Understanding Short-Termism: Questions and Consequences

Understanding
Short-Termism
Questions and Consequences
Report by
J.W. Mason
November 6, 2015
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Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
ADDRESSING THE CRITICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Short-Termism Is Not Real
Short-Termism Is Not Harmful
Short-Termism Is Not Any of Our Business
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

1. Why are we worrying about businesses not investing enough?
Hasnt business spending on investmentand especially R&Drecovered
strongly since the end of the recession?
2. Does the economy really need more spending now? Isnt the Federal
Reserve beginning to worry about the economy overheating?
3. Arent shareholder payouts just a way to move capital from established
corporations to newer, faster-growing ones?
4. Dont shareholder payouts help to reallocate capital to high-technology
sectors in particular?
5. Are we missing the benefits of short-termism because money flowing out of large
public firms is simply flowing into startups and small businesses not listed on the stock
market?
6. If investors get more income from shares, doesnt that mean
they will invest more in new companies?
7. Payouts must go somewhere, so if they are not invested, where do they go?
8. Whether it is reinvested or consumed, the money from shareholder payouts
has to go somewhere. So wont it always boost demand one way or another?
9. Isnt following market signals by focusing on the share price the
best way to encourage innovation and growth in the long run?
10. If managers and shareholders dont see any worthwhile
investment projects, why should we second-guess them?
11. Since shareholders own the business, arent they entitled
to higher payouts if thats what they want?
12. Doesnt the focus on share prices and high payouts
benefit ordinary people, who also own shares?
C O P Y R I G H T 2 0 1 5 B Y T H E R O O S E V E LT I N S T I T U T E .
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
ABOUT THIS REPORT

This report is released by the Financialization
Project as part of the Roosevelt Institutes
comprehensive Rewriting the Rules agenda,
which seeks to level the playing field and grow
the American economy. The Financialization
Project, led by Roosevelt Institute Fellow Mike
Konczal, studies how the economy has been
transformed by the growth of the financial
sector beyond its core savings function,
J.W. Mason is a Fellow at the Roosevelt

Institute, where he works on the Financialization
Project, and an assistant professor of
economics at John Jay College, CUNY. His
current research focuses on the history and
political economy of credit, including the
evolution of household debt and changing role
of financial markets in business investment.
He also works on history of economic
thought, particularly the development of
macroeconomics over the twentieth century.
finances increased power over the real

economy, the increased influence of wealth,
and the reduction of all of society to the
realm of finance. In addition to clarifying the
concept of financialization, it aims to develop
a research and policy agenda to halt these
trends and restore an economy that works for
everyone.
the company. However, over the past 30 years,

shareholder payouts have averaged 90 percent of
reported profits. In recent years, including 2014, total
payouts have been greater than total profits. This is
largely due to buybackscorporations purchases of
their own shareswhich were almost nonexistent
before the 1980s but now account for nearly half of
corporations payouts to shareholders (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Profits and Payouts

8
7
Introduction
Five years after the end of the recession, economic
activity in the U.S. remains below potential. One
important explanation for this slow growth is that
business investment remains weak compared to
previous economic recoveries. To an increasing
number of observers, weak investment appears to be
related to the rise in what experts are calling quarterly
capitalism or short-termismthe focus on short
time horizons by both corporate managers and financial
markets, prioritizing near-term shareholder interests
over the long-term growth of the firm.1
Short-termism is most apparent when assessing
the increase in funds paid out by corporations to
shareholders over the last three decades. Before the
1970s, American corporations consistently paid out
around 50 percent of their profits to shareholders,
retaining the remainder for reinvestment in
% of Sales
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63
-1
Total Payouts
Profits
Dividends
Source: Compustat database; Roosevelt Institute analysis. Cashflow

is profits plus depreciation.
This increase in shareholder payouts is closely

linked to the transformation of American corporate
governance that began in the 1980s, often described as
the shareholder revolution. Through most of the 20th
century, American corporations were governed under
a system best described as managerialism, in which
executives typically rose through the ranks at a single
company and had as their primary objective the survival

and growth of the corporation itself.1 Under this system,
management saw itself as balancing the interests of
a number of stakeholdersemployees, customers,
suppliers, regulators, creditors, and other firms in the
industry. Shareholders were just one constituency
among others. But over the past generation, there
has been a revival of the notion that shareholders
are the primary stakeholders, and that creating value
for shareholders is the sole legitimate objective for
management. This change in the self-conception of
management evolved hand in hand with developments
in law, ideology, and the structure of financial markets
that have increased the power of shareholders to
enforce their demands on managers. Higher payouts
are one of the central demands of these empowered
shareholders.
ADDRESSING THE CRITICS

Recent discussion of short-termism has resulted in
a wave of criticism claiming that it is not real or not
a problem. Under scrutiny, these objections do not
hold up. The goal of this paper is to address the most
common objections to the idea that short-termism is a
serious problem for the economy. These objections fall
into three broad categories.
Short-Termism Is Not Real

A common response to worries about short-termism is
that it is not real. This viewpoint suggests that, although
there may be noteworthy exceptions, overall, this is
not an important problem for our economy. Spending
on investment and research and development (R&D)
is exactly where we would expect it to be, and perhaps
even as high as historical trend.
James Surowiecki argues in The New Yorker that, as a
whole, corporate spending on R&D has risen steadily
over the years, and has stayed relatively constant as
a share of GDP and as a share of sales.2 Mark Zandi
of Moodys Analytics asks, if short-termism is a real
problem, what explains the fact that businesses are
investing so much in research and development?3
1 There is extensive literature on the rise and decline of
managerialism over the 20th century. For a comprehensive
introduction, see chapter 3 of Davis, Gerald. 2011. Managed by the
Market. Davis, Gerald. Managed by the Market. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
We document that this is incorrect, and that much

of what appears to be a recent increase in business
investment is due to changing methodology in how
investment is measured. Weak investment spending has
been masked by the overall weakness of the economic
recovery. When properly accounted, real growth in
investment spending over the business cycle is now at
its slowest by far in the postwar era.
This has major implications for future recoveries
as well: The delinking of record high earnings and
expansionary monetary policy from investment is a
troubling development. Full employment may be harder
to maintain using conventional monetary policy when
corporations are dominated by shareholders demanding
quick payouts. Monetary policy may still work, but only
by encouraging household borrowing, which carries its
own serious risks and costs.
Short-Termism Is Not Harmful

A more common refrain is that while it is true that an
increasing share of corporate surplus is paid out to
financial markets rather than invested, this shift has
been beneficial to long-term growth. According to this
line of reasoning, the money leaving old firms is going to
small startups, especially firms involved in innovative
technology.
As Robert Samuelson describes in The Washington Post,
Investment funds are being channeled from slowgrowing to fast-growing sectors.4 The Economist notes
that this system is best at producing world-beating
startups because it is better at shifting capital quickly to
new opportunities.5 Or, as Harvard Law professor Mark
Roe puts it, the cash should leave old-line firms with
weak futures and end up where it can be deployed more
effectively, benefiting the economy as a whole.6
We document that this is an inaccurate assessment of
what is occurring in the economy. The data shows the
link between cash and investment breaking across the
economy as a whole, not just among older and more
established firms. And instead of increasing, the share
of investment coming from new and small companies is
actually declining. There is no handoff to new firms.
Nor is there any sign that financial markets are directing
funds toward technology-intensive industries. Over
the past 15 years, the share of investment from tech
R O O S E V E LT I N S T I T U T E . O R G
companies has steadily declined. Tech industries have

increasingly become sources of funds for the financial
system. Payouts in dividends and buybacks from tech
industries have actually increased more quickly than
payouts from publicly traded firms in general. Rather
than reinvesting profits into technology firms, the
finance industry is increasingly getting money out of
them.
More broadly, the scale of money that finance is taking
out of firms is an order of magnitude greater than
estimates of the money that finance puts into firms.
Total shareholder payouts in 2014 were over $1.2
trillion, while general estimates show that money going
from investors to businesses in the form of IPOs and
venture capital (VC) is less than $200 billion. This
implies that for every $1 invested by finance more than
$6 is taken out by finance.
Short-Termism Is Not Any of Our

Business
A final argument is that whether or not the short-term
orientation of corporations and finance supports
investment, it is not an appropriate question for public
policy. Since shareholders own the firm, this view says,
they should make the calls. If shareholders, and the
corporate managers who work for them, do not see any
value to higher investment, then it is not the place of the
public to second-guess them. Letting financial markets
decide where the surplus goes will produce the best
outcomes for everyone. Or, at the very least, it cannot do
any real harm, since the money will be spent one way or
another.
As economist Ryan Drecker notes, those shareholder
payouts go somewhere, and thus drive aggregate
economic trends.7 Robert Samuelson argues,
Shareholder payouts boost consumer confidence
and spending.8 More generally, a common response
to criticism of short-termism is that it is the sole
responsibility of the firm to act in the interests of
shareholders.9
But short-termism does have consequences. In
a demand-constrained economy, a reduction in
investment by one firm will tend to reduce, not increase,
investment by other firms. To the extent that corporate
profits end up paying for higher consumption by
wealthy households, or for salaries in the financial
system, they are not contributing to the development

of the countrys productive capacities or to a long-term
increase in the standard of living.
In general, investments have positive externalities.
When corporations invest more, it has a range of
positive spillover effects for the development of
technology, the dissemination of new skills, and more.
The most innovative businesses tend to be firms that
prioritize growth and carry out investment that may
turn out to be unprofitable for the owners of that
particular firm but is critical to creating new markets,
developing a critical mass of skilled workers, pioneering
new products, and so on. When corporations cease to
invest, these benefits also decline.
From a social standpoint, short-termism exacerbates
inequality. Most Americans own little or no stock and
therefore do not benefit from higher share prices or
larger payouts. The bottom 50 percent of households
own just 9 percent of shares. Stock ownership is
significantly concentrated, with just 4 percent of
households owning a majority of all shares. Rather
than having a democratizing effect, the concentration
of income from capital is one of the primary drivers of
inequality.
As long as corporations are simply conceived of as
machines for increasing share value, they will be unable
to fully utilize Americas collective productive capacities
or develop those capacities for the future.
The remainder of this paper is organized as answers
to 12 common questions about short-termism and
shareholder payouts. Questions 1 and 2 reflect the
first objection, that short-termism is not a real issue.
Questions 3 through 7 reflect the second objection, that
shareholder payouts are just a way of allocating capital
more efficiently. And questions 8 through 12 reflect the
third objection, that both normatively and practically
shareholders are the ones who should decide what to do
with a corporations surplus funds.
A companion report, Ending Short-Termism, develops
a policy agenda to respond to this economic challenge.
It is true that, measured as a share of gross domestic

product (GDP), investment has fully recovered from
its fall during the recession, and is now slightly above
average by historical standards12.8 percent of GDP,
versus a postwar average of 12.0 percent. But this is
misleading for several reasons.10
First, the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
recently redefined investment to include not just
spending on structures, equipment, and software, which
is what businesses classify as investment in their own
accounts, but also R&D spending and the development
of intellectual property of all sorts, including costs
associated with the creation of movies, television
shows, etc.11 When we define investment in a more
conventional way, it remains below average as a share of
GDP.
More importantly, the use of GDP as a denominator
is misleading, since the recent recovery has been
exceptionally weak by historical standards. Since low
investment itself results in lower GDP, the investmentto-GDP ratio is not a good guide to the strength of
investment. A more meaningful metric is real growth in
investment spending over the business cycle, and the
most recent cycle shows by far the slowest investment
growth in the postwar erano matter how investment is
defined.
Finally, its important to remember that this very
weak investment is occurring in what should be an
Figure 2: Total Investment

