Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 135721

May 27, 2004

CHUA TEE DEE, doing business under the name and style of PIONEER
ENTERPRISES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and J.C. AGRICOM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
INC., respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court assailing the Decision1of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50306 which
affirmed with modification, the Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
Branch 9, ordering the petitioner Chua Tee Dee to pay the private respondent back
rentals plus interest and attorneys fees.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
J.C. Agricom Development Corporation, Inc. (Agricom, for brevity), a corporation duly
organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines, is the owner of a rubber plantation located at Bayabas, Toril, Davao City,
with an area of 132.4012 hectares, more or less. Agricom planned to lease the
plantation.
Chua Tee Dee, married to Amado Dee, is a businesswoman doing business under
the name and style of Pioneer Enterprises (Pioneer, for brevity).
Manuel G. Alba, the president of Agricom, had a business meeting in Davao City with
Amado Dee where they discussed the possibility of leasing the rubber plantation to
Chua Tee Dee/Pioneer.3 Thereafter, a draft contract of lease was made and delivered
to Alba on May 22, 1985.4
The final contract of lease5 was signed and acknowledged before a notary public on
July 22, 1985. The Agricom, represented by Alba, was referred to as the FIRST
PARTY under the contract, while Chua Tee Dee doing business under the style of
Pioneer was the SECOND PARTY. Lillian Carriedo, a stockholder of Agricom, also
signed the contract. The pertinent portions of the lease contract were as follows:
1. TERM: The lease shall be for a period of fifteen (15) years counted from the
date of execution of this contract and may be renewed for another period of
five (5) years upon such terms as may be agreed upon by the parties.

2. That the plantation, together with all the inventoried machineries,

equipment and improvements found therein shall upon the execution of this
contract be turned over to the SECOND PARTY free from any and all liens
and/or encumbrances, provided, however, that the SECOND PARTY shall
upon expiration and/or termination of the contract return all the inventoried
machineries, equipment and improvements to the FIRST PARTY.
3. RENTAL: The SECOND PARTY shall pay the FIRST PARTY within the first
ten (10) days of the current month the following rentals, to wit:
P45,000.00 per month for the first three (3) years of the lease
P60,000.00 per month for the second three (3) years of the lease
P75,000.00 per month for the third four (4) years of the lease
P90,000.00 per month for the last five (5) years of the lease
4. NON-PAYMENT OF RENTALS: Delay in the payment of the monthly rental
by the SECOND PARTY shall entitle the FIRST PARTY to charge to the
former interest of two (2) percent per month as penalty. Non-payment of
rentals for three (3) months shall automatically bring about the termination of
the lease. In such an event, the FIRST PARTY shall be entitled to recover
from the SECOND PARTY back rentals.
5. DEPOSIT: In addition to the monthly rental stipulated in paragraph 3 of this
contract, the SECOND PARTY upon signing of this contract shall deposit to
the FIRST PARTY an amount equivalent to ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P135,000.00) Philippine Currency and on the first day
of September of the same year another amount equivalent to ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P135,000.00) Philippine
Currency, both interest-free which the latter shall apply against rentals for the
last year of the lease.
6. FARM PERSONNEL: Upon the effectivity of this Contract, the SECOND
PARTY has the option to select and screen those farm personnel that the
SECOND PARTY shall retain; those not selected shall then be terminated by
the FIRST PARTY, whose separation from the FIRST PARTYs employment
shall be the concern of the FIRST PARTY.

10. RIGHT TO ENTER PREMISES: The FIRST PARTY or its duly-authorized

representative shall have the right to enter the leased premises at any
reasonable time during business days, with due notice to the SECOND
PARTY, to verify compliance with the terms and conditions of this contract. In
addition, the FIRST PARTY may use the "REST HOUSE" located in the
leased premises with at least two (2) days advanced notice to the SECOND
PARTY.

