CFR - Military CPI Addendum

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM: “The National Security Adviser”
SUBJECT: Impact of the 2002 National Security Strategy on Reshaping

America’s Military
Subsequent to my memorandum on defense alternatives, you released your National

Security Strategy (NSS), the National Security Presidential Directive, and the Homeland
Security Policy Directive (NSPD-17/HSPD-4). These documents call for potentially the
most profound changes in national security policy in the past fifty years. Consequently,
they have generated a great deal of debate about how they will be implemented. In a
separate and longer memo, I will lay out some alternatives for you on how you might
clear up some of the questions raised about your NSS and the NSPD-17/HSPD4 for the
American people.
The purpose of this memo is to analyze the implications of the NSS of September
20, 2002, and the NSPD-17/HSPD-4 of December 2002 for defense policy, programs,
and budgets.
In the opening pages of the Council Policy Initiative (CPI), Reshaping America’s
Military: Four Alternatives, my memorandum to you noted that “an overarching
discussion of the principles behind your budgets and the implementation of your plans”
was absent from the defense budget debate. The National Security Strategy (NSS) and
NSPD-17/HSPD-4 attempt to provide those principles.
In these documents, you outline three tasks that your national security
establishment must be capable of accomplishing:
• It must be capable of defending the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants;
• It must be capable of preserving the peace by building good relations among
the great powers;
• It must be able to extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on
every continent.
In carrying out these tasks or accomplishing the goals that you outlined, you argue that
this nation must recognize certain strategic principles:
• Traditional deterrence will not work against terrorists or the tyrants who rule
rogue states;
• Given the rapid dissemination of information in today’s globalized world and
the proliferation of technology, threats from terrorists and rogue states can
materialize much more rapidly than in the past;
• Preemptive attack against terrorists or tyrants who control rogue states is a
legitimate form of self-defense;
• The United States must maintain its military dominance in order to discourage
other nations from acquiring sufficient military capability to challenge
American power;
• While multilateral organizations can play a role in helping the United States
accomplish its strategic goals, they cannot have veto power over U.S. actions.
The NSS and NSPD-17/HSPD-4 should have profound implications for U.S. defense
plans, programs, and budgets. Potentially their impact on America’s military could be as
profound as NSC 68, which was completed in the opening days of the Cold War and
provided the intellectual underpinnings for the national security policy of containment,
the military strategy of deterrence, and the largest peacetime buildup of U.S. military
forces in the nation’s history.
Your new bold strategy appears to be most clearly aligned with the CPI
alternative of ‘enhanced defense.’ Indeed the NSS actually calls for increased defenses,
especially missile defense.
In the defense CPI, enhanced defense was defined as:
“The United States is the sole superpower in the world and must substantially
increase spending on both existing and future capabilities. We must do this in
order to ensure the country’s capability to deal with both traditional (and
symmetrical) and nontraditional (or asymmetrical) threats, such as those that were
horribly realized on September 11, 2001.”
The CPI noted that the enhanced defense would “give us high confidence in our
ability to deter, prevent, or defeat current and future threats—foreseen or
unforeseen.”
The NSS argues that:
“Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and
great economic and political influence….Defending our nation against its enemies
is the first and fundamental commitment of the federal government. Today, that
task has changed dramatically. Enemies in the past needed great armies and great
industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of
individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs
to purchase a single tank. Terrorists are organized to penetrate open societies and
to turn the power of modern technologies against us.”
“We will build defenses against ballistic missiles and other means of delivery.
We will cooperate with other nations to deny, contain, and curtail our enemies’
efforts to acquire dangerous technologies. And as a matter of common sense and
self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully
formed.”
“…The United States must and will maintain the capability to defeat any attempt
by an enemy—whether a state or non-state actor—to impose its will on the United
States, our allies, or our friends. We will maintain the forces sufficient to support
our obligations, and to defend freedom. Our forces will be strong enough to
dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of
surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.”
The NSS and NSPD-17/HSPD-4 also would appear to be farthest away from the option
or alternative we labeled cooperative defense. That approach stipulates that “The United
States cannot and should not attempt to meet the array of existing threats by itself, but
should cooperate with its allies and help build international institutions to share the
necessary security responsibilities.”
The NSS does call for organizing coalitions of states able and willing to promote
a balance of power that favors freedom and insists that the United States is committed to
lasting institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the
Organization for American States, and NATO as well as other longstanding alliances.
However, the new strategy makes it clear that while the United States will respect the
values, judgments, and interests of its friends and partners, America will be prepared to
act apart when its interests and unique responsibilities require.
In the debate between an evolutionary and revolutionary approach to military
transformation, which we discussed in the defense CPI, the NSS leans heavily toward the
revolutionary approach. Your new strategy argues that a military structured to deter
massive Cold War–era armies must be transformed. The Department of Defense is told it
must develop such assets as advanced remote sensing, long-range precision strike
capabilities, and transformed maneuver and expeditionary forces.
The need for the military to transform itself is made more urgent by the strategy’s
support for preempting emerging threats militarily. The NSS argues that the U.S. military
must be prepared to preempt not only terrorists but rogue states as well. This more
aggressive strategy requires that the U.S. military take advantage of the revolution in
military affairs very quickly so that with superior information it can locate the enemy
precisely and strike him rapidly from a very long distance with a force that is mobile,
stealthy and agile. This means increasing spending dramatically on such items as Joint
Direct Attack Missiles, communications satellites, Remotely Piloted Vehicles like the
Predator and Global Hawk, and advanced infantry gear like robotic vehicles. In addition,
since a strategy of preemption may provoke attacks on the United States by rouge states
with weapons of mass destruction, as you noted in your statement of December 17, 2002,
we need to accelerate the deployment of the first phase of a national missile defense.
Finally, the Wilsonian overtones in the new strategy could lead to a much more
ambitious role for the U.S. military in the international arena than even our enhanced
option called for. In fact, in the CPI we specifically ruled out the United States playing
the role of global policeman. However, the new strategy envisions the United States
promoting global security, advancing democracy and openness, and extending the
benefits of freedom across the globe. Implementing this vision would require a much
greater U.S. military involvement around the world and a much larger active duty force
than currently planned. As you know, our forces, particularly the U.S. Army, are already
stretched thin with existing deployments.
To bring the defense budget in line with the NSS and NSPD-17/HSPD-4, you
would have to increase U.S. military spending across the board and continue raising the
defense budget by $40 billion to $50 billion a year over the next five years. Therefore, the
baseline defense budget for FY 2007 would be at least $600 billion rather than the
projected $470 billion and will consume nearly 4 percent of the GDP and 20 percent of
the overall Federal budget. The cost of the continuing military operations in Afghanistan
or a war against Iraq would have to be added to this figure. At the present time the U.S.
military is spending about $2 billion a month in Afghanistan. Your National Economic
Council estimates that a war against Iraq could cost as much as $200 billion. Others, like
the American Academy of Science put the cost much higher.
Given the fact that the cumulative budget surpluses from 2002 to 2011, which
were estimated to be $5.6 trillion when you took office, have turned into a deficit of $3
trillion over the next decade, it will be difficult to provide these additional funds to
defense and not run huge deficits, raise taxes, or forgo other domestic priorities like
prescription drug benefits for seniors.

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MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: “The National Security Adviser”

SUBJECT: Impact of the 2002 National Security Strategy on Reshaping

Subsequent to my memorandum on defense alternatives, you released your National

The NSS argues that:

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