SECOND DIVISION

MINDANAO TERMINAL AND G.R. No. 162467

BROKERAGE SERVICE, INC.
Petitioner, Present:
- versus - CARPIO MORALES ,* JJ.,
Acting Chairperson,
TINGA,
PHOENIX ASSURANCE VELASCO, JR.,
COMPANY OF NEW YORK/ LEONARDO DE CASTRO,** and
MCGEE & CO., INC., BRION, JJ.
Respondent.
Promulgated:
May 8, 2009
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DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari [1] under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure of the 29 October 2003[2] Decision of the Court of Appeals and
the 26 February 2004 Resolution[3] of the same court denying petitioners motion
for reconsideration.
The facts of the case are not disputed.
Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (Del Monte) contracted petitioner Mindanao
Terminal and Brokerage Service, Inc. (Mindanao Terminal), a stevedoring
company, to load and stow a shipment of 146,288 cartons of fresh green Philippine
bananas and 15,202 cartons of fresh pineapples belonging to Del Monte Fresh
Produce International, Inc. (Del Monte Produce) into the cargo hold of the
vessel M/V Mistrau. The vessel was docked at the port of Davao City and the
goods were to be transported by it to the port of Inchon, Korea in favor of
consignee Taegu Industries, Inc. Del Monte Produce insured the shipment under an
open cargo policy with private respondent Phoenix Assurance Company of New
York (Phoenix), a non-life insurance company, and private respondent McGee &
Co. Inc. (McGee), the underwriting manager/agent of Phoenix.[4]

Mindanao Terminal loaded and stowed the cargoes aboard the M/V Mistrau. The
vessel set sail from the port of Davao City and arrived at the port of Inchon, Korea.
It was then discovered upon discharge that some of the cargo was in bad condition.
The Marine Cargo Damage Surveyor of Incok Loss and Average Adjuster of
Korea, through its representative Byeong Yong Ahn (Byeong), surveyed the extent
of the damage of the shipment. In a survey report, it was stated that 16,069 cartons
of the banana shipment and 2,185 cartons of the pineapple shipment were so
damaged that they no longer had commercial value.[5]
Del Monte Produce filed a claim under the open cargo policy for the damages to its
shipment. McGees Marine Claims Insurance Adjuster evaluated the claim and
recommended that payment in the amount of $210,266.43 be made. A check for the
recommended amount was sent to Del Monte Produce; the latter then issued a
subrogation receipt[6] toPhoenix and McGee.
Phoenix and McGee instituted an action for damages[7] against Mindanao Terminal
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 12. After trial, the RTC,
[8]
in a decision dated 20 October 1999, held that the only participation of
Mindanao Terminal was to load the cargoes on board the M/V Mistrau under the
direction and supervision of the ships officers, who would not have accepted the
cargoes on board the vessel and signed the foremans report unless they were
properly arranged and tightly secured to withstand voyage across the open seas.
Accordingly, Mindanao Terminal cannot be held liable for whatever happened to
the cargoes after it had loaded and stowed them. Moreover, citing the survey
report, it was found by the RTC that the cargoes were damaged on account of a
typhoon which M/V Mistrau had encountered during the voyage. It was further
held that Phoenix and McGee had no cause of action against Mindanao Terminal
because the latter, whose services were contracted by Del Monte, a distinct
corporation from Del Monte Produce, had no contract with the assured Del Monte
Produce. The RTC dismissed the complaint and awarded the counterclaim of
Mindanao Terminal in the amount of P83,945.80 as actual damages
and P100,000.00 as attorneys fees.[9] The actual damages were awarded as
reimbursement for the expenses incurred by Mindanao Terminals lawyer in
attending the hearings in the case wherein he had to travel all the way from Metro
Manila to Davao City.
Phoenix and McGee appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
reversed and set aside[10] the decision of the RTC in its 29 October 2003 decision.

