Case 1-4

True Religion Brand Jeans and the Premium

Jeans Industry: Cyclical Downturn or Secular
Slowdown?
Teaching Note
Synopsis and Position in the Course
True Religion Brand Jeans and the Premium Jeans Industry: Cyclical Downturn or
Secular Slowdown?is an updated and revised version of the True Religion Brand Jeans
and the Premium Jeans Industry case that appears in Barney & Hesterly 3ed. In the two
years after the original case, some significant developments occurred both in the industry
and within the firm - True Religion Brand Jeans. This teaching note highlights key
changes in the sector as well as within True Religion Brand Jeans.
True Religion Brand Jeans, a startup in 2002, became a major force in the premium
segment jeans retailing for $100 or more -- of the US denim market in just three years.
By 2007, the company had the second largest premium denim brand in the US behind
segment pioneer Seven For All Mankind. This made True Religion far larger than jeans
stalwarts Levis, Lee, and Wrangler in the high end of the denim market. Although not
the first entrant to the premium jeans segment, True Religion was successful in
capitalizing on some substantial early mover advantages namely, brand establishment in
the heady days of huge industry growth, and excellent placement in key retail outlets
Nordstrom, Neiman-Marcus, and trend-setting boutiques in Los Angeles. Despite the
inherent fickleness of core True Religion jeans consumers, the companys reputation for
cutting edge, hot jeans designs had proven difficult for competitors to overcome.
The companys exceptionally strong financial performance from 2002-2006 reflected
those early mover advantages.
Nevertheless, several issues plagued True Religion management. Premium denim market
growth slowed in 2006, and the industry experienced a (-5%) drop in sales in 2007. In
the difficult US economic environment, managements growth plans faced increasing
scrutiny from investors. After an enormous drop in sales in Japan for True Religion in
2007, investor attention was focused on determining the potential for long-term aboveaverage growth in the US market. With 7 pairs of jeans in the average American
womans closet and the ever-present possibility that fashion trends would change
dramatically and make premium denim pass, investors wondered if True Religion could
both survive the industry downturn and continue to grow its brand in the US. Although
caught flat-footed by first-mover Seven For All Mankind from about 2000-2004, lower
priced denim brands such as Levis copied the many of the companys innovations in fit,
pocket stitching, back pocket placement, fabric and finishes by 2006. The lucrative
premium jeans segment accounted for an estimated 15% of womens jeans dollar sales
and about 9% of total jeans industry sales. VF Corporation (Lee jeans and recentlyacquired Seven For All Mankind) in particular was determined to bring premium jeans
innovations to its lower-priced brands. With the economic downturn, consumers might
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Part I

trade down and stick with these newly improved lower-priced brands when the economy
rebounded.
Seemingly in defiance of the overall weakness in the US economy, premium jeans
industry sales rebounded sharply in 2008 (up an estimated 17%) from the estimated (5%) drop off in 2007 only to fall approximately (8%) in 2009. Major department store
accounts Nordstrom, Neiman-Marcus, Saks, and Bergdorf-Goodman all experienced very
sharp declines in sales during 2009 as consumers cutback on expenditures. Most
worryingly for the premium denim segment, the so-called aspirational shopper all but
disappeared from the market. Aspirational shoppers middle class consumers with
luxury tastes had household incomes between $75,000 and $150,000. Numerous press
articles declared the death of the aspirational shopper and a new bargain hunting is cool
zeitgeist that would survive after the economy rebounded. This perception was backed
up by a large McKinsey & Co. consumer study in 2009 that highlighted that many
Americans had traded down to less expensive products during the recession and had no
intention of trading back up to premium goods after the economy recovered. Some
analysts estimated that up to 70% of luxury brand sales and 50% of the growth in the
luxury market was derived from so-called aspirational shoppers prior to the recession.
Two other developments raised questions about the long-term profitability and even the
long-term survival of the premium jeans segment. First, the premium jeans market
remained soft even as key upscale department store accounts showed good comparable
store sales gains in 2010. Department store buyers kept inventory levels tight and were
cautious about the prospects for upscale denim. Second, Maurice Marciano, co-founder
of industry icon Guess?, announced to the world, We are basically at the end of the
denim dominance. Marcianos comments immediately raised the specter of a denim
bust similar to the one in the 1980s. If consumers had lost their appetite for denim, then
the premium industrys recent problems were far more significant than those arising from
a mere downturn in the economy no matter how severe the downturn.
True Religions Chairman and Founder, Jeff Lubell had publicly announced his intention
to grow sales from about $173 million in 2007 to $1 billion (sales came in at $311 million
in 2009). The new professional management team he installed during 2006 and 2007
hoped to achieve Lubells goal by using a two-pronged strategy. The two elements of the
companys strategy were 1. expansion of True Religions brand into a global lifestyle
brand a la Diesel and Ralph Lauren; and 2. forward vertical integration into companyowned mono-brand stores. However, failed attempts to significantly broaden the
companys product mix a caused bears on the company to question the long-term
viability of the True Religion brand. Only 10% of revenues were derived from sales of
non-denim products at the end of 2008. By the end of 2010, True Religions non-denim
sales in company-owned stores had risen to 25% of retail sales. Management declined to
break out non-denim sales overall, but removing the retail markup on goods sold through
company-owned stores suggested that management had not been successful at goosing
non-denim sales. Nevertheless, the companys forward vertical integration strategy
overall had worked well. Adjusting for the retail markup in company-owned stores,
revealed that management had been successful in growing the True Religion brand since
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Case 1-4

