2010-2012 Cases

UPDATES OF CASES ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS 2010-2012
Digests written by 4B 2012

ART. 26
CORPUZ v. TIROL STO. TOMAS AND THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

G.R. No. 186571
August 11, 2010
FACTS
Petitioner Corpuz, a naturalized Canadian citizen married respondent Sto. Tomas but
subsequently filed for divorce in Canada which was granted by the Court Justice of Windsor,
Ontario, Canada. Two years later, Corpuz fell in love with another Filipina. He went to Civil
Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian divorce decree on his marriage certificate
with Sto. Tomas. However, despite the registration, an official of National Statistics Office
informed Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists under the Philippine law until there has
been a judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce decree by a competent judicial court in view
of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.
Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC. However, the RTC denied the petition
reasoning out that Corpuz cannot institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign
divorce decree because he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided further that
Sto. Tomas was the proper party who can institute an action under the principle of Article
26 of the Family Code which capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry in case the alien
spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grant aliens the right to institute
a petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
HELD
No. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens
BUT the foreign divorce decree obtained by such alien, may be proven in court and recognized
according to our rules of evidence. Thus, it serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of
the alien, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of
foreign judgments.
Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat

Submitted to Atty. M. Sta. Maria SY 2015-2016


VDA. DE CATALAN v. CATALAN-LEE
G.R. No. 183622
February 08, 2012
Under the principles of comity, Philippine jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a
spouse of foreign nationality. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. Nonetheless, the fact of
divorce must still first be proven by the divorce decree itself.
The best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a
writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either
(1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of
his office.
ART. 36
SILVINO A. LIGERALDE v. MAY ASCENSION A. PATALINGHUG and the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 168796
April 15, 2010
Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in
the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, its
incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the totality of the evidence presented
during trial.
Private respondent's act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with a
psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a
trait already existing at the inception of marriage. Petitioner must be able to establish that
respondent's unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes her
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.



RICARDO P. TORING v. TERESITA M. TORING and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 165321
August 3, 2010
-
Reiterated Santos v. CA and Republic v. CA and Molina
Grounds for denial of Psychological Incapacity

- First of all, the testimony given by Dr. Albaran was based solely on the testimony of
Ricardo, the petitioner and their son, Richardson. No personal evaluation was made as to
the condition of Teresita to properly conclude that she is indeed inflicted with the
Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Conclusions and generalizations about Teresitas
psychological condition, based solely on information fed by Ricardo, are not any
different in kind from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the
content of such evidence.
-
Second, it was not proven that the condition of Teresita was present from the moment the
marriage was celebrated.
Third, the statement of the root cause is a requirement that cannot be dispensed with but
it may be proven either by an express statement or through the description of its physical
manifestations.
CAMACHO-REYES v. REYES
G.R. No. 185286
August 18, 2010
Within their acknowledged field of expertise, (THREE) doctors can diagnose the psychological
make up of a person based on a number of factors culled from various sources. A person afflicted
with a personality disorder will not necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this case,
considering that a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by
the respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors separate diagnoses, does not
necessarily evoke credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of experts.
A recommendation for therapy does not automatically imply curability. In general,
recommendations for therapy are given by clinical psychologists, or even psychiatrists, to
manage behavior. In short, the recommendation that respondent should undergo therapy does not
necessarily negate the finding that respondents psychological incapacity is incurable.
In the case at bar, however, even without the experts conclusions, the factual antecedents
(narrative of events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to the inevitable
conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations.
In the instant case, respondents pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological
incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial


support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid
money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family businesses;
and (7) criminal charges of estafa.
In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of the foregoing disquisition, we
find ample basis to conclude that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations at the time of his marriage to the petitioner.
BACCAY v. BACCAY
G.R. No. 173138
December 1, 2010
The phrase psychological incapacity is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of
psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Art. 68, include their mutual obligations to
live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of
the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.
In this case, the totality of evidence presented by Noel was not sufficient to sustain a finding that
Maribel was psychologically incapacitated. Noels evidence merely established that Maribel
refused to have sexual intercourse with him after their marriage, and that she left him after their
quarrel when he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage. He failed to prove the root cause
of the alleged psychological incapacity and establish the requirements of gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability. The report of the psychologist, who concluded that Maribel was
suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder traceable to her experiences during childhood,
did not establish how the personality disorder incapacitated Maribel from validly assuming the
essential obligations of the marriage.
MARABLE v. MARABLE
G.R. No. 178741
January 17, 2011
In cases of annulment of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the psychological
illness and its root cause must be proven to exist from the inception of the marriage. The
evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made a general conclusion that petitioner is suffering from an
Anti-social Personality Disorder. As held in the case of Suazo v. Suazo, the presentation of expert
proof in cases for declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity
presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert,
for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
The evaluation of Dr. Tayag falls short of the required proof which the Court can rely on as basis
to declare as void petitioner's marriage to respondent. It is indispensable that the evidence must
show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.

Petitioner tried to make it appear that his family history of having a womanizer for a father, was
one of the reasons why he engaged in extra-marital affairs during his marriage. However, it
appears more likely that he became unfaithful as a result of a general dissatisfaction with his
marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in his personal history. In Santos v. Court of
Appeals, the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
YAMBAO v. REPUBLIC AND YAMBAO
G.R. No. 184063
January 24, 2011
Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will. This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit
oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the
essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering
of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be
tantamount to a psychological abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet
his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be
incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.
That respondent, according to petitioner, lack[ed] effective sense of rational judgment and
responsibility" does not mean he is incapable to meet his marital obligations. His refusal to help
care for the children, his neglect for his business ventures, and his alleged unbearable jealousy
may indicate some emotional turmoil or mental difficulty, but none have been shown to amount
to a psychological abnormality. Moreover, even assuming that respondents faults amount to
psychological incapacity, it has not been established that the same existed at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.
Furthermore, as found by both RTC and CA, respondent never committed infidelity or physically
abused petitioner or their children. In fact, considering that the children lived with both parents,
it is safe to assume that both made an impact in the childrens upbringing. Still, the parties were
able to raise three children into adulthood without any major parenting problems," and such fact
could hardly support a proposition that the parties marriage is a nullity.



OCHOSA v. ALANO
G.R. No. 181881
January 26, 2011
In Marcos v. Marcos, it was held that the foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician
examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated and that what is important is the
presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition. In the
case at bar, the evidence presented were the testimonies of Jose, his military aides and the
psychiatrist. But this is inadequate in proving that her defects were already present at the
inception of, or prior to, the marriage. Only the uncorroborated testimony of Jose supported the
allegation that Bonas sexual promiscuity already existed prior to the marriage. The
psychiatrists testimony on Bonas histrionic personality disorder did not meet the standard of
evidence required in determining psychological incapacity as her findings did not emanate from
a personal interview with Bona herself and merely relied on her interview with Jose and his other
witnesses.
This factual circumstance evokes the possibility that the information fed to the psychiatrist is
tainted with bias for Joses cause, in the absence of sufficient corroboration. In view of the
foregoing, the badges of Bonas alleged psychological incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and
abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period of time after her marriage to Jose
and not to the inception of the said marriage.
Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party
even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about
to assume.
AURELIO v. AURELIO
G.R. No. 175367
June 06, 2011
The following are the guidelines to aid the courts in the disposition of cases involving
psychological incapacity: (1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff; (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage; (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable; (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage;
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision; (7)
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in


