QUIJADA, MARIA CHERRYLEN C.

LEGAL MEDICINE: TUE-9:00-10:00

1. EL PUEBLO DE FILIPINAS VS. LACENA

Facts:
At about 3 oclock in the morning of August 16, 1938, Mariano Dante woke up
startled because his wife, the appellant-defendant, who was sick with a high fever, while
saying Patay ka ngayon, stabbed him in the abdomen with a pair of scissors. Mariano
eventually died due to acute peritonitis which was triggered by the inflicted wound.
It was alleged that on the day of the incident, the accused was suffering from high fever.
The appellant was then delirious and rushing to any of those who lived with her in the
house.
An examination of her blood was conducted, which was verified on October 12, 1938,
and it was found out that she was suffering from Plasmodium falciparum or malignant
malaria.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused is criminally liable for the crime committed while she is
suffering from high fever due to malignant malaria.

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the accused is not criminally liable for the acts
committed while she is suffering from high fever due to malignant malaria for the same
presupposes lack of intelligence and is embraced within the plea of insanity.
According to the Supreme Court, malignant malaria is a disease that causes
disturbance in the nervous system, causing complications including acute melancholia
and insanity at times.

The circumstances in which the appellant stabbed her husband reveals that at the time
of the execution of such act, she is suffering from madness as a result of her illness and
therefore in accordance with the provisions of Article 12, paragraph of the Revised
Penal Code, she has not incurred criminal liability.

2. People of the Philippine Islands vs. Donato Bascos

FACTS:
The accused Donato Bascos was charged with the murder of Victoriano Romero.
The prosecution established that the accused killed the victim while the latter was
sleeping. The defense was that of insanity. The trial court found the accused guilty of
homicide, sentencing him to reclusion temporal and requiring him to indemnify the heirs
of the victim. However, the trial court ordered that the execution of his sentence be
suspended until his mental condition could be ascertained and that he be placed in a
hospital in the meantime.
The decision of the trail court is assailed on the ground that it erroneously applied
Art. 100 of the Penal Code (when the convict shall become insane after final sentence is
pronounced) instead of Art. 8 (when a lunatic has committed a grave felony, the court
shall order his confinement).

ISSUES:
Whether or not the accused is exempted from criminal liability on the ground of insanity.
RULING:
YES, the judgment is reversed and the accused is ACQUITTED, but shall be kept
in confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital or such other hospital for the insane.
It is well-established that the law presumes every man to be sane and that the
defendant has the burden of proving facts necessary to interpose the defense of mental
incapacity. The wife and cousin of the accused had testified that the accused had been
more or less out of his mind for many years. The assistant district health officer, upon

examination, found the accused to be a violent maniac and expressed his opinion that
the accused was most likely insane when he killed Romero. The total lack of motive of
Bascos to kill Romero also bears out the assumption that the former was insane. The
Court finds that the accused was a lunatic when he committed the grave felony. Thus,
he is exempt from criminal liability and should be confined in an insane asylum.

3. Pp v. POTENCIANO TANEO
GR No. 37673 March 31, 1933

FACTS:
Potenciano Tadeo live with his wife in his parent's house of the barrio of Dolores,
municipality of Ormoc, Leyte. On January 16, 1932, a fiesta was being celebrated in the
said barrio and visitors were entertained in the house. Among them were Fred Tanner
and Luis Malinao. Early that afternoon, Potenciano Taneo, went to sleep and while
sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room bolo in hand and, upon meeting his wife who
tried to stop him, he wounded her in the abdomen. Potenciano Taneo attacked Fred
Tanner and Luis Malinao and tried to attack his father after which he wounded himself.
Potenciano's wife who was then seven months pregnant died and also the foetus.
An information for parricide was filed against Potenciano Taneo, and was
convicted. The defendant appealed his conviction.
ISSUE:
WON the defendant is criminally liable.
HELD:
No. The court concluded that the defendant acted while in a dream and his acts, which
he is charged, were not voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability.
The court stated that under the special circumstances of the case, in which the victim
was the defendant's own wife whom he dearly loved, and taking into consideration the
fact that the defendant tried to attack also his father, in whose house and under whose
protection he lived, besides attacking Tanner and Malinao, his guests, whom he himself
invited as may be inferred from the evidence presented, we find not only a lack of
motives for the defendant to voluntarily commit the acts complained of, but also motives
for not committing said acts.

Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is also of the same opinion. The doctor
stated that considering the circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in a
dream, under the influence of an hallucination and not in his right mind.
In view of all these considerations, and reserving the judgment appealed from, the
courts finds that the defendant is not criminally liable for the offense with which he is
charged, and it is ordered that he be confined in the Government insane asylum,
whence he shall not be released until the director thereof finds that his liberty would no
longer constitute a menace.

4. LOCSIN vs. LOCSIN

FACTS:
Juan Locsin filed with the RTC a Petition for Letters of Administration praying
that he be appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased. He alleged
(a) that he is an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan Locsin; (b) that during his
lifetime, the deceased owned personal properties and 1/6 portion of the undivided mass
of real properties owned by him and his siblings, namely: Jose Locsin, Jr., Manuel
Locsin, Maria Locsin Yulo, Lourdes Locsin and Ester Locsin; and (c) that he is the only
surviving legal heir of the decedent.
However, the heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin
and Ester Jarantilla, claiming to be the lawful heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition
to respondents petition. They averred that respondent is not a child or an acknowledged
natural child of the late Juan Locsin, who during his lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in his
name.
To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of the deceased,
respondent submitted a machine copy of his Certificate of Live Birth found in the bound
volume of birth records in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. It contains
the information that respondent's father is Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and that he was the
informant of the facts stated therein, as evidenced by his signatures. To prove the
existence and authenticity of Certificate of Live Birth from which it was machine copied,
respondent presented the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. She produced and identified

in court the bound volume of 1957 records of birth where the alleged original of
Certificate of Live Birth is included. Respondent also offered in evidence a photograph
showing him and his mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a coffin bearing Juan C.
Locsin's dead body. The photograph, respondent claims, shows that he and his mother
have been recognized as family members of the deceased.
ISSUE:
WON the Certificate of Live Birth and respondents photo with his mother near the coffin
of the deceased are sufficient to constitute proof of filiation.
HELD:
No. A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the Civil
Code and Article 172 of the Family Code for purposes of recognition and filiation.
However, birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted
by contrary evidence. Its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where there exist
strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. In this case, respondent's
Certificate of Live Birth entered in the records of the Local Civil Registry from which it
was machine copied has all the badges of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic copy
filed in that office was removed and substituted with a falsified Certificate of Live Birth.
Incidentally, respondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan
C. Locsin cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation. Anybody can have a picture
taken while standing before a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming the
estate of the deceased.

5. De JESUS vs. DIZON

FACTS:
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August
1964. It was during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de
Jesus, herein petitioners, were born, the former on 01 March 1979 and the latter on 06
July 1982.
In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline
and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de

Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable
assets. It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgment that petitioners filed a
complaint for Partition with Inventory and Accounting of the Dizon estate with the RTC.
Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan
G. Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought
the dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being
one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being
the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead
be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon.

ISSUE:
WON petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate children of the decedent
cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first been instituted to
impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves
de Jesus born in lawful wedlock.

HELD:
Yes. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any
authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a
voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.
Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending
to prove paternity, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in
order to establish the childs acknowledgment.
The presumption is that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption
indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of
access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife
are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious
illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse.
In an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon,
petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de
Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the law

itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of the
parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock,
and only the father, or in exceptional instances the latters heirs, can contest in an
appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the
legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband
can be rejected.
The court ruled that the written acknowledgment made by the deceased Juan G.
Dizon establishes petitioners alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be
validly invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. Jurisprudence is strongly settled
that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one
that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that
purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate
although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as having been an adulteress.