The same court ordered Mindanao Terminal to pay Phoenix and McGee the total
amount of $210,265.45 plus legal interest from the filing of the complaint until
fully paid and attorneys fees of 20% of the claim. [11] It sustained Phoenixs and
McGees argument that the damage in the cargoes was the result of improper
stowage by Mindanao Terminal. It imposed on Mindanao Terminal, as the
stevedore of the cargo, the duty to exercise extraordinary diligence in loading and
stowing the cargoes. It further held that even with the absence of a contractual
relationship between Mindanao Terminal and Del Monte Produce, the cause of
action of Phoenix and McGee could be based on quasi-delict under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code.[12]
Mindanao Terminal filed a motion for reconsideration,[13] which the Court of
Appeals denied in its 26 February 2004[14] resolution. Hence, the present petition
for review.
Mindanao Terminal raises two issues in the case at bar, namely: whether it
was careless and negligent in the loading and stowage of the cargoes onboard M/V
Mistraumaking it liable for damages; and, whether Phoenix and McGee has a
cause of action against Mindanao Terminal under Article 2176 of the Civil Code on
quasi-delict. To resolve the petition, three questions have to be answered: first,
whether Phoenix and McGee have a cause of action against Mindanao Terminal;
second, whether Mindanao Terminal, as a stevedoring company, is under obligation
to observe the same extraordinary degree of diligence in the conduct of its business
as required by law for common carriers [15] and warehousemen;[16] and third,
whether Mindanao Terminal observed the degree of diligence required by law of a
stevedoring company.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the complaint filed by Phoenix and
McGee against Mindanao Terminal, from which the present case has arisen, states
a cause of action. The present action is based on quasi-delict, arising from the
negligent and careless loading and stowing of the cargoes belonging to Del Monte
Produce. Even assuming that both Phoenix and McGee have only been subrogated
in the rights of Del Monte Produce, who is not a party to the contract of service
between Mindanao Terminal and Del Monte, still the insurance carriers may have a
cause of action in light of the Courts consistent ruling that the act that breaks the
contract may be also a tort.[17] In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a
contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract [18]. In the present
case, Phoenix and McGee are not suing for damages for injuries arising from the
breach of the contract of service but from the alleged negligent manner by which

Mindanao Terminal handled the cargoes belonging to Del Monte Produce. Despite
the absence of contractual relationship between Del Monte Produce and Mindanao
Terminal, the allegation of negligence on the part of the defendant should be
sufficient to establish a cause of action arising from quasi-delict.[19]
The resolution of the two remaining issues is determinative of the ultimate
result of this case.
Article 1173 of the Civil Code is very clear that if the law or contract does
not state the degree of diligence which is to be observed in the performance of an
obligation then that which is expected of a good father of a family or ordinary
diligence shall be required. Mindanao Terminal, a stevedoring company which was
charged with the loading and stowing the cargoes of Del Monte Produce
aboard M/V Mistrau, had acted merely as a labor provider in the case at bar. There
is no specific provision of law that imposes a higher degree of diligence than
ordinary diligence for a stevedoring company or one who is charged only with the
loading and stowing of cargoes. It was neither alleged nor proven byPhoenix and
McGee that Mindanao Terminal was bound by contractual stipulation to observe a
higher degree of diligence than that required of a good father of a family. We
therefore conclude that following Article 1173, Mindanao Terminal was required to
observe ordinary diligence only in loading and stowing the cargoes of Del Monte
Produce aboard M/V Mistrau.
The Court of Appeals erred when it cited the case of Summa Insurance
Corporation v. CA and Port Service Inc.[20] in imposing a higher degree of
diligence,[21] on Mindanao Terminal in loading and stowing the cargoes. The case
of Summa Insurance Corporation v. CA, which involved the issue of whether an
arrastre operator is legally liable for the loss of a shipment in its custody and the
extent of its liability, is inapplicable to the factual circumstances of the case at bar.
Therein, a vessel owned by the National Galleon Shipping Corporation (NGSC)
arrived at Pier 3, South Harbor, Manila, carrying a shipment consigned to the order
of Caterpillar Far East Ltd. with Semirara Coal Corporation (Semirara) as "notify
party." The shipment, including a bundle of PC 8 U blades, was discharged from
the vessel to the custody of the private respondent, the exclusive arrastre operator
at the South Harbor. Accordingly, three good-order cargo receipts were issued by
NGSC, duly signed by the ship's checker and a representative of private
respondent. When Semirara inspected the shipment at house, it discovered that the
bundle of PC8U blades was missing. From those facts, the Court observed:

x x x The relationship therefore between the consignee and the arrastre

operator must be examined. This relationship is much akin to that existing
between the consignee or owner of shipped goods and the common carrier, or
that between a depositor and a warehouseman[[22]]. In the performance of its
obligations, an arrastre operator should observe the same degree of
diligence as that required of a common carrier and a warehouseman as
enunciated under Article 1733 of the Civil Code and Section 3(b) of the
Warehouse Receipts Law, respectively. Being the custodian of the goods
discharged from a vessel, an arrastre operator's duty is to take good care
of the goods and to turn them over to the party entitled to their
possession. (Emphasis supplied)[23]