11. LESSEES OPTION TO BUY: The FIRST PARTY shall maintain the
SECOND PARTY in the quiet peaceful possession and enjoyment of the
leased premises during the effectivity of the lease.
If at any time during the lease or renewal thereof, the first party shall opt to
sell, assign, transfer or convey the leased premises for a valuable
consideration, the SECOND PARTY shall be given written notice thereof, and
the latter shall have first option to buy the leased premises upon such terms
and conditions as may be mutually agreed by the parties. In the event [that]
this FIRST PARTY receives an offer to buy from a THIRD PARTY, the
SECOND PARTY shall be advised thereof in writing and shall have the option
to match said offer within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of said
advice.
If the SECOND PARTY or his nominees fail to exercise the option granted
under this aforementioned paragraph, and there is a sale, assignment,
transfer or conveyance of the leased premises to a third party, it shall be a
condition thereof that this contract of lease shall be respected and shall
continue under the terms and conditions herein stipulated.
13. (sic) VENUE: UPON the expiration of this lease contract or its earlier
termination for violation of its terms and conditions, the SECOND PARTY
binds himself to peacefully turn over the possession of and surrender the
leased premises to the FIRST PARTY is compelled, to resort to the courts to
protect its rights under this contract, the parties agree that venue thereof shall
be in the courts at Davao City. In such an event, the SECOND PARTY shall
be answerable for all damages that the FIRST PARTY may suffer or be
entitled to plus attorneys fees equivalent to twenty-five (25%) percent thereof
and costs of suit.
On May 27, 1985, Alba met with the employees of the rubber plantation 6 and
updated them on the impending termination of their employment due to the
companys contract of lease with Chua Tee Dee. The employees were told that they
would be given separation pay.
On June 3, 1985, Amado Dee delivered the amount of two hundred seventy
thousand pesos (P270,000.00) to the Spouses Manuel and Suzanne Alba in
compliance with paragraph 5 of the lease contract. The corresponding receipt was
issued.7
In the meantime, Azarinas P. Liguiz of Agricom sent letters to the said employees,
confirming the termination of their employment and informing them that their
separation pay shall be computed at one-half (1/2) months salary for every year of
service rendered, and that a fraction of at least six (6) months service shall be
considered as one year. Thereafter, the corresponding vouchers were prepared. 8
Sometime thereafter, the severed employees filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
and unfair labor practice against Agricom, Amado Dee and Pioneer, docketed as
NLRC Case No. 1815-LR-XI-85. The labor arbiter rendered his decision on August
22, 1986, holding that the termination of the complainants employment was illegal.

The respondents were ordered to pay its employees separation pay and backwages,
but the complaint for unfair labor practice was dismissed for lack of merit. 9 The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) Declaring the termination of complainants as illegal, thereby ordering
respondents J.C. Agricom Development Company and/or Pioneer Enterprises
and Amado Dee to pay all complainants herein, jointly and severally, the
following, to wit:
(a) Separation pay at one (1) month salary per year of service, from
date of hiring to date this Decision becomes final and executory;
(b) Backwages from date employment stopped up to the date this
Decision becomes final and executory.
(2) Dismissing the charge of unfair labor practice for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.10
The respondents appealed the decision. Amado Dee and Pioneer posted a
supersedeas bond of P21,415.58, as well as P142,770.54 covered by Check No.
610489625,11 and P142,770.54 covered by Check No. 610489624 12to stave off
execution pending appeal.
Because Pioneer was dragged into labor disputes not of its own making, it wrote
Agricom, through its counsel, on October 20, 1987 suggesting a conference to settle
the labor case, otherwise, it would consider the contract of lease as rescinded. 13
Aside from the labor case, Pioneer, through Amado Dee, complained of being
pestered by some individuals who claimed portions of the plantation as their own
property. Some of them went to its office and even presented tax declarations to
prove their claims.14 Pioneer claimed that the foregoing circumstances prevented it
from operating fully the agreed area stated in the lease contract. It also complained
that the death of Pioneers foreman sometime in 1990 even exacerbated the
unresolved labor problem.
On May 24, 1990, the counsel of the Carriedo heirs, the stockholders-owners of
Agricom, sent a telegraphic note to Amado Dee demanding payment of long overdue
rentals.15 On June 21, 1990, Pioneer sent a letter to Agricom complaining of facts
and events which disrupted its operations in the plantation. In a Letter dated August
2, 1990, Agricom informed Pioneer that, after due investigation, it concluded that the
latters complaints were unfounded. It also demanded the payment of back rentals
for June, July and August 1990.16
As Pioneer was unable to pay its monthly rentals, Agricom filed, on September 4,
1990, a civil complaint for sum of money, damages and attorneys fees against Chua
Tee Dee before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 9. The case was