opening the stores despite weak wholesale sales. International operations also showed
good growth as True Religion improved the Japanese business and began to transition
away from arms-length distributors to company salesforces and joint ventures with
distributors in some markets. Management felt this gave the company more control over
the brand and its positioning in international markets.
Nevertheless, investors were quite concerned about True Religions growth prospects
given industry trends and surprisingly disappointing company results in 3Q:10.
Moreover, CEO Michael Buckley abruptly and mysteriously resigned in April 2010 only
to be replaced almost immediately by industry veteran Mike Egeck (former President of
Seven for All Mankind). Rock N Republics bankruptcy and subsequent sale to Sevens
corporate parent, VF Corp, raised questions about the level of rivalry in the market.
While industry consolidation overall suggested some abatement in competitive pressures,
investors wondered if new venture financing for up and coming brands such as J Brand,
Not Your Daughters Jeans, and Cookie by CJ Johnson would cause more intense
competition among the remaining players in the market. Not Your Daughters Jeans
(NYDJ) and CJ by Cookie Johnson were attempting to segment the market, and carve
out a lucrative niche by serving two previously underserved segments of the market
fashion-minded women over 40 and so-called curvy women.
The case leaves several questions unanswered. Will the premium denim industry resume
its strong growth after the US economy improves or is the downturn in industry sales
attributable to a long-term change in consumer preferences? Could the industrys decline
in sales be short-lived because of a brief flirtation with other fashion clothing types by
consumers? Can True Religion recover from near-term problems and achieve its longerterm goal of $1 billion in sales? Does the company have a source or sources of sustained
competitive advantage?
Objectives
1. Review industry structure concepts in a rapidly maturing market subject to changes in
fashion trends. Students can use both Porters Five Forces and value chain analysis in
this exercise.
2. Evaluate the sources of True Religions competitive advantage and determine whether
or not the company can sustain its advantage given the similarities between both its
strategy and its products to its four largest competitors.
3. Discuss product differentiation as a source of competitive advantage.
Study Questions
1. Is the premium jeans industry an attractive market? Develop an understanding of the
industry structure and market dynamics.
2. Does True Religion enjoy a competitive advantage in the segment? If so, is its
advantage sustainable? Discuss the sources of competitive advantage and use the
VRIO framework to evaluate True Religion and its major competitors.

