1.

Attys Humberto Basco et al vs Phil Amusements and Gaming

Corp G.R. No. 91649
Facts: Petitioners seek for the annulment of PAGCOR Charter, PD 1869
being contrary to morals, public policy and order and for tending
towards monopoly, crony economy, waiving the Manila City
governments right to impose taxes and license fees, and violating the
equal protection clause, local autonomy and other state policies in the
Constitution.
Issue: Whether PD 1869 violates the local autonomy clause.
Held: PD 1869 does not violate the local autonomy clause.
The power of local government units to regulate gambling through the
grant of franchises, licenses or permits was withdrawn by PD 771 and
is now vested exclusively on the national governments. The power to
demand or collect license fees is no longer vested in the city of Manila.
Local government units have no power to tax government
instrumentalities. Being a GOCC, PAGCOR is therefore exempt from
local taxes. The national government is supreme over local
governments. As such, mere creatures of the State cannot defeat
national policies using the power to tax as a tool for regulation. The
power to tax cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality of the very
entity which has the inherent power to wield it. The power of LGUs to
impose taxes and fees is always subject to limitation provided by
Congress.
2. Juanito Mariano Jr et al vs Commission on Elections G.R. No.
118577
Facts: Petitioners seek for annulment of section 2 of Republic Act 7854
for being unconstitutional as they failed to delineate the land areas of
Makati by metes and bounds with technical descriptions, section 51 for
colliding with provisions of the Constitution as said section allows for
the corporate existence of a new city, thereby, permitting the
incumbent municipal elective officials to have a fresh term for their
office, and section 52 for adding a legislative district.
Republic Act 7854 converts the municipality of Makati into a highly
urbanized city to be known as City of Makati.
Issue: Whether RA 7854 is unconstitutional.
Held: RA 7854 is constitutional.

The said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area
previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add,
subtract, divide or multiply the already established land area of Makati.
The court cannot entertain the challenge to the constitutionality of
section 51 as petitioners only relied on contingencies which may or
may not happen. At best, petitioners posed a hypothetical issue which
has yet to ripen into an actual controversy.
The reapportionment of legislative districts may be done through a
special law.
3. Municipality of Jimenez vs Hon. Vicente Baz, Jr. G.R. No.
105746
Facts: The Municipality of Jimenez and Municipality of Sinacaban
argued over a certain lot, which, based on E.O. 258 enacted by then
Pres Elpidio Quirinocreating the Municipality of Sinacaban defined
the latters territorial boundary.
Jimenezs claim over the disputed lot is based on an agreement with
the Municipality of Sinacaban and approved in resolution no. 77 by the
Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental. But said resolution was
superseded by another, declaring resolution no 77 as void.
The municipality of Jimenez filed for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus against Sinacaban, the Province of Misamis Occidental and
its Provincial Board, the Commission of Audit and Department of Local
Government Budget and Management and the Executive Secretary.
Issue: Whether Sinacaban has legal personality to file a claim and if it
has, whether it is the boundary provided for in EO 248 or in Resolution
77 of the Board of Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental which should
be used as the basis for adjudicating its territorial claim.
Held: Sinacaban is a de facto corporation since it had completely
organized itself and exercised corporate powers for forty years before
its existence was questioned. Where a municipality created as such by
executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded
legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned.
Above all, it was held that whatever doubt there might be as to the de
jure character of the municipality must be deemed to have been put to
rest by the Local Government Code of 1991.

4. City of Pasig vs Commission on Elections G.R. No. 125646

Facts: The Comelec withheld the holding of plebiscite on the creation of
Barangay Karangalan until the court has settled with finality the
boundary disputes, but not the petition creating barangay napico,
ruling the same is moot and academic for the plebiscite was held and
the creation of such barangay was approved by majority of the votes
cast therein. The city of pasig filed a suit against comelec for holding in
abeyance the plebiscite for creating Barangay Karangalan.
Issue: Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of the
two barangays should be suspended in view of the pending boundary
dispute between two local governemtns.
Held: Yes, precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in
the pending civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved with
finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays
would only be an exercise in futility. Not only that, we would be paving
the way for potentially ultra vires acts of such barangays.
In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the
areas covered by the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico are
within its territory, it can not deny that portions of the same area are
included in the boundary dispute case pending before the Regional
Trial Court of Antipolo. Surely, whether the areas in controversy shall
be decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of
Cainta or the City of Pasig has material bearing to the creation of the
proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico. Indeed, a requisite for the
creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly
identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural
boundaries.
5. Flaviano Mejia et al vs Pedro U. Balolong G.R. No. L-1925
Facts: In November 1947 General Election for provincial, municipal and
city officials, petitioners were elected as councilors of Dagupan City.
The respondents, having been defeated in the said election were
nevertheless appointed as councilors by the President of the
Philippines on Dec 30, 1947.
Petitioners filed an action for quo warranto against respondents on the
ground that their appointments by the president of the republic of the
phils were null and void.

