2013-11-13 Comments - Crapo Johnson Key Issues
2013-11-13 Comments - Crapo Johnson Key Issues
2013-11-13 Comments - Crapo Johnson Key Issues
bill
is
all
politics
and
has
nothing
to
do
with
sound
finance.
At
every
turn
there
is
one
more
item
demonstrating
that.
You
need
to
ask
1
Is
it
an
improvement?
- Protect
the
public?
- Improve
market
function?
2-
Does
it
do
what
it
claims
to
do?
3-
Clearly
the
answer
is
no.
ONE
first
loss
isnt
real,
cant
be
enough
private
capital
under
this
structure
To
replace
the
GSEs
(roughly
$5
trillion
and
get
a
10%
first
loss)
we
will
need
to
attract
$500
billion
before
risk
weighting).
In
an
overly
generous
environment
they
will
get
to
$100
billion
of
first
loss
and
then
it
will
dry
up
(over
the
past
5
years
there
was
$15
billion
of
first
loss
on
the
crme
de
la
crme
of
cherry-picked
loans)
that
is
nothing
relative
to
the
needed
funds
to
support
housing
in
a
crisis.
TWO
problems
with
structure
of
regulator
no
internal
competency
P72
MONITORING,
COORDINATING,
AND
FACILITATING
THE
NEEDS
OF
UNDERSERVED
MARKETS.
P51
The
comingling
of
an
affordability
mission,
consumer
protection
and
safety/soundness
is
a
recipe
for
political
gaming
safety
and
soundness
should
be
separate
and
primary.
Otherwise
legislators
and
regulated
entities
will
be
able
to
use
affordability
goals
as
a
way
to
push
back
against
the
regulators
attempts
to
ensure
safety
and
soundness.
P39
Federal
Status:
A
new
federal
regulator
like
OFHEO
but
overseeing
mission,
consumer
protection
and
safety
and
soundness
of
even
greater
complexity
(aggregators,
insurers,
platform)
than
OFHEO
(and
HUD)
or
FHFA
were
required
to
do
and
failed
at.
P77
UNDERSERVED
MARKET
SEGMENTS.
The
Corporation
shall,
by
regulation,
identify
and
define
not
more
than
8
segments
of
the
primary
mortgage
market
in
which
lenders
and
eligible
borrowers
have
been
determined
to
lack
equitable
access
to
the
housing
finance
system
facilitated
by
the
Corporation.
Without
a
strict
definition
of
an
eligible
borrower
this
creates
the
opportunity
for
lenders
to
take
advantage
of
the
weakest
borrowers
by
pushing
the
regulator
to
allow
them
to
reduce
underwriting
standards
to
exploit
those
markets.
1)
leaving
it
to
regulators
opens
the
definition
to
ongoing
easing
as
we
saw
in
the
last
crisis
through
housing
goals
2)
any
such
focus
on
underserved
should
be
done
through
explicit
government
programs
like
FHA
3)
Delivering
subsidies
through
private
markets
only
leads
to
arbitrage,
rent
seeking
and
distortions
and
conflicts
between
public/private
incentives.
THREE
unmanageable
complexity
P83
CONSIDERATIONS
FOR
APPROVAL
OF
VARIOUS
MECHANISMS
In
approving
credit
risk-sharing
mechanisms
There
is
no
requirement
of
uniformity?
Will
the
regulators
have
the
ability
to
follow
and
understand
all
of
the
developments
in
the
market?
The
ability
to
approve
or
disapprove
(is
there
deeming
language?)
on
a
timely
basis
and
the
ability
to
properly
inform
investors
of
the
various
and
non-
standard
mechanisms?
This
is
an
open
door
to
sophisticated
market
participants
overwhelming
the
capacity
of
the
regulator.
We
have
seen
this
with
the
GSEs
when
their
regulators
task
was
much
simpler.
FOUR
weak
disclosures
P92
EXEMPTION
FROM
SECTION
27B
OF
THE
SECURITIES
ACT
OF
1933
What
is
the
rationale
behind
this?
They
are
exempting
the
10%
first-loss
piece
from
registration.
This
has
the
potential
to
create
disclosure
issues
and
the
avoidance
of
Reg
AB
allows
the
sale
of
toxic
bad
first
loss
securities
(seen
this
movie
before)
without
disclosures
adequate
enough
to
prevent
investors
from
running
for
the
door
as
collateral
or
economy
deteriorates.