There is a distinction between an arrastre and a stevedore. [24] Arrastre, a Spanish

word which refers to hauling of cargo, comprehends the handling of cargo on the
wharf or between the establishment of the consignee or shipper and the ship's
tackle. The responsibility of the arrastre operator lasts until the delivery of the
cargo to the consignee. The service is usually performed by longshoremen. On the
other hand, stevedoring refers to the handling of the cargo in the holds of the vessel
or between the ship's tackle and the holds of the vessel. The responsibility of the
stevedore ends upon the loading and stowing of the cargo in the vessel.
It is not disputed that Mindanao Terminal was performing purely stevedoring
function while the private respondent in the Summa case was performing arrastre
function. In the present case, Mindanao Terminal, as a stevedore, was only charged
with the loading and stowing of the cargoes from the pier to the ships cargo hold; it
was never the custodian of the shipment of Del Monte Produce. A stevedore is not
a common carrier for it does not transport goods or passengers; it is not akin to a
warehouseman for it does not store goods for profit. The loading and stowing of
cargoes would not have a far reaching public ramification as that of a common
carrier and a warehouseman; the public is adequately protected by our laws on
contract and on quasi-delict. The public policy considerations in legally imposing
upon a common carrier or a warehouseman a higher degree of diligence is not
present in a stevedoring outfit which mainly provides labor in loading and stowing
of cargoes for its clients.
In the third issue, Phoenix and McGee failed to prove by preponderance of
evidence[25] that Mindanao Terminal had acted negligently. Where the evidence on
an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is any doubt on which side the evidence
preponderates the party having the burden of proof fails upon that issue. That is to
say, if the evidence touching a disputed fact is equally balanced, or if it does not

produce a just, rational belief of its existence, or if it leaves the mind in a state of
perplexity, the party holding the affirmative as to such fact must fail.[26]
We adopt the findings[27] of the RTC,[28] which are not disputed
by Phoenix and McGee. The Court of Appeals did not make any new findings of
fact when it reversed the decision of the trial court. The only participation of
Mindanao Terminal was to load the cargoes on board M/V Mistrau.[29] It was not
disputed by Phoenix and McGee that the materials, such as ropes, pallets, and
cardboards, used in lashing and rigging the cargoes were all provided by M/V
Mistrau and these materials meets industry standard.[30]
It was further established that Mindanao Terminal loaded and stowed the
cargoes of Del Monte Produce aboard the M/V Mistrau in accordance with the
stowage plan, a guide for the area assignments of the goods in the vessels hold,
prepared by Del Monte Produce and the officers of M/V Mistrau.[31] The loading
and stowing was done under the direction and supervision of the ship officers. The
vessels officer would order the closing of the hatches only if the loading was done
correctly after a final inspection.[32] The said ship officers would not have accepted
the cargoes on board the vessel if they were not properly arranged and tightly
secured to withstand the voyage in open seas. They would order the stevedore to
rectify any error in its loading and stowing. A foremans report, as proof of work
done on board the vessel, was prepared by the checkers of Mindanao Terminal and
concurred in by the Chief Officer of M/V Mistrau after they were satisfied that the
cargoes were properly loaded.[33]
Phoenix and McGee relied heavily on the deposition of Byeong Yong Ahn [34] and
on the survey report[35] of the damage to the cargoes. Byeong, whose testimony was
refreshed by the survey report,[36] found that the cause of the damage was improper
stowage[37] due to the manner the cargoes were arranged such that there were no
spaces between cartons, the use of cardboards as support system, and the use of
small rope to tie the cartons together but not by the negligent conduct of Mindanao
Terminal in loading and stowing the cargoes. As admitted by Phoenix and McGee
in their Comment[38] before us, the latter is merely a stevedoring company which
was tasked by Del Monte to load and stow the shipments of fresh banana and
pineapple of Del Monte Produce aboard the M/V Mistrau. How and where it should
load and stow a shipment in a vessel is wholly dependent on the shipper and the
officers of the vessel. In other words, the work of the stevedore was under the
supervision of the shipper and officers of the vessel. Even the materials used for
stowage, such as ropes, pallets, and cardboards, are provided for by the vessel.
Even the survey report found that it was because of the boisterous stormy weather
due to the typhoon Seth, as encountered by M/V Mistrau during its voyage, which

caused the shipments in the cargo hold to collapse, shift and bruise in extensive
extent.[39] Even the deposition of Byeong was not supported by the conclusion in
the survey report that:
CAUSE OF DAMAGE
xxx
From the above facts and our survey results, we are of the opinion that
damage occurred aboard the carrying vessel during sea transit, being caused
by ships heavy rolling and pitching under boisterous weather while
proceeding from 1600 hrs on 7th October to 0700 hrs on 12th October, 1994 as
described in the sea protest.[40]

