FACTS:

The Republic, through the OMB, filed against retired Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, his wife,
Clarita (petitioner), children Ian Carl, Juan Paulo and Timothy Mark [collectively, the Garcias]
a petition for forfeiture of properties [Forfeiture 1] to recover unlawfully acquired funds and
properties, in the aggregate amount of PhP 143,052,015.29. After Forfeiture 1 was another
forfeiture case was filed, this time to recover funds and properties amounting to PhP
202,005,980.55 [Forfeiture 2].
Before the filing of Forfeiture 2 but after the filing of Forfeiture 1, the OMB charged the Garcias
and 3 others with violation of RA 7080 (plunder). The plunder charge covered substantially the
same properties identified in both forfeiture cases.
After the filing of Forfeiture 1, the The following events occurred after the
following events transpired:
petition for Forfeiture 2 was filed:
The corresponding summons were issued and SB sheriff served the corresponding
all served on Gen. Garcia at his place of
summons. In his return, the sheriff
detention. Instead of an answer, the Garcias
stated giving the copies of the summons to
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of
the
OIC/Custodian
of
the
the SBs lack of jurisdiction over separate
PNP Detention Center who in turn handed
civil actions for forfeiture. The SB denied
them to Gen. Garcia. The general
the motion to dismiss and also declared the
signed his receipt of the summons, but as to
Garcias in default.
those pertaining to the other respondents,
Despite the standing default order, the Garcias
Gen. Garcia acknowledged receiving the
same, but with the following qualifying
moved for the transfer and consolidation of
note: Im receiving the copies of Clarita,
Forfeiture 1 with the plunder case which
Ian Carl, Juan Paolo & Timothy but these
were respectively pending in different
copies will not guarantee it being served to
divisions of the SB, contending that such
the above-named (sic).
consolidation is mandatory under RA 8249.
The SB denied the motion because the
forfeiture case is not the corresponding civil Clarita and her children filed a motion to
action for the recovery of civil liability
dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture 2
arising from the criminal case of plunder.
primarily for lack of jurisdiction over their
The Garcias filed another motion to dismiss
persons and on the subject matter which is
now covered by the plunder case. The
and/or to quash Forfeiture 1 on the
Republic filed its opposition with a motion
following grounds: (a) the filing of the
for alternative service of summons. Both
plunder case ousted the SB of jurisdiction
motions were denied by the SB.
over the forfeiture case; and (b) that the
consolidation is imperative in order to avoid
possible double jeopardy entanglements. By
an Order on the SB merely noted the motion
in view of movants having been declared in
default which has yet to be lifted.
Upon the foregoing facts, Clarita filed for

Clarita filed in the SC this instant petition

mandamus and certiorari raising the issue

whether SB acted with GADALEJ in issuing
its order since:
(a) SB could not have acquired jurisdiction
over the Garcias persons because of the
lack of proper and valid service of
summons
(b) SB has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of Forfeiture 1 upon the filing of
the main plunder case that mandates the
automatic forfeiture of the subject
properties in forfeiture cases 1 & 2 as a
function or adjunct of any conviction for
plunder
(c) Forfeiture law (RA No. 1379 [1955]) was
impliedly repealed by the Plunder law (RA
No. 7080 [1991]) with automatic forfeiture
mechanism.
(d) Since the sought Forfeiture 1 includes
properties purportedly located in the USA,
any penal conviction for Forfeiture 1 in
this case cannot be enforced outside of the
Philippines
(e) it is imperative that the matter of forfeiture
be exclusively tried in the main plunder
case to avoid possible double jeopardy
entanglements, and to avoid possible
conflicting decisions by 2 different
divisions of the SB on the matter of
forfeiture as a penal sanction.

for certiorari saying that SB acted with

GADALEJ in issuing its Joint Resolution
and its resolution denying petitioners motion
to dismiss and/or to quash in that:
(a) SB should have dismissed Forfeiture 2
for lack of jurisdiction over petitioners
person
because
summons
was
improperly served
(b) SB has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of forfeiture because plunder case
mandates the automatic forfeiture of
unlawfully acquired properties upon
conviction
(c) Forfeiture law (RA No. 1379 [1955])
was impliedly repealed by the plunder
law (RA No. 7080 [1991]) with
automatic forfeiture mechanism.
(d) it is imperative that the matter of
forfeiture be exclusively tried in the
main plunder case to avoid possible
double jeopardy entanglements and
worse conflicting decisions by 2
different divisions of the SB on the
matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction.

HELD: Resolution to both petitions were consolidated. The petitions are partly meritorious.
1. SB has jurisdiction over actions for forfeiture under RA 1379, albeit the proceeding thereunder
is civil in nature.
2. Plunder case did not absorb the forfeiture cases.
The civil liability for forfeiture cases do not arise from the commission of a criminal offense.
Such liability is based on a statute that safeguards the right of the State to recover unlawfully
acquired properties. The action of forfeiture arises when a public officer or employee acquires
during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion of his salary.
Such amount of property is then presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. Thus if
the respondent public official is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has
lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such property forfeited in

favor of the State, and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become property
of the State.
3. Forfeiture Cases and the Plunder Case have separate causes of action; the former is civil in
nature while the latter is criminal.
A forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action separate and different from a
plunder case, thus negating the notion that the crime of plunder charged absorbs the forfeiture
cases. In a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the commission of the
criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. For purposes of establishing
the crime of plunder, it is sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth.
On the other hand, all that the court needs to determine, by preponderance of evidence, under RA
1379 is the disproportion of respondents properties to his legitimate income, it being
unnecessary to prove how he acquired said properties.
Given the foregoing considerations, petitioners thesis on possible double jeopardy
entanglements should a judgment of conviction ensue criminal case is clearly wrong. Double
jeopardy, as a criminal law concept, refers to jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense, suggesting
that
double
jeopardy presupposes
two
separate
criminal
prosecutions. Proceedings under RA 1379 are, to repeat, civil in nature. As a necessary corollary,
one who is sued under RA 1379 may be proceeded against for a criminal offense. Thus, the filing
of a case under that law is not barred by the conviction or acquittal of the defendant in Crim.
Case 28107 for plunder.
Moreover, given the variance in the nature and subject matter of the proceedings between
the plunder case and the subject forfeiture cases, petitioners apprehension about the likelihood of
conflicting decisions of two different divisions of the anti-graft court on the matter of forfeiture
as a penal sanction is specious at best. What the SB said in this regard merits approving citation:
On the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction, respondents argue that the
division where the plunder case is pending may issue a decision that would
collide or be in conflict with the decision by this division on the forfeiture case.
They refer to a situation where this Courts Second Division may exonerate the
respondents in the plunder case while the Fourth Division grant the petition for
forfeiture for the same properties in favor of the state or vice versa.
Suffice it to say that the variance in the decisions of both divisions does
not give rise to a conflict. After all, Forfeiture 1n the plunder case requires the
attendance of facts and circumstances separate and distinct from that in the
forfeiture case. Between the two (2) cases, there is no causal connection in the
facts sought to be established and the issues sought to be addressed. As a result,
the decision of this Court in one does not have a bearing on the other.

There is also no conflict even if the decisions in both cases result in an

order for the forfeiture of the subject properties. The forfeiture following a
conviction in the plunder case will apply only to those ill-gotten wealth not
recovered by the forfeiture case and vise (sic) versa. This is on the assumption
that the information on plunder and the petition for forfeiture cover the same set
of properties.[21]
RA 7080 Did Not Repeal RA 1379
Petitioner takes a different tack in her bid to prove that SB erred in not dismissing
Forfeitures I and II with her assertion that RA 7080 impliedly repealed RA 1379. We are not
convinced.
Nowhere in RA 7080 can we find any provision that would indicate a repeal, expressly or
impliedly, of RA 1379. RA 7080 is a penal statute which, at its most basic, aims to penalize the
act of any public officer who by himself or in connivance with members of his family amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of at least PhP 50 million. On
the other hand, RA 1379 is not penal in nature, in that it does not make a crime the act of a public
official acquiring during his incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of proportion of
his salary and other legitimate income. RA 1379 aims to enforce the right of the State to recover
the properties which were not lawfully acquired by the officer.
It has often been said that all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal and all
efforts should be exerted to harmonize and give effect to all laws and provisions on the same
subject. To be sure, both RA 1379 and RA 7080 can very well be harmonized. The Court
perceives no irreconcilable conflict between them. One can be enforced without nullifying the
other.
Sandiganbayan Did Not Acquire Jurisdiction over
the Persons of Petitioner and Her Children
On the issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner argues that the SB did not acquire
jurisdiction over her person and that of her children due to a defective substituted service of
summons. There is merit in petitioners contention.
Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides for the
requirements of a valid substituted service of summons, thus:
SEC. 7. Substituted service.If the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section [personal service on
defendant], service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place
of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be bound by
its decision or orders. Valid service of summons, by whatever mode authorized by and proper
under the Rules, is the means by which a court acquires jurisdiction over a person.[22]
In the instant case, it is undisputed that summons for Forfeitures I and II were served
personally on Maj. Gen. Carlos Flores Garcia, who is detained at the PNP DetentionCenter, who
acknowledged receipt thereof by affixing his signature. It is also undisputed that substituted
service of summons for both Forfeitures I and II were made on petitioner and her children
through Maj. Gen. Garcia at the PNP Detention Center. However, such substituted services of
summons were invalid for being irregular and defective.
In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals,[23] we broke down the requirements to be:
(1) Impossibility of prompt personal service, i.e., the party relying on substituted service
or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of
prompt service within a reasonable time. Reasonable time being so much time as is necessary
under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the
contract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of
loss, if any[,] to the other party.[24] Moreover, we indicated therein that the sheriff must show
several attempts for personal service of at least three (3) times on at least two (2) different dates.
(2) Specific details in the return, i.e., the sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons
the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service.
(3) Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion residing at
defendants house or residence; or on a competent person in charge of defendants office or regular
place of business.
From the foregoing requisites, it is apparent that no valid substituted service of summons
was made on petitioner and her children, as the service made through Maj. Gen. Garcia did not
comply with the first two (2) requirements mentioned above for a valid substituted service of
summons. Moreover, the third requirement was also not strictly complied with as the substituted
service was made not at petitioners house or residence but in the PNP Detention Center where
Maj. Gen. Garcia is detained, even if the latter is of suitable age and discretion. Hence, no valid
substituted service of summons was made.
The stringent rules on valid service of summons for the court to acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the defendants, however, admits of exceptions, as when the party voluntarily
submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court by asking affirmative relief. [25] In the instant case,
the Republic asserts that petitioner is estopped from questioning improper service of summons
since the improvident service of summons in both forfeiture cases had been cured by their
(petitioner and her children) voluntary appearance in the forfeiture cases. The Republic points to
the various pleadings filed by petitioner and her children during the subject forfeiture
hearings. We cannot subscribe to the Republics views.
Special Appearance to Question a Courts Jurisdiction

Is Not Voluntary Appearance

The second sentence of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly
provides:
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance.The defendants voluntary appearance in
the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion
to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. (Emphasis ours.)
Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court
over his person, together with other grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared
voluntarily before the court. What the rule on voluntary appearancethe first sentence of the
above-quoted rulemeans is that the voluntary appearance of the defendant in court is without
qualification, in which case he is deemed to have waived his defense of lack of jurisdiction over
his person due to improper service of summons.
The pleadings filed by petitioner in the subject forfeiture cases, however, do not show
that she voluntarily appeared without qualification. Petitioner filed the following pleadings in
Forfeiture 1: (a) motion to dismiss; (b) motion for reconsideration and/or to admit answer; (c)
second motion for reconsideration; (d) motion to consolidate forfeiture case with plunder case;
and (e) motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture 1. And in Forfeiture 2: (a) motion to dismiss
and/or to quash Forfeiture 2; and (b) motion for partial reconsideration.
The foregoing pleadings, particularly the motions to dismiss, were filed by petitioner
solely for special appearance with the purpose of challenging the jurisdiction of the SB over
her person and that of her three children. Petitioner asserts therein that SB did not acquire
jurisdiction over her person and of her three children for lack of valid service of summons
through improvident substituted service of summons in both Forfeiture 1 and Forfeiture 2. This
stance the petitioner never abandoned when she filed her motions for reconsideration, even with
a prayer to admit their attached Answer Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam dated January 22,
2005 setting forth affirmative defenses with a claim for damages. And the other subsequent
pleadings, likewise, did not abandon her stance and defense of lack of jurisdiction due to
improper substituted services of summons in the forfeiture cases. Evidently, from the foregoing
Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, petitioner and her sons did not
voluntarily appear before the SB constitutive of or equivalent to service of summons.
Moreover, the leading La Naval Drug Corp. v. Court of Appeals [26] applies to the instant
case. Said case elucidates the current view in our jurisdiction that a special appearance before the
courtchallenging its jurisdiction over the person through a motion to dismiss even if the movant
invokes other groundsis not tantamount to estoppel or a waiver by the movant of his objection to
jurisdiction over his person; and such is not constitutive of a voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court.

Thus, it cannot be said that petitioner and her three children voluntarily appeared before
the SB to cure the defective substituted services of summons. They are, therefore, not estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the SB over their persons nor are they deemed to have
waived such defense of lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, there being no valid substituted
services of summons made, the SB did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of petitioner and
her children. And perforce, the proceedings in the subject forfeiture cases, insofar as petitioner
and her three children are concerned, are null and void for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the order
declaring them in default must be set aside and voided insofar as petitioner and her three children
are concerned. For the forfeiture case to proceed against them, it is, thus, imperative for the SB
to serve anew summons or alias summons on the petitioner and her three children in order to
acquire jurisdiction over their persons.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and mandamus are PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division has not acquired jurisdiction over petitioner
Clarita D. Garcia and her three children. The proceedings in Civil Case Nos. 0193 and 0196
before the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, insofar as they pertain to petitioner and her three
children, are VOID for lack of jurisdiction over their persons. No costs.
SO ORDERED.