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Teaching Plan
This case is designed to be used as an industry case, but works very well as a case on
internal analysis also. I like to use the case to bring together concepts from Chapters 2
and 3 analysis of the external environment, and evaluation of internal resources and
capabilities. In addition, the case serves as a good discussion platform for Chapter 5s
concepts on product differentiation. Students like this case, because they usually are very
familiar with the product line and premium jeans in general. There are a number of
productive ways to open the case discussion. Here are some suggestions:
1. Enlist the aid of 1-3 graduate students to pretend to be potential jeans
entrepreneurs. The capital costs are so low that students could, in fact, start a
premium denim business fairly easily. I like to read a fake disclosure note
mandated by the University that says I will not benefit financially from the case
discussion. I ask the students to discuss the industry dynamics with special
emphasis on Porters Five Forces and value chain analysis so that we can help
the budding entrepreneurs. Be sure to tell the class at the end of the period that
the graduate students were actors.
2. Survey the class either beforehand or at the beginning of the period on the amount
each student spent on his/her last pair of jeans. Discuss why consumers perceive
some jeans are worth $25 and some are worth $250 per pair. Usually, the
responses will split along gender lines with women purchasing far higher priced
jeans than men on average, but you are likely to find a few male students who
also pay premium prices for jeans. This leads into an evaluation of the potential
sources of competitive advantage and the VRIO framework or into a discussion of
the bases of product differentiation.
3. Show a few slides of photos of the back pocket stitching on premium jeans and
ask the students to name the brand or select the brand from a list of options. Read
the brand positioning statement from some premium jeans brands websites, and
let the students figure out which brand statements match different premium labels.
4. Ask the class to vote on whether or not True Religion will be able to hit its sales
goal of $1B and create a lifestyle brand. Split the class into two groups and let the
groups debate the point.
Value Chain Analysis
For external analysis, you can begin either with value chain analysis or a discussion of
Porters Five Forces and industry structure. For internal analysis, it is productive to start
with value chain analysis. You may ask the students to analyze the premium jeans
industrys value chain using a simplified value chain (Exhibit A), McKinseys Generic
Value Chain (Exhibit B), or Porters Generic Value Chain (Exhibit C). The basic
structures of these value chains are on page 72 (simplified), page 74 (McKinsey), and
page 75 (Porter) of the textbook. Closely examining the industrys value chain via the
generic value chain can help students visualize the elements of Porters Five Forces
model more effectively. Once the class has laid out the elements of Porters Five Forces,
it can use either Porters or McKinseys generic value chain to analyze True Religions
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Case 1-4

activities which can lead into an evaluation of the companys internal resources and
capabilities via the VRIO framework. Alternatively, you can skip Porters Five Forces
and concentrate on the VRIO framework. The value chain analysis using either
McKinseys Generic Value Chain or Porters Generic Value Chain will help the students
understand where True Religion Jeans derives its competitive advantages. There is
enough information in the case to allow students to analyze more than one company in
the industry using the value chain.
Exhibit A. Simplified Premium Blue Jeans Value Chain
Cotton Farming & Harvesting

Cotton Ginning and Sales

Denim Yard & Fabric Production

Jeans Design & Sample Sewing

Cut & Sew Operations

Denim Laundries

Jeans Marketing

Retail Sales to Final Customers

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Part I

Exhibit B. McKinseys Generic Value Chain for Premium Jeans

Technology
Development
Denim Fabric

Product
Design
Jeans
Designers

Manufacturing
Contract Mfgs.
Cut & Sew
Operators

Makers
Fiber
Developers
Cotton Co-ops

Marketing
Jeans
Designers
Distributors

Denim Laundries

Distribution

Service

Retailers
Company-Owned
Stores

None

Sales Agents

Exhibit C. Porters Generic Value Chain

PrimaryActivities

RawMaterials

Purchasing
Designers

IntermediateGoods

Denim Fabric Makers

Inventory Holding

Denim Fabric Makers

FinishedProduct
Contract Manufacturers

Contract Manufacturers

Materials Handling
Designers

Denim Fabric Makers

Production

Yarn & Fabric

Cone Mills

Jeans Designers

Contract Manufacturers

Design
TRLG

Contract Mfg.

Seven

Contract Mfg.

Galey & Lord

Citizens

Contract Mfg.
Levis

Contract &

Company
Italian

Joes

Japanese

Warehousing

Contract
Lucky

Chinese

Rock and Republic

Indian

Diesel

Contract
Contract
?