18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
1947
1949
1952
1954
1957
1959
1962
1964
1967
1969
1972
1974
1977
1979
1982
1984
1987
1989
1992
1994
1997
1999
2002
2004
2007
2009
2012
2014
Contrary to some sources, business investment

is not where it needs to be. Much of the recent
increase is due to the changing methodology
of what counts as investment. In addition,
recent weakness in investment spending has
been masked by the overall weakness of the
recovery. When properly accounted, real growth
in investment spending over the business cycle
is at its slowest by far in the postwar era.
Percent of GDP
1. Why are we worrying about businesses

not investing enough? Hasnt business
spending on investmentand especially
R&Drecovered strongly since the end of the
recession?
exceptionally favorable environment, with credit cheap

and abundant and corporate profits at record highs. The
reason interest rates have been held at zero over the
past six years, and the reason for the unconventional
expansionary policy carried out by the Fed, is precisely
to boost investment spending, to offset the weakness
of other sources of demand. If, under these conditions,
American business is turning in its worst-ever
investment performanceindeed, even if it were only
turning in an average onethat represents a serious
breakdown of policy. Over the past three decades, the
U.S. like most other rich countrieshas come to
rely almost exclusive on monetary policy to maintain
full employment and stable prices. If the pressure to
increase payouts and the larger short-term orientation
of American corporations mean that said corporations
no longer respond to abundant credit by increasing
investment spending, then we must fundamentally
rethink this approach. Figure 2 shows investment
spending as a fraction of GDP.12
Equipment and Software

plus R&D
plus other IP
Source: National Income and Product Accounts, Roosevelt Institute
analysis
The black line shows investment as the BEA defined
it until 2013, and as it continues to be defined under

the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)
followed by most U.S. businesses. This includes
spending on new structures, on tangible equipment,
and on software.13 The red line shows investment as it is
currently defined by the BEA, including spending on the
development of intellectual property (IP) of all sorts.
The green line shows traditional investment plus R&D
spending, but not including spending on copyrighted
artistic work.
Measured Investment Has Risen

Because of a Change in Definitions
As Figure 2 makes clear, the biggest part of the 2013
change in the definition of investment was not the
addition of R&D spending, but rather of spending on
the development of TV shows, movies, music, and other
forms of intellectual property (IP). These categories
of spending now account for about 20 percent of
official investment. While this kind of spending may
fit with an abstract definition of investment, there is
little reason to think that this kind of spending has the
kinds of positive externalitiesespecially in terms of
technological innovationthat traditional investment is
widely agreed to have.
IP spending is not normally reported by businesses,
and there was no standard series for it prior to the
2013 changes, so the older values for this series are
retrospective estimates of uncertain reliability. So longrun historical comparisons based on the new series need
to be treated very cautiously. By contrast, traditional
investment spendingstructures, equipment, and
more recently softwareis clearly defined in business
accounting, and we can be confident that when we
compare it in different periods we are looking at more or
less the same kinds of spending.
If we look at investment as it is defined by GAAP, we see
a clear trend of declining investment as a share of GDP
since 1980. Still, as a share of GDP, investment appears
to have recovered strongly from the recession. If GAAP
investment is still below its long-term average share
of the economy, R&D is above it; the two together are
near historical average and well above the level of the
1950s, if still well below the levels of the investment
booms of the 1970s and 1990s. So while excluding the
development of movies, TV shows, etc., from investment
makes it clear that recent investment has been

mediocre, it does not appear exceptionally poor.
In Absolute Terms, Investment Growth

Is Very Weak; This Is Masked by the
Weak Overall Recovery
A more serious problem, however, is that using
share of GDP to measure the strength of investment
spending is fundamentally misleading. In effect, this
grades investment performance on a curve: The same
investment growth looks bigger in a weak recovery than
in a strong one. Whats more, investment spending is,
itself, one of the main factors in determining the level
and growth rate of GDP. Indeed, most macroeconomic
forecasters consider investment spending the single
most important factor in business-cycle fluctuations. 2
If weak investment growth results in a lower overall
level of economic activity, investment as a share of
GDP will look higher. Conversely, an investment
boom that leads to rapid economic growth may not
show up as an especially high investment share of
GDP. So to get a clear sense of the performance of
business investment, we should look at the real growth
of investment spending over a full business cycle,
measured in inflation-adjusted dollars, not in percent of
GDP. And when we do this, we see that the investment
performance of the most recent cycle is the weakest on
recordeven using the BEAs newer, more generous
definition of investment.
Figure 3a shows the cumulative change in real
investment spending since the previous business-cycle
peak, using the current (broad) BEA definition. (The
inflation adjustment uses the same investment-goods
price index as the BEAs measures of real investment.)
Figure 3b shows the same thing, but uses the older,
narrower GAAP definition. Data for both figures is taken
from the aggregates published by the BEA, so it includes
closely held corporations as well as publicly traded
firms. As these figures show, the most recent cycle is a
2 For a recent discussion of the central importance of business
investment for macroeconomic fluctuations, see:
Stiglitz, Joseph. 2015. Toward a General Theory of Deep
Downturns. (NBER Working Paper 21444).
For a classic statement, see Hyman Minskys summary of the
Keynesian vision of the business cycle as an investment theory
of fluctuations in demand and a financial theory of fluctuations in
investment. See:Minsky, Hyman. 1975. John Maynard Keynes. New
York: Columbia University Press, p. 55.
clear outlier in terms of both the depth and duration

of the fall in investment during the downturn and, to
an even greater degree, the slowness of the subsequent
recovery.
Using the BEA measure, the initial fall was only
moderately deeper than in other postwar cycles; what
really stands out is the weak recovery. Using the GAAP
measure, the most recent cycle is exceptional for the
depth of the decline in investment spending in the
recession as well as for its slow growth in the recovery.
Measuring investment as plant and equipment plus
R&D (not shown) gives an intermediate picture.
Figures 3a and 3b: Cumulative Growth

of Broad (BEA) and Narrow (GAAP)
Culmative Investment Growth
2.25
1.75
1.5
1.25
0.75
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
Even using the BEAs more generous definition, it took

more than five years for inflation-adjusted investment
spending to recover to its previous peak. (By the
narrower GAAP definition, it took six years.) Five years
after the average postwar business cycle peak, BEA
investment spending had already risen 20 percent in
real terms. As of the second quarter of 2015seven
and a half years after the most recent peak, and six
years into the recoverybroad investment spending
was up only 10 percent from its previous peak. (GAAP
investment spending was up just 8.5 percent.) In the
four previous postwar recoveries that lasted this long,
the improvement in real investment spending ranged
from 21 percent to 63 percent over the same period.
The current business cycle has had less than half the
investment growth of the weakest previous cycle, and
it is worth noting that the next two weakest investment
performances of the 10 postwar cycles came in the
1980s and the 2000s. In recent years, only the techboom period of the 1990s has matched the consistent
investment growth of the 1950s, 60s, and 70s.
When we look directly at business investment spending,
it is clear that there is a real problem here to be
understood and, hopefully, solved. The weakness of
investment spending has simply been masked by the
overall weakness of the most recent recovery.
Quarters From Peak

1953-1957
1957-1960
1960-1969
1969-1973
1973-1980
1980-1981
1981-1990
1990-2001
2001-2007
2007-2015
Nonresidential Investment Spending

in 10 Postwar Business Cycles
1.5
1.75
1.25
0.75
0.5
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
Culmative Investment Growth
Quarters From Peak

1953-1957
1957-1960
1960-1969
1969-1973
1973-1980
1980-1981
1981-1990
1990-2001
2001-2007
2007-2015
2. Does the economy really need more spending

now? Isnt the Federal Reserve beginning to
worry about the economy overheating?
Given low labor force participation, weak wage
growth, and low inflation, the economy is running
below potential and there is plenty of room for
expanding investment. But even if there wasnt,
the delinking of record high earnings and
expansionary monetary policy from investment is
a troubling development. It could mean that full
employment will be harder to maintain using our
current tools in an economy dominated by shorttermism.
Source: National Income and Product Accounts, Roosevelt Institute

analysis
As the figures make clear, the current business cycle

has had by far the weakest investment growth of any in
the postwar era, no matter how investment is defined.
A few years ago, when unemployment was still high

and GDP was clearly below potential, it was easy to
make the case that low business investment was a
But in fact, there is still good reason to be concerned

about the weakness of business investment discussed in
the previous question. First, it is far from clear that the
economy is operating at potential, or anywhere close to
it. By other measures, demand still appears very weak.
Second, even if we do think that the economy today is
operating near potential, there is still a larger structural
problem. Investment today is lagging despite an
extraordinary stimulus from abundant credit and very
high profits. If this exceptionally favorable environment
delivers only a weakor even mediocrelevel of
investment growth, that suggests that the traditional
macroeconomic tools for stabilizing demand are
unlikely to be effective in the future.
Real GDP (2015 $ Trillions)
Finally, the persistent weakness of investment demand

makes the economy more dependent on other sources
of demand to reach full employment, which may be
hard to sustain. The previous cycle in the 2000s had the
weakest investment performance prior to this cycle, and
one result of that weakness was that the economy was
25
able to reach full employment only thanks
to the housing boom and the associated
exceptionally strong demand from the
20
household sector. As this experience
suggests, even if output can reach potential
15
on the basis of non-investment demand,
there may be strong policy reasons to prefer
an expansion built on investment growth.
close to a trend of about 3 percent annual growth. Since

2007, GDP has fallen well below that trend and shows
no signs of returning to it. Meanwhile, for the first time
in 50 years, inflation has fallen persistently below the
Feds 2 percent target.
Over the past 30 years, a fall in unemployment has
normally been associated with a rise in employment as
a share of the population, and with an acceleration of
nominal wage growth. Neither of these signs of labor
market tightness are present in the current expansion.
Figures 4 and 5 show four measures of output relative to
potential: inflation as measured by the consumer price
index (CPI), real (inflation-adjusted) GDP relative to
its pre-recession trend, the employment-to-population
ratio, and nominal wage growth. None of these are
consistent with an economy operating near capacity
and in danger of overheating. Unless you believe that
the 20082009 recession coincided with an abrupt
slowdown in technological progress, output is still
well below potential. The failure of the employmentto-population ratio to recover following the recession
suggests that the fall in the measured unemployment
rate is mainly due to discouraged workers exiting the
labor force.
Figure 4: Inflation and Real GDP

Growth
16
14
12
10
10
-2
1947
1948
1949
1950
1952
1953
1954
1955
1957
1958
1959
1960
1962
1963
1964
1965
1967
1968
1969
1970
1972
1973
1974
1975
1977
1978
1979
1980
1982
1983
1984
1985
1987
1988
1989
1990
1992
1993
1994
1995
1997
1998
1999
2000
2002
2003
2004
2005
2007
2008
2009
2010
2012
2013
2014
The current state of demand in the U.S.

relative to supply constraints is hotly
5
debated. Answering this question is beyond
the scope of this paper.14 But on the face of
0
it, standard measures of the level of activity
relative to potential are not consistent
with an economy in danger of overheating;
rather, they suggest a substantial continuing shortfall in
demand.
Real GDP
1947-2008 Trend
Inflation
2% Inflation Target
Between 1947 and 2007, long-run real GDP stayed very
-4
Inflation (CPI, Percent)
serious problem for the economy. Today, some people

argue, it is not so clear. At 5.1 percent, unemployment
is near the level that has traditionally been considered
full employment. And with the Federal Reserve
discussing an increase in interest rates, it appears that
policymakers are more worried about demand being too
strong than they are about it being too weak.
10
64
62
60
In our view, this means that there is still

good reason to believe that the economy is
operating well short of potential, and that
there is excess unemployment, with all
the waste and hardship that goes with it,
even if it does not show up in the headline
unemployment rate.
But even if you believe that the economy

is now close to its maximum sustainable
level of investment, there are still solid
macroeconomic reasons to be concerned
2
56
about the ways that financial market
pressures can hold back business
investment. First, in the best case scenario,
0
54
we have only reached something like full
employment five years into a recovery
Wage Growth
Unemployment
Employment-Population Ratio
characterized by extraordinary stimulus for
business investment. This casts doubt on
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index (inflation);
the effectiveness of traditional expansionary monetary
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Situation (unemployment
rate, employment-population ratio, and wage growth)
policy, which will certainly be needed in the future. A
second, related concern is that if investment responds
Similarly, the failure of wage growth to accelerate
only weakly to the availability of credit, a policy of easy
is inconsistent with a tight labor market in which
money may instead end up encouraging other kinds of
businesses are facing a shortage of appropriate workers. borrowing, which may be less sustainable or socially
Note that in the three previous recoveries, there was
desirable.
a strong acceleration of wage growth prior to the top
of the cycle. In the current recovery, there has been
The first of these points, the exceptionally favorable
no such acceleration; in fact, wage growth appears
financial environment for investment, obviously
significantly slower today than it was a year ago.15
includes low interest rates for business borrowers
58
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Unemployment Rate, Wage Growth (%)
12
wider than it was at the bottom of the recession. In