Held: The appointments of the respondents effected on December 30,

1947, are null and void. The validity of the appointment of the
respondents as councilors of the City of Dagupan by the President of
the Philippines depends upon whether the City of Dagupan was created
and came into existence on June 20, 1947, the date Act No. 170
became effective, or on January 1, 1948, when the city government
was organized by Executive Order No. 96.
The City of Dagupan created by Act 170 came into existence as a legal
entity or a public corporation upon the approval of said Act, on June 20,
1947. Because a statute like Act No. 170 is to take effect upon its
approval, it is operative from the exact instance upon its approval or
becoming a law.
Since the election of the members of the Municipal Board of the City of
Dagupan created on June 20, 1947, was to take and took place at the
general election held on November 11, 1947, and the President of the
Philippines was empowered by section 88 of Act 170 to appoint those
members only if the organization of the city government had taken
place pending or before the said election.
6. Ricardo Aguado vs City of Manila G.R. No. L-3282
Ricardo Aguado was an assignor of claims held by Tomas Luna Munoz
against the City of Manila, the latter being an administrator of the
water supply and Carriedo funds. On April 28, 1903, Aguado filed an
action to recover from the City of Manila the sum of P5,621.40. The
Court of First Instance decided in plaintiffs favor.
Issue: Whether or not the present City of Manila is liable under the
contracts for the obligations created by the old City of Manila as its
successor.
Held: The City of Manila is not liable.
The City of Manila is in no way the successor of the Ayuntamiento de
Manila in law. The mere fact that the present authority in these islands
has given to the present city powers like those exercised by the
Ayuntamiento de Manila in no way makes the former the successor of
the latter. It is an entirely new organization, a new agent of a new
principal, and only has such authority, such powers, and such
obligations and responsibilities as the new principal has seen fit to
grant and impose.
7. Marcos Mendoza vs Francisco De Leon et al G.R. No. 9596

Facts: Marcos Mendoza file an action for damages against the

individual members of the municipal council of the municipality of
Villasis, Pangasinan, for the revocation of the lease of an exclusive
ferry privilege duly awarded to Mendoz under the provisions of Act. No.
1643 of the Phil Commission. Mendoza was forcibly ejected after a little
more than a year of use.
Issue: Are the individual members of municipal council personally
liable?
Held: The defendants are liable jointly and severally for the damages
sustained by the plaintiff from the rescission of his contract of lease of
the ferry privilege in question.
Under the provisions of Municipal Code and Act No. 1634, the plaintiff
had a vested right to the exclusive operation of the ferry in question
for the period of his lease. Were the municipality a party to this action,
it would be patent that a judgment for damages against it for the
rescission of the contract would be proper.
8. The People of the Phil Islands vs Maximo Cruz G.R. No.
31265
Facts: Maximo Cruz was convicted of violating ordinance No. 4 series of
1928 of the municipality of Cabanatuan and was sentenced to a fine of
P200 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Hence, this
appeal.
Issue: Whether ordinance no. 4 is unconstitutional.
Held: The ordinance is constitutional.
Municipal councils are empowered to enact zonification ordinances
within their jurisdiction in the exercise of their police power. It is a
matter definitely settled by both Philippine and American cases that
municipal corporation may, in the exercise of their police power, enact
ordinances or regulations on zonification. Within the powers granted to
municipal councils in section 2238 of the Revised Administrative Code,
the municipal council of Cabanatuan was authorized to enact the
zonification ordinance with which we are now concerned.
9. Seng Kee & Co vs Tomas Earnshaw G.R. No. 34976
Facts: Seng Kee & Co filed an appeal from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, declaring sections 120, 121, 122, 1067 and