As it is clear that Mindanao Terminal had duly exercised the required degree
of diligence in loading and stowing the cargoes, which is the ordinary diligence of
a good father of a family, the grant of the petition is in order.
However, the Court finds no basis for the award of attorneys fees in favor of
petitioner. None of the circumstances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code
exists. The present case is clearly not an unfounded civil action against the plaintiff
as there is no showing that it was instituted for the mere purpose of vexation or
injury. It is not sound public policy to set a premium to the right to litigate where
such right is exercised in good faith, even if erroneously.[41] Likewise, the RTC
erred in awarding P83,945.80 actual damages to Mindanao Terminal. Although
actual expenses were incurred by Mindanao Terminal in relation to the trial of this
case in Davao City, the lawyer of Mindanao Terminal incurred expenses for plane
fare, hotel accommodations and food, as well as other miscellaneous expenses, as
he attended the trials coming all the way from Manila. But there is no showing
that Phoenix and McGee made a false claim against Mindanao Terminal resulting
in the protracted trial of the case necessitating the incurrence of expenditures.[42]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66121 is SET ASIDE and the decision of
the Regional Trial Courtof Davao City, Branch 12 in Civil Case No. 25,311.97 is
hereby REINSTATED MINUS the awards of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees
and P83,945.80 as actual damages.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA LEONARDO DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Acting Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]

Rollo, pp. 3-25.

*Acting Chairperson as replacement of Associate Justice Leonardo Quisumbing who is on official leave per
Special Order No. 618.
**Additional member of the Special Second Division per Special Order No. 619.
[2]

Id. at 29-34. Penned by Associate Justice Danilo B. Pine and concurred by Associate Justices Cancio C.
Garcia and Renato C. Dacudao. The dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment appealed from is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Mindanao Terminal Brokerage Services, Inc. is
ordered to pay the plaintiff-appellants the total amount of $210,265.45 plus legal interest from
the filing of the complaint until fully paid and attorneys fees of 20% of the claim.

Costs against defendant-appellee.

SO ORDERED.
[3]

[4]

Id. at 36.

Records, pp. 234-310.

[5]

Rollo, p. 30.

[6]

Records, p. 350.

[7]

Id. at 1-6.

[8]

Rollo, pp. 38-44. Penned by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

[9]

Id. at 44.

[10]

[11]

Id. at 33-34.

Id. at 36.
Id. at 31-33.

[12]

[13]

CA rollo, pp. 94-104.

[14]

Rollo, p. 36.

[15]

CIVIL CODE, Art. 1733.

[16]

Sec. 3(b), Act 2137, Warehouse Receipt Law.

[17]

Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155, 168 (1966). Singson v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, 132 Phil.
597, 600 (1968); Mr. & Mrs. Fabre, Jr . v. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 775, 785 (1996).
[18]

PSBA v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84698, 4 February 1992, 205 SCRA 729, 734.

[19]

CIVIL CODE. Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (Emphasis
supplied)
[20]

323 Phil. 214 (1996).

[21]

Rollo, p. 32.

[22]

Malayan Insurance Co. Inc. v. Manila Port Service, 138 Phil. 69 (1969).

[23]

Supra note at 222-223.

[24]

See Compaia Maritima v. Allied Free Workers Union, 167 Phil. 381, 385 (1977).

[25]

See Republic of the Philippines v. Orfinada Sr., G.R. No. 141145, November 12, 2004, 442 SCRA 342,
352 citing Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112550, February 5, 2001 citing Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA
651 (1996).
[26]

Francisco, Ricardo, Evidence, 3rd (1996), p. 555. Citing Howes v. Brown, 75 Ala. 385; Evans v. Winston,
74 Ala. 349; Marlowe v. Benagh, 52 Ala. 112; Brandon v. Cabiness, 10 Ala. 155; Delaware Coach v. Savage, 81
Supp. 293.
[27]

This Court is not a trier of facts. Furthermore, well settled is the doctrine that the findings of fact by the
trial court are accorded great respect by appellate courts and should not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court
has overlooked, ignored, or disregarded some fact or circumstances of sufficient weight or significance which, if
considered, would alter the situation. The facts of the case, as stated by the trial court, were adopted by the Court of
Appeals. And a conscientious sifting of the records fails to bring to light any fact or circumstance militative against
the correctness of the said findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. See Home Development Mutual
Fund v. CA, 351 Phil. 858, 859-860 (1998).
[28]

Rollo, pp. 38-44.

[29]

Id. at 42.

[30]

Id. at 16.

[31]

TSN, 6 July 1999, p. 5.

[32]

Id. at 9-10.

[33]

Id. at 5-6.

[34]

Records, pp. 89-96.

[35]

Id. at 99-113.

[36]

Id. at 93.

[37]

Id. at 96.

[38]

Rollo, pp. 47-49.

[39]

Records, pp. 105.

[40]

Id. at 112.

[41]

See Ramos v. Ramos, 158 Phil. 935, 960 (1974); Barreto v. Arevalo, 99 Phil. 771, 779 (1956); Mirasol v.
Judge De la Cruz, 173 Phil. 518 (1978).
[42]

See Uy v. Court of Appeals, 420 Phil. 408 (2001).