this straightforward sense, there has been no recovery
66
toward potential output at all.3
Employment-Population Ratio (%)
Figure 5: Labor Market Indicators
Finally, the most straightforward measure of slack

in the economy, the inflation rate, shows no sign of
acceleration. The headline measure of inflation, the
Consumer Price Index (CPI), has been below the Feds
2 percent target in 35 out of the past 36 months, and
seems to be falling rather than rising. There have been
several months this year in which the CPI has shown
outright deflation for the first time since the end of the
recession. (Other measures of inflation have behaved
similarly.) Other than the headline U3 unemployment
rate, almost every standard indicator suggests an
economy that still faces a substantial demand shortfall
and is operating well below potential. Using the
simplest measure of potential, the pre-recession trend,
the shortfall in output stands at nearly 15 percent
which, while they were slower to come down than the

policy rate set by the Fed, are now the lowest theyve
been in nearly 50 years. In addition, the volume of new
borrowing by the corporate sector, while still short
of historical highs, has recovered strongly since the
recession and, at around 4 percent of sales, is well above
its long-term historical average. So interest rates are not
just low on paper: Recent years really have seen a large
flow of credit to the business sector.
Earnings, meanwhile, are near their highest levels ever.
3 The apparent closing of the gap between current output and
potential is entirely the result of lower estimates of potential output
following the recession, rather than faster growth moving GDP
toward the pre-recession trend.
Ball, Laurence. 2014. Long-Term Damage from the Great Recession
in OECD Countries (NBER Working Paper 20185).
11
In 2014, corporations had cash flow from operations

close to 14 percent of sales, a level never reached prior
to 2000. And except for a brief dip during the recession
itself, this extraordinarily strong cash flow has been
sustained continuously throughout the past 15 years
(see Figure 1). The weak performance of investment
is much more puzzling when we consider these very
favorable financing conditions for the corporate sector.
That is the puzzle that this project is intended to
address: not just the absolute level of investment,
but the delinking of investment from the changes
in financial conditions that were long thought to be
its main drivers.16 And this is not just an academic
question; macroeconomic policy today depends
almost exclusively on shifting private spending
levels by adjusting the cost and availability of credit.
Traditionally, it was assumed that investment was
the category of spending most sensitive to these
adjustments. If this is no longer the case, then in a real
sense the monetary policy steering wheel is no longer
connected to the wheels of the economic car. This is a
serious concern regardless of whether the car happens
to be headed in the right direction at the moment.
The housing boom provides a clear example of this.
In the mid-2000s, the U.S. economy did seem to be
operating close to potential by conventional measures,
even if labor markets were never as tight as in the
previous decade.4 And it is not controversial to suggest
that the Feds expansionary policy contributed to
the recovery after the dot-com bust. But business
investment in the 2000s was fairly weakagain, as
Figure 2 shows, the weakest (using the BEA measure
of investment) of any postwar cycle before the current
one. Instead, expansionary policy and abundant credit
operated, even more than was usual during cyclical
expansions, through the housing market.
In 2005, it was easy to say that low investment was not
a problem since GDP was growing along its long-term
trend and unemployment was low and falling. But it
is clear now that, even from the narrow perspective of
macroeconomic policy, one dollar of spending is not
the same as another. Boosting the economy by easing
4 During the later 1990s, the unemployment rate was below 5
percent for over four years, and fell as low as 3.8 percent. During
the 2000s, by contrast, unemployment was below 5 percent for
less than two years and never fell below 4.4 percent. Similarly, the
employment population ratio reached 64.7 percent at the peak of
the 1990s expansion, compared with 63 percent at the peak of the
2000s expansion. See Figure 5.
credit conditions is more likely to produce instability

when the spending it induces comes from the household
sector rather than the business sector.
Some people see this problem and suggest that we
should give up on the idea that low rates and easy credit
can be used to keep the economy at full employment.
There may be something to this if it means a greater role
for fiscal policy and other tools of demand management,
though not if it means, as it often seems to, abandoning
full employment as a macroeconomic policy goal. But
before we give up on monetary policy, it is worth asking
why it no longer affects business investment as reliably
as it once did. One likely culprit is the shareholder
revolution and related changes in financial markets.
3. Arent shareholder payouts just a way to

move capital from established corporations to
newer, faster-growing ones?
The data shows the link between cash and
investment breaking across the economy as a
whole, rather than just among older and more
established firms. And instead of increasing,
the share of investment coming from new and
small companies is actually declining over this
time period. There is no sign of capital being
reallocated to new firms.
People often suggest that high shareholder payouts are
just a way of reallocating funds between businesses.
Thanks to high dividends and share repurchases, the
earnings of established corporations can be used to
finance investment at smaller, newer companies with
better growth prospects.
There are several reason to think this is not true. First,
the link between cash inflows and investment has
gotten weaker for the economy as a whole, not just
for individual corporations. This suggests that there
is something going on beyond reallocation of funds
between businesses. Second, the era of shareholder
dominance has seen a long-term decline in the share of
investment that goes to smaller and newer firms, and in
the economic activity of those firms in general.
The link between funding and investment has broken
for the corporate sector as a whole; its not just a matter
Figure 6: Investment Spending by

Newer and Smaller Corporations
25
20
15
10
2011
2013
2009
2007
2005
1999
2003
1997
2001
1995
1991
1993
1989
1987
1985
1981
1983
1977
1979
1971
1973
1975
1969
1967
1965
1961
1963
1959
1957
1955
1951
1953
Table 1, reproduced from Roosevelts Disgorge the

Cash report, shows the correlations between various
sources and uses of funds for the corporate sector as a
whole.17 Note: Since the data is taken from the financial
accounts, it includes closely held corporations as well
as publicly traded ones. As the second row shows, in
the postwar decades each additional dollar of earnings
flowing into the corporate sector was associated, on
average, with an additional 48 cents of investment
spending; today it is associated with only 22 cents of
investment spending. The relatively high r-squared of
the earlier period indicates that the high-investment
years were, by and large, the high-profit years; the much
lower r-squared for the most recent period indicates
that this correlation no longer exists to any significant
degree. These changes in aggregate relationships
suggest that we are not just looking at a shift in
investment spending across businesses or industries,
but a change in the degree to which corporate profits
finance investment at all.
Second, when we look at the share of smaller and newer

businesses in the economy, we see no sign that they have
benefited from easier access to funds. Figure 6 shows
the share of investment spending accounted for by
publicly traded corporations in their first five years after
listing, as a fraction of all investment by publicly traded
corporations. This shows a clear cyclical pattern, rising
in booms and falling in downturns; not surprisingly,
it was particularly high during the tech boom period
around 2000.
Share of Total Investment
If increased shareholder payouts markets were mainly

reallocating funds between businesses, then we would
expect increased earnings or borrowing in the corporate
sector to be associated with a rise in investment
somewhere, even if not in the firms that initially
received the new funds. But this is not the caseor at
least, it is much less the case than it used to be. The
weakening of the aggregate relationship between cash
flow from operations and borrowing, on the one hand,
and investment, on the other, suggests that higher
payouts from one business are not translated into more
investment funding for some other business.
The Share of Smaller and Younger

Firms is Shrinking, Not Growing
Investment by Corporations Listed Less than Five Years

9
Broad Investment (CAPX + R&D)
Narrow_investment (CAPX Only)
8
7
6
Share of Total (%)
of funds shifting between firms
5
4
3
2
1951
1953
1955
1957
1959
1961
1963
1965
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
Table 1: Changing Correlations

Between Corporate Sources and Uses
of Funds
Investment by Smaller Half of Corporations by Sales
Source: Compustat data, Roosevelt Institute analysis
Regression
1952-1984
1985-2013
Coefficient
r2
Coefficient
r2
Investment on Borrowing
0.20 (0.03)
0.22
0.15 (0.03)
0.22
Investment on Cashflow
0.48 (0.07)
0.28
0.22 (0.08)
0.07
Payouts on Borrowing
0.16 (0.03)
0.17
0.49 (0.07)
0.03
Payouts on Cashflow
0.25 (0.07)
0.09
0.78 (0.21)
0.11
Source: Roosevelt Institute, Disgorge the Cash
Note: These figures are based on data for publicly traded

corporations, taken from the Compustat database.
Investment is defined here to include R&D spending. For
the investment share of newly listed corporations, the
years 19731976 are excluded because the expansion of
coverage in 1973 distorts the apparent number of younger
firms for those years.
But there is no long-term upward trend; on the contrary,
during the past decade the investment share of younger
13
25
20
15
10
Investment by Corporations Listed Less than Five Years

Broad Investment (CAPX + R&D)
Narrow_investment (CAPX Only)
Many supporters of shareholder activism argue

that high payouts are needed to free up capital for
investment, not just in younger firms in general,
but specifically in high-growth and high-technology
sectors. Defenders of the American system of
shareholder-dominated corporate governance often
point to the success of American computer, software,
and pharmaceutical companies as evidence of the
systems dynamism. As we discuss in other sections,
it is not clear that it makes sense even in principle to
think about shareholder payments as freeing real
resources for investment. But in any case, there is no
sign that financial markets are directing funds toward
technology-intensive industries.
Over the Past 15 Years, Investment in

High-Tech Industries has Declined
There is no official definition of the tech sector, but
economists often focus on six industries that are
particularly oriented toward scientific research and
As the figure shows, R&D spending is very important for

these industries; for the past 20 years, it has consistently
exceeded investment spending as traditionally defined.
Using the older, narrow definition, these industries
account for no greater share of investment in the U.S.
today than they did 50 years ago; with R&D included,
their share of total investment has more than doubled.
But by both measures, the investment share of the tech
industries peaked around 2000. Over the past 15 years,
their share of total investment has steadily declined.
By itself, this doesnt tell us anything about why
investment has stalled in these industries since the
end of the tech boom. But it does at least suggest some
problems with a simple story in which financial markets
reallocate capital from old industries to newer ones.
Figure 8 breaks out the industries within the high-tech
group. Investment shown here is the broad measure,
which includes R&D.
2011
2013
2009
2007
2003
2005
1999
2001
1997
1995
1991
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1989
1987
1985
1981
1983
1977
1979
1975
1971
1973
1969
1967
1965
1961
1963
1959
1957
1955
1951
There is no sign that financial markets are

directing funds toward technology-intensive
industries. Over the past 15 years, the share of
investment from tech companies has steadily
declined. Tech industries have increasingly
become sources of funds for the financial
system. Payouts in dividends and buybacks
from tech industries have actually increased
more quickly than payouts from publicly
traded firms in general. Rather than getting
money into technology firms, finance is
increasingly taking money out of them.
Figure 7: Investment Share of HighTech Sector
1953
4. Dont shareholder payouts help to

reallocate capital to high-technology sectors
in particular?
technological innovation: drugs, computers and other

electronic goods, communications equipment, medical
equipment, scientific equipment, and software and
data processing. This definition is widely used in the
economics literature.18 Figure 7 shows the share of total
corporate investment accounted for by these industries,
using both the broad definition now used by the BEA,
which includes R&D spending, and the narrower
definition used by corporations in their financial
reporting, which includes only spending on plant,
equipment, and software.
Share of Total Investment
corporations has been near record lows. As for the

share of investment going to small firms, also shown in
Figure 6, it has steadily declined since the 1950s apart
from, again, a temporary spike during the tech-boom
period. Like the investment share of newer firms, the
investment share of small firms is now at its lowest level
ever.
Figure 8: Investment Share of Specific

High-Tech Industries
Share of Total Investment (%)
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
1951
1953
1955
1957
1959
1961
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1979
1981
1983
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1987
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1995
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1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
Pharmaceuticals
Computers
Communication Equipment
Science and Medical Equipment
Software and Data Processing
Other Electronics
As the figure shows, the decline in investment is

consistent across the high-tech sectors. While the exact
timing varies, in the 1980s and 1990s all of these sectors
saw a rising share of investment; in the past 15 years,
none have. So we can safely say that in the universe of
publicly traded corporations, the sectors we think would
benefit from reallocation of capital were indeed investing
heavily in the decades before 2000, but since then, they
have not been. The decline in investment spending in the
pharmaceutical industrywhich, again, includes R&D
spending on new drugsis especially striking.
While Tech Investment has Declined,