Contract Mfg.
Jeans Designers

Distribution

Distributors
Sales Agents

Marketing

Sales

Jeans

Jeans

Swift Denim

Burlington

Jeans

Jeans Designers

Nordstrom
Neiman Marcus
Macys
Saks
Specialty Boutiques
Designer Owned Stores

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Case 1-4
SupportActivities
Technology

Fabric Makers
Fiber Companies
Denim Laundries/Finishers

Process Improvements

Fabric Makers
Contract Mfg.
Denim Laundries/Finishers

Design

Jeans Designers

Porters Five Forces Overview

The premium jeans industry is an interesting one due to the flamboyant characters that
dominate the industry as well as some interesting twists in industry threats. The top 5
firms in the segment hold an estimated 75%-80% market share - up from about 62%65% in 2007. The industry is quite concentrated but still is quite competitive. The largest
player in the market, Seven For All Mankind, has a market share of a bit less than 2x its
next largest competitor. Note that premium jeans makers typically do not compete
aggressively on the basis of price, but prices range from around $125 per pair to $500 per
pair with some custom jeans priced at $10,000 per pair. If Seven For All Mankind were
to drop its price range down from its current $165-$298 jeans, it would likely impact the
ability of other premium jeans makers to keep price points intact. However, denim
makers are trying to establish their positions as exclusive products for the affluent,
discriminating, and fashion conscious woman or man. Price cuts by major players would
likely significantly erode the cache of the products. Most premium jeans makers target
young fashionistas, but a few lines such as Seven For All Mankind and Citizens of
Humanity market products that appeal to a wider age group. Seven also makes jeans for
plus size women, while True Religion focuses on the very thin, very young woman. Note
that major upscale lines launched both lower-priced line extensions as well as jeggings
in the past two years to provide more attractive price points to nearly price sensitive
consumers.
While the top firms hold considerable market share, the remaining 25%-30% of the
market is highly fragmented. With retail mark ups of 2-2.5x wholesale on top brands and
a slowdown in industry demand, the market has consolidated significantly in the past two
years. Nevertheless, retailers appear happy to continue to carry many brands rather than
just the top 5 or even the top 10 in the industry. In fact, upscale department stores carried
about 21 different brands of premium jeans in late 2010 (almost all made by different
companies). The key to understanding this unusual situation lies in consumer brand
loyalty. Surveys by Cotton, Inc. show that consumers were very likely to try new
premium jeans brands. In other words, consumers are always looking for the next hot
thing or new fashion trend. Upscale retailers like Bloomingdales, Nordstrom, and
Bendels accommodate their customers by seeking out new brands and new looks to
maintain their own images as leaders in fashion trends.
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In summary, the market appears to be transitioning from a monopolistically competitive

structure to an oligopoly. A few firms control a significant chunk of the market. Products
are highly differentiated. However, there still are a large number of firms in the segment
with quite a bit of market share movement among below the top 3 firms. Entry costs
are low, as entry requires only a jeans design, some samples, and the financial backing to
contract with cut and sew operators, and denim laundries. The lack of dedicated
(specific) assets due to the contract-manufacturing model suggests exit costs are low.
Note, firms would lose their investments in advertising, but advertising costs tended to be
low at the time the case was written. True Religion Brand Jeans advertising expense rose
4.5x from 2007-2009, but still only amounted to $5.4 million or 1.7% of sales.
Successful firms can expect to establish a competitive advantage.

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Case 1-4

Summary of Porters Five Forces

Threat
Rivalry

Threat Level
High

Entry

High

Suppliers

Low

Buyers

Moderate-to-High

Substitutes

High

Comments
Low customer switching costs, slowing market
demand, large number of firms, and high profits
associated with larger market positions all increase
rivalry.
High profits for industry leaders and low capital
investment requirements coupled with buyers
interest in new brands encourage entry. Lured by
potentially high profits, new brands entered the
market even during the downturn in the economy
and the industry.
Cotton prices have skyrocketed but the input is a
widely available global commodity. No one
company or group of companies sets prices or
controls cotton supply. Textile makers face intense
global competition; contract manufacturers and
denim laundries are plentiful; and the capabilities
of suppliers are far different from those of denim
designers/marketers.
The concentration of buyers in the department store
channel and their increasing reliance on private label
clothing lines for profit generation makes the threat
level of buyers high. Moreover, the department store
industry is highly concentrated with the top 8 firms
holding 94% market share. Note end consumers do
not have much individual buying power, but are
quite fickle. Product differentiation helps mitigate
this threat as do the extremely high markups on
premium denim by the retailer. Moreover, top
premium makers have forward vertically integrated
in order to reduce reliance on retailers, increase
order predictability and increase margins.
Premium jeans makers are selling fashion as well
as functionality. Fashion could be a pair of must
have jeans this season, and a trendy designer dress
next season. Note the popularity of slacks for
casual Friday workdays and its impact on jeans
sales in the late 1980s and 1990s is a testament to the
threat of substitutes in the jeans market.