the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts; (8)
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
REPUBLIC v. GALANG
G.R. No. 168335
June 6, 2011
It is not absolutely necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the
Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. [Brenda Marcos vs. Marcos]
Instead of serving as a guideline, the Molina Doctrine unintentionally became a straightjacket; it
forced all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it. [Ngo Te vs.
Yu-Te] In Ting vs. Velez-Ting, far from abandoning Molina, the Ngo Te case simply suggested
the relaxation of its stringent requirements; the Ngo Te case merely stands for a more flexible
approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological
incapacity.
KALAW v. HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 166357
September 19, 2011
The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff (petitioner). Petitioners
experts heavily relied on petitioners allegations of respondents constant mahjong sessions,
visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children.
Petitioners experts opined that respondents alleged habits, when performed constantly to the
detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a
psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
But petitioners allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions
of his experts, were not actually proven.
PIMENTEL v. PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 172060
September 13, 2010
On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated
parricide against Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case (Maria Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the
RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question.
ISSUE: Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question
that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in
parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have
killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of
causes independent of petitioners will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime,
petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage will have
no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage.
In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still
be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still
married to respondent.
We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v. CA that the judicial declaration of the
nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x.
First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or
subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for
bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in
Tenebro that [t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage,
although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. In fact, the Court declared in that
case that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned.
DIO v. DIO
G.R. No. 178044
January 19, 2011
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or
Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who
are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.



The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only
after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code.
The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed
under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare
therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court
only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the
Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to
marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and
45 of the Family Code.
In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute
community of property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the parties agree to a complete
separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the
property relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of property or conjugal
partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a
decree of annulment could be issued.
That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the
marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio
under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the
liquidation of the properties of the parties.
YU v. JUDGE REYES-CARPIO AND YU
G.R. No. 189207
June 15, 2011
Finally, petitioner asserts that the deferment of the reception of evidence on custody, support,
and property relations would amount to an ambiguous and fragmentary judgment on the main
issue. This argument does not hold water. The Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10SC clearly allows the deferment of the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property
relations. Conversely, the trial court may receive evidence on the subject incidents after a
judgment granting the petition but before the decree of nullity or annulment of marriage is
issued. Petitioner's assertion that ruling the main issue without receiving evidence on the subject
incidents would result in an ambiguous and fragmentary judgment is certainly speculative and,
hence, contravenes the legal presumption that a trial judge can fairly weigh and appraise the
evidence submitted by the parties.


ART. 35.4
JARILLO v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 164435
June 29, 2010
On November 1979, the petitioner, being previously married in 1974, and without the said
marriage having been legally dissolved, contracted a second marriage. The RTC found petitioner
guilty of bigamy in 2001. In 2003, judgment was promulgated declaring petitioners 1974
marriage null and void ab initio on the ground of petitioner spouses psychological incapacity. In
her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the
reversal of her conviction.
Without a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, it is presumed to be subsisting. Any
decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that the guilty party entered into a
second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is
not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial
question.
Petitioners conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the
crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one
having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated.
Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until
declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
ART. 39
ISIDRO ABLAZA v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 158298
August 11, 2010
Petitioner filed in the RTC in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano
Ablaza and Leonila Honato, alleging that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had
been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9,
1950. Accordingly, since he is the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any
issue, he is entitled to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death,
thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn
the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of
Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
10


wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family
Code and those solemnized under the the Civil Code.
This specifically extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on
August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to
proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.
Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in
the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit.
ART. 40
ANTONE v. BERONILLA
G.R. No. 183824
December 8, 2010
ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void.
This was exhaustively discussed in Mercado (G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000), where this
Court settled the "conflicting" jurisprudence on "the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of
the previous marriage." After establishing that Article 40 is a new provision expressly requiring a
judicial declaration of nullity of a prior marriage, this Court concluded, in essence, that under the
Family Code a subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage is immaterial in
a bigamy case because, by then, the crime had already been consummated. Otherwise stated, a
person who contracts a subsequent marriage absent a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a
previous one, is guilty of bigamy.
TEVES v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 188775
August 24, 2011
Petitioner claims that since his previous marriage was declared null and void, "there is in effect
no marriage at all, and thus, there is no bigamy to speak of;" especially since the first marriage
had already been legally dissolved at the time the bigamy case was filed in court.
It does not matter whether the case for declaration of nullity was filed before the case for bigamy
was instituted, for as long as the offender contracted a subsequent marriage while his previous
marriage is subsisting thereby not being able to secure a Declaration of Nullity of the First
marriage AT THE TIME HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of
action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous
11