Investment in Fossil Fuel Industries
has Grown
Rather than the high-tech industries, the growth in
investment over the past 15 years has been concentrated
in fossil fuel extraction and related industries. This is
shown in Figure 9.
Figure 9: Investment Share of HighTech and Fossil-Fuel Sectors

45
While the growth of the U.S. fossil fuel industry in

recent years is familiar, the extent to which it dominates
business investment is not widely recognized. There
are obvious policy reasons to be concerned about the
growth of fossil fuel extraction, especially with respect to
climate change. For our purposes, however, the important
point is that it is highly unlikely that the growth of these
industries has depended on financing from shareholder
payouts.
Businesses in the technology sector face special
challenges in raising external finance: They are
disproportionately likely to be startups, the winnertake-all nature of competition in these markets creates
risks not found elsewhere, and a large portion of their
value comes from proprietary technology, access to
skilled labor, and other assets that are difficult or
impossible to use as collateral.19 5 These obstacles to
conventional financing explain why specialized venture
capital institutions have grown up specifically to finance
these firms. These obstacles also give some prima facie
plausibility to the idea that financing constraints limit
the growth of high-tech firms and could be relieved by
the flow of new funds into financial markets.20 These
special conditions do not apply in the oil and gas industry.
Investment there is much more likely to be limited by
expected profitability than by financing constraints.
35
The shift toward high shareholder payouts is even more

pronounced in the tech sector than elsewhere.
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1951
1953
1955
1957
1959
1961
1963
1965
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
Share of Total Investment (%)
40
The red lines show broad and narrow investment for

SICs 101-138, 291-299, and 492, which are oil and gas and
related industries. Either way you measure investment,
the increase over the past 15 years has dwarfed that in
any other industry. Note that oil and gas, unlike the hightech industries, is less R&D-intensive than the corporate
sector as a whole. Looking only at plant and equipment,
fossil fuels account for 40 percent of total corporate
investment; by this measure, in some recent years,
investment here has exceeded that of all manufacturing
together. With R&D included, fossil fuels still account for
about a third of corporate investment.
High-Tech (CAPX + R&D)
High-Tech (CAPX Only)
Oil & Gas (CAPX + R&D)
Oil & Gas (CAPX Only)
Figure 7 suggests that until the year 2000 or so,

financial markets were indeed supporting investment
in technology industries, or at least not obstructing it.
Accounts in the business press suggest that the shift
5 Financing constraints may restrict R&D much more than other
forms of investment. Reasons include the lack of collateral value for
R&D capital and firms need to protect proprietary information.
15
toward shareholder dominance and high payouts came

later to these industries than to others. For example,
Apple did not pay dividends or engage in significant
stock buybacks prior to 2012, preferring to retain funds
to finance growth internally rather than distributing
them, as shareholders would have preferred. Since then,
however, Apple has succumbed to pressure from activist
investors and begun making very large distributions of
cash to shareholders. In 2014, it paid out $56 billion in
dividends and repurchases, more than twice as much as
the next-highest corporation (see Table 2).21
To investigate this more systematically, Figure 10 shows
total cash flow from operations, borrowing, investment,
and shareholder payouts for corporations in the six
tech industries. (Investment includes R&D spending;
all are given as fractions of total sales.) Compared with
the flows for publicly traded corporations as a whole, its
clear that these have always been high-profit and highinvestment industries (at least when R&D is included
in investment.) Its not surprising that high levels of
these two flows would go together: Firms with higher
fixed costs will only be viable if they generate larger cash
flows to cover them.
Figure 10: Profits, Investment and

Payouts, High-Tech Corporations
High-Tech, Investment with R&D
35
30
% of Total Sales
25
20
15
industries, and reported profits averaged 12 percent of

salesmore than double the figures for publicly traded
corporations as a whole. Despite this, they have not
increased their investment spending.
So to an even greater extent than corporations in
general, the tech industries have increasingly been
sources of funds for the financial system, not users
of funds from it. Payouts in the tech industries have
also increased even more quickly than they have for
publicly traded corporations in general. Before 1985,
shareholder payouts in the tech industries averaged 3.5
percent of sales, close to the average for the corporate
sector as a whole. But over the past decade, tech
payouts have averaged a full 10 percent of annual sales,
compared with just over 5 percent for publicly traded
corporations as a whole.
Table 2: Largest Shareholder Payouts,

2014
Dividends Repurchases Total
Payouts
Apple
11,215
45,000
56,215
Exxon
11,568
13,183
24,751
IBM
4,265
13,679
17,944
Intel
4,409
10,792
15,201
Royal Dutch Shell
11,843
3,328
15,171
Johnson & Johnson 7,768
7,124
14,892
Novartis
6,810
6,915
13,725
Cisco
3,758
9,843
13,601
Merck
5,156
7,703
12,859
Chevron
7,928
4,412
12,340
Pfizer
6,691
5,000
11,691
AT&T
9,629
1,617
11,246
BP
5,852
4,589
10,441
Oracle
2,255
8,087
10,342
General Electric
8,949
1,218
10,167
10
0
1
11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63
-5
Investment
Cashflow
Payouts
Borrowing
Values in millions of dollars. Tech firms in bold.

What stands out in this picture is how the trends in the

corporate sector as a whole since the 1980s have been
mirrored even more strongly in the tech industries since
the 1990s. These industries have become dramatically
more profitable over the past 15 years; in 2014, cash flow
from operations averaged 30 percent of sales in these
In 2014, there were 15 corporations listed on U.S. stock

markets with total shareholder payouts of $10 billion
or more, as shown in the table below. Ten of the 15 were
tech companies by the definition used here. Software,
computers and other electronics, and pharmaceuticals
are often held up as industries in which the U.S.
economic system, with its tolerance of high inequality

and strong protections for property rights, is especially
successful at fostering innovation. So its striking that
the leading firms in these industries are not recipients
of funds from financial markets, but instead make the
largest payments to them.
Its hard to argue that Apple and Merck represent
mature businesses without significant growth prospects.
And note that, apart from GE (which is not listed in the
high-tech sector as defined here, but arguably should
be), all the other top-payout corporations are in the
fast-growing oil industry. This suggests the hypothesis
that what distinguishes high-payout corporations is not
the absence of investment opportunities, but rather the
presence of large monopoly rents.
5. Are we missing the benefits of shorttermism because money flowing out of large
public firms is simply flowing into startups
and small businesses not listed on the stock
market?
to public traded firms. The problem is that, by their

nature, publicly traded corporations are much more
transparent than other kinds of businesses. It is hard
to get good aggregate data on investment or financial
transactions for closely held corporations. But
employment data, which is a good proxy for funding
data, does not support the idea that the increase in
shareholder payouts has been accompanied by an
increase in funding for startups.
Using data from the Census Survey of Business
Dynamics, we looked at the share of employment
accounted for by firms with fewer than 250 employees,
firms in their first year, and firms less than five years old.
Unlike the Compustat data, this covers all businesses
in the U.S., regardless of how they are legally organized.
The results are shown in Figure 11.
Figure 11: Employment Share of

Smaller and Newer Businesses
60
Share of Employment (%, Census)
50
Though it is difficult to get data on all startup

financing, it is easy to get data on employment.
This data shows that there is no employment
boom in small firms. Economists in general
are worried about a decline in small business
formation in recent decades, and do not believe
a startup wave is currently happening.
40
30
20
Some critics of the Roosevelt Institutes Disgorge the

Cash paper, and of similar work by William Lazonick
and others, have argued that it is misleading to focus
on corporations listed on stock exchanges.22 When
shareholder payouts are used to fund new investment,
they suggest, it is most likely to be at startups and other
privately held businesses. Could stagnant investment in
publicly traded corporations just be the price of more
rapid growth for small businesses that are not (yet)
listed on stock exchanges?
It is true that startups, by definition, are not publicly
traded, nor are many other businesses that may have
the most difficulty getting access to finance. In an
ideal world, we would certainly not limit our analysis
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
10
Fewer than 250 Employees
First Year
< 5 Years Old
Source: US Census Business Employment Dynamics
There is no sign here of a startup boom happening

outside of the publicly traded corporate sector. Smaller
businesses account for a share of employment that,
while fairly stable, shows a clear downward trend. As
for the share of employment in new businesses, by both
measures it is about half what it was in the 1980s. No
doubt there are some startups that find it easier to get
funding today than in decades past, but it is clear that, in
the aggregate, the success of financial markets in getting
money out of established businesses has not been
17
matched by any similar success at getting money into

smaller, newer ones.
Economists have noted the declining role of
entrepreneurialism in the U.S. economy with
concern. In the words of one recent study,
evidence accumulating from multiple datasets and
methodologies suggests that the rate of business
startups and the pace of employment dynamism in
the U.S. economy has fallen over recent decades and
that this downward trend accelerated after 2000.23
This slowdown in new business formation may or
may not be related to the increasing power and shortterm orientation of financial markets that we focus
on here. But at the very least, these findings show that
shareholder dominance of public corporations has not
led to the funding and growth of new businesses.
6. If investors get more income from shares,

doesnt that mean they will invest more in new
companies?
The vast majority of investment by private
shareholders does not directly contribute any
funding to the companies in which they invest,
but instead simply bids up the prices of existing
shares. Total shareholder payouts in 2014 were
more than $1.2 trillion, but money moving from
investors to businesses in the form of IPOs and
venture capital is less than $200 billion. This
implies that in the very best case, for every
dollar invested by finance in the productive
economy, six dollars are taken out.
A common response to concerns about high payouts and
the short-term orientation of financial markets is that
money paid out to shareholders will just be reinvested
elsewhere.
The Vast Majority of Money

Invested by Shareholders is Used to
Purchase Existing Assets
But while private equity funds do replace existing
management at corporations in which they buy
shares, this form of active investment is very much
the minority. The vast majority of investment by
private shareholders does not directly contribute any

funding to the companies in which they invest. Rather,
it involves the purchase of existing assets from other
owners of financial assets.
Suppose a wealthy investor receives $1 million from
increased dividends on shares that he owns. Now
ask: What does he do with that money? His liquidity
has increased, as has his net wealth (since the higher
dividends are unlikely to reduce the market value of the
shares and may well increase them). The natural use of
this additional liquidity and wealth is to purchase more
shares. (If the shares are owned indirectly, through
a mutual fund or similar entity, this reinvestment
happens automatically.) But purchasing additional
shares does not provide any funding for the companies
invested in; it simply bids up the prices of existing
shares and increases the liquidity of the sellers. Those
sellers in turn may purchase more shares or other
financial assets, bidding up their prices and passing the
liquidity to their sellers, and so on.
This process does not continue indefinitely; at each
stage investors may respond to their increased wealth
by increasing their cash holdings or their consumption,
and each transaction involves some payments to the
financial industry. Eventually, the full payout will leak
out through these three channels and share prices
will stop rising. In the end, the full $1 million will be
absorbed by the higher consumption and cash holdings
induced by the higher share prices, and by the financial
sector incomes generated by the transactions.
Not every share purchase involves an existing share, but
the vast majority do. In 2014, there were $90 billion of
new shares issued through IPOs on American markets
an exceptionally high number. By comparison, daily
transactions on the main U.S. stock markets average
around $300 billion.24 6 This implies that only one
trade in a thousand on an American stock exchange
involves the purchase of a newly issued share. And
that is not counting the many ways other than outright
share purchases (closed-end mutual funds, derivative
contracts, etc.) that income from shareholder payouts
can be reinvested in the stock market, none of which
provide any new funding for businesses.
External financing for businesses is much more likely to
6 There are approximately 260 trading days in a year, giving an
annual volume of $78 trillion.
take the form of debt than new shares. But here, again,
we cant assume that there is any direct link between
shareholder payouts and funding for other firms.
Corporate bonds are issued by the same established
corporations that are making the payouts.
Meanwhile, smaller and younger firms, both listed
and unlisted, are dependent on bank loans for startup
capital. But modern banks lending is in no way
dependent on prior saving. Their funding costs are
closely tied to the short-term interest rate set by the
Federal Reserve, while their willingness to lend depends
on the expected riskiness of the loan. Thus there is no
way for increased payouts to increase the availability of
bank loans.
New bonds, on the other hand, do need to be purchased
by someone, and it is possible that the market liquidity
created by high payouts has helped hold down longerterm interest rates. But many other factorsespecially
the beliefs of market participants about the future
path of interest ratesalso affect these rates, so it is
hard to see any direct link between payouts by some
corporations and increased bond financing for others.
Nor do new bonds necessarily finance investment. As
we showed in Disgorge the Cash, since the mid-1980s
corporate borrowing has been more tightly correlated
with shareholder payouts than with investment. So if
payouts do spill over into the bond market, to a large
extent they are simply financing themselves.
It is Mathematically Impossible for