The Threat of Rivalry

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The threat of rivalry is high. Despite the high degree of concentration in the industry (the
top 4 firms hold an estimated 75% share), rivalry is high in the premium denim market.
There are several factors that increase the level of rivalry in the segment. First, the
profitability of the leading companies in the segment is very attractive. True Religion
Brand Jeans enjoys both high margins (operating margin of about 25% in 2009) and high
returns on average assets (nearly 24% in 2009). Financial data is not available on Seven
For All Mankind but it is reportedly very profitable. Moreover, there is a large
difference in profitability between the top 2 companies in the segment and smaller
players suggesting there are some size advantages associated with high market shares in
this category. Second, there are a large number of companies in the premium niche.
Typically, each marketer sells just one brand. Lower priced jeans makers (Levis and
Lee) are attempting to move up in price point by both copying innovations made by
premium labels and by improving fit through extensive consumer research hence
closing the product performance gap. Third, switching costs are low. Consumers can
switch from one brand of jeans to another easily. In fact, pioneers and early adopters
actively seek out the newest fashions. Cotton Inc.s survey of premium denim buyers
brand loyalty revealed consumers are likely to prove quite fickle in this market, despite
being satisfied with their latest denim brand purchase. Fourth, slowing market growth
intensifies competition as firms all fight for the same customers. Market growth had
already slowed prior to the recession, and then declined about (-5%) in 2007, rebounded
17% in 2008 and then fell sharply (-8%) in 2009. Up and coming brands, NYDJ and CJ
by Cookie Johnson were attempting to carve out new niches in the market by offering
superior fit and innovative designs for previously underserved market segments.
The Threat of Entry
The threat of entry is high. The combination of low barriers to entry coupled with the
very high financial returns of industry leaders and the interest of both retailers and
consumers in new, hot or fresh fashion looks and brands encourages entry into the
premium jeans segment. Asset specificity is very low as the dominant model in the
industry is outsourced manufacturing and finishing. High brand awareness and brand
loyalty can be difficult to overcome but actual advertising dollars spent were very low at
the time of the case. Design capabilities are important, but can be obtained at relatively
low cost. The most difficult obstacles to overcome are lack of distribution and lack of
brand awareness. However, key retail accounts seek out new brands and products in
order to maintain their own brand positions as trendsetters, as do end consumers of
premium jeans. Word of mouth advertising and celebrity buzz were critical to the
establishment of the leading brands and remains the major vehicle for brand awareness
creation. Scale appears to come into play in brand awareness and distribution rather than
in production or research and development. Product differentiation has not proven to be a
significant barrier to entry.
Cost advantages independent of scale in managerial know-how and design capabilities do
not appear to erect significant barriers to entry as both can be obtained via hiring from a
large labor pool or through horizontal product diversification by large fashion houses.
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Case 1-4