docketed as Civil Case No. 20,312-90. The plaintiff Agricom alleged, inter alia, in the
said complaint, thus:
2.02 That defendant regularly paid the monthly rentals for the years 1985 to
1989. The payment of the monthly rentals for the first six (6) months of 1990
in the amount of Sixty Thousand (P60,000.00), however, was occasioned by
delay and those for July and August 1990, unpaid;
2.03 That as of August 1990, defendant has an outstanding arrearage of One
Hundred Twenty Thousand (P120,000.00) Pesos in favor of plaintiff, exclusive
of penalty thereon at the rate of two (2%) percent per month;
2.04 That several demands, both verbally and in writing, had been made by
plaintiff upon defendants to make her payment of the monthly rentals current,
but said demands, notwithstanding, defendant failed and refused and still
continues to fail and refuse to do so;
2.05 That by reason of defendants unjustified and wanton refusal to pay
plaintiff its plainly, valid, and demandable claims, the latter has been
compelled to engage the services of counsel to enforce and protect its interest
at an agreed fee of twenty-five (25%) percent of the amount due and
collectible, as provided for in said Contract of Lease (Annex "A") and has,
otherwise, been placed into unnecessary expenses of litigation in an amount
which could not be less than Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos;17
It prayed that after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in its favor, as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that judgment
be rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the latter
a.) to pay plaintiff the sum of P120,000.00 as of August 1990, with penalty
thereon at the rate of two (2%) percent per month, plus the sum
of P60,000.00 a month thereafter;
b.) to pay plaintiff the sum equivalent to twenty-five (25%) of the amount due
and collectible, as and for attorneys fees;
c.) to reimburse the litigation expenses of plaintiff in the amount of not less
than P10,000.00 or such amount which will be proven during the trial;
d.) to pay the cost of suit;
PLAINTIFF further prays for such other reliefs and remedies, just and equitable
under the premises.18
On October 16, 1990, the defendant filed her Answer with Damages where she
asserted that the plaintiff had no cause of action against her. She claimed that it was
the plaintiff which failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the contract of
lease when it failed to settle the labor dispute with its former employees, thus,
dragging the defendant as respondent in NLRC Case No. 1815-LR-XI-85; and that

the plaintiff failed to maintain her in the quiet and peaceful possession and
enjoyment of the leased premises during the effectivity of the lease contract, in
violation of paragraphs 6 and 11 thereof.
The defendant also claimed that she had paid premiums for the appeal bond in the
labor case, and that she deposited with the NLRC the total amount of P306,956.66
to avert execution pending appeal, which was supposed to be the sole responsibility
of the plaintiff.
By way of counterclaim, the defendant asserted that she was exposed to public
contempt and ridicule which besmirched her reputation; and that she suffered mental
anguish and sleepless nights because of the violation of the contract of lease. She
prayed, thus:
WHEREFORE, defendant respectfully prays this Honorable Court, that after
considering all the foregoing facts and circumstances, judgment be rendered in favor
of defendant and against plaintiff:
1. Ordering the termination or rescission of the Contract of Lease;
2. Dismiss the complaint;
3. Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant:
a) P316,956.66 as actual damages
b) P500,000.00 as moral damages
c) P200,000.00 as exemplary damages
d) P100,000.00 as attorneys fees
DEFENDANT FURTHER prays for such other relief and remedies available and
legally tenable under the premises.19
On November 8, 1990, the plaintiff filed its Motion to Strike Out Portion of the
Pleading,20 particularly paragraph 8 thereof and to dismiss the counterclaim of the
defendant with regard to the labor case on the ground that the NLRC had already
rendered a decision ordering the dismissal of the complaint of its former employees.
The plaintiff appended a copy of the decision of the NLRC to its motion. 21
On November 9, 1990, defendant Chua Tee Dee filed her Motion to Declare Plaintiff
in Default22 for failure to answer her counterclaim.
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted the following:
1. Legal Capacities of the respective party (sic);