marriage void. Parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void
even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage
before they can be allowed to marry again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or
her marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. A judicial
declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else,
what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
ART. 42
REPUBLIC v. GRANADA
G.R. No. 187512
June 13, 2012
After nine years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead
with the RTC Lipa City. On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus
presumptively dead.
On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the OSG, filed a
Motion for Reconsideration arguing that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate
Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead. The motion was
denied. The OSG then elevated the case on appeal to the CA. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued that her Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the Family Code, was a summary
judicial proceeding, in which the judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not
appealable.
A petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of
contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding
as provided for under the Family Code. Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the
Family Code provide that since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary
proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory.
As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article
41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a
petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries
and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is
still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of
death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature
and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.
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ART. 92
Munoz v. Ramirez
G.R. No. 156125
August 25, 2010
As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to
have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be
conjugal unless the contrary is proved. In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda inherited
the residential lot from her father has sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal
ownership pursuant to Articles 92 and 109 of the Family Code. The residential lot, therefore, is
Erlindas exclusive paraphernal property.
Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article 158 of the Civil Code, provides the
solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that are made on the separate
property of the spouses, at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either
or both spouses. When the value of the paraphernal property is considerably more than the
conjugal improvement, said paraphernal property does not become conjugal property.
ART. 96
Fuentes vs. Roca
G.R. No. 178902
April 21, 2010
Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this case is the Family
Code, not the Civil Code.
Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property without
the consent of his wife on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took effect on
August 3, 1988.
In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code which gives the wife right to have the sale annulled
during the marriage within ten years from the date of the sale, Article 124 of the Family Code
does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husbands
sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other spouses written consent or a
court order allowing the sale, the same would be void. The passage of time did not erode the
right to bring such an action.
The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Its Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains
expressly superseded Title VI, Book I of the Civil Code on Property Relations Between Husband
and Wife. Further, the Family Code provisions were also made to apply to already existing
conjugal partnerships without prejudice to vested rights.

13


Art. 105. x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains
already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in
Article 256. (n)
ART. 116
DELA PENA v. AVILA
G.R. No. 187490
February 08, 2012
In the case Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals, the phrase "married to" is merely descriptive of the civil
status of the wife and cannot be interpreted to mean that the husband is also a registered owner.
Because it is likewise possible that the property was acquired by the wife while she was still
single and registered only after her marriage, neither would registration thereof in said manner
constitute proof that the same was acquired during the marriage and, for said reason, to be
presumed conjugal in nature. "Since there is no showing as to when the property in question was
acquired, the fact that the title is in the name of the wife alone is determinative of its nature as
paraphernal, i.e., belonging exclusively to said spouse."
ART. 121
AGUETE v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
G.R. No. 170166
April 6, 2011
If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, that contract falls within the term
"x x x x obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at
the signing of the contract. Where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family
business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
ART. 124
14

SPOUSES AGGABAO v. PARULAN, JR. AND PARULAN

G.R. No. 165803
September 1, 2010
Article 124, Family Code, applies to sale of conjugal properties made after the effectivity of the
Family Code. The sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of
the Family Code. :
Article 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail,
subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within
five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration.
These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition
or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer
on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.
The power of administration does not include acts of disposition or encumbrance, which are acts
of strict ownership. As such, an authority to dispose cannot proceed from an authority to
administer, and vice versa, for the two powers may only be exercised by an agent by following
the provisions on agency of the Civil Code (from Article 1876 to Article 1878).
FLORES v. LINDO
G.R. No. 183984
April 13, 2011
Article 124 of the Family Code of which applies to conjugal partnership property, is a
reproduction of Article 96 of the Family Code which applies to community property.
Both Article 96 and Article 124 of the Family Code provide that the powers do not include
disposition or encumbrance without the written consent of the other spouse. Any disposition or
encumbrance without the written consent shall be void. However, both provisions also state that
the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and
the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse x x x before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage were executed on 31
October 1995. The Special Power of Attorney was executed on 4 November 1995. The execution
15