the Additional Funds that Financial
Markets Direct to New Firms to Offset
What those Markets Drain from
Established Ones
Defenders of the current structure of American
financial markets suggest that it is wrong to accuse the
markets as a whole of short-termism, since for every
established company being pressured to increase
payouts, there is a startup getting funded despite any
profits it might make being years away. We certainly
dont want to deny that financial markets do often fund
startups and other small, financially constrained firms,
and these firms do sometimes undertake socially useful
investment that established corporations, for whatever
reason, do not. Shareholder payouts can support this
kind of funding both directly, as shareowners put money
into venture capital funds, IPOs, etc.; and indirectly, as

higher share prices make it easier to raise funds through
new offerings. But this optimistic view is not sustainable
once we look at the magnitudes of cash flow involved. It
is mathematically impossible for the additional funds
that financial markets direct to new firms to offset what
those markets drain from established ones.
As noted above, IPOs in 2014 raised a record $90 billion
for newly listed firms. (Over the past 10 years, IPOs
raised an average of $45 billion annually.) Secondary
offerings by listed firms totaled $180 billion, but some
large fraction of those offerings involved executives
exercising their stock options rather than corporations
raising new funding.
Prior to an IPO, venture capital funds are the most
important non-bank source of external funding for new
companies. In 2014, VC funds invested approximately
$50 billion, but only $30 billion of this represented new
commitments by investors; the remaining $20 billion
came from the funds own retained profits.25 (And there
is some double-counting between VC commitments
and IPOs, since one of the main functions of IPOs today
is to cash out earlier investors.) Net commitments to
private equity funds come to perhaps another $200
billion, but very little of this represents funding for
the businesses in which they invest private equity
specializes, rather, in buying control of corporations
from existing shareholders.26 All told, the flow of money
from investors to businesses through these channels
could not have come to more than $200 billion in 2014,
and was probably less than $100 billion.
Meanwhile, total shareholder payouts in 2014 were over
$1.2 trillion. So, at best, less than one dollar in 10 flowing
out of publicly traded corporations went to fund a
startup. Even this assumes that shareholder payouts are
the only source of funds for IPOs and venture capital,
but of course people also invest in these out of labor
income (since most very high incomes in the U.S. take
the form of salaries) and other sources. That means that
the real fraction of payouts flowing to startups must be
much smaller.
The financial pipelines flowing into new businesses are
simply too constricted to accommodate the immense
gusher of cash pouring out of established firms. Apple
alone paid out $56 billion to shareholders last year,
19
or nearly twice total commitments to VC funds.

(Intel, Oracle, IBM, Cisco and AT&T together paid out
another $70 billion.) It is hard to imagine that venture
capitalists are able to produce more value by investing
$1 billion than an established company could produce
by investing $10 billion.
7. Payouts must go somewhere, so if they are

not invested, where do they go?
Money from shareholder payouts does not
need to be reinvested. It may also fund
higher consumption by shareholders. The
short-termism of financial markets may be
contributing to the consumption boom among
Americas rich.
Discussions of shareholder payouts often take for

granted that shareholders automatically reinvest the
income they receive from dividends and repurchases. As
discussed above, reinvestment by shareholders need
not provide any new funds to businesses, and in the vast
majority of cases it does not. But there is no guarantee
that paid-out funds will be reinvested even in the sense
of being used to purchase securities issued by some
nonfinancial business.
Shareholders can also use payouts to increase their
own liquidity by increasing their holdings of cash or
cash equivalents, or by paying down debt. (Even very
high-income households typically have significant
debt.) Payouts can also finance increased consumption.
We cannot show a direct link between higher payouts
and higher elite consumption, but to the extent that
there has been a consumption boom over the past two
decades, it has been concentrated at the highest income
levels.27 Something has been boosting consumption
among the wealthiest households, and it is plausible
that shareholder payouts are one important factor.
One puzzling feature of the recent macroeconomic
history of the U.S. is that consumption demand
has remained strong even though inequality has
sharply increased. One of the strongest empirical
regularities in modern economies is that high-income
households spend a smaller fraction of their income
on consumption than do low-income households.28 It
follows that a redistribution of income from lowerto higher-income households should reduce total
consumption spending.
Why have we not seen such a reduction? One popular
explanation is that middle-class and working-class
households have used debt to offset stagnant incomes.
If this were true, we should find that consumption
inequality has increased by less than income inequality.
But we do not. Rather, studies consistently find that
consumption inequality has increased in line with
income inequality. One of the most thorough recent
studies, by Mark Arguilar and Mark Bils, concludes
that consumption inequality increased by 30 percent
between 1980 and 2007, approximately the same as
the change in income inequality.29 For households
lower on the income distribution, whose incomes were
essentially flat over this period, consumption was also
flat; in other words, there is no sign that household
debt was used to maintain rising living standards.
This should not be surprising, since households at the
bottom of the income distribution do not have much
access to credit; according to the Survey of Consumer
Finance, only half of all households in the bottom 20
percent report holding debt of any kind.
Over the full post-1980 period, the entire rise in
household debt can be explained by households facing
lower inflation and higher interest rates; there is no
reason to think that debt growth has contributed to
consumption demand at all.30 Meanwhile, households
at the top of the distribution increased consumption
spending right along with incomea puzzling exception
to the normal pattern that the share of each additional
dollar consumed falls as income rises. So if there has
been excess consumption growth over the past 30
years, it seems to have been among the rich, not the
middle class and poor. Looking at the 19892012 period,
Steven Fazzari and Barry Cynamon find, even more
dramatically, that the consumption-to-income ratio
for the bottom 95 percent of households has actually
declined slightly, from around 91 percent to 89 percent.
Over the same period, the share of income consumed
by the top 5 percent has risen from just over 80 percent
to 88 percent.31 Again, this suggests that if we want
to explain how changes in the financial system have
supported consumption growth, we should be focusing
on the top of the income distribution, not the bottom.
High shareholder payouts are not the only factor
boosting consumption at the top. Status competition

and the conspicuous consumption associated with it are
probably important, along with opting out from public
institutions (via private schools, private security, etc.)
and the wealth effect from rising asset prices. But it is
likely that higher shareholder payouts have also had an
effect. In any case, the fact that consumption spending
has risen most rapidly among the same households
that own most corporate shares means by definition
that these households have made less of their income
available to fund new investment.
8. Whether it is reinvested or consumed, the

money from shareholder payouts has to go
somewhere. So wont it always boost demand
one way or another?
Its natural to think that the money from
shareholder payouts has to go somewhere
that in the worst case, higher consumption by
shareholders still at least boosts demand. But
the fundamental Keynesian insight is that total
output is not fixed, but depends on the spending
decisions of households and businesses. When
corporations reduce investment, that does not
simply reallocate resources, but leads to a lower
overall level of income and production.
One common objection to the argument that high

payouts discourage investment is that the money has
to go somewhere. One way or another, the money
paid out by corporations will end up getting spent
hopefully on new investment elsewhere, but if not, then
on consumption or on the operations of the financial
sector. From an individual perspective, of course, this
is true; if we follow an individual dollar of payouts, it
does not disappear from the economy. And as noted
above, it is quite likely that high payouts have boosted
consumption by the rich households in which share
ownership is concentrated.
But the fundamental Keynesian insight is that this is
not true at the level of the economy as a whole. In the
aggregate, income depends on spending just as much
as spending depends on income. Corporate decisions
about payouts and investment do not simply reallocate
a fixed total income, but instead help to determine what
total income will be. This is not a complicated idea, but
it can be hard to grasp, since most of us are more used to

the perspective of an individual household or business.
So it is worth going through the logic in detail.
If we want to talk about the effect of a change in
shareholder payouts at the aggregate level, we cannot
only ask what happens to the shareholders who receive
the payouts. As a matter of accounting, payouts cannot
be changed in isolation. Some other use or source of
funds has to change as well. So in addition to the effects
of the payouts themselves, we also have to look at the
effects of whatever other flows are changing. We will
consider two cases: one in which a corporation funds
higher payouts with new borrowing, and a second in
which a corporation funds higher payouts by reducing
investment spending.
In the first case, Firm A pays a special dividend of $1
million, financed by issuing $1 million in new bonds.
The shareholders use the dividend payment to purchase
the bonds. The net effect is that a $1 million liability has
been added to the firms balance sheet and shareholders
have gained a $1 million asset. There is no leftover
money that has to go anywhere.
In this scenario, the composition of shareholder balance
sheets has changed: They have a greater proportion
of safe, liquid assets, and probably a higher net worth.
The additional debt on the balance sheet of the firm
may depress its share price, but on the shareholder
side, the higher proportion of safe assets will lead to
increased demand for risky assets, bidding up share
prices. (Of course, the price-depressing effect will be
specific to firm A, while the price-boosting effect will
be spread over shares in general. But again, at the
aggregate level, this does not matter.) The firm still
owes all its residual cash flow to the shareholders, and
now owes them payments on the bonds as well. In
effect, the shareholders have converted some of their
residual claim on the firm to a fixed claim, shifting risk
to creditors and other claimants.
Firm A is left with greater bankruptcy risk and a less
liquid balance sheet; this will reduce both its desire to
undertake fixed investment and its capacity to finance
it. Meanwhile, the effect of the increased supply of
bonds will be to reduce bond prices (i.e. raise interest
rates) and raise share prices. This may make investment
financing for other firms either easier or more difficult
to obtain, depending on what kind of liability the firms
21
prefer to issue.7 But there will be no net increase in

the funds available for investment. The idea that the
money has to go somewhere is based only on the new
funds coming into financial markets from payouts, and
ignores the money going out from new borrowing.
In short: If higher payouts are financed by balance sheet
changes at the paying firms, then they involve offsetting
sources and uses of funds from financial markets, and
there is no leftover money that has to go anywhere.
The increased illiquidity for the payout-making firms
will depress their investment, and while it is possible
that the payout-induced changes in the prices of
different financial assets will ease the financing of
investment elsewhere, there is no reason to expect this
as a general rule.
When a Business Reduces Investment

Spending, that Means Lower Sales
and Profits at Other Businesses and
Lower Output in the Economy as a
Whole
Second, let us consider the case of a corporation that
funds higher payouts by reducing investment spending.
We will call it firm B. As discussed above, increased
payments to shareholders will result in higher stock
prices, plus some mix of new inflows into other
businesses, higher consumption spending and more
liquid balance sheets for wealthy households, and higher
incomes in the financial sector via the (individually
small, but numerous) transaction costs incurred along
the chain of security trades initiated by the payouts.
The reduced investment spending, on the other hand,
will mean lower fixed assets for firm B, and presumably
lower future production and profits. Butand this is
the key point that is often overlookedthis also means
lower sales and profits for the businesses that produce
investment goods. These businesses will in turn reduce
their own production and investment.
This is the critical Keynesian insightarguably the
biggest macroeconomic idea of the 20th century:
In a demand-constrained economy, a reduction in
7 This would happen in a Modigliani-Miller world, but in such a
world there would be no reason for firms to make payments to
shareholders, let alone for the real resources spent on increasing
them. For the classic statement of this dividend puzzle see
Black, Fisher. 1976. The Dividend Puzzle. The Journal of Portfolio
Management, 2(2), 5-8.
investment at one firm will tend to reduce investment at

