, and pending when defendant died. It is contended by plaintiff-appellant that this provision
    is not applicable, for a writ of attachment has been issued on property of the defendant, and the
    lien was transferred to the counterbond filed for the dissolution of the writ. This contention is
    disposed of unfavorably to appellant by the provision of section 700 of Act No. 190 which reads as
    follows:
    "All actions commenced against the deceased person, for the recovery of money,
    debt, or damages, and pending at the time the committee are appointed, shall be
    discontinued, and the property, if any, therein attached, shall be discharged from the
    attachment, and the claim embraced in such action may be presented to the
    committee, * * *." (Underscore ours.)
    Besides, the obligation of the sureties, under the counterbond, is subject to the condition that
    when the plaintiff recovered judgment, they shall deliver the property so released to the officer of
    the court for the payment of said judgment or in default thereof, pay its full value to the plaintiff.
    This condition has become a legal impossibility, for no judgment can be recovered by the plaintiff
    in the case which should be dismissed under section 119 aforementioned. Therefore, the
    obligation dependent upon this condition must be deemed extinguished, according to article 1116
    of our Civil Code.
    Judgment is affirmed with costs against the appellant.

    Avancea, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

    Source: Supreme Court E-Library


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