2. The Contract of Lease entered into on July 22, 1985 between parties herein
over the 132.4102 hectares of rubber plantation located in Bayabas, Toril,
Davao City;
3. The Labor Case entitled NLRC Case No. 1815-LR-XI-85, BONIFACIO
LANSANG, et al. vs. JC AGRICOM DEV. CORP. and/or PIONEER ENT. and
AMADO DEE;23
In the meantime, on June 4, 1991, the defendant extended a personal loan
of P30,000 to Lillian Carriedo as evidenced by a voucher 24 and a personal
receipt25 signed by Ma. Cecilia and Elaine, both surnamed Carriedo. 26
On October 21, 1992, the court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint and
declaring the lease contract terminated for failure of the plaintiff to implement the
terms thereof. The court ruled as follows:
The evidence on record proves that plaintiff failed to effectively complement,
implement and enforce the foregoing provision. The inevitable consequence was the
impleading and involvement of defendant in a vexatious labor problem instituted by
plaintiffs original farm workers. This violation of paragraph 6 caused the problems
that in great measure prejudiced the efficient operations intended by defendant,
because of the peace and order situation caused by the malcontents, among others,
resulted in the death of defendants foreman Elicano Apolonio.
"11. Leases option to buy, the First Party shall maintain the Second Party in the quiet
possession and employment (sic) of the leased premises during the effectivity of the
lease. "
The evidence establishes that defendants possession was anything but peaceful
and enjoyable. Within a comparatively short span of time from entry and occupation,
defendant suffered from vexatious labor problems caused by plaintiffs original farm
workers who instituted a labor case impleading the defendant. Many of them
remained in the area and made trouble to the workers hired by defendant, so
terrorizing the latter that they were afraid to go to work for fear of bodily harm.
Defendants foreman Elicano Apolonio, who reported early for work was shot to
death in the premises (Exhibits "11," "12").27
The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered dismissing the complaint
and declares the lease contract between the parties terminated and of no force and
effect.
Cost against the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.28
The plaintiff received its copy of the above decision on March 11, 1993 and filed its
motion for reconsideration praying that the defendant be ordered to pay for the

unpaid rentals in accordance with the contract of lease until it had actually vacated
and surrendered the leased premises.29
The defendant filed her manifestation and compliance, declaring that when she
learned about the RTC decision that the lease contract between the parties no
longer had force and effect, she pulled out her enterprise and stopped operations in
the leased premises.30 She also filed her opposition to the motion for
reconsideration.31
On March 8, 1995, the court issued an Order granting the plaintiffs motion and
modifying its decision. It ordered the defendant to pay rentals to the plaintiff since the
defendant had occupied, used and continually operated the rubber plantation during
the time the case was pending; equity demanded that compensation for the use
thereof was just and proper.32 The decretal portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED
and the Decision dated October 21, 1992 is hereby recalled and modified as follows:
1. Judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, J.C. Agricom Development
Corporation, Inc. and against the defendant, CHUA TEE DEE.
2. Defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff:
a. P45,000.00 per month for the first three (3) years, less the deposit
made in the amount ofP270,000.00 or the amount of P1,350,000.00;
b. P60,000.00 per month for the second three (3) years of the lease or
the equivalent amount ofP2,160,000.00;
c. P75,000.00 per month for the succeeding years up to the time this
case was decided on October 21, 1992, or the amount
of P1,125,000.00;
d. To pay the interest of 2% of the arrears as penalty for the delay in
the payment of the rentals, or in the amount of P92,700.00; and,
e. Attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the total amount due to plaintiff
or in the amount ofP463,500.00.
Accordingly, the contract of lease entered into by the parties on July 22, 1985 is
declared terminated and of no force and effect.
SO ORDERED.33
The defendant appealed the March 8, 1995 Order to the Court of Appeals. 34 The
appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 50306. It ascribed the following errors to
the trial court:
I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED ITS DECISION DATED