other firms, not increase it.
Here is another example: Let us suppose that businesses
normally invest half their profits and pay the other half
out to shareholders. Let us also suppose, for the sake
of simplicity, that labor and other production costs are
fixed. Now imagine that firm B decides to shift $100
from investment to payouts. That means a $100 increase
in current income for its shareholders, but it also means
a reduction of $100 in sales for the firm that supplies it
with capital goods. Let us call this supplying firm, firm B.
With costs fixed, a reduction of $100 in sales means a
reduction of $100 in profits. Since businesses in our
hypothetical economy invest half their profits and pay
out half to shareholders, firm B reduces payouts to its
shareholders by $50 and reduces investment by $50.
This in turn means that Bs capital goods supplier, which
we will call firm C, faces a $50 reduction in sales and
profits. So C also reduces investment and payouts by
$25 each. This means that, in this case, firm As decision
to increase payouts does not increase total payouts at
all. Instead, it reduces the economys total profits, total
investment, and total output by $100 while leaving
total payouts unchanged. The result of increasing
shareholder payouts in this case is that shareholders
end up with an equally large slice of a smaller pie.
Obviously, this is a very simple example; in a more
realistic story, most of the income reduction would
fall on wages rather than profits, and some would fall
on the rest of the world. And the total reduction in
income would depend on the propensities to consume
out of labor and profit income. But unless every dollar
of additional payouts is consumed, basic Keynesian
logic tells us that a shift from investment to payouts
must result in a fall in total output and income. This is
because every dollar of payouts instead of investment
is a dollar less of sales for the businesses producing
investment goods. So if we are interested in what is
happening at the level of the economy as a whole, we
cannot ask how the shareholders are spending their
increased incomes without also asking what spending is
being cut in response to reduced incomes elsewhere.
The idea that the money must go somewhere
makes sense only on an individual- or micro-level
analysis, which implicitly treats the economys total
output as fixed. In general, there is no mechanism by
which reduced investment by one company will lead

to higher investment elsewhere. On the contrary,
by reducing demand, a decision by one company to
reduce investment will probably lead to further falls in
investment elsewhere
A simpler way to see this is to imagine that you are a
business owner. Now ask yourself: Would the depths
of the Great Depression, in which business investment
had fallen by over 90 percent from its 1929 high, be a
particularly good time for your business to expand?
The view that established firms must cut their
investment spending if new firms are to increase theirs
is reminiscent of the anti-Keynesian Treasury view
of the 1930s, which claimed that increased spending on
public works would simply crowd out an equal volume
of private investment.32
9. Isnt following market signals by focusing

on the share price the best way to encourage
innovation and growth in the long run?
Theres no reason to think that organizing
production on the basis of shareholder value
produces the best outcomes in terms of
innovation or growth. Some of the worlds
most successful economies, such as Germany,
have corporate governance systems that give
shareholders much less power than in the U.S.
It is sometimes argued that, even if other stakeholders
legally and morally have as good a claim on the surplus
generated by a corporation as the shareholders do, it
still makes sense to make shareholder value the sole
objective pursued by management. The reasoning is
that having a single, unambiguous, easily monitored
objective makes it easier to hold managers accountable,
and over the long run, businesses will find that the best
way to boost the value of their shares is to innovate and
invest wisely. In this view, it does not matter so much
what happens to money paid out to shareholders; the
important thing is that pressure to deliver those payouts
will create the best incentives for managers.
By its nature, this is a hard claim to prove or disprove.
Economic growth is subject to many influences, and it
is hard to isolate the effects of shareholder power for
good or for ill. But cross-country evidence suggests that,

at least, there is not a strong link between high share
prices and economic success more broadly.
We can see this clearly if we look at Europe. It is well
known that Germany is the continents economic
superpower, racking up huge trade surpluses on the
strength of its dominance in advanced manufacturing.
German firms are leaders in many technologyintensive industries, and Germany, unlike most
European countries, has enjoyed solid growth and
low unemployment in recent years. Yet surprisingly,
this success is not reflected in the market wealth of
German households. In a recent survey by the European
Central Bank, the median German household reported
net worth of just 50,000, compared with 100,000
in Greece, 110,000 in France, and 180,000 in Spain.
The pattern is essentially the same if you look at assets
rather than net worth: Median household assets are
lower in Germany than almost anywhere else in Europe,
including the crisis countries of the Mediterranean. The
low wealth of most German households is all the more
surprising given that the country has among the most
equal distributions of income in Europe.33
One explanation for this is the low rate of
homeownership in Germany. But another important
piece of the puzzle is the low stock market valuation
of German corporations. The per capita value of the
capital stock appears to be more than twice as large in
Germany as in Spain. Yet the average financial wealth of
a household in Germany is only 25 percent higher than
that of a household in Spain. Evidently a dollar of capital
in a German firm is worth much less to its ultimate
owners than a dollar of capital in a Spanish (or French,
or Italian, etc.) firm. This suggests that economic
success does not translate reliably into success at
creating shareholder valueor vice versa.
Figure 12 compares the ratio of stock-market
capitalization to GDP for a number of European
countries. As the figure shows, during the 2000s
shareholder value was lower in Germany, relative
to the size of the economy, than in almost any other
European country. Again, it is clear that the strategies
followed by German corporations were successful
at developing highly competitive industries, but
they were not successful at generating wealth for
shareholders. In 2007, just before the financial crisis,
23
the market capitalization of German corporations

was 52 percent of GDP, lower than any other major
European country except Italy and the fifth lowest of
the 20 European countries for which data is available.
Market capitalization was substantially higher relative
to GDP in Spain, Ireland, and Greece, and much higher
in Icelandcountries that would soon fall into deep
crises. The value of corporate shares was also much
higher, relative to GDP, in France and the UK, and has
continued to be since the crisisyet the real economic
performance of these countries has been mediocre at
best compared with Germanys.
Figure 13: Tobins Q

160%
140%
120%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010
Figure 12: Stock Market Capitalization
USA
Japan
Germany
1.4
France
UK
Canada
Source: Thomas Piketty, Capital in the 21st Century online

appendices
1.2
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
Italy
Portugal
Germany
Ireland
Greece
Sweden
Belgium
France
Spain
Netherlands
Ireland
UK
Share of GDP
Source: Eurostat, Roosevelt Institute analysis
Figure 13, based on data from Thomas Piketty shows a

similar picture.34 Here we are looking at Tobins qthe
ratio of the market value of corporate shares to the
replacement value of corporations assets less their
debt. In theory, this is a measure of how successfully
firms are at choosing investment levels to maximize
shareholder value. If q is greater than 1, then each
dollar of net assets is generating more than a dollar
of shareholder value, implying that firms should be
investing more. If q is less than 1, each dollar of assets
is generating less than a dollar of value of value for
shareholders, implying that the firm isfrom the
perspective of shareholdersinvesting too much. (In
practice, there are a number of complications. For
example, shareholder valuemaximizing managers
should strictly speaking set marginal q to 1, not average
q. But it remains true that, the higher is q, the more
successful the firm is in turning real resources into
wealth for shareholders.)
As the figure shows, by this measure, too, German

corporations are laggards when it comes to the creation
of shareholder value. Over the past 40 years, average q
in Germany is barely half that in the other six countries
for which Piketty has data. While q in the Englishspeaking countries is close to the shareholder-optimal
value of 1, in Germany it is closer to 0.5. In other words,
adding one dollars worth of buildings, machines,
patents, etc. to the capital stock of the typical German
corporation adds only 50 cents to the wealth of its
shareholders. From the point of view of the German
shareholder, it would have been better to pay that dollar
out in dividends.
Why are shares in German corporations worth so
little, despite their evident success on measures like
profitability or sales growth? Piketty and Gabriel
Zucman have a suggestion:
The higher Tobins Q in Anglo-Saxon countries might
be related to the fact that shareholders have more
control over corporations than in Germany, France, and
Japan. This would be consistent with [empirical work]
that finds that firms with stronger shareholders rights
have higher Tobins Q. Relatedly, the control rights
valuation story may explain part of the rising trend in
Tobins Q in rich countries. [T]he control right or
stakeholder view of the firm can in principle explain
why the market value of corporations is particularly low
in Germany (where worker representatives have voting
rights in corporate boards without any equity stake in
the company). According to this stakeholder view of the
firm, the market value of corporations can be interpreted
as the value for the owner, while the book value can be
interpreted as the value for all stakeholders.35
German households, by this reading, are not really

poorer than households in Spain or Greece (as common
sense would confirm). It is just that they exercise more
of their claims on the business sector as workers, rather
than as shareholders.
At the least, the German example shows that delivering
wealth for shareholders is not the only route to
developing productive, internationally competitive
corporations. But we could go further. Arguably, the
feature of German corporations that makes them less
valuable to shareholders is precisely what has made
them more successful at developing new products
and producing them competitively. The limits to
shareholder control empower management to pursue
long-term strategies without worrying about the need
to deliver positive financial results every quarter or
year. And the structures that allow workers to share in
the governance of the corporation and the surplus it
generates encourage worker loyalty and investment in
industry- and firm-specific skills, without which high
valueadded production is impossible.
It is no coincidence that Europes dominant economy
has the least market wealth. The truth is, success in
the global economy has depended for a long time on
limiting dependence on asset markets. Germany, as with
late industrializers like Japan, Korea, and now China,
has succeeded largely by ensuring that investment is not
guided by market signals, but through active planning
by banks and/or the state. Theres nothing new in the
fact that greater real wealth in the sense of productive
capacity goes hand in hand with less wealth in the sense
of claims on the social product capitalized into assets.
10. If managers and shareholders dont see any

worthwhile investment projects, why should
we second-guess them?
There are good reasons for society to
encourage a greater level of investment than
a business might choose on its own. When
the economy is operating below potential,
productive resources are going unused, so there
is no social opportunity cost to investment even
if private returns are low. More generally, society
favors a higher level of investment because we
place a higher value on the distant future when
thinking collectively than we do as individuals.
In general, we trust financial markets and business

leaders to decide which investment projects are
worthwhile and which are not. It is quite possible to
look at the long-run investment picture, agree that
financial market pressure is resulting in lower business
investment, but not see any problem with that. If
managers and shareholders agree that relatively few
investment projects have returns that exceed the
relevant cost of capital, then maybe the best outcome is
that relatively few projects go forward.
But there are several reasons to think that the socially
optimal level of business investment is substantially
higher than the level preferred by financial markets.
First, as long as the economy is operating below
potential output, there is no real opportunity cost to
higher investment. Second, investment spending often
has positive externalitiesmeaning its social return
is higher than its private return. Finally, most broadly,
there is good reason to think that society as a whole
places too little weight on future outcomes compared to
present onesthat is, that we systematically apply too
high a discount rate. So excess investment by prestigeor growth-chasing managers may offset a pervasive bias
in the opposite direction.
When the Economy is Below Potential,

there are No Real Opportunity Costs
to Higher Investment.
As discussed in the response to Question 2, it is clear
that the U.S. economy is still operating far below full
capacity. The employment-to-population ratio stands
at 59 percent, compared with 63 percent before the
recession, and shows no sign of returning to its former
level. Real GDP remains 16 percent below the level
predicted by the pre-recession trenda gap with no
precedent in the postwar era.
Under conditions of depressed demand, excess
investment is not just non-wasteful; it is positively
desirable, since it reduces unemployment and creates
demand for other businesses. This logic is often applied
to government spending, but it applies just as much to
private spending. In John Maynard Keynes famous
example, in a deep depression it would even be worth
burying dollar bills in unused mine shafts, so that
people could be employed digging them up. But we need
not go to that extreme. Surveys of executives suggest
that the hurdle rate for new investment is usually a
25
10% return or higher a minimum required return

that is surprisingly insensitive to changes in interest
rates.36 There must be an enormous number of potential
investment projects that, while offering returns short of
these high levels, still will yield some positive return.
When a firms resources are viewed as its own property,
the effective cost of internal finance will be lower than
when its resources are viewed as the property of the
shareholders. Reducing the pressure on managers to
deliver short-term results could allow projects with
lower, but still positive, returns to go forward.
Of course, these arguments only apply as long as the
economy continues to be far from supply constraints.
However, there is a broader issue even if the
economy returns to something like full employment.
Conventional macroeconomic policy operates through
changing the availability of credit, but this only works
to manage demand if there are sufficient units in
the economy whose spending on goods and services
depends on their ability to finance it. When shareholder
pressure imposes a hard floor on the required return
for new investment projects, changes in the availability
of credit are less likely to affect the level of investment.
This means that the increase in shareholder power
threatens the effectiveness of monetary policy whether
it is tightening or loosening. It also means that, to
be effective, monetary policy must increase target
spending by households rather than by businesses. As
we saw in the housing boom, that is a very dangerous
method of stabilizing aggregate demand.
Business Investment has Substantial

