SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL. vs.

MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO

SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO (CASE DIGEST) G.R. No. L-21450 - - April 15,
1968
FACTS:

question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or

The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum of money in the sum of

affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such

exactly P 1,908.00, exclusive of interest filed by Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog

relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86

against Spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio, was originally instituted

A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that

in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. A month prior to the filing of

the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the

the complaint, the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. 296) took effect depriving the Court of

action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred

First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand, exclusive of

from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and

interest, is not more than P 2,000.00 (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. 296.)

conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be

asserted.
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure

tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy.

The case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the
entire proceeding the appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until the

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and

receipt of the Court of Appeals' adverse decision.

encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question
the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61

Considering that the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all

L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659).

cases in which jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue, the Court of Appeals

And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party

certified the case to the Supreme Court along with the records of the case.

who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to
secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a

ISSUE:

penalty.

Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
of the Court of First Instance during the pendency of the appeal will prosper.

Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the
resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) to the effect that we
frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and

RULING:

then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction,
when adverse as well as in Pindagan etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591,

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for

September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-

different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by

15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-

record, and of estoppel by laches.

20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.

Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained

The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on

length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have

July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court

been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable

of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the

time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has

sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the

abandoned it or declined to assert it.

original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several

The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy
which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and,
unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a

stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it
invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its
case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was
rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of

jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be

declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was
commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their
Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but
revolting.
Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record, We have
become persuaded that We can do nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval,
the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals x x x granting plaintiffs' motion for
execution against the surety x x x
UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with
costs against the appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.

CALIMLIM vs. HON. RAMIREZ

G.R. No. L-34362

November 19, 1982

Independent Mercantile Corporation filed a petition in the

respondent Court to compel Manuel Magali to surrender the owner's
duplicate of TCT No. 9138 in order that the same may be cancelled
and a new one issued in the name of the said corporation. Not being
the registered owner and the title not being in his possession, Manuel
Magali failed to comply with the order of the Court directing him to
surrender the said title. This prompted Independent Mercantile
Corporation to file an ex-parte petition to declare TCT No. 9138 as
cancelled and to issue a new title in its name. The said petition was
granted by the respondent Court and the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan issued a new title in the name of the corporation, TCT No.
68568. Petitioner, upon learning that her husband's title over the
parcel of land had been cancelled, filed a petition with the respondent
Court, sitting as a cadastral court, praying for the cancellation of TCT
No. 68568 but the court dismissed the petition.
Petitioner thereafter filed in the LRC Record No. 39492 for the
cancellation of TCT No. 68568 but the same was dismissed therein.
Petitioners then resorted to the filing of a complaint in for the
cancellation of the conveyances and sales that had been made with
respect to the property, covered by TCT No. 9138, against Francisco
Ramos who claimed to have bought the property from Independent
Mercantile Corporation. Private respondent Francisco Ramos,
however, failed to obtain a title over the property in his name in view
of the existence of an adverse claim annotated on the title thereof at
the instance of the herein petitioners. Francisco Ramos filed a Motion
to Dismiss on the ground that the same is barred by prior judgement or
by statute of limitations. Resolving the said Motion, the respondent
Court dismissed the case on the ground of estoppel by prior judgment.

Issue: W/N dismissal of the case is proper on the ground of estoppel

by prior judgment

No. It is error to consider the dismissal of the petition filed by

the herein petitioner in LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of
TCT No. 68568 as a bar by prior judgment against the filing of the
subsequent civil case. In order to avail of the defense of res judicata, it
must be shown, among others, that the judgment in the prior action
must have been rendered by a court with the proper jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the proceeding in which the prior judgment or order was
rendered. If there is lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the
suit or of the parties, the judgment or order cannot operate as an
adjudication of the controversy. This essential element of the defense
of bar by prior judgment or res judicata does not exist in the case.
The petition filed by the petitioners in LRC Record No. 39492
was an apparent invocation of the authority of the respondent Court
sitting as a land registration court. Reliance was apparently placed on
Section 112 of the Land Registration Act wherein it provides that a
Court of First Instance, acting as a land registration court, is a court of
limited and special jurisdiction. As such, its proceedings are not
adequate for the litigation of issues pertaining to an ordinary civil
action, such as, questions involving ownership or title to real property.

to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning
the court or bodys jurisdiction.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the LA
G.R. No. 154295. July 29, 2005]
METROMEDIA

TIMES

CORPORATION

during appeal.
and/or

ROBINA

GOKONGWIE-PE,

petitioner, vs. JOHNNY PASTORIN, respondent.

HELD

FACTS

The SC held that petitioner is not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the LA
during appeal.

Respondent, because of tardiness was supposedly terminated by the petitioner

company, but because of the timely intervention of the union, the dismissal was not

The general rule is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action

effected. However, he incurred another infraction when he obtained a loan from a

is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties.

magazine dealer and when he was not able to pay the loan, he stopped collecting the

The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even

outstanding dues of the dealer/creditor. After requiring him to explain, respondent

on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which

admitted his failure to pay the loan but gave no definitive explanation for the same.

stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be

Thereafter, he was penalized with suspension. He was also not allowed to do field

regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which

work, and was transferred to a new position. Despite the completion of his

were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstances involved in

suspension, respondent stopped reporting for work and sent a letter communicating

Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-

his refusal to accept the transfer. He then filed a complaint for constructive dismissal,

waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine

non-payment of backwages and other money claims with the labor arbiter.

had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as
the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time
honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.

The complaint was resolved in favor of respondent. Petitioner lodged an appeal with
the NLRC, raising as a ground the lack of jurisdiction of the labor arbiter over

The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly

respondents complaint. Significally, this issue was not raised by petitioner in the

depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no

proceedings before the Labor Arbiter.

jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction,
the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same

The NLRC reversed the decision of the LA and ruled that the LA has no jurisdiction

'must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or

over the case, it being a grievance issue properly cognizable by the voluntary

by estoppel. However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and

arbitrator. However, the CA reinstated the ruling of the CA. The CA held that the

decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction,

active participation of the party against whom the action was brought, coupled with

the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to

his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the

assume an inconsistent positionthat the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the

action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness

principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does
not depend upon the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon.

Applying the general rule that estoppel does not confer jurisdiction, petitioner is not
estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter before the NLRC on
appeal.

Decision of the CA is set aside