People vs. Bernardino Gaffud

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People vs.

Bernardino Gaffud
G.R. No. 168050. September 19, 2008

People v. Guillen
GR No. L-1477, January 18, 1950

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. was found
guilty of two (2) counts of murder for killing Manuel
Salvador and Analyn Salvador by means of fire.
Evidence for the prosecution presented the following:

FACTS:
The accused Julio Guillen, was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and multiple
frustrated murder after his attempt to assassinate the
President of the Philippines, Manuel Roxas on March
10, 1947. During the 1946 Presidential Elections,
Guillen voted for the opposing candidate of Manuel
Roxas. According to the accused, he was
disappointed with the latter for failing to redeem and
fulfill promises made by President Roxas during the
elections. Consequently, the accused determined to
assassinate the President and found the oppoturnity
to do so on the night of March 10, 1947 when the
President attended a popular meeting by the Liberal
Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila. Guillen
first intended to use a revolver to accomplish his goal
but he had previously lost his licensed firearm, so he
thought of using two hand grenades which were
given to him by an American soldier in exchange for
two bottles of whisky. The accused stood on the
chair he had been sitting on and hurled the grenade
at the President when the latter had just closed his
speech. A general who was on the platform saw the
smoking grenade and kicked it away from the
platform towards an open space where he thought
the grenade was likely to do the least harm. The
grenade exploded in the middle of a group of
persons standing close to the platform and grenade
fragments seriously injured Simeon Varela, who died
the next day due to the mortal wounds caused, and
several other persons. Guillen was arrested and he
readily admitted his responsibility.

1) That on the night of May 10, 1994, Orly Salvador,


while on his way to the house of his uncle Manuel
Salvador, heard two gunshots and thereafter saw the
house of his uncle burning. He saw three persons
within the vicinity of the burning house, one of whom
he identified as appellant Gaffud, Jr.
2) That Dan Dangpal, neighbor of the deceased, at
about 8:00 PM that evening, heard successive
gunshots and saw the deceaseds house burning.
3) That prior the incident, Barangay Captain Potado
Ballang saw the appellant a few meters away from
the house of the deceased.
4) That earlier that day, Dominga Salvador, commonlaw wife of Manuel Salvador and mother of Analyn
Salvador, went to the house of the appellant to
inquire about her husbands share in the construction
of the barangay hall. Dominga also related that had
earlier filed a complaint against the appellant and his
brother for slaughtering her pig.
In his appeal, the appellant argued that the court
failed to rule and resolve whether or not conspiracy
existed, despite the fact that there was no proof as to
what overt acts he committed which would constitute
the crime of murder.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not there was conspiracy.
2) Whether or not accused-appellant should be held
liable for two (2) separate counts of murder or for the
complex crime of double murder.
HELD:
1) Conspiracy, in this case, is not essential. The rule
is that in the absence of evidence showing the direct
participation of the accused in the commission of the
crime, conspiracy must be established by clear and
convincing evidence in order to convict the accused.
In the case at bar, however, direct participation of
accused-appellant in the killing of the victims was
established beyond doubt by the evidence of the
prosecution. Thus, a finding of conspiracy is no
longer essential for the conviction of accusedappellant.
2) No. The Court ruled that in a complex crime,
although two or more crimes are actually committed,
they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law
as well as in the conscience of the offender. The
burning the house of Manuel Salvador, with the main
objective of killing the latter and his daughter,
resulting in their deaths resulted in the complex
crime of double murder. Hence, there is only one
penalty imposed for the commission of a complex
crime.

ISSUE:
WON the accused was guilty only of homicide
through reckless imprudence in regard to the death
of Simeon Varela and of less serious physical
injuries in regard to the other injured persons.
HELD:
The facts do not support the contention of the
counsel for the appellant. In throwing the hand
grenade at the President with the intention of killing
him, the appellant acted with malice and is therefore
liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act. As
provided by Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code,
criminal liability is incurred by any person committing
a felony although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended. In criminal negligence,
the injury caused to another should be unintentional,
it being simply the incident of another act performed
without malice. As held by the Court, a deliberate
intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent
with the idea of reckless imprudence. Where such
unlawful act is willfully done, a mistake in the identity
of the intended victim cannot be considered reckless
imprudence. The sentence of the trial court is
affirmed by unanimous vote and death sentence
shall be executed in accordance with article 81 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Criminal law; complex crime of murder and
multiple attempted murder; offended parties
other than intended victim; act with intention
to kill; criminal liability. In throwing a hand
grenade at the President with the intention of
killing him, the appellant acted with malice. He is

therefore liable for all the consequences of his


wrongful act; for in accordance with article 4 of
the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability incurred
by any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended to do.
The qualifying circumstance of treachery may
properly be considered, even when the victim of
the attack was not the one whom the defendant
intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence
that neither of the two persons could in any
manner put up a defense against the attack, or
became aware of it.
Aggravating Circumstances Need Not Be
Considered. In meting out the penalty for the
complex crime of murder and multiple attempted
murder, aggravating circumstances need not be
considered in view of article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code, which provides that the prescribed
penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period.
Criminal Negligence, What Constitutes. In
criminal negligence, the injury caused to another
should be unintentional, it being simply the
incident of another act performed without malice.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NAO
MILFLORES y LAKSA
G.R. Nos. L-32144-45. July 30, 1982
SYNOPSIS
Early in the morning of November 27, 1967, an old
man with black-painted face approached the house
on 2233 Garrido Street, Sta. Ana, Manila, and called
out the name of one of the occupants therein, Mrs.
Javier. Heeding the call, Florencia Tactay-Javier
came out of the door and met the caller. The old man
handed to her a paper bag containing some
vegetables and then left the place in a hurry. After
Mrs. Javier had brought the bag into the house, the
said bag exploded killing one and wounding seven
other occupants of the house. Investigations
thereafter conducted by various police agencies led
to the arrest of accused-appellant, a magician,
illusionist and marriage counselor, who was charged
separately with multiple frustrated murder and
murder. On trial, appellant, who interposed the
defense of alibi, was positively identified by Mrs.
Florencia Javier as the man with black-painted face
who delivered the bag with the fatal bomb, Likewise,
two other witnesses testified that appellant was the
man with the blackened face who ran towards them
and away from the scene of the crime soon after the
explosion was heard. Evidence was also presented
as to the black dyeing materials found in appellant's
jeep. Consequently, the trial court found accusedappellant guilty of two separate crimes of multiple
attempted murder and murder, On appeal, appellant,
in addition to his defense of alibi, invoked double
jeopardy, lack of sufficient motive and lack of positive
identification.
On review, the Supreme Court held that: (a) the
mere filing of two information or complaints against
accused-appellant could not have placed him in
double jeopardy for the simple reason that what
could have been the first jeopardy had not yet been
completed or even began; (b) appellant's alibi is

destroyed by clear, positive and convincing


identification of him by eyewitnesses; (c) there being
positive identification, motive for the commission of
the crime loses its importance; and (d) the crime
committed, being the result of a single act, is the
complex crime of murder with multiple frustrated
murder qualified by the use of explosive and
attended by the aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation, craft and dwelling, penalized
with death. The Court, however, finding that
appellant is over 70 years old, reduced the penalty to
reclusion perpetua.
Judgment modified.
COMPLEX CRIMES; MURDER WITH MULTIPLE
FRUSTRATED MURDER; CASE AT BAR. Since
the injuries suffered by the offended parties in
Criminal Case No. 88173 resulted from the same act
allegedly of the accused that caused the death of
Felicidad Mique, the victim in Criminal Case No.
88174, namely, the explosion of the bomb which
according to the prosecution was handed by
appellant to Florencia Tactay-Javier, the crime for
which appellant could be made to answer is the
virtually single complex offense of murder with
frustrated murder pursuant to Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code. There is in law only one
offense because there is only one penalty that can
be imposed notwithstanding that the act may in fact
involve a cluster of otherwise separate or distinct
offenses.
PENALTY FOR THE COMPLEX CRIME OF
MURDER
WITH
MULTIPLE
FRUSTRATED
MURDER; DEATH. Appellant's guilt having been
proven beyond reasonable doubt, the Court has no
alternative than to find him guilty of the complex
offense of murder with multiple frustrated murder,
qualified by use of explosive and attended by the
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation,
craft and dwelling, which crime deserves no less
than the extreme penalty of death.
PENALTY; DEATH PENALTY COMMUTED TO
RECLUSION PERPETUA ON ACCOUNT OF
APPELLANT'S ADVANCED AGE. It appearing
from the records, however, that appellant is presently
more than 70 years old, pursuant to Article 47 of the
Revised Penal Code, the Court has no alternative
but to affirm the penalty of reclusion perpetua
imposed by the trial court, with all the concomitant
accessories thereof.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VEDASTO


MORENO
G.R. Nos. L-37801-05. October 23, 1978

ISABELITA REODICA vs. COURT OF APPEALS,


and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 125066. July 8, 1998.

SYNOPSIS
In an ambuscade, Cebu mayor Samson Cerna was
mortally wounded. His wife and three other
companions in the truck suffered wounds. Mrs.
Cerna and the truck driver positively identified
appellants Moreno, Rodrigo Baricutaro, Roberto and
Carlos Paslon, and Generalao, political rivals of the
slain mayor, as among the perpetrators of the crime.
In a dying declaration, Mayor Cerna stated that he
recognized the same five appellants as among their
assailants. One year after the incident and after the
trial had commenced, the seven other appellants
were implicated as co-conspirators by one Norteza,
a known follower of the mayor, who claimed that he
was a co-conspirator in the plot to kill the mayor but
that he withdrew from the same and was not
indicted. The ambush appeared to have been the
aftermath of the late mayor's issuance of warrants
for the arrest of four of the appellants and the
incarceration and posting of four bail bonds by
appellant Moreno in connection with an incident
during the 1969 elections. The original five accused
interposed the defense of alibi which, however, were
either weak and unconvincing, or uncorroborated.
The trial court found all twelve appellants guilty of the
complex crime of murder with atentado and four
frustrated murders, although the charges were only
for murder with atentado, two frustrated murders,
and two attempted murders.

SYNOPSIS
In the evening of October 17,1987, petitioner
Isabelita Reodica was driving a van along Doa
Soledad Avenue, Better Living Subdivision,
Paraaque, Metro Manila hit the car of complainant
Norberto Bonsol that resulted to physical injuries to
the complainant and damage to his car amounted to
P8,542.00. Consequently, an information for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property with Slight Physical Injuries docketed as
Criminal Case No. 33919 was filed against her. After
trial, the Regional Trial Court of Makati convicted the
petitioner as charged and was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor. On
Appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the said
decision.

The Supreme Court acquitted the seven appellants


implicated by Norteza holding that the veracity of his
testimony is impaired not merely by the long delay in
giving it but also by the undeniable fact that he was a
follower of the slain mayor which strongly militates
against his credibility. It found the conviction of the
appellants for four frustrated murders glaringly
erroneous, the charges being merely for two
frustrated murders and two attempted murders, and
the injuries suffered by the victims not being capable
of causing death.
Decision modified.
COMPLEX CRIME OF MURDER WITH ATENTADO
(ARTICLE 48, 148 and 248, REVISED PENAL
CODE. Where a person in authority while
engaged in the performance of his official duties or
on occasion of such performance, has been killed in
an ambuscade which exhibited the characteristics of
alevosia (Article 14 (16), Revised Penal Code), the
offense committed is the complex crime of murder
with direct assault upon a person in authority.
PENALTY. In the complex crime of murder with
attentado, the penalty of death, the maximum
penalty for murder, the more serious offense, should
be imposed. However, for lack of the requisite votes,
the Supreme Court would impose the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.

Hence, this petition for review.


The court ruled that clearly, if a reckless, imprudent
or negligent act results in two or more grave or less
grave felonies, a complex crime is committed.
However, in Lontok v. Gorgonio, this Court declared
that where one of the resulting offenses in criminal
negligence constitutes a light felony, there is no
complex crime. Hence, the trial court erred in
considering the following felonies as a complex
crime: the less grave felony of reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property in the amount of
P8,542.00 and the light felony of reckless
imprudence resulting in physical injuries.
Similarly, since offenses punishable by imprisonment
of not exceeding 4 years and 2 months were within
the jurisdictional ambit of the MeTCs, MTCs and
MCTCs, it follows that those penalized with censure,
which is a penalty lower than arresto menor under
the graduated scale in Article 71 of the Revised
Penal Code and with a duration of 1 to 30 days,
should also fall within the jurisdiction of said courts.
Thus, reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries was cognizable by said courts.
As to the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property in the amount of P8,542.00, the same was
also under the jurisdiction of the MeTCs, MTCs or
MCTCs because the imposable penalty therefor was
arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods
the duration of which was from 1 month and 1 day to
4 months.
Criminal Case No. 33919 should, therefore, be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
RTC of Makati.
CRIMINAL LAW; QUASI-OFFENSES; RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN SLIGHT PHYSICAL
INJURIES; PROPER PENALTY. The penalty for
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
injuries, a light felony, is arresto menor in its
maximum period, with a duration of 21 to 30 days. If
the offense of slight physical injuries is, however,
committed deliberately or with malice, it is penalized
with arresto menor under Article 266 of the Revised
Penal Code, with a duration of 1 day to 30 days.
Plainly, the penalty then under Article 266 may be
either lower than or equal to the penalty prescribed

under the first paragraph of Article 365. This being


the case, the exception in the sixth paragraph of
Article 365 applies. Hence, the proper penalty for
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
injuries is public censure, this being the penalty next
lower in degree to arresto menor.
CLASSIFICATION. As earlier stated, reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is
punishable by public censure only. Article 9,
paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code defines light
felonies as infractions of law carrying the penalty of
arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or
both. Since public censure is classified under Article
25 of the Code as a light penalty, and is considered
under the graduated scale provided in Article 71 of
the same Code as a penalty lower than arresto
menor it follows that the offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is a
light felony.
RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE
RESULTING
IN
DAMAGE TO PROPERTY; PROPER PENALTY;
CASE AT BAR. As to reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property in the amount of
P8,542.00, the third paragraph of Article 365, which
provides for the penalty of fine, does not apply since
the reckless imprudence in this case did not result in
damage to property only. What applies is the first
paragraph of Article 365, which provides for arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods (1 month
and 1 day to 4 months) for an act committed through
reckless imprudence which, had it been intentional,
would have constituted a less grave felony. Note that
if the damage to the extent of P8,542.00 were
caused deliberately, the crime would have been
malicious mischief under Article 329 of the Revised
Penal Code, and the penalty would then be arresto
mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2
months and 1 day to 6 months which is higher than
that prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 365).
If the penalty under Article 329 were equal to or
lower than that provided for in the first paragraph,
then the sixth paragraph of Article 365 would apply, i.
e., the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto
menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its
minimum period or imprisonment from 21 days to 2
months. Accordingly, the imposable penalty for
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property
to the extent of P8,542.00 would be arresto mayor in
its minimum and medium periods, which could be
anywhere from a minimum of 1 month and 1 day to a
maximum of 4 months, at the discretion of the court,

since the fifth paragraph of Article 365 provides that


in the imposition of the penalties therein provided
"the courts shall exercise their sound discretion
without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64."
CLASSIFICATION. On the other hand, reckless
imprudence also resulting in damage to property is,
as earlier discussed, penalized with arresto mayor in
its minimum and medium periods. Since arresto
mayor is a correctional penalty under Article 25 of
the Revised Penal Code, the quasi offense in
question is a less grave felony not a light felony
as claimed by petitioner.

WHERE ONE OF THE RESULTING OFFENSES IN


CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE CONSTITUTES A LIGHT
FELONY, THERE IS NO COMPLEX CRIME.
Clearly, if a reckless, imprudent or negligent act
results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a
complex crime is committed. However, in Lontok v.
Gorgonio this Court declared that where one of the
resulting offenses in criminal negligence constitutes
a light felony, there is no complex crime.
JURISDICTION; DETERMINING FACTORS. The
jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be determined
by the law in force at the time of the institution of the
action, unless the statute expressly provides, or is
construed to the effect that it is intended to operate
as to actions pending before its enactment. . . . The
criminal jurisdiction of the lower courts was then
determined by the duration of the imprisonment and
the amount of fine prescribed by law for the offense
charged.
OFFENSES PUNISHABLE BY CENSURE ARE
COGNIZABLE BY MeTCs, MTCs AND MCTCs.
Similarly, since offenses punishable by imprisonment
of not exceeding 4 years and 2 months were within
the jurisdictional ambit of the MeTCs, MTCs and
MCTCs, it follows that those penalized with censure,
which is a penalty lower than arresto menor under
the graduated scale in Article 71 of the Revised
Penal Code and with a duration of 1 to 30 days,
should also fall within the jurisdiction of said courts.
Thus, reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries was cognizable by said courts.

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