1068 of the Revised Ordinances No. 1600 of the City of Manila

constitutional, thereby affecting his toyo manufacturing business.
Issue: Whether the assailed provisions are unconstitutional.
Held: The provisions are constitutional.
The power of the City of Manila to adopt ordinances of this kind is
derived from sections 1019 and 1020 (g) of the Administrative Code.
And the constitutionality of these two provisions cannot be put in issue
as they flow from the police power inherent in every legislature, and
here delegated to the City of Manila.
10. In the matter of the petition of TIU SAN alias ANGEL GOMEZ
to be admitted a citizen of the Philippines. TIU SAN, alias
ANGEL GOMEZ, petitioner-appellant, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee. [G.R. No. L-7301. April 20,
1955.]
Facts:
The petition for naturalization as a Filipino citizen by Tiu San alias
Angel Gomez was denied due to his being convicted for a violation of a
Municipal Ordinance in the Municipality of Lucena, Quezon Province
on account of his failure to remove and transfer his lumber yard from a
prohibited zone in said municipality.
Issue:
Whether or not conviction for a violation of a municipal ordinance
is tantamount to a conviction for an offense or violation of
Government promulgated rules.
Held:
The regulation violated by petitioner was a zoning ordinance,
which seeks to protect the people and their property and to promote
their well being. It was promulgated by the municipal government of
Lucena acting as an agent of the national government. Hence, it
partakes of the nature of a "government promulgated rule", although
limited in its application to said locality.
11. MACASIANO v. DIOKNO, Mun. of Paranaque, and Palanyag
Kilusang Bayan
GR 97764 (Aug. 10, 1992)
Facts:
The Municipality of Paranaque passed an Ordinance, which
authorized the closure of several streets and the establishment of a

flea market thereon. The municipality and Palanyag, a service

cooperative, entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall
operate, maintain and manage the flea market with the obligation to
remit dues to the treasury of the Mun. of Paranaque. Consequently,
Palanyag put up market stalls on subject streets.
Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan
Traffic Command, ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls
along GG Cruz and J Gabrielle St. in Baclaran. These stalls were
returned to Palanyag. Thereafter, Macasiano wrote a letter to Palanyag,
giving the latter 10 days to discontinue the flea market, otherwise the
market stalls shall be dismantled.
The trial court (Judge Dikono) issued an Order upholding the
validity of the Ordinance allowing the use of public streets for the
operation of flea markets, and enjoining Macasiano from enforcing his
letter-order to Palanyag.
Issue:
WON an Ordinance or Resolution, issued by the municipal council
of Paranaque, authorizing the lease and use of public streets as sites
for a flea market is valid
Held:
No. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is
divided into property for public use and partrimonial property (Art. 423,
Civil Code).
In the present case, the streets in question are local roads used
for public service and therefore considered public properties of the
municipality. Properties of the local government which are devoted to
public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of
Congress. Hence, local government has no authority whatsoever to
control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority
is vested upon them by Congress
12. The United States vs Isidro Espiritusanto, G.R. No. 7404,
December 11, 1912
Facts:
Isidro Espiritusanto was charged with a violation of Municipal
Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1910, enacted by the municipal council of
Malabon, Rizal, in collecting wagers for the gambling game known as
jueteng.

Accused assails the constitutionality of the said ordinance for

being contrary to the municipal code because the council exceeded the
powers conferred upon it which, in subsection (u) of section 39, only
authorizes it "to provide against the evils of gambling, gambling
houses, and disorderly houses of whatsoever sort.
Issue:
WON the ordinance is valid.
Held:
Yes. A municipal council acts within its power, as conferred by
the organic law, in enacting an ordinance prohibiting the game called
jueteng within the limits of the municipality. The Municipal Code, Act
No. 82, section 39, authorizing municipalities to provide against the
evils of gambling, should be understood to include the power to
prohibit games of chance and to make necessary regulations to
exterminate the evils arising from the playing of prohibited games.
13. The United States vs Silvestre Pompeya, G.R. No. L-10255
Facts:
A municipal ordinance was enacted by the Province of Iloilo
pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 1309, requiring each able-bodied
male resident of the municipality, between the ages of 18 and 55, as
well as each householder, when so required by the president, to assist
in the maintenance of peace and good order in the community, by
apprehending landrones, as well as by giving information of the
existence of such persons in the locality.
A complaint was filed by the prosecuting attorney of the Province
of Iloilo against Pompeya for the violation of the said ordinance in
failing to render service on patrol duty.
Issue:
WON the ordinance is constitutional.
Held:
Yes. The right or power conferred upon municipalities by Act No.
1309 falls within the police power of the state. The police power of the
state may be said to embrace the whole system of internal regulation,
by which the state seeks not only to preserve public order and to
prevent offenses against the state, but also to establish, for the
intercourse of citizen with citizen, those rules on good manners and
good neighborhood, which are calculated to prevent conflict of rights,
and to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his own.

14. People of the Philippine Islands vs Teofilo Gabriel, G.R. No.

18838
Facts:
A policeman, William S. Able, while passing through Rosario
Street in the city of Manila, heard a crier of an auction sale in a place of
business numbered 109 and 111 of the street, the voice of the crier to
be heard at quite a little distance from the place. Such was a violation
of Section 749 of Ordinance No. 938 which prohibits the use of a bell or
crier, or other means of attracting bidders by the use of noise or show,
other than a sign or a flag, between the hours of 8 am and 12 pm, and
2 pm and 7 pm.
Issue:
WON the ordinance is discriminatory and is therefore void and
unconstitutional.
Held:
There is no discrimination in the ordinance. It applies to all kinds
and classes of people alike doing business within the prohibited area,
and no person within the city limits has any legal or constitutional right
to auction his goods without a license from, or the consent of, the city,
and it must follow that, so long as the ordinance is uniform, the city
has a legal right to specify how, when, where, and in what manner
goods may be sold at auction within its limits, and to prohibit their sale
in any other manner.
15. Recreation and Amusement Association of the Philippines
vs City of Manila, et al, G.R. No. L-7922
Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of said
City praying that a preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the City
Mayor and the Treasurer from enforcing Ordinance No. 3628 for being
unconstitutional, and further praying by way of mandamus that the
latter be compelled to issue permits and licenses to the members of
the said corporation.
Issue:
WON the grant or withholding of municipal licenses and permits
can be controlled by mandamus.
Held:
No. The City Mayor has discretionary power to issue or refuse the
issuance of a license or permit. Mandamus cannot lie with regards to
discretionary functions.

16. People of the Philippines vs Jaunito Solon, G.R. No. L-14864

Facts:
Juanito Solon, a rig driver in the City of Cebu, was prosecuted
and convicted for violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of
animal-drawn vehicles to pick up, gather and deposit in receptacles the
manure emitted or discharged by their vehicle-drawing animals in any
public highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys of the City.
Solon assails the legality of the ordinance as violative of the
equal protection clause, the same being discriminatory in the sense
that it does not equally apply to all owners and possessors of animals,
but its application is limited to owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing
animals.
Issue:
WON the ordinance is valid.
Held:
Yes. The principle is well-organized that the limited application of
a statute, either in the objects to which it is directed or by the territory
within which it is operate, does not necessarily violate the guaranty of
"equal protection of the laws." It is sufficient, for purposes of complying
with this constitutional mandate, that the classification be reasonable,
not arbitrary or capricious. And, for the classification to be considered
reasonable, the same must be based on substantial distinction which
make real differences; must be germane for the purposes of the law;
must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally
to each member of the class, under similar conditions.
17. People of the Philippines vs Loreta Gozo, G.R. No. L-36409
Facts:
Gozo sought to set aside a judgment of CFI of Zambales,
convicting her of a violation of an ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales,
which requires a permit from the municipal mayor for the construction
or erection of a building, as well as any modification, alteration, repair,
or demolition thereof. She questions its validity, or at the very least, its
applicability to her, by invoking due process. She contended that her
house was constructed within the naval base leased to the American
armed forces located within the United States Naval Reservation within
the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City and therefore should be
exempted from the municipal ordinance.
Issue:

WON the property of the appellant should be exempt the

application of the municipal ordinance.
Held:
No. By the Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine Government
merely consents that the United States exercise jurisdiction incertain cases. The
consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency. The
Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part
of thePhilippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction
over offenses committed therein.
Though the property is within the Naval base of US, it is a clear doctrine
that the Philippines still possess the sovereignty over that area given
the record that it is still a part of its territory. Thus, the state can still
enforce its administrative jurisdiction by virtue of its government
instrumetalities which the people sojourning to that territory must always adhere
andrespect.
18. Elisa Samson and Angel Gavilan vs Honorable Mayor of
Bacolod City, G.R. No. L-28745, October 23, 1974
Facts:
Appellees are movie operators of Bacolod City assailing the
validity of Ordinance No. 1074 which prohibits the admission of two or
more persons with only one admission ticket, for being ultra vires and
its being contrary to the due process provision of the Constitution as
they were deprived of their property without due process of law, more
specifically in that there was a limitation on their right to manage
their respective theaters in the manner they wish.
Issue:
WON the ordinance is valid.
Held:
Yes. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the enactment of said
law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may
interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of
restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health
and prosperity of the state.
The statute is only a regulation of places of public entertainment
and amusement upon terms of equal and exact justice to everyone
holding a ticket of admission, and who is not, at the time, under the
influence of liquor, or boisterous in conduct, or of lewd and immoral
character. Such a regulation, in itself just, is likewise promotive, of
peace and good order among those who attend places of public
entertainment and amusement. It is neither an arbitrary exertion of the

state's inherent or governmental power, nor a violation of any right

secured by the Constitution
19. Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership vs Feati Bank and Trust
Co., G.R. No. L-24670, December 14, 1979
Facts:
On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the
Highway Hills Subdivision at Mandaluyong to Augusto and Natividad
Angeles. The latter transferred their rights in favour of Emma Chavez,
upon completion of payment a deed was executed with stipulations,
one of which is that the use of the lots are to be exclusive for
residential purposes only. Feati then acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma
Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills. On May 5, 1963, Feati
started construction of a building on both lots to be devoted for
banking purposes but could also be for residential use. Ortigas sent a
written demand to stop construction but Feati continued contending
that the building was being constructed according to the zoning
regulations as stated in Municipal Resolution 27 declaring the area
along the West part of EDSA to be a commercial and industrial zone.
Civil case No. 7706 was made and decided in favour of Feati.
Issue:
WON Resolution No. 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an
industrial and commercial zone is valid considering the contract
stipulation in the Transfer Certificate of Titles.
Held:
Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section
3 of RA 2264 of the Local Autonomy Act empowers a Municipal Council
to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the
Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264 states that implied power of the
municipality should be liberally construed in its favour, to give
more power to the local government in promoting economic conditions,
social welfare, and material progress in the community. This is found
in the General Welfare Clause of the said act. Although non-impairment
of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute since it
has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power.
20. Tano vs Socrates, G.R. No. 11029, August 21, 1997
FACTS:
On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto
Princesa enacted an ordinance banning the shipment of all live fish and

lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to January 1,

1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial
Government of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching ,
gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several
species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in
and coming from Palawan waters.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition, praying that the court declare the said ordinances and
resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said ordinances
deprived them of the due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly
restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section
2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions
baseless and held that the challenged ordinances did not suffer from
any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws. There is
absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a
subsistence or marginal fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII
aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to
lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nations marine
wealth. The so-called preferential right of subsistence or marginal
fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute.
In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources
belong to the state and pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution, their exploration, development and
utilization shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.
In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution
is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the
conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of
ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the
municipal waters. In light of the principles of decentralization and
devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to
LGUs which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the
validity of the questioned ordinances cannot be doubted.
21. MMDA vs Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., G.R. No. 135962
FACTS:
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice
requesting the former to open its private road, Neptune Street, to

public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day,

respondent was apprised that the perimeter separating the subdivision
from
Kalayaan
Avenue
would
be
demolished.
Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner,
praying for the issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining
the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the
perimeter wall.
ISSUE:
WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic
as an agent of the state endowed with police power.
HELD:
A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state
which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs.
It is a body politic and corporate one endowed with powers as a
political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate
entity representing the inhabitants of its territory (LGC of 1991).
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of the
LGC of 1991. It empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod
and bayan to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province, city
or municipality] and its inhabitants pursuant to Sec.16 of the Code
and in the proper exercise of the [LGUs corporate powers] provided
under the Code.
There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let
alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the LGUs, there
is no grant of authority in RA 7924 that allows the MMDA to enact
ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of
Metro Manila. The MMDA is merely a development authority and not
a political unit of government since it is neither an LGU or a public
corporation endowed with legislative power. The MMDA Chairman is
not an elective official, but is merely appointed by the President with
the rank and privileges of a cabinet member.
In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of
the community. It is the LGUs, acting through their respective
legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police
power.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance
or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its
proposed opening by the MMDA is illegal.
22. HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF
LAGUNA, and HON. CALIXTO CATAQUIZ, petitioners, vs. HON.

FRANCISCO DIZON PAO and TONY CALVENTO, respondents.

[G.R. No. 129093. August 30, 2001.]
FACTS:
On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed
agent by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install
Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto
Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayors permit to open
the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated
February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an ordinance
passed
by
the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of
Laguna
entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995which was issued on September
18, 1995.As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento
filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said complaint,
respondent Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro
Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction
or temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to refrain from
implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order
requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a business
permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling or
declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.On February 10,
1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Pao, promulgated his
decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing
resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.
ISSUE:
WON Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid
HELD:
As a policy statement expressing the local governments objection
to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the local
governments autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that
of the national governments. However, this freedom to exercise
contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually
enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by
Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could
not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance
prohibiting the operation of lotto.n our system of government, the
power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and
resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. As
held in Tatel vs. Virac, ordinances should not contravene an existing
statute enacted by Congress. The reasons for this is obvious, as
elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp

23. MUNICIPALITY OF DAET, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS

and LI SENG GIAP & CO., INC., respondent. [G.R. No. L-35861.
October 18, 1979.]
Facts:
The municipality of Daet instituted an expropriation proceeding
against private respondent before the CFI of Camarines Norte for the
purpose of acquiring and subsequently converting a parcel of land
owned by the latter as a public park.
However, prior to the institution of the expropriation proceeding,
petitioner, acting through its mayor, demolished the building owned by
the respondent in the aforestated lot.
Issue:
WON the act of petitioner, through its mayor, constituted taking.
Held:
Yes. The demolition of the building of private respondent
standing on the land by the Municipal Mayor constituted the actual
taking of possession of the property sought to be expropriated by the
Municipality of Daet. There is taking when the a person is unduly
deprived of his property.
24. Percival Moday, et al vs CA, Judge Yuipco and Municipality
of Bunawan, G.R. No. 107916
FACTS: Percival Moday is a landowner in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur. In
1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan passed a resolution
authorizing the mayor to initiate an expropriation case against a 1
hectare portion of Modays land. Purpose of which was to erect a
gymnasium and other public buildings. The mayor approved the
resolution and the resolution was transmitted to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan which disapproved the said resolution ruling that the
expropriation is not necessary because there are other lots owned by
Bunawan that can be used for such purpose. The mayor pushed
through with the expropriation nonetheless.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private
property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
HELD: Yes. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of
Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power
that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is governments right to
appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private
property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the
national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly

delegated to local governments, other public entities and public

utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be
valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just
compensation. The only ground upon which a provincial board may
declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when
such resolution, ordinance, or order is beyond the powers conferred
upon the council or president making the same. This was not the case
in the case at bar as the SP merely stated that there are other
available lands for the purpose sought, the SP did not even bother to
declare the SB resolution as invalid. Hence, the expropriation case is
valid.
25. Municipality of Paranaque vs VM Realty, G.R. No. 127820
Facts:
Under a city council resolution, the Municipality of Paraaque
filed on September 20, 1993, a Complaint for expropriation against
Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land of
10,000 square meters. The city previously negotiated for the sale of
the property but VM didnt accept.
The trial court issued an Order dated February 4, 1994, authorizing
petitioner to take possession of the subject property upon deposit with
its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair
market value based on its current tax declaration.
According to the respondent, the complaint failed to state a
cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to
an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code);
and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or
res judicata. Petitioner claimed that res judicata was not applicable.
Issue:
WON a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the
same force and effect of an ordinance and will not deprive an
expropriation case of a valid cause of action.
Held:
No. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An
ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the
sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An
ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a
resolution is temporary in nature.
A local government unit may, through its chief executive and
acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain
for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the
landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws.

If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain

through a mere resolution, it would have simply adopted the language
of the previous Local Government Code. But Congress did not. In a
clear divergence from the previous Local Government Code, Section 19
of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive act
pursuant to an ordinance.
26. BARANGAY MATICTIC, Municipality of Norzagaray, Province
of Bulacan, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE J. M. ELBINIAS as
District Judge, CFI of Bulacan, Branch V and SPOUSES JOSE
SERAPIO and GREGORIA PACIDA, et al., respondents. [G.R. No.
L-48769. February 27, 1987.]
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus to compel
respondent judge to allow Barangay Matictic's complaint in
intervention in assailing the decision of the lower court in a case
entitled Municipality of Norzagay vs Jose Serapio, et al. Respondent
judge dismissed the original complaint on the ground that at the time
the complaint was filed, the plaintiff municipality had not yet obtained
the requisite authority from the Department Head or Office of the
President, as required in Section 2245 of the Revised Administrative
Code.
Issue:
WON Barangay Matictic can intervene in the case.
Held:
Regarding the annulment and setting aside orders of the public
respondent, dismissing the expropriation proceedings, the proper party
to appeal the same or seek a review of such dismissal, would be the
Municipality of Norzagaray. Petitioner Barrio Matictic, which is a
different political entity, and although a part and parcel of the
aforesaid municipality, has no legal personality to question the
aforestated orders because by itself, it may not continue the
expropriation case. It must be considered that the subject orders of the
court a quo were not appealed by the Municipality of Norzagaray. The
dismissal of the expropriation case, insofar as said municipality is
concerned, became final. The expropriation case ceased to exist and
there is consequently no more proceeding wherein Barangay Matictic
may possibly intervene.
27. PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOV. LUIS R.
VILLAFUERTE and HON. BENJAMIN V. PANGA as Presiding Judge
of RTC Branch 33 at Pili, Camarines Sur, petitioners, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION), ERNESTO SAN JOAQUIN

and EFREN SAN JOAQUIN, respondents. [G.R. No. 103125. May

17, 1993.]
Facts:
Private respondent Dato was appointed as Private Agent by the
then governer of Camarines Sur, Apolonio Maleniza. He was
subsequently promoted and appointed Assistant Provincial Warden.
Dato had no civil service eligibility for the position he was
appointed to, thus, he could not be legally extended a permanent
appointment. He was extended a temporary appointment, which was
renewed annually.
Dato was indifinetely suspended and criminal charges filed
against him for allegedly conniving and/or consenting to evasion of
sentence of some detention prisoners who escaped from confinement.
Two years after the request for change of status was made, the
head of the Camarines Sur Unit of the Civil Service Commission wrote
the governor informing him of that the status of Dato was changed
from temporary to permanent, the latter having passed the
examination for Supervising Security Guard. The change of status was
made retroactive to the date of release of said examination.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan suppressed the appropriation for
the position of Assistant Warden and deleted the respondent's name
from the petitioners plantilla.
Dato was subsequently acquitted of the charges against him.
Consequently, he requested the governor for reinstatement and
backwages. His request was not heeded.
Issue:
WON Dato was a permanent employee of petitioner at the time
he was suspended.
Held:
No. Dato being a temporary employee is not entitled to
backwages for the entire period of his suspension.
At the time Dato was appointed Assistant Provincial Warden, he
had not yet qualified in an appropriate examination for the position.
Such lack of civil service eligibility made his appointment temporary
and and without a fixed and definite term and is dependent entirely on
the pleasure of the appointing body.

28.
No.

City of Cebu vs Spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo, G.R.

142971

FACTS:
The City of Cebu expropriated the parcel of land owned by the
Sps. Dedamo. The parties executed and submitted to the trial court an
Agreement wherein they declared that they have partially settled the
case. Pursuant to the Agreement, the trial court appointed 3
Commissioners to determine the just compensation of the lots sought
to be expropriated. The 3 Commissioners rendered an assessment for
the lot in dispute and fixed it at P 12, 824.10 per sq. m. The
assessment was approved as just compensation thereof by the trial
court. As a result, the City of Cebu elevated the case to the SC and
raised the issue that just compensation should be based on the
prevailing market price of the property at the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings and not at the time the property was
actually taken.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner has the right to attack or question the report
of the Commissioners on which the decision was based.
HELD:
No. By a solemn document freely and voluntarily agreed upon by
the petitioner and the respondents, agreed to be bound by the report
of the commission and approved by the trial court. The AGREEMENT is
a contract between the parties. It has the force of law between them
and should be complied with (Art. 1159 , CC). Furthermore, Art. 1315 of
the same Code provides that contracts are perfected by mere consent.
In the case at bar, the petitioner was estopped from attacking
the report on which the decision was based due to consenting the
commissioners report during the hearing.
29. LFREDO PATALINGHUG, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, RICARDO CRIBILLO, MARTIN ARAPOL, CORAZON
ALCASID, PRIMITIVA SEDO, respondents. [G.R. No. 104786.
January 27, 1994.]
Facts:
On November 17, 1982, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao
City enacted Ordinance No. 363, otherwise known as the Expanded
Zoning Ordinance of Davao City, Sec.8 of which states:
A C-2 District shall be dominantly for commercial and compatible
industrial uses as provided hereunder:
xxx

3.1. Funeral Parlors/Memorial Homes with adequate off street parking

space and provided that they shall be established not less than 50
meters from any residential structures, churches and other
institutional buildings.
Petitioner constructed a funeral parlor in the name and style of
Metropolitan Funeral Parlor at Cabaguio Avenue, Agdao, Davao City.
Acting on the complaint of several residents of Brgy. Agdao that
the construction of petitioners funeral parlor violated Ordinance No.
363 since it was allegedly situated within a 50-meter radius from the
Iglesia ni Kristo chapel and several residential structures, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod conducted an investigation and found that
the nearest residential structure, owned by Wilfred Tepoot, is only 8
inches to the south.
Notwithstanding the findings of the Sangguniang Panlungsod,
petitioner continued with the construction of his funeral parlor until it
was finished on November 3, 1987.
Issue:
WON petitioners operation of a funeral home constitutes
permissible use within a particular district or zone in Davao City.
Held:
Yes. Even if Tepoots building was declared for taxation purposes
as residential, once a local government has reclassified an area as
commercial, that determination for zoning purposes must prevail.
While the commercial character of the questioned vicinity has been
declared through ordinance, private respondents have failed to present
convincing arguments to substantiate their claim that Cabaguio
Avenue, where the funeral parlor was constructed, was still a
residential zone. Unquestionably, the operation of a funeral parlor
constitutes as commercial purposes as gleaned from Ordinance No.
363.
The declaration of the said area as a commercial zone thru a
municipal ordinance is an exercise of police power to promote the good
order and general welfare of the people in the locality. Corollary
thereto, the state, in order to promote the general welfare, may
interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Thus, persons may be subjected to certain kinds of
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the
state and to this fundamental aim of government, the rights of the
individual may be subordinated. The ordinance which regulates the
location of funeral homes has been adopted as part of comprehensive
zoning plans for the orderly development of the area covered
thereunder.

30. HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF

BUKIDNON, HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF
SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HON. RENATO C. CORONA,
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
respondents. [G.R. No. 131457. August 19, 1999.]
Facts:
Background facts: On October 1997, alleged farmer-beneficiaries
commenced a hunger strike in front of the Department of Agrarian
Reform compound in Quezon City. They protested the decision of the
Office of the President (OP) dated March 29, 1996 which approved the
conversion of a 144-hectare land from agricultural to agroindustrial/institutional area. Note that this decision already became
final and executory.
o The land is located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon,
owned by NQSRMDC (Norberto Quisumbing Sr.
Management and Development Corp). It was leased as a
pineapple plantation to Del Monte.
o The Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon became
interested in the property, and enacted an ordinance
converting the said land to industrial/institutional with a
view to attract investors in order to achieve economic
vitality.
o Apparently, land conversion issues need to go through the
Department of Agrarian Reform. The DAR rejected the land
conversion and instead opted to put the same under CARP
and ordered the distribution of the property to the farmers.
o The case reached the OP. The OP rendered a decision
reversing the DAR and converting the land to agro-indusrial
area, which became the subject of the strike of the
farmers.
o The hunger strike was dramatic and well-publicized which
commanded nationwide attention that even church leaders
and some presidential candidates tried to intervene for
their cause.
These events led the OP, through then Deputy Exec. Sec. Corona, to
issue the so-called Win-Win Resolution, substantially modifying its
earlier Decision (see decision dated March 29, 1996) after it had
already become final and executory.
It modified the approval of the land conversion to agro-industrial area
only to the extent of forty-four (44) hectares, and ordered the

remaining one hundred (100) hectares to be distributed to qualified

farmer-beneficiaries.