Obtaining the services of a design team known for its ability to accurately predict or set
fashion trends over the long run would likely be costly and difficult. However, those
capabilities have proven to be quite elusive for designers in the fashion industry, and may
not exist. Nevertheless managerial know-how and design capabilities along with possible
learning curve advantages related to understanding the desires of fashionistas may have
contributed to the large split in profitability between the top 2 companies and all other
competitors in the sector.
Threat of Suppliers
Suppliers pose little threat to premium jeans companies. Suppliers are strong threats
when 1. a few suppliers account for a large percentage of industry supply; 2. the products
suppliers sell to manufacturers (inputs) are differentiated; 3.manufacturers incur
switching costs if they change suppliers; and 4. suppliers pose a credible forward vertical
integration threat. US textile manufacturers face intense global competition from denim
fabric manufacturers in China, and India. Moreover, producers of high quality denim in
Italy and Japan supply many US premium denim makers. Overall, global denim fabric
supply is ample. Capacity additions occur in large increments, which increases pricing
pressure for denim fabric manufacturers as it increases the incentive for companies with
new capacity to use marginal costs as their basis for pricing.
The contract cut and sew apparel industry is highly fragmented and populated by
thousands of firms. According to the US Economic Census there were nearly 7,200 cut
and sew apparel contractors in the US alone in 2002 (most recent data available). The
four largest cut and sew apparel contractors held just 5% of the market with the eight
largest firms holding only an 8% share. Although True Religion Brand Jeans relied upon
on two companies for about 90% of its production of jeans as recently as 2007, the firm
expanded its contracted manufacturing base to include other suppliers from 2008-2010.
Many other contract cut and sew operators have the capabilities to make premium jeans
to the companys specifications. The company does not have any long-term supply
agreements with its manufacturing contractors so switching costs are likely to be
minimal. Cotton is the most important raw material in denim jeans, but it is
undifferentiated and trades on global commodity markets.
Both denim fabric makers and cut and sew operators could forward vertically integrate
into jeans design and marketing. So far, most of these companies have not chosen to do
so despite the attractive margins available to some premium jeans designers. This is
likely due to the large difference in resources and capabilities required to move from
production to branding (product differentiation). However, Mexican denim maker, Grupo
Denim launched a line of premium jeans in the US market in Fall 2010. The denim
manufacturer already was vertically integrated into pattern design and jeans
manufacturing and finishing. The branded denim business, called Vintage Revolution,
was run by industry veteran, Michael Press (formerly of Paige Premium and Earnest
Sewn).