Positive Externalities.
Beyond this, investment hasmany positiveexternalities.
When corporations invest more, it has spillovers for
the development of technology, the dissemination of
new skills, and so on. In the most innovative parts of the
economy, there are many firms that prioritize growth
and carry out a high level of investment that may turn
out to be unprofitable for the owners of that particular
firm, but which is critical for creating new markets, a
critical mass of skilled workers, new products, etc. So
from a social standpoint, we almost certainly would
prefer a higher level of investment than would be
optimal for the individual business.
As a Society, We Place a Greater

Value on Future Outcomes than is
Reflected in Market Rates of Return
Economists have longstanding concerns that the
discount rate that emerges from private choices in
financial markets places too low a value on future
goods relative to present goods. This is why economic
policy often seeks to encourage saving and subsidize
investment. But more recently, the issue of social
discount rates has been crystallized in discussions
of climate change policy. Addressing climate change
requires incurring costs today for benefits that may
be decades or even centuries in the future. This will
only be justifiable if we place a relatively high value
on future outcomes compared to to present ones. But
as is widely recognized, the discount rates implied by
market interest rates or equity returns imply a much
lower value on future outcomes. So if we agree that
addressing climate change is worthwhile, we must find
reasons why the appropriate social discount rate is
lower than the discount rate implied by market asset
prices and returns.37 It is not difficult to do so: Most
obviously, private discount rates must reflect the fact
that individuals are mortal, while societybarring
asteroid impacts and similarly remote possibilities
lives forever. A long list of other reasonsfrom human
psychology to imperfections in financial marketscould
be added.
For present purposes, the important point is simply
that the debates over the economics of climate change
prevention have made it clear that the appropriate
discount rate for public policy questions is considerably
lower than the rate reflected in returns on financial
assets. And once this principle is accepted, it applies
to areas beyond climate change as well. Even if fixed
investment does not usually involve time scales as long
as climate change mitigation, it still involves incurring
present costs to produce benefits many years in the
future. The same factors that make market rates of
return a poor guide to climate policy must make them
poor guides to the true returns on private investment.
In this sense, the supposed principalagent problems
that lead autonomous managers to overinvest may
simply be offsetting other problems in financial markets
that tend to undervalue long-term investment.8
8 For a survey of reasons why financial markets might produce
excessively high discount rates, see Kocherlakota, N. R. 1996. The
equity premium: Its still a puzzle. Journal of Economic Literature.
11. Since shareholders own the business,

arent they entitled to higher payouts if thats
what they want?
Despite popular perceptions, American law has
never regarded shareholders as owners of
the corporation, and this view has only recently
become widespread in the business world. Nor
is there any good moral or economic reason to
think that business decisions should be made
solely in the interests of shareholders.
Popular discussions of corporate governance often take

it for granted that shareholders own the corporation
in the same way they own their personal property,
and the only duty of managers is to serve the interests
of shareholders. But this is a myth. In American law,
shareholders have never been considered owners of
the corporation. Nor is there any basis for this view
historically.
The claim that shareholders own the firm is often
repeated but incorrect. Cornell law professor Lynn
Stout bluntly summarizes the position of American
courts on the rights of shareholders: From a legal
perspective, shareholders do not and cannot own
corporations. Corporations are independent legal
entities that own themselves. Shareholders own
stock, [which] is simply a contract between the
shareholder and the corporation, a contract that gives
the shareholder very limited rights under limited
circumstances. Nor is there any legal basis for the
idea that shareholders are residual claimants on
the corporation, except in the specific context of the
disposal of assets in a bankruptcy proceeding.38
Corporations are a nexus of contracts and obligations,
and shareholders are just one of many agents who have
claims on a firm. Shareholders own stock but do not
have traditional ownership rights to a firm because they
cannot freely access the companys place of business,
exclude others, or decide what happens on a day-to-day
basis.39 Law professor Stephen Bainbridge uses the
case of W. Clay Jackson Enterprises, Inc. v. Greyhound
Leasing and Financial Corp to illustrate the fact that
shareholders are not owners. In this case, it was stated,
even a sole shareholder has no independent right
which is violated by trespass upon or conversion of the

corporations property.40 In other words, shareholders
do not have the right of use or possession of corporate
property.
A number of legal experts believe the law states clearly
that shareholders are not owners. Loizos Heracleous
and Luh Luh Lan conducted a review of the legal theory
and precedent literature spanning a hundred years and
conclude that the law provides a surprisingly clear
answer:Shareholders do not own the corporation,
which is an autonomous legal person.41Virgile
Chassagnon and Xavier Hollandts conduct their
own review of the corporate ownership debate and
conclude similarly that shareholders are not owners of
a corporation. They state that a firm is an independent
entity that cannot be owned by any group, including
shareholders.42
In reality, corporations are autonomous legal persons,
not just vehicles for the management of shareholders
wealth. Corporations enter into contracts, own
property, engage in lawsuits, and incur debts, all
of which are their own, not the shareholders.
Shareholders have limited legal rights to vote on the
board and certain other matters, on terms set by the
board itself, and to receive a dividend, when and if the
management and board choose to pay one.
And why should we expect anything else? Many other
claimantsworkers, suppliers, customers, communities
in which the corporation operates, governments to
which it pays taxeshave an interest in the survival
and growth of the firm, and various legal rights over it.
Nothing distinguishes shareholders in this regard. The
idea that shareholders own the firm, or are residual
claimants, assumes that everyone else involved in
the production process has made a fixed one-time
contribution, for which they have received a fixed
payment. On this assumption, only shareholders have
an interest in the success of the firm. But of course,
many other stakeholders make an ongoing commitment
to the firm, from workers who acquire specific skills and
refrain from stealing and malingering to communities
that grow up around particular employers. In an
economic sense, all these stakeholders have contributed
capital to the firm and are as entitled as shareholders
to ownership of it. The idea that everyone except
shareholders is engaged in one-off, arms-length
transactions with the corporation with no regard for
27
whether it succeeds or fails does not survive a moments

thought about how real businesses operate.
12. Doesnt the focus on share prices and high

payouts benefit ordinary people, who also
own shares?
Most Americans own little or no stock ownership
and do not benefit from higher share prices
or larger payouts. The bottom 50 percent of
households own just 9 percent of shares. Stock
ownership is significantly concentrated, with just
4 percent of households owning a majority of
all shares. Rather than having a democratizing
effect, the concentration of income from capital
is one of the drivers of inequality. solely in the
interests of shareholders.
It is widely believed that stock ownership in the U.S.
is no longer limited to the rich. At various times,
writers like Peter Drucker, Jeremy Rifkin, and Robin
Blackburn have suggested that stock ownership by
working people, especially through pension funds, has
effectively socialized corporate America.43 If this were
true, we might still object to shareholder payouts on
macroeconomic or efficiency grounds. But at least they
would not be redistributing income upward or directly
lowering living standards for ordinary Americans. In
reality, however, claims about the democratization
of stock ownership have been exaggerated. Most
Americans own little or no stock and get no benefit from
higher dividends and share repurchases.
According to the most recent Financial Account
published by the Federal Reserve, about 15 percent of
U.S. corporate equities are owned by foreigners. Another
20 percent is owned by pension funds and insurance
companies. The remaining two-thirds is owned by
households, either directly or through mutual funds
and the like.44 Household stock ownership remains
highly concentrated. The majority of shares are owned
by the richest 4 percent of households, with incomes of
$250,000 or more, according to NYU economist Edward
Wolff.45 Another 25 percent is owned by the 15 percent
of households with incomes between $100,000 and
$250,000. Meanwhile, the 50 percent of households
with incomes under $50,000 own just 9 percent of
shares. Grouping by wealth rather than income, share
ownership is even more concentrated. The wealthiest 5

percent of households own more than two-thirds of all
shares, and the bottom 60 percent own just 2.5 percent.
(All these numbers include indirect ownership through
mutual funds and defined-contribution retirement
plans.)
The significant share of stocks owned by defined-benefit
pension funds and life insurance companies means that
many working-class households do still see some benefit
from higher payouts. But overall, stock ownership is far
from democratic. It remains highly concentrated among
the very rich.
Conclusion
A broad social change inevitably raises many questions,
not all of which can be answered precisely. Making sense
of the shift toward shorter-term horizons in corporate
management and financial markets, and of the broader
legacy of the shareholder revolution, is an ongoing
challenge. But there is no question that this shift is real
and important.
Despite optimistic efforts to spin the aggregate
statistics, or to elevate anecdotes about individual
companies, there is no question that the reluctance of
business to invest is a drag on both current demand
and long-term growth. There is also no question that
shareholders power within the corporation has greatly
increased compared with a generation ago, and no
question that one of the main uses of that power has
been a dramatic increase in the share of corporate
surplus paid out to shareholders. It is not obvious
that these two phenomena are linked, but we believe
there is clear and compelling evidence that they are.
From a macroeconomic standpoint, perhaps the most
important consequence of the shareholder revolution
has been to break the link between the cash available to
corporations and their investment spending.
By any reasonable measure, business investment is
weak. Not coincidentally, so is aggregate demand,
which remains, by most metrics, very far from potential
five years into the recovery. The extraordinary
measures taken by the Federal Reserve to stimulate
the economy have had limited success at best. While
some commenters blame this failure on the Fed itself,
we believe the problem is more likely to be located in
the transmission belt of monetary policy within the

corporate sector. When managers are concerned mainly
or solely with short-term movements of the stock price,
even the most abundant credit may not convince them
to increase real investment spending.
Some people, looking at these facts, will simply reassert
their faith in financial markets. If shareholders are
demanding high payouts, they will say, it must be
because they have identified better uses of funds
elsewhere. Indeed, the fact that investment decisions
are made by financial markets rather than within
corporations is supposed to be a source of great
dynamism for the American economy: It allows
resources to be reallocated from old sectors to new,
growing ones.
Claims like these justified the shareholder revolution
the shift in resources and authority from managers
to markets that began in the 1980s. But as this report
shows, these promises have not been fulfilled.
There has been no boom in investment, even as financial
markets have supposedly eased the way for promising
new projects to get funded. The period of shareholder
dominance and high payouts has been associated with
a decline in investment and employment at smaller,
younger firmsjust the opposite of what we should see
if high payouts are reallocating capital from established
businesses to new ones. It is true that, in the 1990s,
high-tech sectors did see high investment, with the
stock market making some contribution. But the shift
in investment spending toward the high-tech sectors
ended with the bursting of the tech bubble in 2000; over
the past 15 years, it has reversed, with investment in
high-tech sectors declining in favor of investment in the
ultimate smokestack industry, fossil fuel extraction.
The failure of the shareholder revolution to deliver
on its promises should not be surprising. The scale of
payouts from established companies is simply too large,
by an order of magnitude, for the financial markets
to direct it all to new firms and industries through its
limited channels. And from a Keynesian standpoint,
there is no reason to expect a decline in investment in
one sector to be helpful or necessary for an increase
elsewhere. Rather, by pressuring managers to pay
out funds instead of investing them, shareholders are
simply reducing production and income in the economy
as a whole. If anything, this creates a less favorable
environment for investment at new firms.
The bottom line is simple: When financial markets

demand immediate payouts, it makes long-term
investment difficult. This is bad for demand today
and bad for innovation and growth in the future.
Shareholder payouts do not, in general, reallocate
resources. By diverting funds from the corporate
sector into the maelstrom of Wall Street, payouts may
contribute to higher consumption among wealthy
owners of financial assets and higher incomes in the
financial sector, but they leave us all poorer than we
would be in a world where the money had been used for
productive investment.
Finally, we should be clear that shareholders do not
possess an inviolable legal or moral claim to the surplus
generated by their corporations. Shareholders
represent a narrow segment of the public; working- and
middle-class Americans own only a small fraction of
corporate stock. The interest of a small group of wealth
shareholders in immediate payouts does not trump the
interest of society at large in a productive corporate
sector and in a rising standard of living over time.
We do not have to accept the current short term
focused, finance-dominated corporate regime as a
fact of life. The example of Germany, a country that
leads the world in high-value exports despite offering
shareholders much less income and authority than in
the U.S., demonstrates that there are viable alternatives
to our current finance-dominated corporate sector.
An overnight transformation of the economy is not, of
course, possible, and there is no silver bullet solution
to the problems of short-termism and excessive
payouts. But there are steps we can take to ensure that
corporations once again serve as vehicles for organizing
our collective productive activity rather than as ATMs
for shareholders.
An accompanying report, Ending Short-Termism,
develops a policy agenda to respond to the economic
developments discussed here. We believe the steps
it lays out represent a meaningful path away from
what Hillary Rodham Clinton has called quarterly
capitalism. But beyond the specific proposals, the
most important step is to identify the problem. As long
as corporations are simply conceived of as machines
for increasing share value, they will be unable to fully
utilize Americas collective productive capacities or
develop those capacities for the future.
29
Endnotes
1
Ross Sorkin, Andrew. 2015. BlackRocks Chief, Laurence Fink Urges Other C.E.O.s to Stop Being So Nice to Inves

tors. New York Times. Retrieved October 23, 2015 (http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/14/business/dealbook/black
rocks-chief-laurence-fink-urges-other-ceos-to-stop-being-so-nice-to-investors.html?_r=0).
2
Surowiecki, James. 2015. The Short-termism Myth, August 24, The New Yorker. Retrieved October 23, 2015 (http://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/08/24/the-short-termism-myth).
3
Zandi, Mark. 2015. What Hillary Clinton Gets Wrong About Quarterly Capitalism: Businesses Are Actually More than

Ever in R&D, July 24, New York Daily News. Retrieved October 23, 2015 (http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/
mark-zandi-hillary-wrong-quarterly-capitalism-article-1.2303721).
4
Samuelson, Robert. 2015. Shareholder Capitalism on Trial, March 18, Washington Post. Retrieved October 23,

2015 (https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/shareholder-capitalism-on-trial/2015/03/18/f510b15a-cd80-11e4-a2a7 9517a3a70506_story.html).
5
No author. 2015. The Tyranny of the Long Term, November 22, The Economist. Retrieved October 23, 2015 (http://
www.economist.com/news/business/21633805-lets-not-get-carried-away-bashing-short-termism-tyranny-long-term).
6
Roe, Mark. 2015. Short-Term Talk, Long-Term Cost, October 20, Project Syndicate. Retrieved October 23, 2015
(https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/corporate-short-termism-imaginary-threat-by-mark-roe-2015-10).
7
Drecker, Ryan. 2015. Articulating my confusion: Shareholders vs. the real economy, February 25, Updated Priors.

Retrieved October 23, 2015 (http://updatedpriors.blogspot.com/2015/02/articulating-my-confusion-shareholders.html).
8
Op. Cit. Samuelson.
9
Friedman, Milton. 1970. The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, September 13, New York

Times Magazine. Retrieved October 23, 2015 (http://www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/libertarians/issues/fried
man-soc-resp-business.html)s
10
Bureau of Economic Analysis. 2015. National Income and Product Accounts Table 1.1.6. Washington, DC: U.S.

Department of Commerce. Retrieved May 5, 2015 (http://www.bea.gov/itable/).
11
Bureau of Economic Analysis. 2013. Preview of the 2013 Comprehensive Revision of the National Income and Product

Accounts: Changes in Definitions and Presentations. Washington, DC: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department

of Commerce.
12
Bureau of Economic Analysis. 2015. National Income and Product Accounts, Table 5.2.5 lines 10 and 19, Table 5.2.6

line 18, and Table 5.6.5 line 6. Retrieved October 30, 2015 (http://www.bea.gov/itable/).
13
Bureau of Economic Analysis. 2013. Frequently Asked Questions: How did BEA change the treatment of spending

for research and development during the 2013 comprehensive revision? Washington, DC: Bureau of Economic

Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce. Retrieved October 20, 2015 (http://www.bea.gov/faq/index.cfm?faq_
id=1028).
14
Yellen, Janet L. 2015. Recent Developments and the Outlook for the Economy. Speech delivered by Federal

Reserve Chair Janet L. Yellen on July 10, 2015 at the City Club of Cleveland in Cleveland, Ohio. Retrieved October 20,

2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150710a.htm).
15
Brainard, Lael. 2015. Economic Outlook and Monetary Policy. Speech delivered by Federal Reserve Governor Lael

Brainard on October 12, 2015 at the 57th National Association for Business Economics Annual Meeting in Washington,

DC. Retrieved October 20, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20151012a.htm).
16
Konczal, Mike and Nell Abernathy. 2015. Defining Financialization. New York, NY: The Roosevelt Institute. Retrieved

October 20, 2015 (http://rooseveltinstitute.org/sites/all/files/Defining_Financialization_Web.pdf).

Mason, J.W. 2015. Disgorge the Cash: The Disconnect Between Corporate Borrowing and Investment. New York,

NY: The Roosevelt Institute. Retrieved May 8, 2015 (http://rooseveltinstitute.org/sites/all/files/Mason_Disgorge_the_
Cash.pdf).
17
Op. Cit. Mason
18
Brown, J. R., and Steven M. Fazzari, and B. C. Petersen. 2009. Financing innovation and growth: Cash flow, external

equity, and the 1990s R&D boom. The Journal of Finance, 64(1):156. See also the sources cited there.
19
Ibid.
20
Janeway, William H. 2012. Doing Capitalism in the Innovation Economy: Markets, Speculation and the State. New

York: Cambridge University Press.
21
Rushton, Katherine. 2014. Apple to return $130bn to shareholders, April 23, The Telegraph. Retrieved October 20,

2015 (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/mediatechnologyandtelecoms/electronics/10784073/Apple to-return-130bn-to-shareholders.html).
22
Lazonick, William. 2014. Taking Stock: Why Executive Pay Results in an Unstable and Inequitable Economy. New

York, NY: The Roosevelt Institute. Retrieved October 20, 2015 (http://rooseveltinstitute.org/sites/all/files/Lazonick_Executive_Pay_
White_Paper_Roosevelt_Institute.pdf).

Lazonick, William. 2014. Profits Without Prosperity. Harvard Business Review September 2014. Retrieved September 25, 2015
(https://hbr.org/resources/pdfs/comm/fmglobal/profits_without_prosperity.pdf).
23
Decker, Ryan, John Haltiwanger, Ron S Jarmin, and Javier Miranda. 2014. The Secular Decline in Business Dynamism in the U.S.

Suitland, Maryland: U.S. Bureau of the Census. Retrieved October 20, 2015 (http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/workshops/
appliedecon/pdf/Haltiwangersecular.pdf).
24
BATS Global Markets. 2015. U.S. Equities Market Volume Summary. Retrieved October 28, 2015 (http://www.batsglobalmarkets.
com/us/equities/market_share/).
25
National Venture Capital Association, Yearbook 2015
26
Bain and Company, Global Private Equity Report 2015
27
Fazzari, Steven M and Barry Z. Cynamon. 2014. Inequality, the Great Recession, and Slow Recovery. Retrieved October 18, 2015
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2205524).
28
Carroll, Christopher D. 2000. Why Do the Rich Save So Much? In Joel Slemrod, ed., Does Atlas Shrug?: The Economic

Consequences of Taxing the Rich. Cambridge: Harvard University Press
29
Aguiar, Mark A and Mark Bils. 2011. Has Consumption Inequality Mirrored Income Inequality? (NBER Working Paper No. 1607).

National Bureau of Economic Research. Retrieved October 20, 2015 (http://www.nber.org/papers/w16807).
30
Mason, J. W. and Jayadev, Arjun. 2014. Fisher Dynamics in US Household Debt, 19292011. American Economic Journal:

Macroeconomics 6(3):214-234.
31
Cynamon, Barry Z. and Steven M. Fazzari. 2014. Inequality, the Great Recession, and Slow Recovery. Washington University in St.

Louis. Retrieved October 20, 2015 (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2205524).
32
Sidelsky, Robert. 1981. Keynes and the Treasury view: the case for and against an active unemployment policy 19201939. In W.J.

Mommsen (ed.), The Emergence of the Welfare State in Britain and Germany.
33
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No. 2). Retrieved October 28, 2015 (https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpsps/ecbsp2.en.pdf).
34
Piketty, T. 2014. Capital in the 21st Century. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Online data appendices.
35
Piketty, Thomas, and Gabriel Zucman. 2014. Capital is Back: Wealth-Income Ratios in Rich Countries 17002010. The Quarterly

Journal of Economics 129(3): 1255-1310.
36
Sharpe, S., & Suarez, G. 2013. Do CFOs Think Investment is Sensitive to Interest Rates? (Federal Reserve Board of Governors

FEDS Notes, 26). See also:

Jagannathan, Ravi, Iwan Meier, and Vefa Tarhan. The cross-section of hurdle rates for capital budgeting: an empirical analysis of

survey data. (NBER Working Paper 16770). National Bureau of Economic Research. Their survey of 127 CFOs of publicly traded

nonfinancial corporations finds a median hurdle rate of 15%. This is consistent with:

Lane, Kevin and Tom Roswell. 2015. Firms Investment Decisions and Interest Rates. Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin.

Poterba, J. M. and Summers, Lawrence. 1995. A CEO survey of US companies time horizons and hurdle rates. MIT Sloan

Management Review 37(1):43.
37
Stern, Nicholas. 2008. The economics of climate change. The American Economic Review:1-37.
38
Stout, Lynn. 2012. The Shareholder Value Myth. San Francisco, California: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc.
39
Greenfield, Kent. 2012. Are shareholders owners? Policy Network. Retrieved October 29, 2015 (http://www.policy-network.net/
pno_detail.aspx?ID=4259&title=Are-shareholders-owners).
40
Brainbridge, Stephen. 2011. The Fundamental Error: Shareholder & Ownership. Retrieved October 29, 2015 (http://www.
professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2011/11/the-fundamental-error-shareholders-ownership.html). Stephen

Bainbridge is the William D. Warren Distinguished Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law in Los Angeles.
41
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2015 (https://hbr.org/2010/04/the-myth-of-shareholder-capitalism/ar/1).
42
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no one? Journal of Institutional Economics 10:47-69. Retrieved October 28, 2015 (http://journals.cambridge.org/action/
displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=9160025&fileId=S1744137413000301).
43
Drucker, P. F. 1976. The unseen revolution: How pension fund socialism came to America. London: Heinemann.

Rifkin, Jeremy and Randy Barber. 1978. The North will rise again: pensions, politics and power in the 1980s. Boston: Beacon Press

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44
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45
Wolff, Edward N. 2012, The asset price meltdown and the wealth of the middle class. (National Bureau of Economic Research,

Working Paper No. 18559). Retrieved October 28, 2015 (http://www.nber.org/papers/w18559
31
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Understanding Short-Termism: Questions and Consequences

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Understanding

Until economic and social rules work for all,

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

ABOUT THIS REPORT

J.W. Mason is a Fellow at the Roosevelt

finances increased power over the real

the company. However, over the past 30 years,

Figure 1: Profits and Payouts

Source: Compustat database; Roosevelt Institute analysis. Cashflow

This increase in shareholder payouts is closely

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

company and had as their primary objective the survival

ADDRESSING THE CRITICS

Short-Termism Is Not Real

We document that this is incorrect, and that much

Short-Termism Is Not Harmful

companies has steadily declined. Tech industries have

Short-Termism Is Not Any of Our

system, they are not contributing to the development

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

It is true that, measured as a share of gross domestic

Figure 2: Total Investment

Contrary to some sources, business investment

1. Why are we worrying about businesses

exceptionally favorable environment, with credit cheap

Equipment and Software

The black line shows investment as the BEA defined

it until 2013, and as it continues to be defined under

Measured Investment Has Risen

makes it clear that recent investment has been

In Absolute Terms, Investment Growth

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

clear outlier in terms of both the depth and duration

Figures 3a and 3b: Cumulative Growth

Culmative Investment Growth

Even using the BEAs more generous definition, it took

Quarters From Peak

Nonresidential Investment Spending

Culmative Investment Growth

Quarters From Peak

2. Does the economy really need more spending

Source: National Income and Product Accounts, Roosevelt Institute

As the figures make clear, the current business cycle

A few years ago, when unemployment was still high

But in fact, there is still good reason to be concerned

Real GDP (2015 $ Trillions)

Finally, the persistent weakness of investment demand

close to a trend of about 3 percent annual growth. Since

Figure 4: Inflation and Real GDP

The current state of demand in the U.S.

Between 1947 and 2007, long-run real GDP stayed very

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

Inflation (CPI, Percent)

serious problem for the economy. Today, some people

In our view, this means that there is still

But even if you believe that the economy

Unemployment Rate, Wage Growth (%)