Also
would
allow
the
acquisition
of
large
and
concentrated
unregistered
and
risky
first
loss
positions
that
will
engender
systemic
risk.
This
is
dangerous.
FIVE
first
loss
is
unworkable
and
inadequate
replacement
for
capital
P108
AUTHORITY
TO
PROTECT
TAXPAYERS
IN
UNUSUAL
AND
EXIGENT
MARKET
CONDITIONS.
The
notion
of
a
first-loss
requirement
that
can
be
waved
as
liquidity
is
reduced
demonstrates
that
this
is
not
first
loss
at
all.
In
other
words,
first-loss
is
only
first
loss
in
times
in
which
it
is
least
needed.
Does
this
make
sense?
No.
In
fact,
at
precisely
the
time
that
markets
begin
to
become
concerned
about
the
functioning
of
the
market
they
will
have
an
increased
incentive
to
pull
back
and
exacerbate
a
liquidity
crisis
to
relieve
themselves
of
the
first
loss
obligation
and
to
ensure
the
government
is
on
the
hook.
Moreover,
by
leaving
this
trigger
to
regulators
there
is
even
more
likelihood
that
it
will
be
exercised.
Think
about
it;
during
the
crisis
our
regulators
had
no
qualms
about
ignoring
explicitly
clear
legal
requirements
about
prompt
corrective
action.
Why
would
we
assume
they
would
not
be
pushed
into
action
to
suspend
first-loss
in
a
difficult
environment
given
the
less
clear
direction
in
this
bill?
P110
The
ability
of
regulators
to
waive
private
first
loss
in
an
adverse
economic
environment,
without
any
congressional
direction
before
exercising
that
decision
-
requiring
that
the
regulator
only
provide
notice
to
congress
after
the
fact
-
creates
a
TARP
like
situation
without
the
requirement
for
congressional
authorization.
If
there
is
insufficient
private
capital
in
the
Fund
(as
is
almost
certain)
this
is
merely
a
pre-
approval
of
undefined
amounts
of
government
first-loss
without
legislative
pre-
approval.
Is
this
even
legal?
P101
FULL
FAITH
AND
CREDIT.
The
full
faith
and
credit
of
the
United
States
is
pledged
to
the
payment
of
all
amounts
from
the
Mortgage
Insurance
Fund
which
may
be
required
to
be
paid
under
any
insurance
provided
under
this
title.
We
have
added
a
new
systemic
risk
given
that
the
FMIC
can
become
a
government
obligation
if
they
misprice
risk
as
a
result
of
being
incented
to
ensure
liquidity
in
mortgage
credit
is
a
primary
goal
(leading
to
underpricing)
SIX
New
GSEs
P38
In
general:
These
are
new
GSEs
and
there
will
be
more
than
just
two.
This
will
reduce
the
liquidity
of
each
as
witnessed
by
FREs
relatively
worse
liquidity
than
Fannie.
SEVEN
Concentration
of
market
will
harm
small
lenders
P71
if
the
small
lender
aggregator
allows
small
lender
loans
to
be
loans
be
pooled
separately
from
other
aggregators
loans
it
will
result
in
less
volume
and
lower
loan
diversity.
In
turn
this
will
lead
to
worse
execution
prices
and
thus,
over
time,
drive
volume
away
from
the
smaller
lenders.
The
result
will
be
increased
concentration
of
the
industry
in
the
hands
of
the
largest
and
most
systemically
interconnected
firms.
EIGHT
No
chance
of
a
fully
private
market
even
at
a
point
when
capital
may
be
there
P78
The
Corporation
shall
require
that
each
approved
guarantor
and
approved
aggregator
engaged
in
a
covered
guarantee
transaction
or
in
a
covered
market-
based
risk-sharing
transaction
submit
on
annual
basis
a
public
report
describing
the
actions
taken
by
such
approved
guarantor
or
approved
aggregator
during
the
year,
consistent
with
its
business
judgment,
to
provide
credit
to
the
underserved
market
segments
identified
and
defined
by
the
Corporation
pursuant
to
this
subsection,
including
corporate
practices
designed
to
serve
such
identified
market
segments.