OCTOBER 21, 1992 IN AN ORDER DATED MARCH 8, 1995, THE SAID
REVERSAL NOT BEING IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS ORDER DATED MARCH 8, 1995, THE SAME
NOT BEING SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED DURING TRIAL.35
The appellant therein alleged that the motion for reconsideration of the appellee of
the decision of the trial court was actually a motion for new trial; 36 that while she
admitted being in possession of the leased premises, there was no evidence that
she had profited from operating the rubber plantation. 37 She also posited that, under
Article 1658 of the New Civil Code, she had the right to suspend payment of the
rentals since the lessor failed to maintain her in the peaceful and adequate
enjoyment of the leased property. She noted that the lower court even found in its
October 21, 1992 decision that her possession of the property was anything but
peaceful and enjoyable.38 The appellant asserted that the order of the trial court
ordering her to pay the plaintiff-appellee was not supported by evidence presented
during trial.39
The appellate court in its Decision dated May 6, 1998 affirmed the assailed order of
the lower court, but modified it by reducing the award of attorneys fees:
WHEREFORE, subject to the modification concerning the award of attorneys fees,
which is hereby reduced to P50,000.00, the Order appealed from is AFFIRMED in all
other respects. Without pronouncement as to costs.40
The appellant filed her motion for reconsideration on June 2, 1998 but the same was
denied by the CA in its October 2, 1998 Resolution.41
Chua Tee Dee, now the petitioner, filed her supplemental petition and/or amended
petition for certiorari with this Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and
assigned the following as errors committed by the CA:
I. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE ERROR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN SWIFTLY CONCLUDING
THAT THE "CONTRACT OF LEASE IS VALID, BINDING AND EFFECTIVE
BETWEEN THE CONTRACTING PARTIES." FOR IN DOING SO, THE
COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED THE INVALIDITY OF THE
CONTRACT OF LEASE WHICH PRIVATE RESPONDENT LEASED, (A
PLANTATION THAT IT DID NOT OWN), AND AGAIN, CLEARLY DID NOT
INSTALL PETITIONER "IN PEACEFUL ENJOYMENT" OF THE LEASED
PREMISES, AND WHICH PETITIONER WAS NOT ABLE TO POSSESS AND
ENJOY, IN CLEAR, DELIBERATE AND VERY IRRESPONSIBLE VIOLATION
OF THE CONTRACT OF LEASE. THIS JUSTIFIES LESSEES
SUSPENSION OF RENTALS.

II. IN DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

(ANNEX "O"), PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE
RESPECT, COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ORDERING
PETITIONER TO PAY RENTALS WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN PAID. 42
The petitioner asserts that the suspension of the payment of rentals is justified by the
fact that the private respondent Agricom breached its lease contract with her, relying
on the provision of Art. 1658 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1658. The lessee may suspend the payment of the rent in case the lessor fails to
make the necessary repairs or to maintain the lessee in peaceful and adequate
enjoyment of the property leased.
The petitioner claims that the private respondent failed to maintain her in a quiet and
peaceful enjoyment of the leased premises.43 She asserts that while she occupied
the property, she was pestered and harassed by squatters and several claimants of
the leased premises.44 As such, the private respondent violated paragraphs 6 and 11
of the lease contract. The petitioner also alleges that her business was dragged to a
labor case which caused her to shell out the amounts of P306,956.99 and P10,000
as bond premiums and attorneys fees, respectively. While machine copies of the
checks were presented during trial, the court ordered the presentation of the original
checks, which, however, have been lost and cannot be found. 45 According to the
petitioner, the various claimants of the premises fenced their claimed areas, thus,
reducing the area of the leased premises and the production of rubber latex, the
produce of the rubber plantation.46 The petitioner also alleges that she made verbal
demands to the private respondent to observe and enforce the contract, but such
demands fell on deaf ears.47
The petitioner further asserts that the private respondent included in their contract of
lease areas in the rubber plantation that belonged to other persons. 48 She further
alleges that the private respondent misrepresented itself as the owner of a rubber
plantation covering an area of 132.4102 hectares when, in fact, only an area of 36
hectares was free from any claimants.49 Thus, the petitioner argues, the diminution of
the area resulted in loss of profits in the operation of the plantation.
The petitioner also claims that since the private respondent failed to maintain her, as
lessee, in the quiet and peaceful possession of the leased premises, she is entitled
to moral damages.50 The petitioner further claims that she agreed to remain in the
leased premises upon the request of Mrs. Carriedo, a stockholder of Agricom. The
petitioner avers that she did the private respondent a favor because due to her
presence in the premises, the same was protected from outside forces. 51 Thus, she
should not be ordered to pay any back rentals.
Anent the second assigned error, the petitioner asserts that she had religiously paid
rentals up to June 30, 1990, and that she suspended the payment thereof due to the
private respondents breach of the lease contract. She avers that the lower court
erred when it ordered her to pay rentals starting from 1985, when the contract
commenced. She posits that her liability for back rentals, if any, should cover only
the period of July 1990 to October 21, 1992, when the decision of the RTC was
promulgated, computed as follows:

Second 3 years at P60,000.00 monthly rental

Payment stopped on July 1990:
July 31, 1990

P60,000.00

August 31

60,000.00

September 30

60,000.00

October 31

60,000.00

November 30

60,000.00

December 31

60,000.00

January 31, 1991

60,000.00

February 28

60,000.00

March 31

60,000.00

April 30

60,000.00

May 31

60,000.00

June 30, 1991

60,000.00

Total

P720,000.00

Succeeding 3 years at P75,000.00 per month

Rental up to the time this case was decided
On October 21, 1992:
July 31, 1991

P75,000.00

August 31

75,000.00

September 30

75,000.00

October 31

75,000.00

November 30

75,000.00

December 31

75,000.00

January 31, 1992

75,000.00

February 28

75,000.00

March 31

75,000.00

April 30

75,000.00

May 31

75,000.00

June 30, 1992

75,000.00

Total

P900,000.00

July 31, 1992

75,000.00

August 31

75,000.00

September 30

75,000.00

October 21, 1992

52,500.00

Total
Grand Total

P280,500.00
P1,900,500.0052
=============

For its part, the private respondent contends that the petition should be dismissed for
having been filed under Rule 65, an inappropriate remedy or wrong mode of appeal
in the present case. And even if the Court considers the same as filed under Rule 45,
the same is still unavailing as only questions of law can be raised therein, while the
present petition raises questions of fact.53
The private respondent maintains that the appellate court did not commit any grave
abuse of its discretion when it decided the case and affirmed with modification the
assailed RTC Order. It contends that the sweeping statements of the petitioner, that
the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of its discretion, are baseless and
unfounded. It asserts that the petition is without merit.
The petition is partly meritorious.
Preliminarily, we note that the remedy resorted to by the petitioner is a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a remedy resorted to where the issues
raised involve lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. For the writ of
certiorari under Rule 65 to issue, the petitioner must show not only that the lower
court acted with grave abuse of discretion, but also that "there is no appeal, or any
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." 54 The
assailed CA decision was a disposition on the merits; hence, the proper remedy of
the petitioner was a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. For this procedural lapse, the instant petition should be dismissed outright. 55
Nonetheless, as the petition was filed within the reglementary period under Rule 45,
and in the interest of justice, this Court shall treat the action as a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45.
We now delve into the merits of the case.
The cause or essential purpose in a contract of lease is the use or enjoyment of a
thing.56 It is consensual, bilateral, onerous and commutative, the owner temporarily
grants the use of his or her property to another who undertakes to pay rent
therefor.57 In the case at bar, petitioner Chua Tee Dee is the lessee of the private
respondent Agricom. As lessor, the Agricom had the duty to maintain the petitioner in
the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the leased premises. Such duty was made

as part of the contract of lease entered into by the parties. Even if it had not been so,
the lessor is still duty-bound under Art. 1654 of the Civil Code, thus:
Art. 1654. The lessor is obliged:
(1) To deliver the thing which is the object of the contract in such a condition
as to render it fit for the use intended;
(2) To make on the same during the lease all the necessary repairs in order to
keep it suitable for the use to which it has been devoted, unless there is a
stipulation to the contrary:
(3) To maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the
lease for the entire duration of the contract.
The duty "to maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the
lease for the duration of the contract" mentioned in no. 3 of the article is merely a
warranty that the lessee shall not be disturbed in his legal, and not physical,
possession. Thus, in the case of Goldstein v. Roces,58 the Court ruled in favor of the
lessor and denied the lessee's claim for damages which resulted from the opening of
holes in the roof, as the lessor had allowed another lessee to construct another floor
to the leased building. The Court had the occasion to state:
Article 1554 provides that the lessor is obliged to maintain the lessee in the peaceful
enjoyment of the lease during all the time covered by the contract.
Nobody has in any manner disputed, objected to, or placed any difficulties in the way
of plaintiff's peaceful enjoyment, or his quiet and peaceable possession of the floor
he occupies. The lessors, therefore, have not failed to maintain him in the peaceful
enjoyment of the floor leased to him and he continues to enjoy this status without the
slightest opposition on the part of any one. That there was a disturbance of the
peace or order in which he maintained his things in the leased story does not mean
he lost the peaceful enjoyment of the thing rented. The peace would likewise have
been disturbed or lost had some tenant of the Hotel de Francia, living above the floor
leased by plaintiff, continually poured water on the latter's bar and sprinkled his bartender and his customers and tarnished his furniture; or had some gay patrons of the
hotel gone down into his saloon and broken his crockery or glassware, or stunned
him with deafening noises. Numerous examples could be given to show how the
lessee might fail peacefully to enjoy the floor leased to him, in all of which cases he
would, of course, have a right of action for the recovery of damages from those who
disturbed his peace, but he would have no action against the lessor to compel the
latter to maintain him in his peaceful enjoyment of the thing rented. The lessor can
do nothing, nor is it incumbent upon him to do anything, in the examples or cases
mentioned, to restore his lessee's peace. 59
In the case at bar, the petitioner claims that several people presented tax
declarations to her and claimed some portions of the leased premises. However, no
case was filed by any of the said claimants against her or her lessor during the time
she occupied the premises. Even her branch manager testified that no such action to
quiet title had been filed by the alleged claimants:

Q Now, one other question which is not related to the xerox document now,
will you kindly inform this Honorable Court whether you received a formal
letter from the person you said was claiming ownership?
A No, they went to the office.
Q They did not make a formal claim against you?
A They made (sic) formal claim because they went to the office taking with
them the documents, the title and the tax declaration and they came to me.
That is a formal address.
Q And that is what they did, they just came to your office and presented
certain documents, is that correct?
A They presented documents and they have done also something in the field,
they fenced the area.
Q Now, did they file a case against you?
A Against me?
Q Against Pioneer?
A A case, no.
Q And then as a matter of fact there is no judgment for ejectment or anything
against Pioneer between that claimant and Pioneer?
ATTY. SABILLO:
It is already answered, Your Honor, there is no case.
ATTY. MOJICA:
So, there is no judgment.
ATTY. SABILLO:
There is no case.
ATTY. MOJICA:
If counsel and I stipulate that there is no judgment ?
ATTY. SABILLO:
Of course, there is no case.
COURT:

All right, no case, no judgment.60

Patently, then, the petitioner had not been disturbed in her legal possession of the
property in derogation of Article 1654 of the New Civil Code. When the petitioners
representative saw that a portion of the leased premises was being fenced by the
claimants, she had all the right to sue the intruders who had disturbed her physical
possession61 as provided for in Article 1664 of the New Civil Code.62 However, the
petitioner did not file any suit against any of the claimants. Thus, it cannot be said
that the private respondent violated paragraph 11 of the contract of lease.
We agree with the trial court and the CA that the petitioner failed to prove that she
suffered any loss from the labor case that was filed against her enterprise and her
husband. The trial court declared that the petitioner "did not actually established (sic)
the alleged losses especially in the labor case with the NLRC where the complaints
of the laborers appear to have been dismissed" 63 The CA, likewise, noted thus:
[T]rue, the labor case was instituted during the effectivity of the lease
contract until the case was finally resolved on August 22, 1986. Surprisingly,
however, during the interregnum, appellant regularly paid the monthly rentals
for the years 1985 to 1989. It was after the labor case has been resolved that
appellant started to fail to pay her rentals, strongly indicating that the labor
case has not dampened her peaceful and adequate possession of the leased
premises.64

[T]hat the NLRC case did not deter the continuance of the possession and
occupation of the leased premises. It also proved the continuous production of
latex in the plantation. Now, if in the production of latex, the corporation rather
than made profit, instead incurred losses, such losses has to be borne by the
corporation.65
In sum, then, the petitioner failed to prove that the private respondent breached any
of the provisions of the contract of lease. Thus, the petitioner had no valid reason to
suspend the payment of rentals under Art. 1658.
In the complaint filed by the private respondent against the petitioner, it alleged that
the petitioner failed and/or refused to pay the rent starting in July 1990. Also, the
private respondents president, Manuel G. Alba, testified that Agricom had suffered
from the petitioners non-payment of rentals since July 1990. 66 At that time, the
parties were already on their second three-year period of the lease contract.
We agree with the contention of the petitioner that her obligation to pay back rentals
should cover only the period of July 1990 until the time that she vacated the leased
premises. The CA, thus, erred when it affirmed the order of the trial court ordering
the petitioner to pay back rentals, including the first three (3) years of the lease, as
that period had already been paid by the petitioner. The petitioner should also be
credited for the amount ofP270,000.00 she paid to the private respondent under
paragraph 5 of the contract of lease.

The personal loan67 extended by the petitioner to Lillian Carriedo should not be
charged against the private respondent. While it is true that the petitioner and
Carriedo had agreed that the personal loan of the latter shall be "chargeable against
Agricoms account," the private respondent is not privy to the agreement; nor did it
agree to pay the said loan. It must be stressed that the private respondent has a
personality separate and distinct from its stockholders.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 50306 and the RTC Order dated March 8, 1995 are AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION. The petitioner is hereby ordered to pay to the private
respondent monthly rentals in the amount of P60,000 starting July 1990 up to June
30, 1991; and in the amount of P75,000.00 per month from July 1991 until the
petitioner actually left the leased premises. The petitioner is also ordered to pay
interest of two percent (2%) of the arrears, as penalty for the delay in the payment of
rentals.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, (Acting Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Puno, (Chairman), J., on official leave.