Pp v.

Quidato

RTC found the accused guilty

FACTS:

ISSUE:

Bernardo Quidato was the father of accused Bernardo Quidato, Jr.

and Leo Quidato. Bernardo lived alone in his house. He owned a parcel of
land. Bernardo, accompanied by accused and Reynaldo Malita and Eddie
Malita, went to Davao City to sell copra. Afterwhich, Bernardo paid the
Malita brothers for their labor, who thereafter left. Bernardo and accused
went home. According to Gina Quidato, on the evening of the next day,
accused-appellant and the Malita brothers were drinking tuba at their
house. She overheard the trio planning to go to Bernardos house to get
money from the latter. She had no idea as to what later transpired because
she had fallen asleep before 10 pm. Accused-appellant objected to Gina
Quidatos testimony on the ground that the same was prohibited by the
marital disqualification rule found in Section 22 of Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court. The judge, acknowledging such, allowed said testimony only
against co-accused, Reynaldo and Eddie.

WON ERRED IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF MALTA

BROTHERS.

Accused asked Reynaldo to come to the formers house to discuss an

important matter. Upon Reynaldos arrival at accused house, he saw that
Eddie was already there. They started drinking beer. The Malita brothers
alleged that the accused proposed that they rob and kill his father. They
went to Bernardos house only at 10:00 p.m., after the rain had stopped.
Reynaldo brought along a bolo. When Bernardo opened the door, Eddie
knocked the old man down. Reynaldo then hacked Bernardo on the nape
and neck. Accused and Eddie ransacked Bernardos aparador looking for
money to no avail; so, the three of them left.
Leo confronted his brother regarding the incident and learned that
Reynaldo and Eddie were the ones responsible for Bernardos death. The
two arrested by the police Together with accused. The Malita brothers
were interrogated and were made known of their constitutional rights.
They signified their intent to confess even in the absence of counsel. The
police escorted Malita brothers along with their unsigned affidavits, to a
PAO lawyer.
The PAO lawyer made them known to their rights and explained their
affidavits in a dialect known to them, only then did they signed such.

RULING:
The two brothers were, however, not presented on the witness
stand to testify on their extra-judicial confessions. The failure to present
the two gives these affidavits the character of hearsay. It is hornbook
doctrine that unless the affiants themselves take the witness stand to
affirm the averments in their affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded
from the judicial proceeding, being inadmissible hearsay. The voluntary
admissions of an accused made extrajudicially are not admissible in
evidence against his co-accused when the latter had not been given an
opportunity to hear him testify and cross-examine him.
The manner by which the affidavits were obtained by the police render
the same inadmissible in evidence even if they were voluntarily given.
The settled rule is that an uncounseled extrajudicial confession without a
valid waiver of the right to counsel that is, in writing and in the presence
of counsel is inadmissible in evidence. It is undisputed that the Malita
brothers gave their statements to Patrolman Mara in the absence of
counsel, although they signed the same in the presence of counsel the next
day.
With regard to Gina Quidatos testimony, the same must also be
disregarded, accused-appellant having timely objected thereto under the
marital disqualification rule. As correctly observed by the court a quo the
disqualification is between husband and wife, the law not precluding the
wife from testifying when it involves other parties or accused. Hence,
Gina Quidato could testify in the murder case against Reynaldo and
Eddie, which was jointly tried with accused-appellants case. This
testimony cannot, however, be used against accused-appellant directly or
through the guise of taking judicial notice of the proceedings in the
murder case without violating the marital disqualification rule. What
cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly is a rule familiar even to
law students.