of the SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the continuing offer as a binding
contract between the parties, making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.
ART. 129
QUIAO v. QUIAO
G.R. No. 176556
July 04, 2012
FACTS: Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B.
Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the
custody of their 3 minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided
equally between the spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment
of the unpaid conjugal liabilities.
Brigidos share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in
favor of the common children because Brigido is the offending spouse.
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period. After more than
nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion
for Clarification, asking the RTC to define the term Net Profits Earned.
RTC held that the phrase NET PROFIT EARNED denotes the remainder of the properties of
the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts. It
further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of
the common children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the
net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family
Code, instead of Article 102. He argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other
provision under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result
of legal separation.
When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife become
joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the
marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the
Family Code) form the common mass of the couple's properties. And when the couple's marriage
or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective
heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one
may have originally owned.
In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been established that the
spouses have no separate properties, what will be divided equally between them is simply the
net profits. And since the legal separation decision states that the share of Brigido in the net
profits shall be awarded to the children, Brigido will still be left with nothing.
16

On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under
Article 142 of the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their
separate property and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the
dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage. From the foregoing provision, each of
the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture
or merger of those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete
separation of capitals.
In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no
separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are
considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed
properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However,
since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the
conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the
Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will
be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate
property which may be accounted for in the guilty party's favor.
ART. 130
HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. et. al. v. SERVACIO and GO
G.R. No. 157537
September 7, 2011
Under Article 130 in relation to Article 105 of the Family Code, any disposition of the conjugal
property after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation;
otherwise, the disposition is void.
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Martas share in the
conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Martas share
without an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial
decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Martas share. Nonetheless, a
co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and
dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners.
Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other
co-owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby
effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Martas share. Article 105 of
the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the applicability of the rules on dissolution of the
conjugal partnership is "without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with
the Civil Code or other laws."

17


The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of
possession of the thing owned in common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or
co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it
continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it
[Mainit v. Bandoy, supra] In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the
co-heirs of her vendors in respect of any portion that might not be validly sold to her.
ART. 153
RAMOS v. PANGILINAN et. al.
G.R. No. 185920
July 20, 2010
For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law
applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the
judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege and on both instances, the exemption
must be proved.
If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3,
1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under
Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is
governed by Articles 240 to 242.
On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extrajudicially or judicially, and the exemption is
effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art.
154 actually resides therein. Moreover, the family home should belong to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have
been with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon
the area where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply
as provided under Art. 155 for which the family home is made answerable must have been
incurred after August 3, 1988. In both instances, the claim for exemption must be proved.
ART. 155
DE MESA v. ACERO
G.R. No. 185064
January 16, 2012
For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law
applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the
judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege.

18


The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from execution,
could be summarized as follows:
First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August
3, 1988 must be constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance
with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution;
Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988
are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it
was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein;
Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family
home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter, are considered as
family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a
family home under the Family Code.
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code
is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the
sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction. It is not
sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family
home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff.
Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home and, thus, should have been exempt
from execution, Spouses De Mesa should have asserted the subject property being a family home
and its being exempted from execution at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time
thereafter. They are stopped from claiming the exemption of the property from execution.
ART. 175
DOLINA v. VALLECERA
G.R. No. 182367
December 15, 2010
FACTS: In 2008, Cherryl Dolina filed a petition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
protection order against Glenn Vallecera before RTC for VAWC under RA 9262. In the pro
forma complaint Cherryl added a prayer for support for their supposed child. She based such
prayer on the latters certificate of live birth which listed Vallecera as the childs father. The
petition also asked Valleceras employer, to withhold from his pay such amount of support as the
RTC may deem appropriate.
Vallecera opposed petition and claimed that Dolinas petition was essentially one for financial
support rather than for protection against woman and child abuses, that he was not the childs
father and that the signature in the birth certificate was not his. He also added that the petition is
a harassment suit intended to for him to acknowledge the child as his and therefore give financial
support.
19

The RTC dismissed the petition.

Although the issuance of a protection order against the respondent can include the grant of legal
support for the wife and the child, this assumes that both are entitled to a protection order and to
legal support. In this case neither her or her child lived with Vallecera.
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the filiation of the
child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolinas demand for support for her
son is based on her claim that he is Valleceras illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such
support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his relation to him. The
childs remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory
recognition. If filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. In short,
illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights but their filiation must be duly
proved.
Dolinas remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against Vallecera for compulsory
recognition in order to establish filiation and then demand support. Alternatively, she may
directly file an action for support, where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated
and resolved.
JESSE U. LUCAS v. JESUS S. LUCAS
G.R. No. 190710
June 6, 2011
FACTS: Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the
Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the RTC. Jesse alleged that he is the son of his
mother Elsie who got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in Manila. He also submitted
documents which include (a) petitioners certificate of live birth; (b) petitioners baptismal
certificate; (c) petitioners college diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint Louis
University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation from
the same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from the University of the Philippines, College of
Music; and (f) clippings of several articles from different newspapers about petitioner, as a
musical prodigy.
Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting that the
petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on him. Meanwhile,
Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC found to be sufficient
in form and hence set the case for hearing.
Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of
a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesses father.
RTC held that the grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition is premature
considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. The CA also ruled in favour of Jesus,
noting that Jesse failed to show that the four significant aspects of a traditional paternity action
20


had been met and held that DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to
establish a prima facie case.
The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional
paternity case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this
case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties
have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined
at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed.
The CAs observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case is herefore misplaced.
A prima facie case is built by a partys evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory
pleading.
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed to
safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. It states that the appropriate court may,
at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person, who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to
the parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the
case;(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now
requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The
DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper
resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may
consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.
This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of
any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced. This
does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during
the hearing, the said conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause
hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or good cause for the holding of the test.
The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father
from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the
petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.

21

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UPDATES OF CASES ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS 2010-2012

Digests written by 4B 2012

CORPUZ v. TIROL STO. TOMAS AND THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat

UPDATES OF CASES ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS 2010-2012

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat

UPDATES OF CASES ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS 2010-2012

Reiterated Santos v. CA and Republic v. CA and Molina

Grounds for denial of Psychological Incapacity

UPDATES OF CASES ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS 2010-2012

UPDATES OF CASES ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS 2010-2012

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat

UPDATES OF CASES ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS 2010-2012

UPDATES OF CASES ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS 2010-2012

UPDATES OF CASES ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS 2010-2012

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat

UPDATES OF CASES ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS 2010-2012

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat

UPDATES OF CASES ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS 2010-2012

UPDATES OF CASES ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS 2010-2012

UPDATES OF CASES ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS 2010-2012

UPDATES OF CASES ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS 2010-2012

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat

UPDATES OF CASES ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS 2010-2012

UPDATES OF CASES ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS 2010-2012

SPOUSES AGGABAO v. PARULAN, JR. AND PARULAN

UPDATES OF CASES ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS 2010-2012

UPDATES OF CASES ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS 2010-2012

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat

UPDATES OF CASES ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS 2010-2012

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat

UPDATES OF CASES ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS 2010-2012

UPDATES OF CASES ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS 2010-2012

The RTC dismissed the petition.

UPDATES OF CASES ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS 2010-2012

Compiled by Eric Andres, Mateo Escueta, Beau Masiglat

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