Guidance Off-The-Shelf Software Use
Guidance Off-The-Shelf Software Use
and Compliance on
Preface
Public Comment
Comments and suggestions may be submitted at any time for Agency consideration to John Murray,
Office of Device Evaluation at [email protected] or at 301-796-5543. Comments may not
be acted upon by the Agency until the document is next revised or updated. For questions regarding
the use or interpretation of this guidance contact John Murray at [email protected]
or at 301-796-5543. Questions regarding theuse or interpretation of this guidance for a particular
device should be directed to the appropriate ODE review division.
Additional Copies
World Wide Web/CDRH home page at http://wcms.fda.gov/FDAgov/MedicalDevices/
DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/UCM073778.htm. You may also
send an e-mail request to [email protected] to receive an electronic copy of the guidance
or send a fax request to 301-847-8149 to receive a hard copy. Please use the document
number (585) to identify the guidance you are requesting
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Table of Contents
1
OVERVIEW....................................................................................................................................... 1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
4
5
BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................................. 18
APPENDICES ................................................................................................................................. 19
5.1
Operating Systems ..........................................................................................................................................19
5.2
Utilities and Drivers...........................................................................................................................................20
5.3
Local Area Networks (LANs) ...........................................................................................................................20
5.3.1 Requirements Analysis................................................................................................................... 21
5.3.2 Implementation .............................................................................................................................. 22
5.4
Device Master Files..........................................................................................................................................22
5.5
Maintenance and Obsolescence .....................................................................................................................23
5.5.1 Safety ............................................................................................................................................ 23
5.5.2 Design ........................................................................................................................................... 24
5.5.3 Verification and Validation.............................................................................................................. 24
5.5.4 Installation ..................................................................................................................................... 25
5.5.5 Obsolescence ................................................................................................................................ 25
5.5.6 Change control............................................................................................................................... 25
Numbers in square brackets [##] appearing in this guidance refer to citations in the Bibliography (Section 4)
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1 Overview
1.1 Introduction and Background
Off-the-shelf (OTS) software is commonly being considered for incorporation into medical
devices as the use of general purpose computer hardware becomes more prevalent. The use of
OTS software in a medical device allows the manufacturer to concentrate on the application
software needed to run device-specific functions. However, OTS software intended for general
purpose computing may not be appropriate for a given specific use in a medical device. The
medical device manufacturer using OTS software generally gives up software life cycle control,
but still bears the responsibility for the continued safe and effective performance of the medical
device.
This guidance document was developed to address the many questions asked by medical device
manufacturers regarding what they need to provide in a pre-market submission to the FDA when
they use OTS software. The specific response to these questions depends on the medical device in
question and the impact on patient, operator, or bystander safety if the OTS software fails. Thus,
the answer to the question, What do I need to document? may differ and is based on the risk
analysis that is an integral part of designing a medical device. The detail of documentation to be
provided to FDA and the level of life cycle control necessary for the medical device manufacturer
increase as severity of the hazards to patients, operators, or bystanders from OTS software failure
increases.
This document lays out in broad terms how the medical device manufacturer can consider what is
necessary to document for submission to the agency. A BASIC set of need-to-document items is
recommended for all OTS software, and a detailed discussion is provided on additional
(SPECIAL) needs and responsibilities of the manufacturer when the severity of the hazards from
OTS software failure become more significant.
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Contained in Medical Devices [4]. Many of the principles outlined herein may also be helpful to
device manufacturers in establishing design controls and validation plans for use of off-the-shelf
software in their devices. This guidance discusses key elements reviewers should look for in the
submission thereby providing a common baseline from which both manufacturers and reviewers
can operate. This should improve predictability of agency interaction with sponsors regarding
applications involving OTS software.
The guidance provided in this document reflects a safety-based approach to risk management and
is designed to be consistent with international standards on risk management. Existing
international standards indicate that the estimation of risk should be considered as the product of
the severity of harm and the probability of occurrence of harm. Probabilities of occurrence are
calculated based on clinical and engineering considerations. On the clinical side, manufacturers
use patient populations, user skill sets, labeling and risk benefit analysis to calculate risk and
acceptable risk levels. On the software engineering side, probabilities of occurrence would
normally be based on software failure rates. However, software failures are systematic in nature
and therefore their probability of occurrence can not be determined using traditional statistical
methods.
Because the risk estimates for hazards related to software cannot easily be estimated based on
software failure rates, CDRH has concluded that engineering risk management for medical device
software should focus on the severity of the harm that could result from the software failure.
Hazard Analysis is defined as the identification of Hazards and their initiating causes [IEC 606011-4]. Based on the definition of Risk Analysis in ISO DIS 14971 and EN 1441, hazard analysis is
actually a subset of risk analysis; because risk analysis for software cannot be based on probability
of occurrence, the actual function of risk analysis for software can then be reduced to a hazard
analysis function. Technically speaking, the use of either term risk or hazard analysis is
appropriate. However, CDRH has chosen to use the term hazard analysis to reinforce the
concept that calculating risk based on software failure rates is generally not justified, and that it is
more appropriate to manage software safety risk based on the severity of harm rather then the
software failure rates.
1.3 Definitions
Following a safety-based approach to risk analysis, we define:
Hazard A possible source of danger or a condition which could result in human injury.
Hazard Analysis Identification of hazards and their initiating causes. [IEC 60601-1-4]
Hazard Mitigation Reduction in the severity of the hazard, the likelihood of the occurrence, or
both.
Major Level of Concern The Level of Concern is major if operation of the software associated
with device function directly affects the patient, operator, and/or bystander so that failures or
latent flaws could result in death or serious injury to the patient, operator, and/or bystander, or if
it indirectly affects the patient, operator, and/or bystander (e.g., through the action of care
OTS Software Guidance, Final
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provider) such that incorrect or delayed information could result in death or serious injury to the
patient, operator, and/or bystander.
Minor Level of Concern The Level of Concern is minor if failures or latent design flaws would
not be expected to result in any injury to the patient, operator, and/or bystander.
Moderate Level of Concern The Level of Concern is moderate if the operation of the software
associated with device function directly affects the patient, operator, and/or bystander so that
failures or latent design flaws could result in non-serious injury to the patient, operator, and/or
bystander, or if it indirectly affects the patient, operator, and/or bystander (e.g., through the action
of the care provider) where incorrect or delayed information could result in non-serious injury of
the patient, operator, and/or bystander.
Off-the-Shelf Software (OTS software) A generally available software component, used by a
medical device manufacturer for which the manufacturer can not claim complete software life
cycle control.
Risk Analysis Investigation of available information to identify hazards and to estimate risks.
[ISO DIS 14971]
Risk Control the process through which decisions are reached and implemented for reducing
risks to, or maintaining risks within, specified limits. [ISO DIS 14971]
Safety In the regulation of medical devices, safety means that the probable benefits to health for
its intended use when accompanied by adequate directions and warnings against unsafe use,
outweigh any probable risks. In this guidance we will use the words safety and effectiveness to
remind ourselves that safety is only meaningful in the context of the benefit-risk considerations
and the labeling.
Serious Injury as adopted from the Medical Device Reporting (MDR) regulation in the Code
of Federal Regulations 21 CFR 803.3 (aa), means an injury or illness that:
1. is life threatening,
2. results in permanent impairment of a body function or permanent damage to a body structure,
or
3. necessitates medical or surgical intervention to preclude permanent impairment of a body
function or permanent damage to a body structure.
Permanent for the purpose of this subpart, permanent means irreversible impairment or damage
to a body structure or function excluding trivial impairment or damage.
Other software terminology used in this document is defined in FDA's Glossary of Computerized
System and Software Development Terminology [6].
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No
Done
Yes
Yes
Done
Minor LOC
No
Hazard Mitigation
(see section 2.3)
No
Yes
Minor or
Moderate LOC
Major LOC
Done
Table 1-1 summarizes the recommended contents for an OTS Software submission based on
Figure 1-1.
Table 1-1. Documentation Summary from Figure 1-1
Minor Level of Concern before mitigations
Hazard Analysis
Basic Documentation
Minor Level of Concern after mitigations
Hazard Analysis
Basis Documentation
Hazard Mitigations
Moderate Level of Concern
Hazard Analysis
Basis Documentation
Hazard Mitigations
Describe and Justify Residual Risk
Major Level of Concern after mitigations
Hazard Analysis
Basic Documentation
Hazard Mitigations
Describe and Justify Residual Risk
Special Documentation
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Describe testing, verification and validation of the OTS Software and ensure it is
appropriate for the device hazards associated with the OTS software. (See Note1)
Provide the results of the testing. (See Note 2)
Is there a current list of OTS Software problems (bugs) and access to updates?
Note 1: FDA recommends that software test, verification and validation plans identify the
exact OTS Software (title and version) that is to be used. When the software is tested
it should be integrated and tested using the specific OTS Software that will be delivered
to the user.
Note 2: If the manufacturer allows the use of the medical device with different versions of
OTS Software then the manufacturer should validate the medical device for each OTS
Software version.
6. How will you keep track of (control) the OTS Software? - An appropriate plan should
answer the following questions:
What measures have been designed into the medical device to prevent the introduction of
incorrect versions? On startup, ideally, the medical device should check to verify that all
software is the correct title, version level and configuration. If the correct software is not
loaded, the medical device should warn the operator and shut down to a safe state.
How will you maintain the OTS Software configuration?
Where and how will you store the OTS Software?
How will you ensure proper installation of the OTS Software?
How will you ensure proper maintenance and life cycle support for the OTS Software?
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Note: A tabular format of the OTS Software hazard analysis or a tabular summary will facilitate
review. The hazard analysis for OTS Software may be included in the overall device hazard
analysis provided adequate documentation is provided.
If the device with the OTS Software represents a Minor Level of Concern, then the Level of
Concern for the OTS Software can be no greater. The hazard analysis for the OTS Software in
such a device may simply document the Minor Level of Concern of the device.
Where failure, malfunction, or misuse of the OTS Software poses no possibility of injury to the
patient, operators, or bystanders, then the OTS Software is said to present a Minor Level of
Concern, and the fulfillment of the BASIC DOCUMENTATION (see section 2.1) will be
considered sufficient.
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Mitigate hazard by
inherent safe
design
protective
measures
user
information
and training
Hazard Analysis
Hazard Mitigation
No
Yes
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These approaches may involve hardware and/or software. These three mitigation approaches are
by no means mutually exclusive and may be used concurrently. The most desirable approach is to
design in effective controls, i.e., eliminate the need for a hazardous operation or component.
Protective measures are considered passive (from the users standpoint) since they do not require
any action on the part of the user. The least effective approaches depend on some action (or lack
of action) on the part of the medical device user.
The submission should include the following information to document the OTS Software hazard
mitigation:
1. A list of all identified medical device hazards associated with the OTS Software
2. The steps taken to mitigate each hazard
3. The residual risk
Note: A tabular format of the risk management or a tabular summary will facilitate review. These
results will typically be included as a part of the overall medical device Hazard Analysis and
Mitigation plan.
One example of a comprehensive approach to injury prevention in public health was developed
around ten countermeasures [2]. Table 2-1 (see next page) illustrates a generic approach to the
hazard mitigation, in this case, to preventing injury-related energy release to patients, operators,
or bystanders.
With implementation of each hazard mitigation, the residual risk is assessed as well as assessment
of any new hazards which may be introduced.
Acceptable levels of residual risk, based on the severity or the likelihood of the residual risk
occurring, will depend on the intended use of the medical device and the function performed by
the software. In the case of diagnostic tests, injury includes results which can lead to unnecessary
invasive diagnostic testing (e.g., biopsy) or withholding or delaying important diagnostic or
therapeutic procedures.
The sponsor will need to describe and justify the residual risk (section 2.4) for Moderate or Major
Levels of Concern. Where failure, malfunction, or misuse of the OTS Software is likely to result
in death or serious injury to the patient, operators, or bystanders, then the OTS Software is said
to present a Major Level of Concern. If the residual risk from the OTS Software presents a
Major Level of Concern, the sponsor will need to fulfill SPECIAL DOCUMENTATION (see
Section 2.5).
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
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Note: If such an audit is not possible and after hazard mitigation, the OTS Software
still represents a Major Level of Concern, the use of such OTS Software may not be
appropriate for the intended medical device application.
2. Demonstrate that the procedures and results of the verification and validation activities
performed for the OTS Software are appropriate and sufficient for the safety and effectiveness
requirements of the medical device. Verification and validation activities include not only
those performed by the OTS Software developer, but also include those performed by the
medical device manufacturer when qualifying the OTS Software for its use in the specific
medical device.
3. Demonstrate the existence of appropriate mechanisms for assuring the continued maintenance
and support of the OTS Software should the original OTS Software developer terminate their
support.
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OTS Software Level of Concern: A corneal topographer represents no threat of direct harm
to the patient. The risk of indirect harm from a misdiagnosis relating to medical device
malfunction is small since the worst case is an incorrect image which is considered correct.
The OTS Software in this medical device thus represents a Minor Level of Concern (see
section 2.2) and should satisfy BASIC DOCUMENTATION (see section 2.1).
3.1.2 Perineometer
Minor Level of Concern medical device (see Section 2.1)
Intended Use: Perineometers are used to provide feedback to a patient performing muscle
strengthening exercises (Kegel exercises) for the treatment of certain types of urinary
incontinence.
Description: There are two types of perineometers: those which measure pressure, and those
which measure electrical activity (EMG) from muscles. Each device consists of a probe
that is placed into either the vagina or the rectum, and a monitoring unit. The pressure
devices use an air-filled probe connected to the monitoring unit by a piece of plastic
tubing. When the patient performs the exercise, the probe is compressed, and the
monitoring unit reports the change in pressure. The electrical devices use an electrode to
measure the electrical activity of the target muscles during the exercises, and this
information is reported by the monitoring unit.
OTS Software: An OTS operating system, such as DOS or Windows, may be used to record
and display the data collected by the monitoring unit.
OTS Software Level of Concern: Perineometers represent no threat of direct injury to the
patient, since no energy is applied by the medical device to the patient. The risk of
indirect injury due to inaccurate feedback during the exercise session is expected to be
small, as these medical devices are only used as an adjunct to exercise therapy, and they
are used under clinical supervision. The OTS Software in this medical device thus
represents a Minor Level of Concern (see section 2.2) and should satisfy the BASIC
DOCUMENTATION (see Section 2.1).
query the implant for performance history (device and patient), and, in some systems,
for print-out of the recorded electrograms;
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provide the induced shock for system initialization and diagnostic purposes; and
verify implant operating characteristics and status (including battery) via signals from
the implant.
OTS Software: An OTS operating system such as DOS or Windows is used to provide a
user interface (sometimes graphical), interface to the PC (hardware platform), and
interface with data storage, and output devices.
OTS Software Level of Concern: The on-board software for the implant satisfies the
definition of Major Level of Concern software (life supporting/life sustaining) and would
need to satisfy the SPECIAL DOCUMENTATION (see Section 2.4). Whether the device
programmer can be considered of lesser Level of Concern depends primarily on the
protection designed into the implant or the programmer. Steps taken to mitigate the risk
might include:
limiting the part of the OTS Software which is utilized in the programming application;
protecting the PC from use for other applications, including consideration of the
following:
Software design features to protect against adding unwanted software,
modification or system use; and
Hardware design features to protect against unwanted system use.
Other points which might be offered to support use of OTS Software in the programmer might
include:
1. documented experience (data) with use of the OTS Software in this application
What was the system in place to detect and report problems?
What is the rate of problems reported compared to other (perhaps non-OTS
Software) systems?
2. documented experience with the OTS Software in other relevant applications
What are the reported problems (bug list) and how many are relevant to this
application?
Has there been difficulty in developing work-arounds for the problems relevant to this
application?
OTS Software Guidance, Final
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The review team must decide whether the overall programmer system as implemented satisfies
the necessary system safety and effectiveness (see section 2.5).
B8.1 Does the change affect the indications for use? As with an explicit labeling change, if the
change affects the indications for use, i.e., if it creates an implied new indication for use, a new
510(k) should be submitted.
B8.2 Are clinical data necessary to evaluate safety and effectiveness for purposes of
determining substantial equivalence? Whenever a manufacturer recognizes that clinical data
are needed because bench testing or simulations are not sufficient to assess safety and
effectiveness and, thus, to establish the substantial equivalence of a new design, a 510(k)
should be submitted.
B8.3 Do results of design validation raise new issues of safety and effectiveness? All changes
to medical device design will require some level of design validation or evaluation to assure
that the device continues to perform as intended. The successful application of routine design
validation activities will logically result in manufacturers documenting their efforts and
proceeding with the design change, i.e., assuring that no issues of safety or effectiveness are
raised.
A yes answer to any of these questions in section B will generally require a new 510(k).
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4 Bibliography
1. Levesen NG: Safeware System Safety and Computers. Addison-Wesley, New York, 1995,
680 pages. Abs: A good discussion of the problem area by a recognized expert on software
safety.
2. Haddon W, Baker SP: Injury protocol. in Duncan, Clark Brain, MacMahon (eds): Preventive
Medicine, New York, Little, Brown, 1979. Abs: A readable discussion of basic injury
reduction strategies from some of the most experienced in the field.
3. USPHS DHHS FDA CDRH: Deciding When to Submit a 510(k) for a Change to an Existing
Device. 510(k) Memorandum #K97-1. January 10, 1997. Abs: CDRH guidance that
discusses how to decide when a change to an existing 510(k) requires a new 510(k)
submission. Text version is available on the FDA home page at
http://www.FDA.GOV/cdrh/ode/510kmod.html.
4. USPHS DHHS FDA CDRH: ODE Guidance for the Content of Premarket Submissions for
Software Contained in Medical Devices. May 29, 1998. Abs: This document provides the
current guidance in the review of software which comprises part of (or all of) a medical
device. Available on the FDA Home Page at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/ode/software.pdf
5. USPHS DHHS FDA CDRH: Medical Device LabelingSuggested Format and Content.
DRAFT Version 4.2, copies of this work-in-progress are available as of March 4, 1997. Abs:
OTS Software Guidance, Final
page 18
This document provides the current guidance on the policy, format and content of the labeling
of medical devices.
6. USPHS DHHS FDA ORA: Glossary of Computerized System and Software Development
Terminology. Abs: This document provides a glossary of commonly used computer and
software terms.
5 Appendices
The purpose of these appendices is to provide background and comment on various OTS
software. Based on the Level of Concern, device manufacturers should either use or not use
Commercial Off-the-shelf Software (COTS).
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monitors and imaging systems, are increasingly networked for clinical work groups, centralized
monitoring, and storage of patient medical data and records. LANs and other networks support
more and more communication and sharing of images, measurement data, audio, video, graphics,
text, etc. This heterogeneous media environment comes at a cost of more processing power,
higher bandwidth or network speed, sophisticated object-relational databases, and security and
access considerations.
The evaluation of networked medical devices begins with a definition of the technical
requirements of the network application and the understanding of those requirements.
data rate (bandwidth) for the medical device system. The CPU processing power and
clock speed required at device monitors, workstations, and client machines should be
appropriate so that bottlenecks do not occur.
2. LAN Architecture - The size of the LAN (the number of user nodes) and the topology of
the LAN should be specified.
Discuss to what extent the LAN needs to be fault tolerant, e.g., when a
workstation fails?
Discuss to what extent the LAN needs to be scaleable, i.e., can new user
nodes be added without degrading system performance?
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Transmission of data packets and files should include error detection and correction.
Error detection methods include parity, checksum, and cyclic redundancy check (CRC).
Transaction rollback after non-committed changes or network failure, supports data
integrity in medical device LANs.
Critical data and files may be stored in duplicate at separate locations.
5. Network Management and Security - User authorization and authentication should precede
accesses to sensitive patient information.
The above five items are not independent. Decisions made in one item area may affect the
performance of the LAN in another area.
5.3.2 Implementation
The speed required by the medical device system dictates the hardware selection, the network
interface cards and transmissions protocols. For example, if the conventional Ethernet protocol
(maximum transmission speed of 10 Mbps) is too slow for the intended application, then a
different transmission protocol will be needed.
Simplicity of the LAN architecture versus fault tolerance is a trade-off that may arise in the
implementation of the networked medical device systems. The LAN could be implemented as a
linear bus network (perhaps the simplest scheme), but if any connecting link on the bus fails the
whole network can fail. A star topology with redundant centralized hub is an example of a more
complex but more robust network structure.
Segmentation of high bandwidth applications may be employed to improve LAN performance.
Limiting the data traffic to data intensive clusters reduces traffic throughout the overall LAN.
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permission to specific device manufacturers to reference the master file in their premarket
submissions. Information regarding device master files is contained in DSMAs Premarket
Approval (PMA) Manual, or via Facts-on-Demand or from the FDA home page
(http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/dsma/pmaman/front.html)
Manufacturer Good Software Development Practices (GSDP)s and Good Corrective Action
Practices (GCAP) are in place.
A new product baseline based on a prior product baseline is under CDRH review.
Each concern below corresponds to a product development life cycle phase. The concerns
identify fundamental maintenance concerns relevant to all regulated PEMS and stand-alone
medical software devices. Guidance in the main body of this document provides the procedural
foundation for concerns in this section.
5.5.1 Safety
Introduction of new or modified OTS components to a product baseline may impact the safety of
the product. Therefore a safety impact assessment of the medical device must be performed and
associated hazards documented in a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) table. Each
hazards consequence should be provided and expressed qualitatively; e.g. major, moderate, or
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minor. Traceability between these identified hazards, their design requirements, and test reports
must be provided.
Analysis should include the review of release bulletins (known error reports), user manuals,
specifications, patches, literature and internet searches for other users experience with this OTS
Software.
The submission should answer the following questions:
has a FMEA with traceability to requirements and test reports been provided?
what new human factors conditions are introduced with new OTS components?
5.5.2 Design
Introduction of new or modified OTS Software components to a product baseline may impact the
original design of the product. This impact may result from necessary changes to the product
structure organization, architecture, logic, integration, or combination of these characteristics.
Problems attributable to structural changes include:
How will the new OTS Software component(s) change the performance characteristics?
How will the new OTS Software component(s) change the operational environment?
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logic paths and complexities of OTS Software components make it important to know that design
structure or logic elsewhere in the system is not impacted. This means a full system regression
test should be performed. Results of these validation activities should be documented.
The submission should answer the following questions:
Do test reports provide objective evidence that identified OTS Software component hazards
have been addressed?
Do test reports provide objective evidence that all identified SYSTEM hazards have been
addressed?
5.5.4 Installation
Changes in a product baseline structure resulting from the integration of new OTS Software
components may impact installation requirements. This impact can range from minor
documentation changes to field upgrades. The reviewer should ascertain the impact of OTS
Software component changes on fielded products.
The submission should answer the following question: What is the impact of new OTS Software
components on fielded medical device products?
For example: Do new OTS Software components correctly operate within the specifications of
medical devices currently fielded?
5.5.5 Obsolescence
Rapid technology changes, economics, and market demand are shrinking product life spans. A
direct consequence of these phenomena is that an OTS Software component today may not exist
two years from now. Short life spans are a particular characteristic of software because it is
relatively easy to change. Obsolescence of OTS Software components can have significant
impact on regulated products because the device manufacturer may lose the ability to properly
support fielded products. The sponsor needs to support fielded medical device products with
OTS Software components.
The submission should answer the following questions:
Will the old OTS Software component still be available for fielded medical devices?
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hardware platform (e.g. microprocessor, minimum memory required, addressable word size)
OTS component(s) other than (b) above (see basic requirements in the main body of this
document)
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