Reyes v. CA
FACTS:
Juan Mendoza, father of defendant Olympio, owns a parcel of land
devoted for production of palay. The land was cultivated by Julian,
husband of Eufrocina. The latter alleged upon the death of Julian, she
succeeded him as bona fide tenant. That Olympio, through FISTS,
prevented her daughter Violeta and others from entering the premises
and that until filing of such case, they were Olympio refused to vacate
the premises thereby violating her tenancy rights. Plaintiff therefore
prayed for judgment for the recovery of possession and damages with
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in the meantime.
Defendant barangay officials denied interference in the tenancy
relationship existing between plaintiff and defendant Mendoza,
particularly in the cultivation of the latters farm lots and asked for the
dismissal of the case, moral damages and attorneys fees. Mendoza
raised abandonment, sublease and mortgage of the farm lots without
his consent and approval, and non-payment of rentals, irrigation fees
and other taxes due the government, as his defenses
CA ordered defendant Olympio to restore possession of the land to
Eufrocina and ordering them vacate the same.
ISSUES:
WON the court erred in holding Olympio liable.
RULING:
No. It is clear that petitioners are asking the Court to re-examine all the
evidence already presented and evaluated by the trial court and reevaluated again by the respondent appellate court. Said evidence
served as basis in arriving at the trial court and appellate court's
findings of fact. We shall not analyze such evidence all over again but
instead put finis to the factual findings in this case. The evidence
presented before the trial court and CA served as basis in arriving at

their findings of fact. The Supreme Court will not analyze such
evidence all over again because settled is the rule that only questions
of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court absent the exceptions which do not obtain in
the instant case.
In agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence is no more than substantial
evidence. Substantial evidence does not necessarily import
preponderant evidence, as is required in an ordinarily civil case. It has
been defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion and its absence is not
shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence on record, direct or
circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot substitute its own
judgment or criteria for that of the trial court in determining wherein
lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to belief.

ISSUE:

Pp v. Turco
FACTS:
Accused Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (aka Totong) was charged with the
rape of his neighbor 13-year-old Escelea Tabada. Escelea was about to
sleep when she heard a familiar voice calling her from outside her
house. She recognized appellant Turco immediately as she had known
him for 4 years and he is her second cousin. Unaware of the danger
that was about to befall her, Escelea opened the door. Turco, with the
use of towel, covered Esceleas face, placed his right hand on the
latters neck and bid her to walk. When they reached a grassy part,
near the pig pen which was about 12 meters away from the victims
house, appellant lost no time in laying the victim on the grass, laid on
top of the victim and took off her short pants and panty and succeeded
in pursuing his evil design-by forcibly inserting his penis inside
Esceleas private part despite Esceleas resistance. Appellant then
threatened her that he will kill her if she reports the incident to
anybody.
For almost 10 days, she just kept the incident to herself until she was
able to muster enough courage to tell her brother-in-law, Orlando
Pioquinto, who in turn informed Alejandro, the victims father, about
the rape of his daughter. Alejandro did not waste time and immediately
asked Escelea to see a doctor for medical examination and eventually
file a complaint after the issuance of the medical certificate. Turco,
meanwhile, alleged that he and Escelea were sweethearts.
The trial court found Turco guilty of the charge.
In his appeal, Turco argues, among others, that no actual proof was
presented that the rape of the complainant actually happened
considering that although a medical certificate was presented, the
medico-legal officer who prepared the same was not presented in court
to explain the same.

W/N the appellants contention that the medical certificate may not be
considered is with merit
RULING:
Yes. With regard to appellants argument on the proof of medical
certificate, while the certificate could be admitted as an exception to
the hearsay rule since entries in official records constitute exceptions
to the hearsay evidence rule, since it involved an opinion of one who
must first be established as an expert witness, it could not be given
weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to
show his qualifications. Emphasis must be placed on the distinction
between admissibility of evidence and the probative value thereof.
Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not
excluded by the law or the rules or is competent. Since admissibility of
evidence is determined by its relevance and competence, admissibility
is, therefore, an affair of logic and law. On the other hand, the weight
to be given to such evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial
evaluation within the guidelines provided in Rule 133 and the
jurisprudence laid down by the Court. Thus, while evidence may be
admissible, it may be entitled to little or no weight at all. Conversely,
evidence which may have evidentiary weight may be inadmissible
because a special rule forbids its reception.
Withal, although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay
rule, hence admissible as evidence, it has very little probative value
due to the absence of the examining physician. Nevertheless, it cannot
be said that the prosecution relied solely on the medical certificate. In
fact, reliance was made on the testimony of the victim herself which,
standing alone even without medical examination, is sufficient to
convict. It is well-settled that a medical examination is not
indispensable in the prosecution of rape. The absence of medical
findings by a medico-legal officer does not disprove the occurrence of
rape. It is enough that the evidence on hand convinces the court that
conviction is proper. In the instant case, the victims testimony alone is
credible and sufficient to convict.