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From a bargaining power standpoint, only the denim laundries appear to pose a potential
threat to the premium labels. Denim laundries are not scarce, but they turn out highly
differentiated products that are custom formulated or each designer. The wash and
other fabric treatments such as the judicious application of paint, oil, and formaldehyde
are major factors in creating the distinctive look of each designers product. Skill
levels vary widely as to specific areas of expertise among the denim laundries. Most
laundries are located in Los Angeles as are many denim designers. Interestingly, Citizens
of Humanity recognized the key contribution and potential for holdup of denim laundries
and acquired its own laundry. The labor intense nature of the laundries and the valueadded of the finish of the jeans mean that denim laundries capture a meaningful slice of
the total input costs of premium jeans. On a total supply cost of approximately $40-$50
per pair, the wash and finish cost ran about $12 with some finishing treatments running at
$25 or higher per pair. Note the move away from embellished and distressed denim to
clean and classic reduced dependence on denim laundries somewhat.
Threat of Buyers
Buyers pose a high threat to premium denim makers in the US. The buyer threat level is
heightened when 1. a few buyers account for a large percentage of sales; 2. the number of
buyers in the industry is small; and 3. there is a credible threat of backward vertical
integration by buyers. High-end department stores account for a large percentage of
industry sales and those retailers have large market shares in the department store sector.
For True Religion, US department store Nordstrom accounted for over 15% of sales.
According to the 2002 US Economic Census (most recent data available), the department
store industry is highly concentrated with the top 8 firms controlling 94% of the market.
The top 4 firms hold a 66% share of the department store sector. Both factors suggest
department stores have considerable potential bargaining power with premium jeans
companies.
In addition, department store companies already have considerable experience in the store
brand or private label business. Major upscale retailers, Saks and Nordstrom, derive
15%-17% of total revenues from store brand sales. These firms have the resources and
capabilities to backward vertically integrate into premium jeans. With the economic
downturn, retailers increasingly are looking to store brands for both sales growth and
profit growth. Two factors reduce the threat premium jeans have high retail markups
(margins), and the products are sold on the basis of their brand positioning rather than on
the basis of functionality.
Threat of Substitutes
The threat level of substitutes is high. The discussion of substitutes typically proves to be
the most controversial with students. Some students will maintain that there is no
substitute for premium jeans given consumers enduring interest in the high-priced pants.
Other students will argue there are many substitutes for jeans based upon the
functionality of the product and the availability of other products that can provide the
same functionality. This is an opportunity to encourage the students to think about True
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Religions, Seven For All Mankinds, Citizens of Humanity, and Rock and Republics
value proposition to the end consumer. What are these companies selling jeans,
comfortable and good -looking pants, or something else? Youll probably have to remind
the students that lower-priced jeans are not substitutes as they are in the same product
category as premium denim. Those lines such as Levis are direct, lower-priced
competitors.
In my view, substitutes are the single largest threat to both the premium jeans industry
and to individual denim designers like True Religion. This is the issue that most worries
investors in True Religion - a major shift in fashion trends. True Religion, Rock and
Republic and other denim design companies that emphasize trendiness, and the latest
hot styles are especially vulnerable to a shift in consumer preference to other high
fashion categories. Seven and Citizens have broadened their appeal in order to attempt to
become wardrobe staples with some success. Nevertheless, when fashion trends change,
all denim design companies will be hurt. Marcianos comment about coming to the end of
denim dominance suggests major industry players thought that fashion trends had already
shifted away from jeans in late 2010.
The companies are selling fashion and image as much or more than they are selling
functionality. Of course without the fit and comfort of a well-designed product, none of
the premium denim designers would survive for long. Product functionality will not
likely prove to be enough to save many industry players when high-end denim consumers
have had enough of the product. Substitutes could include premium-priced designer
dresses and slacks, leather pants, and shorts. Consumers also could decide to spend more
money on accessories like premium-priced bags, gloves, scarves, and shoes or expensive
costume jewelry.
Key Elements of True Religions Strategy 2009 & 2010
The major question facing True Religion management was how to continue the
companys strong growth over the next five years. Jeff Lubell Chairman and CEO,
and Michael Buckley- President devised a three-pronged plan to move the company
forward in 2007. First, True Religion would try to establish itself as a lifestyle brand
via product diversification. Product diversification moves would come through
company-launched line extensions into categories closely related to denim jeans as well
as licensing arrangements for products in categories like perfume, bikinis, and shoes.
Second, True Religion would forward vertically integrate into company-owned monobrand stores and outlets. Forward vertical integration carried three potential advantages
margin enhancement, and reinforcement of the product diversification plan. Management
expected so-called 4-wall contribution to come in at about 40% compared to the
companys 27% operating margin. True Religion had difficulty getting key retail
accounts to carry its non-denim items. Management felt that company-owned stores
would be showcases for the entire product line and help to convince skeptical retailers
that the whole line had consumer draw. Ownership of outlet stores helped management
retain control over seconds and obsolete product. Third, True Religion would continue
to pursue international expansion. As of late 2010, the company had not changed the
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basic elements of its strategy. Note that True Religion was more vertically integrated in
2010 than in 2007 as it moved to bring the sales function within company boundaries
both in the US market and in some international markets.
Overall, it appeared that True Religions forward vertical integration into retail stores had
worked. The company was successful in generating increased total True Religion brand
sales within the US market even though wholesale sales were weak in 2009. Margins for
the retail side (or consumer direct segment) came in at or above plan. Nevertheless, the
decline in wholesale sales and lack of success in expansion into non-denim items as well
as the abrupt departure of Michael Buckley in April 2010, meant the companys strategy
had not been completely validated by the marketplace.
True Religion Brand Jeans and Sources of Competitive Advantage
I use the VRIO framework to evaluate potential sources of competitive advantage for
True Religion. The industry/external analysis especially the value chain analysis will
help students understand the companys business model as well as the dominant model in
the industry. Thinking about the key components of the value chain will help students
isolate some resources and capabilities that contribute to True Religions success.

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Copyright 2012 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall

Case 1-4

Summary of VRIO Analysis of True Religion Brand Jeans

Resource/Capability
Product Design
Fashion Trend
Forecasting
Brand Equity
Financial Position
Distribution
Licensing
Arrangements
Company-Owned
Stores
Lifestyle Brand
Strategy
Relationships with
Contract
Manufacturers

Valuable
Yes
Yes

Rare
Somewhat
Yes

Imperfectly
Imitable
No
Yes

Organized to
Leverage
Assets
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Somewhat
Yes
Somewhat
Somewhat

Yes
No
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes

Somewhat

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Implications of VRIO Analysis on True Religion

A VRIO analysis of Seven For All Mankind, and Citizens of Humanity would likely be
identical to the one shown above for True Religion brand jeans. All three firms are
pursuing similar strategies and have similar resources and capabilities. There does not
appear to be any one resource or capability that gives True Religion a competitive
advantage rather it is some combination of resources/capabilities that is not observable
(causally ambiguous) from outside the company. It is worth noting that the three top
firms entered the premium denim market early in the product life cycle. Timing seems to
have played a major role in establishing these brands as the top brands in the US
premium denim market.

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Copyright 2012 Pearson Education, Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall