Canon 9 Cases
Canon 9 Cases
Canon 9 Cases
FACTS:
[C]omplainant Ana Marie Cambaliza, a former employee of respondent Atty. Ana Luz B.
Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, charged the latter with deceit, grossly immoral conduct,
and malpractice or other gross misconduct in office. Case on deceit and grossly
immoral conduct did not pursue lacking clear and convincing evidence. On malpractice
or other gross misconduct in office, the complainant alleged that the respondent
cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband, who is not a member of the
Philippine Bar and two other allegations. The respondent averred that this disbarment
complaint was filed by the complainant just to get even with her. The complainant later
filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint as she is no longer interested in pursuing the
case. This motion was not acted upon by the IBP and the case was pursued. The IBP
found the respondent guilty of assisting in unauthorized practice of law.
ISSUE:
HELD:
YES. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
RATIO:
A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to misrepresent himself as a lawyer and
to practice law is guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which read as follows:
Canon 9 A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of
law.
Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of
any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized
practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the
practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and
character.
Respondents claim that the attorneys fee pertains only to the recovery of complainants
savingsdeposit from Planters Development Bank cannot be sustained. Records show
that he acted as complainants counsel
in the drafting of the compromise agreement between the latter and the bank relative to
LRC Case No. B-2610.Respondent admitted that he explained the contents of the
agreement to complainant before the latter affixed her signature. Moreover, the
Investigating Commissioner observed that the fee of P70,000.00 for legal assistance in
therecovery of the deposit amounting to P180,000.00 is unreasonable. A lawyer shall
charge only fair and reasonablefees.
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WHEREFORE, Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado is found GUILTY of violating Rules 1.01, 9.02,
18.02 and 20.01 of theCode of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for
six (6) months
effective fromnotice, and STERNLY WARNED that any similar infraction will be dealt
with more severely. He is further orderedto RETURN, within thirty (30) days from notice,
the sum of P70,000.00 to complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco andto submit to this Court
proof of his compliance within three (3) days therefrom.CANON 20 - A LAWYER SHALL
CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.Rule 20.01 - A lawyer shall be guided
by the following factors in determining his fees(a) The time spent and the extent of the
service rendered or required;(b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;(c)
The importance of the subject matter;(d) The skill demanded;(e) The probability of
losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;(f) The
customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to
which he belongs;(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting
to the client from the service;(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;(i) The
character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and(j) The
professional standing of the lawyer.Rule 20.02 - A lawyer shall, in case of referral, with
the consent of the client, be entitled to a division of fees in proportion to the work
performed and responsibility assumed.Rule 20.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the full
knowledge and consent of the client, accept any fee, reward, costs,commission,
interest, rebate or forwarding allowance or other compensation whatsoever related to
his professionalemployment from anyone other than the client.Rule 20.04 - A lawyer
shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to
judicialaction only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.
The Facts
and Dishonesty3
be filed against Divinagracia, with Rustia
and Atty. Bancolo as complainants.
Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August
2005 denying that he falsified the signature of his former lawyer, Atty.
Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence an affidavit dated 1 August
2005 by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the
Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracias case and that the
Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman was signed by the office
secretary per Atty. Bancolos instructions. Divinagracia asked that the
Office of the Ombudsman dismiss the cases for falsification of public
document and dishonesty filed against him by Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and
1 Docketed as OMB-V-C-04-0445-I and OMB-V-A-04-0429-I. 2 Docketed as OMB-V-C05-0207-E. 3 Docketed as OMB-V-A-05-0219-E.Decision 3 A.C. No. 9604
to revive the original Complaint for various offenses that he filed against
Tapay and Rustia.
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the
Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for falsification of public document
(OMB-V-C-05-0207-E) for insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive
portion states:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for
insufficiency of evidence, without prejudice to the re-filing by
Divinagracia, Jr. of a proper complaint for violation of RA 3019 and other
offenses against Rustia and Tapay.
SO ORDERED.4
The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was
also dismissed for lack of substantial evidence in a Decision dated
19 September 2005.
were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The cases were assigned
to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after being informed of the
assignment of the cases, he ordered his staff to prepare and draft all the
necessary pleadings and documents. However, due to some minor lapses,
Atty. Bancolo permitted that the pleadings and communications be signed in
his name by the secretary of the law office. Respondents added that
complainants filed the disbarment complaint to retaliate against them since
the cases filed before the Office of the Ombudsman were meritorious and
strongly supported by testimonial and documentary evidence. Respondents
also denied that Mary Jane Gentugao was employed as secretary of their law
office.
Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006.
Thereafter, the parties were directed by the Commission on Bar Discipline to
attend a mandatory conference scheduled on 5 May 2006. The conference
was reset to 10 August 2006. On the said date, complainants were present
but respondents failed to appear. The conference was reset to 25 September
2006 for the last time. Again, respondents failed to appear despite receiving
notice of the conference. Complainants manifested that they were
submitting their disbarment complaint based on the documents submitted to
the IBP. Respondents were also deemed to have waived their right to
participate in the mandatory conference. Further, both parties were directed
to submit their respective position papers. On 27 October 2006, the IBP
received complainants position paper dated 18 October 2006 and
respondents position paper dated 23 October 2006.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating
Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, submitted
her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01
of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility while Atty. Jarder
violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same Code. The Investigating
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Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner,
having passed the bar in 1995 and practicing law up to the present. He
holds himself out to the public as a law firm designated as Jarder Bancolo
and Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T. Jarder to exert
ordinary diligence to find out what is going on in his law firm, to ensure
that all lawyers in his firm act in conformity to the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As a partner[,] it is his responsibility to provide
efficacious control of court pleadings and other documents that carry the
name of the law firm. Had he done that, he could have known the
unethical practice of his law partner Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo.
Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed to perform this task and is
administratively liable under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.7
On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board
of Governors of the IBP approved with modification the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The Resolution states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent Atty. Bancolos
violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year.
7 IBP Records (Vol. III), pp. 4-6.Decision 6 A.C. No. 9604
Section 102 of the Code of Civil procedure, providing that every pleading must be
subscribed by the party or his attorney, does not permit, and by implication prohibits, a
subscription of the names of any other persons, whether agents or otherwise; therefore
a signature containing the name of one neither a party nor an attorney was not a
compliance with this section, nor was it aided by the too obvious subterfuge of the
addition of the individual name of a licensed attorney. The illegality in this instance was
aggravated by the fact that one of the agents so named was a person residing in these
Islands to whom this court had expressly denied admission to the bar. The papers in
question were irregular and were properly rejected. We refuse to recognize as a
practice any signature of names appended to pleadings or other papers in an action
other than those specified in the statute. A signature by agents amounts to a signing by
non-qualified attorneys, the office of attorney being originally one of agency. (In re
Cooper, 22 N.Y., 67.) We do not, however, mean to discountenance the use of a
suitable firm designation by partners, all of whom have been duly admitted to practice.
It is to be noted that we are not now considering an application for the suspension or
removal of the defendant Ney from his office as attorney. The defendant Bosque, not
being an officer of the court, could not be proceeded against in that way, and probably
for that reason the Attorney-General instituted this form of proceeding.
1.
Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or
command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge;
2.
Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties or in
his official transactions.
Where the law defines contempt, the power of the courts is restricted to punishment for
acts so defined. (Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S., 505.)
As to the first subdivision of this section, no direct order or command of this court has
been disobeyed or resisted by the defendant Ney. The only order that the defendant
Bosque can have disobeyed is the one denying him the right to practice law. This order,
however, was directly binding upon him, notwithstanding proceedings taken for its
review, and any hope on his part of ultimately reversing it furnished no excuse for its
violation. Even had he been entitled under the statute to practice law without any
license from the court and without an application to it, yet its order made on his own
petition. A mandate of the court, while in force, must be obeyed. The irregular signature
to papers, though affixed by his associate, had his authorization and constitutes a
substantial attempt to engage in practice. Moreover the firm circular in setting forth the
establishment of an office for the general practice of law in all the courts of the Islands,
amounted to an assertion of his right and purpose, not effectively qualified by the
addition that he would devote himself to consultation and office work relating to Spanish
law. Spanish law plays an important part in the equipment of a lawyer in the
Archipelago, standing on a different footing from the law of other foreign countries, in
regard to which a skilled person might as a calling, advise without practicing law. The
fact stated on the circular that he was a Spanish lawyer did not amount to a disclaimer
of his professional character in the Islands. Independent of statutory provisions, a
foreigner is not by reason of his status disqualified from practicing law. One of the most
eminent American advocates was an alien barrister admitted to the bar after a contest in
the court of New York State. (In re Thomas Addis Emmett, 2 Cain's Cases, 386.)
Consequently the conduct of the defendant Bosque amounts to disobedience of an
order made in a proceeding to which he was a party.
Under the second subdivision of the section cited, Bosque is obviously not answerable,
inasmuch as he was not an officer of the court. On the other hand, under this
subdivision, the defendant Ney, as an admitted attorney, is liable if his conduct
amounted to misbehavior. We are of the opinion that it did. In the offense of Bosque in
holding himself out as a general practitioner Ney participated, and for the improper
signature of the pleadings he was chiefly and personally responsible. It is impossible to
say that the signature itself was a violation of the law, and yet hold guiltless the man
who repeatedly wrote it. Moreover we regret to add that his persistent and rash
disregard of the rulings of the court has not commended him to our indulgence, while
the offensive character of certain papers recently filed by him forbids us from presuming
on the hope of his voluntarily conforming to the customary standard of members of the
bar.
The judgment of the court is that each of the defendants is fined in the sum of 200
pesos, to be paid into the office of the clerk of this court within ten days, with the costs
de oficio. So ordered.