ISSUE:
Heirs of Sabanpan v. Comorposa
FACTS:
A complaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed
by petitioners against respondents. It alleged that Saez was
the lawful and actual possessor of the land. He died leaving
his children and grandchildren. Francisco Comorposa was
fired from his job. Being a close family friend of Saez, he
approached the Adolfo Saez. The latter, out of compassion
and pity, allowed Fran to occupy the land without any rental.
When Fran left for SanFo, he was succeeded by other
Comorposa in the possession without any rental.
After which, those occupying the land received a formal
demand letter but they refused to vacate and claimed that
they were the legitimate and actual possessor of the land
RTC ruled in favor of the Comorposas. CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC it held that although not yet final, the
Order issued by the DENR Regional Director remained in
full force and effect. The certification that the DENR's
community environment and natural resources (CENR)
officer issued was proof that when the cadastral survey was
conducted, the land was still alienable and was not yet
allocated to any person. Respondents had the better right to
possess alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
because they have sufficiently proven their actual, physical,
open, notorious, exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted
possession thereof since 1960.

1.) Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion

and err in sustaining the Regional Trial Courts ruling
giving weight to the CENR Officers Certification,
which only bears the facsimile of the alleged signature
of a certain Jose F. Tagorda and, [worse], it is a new
matter raised for the first time on appeal?
2.) Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion
and err in holding that the land subject matter of this
case has been acquired by means of adverse
possession and prescription?
RULING:
1.) Petitioners contend that the CENR Certification dated
July 22, 1997 is a sham document, because the
signature of the CENR officer is a mere facsimile. In
support of their argument, they cite Garvida v. Sales
Jr. and argue that the Certification is a new matter
being raised by respondents for the first time on
appeal.
In Garvida, the Court held: "A facsimile or fax
transmission is a process involving the transmission and
reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning
an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and
representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified
amount of electric current." Pleadings filed via fax
machines are not considered originals and are at best
exact copies. As such, they are not admissible in

evidence, as there is no way of determining whether they

are genuine or authentic.
The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested
for bearing a facsimile of the signature of CENR Officer
Jose F. Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not the same as
that which is alluded to in Garvida. The one mentioned here
refers to a facsimile signature, which is defined as a
signature produced by mechanical means but recognized as
valid in banking, financial, and business transactions
Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the
Certification. In fact, the DENR regional director has
acknowledged and used it as reference in his Order dated
April 2, 1998. If the Certification were a sham as petitioner
claims, then the regional director would not have used it as
reference in his Order. Instead, he would have either verified
it or directed the CENR officer to take the appropriate
action, as the latter was under the former's direct control and
supervision.
Petitioners' claim that the Certification was raised for
the first time on appeal is incorrect. As early as the pretrial
conference at the Municipal Trial Court, the CENR
Certification had already been marked as evidence for
respondents as stated in the Pre-trial Order. The Certification
was not formally offered, however, because respondents had
not been able to file their position paper. Neither the rules of
procedure nor jurisprudence would sanction the admission
of evidence that has not been formally offered during the
trial. But this evidentiary rule is applicable only to ordinary
trials, not to cases covered by the rule on summary
procedure -- cases in which no full-blown trial is held.

2.) Petitioners assert that the CA erred in disregarding the

Affidavits of their witnesses, insisting that the Rule on
Summary Procedure authorizes the use of affidavits.
They also claim that the failure of respondents to file
their position paper and counter-affidavits before the
MTC amounts to an admission by silence.
The admissibility of evidence should not be confused
with its probative value. Admissibility refers to the
question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be
considered at all, while probative value refers to the
question of whether the admitted evidence proves an
issue
Thus, a particular item of evidence may be
admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on
judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by
the rules of evidence.
While in summary proceedings affidavits are
admissible as the witnesses respective testimonies, the
failure of the adverse party to reply does not ipso
facto render the facts, set forth therein, duly proven.
Petitioners still bear the burden of proving their cause
of action, because they are the ones asserting an
affirmative relief.

Tan v. Pp
FACTS: