Criminal Law II: Case Digests

Ateneo de Davao University

College of Law
Jacinto St., Davao City

2nd Semester School Year 2010-2011

Submitted by:
Christian Bryan S. Arias

Submitted to:
Atty. Teodoro Angel

PART I
A. Crimes Against National Security and the Law of Nations
Treason
Laurel vs. Misa 77 Phil 856
Nature: Petition for habeas corpus.
Facts: Anastacio Laurel was convicted for treason. In his petition for habeas corpus, he contended that a
Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation
cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal
Code, for the reasons that:
The sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative
allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and
There was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine
Republic.
Issues: Were Laurels contention tenable?
Held: NO.
Rationale: A citizen or subject owes not a qualified and temporary but an absolute and permanent allegiance,
which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign.
The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their
legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the
sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, and if it is not
transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government. The existence of
sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least
during the so-called period of suspension. What may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty
with the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant.
The subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied by the military forces
of the enemy during the war, "although the former is in fact prevented from exercising the supremacy over
them" is one of the "rules of international law of our times" recognized, by necessary implication, in articles
23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague Regulation. As a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not
suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate
government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is no such thing as suspended allegiance.
Decision: Petition denied.
People of the Philippines vs. Perez 83 Phil 314
Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the Peoples Court sentencing Perez with death sentence.
Facts: Susano Perez alias Kid Perez was convicted by the 5th Division of the Peoples Court sitting in Cebu
City and sentence to death by electrocution. Seven counts were alleged in the information but only on counts
1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 were substantiated.
Accused contended that his deeds of furnishing women for immoral purposes to the enemies do not
constitute treason. The solicitor General submits the opposite view, and argues that to maintain and preserve
the morals of the soldiers has always been, and will always be, a fundamental concern of army authorities, for
the efficiency of an army rests not only on its physical attributes but also, mainly, on the morale of its soldiers.
Issue: Whether or not the commandeering of women constitutes the crime of treason
Held: NO.
Rationale: As a general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid and comfort given to the enemies must be
to render assistance to them as enemies and not merely as individuals and, in addition, be directly in
furtherance of the enemies hostile designs. In the case at bar, the acts herein charged were not, by fair
implication, to strengthen the Japanese empire or its army or to cripple the defense and resistance of the
other side. Commandeering of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers during world War II is not
treason because it does not directly strengthen the enemy and weaken the defense. Whatever favorable

effect the defendants collaboration with the Japanese might have in their prosecution of the war trivial,
imperceptible and unintentional. Intent of disloyalty is a ingredient in the crime of treason, which, in the
absence of admission, may be gathered from the nature and circumstances of each particular case.
The accused Eriberto Ramo, Eduardo Daohong, Eutiquia Lamay and Flaviana Bonalos here may be
punished for rape as principal by direct participation. Without his cooperation, these rapes could not have
been committed. All rapes are alleged in the information and substantiated by the evidence.
People of the Philippines vs. Prieto 80 Phil 314
Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the Peoples Court convicting Prieto of seven counts of treason.
Facts: Defendant was prosecuted in the Peoples Court for treason on seven counts. After pleading not guilty
he entered a plea of guilty to counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 (execution of some of the guerilla suspects and the infliction
of physical injuries on others) and as to count 4, 5, and 6 maintained the original plea. The prosecution
introduced evidence only on count 4, stating with reference to count 5 and 6 that he did not have sufficient
evidence to sustain them. The defendant was found guilty on count 4 as well as counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 and was
sentenced to death and a fine of P 20, 000.
The lower court believed that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of treason complex
by murder and physical injuries. Apparently, the court has regarded the murder and physical injuries charged
in the information, not only as crimes distinct from treason but also as modifying circumstances. Solicitor
General agreed with the decision except as to the technical designation of the crime. In his opinion, offense
committed by the defendant is a complex of treason with homicide.
Issue: Whether or not treason can be complex by murder and physical injuries
Held: NO.
Rationale: The execution and the infliction of physical injuries are not offenses separate from treason. When
the deed was charged as an element of treason it becomes identified with the latter crime and cannot be
subjected as separate punishment or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code provides. This would not, preclude the punishment of murder or physical injuries as
such if the government should prosecute the culprit specifically for those crimes instead of relying on them as
an element of treason. It is which murder or physical injuries are charged as overt acts of treason that they
cannot be regarded separately under the general denomination.
However, the brutality with which the killing or physical injuries were carried out may be taken as an
aggravating circumstance since they augmented the sufferings of the offended parties unnecessarily to the
attainment of criminal objective. This aggravating circumstance is compensated by the mitigating
circumstance of plea of guilty.
Piracy
People of the Philippines vs. Lol-lo and Saraw 43 Phil 19
Nature: Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi which found the accused guilty of the crime
of piracy.
Facts: On June 30, 1920 two boats left Matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta another Dutch possession one
of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject and in the other boat eleven men, women and child were
subjected to Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at about 7:00 pm, the second boat stopped
between the Island of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by sixty
vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat,
took themselves all of the cargo,, attacked by men and brutally violated two of the women by methods too
horrible to be described.
All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two women, were again placed on it and holes
were made in it, with the idea that it would submerge, although in fact, these people, after eleven days of
hardship and privation, were rescued. The two men with them and repeatedly violating them, the Moros finally
arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. The two Moros were Lol-lo who also raped one of the women and
Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape.

When Lol-lo and Saraw returned in South Ubian, Tawi-tawi, Sulu, they were arrested and were charged in the
CFI of Sulu with the crime of piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based on
the grounds that the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the CFI, nor of any court of the
Philippine Island, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine
Islands, after the trial judge overruled the demurrer, a trial was had, and a judgment was rendered finding the
two defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment, as the single aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity and the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction offset each other.
Issue: Whether or not the CFI of Sulu had jurisdiction when the offense charged was committed outside
Philippine territory
Held: YES.
Rationale: Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the highest seas, without lawful authority and done
animo fura and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility. It cannot be contended that the CFI was without
jurisdiction in the case, piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be
punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or in which he may be
carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against mankind so it
may be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of
a foreign state, for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes.
The crime piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons
without apparent means of saving themselves. At least three aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done
in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its
commission. The advantage was taken of superior strength and that means were employed which added
ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be taken of superior strength and that means were
employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be taken into consideration in
fixing the penalty. Considering, therefore, the number are important of qualifying and aggravating
circumstances of lack of instruction and the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to
impose capital punishment.
People of the Philippines vs. Rodriguez 135 SCRA 485
Nature: Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Sulu and Tawi- tawi convicting the accused for the crim of piracy
and sentencing them to death.
Facts: On August 29, 1981, M/V Noria 767 vessel left Jolo wharf for Cagayan de Tawi-tawi and arrived at the
port of Cagayan de Tawi-tawi the following day at around 2:00 pm. In the evening of the same date the vessel
left for Labuan with several traders and crew members on board. Two or three hours after its departure about
25 miles from Cagayan de Tawi- tawi, a commotion accured in one of the cabins of the vessel.
Armed with bladed weapons and high caliber firearms, the accused killed 36 persons and injured four persons
to accomplish their criminal purpose. About 10:00 am of the same day, the vessel reached an island where
the four accused were able to secure pump boats. Macasaet was ordered to load in one of the pump boat
nine attach cases that were full of money. Rico Lopez and Jaime Rodriguez boarded another bringing with
them: dressed chicken, soft drinks, durians, boxes of ammunitions, galloons of water and some meat, as well
as rifles.
The information against the four appellants for piracy with the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident
premeditation and the use of superior strength, was filed before the CFI of Sulu and Tawi-tawi. They were
arrested and detained by Malaysian authorities. The NBI authorities fetched and brought them to Manila on
January 8, 1982, where they executed their respective statements. They pleaded not guilty, but were
convicted of the crime charged and sentenced the penalty of death.
The case went to the Supreme Court for automatic review. In their brief the four accused claimed that the trial
court erred, inter alia, in imposing the death penalty to them despite their plea of guilty.
Issue: Whether or not the appellants contention is valid
Held: No.

Rationale: PD No. 532, the Anti-Piracy Law, which amended article 134, Revised Penal Code and took effect
on august 8, 1988 provides:
Section 3. Penalties- Any person who commits piracy or highway robbery/ brigandage as herein defined,
shall, upon conviction by competent court be punished by:
Piracy- The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed. If physical
injuries or other crimes are committed as a result or no the occasion thereof, the penalty of reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed. If rape, murder or homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, or when
the offenders abandoned the victims without means of saving themselves, or when the seizure is
accomplished by firing upon or bonding a vessel, they mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.
Clearly, the penalty imposable upon person found guilty of the crime of piracy where rape, murder or homicide
is committed is mandatory death penalty. Thus, the lower court committed no error in not considering the plea
of guilty of three defendants as a mitigating circumstance. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code states that:
Article 63- Rules for the application of indivisible penalties- In all cases in which the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
Decision: The decision of the lower court was affirmed.
People of the Philippines vs. Siyoh 141 SCRA 356
Nature: An automatic review of the decision of the defunct Court of First Instance of Basilan, Judge Jainal D.
Rasul as ponente, imposing the death penalty.
Facts: On July 14, 1979, Antonio de Guzmun, together with a group of merchants, went to Baluk-Baluk using
the pumpboat of Kiram to sell their goods. The group was accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh who were armed
with 'barongs'. Upon arrival at the place, Kiram and Siyoh were seen talking with two persons whose faces
the group saw but could not recognize. After selling their goods, the members of the group, together with
Kiram and Siyoh, prepared to return to Pilas Island. They rode on a pumpboat where Siyoh positioned himself
at the front while Kiram operated the engine. On the way to Pilas Island, Antonio de Guzman saw another
pumpboat painted red and green about 200 meters away from their pumpboat (pp. 55, tsn). Shortly after,
Kiram turned off the engine of their pumpboat. Then, two shots were fired from the other pumpboat as it
moved towards them.
Two persons on the other pumpboat were armed with armantes. De Guzman recognized them to be the same
persons he saw Kiram conversing with in a house at Baluk-Baluk Island. When the boat came close to them,
Kiram threw a rope to the other pumpboat which towed de Guzman's pumpboat towards Mataja Island. On
the way to Mataja Island, Antonio de Guzman and his companions were divested of their money and their
goods by Kiram. Thereafter Kiram and his companions ordered the group of de Guzman to undress. Kiram
wore the pants of de Guzman. Then, Kiram and Siyoh killed some of the merchants. De Guzman was able to
escape by jumping into the water. As he was swimming away from the pumpboat, the two companions of
Kiram fired at him, injuring his back.
Kiram and Siyoh were convicted by the trial court for the crime of qualified piracy with triple murder and
frustrated murder and was sentenced to death.
Issue: Was the trial court correct imposing the death penalty to Kiram and Siyoh?
Held: YES.
Rationale: The number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy is not material. P.D. No. 532 considers
qualified piracy, i.e. rape, murder or homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, as a
special complex crime punishable by death regardless of the number of victims.
Decision: Decision of trial court affirmed. However, for lack of necessary votes, penalty imposed was reclusion
perpetua.
B. Crimes Against Fundamental Laws of the State
Arbitrary Detention

Umil vs. Ramos G.R. No. 81567, 3 October 1991

Facts: This case is composed of eight (08) separate petitions for habeas corpus consolidated into one (01) as
the issues raised by petitioners are more or less similar. There was a valid arrest in the case of Rolando
Dural, a member of the Sparrow Unit of the New People's Army,who was arrested after being admitted at the
St. Agnes Hospital for gunshots incurred during a crossfire between him and the authorities. Dural had just
shot two (02) CAPCOM policemen one (01) day prior to his arrest. Authorities received confidential
information that a member of the NPA sparrow unit was being treated in the said hospital. The said
information was sufficient to serve as probable cause mentioned in Section 5, paragraph (b) Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which lead to his valid arrest. The other cases involved arrests made in
flagrante delicto in the residence of Renato Constantino located in Marikina, Metro Manila, which at the time
was under surveillance by the police. The accused had in their posession several explosives, unlicensed
firearms, live ammunitions and subversive documents.
Issue: Whether or not the appellants' arrest are valid and legal.
Held: YES.
Rationale: Subversion is a continuing crime. As such, authorities, upon determination of probable cause, may
execute a valid arrest pursuant to Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. In the case of Dural,
there was probable cause when the authorities received reliable information that a member of the NPA
sparrow unit was undergoing treatment in a nearby hospital. This was enough to serve as personal
knowledge on part of the arresting officers as mentioned in section 5, paragraph (b) of the above-mentioned
rule. On the other hand, there were valid arrests in the several other cases where the accused were caught in
flagrante delicto in possession of unlicensed firearms, live ammunitions and subversive documents. It is wellestablished that subversion is a continuing crime. Hence, the arrests made were in compliance of paragraph
(a) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure as it was being committed in the presence of the arresting
officers.
People of the Philippines vs. Burgos 144 SCRA 1
Nature: Appeal from the decision of the RTC of Davao del Sur.
Facts: On May 13, 1982, one Cesar Masamlok voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, stating that he was
forcibly recruited by the accused Ruben Burgos as member of the NPA. Upon receipt of the information, a
joint team of PC INP units was dispatched at Tiguman to arrest the accused Burgos. Through the help of his
brother Pedro, accused was found plowing his field. Into his house, accused was called and asked about his
firearm, as reported by Cesar Masamlok. At first accused denied possession of said firearm but later, upon
questioning of the wife of the accused the latter pointed to a place below their house where a gun was buried
in the ground. After the recovery of the firearm, accused likewise pointed to the team, subversive documents
which he allegedly kept in a stock pile of cogon, at a distance of three meters apart from his house.
To prove accuseds subversive activities, Cesar Masamlok was presented. Assitant Provincial Fiscal Panfilo
Lovitos was also presented to prove that he administered the subscription of the extra-judicial confession of
the accused. Finally, in order to prove illegal possession by accused of the subject firearm, it was testified to
that accused was not licensed to carry a firearm. After trial, the court convicted the accused Burgos of the
crime of illegal Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of subversion.
Issue: Whether or not the arrest without warrant and the search of his house likewise without warrant were
lawful.
Held: The arrest was illegal.
Rationale: Under Section 6 (a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must
also committed in his presence or within his view. There is no such personal knowledge in this case.
Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirely from the information
furnished by Ceasar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the appellants wife. At the time of
the appellants arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document. Neither was he
committing any which could be described as subversive. He was, in fact, plowing his field at the time of the
arrest.

In arrest without a warrant under Section 6 (b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been
committed first. In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamloks verbal report. The
authorities were still fishing for evidence of crime not yet ascertained.
The arrest of the accused while he was plowing his field is illegal. The arrest being unlawful, the search and
seizure which transpired afterwards could not likewise be deemed legal as being mere incidents to a valid
arrest.
Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was by the accused to be searched
simply because he failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly,
that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that
said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. The fact that the accused failed to object to the
entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein.
Search warrants maliciously obtained
Stonehill vs. Diokno 20 SCRA 383
Nature: Original action in the SC. Certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction
Facts: Respondent-prosecutors and respondent-judges issued a total of 42 search warrants against
petitioners and the corporations of which they were officers, directed to any peace officer, to search the
persons above-name and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences and to seize and
take possession of document and/or papers showing all business transactions in violation of Central Bank
Law, Tariff and Custom Law, Internal Revenue (Code) and the RPC.
Petitioners alleged that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the
Constitution and Rule of Court because inter alia they do not describe with particularly the documents books
and things to be sized.
Issues:
1. Whether or not search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under their
authority, are valid.
2. Whether or not the things seized are admissible in evidence against the petitioners herein
Held 1: NO.
Rationale: The Constitution provides that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by
the judge, and that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. Search warrants authorizing
the seizure of books and records showing all the business transactions of certain persons, regardless of
whether transaction were legal or illegal contravene the explicit command of the Bill of Rights that the things
to be seized should be particularly described and defeat its major objective of eliminating general warrants.
The search warrants issued upon applications also stated that the natural and juridical persons there named
had committed a violation of Central Bank, Tariff and Custom Law, Internal Revenue (Code) and the RPC do
not satisfy the constitutional requirements because no specific offense had been alleged in the said
applications. To prevent the issuance of general warrants, the Supreme Court amended the Old Rules of
Courts by providing the Revised Rules of Courts that no search warrant shall issue for more than one
specific offense.
Held 2: The things seized were not admissible.
Rationale: As to the admissibility in evidence of the documents, papers and things illegally seized, the
Moncado ruling that such evidence are admissible must be abandoned. The exclusion of such evidence is the
only practical means enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures (fruit
of the poisonous tree doctrine). The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and spirit of the prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Burgos vs. Chief of Staff 133 SCRA 800
Nature: Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction.

Facts: On December 7, 1982, respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pao, Executive Judge of CFI of Rizal issued
two search warrants, under which the premises of the Metropolitan Mail and We Forum newspapers were
searched and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used
in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers as well as numerous papers, documents,
books, and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr.
publisher-editor of the We Forum newspaper, which were allegedly used and are all continuously being used
as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended,
were seized. Petitioners are assailing the validity of the search warrants on the ground inter alia that there
was no probable cause for their issuance.
Issue: Whether or not search warrants in question were valid.
Held: The search warrants were not valid.
Rationale: The probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant
applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive
materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification,
stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere
generalization will not suffice. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable
cause, the applying officers allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was
a grave error for respondent judge to have done so.
Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained in the joint
affidavit of the surveillance team members. In mandating that no warrant shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce; the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or
his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. Another factor which
makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable was that they were the nature of
general warrants.
Offending religious feelings
People of the Philippines vs. Mandoriao 51 OG 4619
Nature: Appeal from CFI Baguio Judgment
Facts: At 6 pm, March 31, 1953, the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC for brevity) held a religious rally at the City Camp,
Baguio. 50 out of approx. 200 people attendees were INC members while the rest were outsiders and
curious listeners.
Minister Plutarco Salvio expounded on the topic effecting that Jesus Christ is not God but only a man.[1]
Thereafter the crowd became unruly, shouted and made noise.
Some people urged Jose Mandoriao, Jr (Jr for brevity) to go up the stage to have a debate w/ the minister.
Among those shouting was Mandoriao Sr. and co-defendant Rivera. Thus, Jr went up the stage and
challenged the minister to a debate. He was not able to speak because the wire connecting the microphone
was abruptly disconnected.
Jr and Alipio Rivera were accused of a violation of Art 133, RP in the Baguio CFI.[2] Rivera was acquitted
while Jr was found guilty thus sentenced to 4 mo & 1 day of arresto mayor plus costs.
Jr insists that the religious rally was not a religious ceremony within the purview of Art 133, RPC and that the
acts were not notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithfuls.
Issues:
1)
WON the religious rally was a religious ceremony [NO]
2)
WON Jrs acts were notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithfuls [NO]
3)
WON Jr may be liable under Art 153, RPC [NO]

Ratio: 1) The rally was not held in a place devoted to religious services but in a public space. A religious
meeting is an assemblage of people met for the purpose of performing acts of adoration to the Supreme
Being, or to perform religious services in recognition of God as an object of worship, love and obedience, it
matters not the faith w/ respect to the Deity entertained by the persons so assembled.
Salvio admitted that the event was not limited to INC members, it was open to all per radio announcement.
The meeting was held for the purpose of acquiring new members and the prayers and singing of hymns were
merely incidental. The INC churches were located nearby and thus the members could have celebrated their
rituals there w/o staying in an open space.
The reading of a Bible in a public schoolhouse does not convert that into a place of worship. In that same
way, the court ruled that: The mere saying of prayers and singing of hymns in an open space dont
make such place as one devoted to religious worship and make such an occasion a religious
ceremony w/in the purview of Art 133.
If the contrary is opined by the Court, then Art 133 will be subject to abuse other religious sects may hold
meetings/services in open grounds in order to publicly vilify rival sects thus making any public lace a place to
celebrate religious ceremonies.
2) Jr did not state any notoriouly offensive words. The information merely stated that Jr disturbed the
meeting by going up the stage and grabbing the mic from the minister
An act is notoriously offensive to the religious feelings of the faithful when a person ridicules or makes light of
anything constituting a religious dogma; mocks or scoffs at anything devoted to religious ceremonies; plays w/
or damages or destroys any object of veneration by the faithful. (People v. Baes)
There was no object of veneration in this meeting. The mere fact that Jr ascended the stage, challenged
the minister to a debate, and grabbed the mic do not constitute acts calculated to ridicule or make light of a
religious ritual. They might fall under public disturbance under Art 153, RPC, but not offending religious
feelings in Art 133.
3) While the information may point to a violation of Art 153, the facts do not prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
a. There was already a commotion before he went up the stage
b. Some people urged Jr to debate w/ Salvio
c. It was Salvio who is to blame because his remarks (see footnote 1) sparked the violent reactions from the
crowd.
d. Jrs voice was loud and he did not need a mic.
e. He wasnt even able to speak on the mic as it was disconnected.

Decision: Judgment reversed. Accused acquitted plus costs.

[1] Chirst is not a God but only a man. Those who believe that Christ is God is anti-Christ. All members of
the Roman Catholic Church, from the highest official down to the last member, are marked by the demon.
The Pope is the commander-in-chief of Satan.
[2] Mandoriao: disturbed the religious service, went up the stage and grabbed the microphone (spelled as
mike in the information) from the preacher
Rivera: uttered derogatory remarks against the INC, threatened to shoot the minister
People of the Philippines vs. Baes 68 Phil 203
Nature: appeal from order of the CFI of Laguna
Facts: Baes, parish priest of the Roman Catholic Church, filed a complaint in the justice of the peace court in
Lumban, Laguna charging Enrique Villaroca, Alejandro Lachay and Bernardo del Rosario with having caused,
through force, intimidation and threats. On April 14, 1932 at 9 am the funeral of Antonio Macabigtas one

belonging to the Church of Christ pass through the churchyard of his Church having the religious rites of the
sect. The accused pleaded not guilty here. Baes filed a sworn statement to give the fiscal full knowledge of
the facts and witnesses to testify thereon.
When the case was remanded to the CFI of Laguna, the fiscal submitted, instead of the information, a motion
for dismissal. He was of the opinion that the act complained of did not constitute the offense under Article 133
of the RPC, stating that the accused may be held liable only for threats or trespass. The trial court sustained
his motion and ordered the dismissal of the case, reserving to the fiscal the right to file another information.
Baes appealed the trial courts order and was at first denied, but the supreme Court ordered the CFI through a
writ of mandamus to give his appeal due course.
Issue: Whether or not the fiscals submission of motion to dismiss was proper
Held: No.
Rationale: The fiscal omitted the facts mentioned that the churchyard belonged to the Roman Catholic Church
and was devoted to religious services, the act complained of would have constituted the crime defined and
penalized by Article 133 of the RPC. He should have admitted and not denied the facts alleged. His motion
raised question of law and not facts. The question of whether the act complained of was offensive to the
Catholic should have been judged only according to Catholics and not of other faiths. It should depend upon
the religious feelings of the faithful and not those other faiths. In the case at bar, there was an offending of
religious feelings. Thus, the appealed order was reversed and the fiscal was ordered to comply with his duty
under the law.
C. Crimes Against Public Order
Rebellion, insurrection, coup detat (R.A. 6968)
Enrile vs. Salazar 186 SCRA 217
Nature: Petition for habeas corpus.
Facts: Senate Minority floor leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers pursuant to a
warrant of arrest issued by the Hon. Jaime Salazar of branch 103 of the Quezon City RTC. The warrant,
which did not recommend bail, was issued subsequent to the filing of an information charging Enrile, Sps.
Panililion and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple murder for their failed
coup attempt in 1990.
Issue: Could the crime of rebellion be complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder in line with the
provision in Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
Held: No.
Rationale: Common crimes such as murder and multiple murder committed on the occasion in furtherance of
rebellion is absorbed therein. Complexing the crime of rebellion with common crimes such as murder, as in
the instant case, would defeat the purpose of article 48 of the Revised Penal code which was enacted to favor
the accused. The Supreme Court maintained its ruling in the case of People vs. Hernandez wherein they held
that: " In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information against defendantappellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere ingredients of
the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants, as means "necessary" for the perpetration of
said offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the aforementioned amended information is, therefore,
simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that the
maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine
of P20,000; and that, in conformity with the policy of this court in dealing with accused persons amenable to
similar punishment, said defendant may be allowed to bail" Herein petitioners where allowed to post bail and
the information charged against them was amended to the crime of simple rebellion.
Enrile vs. Amin 189 SCRA 573
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction committed by the respondent court in refusing to quash/dismiss the information filed against
Enrile.

Facts: On or about the same time when Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with the crime of rebellion
complexed with murder and multiple murder.
Government prosecutors filed another information against Enrile for violation of PD 1829, a statute penalizing
obstruction of apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders. The said information alleged that herein
petitioner, harbored and concealed in his home Col. Honasan who, at the time was wanted for rebellion
charges as well thus frustrating the latter's apprehension. Petitioner however, contends that the alleged
harboring or concealing of Col. Honasan is absorbed in, or is a component element of rebellion.
Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioner could be charged with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple
murder.
2. Whether or not petitioner could be charged separately for rebellion and violation of said statute.
Held 1: No.
Rationale: Petitioners act of concealing and harboring Honasan was on occasion of the crime of rebellion
charged against petitioner in a different case, thus, it should be absorbed as it is a necessary means to further
petitioner's political purpose. Furthermore, complexing the crime of rebellion with common crimes committed
on the occasion thereof would not be beneficial for the accused, contrary to the purpose as to why Art. 48 of
the Revised Penal Code was enacted.
Held 2: NO.
Rationale: Although the instant case involves a statute (PD 1829), the same rationale applies to crimes mala
in se committed on occasion of rebellion- the same would be unfavorable to the accused.
Decision: Petition was granted. The information against appellant for violation of PD 1829 was quashed.
People of the Philippines vs. Lovedioro 250 SCRA 389
Nature: Appeal from the decision of the trial court finding the accused guilty of murder.
Facts: Accused-appellant in the instant case was found guilty by the lower court of the crime of murder when
he, together with several other persons who served as look-outs, shot SPO3 Jesus Lucilo,an off -duty police
man, causing the latter's death. Accused avers that the deceased, an informant, identified him as a member
of the New People's Army. He contends that the killing was a means to or in furtherance of subversive ends
and as such should be absorbed in the crime of rebellion under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Issue: Whether or not the accused could plead guilty of the crime of rebellion which warrants less criminal
liability relative to the crime of murder.
Held: NO.
Rationale: The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the government.
Therefore, any killing committed in furtherance and in occasion of rebellion, to be absorbed therein, should be
with a political motive. Accused, in this case, failed to present any clear and sufficient evidence that the killing
was in furtherance of their political purpose.
The following facts of the case disproved their claims:
- Appellant in his extra judicial confession, never admitted that he was a member of the NPA.
-The information filed against appellant failed to show that he was a member of the NPA.
-Appellants assertion that the killing was politically motivated in backed-up only by his self-serving and
unsupported testimony.
-There was no showing on how the killing would further the NPA's subversive cause.
Therefore, sans any findings that the killing was on occasion or in furtherance of subversion, herein accused
cannot plead guilty of rebellion which would lessen his criminal liability.

Decision: The judgment of the lower court was affirmed.

Sedition
People of the Philippines vs. Umali 96 Phil 682
Facts: The complex crime of which appellants Narciso Umali, et. al were found guilty was said to have been
committed during the raid staged in the town of Tiaong, Quezon, between 8:00 and 9:00 in the evening of
November 14, 1951, by armed men. The raid took place resulting in the burning down and complete
destruction of the house of Mayor Marcial Punzalan including its content valued at P24,023; the house of
Valentin Robles valued at P10,000, and the house of one Mortega, the death of Patrolman Domingo Pisigan
and civilians Vicente Soriano and Leocadio Untalan, and the wounding of Patrolman Pedro Lacorte and five
civilians.
During and after the burning of the houses, some of the raiders engaged in looting, robbing one house and
two Chinese stores; and that the raiders were finally dispersed and driven from the town by the Philippine
Army soldiers stationed in the town led by Captain Alzate.
Issue: Whether or not the accused-appellants are liable of the charges against them of complex crime of
rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery.
Held: Yes, the appellants were guilty of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and physical
injuries.
Rationale: For the crime of sedition each of the appellants is sentenced to 5 years of prision correctional and
to pay a fine of P4,000; for each of the three murders, each of the appellants is sentenced to life
imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of each victim in the sum of P6,000; and for the arson, for which we
impose the maximum penalty provided in Article 321, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason
that the raiders in setting fire to the buildings, particularly the house of Punzalan they knew that it was then
occupied by one or more persons, because they even and actually saw an old lady, the mother of Punzalan,
at the window, and in view of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, each of the appellants is sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and to pay the indemnities mentioned in the decision of the lower court. It shall be
understood, however, that pursuant to the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, the duration of
all penalties shall not exceed 40 years.
Decision: In view of the heavy penalties already imposed and their long duration, the court finds it
unnecessary to fix and impose the prison sentences corresponding to frustrated murder and physical injuries;
however, the sums awarded the victims (Lacorte, Ortega, Anselo, Rivano, Garcia and Lector), by the court
below will stand. With these modifications, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.
People of the Philippines vs. Cabrera 53 Phil 64
Nature: Appeal of the decision of the trial court convicting the accused for violation of Act No. 292 of the
Philippine Commission, and sentenced either to the maximum penalty or a near approach to the maximum
penalty provided by the puniti...ve provisions of that law, all of the defendants have perfected an appeal to this
court.
Facts:On December 13, 1920, policemen of the city of Manila arrested a woman who was a member of the
household of a Constabulary soldier stationed at the Santa Lucia Barracks in this city. The arrest of the
woman was considered by some of the Constabulary soldiers as an outrage committed by the policemen, and
it instantly gave rise to friction between members of Manila police department and member of the Philippine
Constabulary.
The next day, December 14, at about sunset, a policemen named Artemio Mojica, posted on Calle Real, in
the District of Intramuros, city of Manila, had an encounter with various Constabulary soldiers which resulted
in the shooting of private Macasinag of the Constabulary. Private Macasinag was seriously, and as afterwards
appeared, mortally wounded.
The encounter between policemen Mojica and other companions of the Manila force and private Macasinag
and other companions of the Constabulary, with its grave consequences for a Constabulary soldier
endangered a deep feeling of resentment on the part of the soldiers at Santa Lucia Barracks. This resentment
was soon converted into a desire for revenge against the police force of the city of Manila. The officers of the

Constabulary appear to have been aware of the state of excitement among the soldiers the shooting of
private Macasinag, Captain Page, the commanding officer of the Barracks, increased the number of guards,
and confined all the soldiers in the Barracks.
During the afternoon of the next day, December 15, 1920, a rumor spread among the soldiers in Santa Lucia
Barracks to the effect that policeman Mojica was allowed to continue on duty on the streets of Intramuros and
that private Macasinag had died as a consequence of the shot he received the night before. This rumor
contributed in no small degree in precipitating a movement for reprisal by the Constabulary soldiers against
the policemen.
At about 7 o'clock in the evening of the same day, December 15, 1920, corporal Ingles of the Fourth
Company approached private Nicolas Torio who was then the man in charge of quarters, and asked him to let
the soldiers out through the window of the quarters of the Fourth Company. One platoon of Constabulary
soldiers apparently numbering about ten or twelve, on Calle Real, Intramuros, fired in the direction of the
intersection of Calles Real and Cabildo where an American policeman named Driskill was stationed, and was
taking with a friend named Jacumin, a field clerk in the United States Army. These two men were shot and
died soon afterwards. To the credit of policeman Driskill be it said, that although in a dying condition and in the
face of overwhelming odds, her valiantly returned the fire with his revolver. Jacumin was killed
notwithstanding that in response to the command of Constabulary, "Hands up!," he elevated both arms.
A street car happened to stop at this time at the corner of Calles Real and Cabildo. Without considering that
the passengers in the car were innocent passersby, the Constabulary squad fired a volley into the car, killing
instantly the passenger named Victor de Torres and gravely wounding three other civilian passengers.
The firing on Calle Real did not end at that time. Some minutes later, Captain William E. Wichman, assistant
chief of police of the city of Manila, riding in a motorcycle driven by policeman Saplala, arrived at the corner of
Calles Real and Magallanes in Intramuros, and a volley of shorts by Constabulary soldiers resulted in the
instantaneous death of Captain Wichman and the death shortly afterwards of patrolman Saplala.
About the same time, a police patrol came from the Meisic police station. When it was on Calle Real near
Cabildo, in Intramuros, it was fired upon by Constabulary soldiers who had stationed themselves in the
courtyard of the San Agustin Church. This attack resulted in the death of patrolmen Trogue and Sison
FOagEV.
Another platoon of the Constabulary, between thirty and forty in number, had in the meantime, arranged
themselves in a firing line on the Sunken Gradens on the east side of Calle General Luna opposite the
Aquarium.
From this advantageous position the Constabulary fired upon the motorcycle occupied by Sergeant Armada
and driven by policeman Policarpio who with companions were passing along Calle General Luna in front of
the Aquarium going in the direction, of Calle Real, Intramuros. As a result of the shooting, the driver of the
motorcycle, policeman Policarpio, was mortally wounded. This same platoon of Constabulary soldiers fired
several volleys indiscriminately into the Luneta police station, and the office of the secret service of the city of
Manila across Calles General Luna and Padre Burgos, but fortunately no one was injured.
The defendants were charged in one information filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila with
the crime of sedition, and in another information filed in the same, court, with the crimes of murder and
serious physical injuries. The two cases were tried separately before different judges of first instance.
Issue: Is the conviction of the accused of a violation of the Treason and Sedition Law proper?
Held: Sedition, in its more general sense, is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. The
Philippine law on the subject (Act No. 292) makes all persons guilty of sedition who rise publicly and
tumultuously in order to obtain by force or outside of legal methods any one of vie objects, including that of
inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any official or agent of the Insular
Government or of Provincial or Municipal Government. The trial court found that the crime of sedition, as
defined and punished by the law, had been committed, and we believe that such finding is correct.
Counsel's contention that in order for there to be a violation of subdivision 3 of section 5 of Act No. 292 it is
and necessary that the offender should be a private citizen and the offended party a public functionary, and
that what really happened in this instance was a fight between two armed bodies of the Philippine
Government, is absolutely without foundation. Subdivison 3 of section 5 of the Treason and Sedition Law

makes no distinction between the persons to which it applies. In one scene there was a fights between two
armed bodies of the Philippine Government, but it was an unequal fight brought on by the actions of the
accused.
We rule that the trial court did not err in convicting the accused of the violation of section 5, paragraph 3, of
Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission.
Inciting to Sedition
US vs. Tolentino 5 Phil 682
Nature: Appeal from judgement of the CFI of Manila
Facts: Aurelio Tolentino, was convicted upon information charging him with the crime of uttering seditious
words and writings, publishing and circulating scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States
and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands. The said false, seditious and inflammatory words and
scurrilous libels were in the Tagalog language in a theatrical work written by Tolentino , and which was
presented by him and others on May 14, 1903, at the Teatro Libertad in the city of Manila, entitled Kahapon,
Ngayon at Bukas.
Counsel for the appellant insists that the intent of the accused to commit the crime with which he was charged
did not appear from the evidence of the record and that the drama is, in itself a purely artistic reproduction
wherein the legendary history of these Islands and their future, as imagined by the author, are presented
merely for the instruction and entertainment of the public.
Issue: Whether or not the appellant commited the crime with which he is charged.
Held: YES.
Rationale: The publication and presentation of the drama directly and necessarily tended to instigate others to
cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes , and to suggest and incite rebellions, conspiracies and riots
and to stir up the people against lawful authorities and to disturb the peace of the community and the safety
and order of the Government.
The manifest, unmistakable tendency of the play ,in view of the time place and manner of its presentation ,
was to inculcate a spirit of hatred and enmity against the American people and the Government of the U.S in
the Philippines , and the principal object and intent of its author was to incite the people of the Philippines
Islands to open and armed resistance to the constituent authorities; and to induce them to conspire together
for the secret organization of armed forces, to be used when the opportunity presented itself , for the purpose
of overthrowing the present Government and setting up another in its stead.
The manner and form in which the drama was presented at such a time and under such conditions, renders
absurd the pretense that it was merely or even principally a literary of artistic production, and the clumsy
devices, the allegorical figures, the apparent remoteness, past and future, of the events portrayed, could not
and in fact were not intended to leave the audience in doubt as to its present and immediate application.
Espuelas vs. People of the Philippines 90 Phil 524
Facts: In 1974, Accused-appellant made it appear in a photograph that he had hanged himself from a tree. In
the photograph he named himself as "Alberto Reveniera" who supposedly hanged himself due to his
disappointment with the national government. To make his propaganda more believable, accused wrote a
fictitious letter which he annexed to the photograph. In the letter, the accused expressed his disgust over the
administration of Roxas calling it a government "infested with Hitlers and Mussolinis. He then caused the
publication of the said photograph through both local and international media firms.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Bohol found the accused guilty of the crime of inciting to sedition. The
ruling of the CFI was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not appellants action merits him criminal liability for the crime of inciting to sedition
pursuant to Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code.
Held: YES.

Rationale: The violent and provocative statements made by the accused against the state was neither
constructive nor with reason; it instead went beyond the ambit of criticism legally permitted. In other words, it
was more than mere criticisms, it had the dangerous tendency of appealing to the common mind suggesting
or inciting rebellious conspiracies and riots against the duly constituted government.
Decision: Appellants conviction was affirmed.
Umil vs. Ramos supra

Held: Being a member of the New Peoples Army, an outlawed organization, is punishable. Subversion like
rebellion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called "common"
offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission, subversion and
rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness
and violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing organized government is attained.
Violation of parliamentary immunity
Martinez vs. Morfe 44 SCRA 22
Nature: Original actions in SC, certiorari and Habeas Corpus.
Facts: Petitioners Manuel Martinez y Festin and Fernando Bautista, Sr., as delegates of the present
Constitutional Convention would invoke what they consider to be the protection of the above constitutional
provision, if considered in connection with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code penalizing a public officer or
employee who shall, during the sessions of Congress, "arrest or search any member thereof, except in case
such member has committed a crime punishable under [such] Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor."
For under the Constitutional Convention Act, delegates are entitled to the parliamentary immunities of a
senator or a representative. Both petitioners are facing criminal prosecutions, the information filed against
petitioner Manuel Martinez y Festin for falsification of a public document and two informations against
petitioner Fernando Bautista, Sr. for violation of the Revised Election Code. The Solicitor General, on behalf of
the respondent Judges in the above proceedings, would dispute such a contention on the ground that the
constitutional provision does not cover any criminal prosecution being merely an exemption from arrest in civil
cases, the logical inference being that insofar as a provision of the Revised Penal Code would expand such
an immunity, it would be unconstitutional or at the very least inoperative.
Issue: Whether or not Martinez and Bautista are immune from arrest.
Held: NO.
Rationale: There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise
delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their
vital responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of their conscience. Necessarily the utmost
latitude in free speech should be accorded them. When it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would
amount to the creation of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a
criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and
returning from the same. There is likely to be no dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate
can perform his functions efficiently and well, without the need for any transgression of the criminal law.
Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen considering that
there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished. To the fear that may be
expressed that the prosecuting arm of the government might unjustly go after legislators belonging to the
minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the safeguards thrown around an accused by the Constitution,
solicitous of the rights of an individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at abuse of power. The
presumption of course is that the judiciary would remain independent. It is trite to say that in each and every
manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence. Petitioners cannot claim their claim to
immunity.
Direct assault
People of the Philippines vs. Beltran 138 SCRA 521
Nature: Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Cagayan

Facts: Between 9:00 and 10:00 in the evening of 11 Jan. 1972, Ballesteros, Cagayan, Ernesto Alvarado was
bringing Calixto Urbi home in a jeep. Passing by the Puzon Compound, Delfino Beltran alias Minong, shouted
at them, "Oki ni inayo" (Vulva of your mother). They proceeded on their way and ignored Delfino. After
Alvarado had brought Urbi to his house he went to the house of Mayor Bienvenido Quirolgico and reported
the matter. The newly elected Mayor told the Chief of Police that something should be done about it.
They decided to go to the Puzon Compound with the intention to talk to Delfino Beltran and his companions to
surrender considering that he knew them personally as all of them were once working for Congressman David
Puzon When they came near the compound, they saw appellants Delfino Beltran, Rogelio Bugarin and
Domingo Hernandez and suddenly there was a simultaneous discharge of gunfire, The mayor's son, Vicente,
who was with them, cried: " I am already hit, Daddy." As he fell, Vicente pushed his father and both fell down.
Mayor Quirolgico and Patrolman Rolando Tolentino also suffered injuries. When the firing had stopped, they
decided to bring Vicente to the hospital. As the jeep left the compound three (3) men came out of the Puzon
Compound and fired at the fleeing vehicle. They were Cresencio Siazon, Ceferino Beltran and Noling Puzon.
Likewise, Domingo Hernandez and Minong Beltran and Boy Bugarin tried to give chase. After a while, all the
six men returned inside the compound. Vicente Quirolgico died an hour after admission to the hospital.
Issue: Whether or not appellants were properly found guilty of attempted murder with direct assault.
Held: Yes
Rationale: Considering that Mayor Quirolgico is a person in authority and Pat. Rolando Tolentino is a
policeman who at the time was in his uniform, and both were performing their official duties to maintain peace
and order in the community, the finding of the trial court that appellants are guilty of attempted murder with
direct assault on the persons of Mayor Quirolgico and Pat. Tolentino is correct.
Decision: Decision AFFIRMED with modification
People of the Philippines vs. Dollantes 151 SCRA 592
Nature: Appeal from the decision of RTC of Dumaguete City
Facts: Deceased Marcos Gabutero at the time of his death was the Barangay Captain of Barangay Maglihe,
Tayasan, Negros Oriental; that due to the approaching fiesta of barangay Maglihe, a dance was held in said
barangay in the evening of April 21, 1983; that while the Barangay Captain was delivering a speech to start
the dance, the accused Pedro Dollantes went to the middle of the dancing floor, making a dance movement
known in the visayan as "nagkorantsa", brandishing his knife and challenging everyone as to who was brave
among the people present; the Barangay Captain approached Pedro Dollantes and admonished him to keep
quiet and not to disturb the dance. However, the accused, instead of heeding to the advice of the Barangay
Captain, stabbed the latter on the left arm; that accused Hugo Grengia held the left hand of accused Pedro
Dollantes and Dionilo Garol was able to get from the hand of Pedro Dollantes the hunting knife. Immediately
thereafter, accused Hamlet Dollantes, who rushed towards the Barangay Captain, stabbed the Barangay
Captain at the back and the other co-accused also took turns in stabbing the Barangay Captain; the Barangay
Captain at that time was not armed. Except for the accused Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and Leonilo
Villaester who were merely holding stones, the other co-accused participated in the stabbing incident. When
the Barangay Captain fell to the ground and died, the accused in this case took turns in kicking the dead body
of the Barangay Captain and were dancing around said dead body; that the Barangay Captain suffered
eleven (11) wounds in the different parts of his body, two of which happened to be at the back of his dead
body. According to the attending physician, Dr. Rogelio Kho who examined the body of the deceased, the
victim died of "Severe hemorrhage and cardiac tamponade due to stab wounds.
Issue: Whether or not accused was properly found guilty of the Complex Crime of assault upon a person in
authority resulting to murder
Held: YES.
Rationale: The records show that the Barangay Captain was in the act of trying to pacify Pedro Dollantes who
was making trouble in the dance hall when he was stabbed to death. He was therefore killed while in the
performance of his duties. In the case of People v. Hecto (135 SCRA 113), this Court ruled that "As the
barangay captain, it was his duty to enforce the laws and ordinances within the barangay. If in the

enforcement thereof, he incurs, the enmity of his people who thereafter treacherously slew him the crime
committed is murder with assault upon a person in authority.
Delivery of prisoners from jail
Alberto vs. Dela Cruz 98 SCRA 406
Nature: Appeal from the order of the CFI of Camarines Sur
Facts: In Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Eligio Orbita, a Provincial
guard, is prosecuted for the crime of Infedelity in the Custody of Prisoner, defined and punished under Article
224 of the Revised Penal Code. In the course of the trial thereof, or more particularly during the crossexamination of prosecution witness Jose Esmeralda, assistant provincial warden of Camarines Sur, the
defense brought forht and confronted the witness with a note, marked as exhibit, purportedly written by Gov.
Armando Cledera, asking Jose Esmeralda to send five men to work in the construction of a fence at his house
at Taculod, Canaman, Camarines Sur, then leased by the province and used as an official guest house. Jose
Esmeralda, declared, however, that he could not remember who ahnded the note for him; that he was not
sure as to genuineness of the signature appearing therein and that he was not preszent when the note was
made and signed by Gov. Cledera. Beleiving that the escape of Pablo Denaque was made possible by the
note of Gov. Cledera to Jose Esmeralda and that Cledera and Esmeralda are equally guilty of the offense for
which tha accused Eligio Orbita had been charged, the defense cousel filed a motion in court seeking the
amendment of the information so as to include Gov. cledera and Jose Esmeralda as defendants therein.
Issue: Whether or not Gov. Cledera and Jose Esmeralda may be held liable for the escape of Prisoner Pablo
Denaque.
Held: NO.
Ratio: The offense under article 156 is usually committed by an outsider who removes from jail any person
therein confined or helps him escape. If the offender is a public officer who has custody or charge of the
prisoner, he is liable for infidelity in the custody of prisoner defined and penalty under Article 223 of the
Revised Penal Code. Since Gov. Cledera as governor is the jailer of the province, and Jose Esmeralda is the
assistant provincial warden, they cannot be prosecuted for the escape Of Pablo Denaque under Article 156 of
the Revised Penal Code.
There is likewise no sufficient evidence to warrant their prosecution under Article 223 of the Revised Penal
Code. In order to be guilty under article 223 of the Revised Penal Code, it is necessary that the public officer
had consented to, or connived in, the escape of the prisoner under his custody or charge. Connivance in the
escape of a prisoner on the part of the person in charge is an essential condition in the commission of the
crime of faithlessness in the custody of the prisoner. If the public officer charged with the duty of guarding him
does not connive with the fugitive, then he has not violated the law and is not guilty of the crime. For sure no
connivance in the escape of Pablo Denaque from the custody of the accused Eligio Orbita can be deduced
from the note of Gov. Cledera to Jose Esmeralda asking for five men to work in the guest house, it appearing
that the notes does not mention the names of the prisoners to be brought to the guest house; and that it was
the accused Eligio Orbita who picked the men to compose the work party.
Neither is there evidence to warrant the prosecution of Cledera and Esmeralda under Article 224 of the
Revised Penal Code. This article punishes the public officer in whose custody or charge a prisoner has
escaped by reason of his negligence resulting in evasion is definite amounting to deliberate non- performance
of duty.
Decision: Orders ANNULED and SET ASIDE.
Evasion of service of sentence
Tanega vs. Masakayan 19 SCRA 564
Nature: Original action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition
Facts: Convicted of slander by the City Court of Quezon City, Tanega appealed. Found guilty once again by
the Court of First Instance, she was sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor, to indemnify the offended party,

Pilar B. Julio, in the sum of P100.00, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court declined to review on certiorari.
Back to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, said court, on January 11, 1965, directed that execution of
the sentence be set for January 27, 1965. On petitioner's motion, execution was deferred to February 12,
1965, at 8:30 a.m. At the appointed day and hour, petitioner failed to show up. This prompted the respondent
judge, on February 15, 1965, to issue a warrant for her arrest, and on March 23, 1965 an alias warrant of
arrest. Petitioner was never arrested.
On December 19, 1966, the respondent judge ruled that "the penalty imposed upon the accused has to be
served", rejected the plea of prescription of penalty and, instead, directed the issuance of another alias
warrant of arrest.
Issue: Whether or not prescription of penalty ran in favor of petitioner.
Held: NO.
Rationale: Arresto menor and a fine of P100.00 constitute a light penalty. By Article 92 of the Revised Penal
Code, light penalties "imposed by final sentence" prescribe in one year. The period of prescription of penalties
- so the succeeding Article 93 provides shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade
the service of his sentence.
Art. 157 of the RPC states the elements of evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the offender is a convict by
final judgment; (2) he "is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades
service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. Evasion of sentence is jail breaking.
Prescription shall only begin to run when he escapes from confinement. In the case at bar, Tanega was never
placed in confinement, hence, the prescription of penalty does not run in his favor.
People of the Philippines vs. Abilong 82 SCRA 172
Nature: Appeal from a judgement of the Court Of First Instance of Manila.
Facts: Florentino Abilong was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with evasion of service of
sentence imposed upon him of destierro in which he should not enter any place within the radius of 100
kilometers from the City of Manila for the crime of robbery. Upon arraignment he pleaded guilty and was
sentenced to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional. He is appealing from that
decision on the grounds that Art. 157 of the Revised Penal Code does not cover evasion of service of
destierro. Counsel for the appellant contends that a person like the accused evading a sentence of destierro
is not criminally liable under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly article 157 of the said
Code for the reason that said article 157 refers only to persons who are imprisoned in a penal institution and
completely deprived of their liberty. He bases his contention on the word "imprisonment" used in the English
text of said article.
Issue: Whether or not the contention of the defendant-appellant is valid.
Held: NO.
Rationale: Inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code was originally approved and enacted in Spanish, the
Spanish text governs (People vs. Manaba, 58 Phil. 665, 668). It is clear that the word "imprisonment" used in
the English text is a wrong or erroneous translation of the phrase "sufriendo privacion de libertad" used in the
Spanish text. It is equally clear that although the Solicitor General impliedly admits destierro as not
constituting imprisonment, it is a deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the sense that as in the present case,
the appellant by his sentence of destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City of Manila.
Violation of Conditional Pardon
Torres vs. Gonzales 152 SCRA 272
Facts: Petitioner was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila of the crime of estafa. On 18 April
1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the President of the Philippines on condition that
petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated,

he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law." Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon
and was consequently released from confinement.
On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole (the "Board") resolved to recommend to the President the
cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner. In making its recommendation to the
President, the Board relied upon the decisions of this Court in Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons (68 Phil. 154
[1939]) and Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol (108 Phil. 356 [1960]). The evidence before the Board
showed that on 22 March 1982 and 24 June 1982, petitioner had been charged with twenty counts of estafa
in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-19672 and Q-20756, which cases were then (on 21 May 1986) pending trial
before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal (Quezon City).
The record before the Board also showed that on 26 June 1985, petitioner had been convicted by the
Regional Trial Court of Rizal (Quezon City) of the crime of sedition in Criminal Case No. Q-22926: this
conviction was then pending appeal before the Intermediate Appellate Court. The Board also had before it a
letter report dated 14 January 1986 from the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI"), addressed to the
Board, on the petitioner. Per this letter, the records of the NBI showed that a long list of charges had been
brought against the petitioner during the last twenty years for a wide assortment of crimes including estafa,
other forms of swindling, grave threats, grave coercion, illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and
explosives, malicious mischief, violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and violation of Presidential Decree No.
772 (interfering with police functions). Some of these charges were identified in the NBI report as having
been dismissed. The NBI report did not purport to be a status report on each of the charges there listed and
identified.
On 10 October 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice issued "by authority of the President" an Order of
Arrest and Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly arrested and confined in
Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. Petitioner now impugns the validity of the Order of
Arrest and Recommitment. He claims that he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been
convicted by final judgment of the twenty (20) counts of estafa charged in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-19672 and
Q-20756 nor of the crime of sedition in Criminal Case No. Q-22926 3 Petitioner also contends that he was
not given an opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and recommitted to prison, and accordingly
claims he has been deprived of his rights under the due process clause of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the pending charges suffice to constitute breach of the conditional pardon.
Held: NO.
Rationale: It may be emphasized that what is involved in the instant case is not the prosecution of the
parolee for a subsequent offense in the regular course of administration of the criminal law. What is involved
is rather the ascertainment of whether the convict has breached his undertaking that he would "not again
violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines" for purposes of reimposition upon him of the remitted portion
of his original sentence. The consequences that we here deal with are the consequences of an ascertained
breach of the conditions of a pardon. A convict granted conditional pardon, like the petitioner herein, who is
recommitted must of course be convicted by final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with
which he was charged before the criminal penalty for such subsequent offense(s) can be imposed upon him.
Again, since Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code defines a distinct, substantive, felony, the parolee or
convict who is regarded as having violated the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and
convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed in Article 159. Succinctly
put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have
breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him
under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the
Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who
"having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such
pardon." Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President's executive prerogative and is not
subject to judicial scrutiny
Quasi-recidivism
People of the Philippines, vs. Dioso 132 SCRA 616
Nature: Appeal from the judgment of the Cuircuit Criminal Court of Rizal

Facts: Teofilo Dioso and Jacinto Abarca were serving sentence inside the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinglupa,
Rizal havin been convicted of robbery and homicide respectively. Dioso and Abarca were members of the
"Batang Mindanao" gang, while the victims Angelito Reyno and Fernando Gomez, also prisoners at the New
Bilibid Prisons, belonged to a group known as the "Happy Go Lucky" gang. These rival factions had been
involved in intermittent, and sometimes bloody, clashes, the latest of which resulted in the death of one
Balerio a member of the "Batang Mindanao" gang.
Suspecting that Reyno and Gomez had authored the slaying of their gangmate, the two accused set their
Minds to avenge his death. They found the occasion to execute their nefarious design when they learned that
Reyno and Gomez were sick and confined in the prison hospital. At 6:15 in the 'morning of September 12,
1972, Abarca, feigning illness, went to the hospital to seek admission as a patient. He was accompanied by
his co-accused Dioso. Inside Ward 6 of the hospital they saw their intended victims: Reyno was taking
breakfast with Gomez was lying down on a "tarima" [wooden bed] under a mosquito net. Dioso approached
Reyno and spoke briefly to him, while Abarca headed towards the "tarima". Then, both accused suddenly
drew out their improvised knives matalas Abarca raised the mosquito net over the "tarima" and stabbed
Gomez, as Dioso, almost simultaneously, attacked Reyno with his knife. And after the latter had fallen, Dioso
strode to the "tarima" to help his co-accused finish off Gomez. The accused rushed out of the ward and
immediately surrendered to a prison guard they met in the corridor.
When arraigned for the crime of murder, both accused voluntarily entered the plea of guilty. The trial court
found the accused guilty of the said offense and imposed upon them the sentence of death, In the instant
appeal, the accused seek for the attenuation if death penalty invoking the mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender and plea of guilty.
Issue: Whether or not the contention of both accused is valid.
Held: NO.
Rationale: The accused are quasi-recidivist, having committed the crime charged while serving sentence for a
prior offense. As such, the maximum penalty prescribed by law for the new felony [murder] is death,
regardless of the presence or absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstance. But for lack of the requisite
votes, the death sentence imposed on each of the accused is commuted to reclusion perpetua.
D. Crimes Against Public Interest
Counterfeiting
People of the Philippines vs. Kong Leon 46 OG 664
Facts: The accused was a licensed goldsmith maintaining his shop at Bambang, Manila. Detectives searched
his shop and therein found paraphernalia necessary for goldsmithing together with two unfinished $10 U.S.
gold coins, one unfinished $5 U.S. gold coin and eight finished $10 U.S. gold coins; all of which were declared
by the chemist of the Detective Bureau to be fake. Accused admitted possession and ownership of said coins,
the shop and the instruments. Accused raises the question that since under the Gold Reserve Act of 1934,
U.S. gold coins were withdrawn from circulation, they are no longer currency in the Philippines, and therefore
the accused cannot be convicted under Article 163, par.3 of the RPC.
Issue: Whether or not the fabrication of coins withdrawn from circulation is punishable.
Held: YES.
Rationale: The reason for punishing the fabrication of a local coins withdrawn from circulation is not alone the
harm caused to the public by the fact that it may go into circulation, nut the danger that a counterfeiter
produces by his stay in the country, and the possibility that he may later apply his trade to the making of coins
in actual circulation. Thus, the making of false coins of a foreign country is punishable under Article 163, par.
3 of the RPC, even if said country has withdrawn the coin from circulation therein.
Decision: Judgment AFFIRMED.
Forgery
Del Rosario vs. People of the Philippines 3 SCRA 650

Nature: Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Davao.

Facts: After showing to complainant Apolinario del Rosario three Philippine P1 bills and one Philippine P2 bill,
and inducing him to believe that the same were counterfeit paper money manufactured by them, although in
fact they were genuine treasury notes of the Philippine Government one of the digits of each of which had
been altered and changed, the accused had succeeded in obtaining P1,700 from him for the avowed purpose
of financing the manufacture of more counterfeit treasury notes of the Philippines. Accused were convicted of
illegal possession of forged treasury notes by the trial court, which decision was upheld by the appellate court.
In the instant petition appellant del Rosario maintains that, being treasury notes of our government, the
possession thereof cannot be illegal.
Issue: Whether or not the possession of altered genuine treasury notes constitutes a violation of Article 168 of
the RPC.
Held: YES.
Rationale: The possession of genuine treasury notes of the Philippines any of the the figure, letters, words or
sign contained in which had been erased and/or altered, with knowledge of such notes, as they were used by
petitioner herein and his co-defendants in the manner adverted to above, is punishable under Article 168, in
relation to Article 166, subdivision 1, of the RPC.
Decision: Decision AFFIRMED.
People of the Philippines vs. Galano 54 OG 5897
Facts: Pat. Villanueva disclosed that at least nine persons were running after the appellant; that he saw blood
oozing from the appellants lips; that Lilia Cruz handed to him the one peso bill paid to her by the appellant for
four ballot eggs, complaining that it was fake as the word Victory was only written in ink; and, that he
examined the peso bill and really found that the word Victory was written in ink.
Issue: Whether or not the appellant was correctly accused of and convicted under Article 166, in relation to
Article 169 of the RPC.
Held: YES.
Rationale: The alteration or even destruction of a demonetized paper bill would harm no one but the holder.
However its utterance by giving to it the similitude of a true and genuine legal tender of the Victory series
shows the intention to deceive and defraud. The forgery here committed comes under the first paragraph of
Article 169 of the Code. This provision does not only contemplate situations where a spurious, false or
falsified document or instrument is given the appearance of a true and genuine document, but also to
situations involving originally true and genuine documents which have been withdrawn or demonetized, or
have outlived its usefulness.
Decision: Judgment AFFIRMED.
Falsification
Siquian vs. People of the Philippines 171SCRA223
Nature: Petition to review the CA decision.
Facts: Sometime in June 1975, Jesusa Carreon, 20 years old, single and a resident of Ilagan, Isabela, went to
accused Manuel L. Siquian, Mayor of the Municipality of Angadanan, Province of Isabela, to apply for
employment in the office of the Mayor. The accused must have agreed to appoint her because he told her to
report for work the following day. She was appointed clerk to the Municipal Secretary in the Office of the
Municipal Secretary July 1, 1975 by the accused. Accompanying her appointment is the certification, among
others, of the availability funds (C.S. Form No. 203) dated July 1, 1975, issued by the accused Manuel L.
Siquian. Jesusa Carreon took her oath of Office on July 1, 1975, and promptly began to work on the same
day. Her monthly salary was P120.00. She rendered services for the months of July, August, September,
October, November, December 1975. She was not, however, paid. Because of this, she went to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan at the Provincial Capitol in Ilagan, Isabela, to (sic) information regarding her

unpaid salaries. Thereafter, she filed her verified complaint against the accused. It turned out that the
Municipal council of Angadanan, Isabela, failed to enact the annual budget for the municipal for the Fiscal
Year 1975-1976. Accordingly, the annual budget for the previous Fiscal Year 1974-1975, was deemed reenacted. Thus, the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 is the same as the Plantilla
Personnel for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976. No supplemental budged was enacted by the municipal council of
Angadanan. In the Plantilla of Personnel for 1974-1975, which was deemed re-enacted for the Fiscal Year
1975-1976, there was no new item or appropriation for the position of clerk in the Office of the Municipal
Secretary of Angadanan, Isabela.
Petitioner Manuel L. Siquian was charged with and found guilty of the crime of falsification of pubic document
under Article 171 par. 4 of the RPC before the RTC of Cauayan, Isabela. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
decision. Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that there was no criminal intent on his part, that he did not
take advantage of his position as Municipal Mayor, and that the statement Funds for the position available is
not a narration of facts but a conclusion of law.
Issue: WON petitioners contentions are valid.
Held: NO.
Rationale: It is settled that in the fourth kind of falsification, the following requisites must concur: a.) That the
officer makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; b.) That he has a legal obligation to
disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and c.) That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely
false. All requisites had been fully met in the case at bar.
Petitioners stance that the certification which he issued contained no narration of facts but rather conclusion
of law is not meritorious. Conclusion of law is defined as a proposition not arrived at by any process of
natural reasoning from a fact or combination of facts stated but by the application of the artificial rules of law
to the facts pleaded. From the above-cited definition, it can be deduced that the certification by the appellant
that 'funds for the position are available' does not require the application of the artificial rules of law. To certify
that funds are available for the position what one should do was (sic) to refer to the budget and plantilla of
personnel of the applicable fiscal year and ascertain if such item exists and funds are allocated therefor.
The second element of the offense is likewise present. As an officer authorized by law to issue certification
which is designated as Civil Service Form No. 203, as revised, the petitioner has a legal obligation to disclose
the truth of the facts narrated by him in said certification which includes information as to the availability of the
funds for the position being filled up. Contrary to petitioner's claim, the existence of a wrongful intent to injure
a third person is not necessary when the falsified document is a public document.
Lastly, there was no appropriation made in the Annual Budget for the Fiscal Year 1974-1975 for such position,
thus rendering petitioner's statement in his certification utterly false. The requisite of absolute falsity of the
statement made in the document is met when there exists not even an iota of colorable truth in what is
declared in the narration of facts, as in this case.
DECISION: Decision AFFIRMED.
People of the Philippines vs. Villalon 192 SCRA 521
Nature: Special civil action for certiorari to review the order of the RTC of Dagupan City, Branch 40.
Facts: Complainant Mariano Carrera and his brother, Severo Carrera, are co-owners of a parcel of land
located at Barrio Buenlag, Binmaley, Pangasinan, registered in their names under TCT No. 47682. n February
5, 1964, complainant allegedly executed a special power of attorney before Notary Public Jaime B. Arzadon,
Jr., naming private respondent Federico de Guzman as his lawful attorney-in-fact. On February 13, 1964,
private respondent mortgaged the parcel of land with the People's Bank and Trust Company in Dagupan City
using the said special power of attorney, and was able to obtain the amount of P8,500.00 as a loan from the
mortgagee bank. Both the special power of attorney and the mortgage contract were duly registered in the
Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan on February 13, 1964.
After the expiration of the term of the mortgage, and the mortgage account not having been paid, the
mortgagee bank foreclosed said mortgage and the land was sold to one Ramon Serafica and Vileta Quinto
who were issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 85181 for said property. In January, 1972, complainant
allegedly discovered that their property was already registered in the name of said Ramon Serafica when the
latter filed on said date an action for the ejectment of the former from the premises.

A criminal case for estafa thru falsification of a public document was filed against private respondent in the
then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. private respondent pleaded not guilty. On December 16, 1975,
private respondent filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the crime has prescribed since ten years had
elapsed since the time it was committed. The trial court dismissed the case on the ground of prescription and
denied the prosecutions motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document filed against private
respondent is a sufficient ground to exist in law and in fact.
Held: YES.
Rationale: The falsification of a public document may be a means of committing estafa because before the
falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been
consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of public,
official or commercial documents. The damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the
falsification of the document, hence, the falsification of the public, official or commercial document is only a
necessary means to commit the estafa.
Decision: Petition DISMISSED.
Use of falsified documents
Dava vs. People of the Philippines 202 SCRA 62
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari from the decision of the then IAC.
Facts: On October 19, 1975, petitioner Michael T. Dava, then the holder of a non-professional drivers license,
bumped pedestrians Bernadette Roxas Clamor and Dolores Roxas, causing death to the former and physical
injuries to the latter. As a consequence, Davas license was confiscated and a criminal case for homicide and
serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against Dava.
On April 12, 1978, Antonio Roxas, the brother of Bernadette and the father of Dolores, saw Dava driving a
Volkswagen. Knowing that Davas drivers license was used as evidence in court and that no traffic violation
receipt had been issued to Dava; Roxas sought the help of the authorities. Officers of the Constabulary
Highway Patrol Group (CHPG) confronted Dava and were shown a non-professional drivers license issued
by Agency 2L Pampanga. Dava informed them that his officemate had secured it for him. Subsequent
investigation revealed that the license was a fake and a falsity. Accordingly an Information for falsification of a
public document was filed against Dava. Dava was convicted of the crime charged. He appealed to the then
IAC which affirmed the decision and denied his subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence, the instant
petition.
Issue: Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to warrant the conviction of the petitioner for the crime
charged.
Held: YES.
Rationale: While there is no doubt that the drivers license was a spurious one, the evidence do not pinpoint
the petitioner as the actual falsifier. However, there are pieces of evidence which prove beyond reasonable
doubt that he caused the falsification and made use of the falsified drivers license.
The elements of the crime of using a falsified document in any transaction penalized under the last paragraph
of Article 172 are the following: (a.) the offender knew that a document was falsified by another person; (b.)
the false document is embraced in Article 171 or in any of subdivision nos. 1 and 2 of Article 172; (c.) he used
such document (not in judicial proceedings); and (d.) the use of the false document caused damage to
another or at least it was used with intent to cause such damage. Except for the last, all of these requisites
have been proven beyond reasonable doubt in this case.
However, the drivers license being a public document, proof of the fourth element has become immaterial. In
falsification of public or official documents, the principal thing being punished is the violation of the public faith
and the destruction of the truth proclaimed therein.

Decision: Decision of the IAC AFFIRMED.

Usurpation
People of the Philippines vs. Cortez 73 OG 10056
Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Manila
Facts: Elizabeth Z. Reyes was in her Malate store. Appellant Augusto Cortez entered and introduced himself
as a BIR agent, showing an ID card in the name of S. Begunia together with other BIR papers. He told Mrs.
Reyes that he was authorized to examine the latters books and receipts. Appellant then asked for a fee of
P400 so that he would not inspect the books and receipts, claiming that he was sent to collect and raise funds
for the BIR director. Mrs. Reyes went to the BIR and learned that the appellant was merely an impostor. The
BIR agents apprehended the appellant in an entrapment operation with the help of Mrs. Reyes. He was then
convicted of the complex crime of robbery through use and falsification of public and/or official document and
with usurpation of authority.
Issue: Whether or not appellant committed the complex crime of robbery through use and falsification of
public and/or official document and with usurpation of authority.
Held: The crime committed was falsification of public document by a private individual penalized by Article
172 of the RPC and usurpation of authority under Article 177. Robbery was not committed because of the
absence of either violence or intimidation.
Rationale: The crime committed was a complex crime of usurpation of authority thru falsification of a public
document by a private individual. The falsification was the means employed to perpetrate the crime of
usurpation. The penalty for falsification should be imposed in its maximum period, falsification being the most
serious offense.
Decision: Judgment MODIFIED.
Gigantoni vs. People of the Philippines 162 SCRA 158
Nature: Appeal by certiorari to review the decision of the IAC affirming the decision of the RTC finding the
accused guilty of usurpation of authority under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code.
Facts: On or about May 14 or 15, 1981 Petitioner Melencio Gigantoni, an employee of two private
companies--Black Mountain Mining Inc. and Tetra Management Corporation, went to the PAL office and
presented himself as an agent of CIS, Philippine Constabulary (PC-CIS) investigating a kidnapping and
requested that he be shown the passenger manifests for Manila-Baguio- Manila flights covering the period of
Feb 1-3, 1981. He exhibited an ID card to convince the PAL officials and they granted his request. Upon
verification with the PC-CIS, PAL learned that Gigantoni was no longer a CIS agent. In fact, he was dismissed
on June 30, 1980 for gross misconduct. He was apprehended by NBI agents when he returned to the PAL
office. He readily confessed that he was privately employed to check on per diem claims of fellow employees
who had travelled with PAL. He was convicted of the crime of usurpation of authority under Article 177 of the
RPC. The appellate court affirmed the conviction.
Petitioners contention was that he could not be guilty of the crime charged because at the time of the alleged
commission of the offense, he was still a CIS agent who was merely suspended and was not yet informed of
his termination from service.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner knowingly and falsely misrepresented himself as a PC-CIS agent.
Held: NO.
Rationale: The prosecution failed to prove that petitioner was duly notified of his dismissal from the service.
This negates the charge that he knowingly and falsely represented himself to be a CIS agent. The
constitutional presumption of innocence can only be overturned by competent and credible proof and never
by mere application of the disputable presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. It was not
for the accused to prove a negative fact, that he did not receive the order of dismissal. The burden of proof in
criminal cases as to the offense charged lies on the prosecution.

It would have made no difference whether the accused was suspended or dismissed if he were charged with
usurpation of official function under Article 177 Par. 2 because both imply the absence of power to represent
oneself as vested with authority to perform acts pertaining to an office to which he knowingly was deprived of.
But in this case, he was merely charged with usurpation of authority under Article 177 Par. 1, so the argument
does not apply.
Decision: REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
Using Fictitious Name
Legamia vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 131 SCRA 478
Nature: Appeal by certiorari to review the decision of the IAC
Facts: Corazon Legamia lived with Emilio N. Reyes for 19 years. They produced a son named Michael. The
two lived together until the latters death. Corazon was known, styled herself and was introduced by Emilio to
friends as Corazon L. Reyes.
Emilio was working for the Agricultural Credit Administration when he died, shortly after his death, Corazon
filed a letter claim in behalf of their son for death benefits. The letter was signed Corazon L. Reyes. The
voucher evidencing payment was also signed Corazon L. Reyes. Felicisima reyes, Emilios legal spouse
filed a complaint which led to Corazons prosecution and conviction for using an alias in violation of CA 142
Section 1.
Issue: WON the petitioner violated CA 142
Held: NO.
Rationale: It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a woman to represent herself as he wife and use the
name of the man she is living with despite the fact that the man is married to another woman. The practice is
not encouraged but neither is it unduly frowned upon. It is in the light of our cultural environment that the law
must be construed.
In the case at bar, Corazon had been living with Emilio for 20 years. She assumed the role of wife and
Emilios name without any sinister purpose or personal material gain in mind. She applied for his death
benefits not for herself but for their son as his legal guardian. The lawmakers could not have meant to
criminalize what Corazon had done especially because some of them probably had their own Corazons.
Decision: SET ASIDE, petitioner ACQUITTED.
Perjury
Diaz vs. Court of Appeals 191 SCRA 86
Nature: Petition to review the decision of the then IAC.
Facts: Petitioner was a senior clerk at the Jose Abad Santos High School in San Fernando, Pampanga. IN
1972, he sought appointment as School Administrative Assistant of the same school. As one of the
requirements for appointment, he filled up Civil Service Form 212 and indicated that his highest educational
attainment was Fourth Year Bachelor of Arts (Liberal Arts) in Cosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges during
the years 1950-1954. He swore to the truth and veracity of the data and information therein furnished by him
before the proper administering officer. On the basis thereof, he was appointed.
Later, it was discovered that petitioner was never enrolled in the schools during the period that he claimed
and that petitioners name was not in all the enrollment lists of college students both schools submitted to the
Bureau of Private schools, Department of Education. Petitioners only evidence, a transcript showing he had
taken up courses at the Philippine Harvardian College, was disregarded for it lacked the authenticating marks
the Imprint of the college seal and the Presidents signature. Thus, petitioner was convicted of falsification
of official document under Article 171 Paragraph 4 of the RPC. The IAC affirmed the conviction.
Issue: Whether or not the conviction of petitioner for falsification of official document was proper.

Held: NO.
Rationale: The crime committed under the foregoing facts was perjury. Article 183 of the RPC defines perjury
as the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation administered by authority of law on
a material matter. The elements of the crime of perjury are
(a.)That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter.
(b.)That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and
administer oaths.
(c.) That in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a
falsehood.
(d.)That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal
purpose.
All these elements were present in the case at bar.
Decision: MODIFIED.
Machinations in PubliC Auctions
Ouano vs. Court of Appeals 188 SCRA 799.
Nature: Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA.
Facts: The appellate proceedings at bar treat of a parcel of land with an area of 3, 710 square meters,
situated in Mandaue, Cebu, identified as Philippine Railway Lot No. 3-A-1. It was covered by Torrens Title No.
7618 in the name of the registered owner, Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), now the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP). Adjoining Lot 3-A-1 are lands belonging to the private respondent Francisco
Echavez and petitioner Paterno J. Ouano.
The property was offered for sale by public bidding by the RFC on Apr 1 1958. It appears that prior to the
bidding, Ouano and Echavez orally agreed that only Echavez would make a bid, and that if it was accepted,
they would divide the property in proportion to their adjoining properties. To ensure the success of their
enterprise, they also agreed to induce the group headed by Mrs. Bonsuca, the only other party known to be
interested in the property, to desist from presenting a bid. The latter agreed to withdraw, as it did in fact
withdraw from the sale, and Ouanos wife paid it P2,000 as reimbursement for its expenses. The highest bid
submitted and thus accepted by the RFC was that of Francisco Echavez, who offered 27, 826 for the land.
Echavez paid the sum of P5, 565 as 20% deposit of the proffered price.
Two weeks after Echavez won the bid, a document simply entitled Agreement was signed by him and
Ouano. However, the RFC never approved the sharing agreement between Echavez and Ouano concerning
the lot. It approved the sale of the lot to Echavez only, on the condition that he pay the purchase price of P27,
826 in cash. Echavez had great difficulty in complying with the condition. It took him four years of negotiation
to ultimately acquire the title to the property, which was given in December 1963.
On the other hand, Ouano tried to have the DBP either accept and implement his sharing agreement with
Echavez, or allow him to pay the full price of the lot in behalf of Echavez. On June 24, 1963, Ouano filed a
suit for specific performance and reconveyance in the CFI of Cebu against Echavez and the DBP. The trial
court found that the sharing agreement between Ouano and Echavez could not be enforced in view of the
absence of consent of RFC (DBP), which the latter never gave. Also, the agreement had an unlawful cause
and hence could produce no effect whatever in accordance with Article 1352 of the Civil Code, because it
involved a felony defined in Article 185 of the RPC. The CA affirmed the decision.
Issue: Whether or not the sharing agreement between Ouano and Echavez, being a perfected contract,
should be given force and effect.
Held: NO.
Rationale: Ouano and Echavez committed the felony of machinations pubic auctions defined and penalized in
Article 185 of the RPC when they promised to share the property and attempted to cause and in fact
succeeded in causing another bidder to stay away from the auction in order to cause reduction in the price of
the property.

That both Ouano and Echavez did these acts is a matter of record, as is the fact that only one bidthat of
Echavezwas entered for the land, in consequence of which, Echavez eventually acquired it. The agreement
therefore being criminal in character, the parties not only have no action against each other but both are liable
to prosecution and the things and price of their agreement subject to disposal according to the provisions of
the RPC. This, in accordance with the so-called pari delicto principle set out in the Civil Code.
Article 1409 of the CC declares inexistent and void from the beginning those contracts, among others,
whose cause, object, or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy, or
expressly prohibited by law. Such contracts cannot be ratified and the right to set up the defense of
illegality cannot be waived. Article 1410 adds, the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence (of
the contract) does not prescribe.
Furthermore, Article 1411 of the same code states: When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause
or object of the contract and the act constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall
have no action against each other, and both shall be prosecuted. Moreover, the provisions of the Penal Code
relative to the disposal of the effects or instruments of a crime shall be applicable to the things or the price of
the contract.
The dismissal of the action by the RTC and the CA were, thus, correct , in accordance with the Civil Code,
Article 1411 stating that the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and instruments or tools with which it was
committed shall be that as mandated by the provisions of Article 45 of the RPC (escheated in favor of the
State).
Decision: MODIFIED.
E. Crimes Relative to Opium and Other Prohibited Drugs
R.A. 6425, as amended.
US VS. CHAN GUY JUAN, 23 PHIL 105
Facts: Sometimes in May 1910, the steamer Ton-Yek anchored in the Bay of Calbayog, Samar. A Chinese
named Lee See, one of the passengers, disembarked and went to the house of the appellant, Chan Guy Juan
in the town of Calbayog and engaged in a lengthy conversation. Lee See then returned to the boat and the
appellant employed one Isidro Cabinico to go alongside of the streamer with his baroto and receive from the
said Lee See a certain sack containing, as the appellant said, sugar. On arriving at the steamer, Lee see, who
was on deck, tied a rope around the sack, and lowered it into Cabinicos baroto. The latter, while on his way to
the house of the appellant with the sack and its content, was arrested and the contents of the sack examined
and found to consist of a small amount of sugar and twenty-eight cans of opium. This opium was confiscated
by the local authorities and separate criminal charges instituted against the two Chinamen and Cabinico.
Upon investigation by the provincial fiscal, the case against Cabinico was dismissed, while those against the
two Chinamen were proceeded with, resulting in the conviction of both.
Record clearly showed, however, that Cabinico did not know the contents of the sack which he received from
Lee See and which was on his way to deliver to the appellant. It insisted that it cannot be said, under these
facts, that the appellant had possession or control of the twenty-eight cans of opium. It is true that the
appellant never had actual physical possession of the opium, but it must be remembered that while he
employed Cabinico to go to the streamer and receive, as he said, a certain amount of sugar from his
countryman Lee See and bring the same to him, he knew that the sack which Cabinico would receive
contained very little sugar and a large amount of opium.
Issues: 1.) Is the agent also liable with his principals for drug possession?
2.) What is constructive possession?
Held: The High Court held that the law never intended the possession of the drug should be limited to mere
manual touch or personal custody. Upon such holding, a guilty principal could often escape by taking the
precaution to never have the drug in his actual possession, and thus defeat the intent of law. The words
having possession of must therefore be extended to include constructive possession- that is, the relation
between the owner of the drug and the drug itself when the owner is not in actual possession, but when it is
still under his control and management and subject to his disposition. It is immaterial whether Lee See or
Chan Guy Juan was the real owner of the opium found in the sack of sugar. The evidence shows both were
guilty principals in the effort to land the opium from the streamer. Cabinico was the innocent agent of the
defendant in this case, and the responsibility for carrying the opium ashore therefore reverts to this defendant.

One who employs an innocent agent to commit a crime is liable as a principal; although he does nothing
further himself in the actual commission of the crime.
F. Crimes Against Public Morals
Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions
People of the Philippines vs. Aparici 52 OG 249
Facts: One evening, Detectives Nibungco and Jose, accompanied by Manila Chronicle photographers, went
to the Azcarraga Theater to observe what was being exhibited there. They found the theater dark with the
stage dimly lighted where accused Virginia Aparici was swaying to and fro with the middle part of her body,
dancing with her hips swaying and sometimes raising her feet one after the other. The accused had nothing
on except nylon patches over her breasts and a too abbreviated pair of nylon panties to interrupt her stark
nakedness and around her waist was a furry white girdle with a middle piece punctuating attention on the
thing she was supposed to hide. There were more than 100 customers, all men, apparently it was a mens
show most of whom had been howling and shouting in Tagalog: Sigue muna, sigue nakakalibog.
Issue: Whether or not the accused had exhibited indecent and immoral scenes and acts.
Held: YES.
Rationale: The reaction of the public during the performance of the dance by the appellant should be made
the gauge in the determination whether appellants dancing or exhibition was indecent or immoral. And the
spectators that night had given their unequivocal verdict that appellants dancing was indecent and erotic.
The test whether a particular act is obscene is its tendency to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are
open to such immoral influences, be they cultured or not.
Decision: Conviction AFFIRMED.
People of the Philippines vs. Padan101 Phil 749
Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Manila
Facts: On 13Sep1953 in Tondo, Manila, officers of the Manila Police department in plain clothes bought
tickets to and attended a live sex show. Appellant Marina Padan was the girl performer and appellant Jose
Fajardo managed or was in charge of the performance. Both, along with their co-accused, were arrested and
charged with a violation of Article 201 of the RPC. All of them were found guilty by the trial court.
In the instant appeal, appellant Padan seeks a reduction of the penalty imposed by eliminating the prison
sentence because of her plea of guilty in the lower court. Appellant Fajardo, on the other hand, insists that his
participation in the offense, if he participated at all, was to play the role of an innocent bystander.
Issue: Whether or not the instant appeal should be given due course.
Held: NO.
Rationale: An actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded by acts of lasciviousness, can have no redeeming
features. In it, there is no room for art. One can see nothing in it but clear and unmitigated obscenity,
indecency and an offense to public morals, inspiring and causing as it does, nothing but lust and lewdness,
and exerting a corrupting influence especially on the youth of the land. Considering the seriousness of the
crime, the relatively severe penalty imposed by the trial court is proper.
Decision: Judgment AFFIRMED with some modifications.
G. Crimes Committed By Public Officers
Bribery and Corruption of Public Officials
Dacumos vs. Sandiganbayan 195 SCRA 833

Nature: Petition for review the decision of the Sandiganbayan.

Facts: Dacumos was a revenue examiner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. He was offered to settle the tax
liability of R. Revilla Interiors in the amount of P73,307.31 by pulling out its assessments papers from the
office of the BIR Commissioner and procuring a tax clearance. For the said service, he required a fee of
P35,000.00 which was later reduced to P30,000.00. The manager of the firm, Gregorio Samia, pretended to
go along with Dacumos but Samia reported the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation.
When Samia met Dacumos, Samia told Dacumos that he only had P1,000 with him but that he would deliver
the balance later. Samia tendered a white envelope containing the P1,000 previously dusted with fluorescent
powder, but Dacumos accepted it only when they had left the eatery (their meeting place) and he was nearing
his car outside. He put the envelope in his pocket. The NBI agents closed in and placed him under arrest.
Dacumos reaction was to draw out the envelope and throw it on the ground. One of the agents retrieved it. At
the NBI headquarters, Dacumos hands were found positive of the fluorescent powder, as so were the
envelope itself and the bills inside.
Dacumos defense was that the charges were fabricated. He had access to the Commissioners office so he
could not have promised to get the assessment papers. He also imposed the defense that the percentage tax
was mandatory. Dacumos further contended that he was merely framed because Samia resented his refusal
to the bribed.
The Sandiganbayan found Dacumos guilty of direct bribery.
Issue: Whether or not Dacumos was guilty of direct bribery.
Held: Yes, he is guilty.
Rationale: Dacumos suggested that judgment was rendered against him because he happens to be a tax
collector. According to him, history, even from biblical times, depicts tax collectors the most unpopular and
vilified adjunct of any society. However, the SC believes that Dacumos was convicted not because he was a
tax collector but because he accepted the bribe.
Decision: Petition is denied, the assailed decision is affirmed.
Graft and Corruption (R.A. 1379)
Cabal vs. Kapunan 6 SCRA 1059
Nature: Original Petition in the SC. Certiotrari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.
Facts: On 2Aug1961, Col. Jose C. Maristela of the Philippine Army filed with the Secretary of National
Defense a letter-complaint charging Manuel F. Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, with graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth and liabilities in1958 and other equally
reprehensible acts. On 6Sept1961, the President of the Philippines created a committee of 5 members,
consisting of former Justice Marceliano R. Montemayor, as Chairman, former Justices Buenaventura Ocampo
and Sotero Cabahug, and Generals Basilio J. Valdez and Guillermo B. Fransisco, to investigate the said
complaint and submit its report and recommendations as soon as possible. At the beginning of the
investigation, on 15 Sept 1961, the Committee, upon request of complainants, Col. Maristela, ordere Cabal to
take the witness stand and be sworn to as witness for Maristela, in support of his aforementioned charge of
unexplained wealth. Cabal objected to said request invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The Committee insisted that Cabal take the witness stand and be sworn to, subject to be sworn to a s witness
or take the witness stand. Hence, the Committee referred the matter to responded City Fiscal of Manila, for
such action as he may deem proper.
A formal charge was filed. This charge was presided over by respondent Judge Kapunan, Jr.
Cabal alleged that, unless restrained by the SC, Judge Kapunan Jr. may summarily punish him for contempt
and that such action would not be appealable.
In their answer, respondents allege that the investigation being conducted by the Committee above referred to
is administrative, not criminal, in nature; that the legal provision relied upon by Cabal in relation to preliminary

investigations is inapplicable to contempt proceedings; that under section 580, of the Revised Administrative
Code, contempt against an administrative officer is to be dealt with as contempt of a superior court; that Cabal
is charged with only one offense; and that, under the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination, Cabal
may refuse, not to take the witness stand, but to answer incriminatory questions.
Issue: WON the right against self-incrimination can be applied to allege violations of RA 1379 (Anti-Graft
Law).
Held: Yes, it can be applied.
Rationale: It is conceded that the purpose of the charge against Cabal is to apply the provisions of RA 1379
which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or employee which is manifestly out
of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and his other lawful income and the income from
legitimately-acquired property. Such forfeiture has been held, however, to partake of the nature of a penalty.
Proceedings for forfeitures are generally considered to be civil and in the nature of proceedings in rem. The
statute providing that no judgment or other proceedings in civil cases shall be arrested or reversed for any
defect or want of form is applicable to them. In some aspects, however, suits for penalties and forfeitures are
of quasi-criminal nature and within the reason of criminal proceedings for all the purposes of that portion of
the 5th Amendment which declares that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.
On the other hand, the privilege of a witness not to incriminate himself is not infringed by merely asking the
witness a question which he refuses to answer. The privilege is simply an option of refusal and not a
prohibition of inquiry. A question is not improper merely because the answer may tend to criminate but, where
a witness exercises his constitutional right not to answer a question by counsel as to whether the reason for
refusing to answer is because the answer may tend to incriminate the witness is improper.
The possibility that the examination of the witness will be pursued to the extent of requiring self incrimination
will not justify the refusal to answer questions. However, where the position of the witness is virtually that of
an accused on trial, it would appear that he may invoke the privilege in support of a blanket refusal to answer
one and all questions.
The privilege applies where the penalty or forfeiture is recoverable, or is imposed in vindication of public
justice of the state, as a statutory fine or penalty, or a fine or penalty for violation of a municipal ordinance
even though the action or proceeding for its enforcement is not brought in a criminal court but is prosecuted
through the modes of procedure applicable to an ordinary civil remedy.
Decision: The writ prayed for is granted and Judge is enjoined permanently from proceeding further in the
Criminal Case.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals 172 SCRA 296
Nature: Petition for review the Intermediate Appellate Court.
Facts: The dismissed petition charged Simplicio Berdon, an Assistant Staff Civil Engineer assigned to a
Regional Office of the Bureau of Public Highways in Cebu City, with having acquired unexplained wealth in
violation of RA 1379. It alleged that during the period from 1963 to 1969, he and his wife Gaudiosa Mangubat
Berdon purchased parcels of land and constructed a house, the purchase price and costs of which were not
commensurate to their incomes, savings or declared assets. Pleaded as defendants in the petition were
Berdon, his wife, and Luis Berdon, his father. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, which valued the
unexplained wealth at P124,495.82; thus sought the forfeiture of the properties and the issuance of a writ of
attachment. Since the money used to purchase those real properties came from an unexplained income those
properties should be forfeited in favor of the state.
Mrs. Berdon is a pharmacist at the Danao General Hospital. Her parents who have several landholdings in
the municipality of Bordon, Cebu extended to respondent spouses a loan in the sum of P5,000.00 to buy the
house and lot in Danao City. Aside from this amount responded spouses were given by Mrs. Berdons mother
the sum of P3,000.00 to repair said house which was already very dilapidated. Respondents deny having
owned a moviehouse in Bogo, Cebu. Moreover, Mrs. Romualda Mangubat, respondent Mrs. Berdons mother,
owns the movie house.

Simplicio Berdon testified that he started in the government service as construction foreman in 1955. Since
then he has been in the government service and rose from the rank when he was promoted to the position of
Assistant Staff Civil Engineer in the Ministry of Public Highways, Region 7. Aside from respondent spouses
income as government employees, they have also other income for which they have paid taxes thereon. In
respondent spouses statement of assets and liabilities as of December 31, 1967, the P20,000.00 disbursed
as insurance premiums was erroneous. This amount represents the face value of the insurance policy of
Simplicio Berdon. Simplicio Berdon also denied petitioners allegation that the purchase price of the parcel of
land he bought from a certain Elias Dosdos was P45,000.00. The truth is that he paid only P25,000.00 as
shown in the building permit of the house and respondent spouses were able to obtain a real estate loan of
P14,000.00 from the GSIS to finance the construction of said building. Sometime on 7Nov1967, Simplicio
Berdon obtained a personal loan from former congressman Ramon Durano in the sum of P100,000.00 which
amount he used to purchase the several parcels of agricultural lands in 1967 and 1968. The marriage
contract of the respondent spouses showed that congressman and Mrs. Durano stood as sponsors of the
wedding. Defendant spouses had also obtained loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines which
they used to purchase the lot in Bogo, Cebu.
The RTC dismissed the petition then the CA affirmed the decision.
Issue: Whether or not the presumption of unexplained wealth has been rebutted.
Held: Yes, the presumption has been successfully rebutted.
Rationale: RA 1379 entitled An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State of any Property Found to Have
Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Procedure Thereof,
provides:
Section 2. Filing of petition. Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an
amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and
to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be
presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired.
Section 6. Judgment. If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully
acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such property, forfeited in favor of the State,
and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of the State: Provided, That no
judgment shall be rendered within six months before any general election or within three months before any
special election. The Court may, in addition, refer this case to the corresponding Executive Department for
administrative or criminal action, or both.
Clear from these provisions is that the law creates a presumption against the public officer or employee who
acquires a property grossly disproportionate to his income, i.e. that the property was unlawfully acquired.
However, this presumption is juris tantum. It may be rebutted by the public officer or employee by showing to
the
satisfaction
of
the
court
that
his
acquisition
of
the
property
was
lawful.
While respondent spouses had acquired properties and constructed a house the costs of which were
disproportionate to their combined incomes from their employment in the government, it had been proved that
such were financed through a donation and loans.
RA 1379 affords the respondent every opportunity to explain, to the satisfaction of the court, how he had
acquired the property in question.
In sum, the presumption under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379 that the subject properties were unlawfully acquired
had been successfully rebutted by private respondents through competent evidence. Hence, the IAC did not
err in affirming the trial courts decision dismissing the Republics petition.
Decision: Petition is DENIED and the assailed decision is AFFIRMED.
Graft and Corruption (R.A. 3019)
Trieste vs. Sandiganbayan 145 SCRA 508
Nature: Petition for review of the decision of the Sandiganbayan.
Facts: There are 12 different Informations filed by the Tanodbayan against e Trieste, Sr. for violation of
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law.

Trieste Sr., was then the Municipal Mayor and member of the Committee on Award of the Municipality of
Numancia, Aklan, Philippines. As such, he had administrative control of the funds of the municipality and his
approval was required in the disbursements of municipal funds. On July 1980 in Numancia, Treiste, Sr.
allegedly had financial interest in a business in connection with which he intervened in his official capacity and
in which he is prohibited by law from having any interest, to wit the purchases of construction materials by the
Municipality of Numancia, Aklan from Trigen Agro-Industrial Development Corporation, of which he was the
president incorporator, director and major stockholder paid under Municipal Voucher No. 211-90-10-174 in the
amount of P558.80 by then and there awarding the supply and delivery of said materials to Trigen AgroIndustrial Development Corporation and approving payment thereof to said corporation in violation of the AntiGraft
and
Corruption
Practices
Act.
After trial, the Sandiganbayan convicted Trieste, Sr. in all the 12 criminal cases.
Trieste, Sr.s evidence of divestment of interest in Trigen Corporation, which is said to have been effected on
February 25, 1980 before he assumed the Mayorship, should have been presented at the earliest opportunity
before the Tanodbayan and because this was not done by him the resolution of the Tanodbayan finding a
prima facie case against petitioner should be sustained. Furthermore, petitioner was faulted because the
transfer of his interest in the corporate stock of Trigen Corporation should have been recorded in the
Securities and Exchange Commission but no evidence of this sort was presented. The consolidated comment
also played up the advertisement of Trigen Corporation in the program of the Rotary Club of Kalibo, Aklan,
showing the printed name of petitioner as the President-Manager of the said corporation.
Issue: WON the presumption of unexplained wealth has been rebutted.
Held: Yes, it was rebutted.
Rationale: Petitioner sought to establish that before he assumed office as mayor on March 3, 1980, he had
already sold his shares with Trigen to his sister Mrs. Rosene Trieste-Tuason. The sale was made by
corresponding endorsement to her stock certificate which was duly recorded in the stock and transfer book of
the corporation.
What is contemplated in Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law is the actual intervention in the transaction in which
one has financial or pecuniary interest in order that liability may attach. The official need not dispose his
shares in the corporation as long as he does not do anything for the firm in its contract with the office. The law
aims to prevent the dominant use of influence, authority and power.
There is absolutely no evidence that petitioner had, in his capacity as Mayor, used his influence, power and
authority in having the transactions given to Trigen. He didnt ask anyone-neither Treasurer Vega nor
Secretary Maravilla for that matter, to get the construction materials from Trigen.
Decision: The decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan finding Generoso Trieste, Sr. guilty of the violation of
Sec.3 par (h) of RA 3019, as amended is set aside and reversed, a new judgment is rendered ACQUITTING
Generoso Trieste, Sr.
Mejorada vs. Sandiganbayan 151 SCRA 399
Nature: Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Sandiganbayan.
Facts: Arturo A. Mejorada was a right-of way agent in the Office of the Highway District Engineer, Pasig, Metro
Manila. His main duty was to negotiate with property owners affected by highway constructions or
improvements for the purpose of compensating them for the damages incurred by said owners.
Among those whose lots and improvements were affected by the widening of the proposed Pasig - Sta. Cruz Calamba Road 2nd IBRD Project at Binangonan, Rizal were Isagani de Leon, Isaac Carlos, Napoleon
Maybituin, Dominga Villaroza, Florentino de la Cruz, Cipriano Aran, Celestina S. Mallari and Rodolfo Rivera,
all residents of Mambog, Binangonan, Rizal.
Sometime in October or November 1977, Mejorada contacted the aforenamed persons and informed them
that he could work out their claims for payment of the values of their lots and/or improvements affected by the
widening of said highway. Mejorada required the claimants to sign blank copies of the Sworn Statement on
the Correct and Fair Market Value of Real Properties and Agreement to Demolish, Remove and Reconstruct

improvements pertinent to their claims. The claimants complied without bothering to find out what the
documents were all about as they were only interested in the payment of damages.
In said documents, the values of the respective properties of the claimants were made to appear very much
higher than the actual value claimed by them. Likewise, the said Agreement to Demolish reflected the value
of the improvements as per assessor which on the average was only P2,000.00 lower than the value
declared by the owners in their sworn statements. It turned out, however, that said Declarations of Property
are not really intended for the claimants as they were registered in the names of other persons; thus showing
that they were all falsified.
A few months after processing the claims, accused accompanied the claimants to the Office of the Highway
District Engineer at the provincial capitol of Pasig, Metro Manila to receive payments and personally assisted
the claimants in signing the vouchers and encashing the checks by certifying as to their identities and
guaranteeing payment.
Right after the claimants had received the proceeds of their checks, Mejorada accompanied them to his car
where they divested of the amounts paid to them leaving only the sum of P1,000.00 to each, except Isaac
Carlos to whom P5,0000.00 was left, explaining to them that there were many who would share in said
amounts. All the claimants were helpless to complaint because they were afraid of the accused and his armed
companion.
The Sandiganbayan found Mejorada guilty of violating RA 3019.
Issue: WON RA3019 was violated.
Held: Yes.
Rationale: The section under which Mejorada was charged provides:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.
Mejorada enumerated 3 elements which, in his opinion, constitute a violation of Section 3 (e). First, that the
accused must be a public officer charged with the duty of granting licenses or permits or other concessions.
Sec. 3 cited above enumerates in 11 subsections the corrupt practices of any public officers declared
unlawful. Its reference to any public officer is without distinction or qualification and it specifies the acts
declared unlawful. The last sentence of paragraph (e) is intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and
employees of officers or government corporations which, under the ordinary concept of public officers may
not come within the term.
Second, that such public officer caused undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any
private part unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or
judicial functions.
Mejorada denies that there was injury or damage caused the Government because the payments were
allegedly made on the basis of a document solely made by the Highway District Engineer to which petitioner
had no hand in preparing. The fact, however, is that the government suffered undue injury as a result of the
petitioners having inflated the true claims of complainants which became the basis of the report submitted by
the Highway district Engineer to the Regional director of the Department of Highways and which eventually
became the basis of payment. His contention that he had no participation is belied by the fact that as a rightof-way-agent, his duty was precisely to negotiate with property owners who are affected by highway
constructions for the purpose of compensating them.

On the part of the complainants, the injury caused to them consists in their being divested of a large
proportion of their claims and receiving payment in an amount even lower than the actual damage they
incurred. They were deprived of the just compensation to which they are entitled
Third, the injury to any part, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
was done through manifest, partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexecusable negligence.
The Sandiganbayan established the fact that Mejorada took advantage of his position as a right-of-way agent
by making the claimants sign the aforementioned agreements to demolish and sworn statements which
contained falsified declarations of the value of the improvements and lots. There was evident bad faith on the
part of the petitioner when he inflated the values of the true claims and when he divested the claimants of a
large share of the amounts due them.
Mejorada caused damage to the claimants and the Government. The manner by which the petitioner divested
the private parties of the compensation they received was part of the scheme which commenced when the
petitioner approached the claimants and informed them that he could work out their claims for payment of the
value of their lots and /or improvements affected by the widening of the Pasig-Sta. Cruz Calamba Road.
Labatagos vs. Court of Appeals 183 SCRA 415
Nature: Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Sandiganbayan.
Facts: From Jan 1978 to Dec 1980, Carmen Labatagos was the cashier and collecting officer of the Mindanao
State University (MSU), General Santos City. She filed a leave of absence for the months of March, April and
May 1978 but did not discharge her duties for the said period.
On 1 Oct 1980, Fransisco T. Rivera, was designated leader of a tem to conduct the examination of the cash
and accounts of Labatagos. When the team conducted the examination, Labatagos did not have any cash in
her possession, so she was asked to produce all her records, books of collection, copies of official receipts
and
remittance
advices
and
her
monthly
reports
of
collections.
Based on the official receipts and the record of remittances for the period from Jan to Aug 1978, the audit
examination disclosed that Labatagos collected the total amount of P113,205.58, and made a total remittance
to the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), the depository bank of the university, in the amount of
P78,868.69 leaving an unremitted amount of P34,336.19. The audit examination further disclosed that for the
period from January 1979 to June 6, 1980, Labatagos made a total collection of P327,982.00 and remitted to
the DBP the total amount of P256,606.25 incurring a shortage of P71,365.75.
On 27Oct1981, the Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan an information charging petitioner with the
crime of Malversation of Public Funds. Subsequently, the Sandiganbayan found her guilty of such crime.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON Labatagos is guilty of malversation of public funds.
Held: Yes.
Rationale: The audit report which Labatagos signed, shows that she incurred a shortage of P34,336.19 for the
period from January to August 1978; while the statement of her collections and deposits for the same period
which she certified as correct indicates the same amount as her shortage.
Mrs. Easter Guanzon, the prosecutions rebuttal witness, confirmed that she assisted Labitagos in the
collection of fees; that the accused filed application for maternity leave in March 1978 but continued reporting
for work during that month; that accused did not report for work in April 1978; and that she (Guanzon) was the
one assigned to collect the fees in her stead. Mrs. Guanzon, however, explained that she turned over all her
collections to Labitagos during all the times that she was assisting her in collecting the fees; and that even in
April1978 when Labitagos was physically absent from office, she also turned over her collections to her in the
latters house with the duplicate copies of the receipts she issued which the accused signed after satisfying
herself that the amounts turned over tallied with the receipts.
The sum of P4,494.80 was purportedly spent for the cost of uniforms of players of the school and basketball
balls, P2,100.00 in all, the balance taken by Alikhan Marohomsar and Auditor Casan. Another amount
P6,702.12 was supposedly covered by vouchers submitted to the Auditors office through Rosa Cabiguin.
Again, the auditor did not err in not crediting the aforesaid sums to the accuseds accountability. The

P2,100.00 cost of uniforms and balls, unsupported by a duly accomplished and approved voucher, was not a
valid disbursement. And since the alleged vouchers for P6,792.12 were not presented in evidence nor was
any effort exerted to compel their production in court by subpoena duced tecum, the same was properly
refused to be deduced from the incurred shortage of the accused.
All the other sums allegedly taken from the accused by Director Osop, Alikhan Marohombsar and Auditor
Casan totaling P31,070.00 supported as they are by mere pieces of paper despite the admission by Director
Osop of having signed some of them were not valid disbursements. Granting that the amounts reflected in the
chits were really secured by the persons who signed them, the responsibility to account for them still rests in
the accused accountable officer. Malversation consists not only in misappropriation or converting public funds
or property to ones personal use but also by knowingly allowing others to make use of misappropriate them.
Decision: Petition for review is DENIED and the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.
Ilogon vs. Sandiganbayan 218 SCRA 766
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Sandiganbayan.
Facts: Calinico B. Ilogon was the Acting Postmaster of the Bureau of Posts in Cagayan de Oro City from July
1978 to January 1986. He likewise performed the task of accepting payments, making collections and
effecting disbursement as there was no cashier employed during the period of his incumbency. He was adept
at this work because, before his designation as Acting Postmaster he was, as a matter of fact, a duly
appointed cashier.
On September 19, 1983, COA Auditors Robin S. Aban and Alfonso A. Gala conducted an examination of the
cash and accounts of petitioner covering the period from September 8, 1983 to September 13, 1988. The
examination showed that petitioner incurred shortage in his accounts amounting to P118, 871.29.
Issue: Whether or not is guilty of malversation of public funds?
Held: Yes.
Rationale: In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is proof that the accountable officer
had received public funds and that he did not have them in his possession when demand therefor was made.
There is even no need of direct evidence of personal misappropriation as long as there is a shortage in his
account
and
Ilogon
cannot
satisfactorily
explain
the
same.
In this case, Ilogon was the official custodian of the missing funds. He himself admitted the shortage of P118,
303.10 in his cash and accounts as Acting Postmaster but could not give a satisfactory explanation for the
same. He would invoke what he calls humanitarian reasons as the justification for the said shortage. But like
the accused in Cabello vs. Sandiganbayan, Ilogon knows that his granting of chits and vales which
constituted the bulk of the shortage was a violation of the postal rules and regulations. This Court went further
to state that giving vales is proscribed under PD 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code
of the Philippines specifically Section 69 thereof, which provides that postmasters are only allowed to use
their collections to pay money orders, telegraphic transfers and withdrawals from the proper depository bank
whenever their cash advances for the purpose are exhausted.
The fact that petitioner did not personally use the missing funds is not a valid defense and will not exculpate
him from his liability. And as aptly found by respondent Sandiganbayan, the fact that (the immediate
superiors of the accused have acquiesced to the practice of giving out cash advances for convenience did not
legalize the disbursements.
The fact also that Ilogon fully settled the amount of P118, 003.10 later is of no moment. The return of the thing
malversed is not a defense. It is neither an exempting circumstance nor a ground for extinguishing the
accused from criminal liability. At best, it is a mitigating circumstance.
Decision: The judgment of the Sandiganbayan is affirmed and the petition is dismissed.
Infidelity in the custody of prisoners
Rodillas vs. Sandiganbayan 161 SCRA 766

Facts: Rodillas was a policeman thus a public officer who was in-charge of the custody of Zenaida Sacris, a
detention officer being tried for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. He was directed by his superior to
escort Zenaida before the sala of Judge Pardo in Caloocan bec the policewoman who was supposed to
escort her is sick. While waiting for the arrival of the judge, Pat. Andres, who happened to be a relative of the
husband of the prisoneroner, requested Petitioner if prisoner can talk to her husband to which he agreed.
After a while, he was asked if they be allowed to have lunch since they are really hungry and the policeman
allowed them to.
While eating, the husband requested the policeman if he can accompany the prisoner to the comfort room
since she was not feeling well and felt like defacating. He permitted them and the accused with a lady
companion accompanied the prisoner to the Womens CR and he stood by the door. The lady companion
went out of the CR and told him that shes going to buy sanitary napkin for the prisoner.
After 10 mins he became suspicious and so he went inside the CR only to find that the prisoner is nowhere to
be found. He noticed the CR was not provided with window grills and he saw that outside the window there
was a concrete eave extending down to the ground floor of the building where he presumed was used by the
prisoner in escaping.
Pat Andres advised him the prisoner house is located in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan but the husband lives in
Nueva Ecija. Accused borrowed car of his brother-in-law and proceeded to said town and asked the relatives
of prisoner of her whereabouts but to no avail. They went back to Caloocan to check the prisoner there but
still she wasnt there. The supervisor Victoriano arrived and accused relate to him what happened.
Accused further declared that as a jailer, he never had any training not lecture by his superiors regarding the
manner of delivering prisoners. He admitted that he did not inspect the CR first and that he did not promptly
report the escape be they were then pressed for time to intercept prisoner at the highway.
He was found guilty by Sandiganbayan of infidelity in the custody of a prisoner thru negligence under Article
224.
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed a reversible error in holding the petitioner guilty of
infidelity in the custody of prisoner through negligence penalized under Article 224 of the RPC.
Held: Guilty.
Rationale: The elements of Art. 224 are present: A. public officer. B. charged with the conveyance or custody
of the prisoneroner either detention or by final judgment. C. Such prisoner escapes through his negligence.
It was improper for petitioner to allow prisoner to have lunch with family when he was supposed to bring the
prisoner back to jail which is 1K away from the sala of the judge. It is his duty to take necessary precautions
to assure the absence of any means of escape. A failure to undertake these precautions will make his act one
of definite laxity of negligence amounting to deliberate non-performance of duty.
Petitioner claims that the judge should have pronounced judgment so that the prisoner can be brought back to
the jail immediatelyinconsequential. And that he cannot follow the prisoner inside the CR is a lame excuse.
He could have just asked the permission of the ladies that he will check the CR to insure that the prisoner will
not escape.
No genuine effort on his part to recapture the prisoner. He did not report promptly the matter so that an alarm
could immediately be sent out.
Petitioner contends also that there must first be a showing that he first connived with the prisoner. SC ruled
that conniving or consenting to evasion is a distinct crime under 223. He is charged with infidelity in the
custody of prisoner through negligence and not with connivance with escaping prisoner.
Decision: Conviction affirmed.
H. Crimes Against Person
Parricide

People of the Philippines vs. Jumawan 116 SCRA 739

Nature: Appeal from the judgement of CFI of Quezon
Facts: Rodolfo Magnaye was married on 26 January 1974 to Presentacion Jumawan. Presentacion Jumawan
Magnaye left the conjugal home and stayed with her sister Sebastiana Jumawan. Rodolfo Magnaye, on the
other hand, went and stayed with his mother.
Between 5:00 and 6:00 o clock in the afternoon of 19 June 1976 Rodolfo Magnaye was dressing up and told
her mother that he was going to the public market because his wife asked him to fetch her because they are
going to talk about their lives. He left home at about 6:00 o clock.
Before reaching the slaughter house Rodolfo was killed by Jumawans. Francisco Jumawan is the father of his
co-accused, namely, Cesario Jumawan, Manuel Jumawan and Presentacion Jumawan (Rodolfos wife).
Issue: Whether the wife of victim Presentacion was guilty of parricide.
Held: No.
Rationale: Presentacion should have been accused of parricide but as it is, since her relationship to the
deceased is not alleged in the information, she, like the others, can be convicted of murder only qualified by
abuse of superior strength.
Although not alleged in the information, relationship as an aggravating circumstance should be assigned
against the appellants. True, relationship is inherent in parricide, but Presentacion stands convicted of murder.
And as to the others, the relationships of father-in-law and brother-in-law aggravate the crime.
Death or Physical Injuries under Exceptional Circumstances
PEOPLE v. OYANIB 354 SCRA 196 (2001)
Facts: Manolito Oyanib & Tita Oyanib were legally married. Years thereafter they separated. Tita had affairs
w/ other men. Manolito reminded her that they were still legally married, but Tita still continued with her affairs.
One day, Manolito came to see Tita to inform her of a meeting w/ their sons school ... regarding their sons
failed subject. He then came upon Tita and his paramour, Jesus Esquierdo, having sex w/ the latter on top of
the other w/ his pants down to his knees.
Upon seeing him, Jesus kicked Manolito in the check and Manolito immediately stabbed Jesus. Tita left the
room, got a Tanduay bottle and hit Manolita with it in the head. Tital then stabbed Manolito in the arm with the
broken Tanduay bottle. This angered Manolito and he stabbed Tita as well.
Thereupon, Edgardo, owner of the house where Tita was staying entered the room. Manolito hid but later
gave himself up.
He was found guilty of homicide and parricide and was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 6 month, 1
day to 6 yrs of prision correccional as minimum to 6 yrs 1 day to 8 yrs of prision mayor as maximum and to
pay P50K civil indemnity and costs for the death of Jesus and to reclusion perpetua, to pay P50K and costs
for the death of his wife Tita.
He appealed, admitting the killings but arguing that he killed them both under the exceptional circumstance
provided in A247 RPC
Issue: WON hes entitled to the exceptional privilege under RPC 247
Held: YES. He invoked Art. 247, RPC as an absolutory and an exempting cause. An absolutory cause is
present where the act committed is a crime but for reasons of public policy and sentiment there is no penalty
imposed.
Having admitted the killing, it is inucumbent upon accused to prove the exempting circumstanbces to the
satisfaction of the court in order to be relived of any criminal liability.

RPC A247 prescribes the ff essential elements for such defense:

1. That a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with
another person;
2. That he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter; and
3. That he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has
not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.

Accused must prove these elements by clear and convincing evidence, otherwise, his defense would be
untenable. The death caused must be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after
chancing upon his spouse in the act of infideltity. Simply put, the killing of the husband of his ide must concur
with her flagrant adultery.
The Court finds the accused to have acted within the circumstances contempleated in Art. 247 of the
RPC.The law imposes very stringent requirements before affording offended spouse the opportunity to avail
himself of RPC A247. The vindication of a Mans honor is justified because of the scandal an unfaithful wife
creates; the law is strict on this, authorizing as it does, a man to chastise her, even with death. But killing the
errant spouse as a purification is so sever that it can only be justified when the unfaithful spouse is caught in
flagrante delicto, & it must be resorted to only w/ great caution so much so that the law requires that it be
inflicted only during the sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter (People v. Wagas) Court thus sentenced
Manolito to 2 yrs & 4 mos of destierro and shall not be permitted to enter or be w/in a 100 km radius from
Iligan City.
People of the Philippines vs. Abarca 155 SCRA 735
Nature: Appeal from the decision of the RTC of Palo Leyte
Facts: Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of the accused Jenny, had illicit relationship. The illicit relationship
apparently began while the accused was in Manila reviewing for 1983 Bar Examination. His wife was left in
Tacloban, Leyte.
The accused arrived at his residence at around 6:00 oclock in the afternoon. Upon reaching home, the
accused found his wife and Khingsley in the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and Koh noticedthe
accused, the wife pushed her paramour and got revolver. The accused who was then peeping above the builtin cabinet in their room jumped and ran away.
The accused got M-16 rifle, and went back to his house. His wife and Koh were not there. He proceeded to
mah-jong session as it was the hangout of Khingsley Koh and found him playing mah-jong. He fired him 3
times with his rifle. Koh was hit. Arnold and Lina Amparado who were occupying a room where Koh was
playing were also hit. Khingsley Koh died instantaneously and Arnold was hospitalized. His wife, Lina
Amparado was also treated in the hospital as she was heat by bullet fragment.
The trial court found the accused guilty of the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder. The
Solicitor General however recommends that Article 247 of the RPC should be applied defining death under
exceptional circumstances, complexed with double frustrated murder.
Issue: Whether or not Abarca was covered by privileged under Art.247 of the RPC.
Held: Yes.
Rationale: Article 247 prescribes the following elements: 1.) that a legally married person surprises his spouse
in the act of sexual intercourse with another person. 2.) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter. These elements are present in this case.
Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between the time accused discovered his wife
having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the later was shot, the shooting must be understood to
be the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused appellant. The RPC in requiring that the
accused shall kill any of them or both...immediately after surprising his spouse in the act of sexual
intercourse, does not say that he should commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only requires that the death
caused be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in
the basest act of infidelity. But the killing should have been actually motivated by the same blind impulse, and

must not have been influenced by external factors. The killing must be direct by-product of the accused rage.
Art.247, not being punishable act, cannot be qualified by either aggravating or mitigating or other qualifying
circumstances. Thus, the court cannot accordingly appreciate treachery in this case.
On the liability of Abarca for the physical injuries suffered by the Amparados, Abarca did not have the intent to
kill the Amparado couple. Although as a rule, one committing an offense is liable for the consequences of his
act that presupposes that the act done amounts to felony. In the case at bar, Abarca was not committing
murder when he discharged his rifle upon deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not
murder. The court cannot therefore hold Abarca liable for frustrated murder for injuries suffered by
Amparados.
Accordingly, Abarca is held liable under first part, second paragraph of Art 365, that is less serious physical
injuries through simple imprudence or negligence.
Murder and Homicide
People of the Philippines vs. Buensuceso 132 SCRA 143.
Nature: Appeal from a decision of CFI of Bataan.
Facts: Jose BUENSUCESO, Rodolfo AGUILAR, Condrado IZON, and Ernesto JOSON, all members of the
police force of Dinalupihan, Bataan were convicted of Murder.
Between 5pm and 6 pm of 21 April 1967, Patrolman Aguilar and Pariseo Tayag were cponversing as they
were walking towards the municipal building. Pat. Aguilar was trying to take fan knife of Tayag, but could not
take it because Tayag prevented him from taking it. At the suggestion of Pat. Aguilar, Tayag readily agreed to
go to the office of the chief police.
When they arrived in the said office, a heated argument took place between the two. Arising from the latters
refusal to give his fan knife to the former. Chief of Police Adriano Canlas arrived and inquired what the trouble,
was all about. Pat. Aguilar answered that the two of them (Aguilar and Canlas ) had been cursed by Tayag.
Tayag asserted that he did not curse them, but that Aguilar was trying to force him to give up his knife.
Thereafter, Tayag hurriedly left the office, he was followed by Pat. Aguilar. After having gone out of the
building, Pat. Aguilar fired his gun upward. Hearing the shot, Tayag turned about, then retreated backwards
until he reached the fence of plaza.
When Tayag was near the wooden fence about a knee high,Pat. Aguilar aimed his gun at the former and fired,
hitting him above the right knee. Tayag continued to run toward his house followed by dela Cruz without a
gun. Pat. Mallari, carrying a gun, went to the waiting shed to intercept Tayag. Pat. Aguilar followed Mallare in
the shed and they took opposite sides of road. Then there were several successive gun shots.
After the commotion, Tayag was seen lying prostrate near the back of a jeep parked at the corner of Rizal and
San Juan Streets, about 60 meters away from the municipal building. Pat. Dela Cruz took the knife from
Tayag and gave it to Pat. Jose Buensuceso,who at the precise moment had his revolver tucked in its holster,
Pat. Condrado Izon and Pat. Ernesto Jose were also seen in immediate vicinity of the crime.
Issue: Whether or not accused were guilty of murder.
Held: Yes.
Rationale: The victim was already retreating backward when Aguilar fired his revolver making the victim
completely defenseless. Notwithstanding that he was already hit and wounded, and possibly immobilized, he
was still subjected to successive sot as shown by the wounds that he had received, even at his back.
Certainly, the means employed by the accused- appellants tended directly and specially to insure the
execution of the crime without risk to themselves.
The killing of the victim was aggravated by abuse of superior strength as shown by the number of assailants,
which circumstance, however, is absorbed by treachery.
SC further held that where victims died from several wounds inflicted by different persons and it is not known
which person inflicted the mortal wound, all of them are liable for victims death under theory of conspiracy.

People of the Philippines vs. Pugay 167 SCRA 439

Nature: Appeal from a judgement of the CFI of Cavite.
Facts: The deceased Miranda, a 25 year old retarded, and the accused Pugay were friends. Sometimes after
midnight of May 1982, Eduardo Gabion was setting in ferris wheel and reading comic book with his friend
Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived. These persons appeared to
be drunk as they were all happy and noisy. As the group saw the deceased walking nearby, they started
making fun of him. They made the deceased dance by tickling him with the piece of wood. Not content with
what they are doing with the decease the accused Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline from under the
engine of ferris wheel and poured its contents on the body of the former. Gabion told Pugay not to do so while
the latter was already in process of pouring the gasoline. Then, accused Samson set Miranda on fire making
a human torch out of him which eventually caused his death. Cavite CFI convicted them for murder, qualified
by treachery with mitigating circumstance of praeter intentionem.
Issue: Whether or not accused are guilty of murder.
Held: No, the Supreme Court modified the crime of Homicide through Reckless Imprudence.
Rationale: In the case at bar, both accused were merely playing games on the deceased. Thus, there was
neither intent nor motive to kill the latter. On the other hand they were convicted of homicide through reckless
imprudence because having taken the can from ferris wheel considering the stinging smell of flammable liquid
and even poured to the deceased and knew very will that liquid poured on the deceased was gasoline and
flammable still set the latter on fire. They failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every
undesirable consequence arising from their act.
Unintentional Abortion
People of the Philippines vs. Salufrania 159 SCRA 401.
Nature: Appeal from the decision of the CFI of Camarines Norte.
Facts: On 3 Dec. 1974, in Tagbilaran, Labo, Camarines Norte, Filomeno y Aleman killed Marciana AbuyoSalufrania, his lawfully wedded out of jealousy, by boxing and strangling her. By the same criminal act
committed to the wife of accused, who was at the 8 months on the family way, Salufrania caused the death of
the child while still in its material womb.
The lower court found the accused guilty of parricide and intentional abortion.
Issue: Whether or not the accused committed intentional abortion.
Held: No.
Rationale: There is no evidence to show that he had the intention to cause an abortion. He should not be held
guilty of the complex crime of Parricide with Intentional Abortion but of the Complex crime of Parricide with
unintentional abortion.
The elements of unintentional abortion are as follows:
1. That there is a pregnant woman.
2. That the violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending the abortion.
3. That the violence is intentionally exerted.
4. That as a result of the violence the foetus dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled
therefrom.
The court finds that accused intent to cause an abortion has not been sufficiently established. Mere boxing on
the stomach, taken together with immediate strangling of the victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof to show
intent to cause an abortion.
Therefore, Filomeo Salufrania committed and should be held liable for complex crime of parricide with
unintentional abortion.

Rape ( R.A. 8353)

People of the Philippines vs. Orita 184 SCRA 105
Nature: Appeal from the decision of RTC of Borongan, Eastern Samar.
Facts: In early morning of March 20, 1983, Cristina arrived at her boarding house. Her classmates had just
brought her home from a party. Shortly after her classmates had left, she knocked at the door of her boarding
house. All of sudden, somebody held her and poked a knife to her neck. She then recognized Orita a
Philippine Constabulary Soldier who was a frequent visitor of another boarder.
Orita dragged complainant upstairs. When they reached the 2nd floor, he commanded her to look for a room.
With the batangas knife still poked to her neck, they entered complainants room. Orita ordered Cristina to lie
down on the floor and mounted her. He made her hold his penis and insert it her vagina. She followed his
order as he continued to poke the knife to her. At said position, however, appellant could not fully penetrate
her. Only a portion of his penis entered her as she keeps moving. Orita commanded the complainant to mount
him. Only small part of his penis was inserted into her vagina. In this position complainant manage to escape.
She ran the next room and jumped to the window. Still naked, she darted to the municipal building where she
seeks for the help of policemen.
RTC found Orita guilty of frustrated rape.
Issue: Whether or not frustrated rape was proper.
Held: No.
Rationale: Clearly in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim, he
actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all essential elements of the offense have been
accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed the last act
necessary to crime. Thus, the felony is consummated. In long line of cases, the uniform rule is that for the
consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by male
organ is sufficient to warrant conviction. Ernia ruling where the court found the offender guilty of frustrated
rape was already a stray decision.
People of the Philippines vs. Mangalinao 182 SCRA 329
Nature: Appeal from the decision of the RTC of Manila.
Facts: Marichelle Carlos, 6 years old and a Grade 1 pupil was playing takbuhan alone at the ground floor of
the two storey apartment of Semion Mangalinao, 53, a security guard. At the time of the incident Laura
(Semions wife) was in Batangas, having left the day before the incident. Mangalinao and Marichelles parents
are neighbours, their respective rented apartments being almost opposite each other.
Mangalinao called Marichelle to go inside his bedroom. Once inside the bedroom, the accused handed the
girl P2.00 and told her not to tell anybody his calling, the girl assented.
Mangalinao then laid Marichelle down, removed her jogging pants, and placed them beside her feet. He
kissed her and fondled her infantile breasts. He inserted his finger into the private part of the victim, and then
forcibly and repeatedly introduced his sexual organ into her undeveloped genitalia, but in vain.
RTC found Mangalinao guilty of statutory rape. On the other hand the accused contend that it is impossible
considering the time, place and the presence of many people also the finding of bruises through the private
part of the victim is result of an accident , considering that she was playing takbuhan.
Issue: Whether or not Mangalinao was guilty of statutory rape.
Held: Yes.
Rationale: The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape as provided in Article 335 par.3 of the RPC is the
carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 yrs. of age. Marichell, a little over 6 yrs. of age at the time was raped.
Beyond that proof of intimidation or forced used on her, or lack of it, is immaterial.

The finding of the government doctor concludes that raped could have been perpetrated. He testified the
existence of indication of recent genital trauma caused by forcibly attempt of penetration of an erected penis.
He also further discounted the probability of an accident, such as bumping the edge of the chair, or violent
contact
with
a
blunt
object,
as
there
was
no
contusion
of
labia.
In any case, the Court has consistently held that for a rape to be committed, full penetration is not required. It
is enough that there is proof of entrance of male organ within the labia or pudendum of female organ.
People of the Philippines vs. Geraban 196 SCRA 679
Facts: Venus, who claimed to be fifteen years old at the time of incident, is the eldest among 4 children of
Castro with his wife Dolores Gutay Geraban. After a serious quarrel both separated. Dolores was then renting
with their four children. In the late evening of 19 February 1996, Castro made a surprise visit to his family to
persuade Dolores and the children to return to their residence. His plea was ignored, and since it was already
late, Dolores agreed the request of Castro to sleep at the rented house.
At about 4:00 in the morning of 20 February 1996, Venus was awakened by Castro who asked her to spot
vacated by Dolores who had left early, as her usual routine to deliver some bread. Venus lay in between her
two sleeping younger brother, however Castro objected and insisted that Venus should sleep behind him.
Venus hesitantly obeyed. Castro suddenly placed his leg on top of Venus. He placed himself on top of her and
started to choke her. Venus tried to struggle but threaten to kill her and her siblings. With Venus already
naked from her waist down, CASTRO started to remove his briefs, but since Venus continued to resist him, he
slid his brief sideway and put out his penis which he then successfully inserted into the vagina of the
struggling Venus. During the struggle, Venus hit one of the three cans located just below her feet which
caused it to fall on the floor. The brothers of Venus woke up and started to cry. CASTRO got distracted and
because of this Venus was able to push him away from her.
RTC found the accused guilty of rape. On the other hand, Castro contends the impossibility of committing the
alleged sexual assault in the presence of Venus 2 younger brothers. Further the absence of fresh laceration
and spermatozoa in her organ during the examination
Issue: Whether or not Castro is guilty of rape.
Held: Yes.
Rationale: Rapists are not deterred from committing their odious act by the presence of the people nearby.
Rape is not impossible even if committed in the same room where household members are also slept. Hence,
it was neither impossible nor incredible for Castro to have raped Venus even in the presence of her two
younger brothers. There is no rule that woman can only raped in seclusion. The absence of external injuries
does not negate rape, nor is the presence of spermatozoa an essential element of rape. This is because in
rape, the important consideration is not emission of semen but the penetration of the female genitalia by the
male organ which is present at the case at bar.
In crime against chastity, such as rape relationship is aggravating. The prosecution undisputedly proved the
father daughter relationship between Castro and Venus.
People of the Philippines vs. Atento 196 SCRA 357.
Nature: Appeal from the judgment of the RTC of Legazpi City
Facts: The complainant Glenda Aringo, was 16 years of age but with an intellectual capacity between the
ages of 9 and 12 years. As, such, her intellectual functioning is within mental defective level.
Glenda is a neighbor of Cesar Atento, the herein accused-appellant, a 39 years old store- keeper with a wife
and 8 children. Her claim is that Atento raped her 5 times, the first sometimes on April 1986.
She says that on that first occasion she went to Atentos store to buy bread. Atento cajoled her into coming
inside the house and then took her downstairs, where he succeeded in deflowering her. She says her
maidenhead ached and bled. Afterwards, he gave her P5.00.

Glenda speaks of other times when he raped her. It was later that she felt tickled by his manhood and
described the act of coitus as masarap. Glenda says she never told anybody about Atentos attacks on her
because he had threatened her life. But she could not conceal her condition for long and after five months
had to admit she was pregnant. She revealed the accused as the father of the foetus in the womb.
Issue: Whether or not the accused can be held liable under statutory rape?
Held: Yes.
Rationale: Although she has a physical age of 16 years old, she has a mental age of 9 to 12 years old. Given
the low IQ of Glenda, it is impossible to believe that she could have fabricated her charges against the
accused. A smart and perspicacious person would hesitate to describe to the Court her sexual experiences as
ticking and masarap for that would only elicit disdain or laughter. Only a simple minded artless child would
do it. And Glenda was telling the truth.
Part II
A. Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security
Kidnapping and Illegal Detention
People of the Philippines vs. Tomio 202 SCRA 77
Nature: An appeal from the decision of RTC Manila convicting accused-appellants guilty of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention for ransom.
Facts: Tatsumi Nagao (Nagao), a Japanese national, arrived in Manila on April 29, 1986 for a five-day
vacation tour and was billeted at the Holiday Inn at Pasay City.
On May 2, 1986, Nagao while having his lunch, was approached by Maida Tomio (Tomio) and Mitamura, both
Japanese, and offered themselves as his guides in Manila. Mitamura accompanied Nagao for dinner. Before
Mitamura left the restaurant, he placed a pack of cigarettes on Nagaos shirt pocket. Nagao was later
approached by five policemen in plain clothes who searched his person and found the pack of cigarettes
which was supposedly marijuana. At the police station, Tagahiro Nakajima alias Yamada (Yamada) and Tomio
acted as his interpreters. They told Nagao that they had paid the police U.S. $100,000.00 for his release.
Upon Nagaos release, Nagao returned to his hotel, Holiday Inn, escorted by the appellants and a policeman.
His escorts did not allow him to leave the hotel. From Holiday Inn, Nagao was transferred to Intercontinental
Hotel in Makati, then to Philippine Village Hotel and to Virra Condominium. Nagao called his father asking for
money, who initially refused to pay three million yen, but he eventually agreed when Sato talked to him. After
Tomio and Yamada brought Nagao to RCBC to withdraw U.S. $1,850.00, they were met by policemen and
Tomio and Yamada were arrested.
Tomio and Yamada (accused-appellants) were subsequently charged with the crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention for ransom. The information was filed with RTC Manila.
The accused-appellants argued that they did not always guard Nagao as Nagao was able to watch movies,
eat at a Japanese restaurant, go to a sauna bath, and in one occasion accompanied a girl outside the hotel to
see her off. Also, while they were at Virra Condominium where they stayed for two or three days together in
one room, Nagao sometimes held the key to the room. Also, the reason they went along with Nagao to the
RCBC bank on May 12 was that he did not know how to go there so they brought him to the bank so that he
could withdraw the remittance from Japan which was intended as payment for his hotel accommodation and
other expenses.
The trial court ruled that the accused-appellants were guilty as charged.
Issues:
1. Does RTC Manila have jurisdiction over the case filed against accused-appellants?
2. If RTC has jurisdiction over the case, was it correct in holding the accused-appellants guilty of
kidnapping with serious illegal detention?
Held 1: YES.

Rationale: On 2 May 1986, the day when they made their initial, but crucial move on the target, the
complainant (hereinafter referred to as Mr. Nagao), appellants, through the overt act of accused Tomio Maeda
alias Sato Toshio and another Japanese, brought complainant "some other places in Manila" after they
succeeded in getting his trust and confidence, following a conversation over lunch in a coffee shop at Holiday
Inn Hotel.
The essential ingredients of the crime charged were thus committed in various places.
The case can, therefore, be filed with the appropriate court in any of the places where the complainant was
brought to by appellants in the pursuit of or in connection with the crime charged. Section 15 of Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court provides that subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions, action shall be instituted
and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the
essential ingredients thereof took place.
Held 2: YES.
Rationale: To show that they commiserated with him, they made it appear that they advanced the money to
the police. We are, however, convinced that the accused-appellants never advanced the money. That is why
they stuck to the complainant like "a leech," as vividly described by the trial court, after he was eventually
"released" by the police. There is no doubt in Our mind that during the period from 3 May 1986 until the
accused-appellants were arrested on 12 May 1986, complainant was moved from one hotel to another by the
appellants, effectively depriving him of his liberty. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, while it may
be conceded that complainant had the freedom of locomotion, he "did not have the freedom to leave the hotel
premises at will and go wherever he pleased."
What then was the money they advanced to the police? Nothing. However, they succeeded in making it
appear to Mr. Nagao, after they came out of the room at the Southern Police District, that they advanced the
amount to the police, for which reason he was released. This was part of the stratagem to give a semblance
of legality to the demand for ransom.
Even granting for the sake of argument that, in effect, there was created a simple loan contract between
appellants and Mr. Nagao, as asserted by appellant Tomio Maeda, the deprivation of the former's liberty until
the amount shall have been fully "paid" to them, is still kidnapping or illegal detention for ransom.
Decision: The decision of RTC is affirmed.
People of the Philippines vs. Lim 190 SCRA 706
Nature: Appeal from the decision of RTC Masbate convicting the accused of kidnapping.
Facts: In the morning of July 1, 1986, Aida Villanueva (10 years old) and her younger sister Avelyn Villanueva
(7 years old) were sent on an errand by their father Charito to buy rice in Masbate, Masbate. Upon their
arrival at the poblacion of Masbate, Aida and Avelyn went to the pier, staying there for three hours, to meet
their mother whom they thought would arrive by boat from Manila. They left the pier when their mother did not
arrive and went to Helen Theatre, located across the store and residence of Carmen Lim (appellant), to see a
picture. According to Carmen, she noticed that the sisters were alone and asked the whereabouts of their
parents, to which they responded that their parents had separated and that their mother had gone to Manila,
and that their father was in Masbate. The sisters claimed that they were driven away by their father and that
they were not given any food to eat. Carmen invited the sisters to her house, and Aida and Avelyn went to her
house and got inside passing through the front door.
Aida stayed at Carmens house for two weeks, helping with the household chores, while Avelyn was brought
to Cebu with Carmens sister.
On July 15, 1986, Charito found his daughter Aida in the house of Carmen. He asked her to let Aida go home
with him, but Carmen allegedly refused. Carmen contended that Aida herself refused to go with her father
because she was afraid that his father would beat her up.
When Charito returned to Carmens store the next day accompanied by Sgt. Antonio Ariate, Jr. of the
Philippine Constabulary, Charito again talked to Aida to convince her to go home with him. This time, Aida
agreed to go home with her father.
RTC convicted Carmen of kidnapping.

Issue: Was RTC correct in convicting Carmen of kidnapping?

Held: No, Carmen should not have been convicted of kidnapping.
Rationale: There is no kidnapping in this case. The two minors voluntarily entered the appellant's residence
through the front entrance. The fact of detention which is an essential element in the crime charged was not
clearly established. There was no showing that there was actual confinement or restriction of the person of
the offended party. The appellant's residence has a store fronting the street where many customers
presumably come and go. The place is busy with a movie house in front. There is no indication that Aida was
locked up, physically restrained of her liberty or unable to communicate with anyone.
The fact that her father was already there was the perfect opportunity for Aida to try and get away from the
appellant. She could have clung to him from the moment he came in instead of quietly observing him and the
appellant talk for some time. Aida did not go with her father because the appellant allegedly told her not to go.
For someone who had been detained against her will, as between her father and her detainor, Aida would
have disregarded the appellant's order and would have run to her father. Neither is it believable that a father
who has been desperately looking for his two minor daughters for two weeks would just calmly accept the
appellant's refusal to let go of his daughter.
The appellant is a woman of sufficient means. It is undisputed that she is the owner of a store and was the
employer of two maids at the time of the incident. She did not know the two children prior to the incident. Had
she wanted to hire an additional maid, she could certainly afford to hire another one without going to the
extent of committing a crime as serious as kidnapping. There was no need to kidnap a minor and force her to
work against her will. The appellant had everything to lose and nothing to gain if it is true that she kidnapped
the two children. No motive was ever propounded by the prosecution. We are thus ushered to applying the
precept that though proof of motive is not indispensable to conviction, yet a void in the evidence in this
respect discloses a weakness in the case for the prosecution.
Decision: The judgment of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and appellant Carmen Lim is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged for failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
People of the Philippines vs. Padica, et al. 221 SCRA 362
Nature: An appeal from the decision of RTC Pasay City convicting the appellant for the crime of kidnapping
for ransom with murder.
Facts: In the morning of February 8, 1978, Leon Marajas Jr. (accused-appellant) and his brother, Leopoldo,
using a car driven by Leopoldo, visited Romeo Padica in his house who was requested and paid P100 to
drive for Eddie Boy Marajas, a brother of Leopoldo and appellant, and his classmates. In Sukat, Leopoldo
alighted from the car and talked to Eddie Boy and Francis Banaga, and together they boarded the car and
proceeded to Calamba, Laguna, with Padica still driving the vehicle.
Upon reaching Calamba at about 12:00 noon of the same date, Leopoldo Marajas told Padica to drive the car
into the sugarcane plantation at the side of the road. Once inside the plantation, Padica stopped the car.
Leopoldo then alighted from the vehicle forced Francis Banaga was forced out of the car by Leopoldo, Eddie
boy and accused-appellant. Once inside the sugarcane plantation, more or less ten meters away from the car,
Leopoldo delivered several stabbing blows at Banaga, and accused-appellant shot Banaga with a handgun.
Banaga fell on the ground. Padica remained inside the car when this happened. Leopoldo, Eddie Boy and
accused-appellant returned to the car. Leopoldo took the wheel from Padica and drove the car to Muntinlupa,
where Padica alighted and was left behind.
A few minutes after 6:00 P.M. of the same day, someone called up by phone, telling Tomas Banaga (Francis
father) not to look for his son as he was in good condition, and demanding P500,000.00 for Francis' release.
Eventually, the amount was reduced to P23,000.00. The accused-appellant was apprehended during the
entrapment and was convicted for kidnapping for ransom with murder by RTC.
Issues:
1. Was the RTC correct in convicting the appellant for the crime of kidnapping for ransom with murder?
2. What were the qualifying circumstances present in this case?
Held 1: NO.

Rationale: The essential element in the crime of kidnapping that the victim must have been restrained or
deprived of his liberty, or that he was transported away against his will with the primary or original intent to
effect that restraint, is absent in this case. The malefactors evidently had only murder in their hearts when
they invited the trusting Francis Banaga to go with them to Laguna, and not to confine or detain him for any
length of time or for any other purpose.
We have consistently held that where the taking of the victim was incidental to the basic purpose to kill, the
crime is only murder, and this is true even if, before the killing but for purposes thereof, the victim was taken
from one place to another.
The fact alone that ransom money is demanded would not per se qualify the act of preventing the liberty of
movement of the victim into the crime of kidnapping, unless the victim is actually restrained or deprived of his
liberty for some appreciable period of time or that such restraint was the basic intent of the accused.
Held 2:
There was treachery since the victim was lured by his killers into going with them to Laguna without the
slightest inkling of their nefarious design, coupled with the sudden and unexpected assault by the malefactors
on the hapless victim in the isolated sugarcane plantation in Calamba, which thereby divested him of an
opportunity either to effectively resist or to escape.
Abuse of superior strength was likewise present, for the accused deliberately resorted to their collective
strength for the purpose of overpowering whatever feeble defense the poor Francis Banaga could offer. They
thus insured the commission of the crime with practically no risk at all to themselves.
Under the factual features present in the commission of the crime, however, we are inclined to grant that the
circumstance of superior strength should not be appreciated distinctly but should be considered as being
absorbed in and by treachery.
The aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place was present since appellant and his co-accused obviously
and deliberately chose the desolation and isolation of the sugarcane plantation to perpetrate the crime far
from the gaze of potential eye-witnesses. This aggravating circumstance of despoblado should, therefore, be
considered against appellant even if it was not alleged in the informations since it was duly proved.
Decision: The assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE and another one is rendered
CONVICTING accused-appellant Leon Marajas, Jr. y Ramos of the crime of murder.
Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor
People of the Philippines vs. Ty 263 SCRA 754
Nature: An appeal from the decision of RTC Kalookan City convicting Vicente Ty and Carmen Ty for the crime
of kidnapping and failure to return a minor.
Facts: Johanna Sombong brought her sick daughter Arabella, then seven (7) months old, for treatment to the
Sir John Medical and Maternity Clinic at Kalookan City which was owned and operated by the accusedappellants. Arabella was diagnosed to be suffering bronchitis and diarrhea and was confined at the clinic.
Three days after, when Arabella was ready to be discharged, Johanna did not take her home. A week later,
Johanna came back but did not have money to pay the hospital bill amounting to P300 and told Dr. Carmen
Ty that no one could take care of Arabella. Johanna decided to leave her child to the care of the clinic nursery.
When hospital bills started to mount and accumulate, Dr. Ty suggested to Johanna that she hire a "yaya" for
P400.00 instead of the daily nursery fee of P50.00 to which she agreed. Arabella was transferred from the
nursery to the extension of the clinic which served as residence for the hospital staff.
From then on, nothing was heard of the complainant. She neither visited her child nor called to inquire about
her whereabouts. Her estranged husband came to the clinic once but did not get the child. Efforts to get in
touch with the complainant were unsuccessful as she left no address or telephone number where she can be
reached. This development prompted Dr. Ty to notify the barangay captain of the child's abandonment.
Two years after Arabella was abandoned by Johanna, Dr. Mallonga gave the child to her aunt, Lilibeth Neri.
In 1992, complainant came back to claim the daughter she abandoned some five years back.

When her pleas allegedly went unanswered, she filed a petition for habeas corpus against accusedappellants with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Said petition was however denied due course and
was summarily dismissed without prejudice on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the alleged detention having
been perpetrated in Kalookan City. This led to her filing a criminal case against Drs. Ty for kidnapping and
failure to return a minor.
Issue: Whether or not Drs. Ty were guilty of kidnapping and failure to return a minor.
Held: NO.
Rationale: Before a conviction for kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised
Penal Code can be had, two elements must concur, namely: (a) the offender has been entrusted with the
custody of the minor, and (b) the offender deliberately fails to restore said minor to his parents or guardians.
The essential element herein is that the offender is entrusted with the custody of the minor but what is actually
punishable is not the kidnapping of the minor, as the title of the article seems to indicate, but rather
the deliberate failure or refusal of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or
guardians. Said failure or refusal, however, must not only be deliberate but must also be persistent as to
oblige the parents or the guardians of the child to seek the aid of the courts in order to obtain custody.
Essentially, the word deliberate as used in the article must imply something more than mere negligence; it
must be premeditated, obstinate, headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong.
In the case at bar, it is evident that there was no deliberate refusal or failure on the part of the accusedappellants (Drs. Ty) to restore the custody of the complainant's (Johannas) child to her. When the accusedappellants learned that complainant wanted her daughter back after five long years of apparent wanton
neglect, they tried their best to help herein complainant find the child as the latter was no longer under the
clinic's care. Accused-appellant Dr. Ty did not have the address of Arabella's guardians but as soon as she
obtained it from Dr. Fe Mallonga who was already working abroad, she personally went to the guardians'
residence and informed them that herein complainant wanted her daughter back.
The efforts taken by the accused-appellants to help the complainant in finding the child clearly negate the
finding that there was a deliberate refusal or failure on their part to restore the child to her mother. Evidence is
simply wanting in this regard.
It is worthy to note that accused-appellants' conduct from the moment the child was left in the clinic's care up
to the time the child was given up for guardianship was motivated by nothing more than an earnest desire to
help the child and a high regard for her welfare and well-being.
Decision: Drs. Vicente and Carmen Ty were acquitted for the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor.
Abandonment of Ones Victim
Lamera vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals 198 SCRA 186
Nature: Petition for review of the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals.
Facts: At around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of 14 March 1985, along Urbano Street, Pasig, Metro Manila, an
owner-type jeep, driven by Antonio Lamera, hit and bumped a tricycle driven by Ernesto Reyes resulting in
damage to the tricycle and injuries to Ernesto Reyes and Paulino Gonzal. Because of this, two informations
were filed against Lamera:

For reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries under Article
365 which was filed with RTC Pasig. What was alleged in the information was that Lamera hit the
tricycle driven by Ernesto Reyes and owned by Ernesto Antonel, thereby causing damage to the
Suzuki tricycle in the amount of P7,845.00; and due to the impact the, driver and the passengers of
the tricycle sustained physical injuries which required medical attendance.
For violation of paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code on Abandonment of one's victim
which was filed with MTC Pasig.

Lamera was found guilty by MTC Pasig of the crime of abandonment of ones victim. RTC affirmed MTCs
decision but modified the penalty imposed. CA dismissed Lameras petition for review. Hence, this petition for
review.

Issue: Could there be a valid charge for alleged abandonment under Article 275, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code when he was previously charged with reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with
multiple physical injuries under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code?
Held: YES.
Rationale: Where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one
of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each
crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other.
Since the informations were for separate offenses the first against a person and the second against public
peace and order one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on double jeopardy.
The two informations filed against petitioner (Lamera) are clearly for separate offenses. The first, Criminal
Case No. 64294, for reckless imprudence (Article 365), falls under the sole chapter (Criminal Negligence) of
Title Fourteen (Quasi Offenses) of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. The second, Criminal Case No.
2793, for Abandonment of one's victim (par. 2, Art. 275), falls under Chapter Two (Crimes Against Security) of
Title Nine (Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security) of Book Two of the same Code.
Quasi offenses under Article 365 are committed by means of culpa. Crimes against Security are committed by
means of dolo.
Moreover, in Article 365, failure to lend help to one's victim is neither an offense by itself nor an element of the
offense therein penalized. Its presence merely increases the penalty by one degree.
Such being the case, it must be specifically alleged in the information. The information against petitioner in
this case does not so allege.
Upon the other hand, failure to help or render assistance to another whom one has accidentally wounded or
injured is an offense under paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the same code.
Decision: Petition for review is denied.
Grave Threats
Reyes vs. People of the Philippines 27 SCRA 686
Nature: Appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the municipal court of
Cavite City convicting Rosauro Reyes of the crimes of grave threats and grave oral defamation.
Facts: Rosauro Reyes, a former civilian employee of the Navy Exchange, Sangley Point, Cavite City, led a
group of about 20 to 30 persons carrying different placards in a demonstration staged in front of the main gate
of the United States Naval Station at Sangley Point a month after his termination from his job.
Upon learning of the demonstration, Agustin Hallare, who was inside his office at that time, feared for his
safety. Col. Monzon had to escort Hallare and his companions outside the office and brought them to
Hallares residence where they were followed by the demonstrators who rode in jeeps.
The three jeeps carrying the demonstrators parked in front of Hallare's residence after having gone by it twice.
Reyes got off his jeep and posted himself at the gate, and with his right hand inside his pocket and his left
holding the gate-door, he shouted repeatedly, Agustin, putang ina mo. Agustin, mawawala ka. Agustin
lumabas ka, papatayin kita. Thereafter, he boarded his jeep and the motorcade left the premises. Meanwhile,
Hallare, frightened by the demeanor of Reyes and the other demonstrators, stayed inside the house.
Reyes was charged with the crimes of grave threats for orally threatening to kill Hallare and of grave oral
defamation for uttering insulting and serious defamatory remarks "AGUSIN, PUTANG INA MO".
The lower court convicted Reyes for the crimes charged against him which was affirmed by CA.
Issue: Was CA correct in affirming the lower courts decision?
Held: Reyes should have been convicted for grave threats only.

Rationale: All the elements of the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code
and penalized by its paragraph 2 were alleged therein namely: (1) that the offender threatened another
person with the infliction upon his person of a wrong; (2) that such wrong amounted to a crime; and (3) that
the threat was not subject to a condition. Hence, petitioner could have been convicted thereunder. It is to be
noted that under the aforementioned provision the particular manner in which the threat is made is not a
qualifying ingredient of the offense, such that the deletion of the word "orally" did not affect the nature and
essence of the crime as charged originally. Neither did it change the basic theory of the prosecution that
Reyes threatened to kill Hallare so as to require the Reyes to undergo any material change or modification in
his defense.
The demonstration led by petitioner Agustin Hallare in front of the main gate of the naval station; the fact that
placards with threatening statements were carried by the demonstrators; their persistence in trailing Hallare in
a motorcade up to his residence; and the demonstration conducted in front thereof, culminating in repeated
threats flung by petitioner in a loud voice, give rise to only one conclusion: that the threats were made with
the deliberate purpose of creating in the mind of the person threatened the belief that the threat would be
carried into effect. Indeed, Hallare became so apprehensive of his safety that he sought the protection of Col.
Monzon, who had to escort him home, wherein he stayed while the demonstration was going on. It cannot be
denied that the threats were made deliberately and not merely in a temporary fit of anger, motivated as they
were by the dismissal of petitioner one month before the incident. We, therefore, hold that the appellate court
was correct in upholding petitioner's conviction for the offense of grave threats.
The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the words, "Agustin, putang ina mo". This is a
common enough expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express
anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the
virtues of a mother. In the instant case, it should be viewed as part of the threats voiced by appellant against
Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same more emphatic.
Decision: Reyes was acquitted for the crime of oral defamation, and his conviction for grave threats was
affirmed.
Grave Coercion
Timoner vs. People of the Philippines 125 SCRA 830
Nature: Petition for review of the affirmance in toto by the Court of Appeals of the judgment of conviction
handed down by the Municipal Court of Daet, Camarines Norte convicting Timoner guilty of grave coercion.
Ponente: Escolin
Facts: At about 10:00 in the evening of December 13, 1971, Timoner, then Mayor of Daet, Camarines Norte,
accompanied by two uniformed policemen and six laborers, arrived in front of the stalls along Maharlika
highway, the main thoroughfare of the same town. Upon orders of Timoner, these laborers proceeded to nail
together rough lumber slabs to fence off the stalls which protruded into the sidewalk of the Maharlika highway,
among which were the barbershop of Pascual Dayaon and the store belonging to Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos.
These establishments had been recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer for non-compliance
with certain health and sanitation requirements.
Timoner and the two policemen were charged with the offense of grave coercion before the Municipal Court of
Daet. The said court exonerated the two policemen, but convicted Timoner of the crime charged as principal
by inducement. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Timoner contends that the sealing off of the barbershop was done in
abatement of a public nuisance and, therefore, under lawful authority.
Issue: Was Timoner guilty of grave coercion?
Held: NO.
Rationale: In this case, petitioner (Timoner), as mayor of the town, merely implemented the recommendation
of the Municipal Health Officer to close the said establishments. Having then acted in good faith in the
performance of his duty, petitioner incurred no criminal liability.

Grave coercion is committed when "a person who, without authority of law, shall by means of violence,
prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law or compel to do something against his will, either
it be right or wrong." The three elements of grave coercion are: [1] that any person be prevented by another
from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his will, be it right or wrong;
[2] that the prevention or compulsion be effected by violence, either by material force or such display of it as
would produce intimidation and control the will of the offended party, and [3] that the person who restrained
the will and liberty of another had no right to do so, or, in other words, that the restraint was not made under
authority of law or in the exercise of a lawful right.
The third element being absent in the case at bar, petitioner cannot be held guilty of grave coercion.
Decision: The decision of the Court of Appeals was set aside and acquitted Timoner for the crime of grave
coercion.
Lee vs. Court of Appeals 201 SCRA 405
Nature: A petition for review on certiorari to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Caloocan City and reinstated as well as affirmed in toto the
decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) Caloocan City. The RTC decision found the petitioner guilty of
the crime of light coercion.
Facts: Maria Pelagia Paulino de Chin was fetched from her house by Atanacio Lumba, a bank employee of
Pacific Banking Corporation upon the instruction of Francis Lee, the Branch Manager of the said bank. An
hour later, Lee confronted her about a forged Midland National Bank Cashier Check No. 3526794, which she
allegedly deposited in the account of Honorio Carpio. During the said confrontation, Lee was shouting at her
with piercing looks and threatened to file charges against her unless and until she returned all the money
equivalent of the subject cashier check. Accordingly, Maria was caused to sign a prepared withdrawal slip,
and later, an affidavit prepared by the bank's lawyer, where she was made to admit that she had swindled the
bank and had to return the money equivalent of the spurious check. It was about six o'clock in the afternoon
of the same day when the complainant was able to leave the bank premises.
MTC found Lee guilty of grave coercion. RTC modified MTCs decision finding Lee guilty of light coercion. On
appeal, CA found affirmed MTCs decision.
Issue: Whether or not the acts of petitioner in simply "shouting at the complainant with piercing looks" and
"threats to file charges against her" are sufficient to convict him of the crime of grave coercion.
Held: NO, petitioners acts are not sufficient to convict him of the crime of grave coercion.
Rationale: Petitioner's (Lees) demand that the private respondent (Maria) return the proceeds of the check
accompanied by a threat to file criminal charges was not improper. There is nothing unlawful on the threat to
sue. In the case of Berg v. National City Bank of New York (102 Phil. 309, 316), We ruled that:
... It is a practice followed not only by banks but even by individuals to demand payment of
their accounts with the threat that upon failure to do so an action would be instituted in court.
Such a threat is proper within the realm of the law as a means to enforce collection. Such a
threat cannot constitute duress even if the claim proves to be unfounded so long as the
creditor believes that it was his right to do so.
Coercion did not exist in this case.
Decision: Lee was acquitted for the crime of grave coercion.
Unjust Vexation
People of the Philippines vs. Reyes 60 Phil 369
Nature: An appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance convicting Reyes for violation of Article 133
of the Revised Penal Code (Offending the religious feelings).
Ponente: Hull

Facts: During the pabasa on the evening of April 10, 1933, between 11 and 12 o'clock, the defendants
Procopio Reyes, Policarpio Nacana, Florentino Clemente, Hermogenes Mallari, Marcelino Mallari, Castor
Alipio, and Rufino Matias arrived at the place, carrying bolos and crowbars, and started to construct a barbed
wire fence in front of the chapel. Alfonso Castillo, who was chairman of the committee in charge of
the pabasa, tried to persuade them to refrain from carrying out their plan, by reminding them of the fact that it
was Holy Week and that it was highly improper to construct a fence at that time of the evening. A verbal
altercation ensued.
When the people attending the pabasa in the chapel and those who were eating in the yard thereof noticed
what was happening, they became excited and left the place hurriedly and in such confusion that dishes and
saucers were broken and benches toppled over. The pabasa was discontinued and it was not resumed until
after an investigation conducted by the chief of police on the following morning.
Issue: Whether or not the act of constructing a fence constituted acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of
the faithful.
Held: NO, the act of Reyes in constructing a fence during the pabasa is not notoriously offensive to the
feelings of the faithful.
Rationale: Article 133 of the Revises Penal Code punishes acts "notoriously offensive to the feelings of the
faithful." The construction of a fence, even though irritating and vexatious under the circumstances to those
present, is not such an act as can be designated as "notoriously offensive to the faithful", as normally such an
act would be a matter of complete indifference to those not present, no matter how religious a turn of mind
they might be.
The argument that the act of building a fence was innocent and was simply to protect private property rights is
a pretense only, considering that the fence was constructed late at night and in such a way as to vex and
annoy the parties who had gathered to celebrate the pabasa.
Decision: Reyes and company were acquitted for violation of Article 133 of the Revised Penal Code but was
found guilty of a violation of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code.
B. Crimes against Property
Robbery
Napolis v. Court of Appeals 43 SCRA 301
Nature: Appeal from the decision of CA
Facts: Casimira, the wife of Ignacio Peaflor, heard the barks of the dogs at 1am in the morning after
answering the call of nature downstairs. It indicated the presence of the strangers nearby. She went up to the
bedroom and woke up her husband. Ignacio brought with him a .38 caliber revolver and went down to see the
intruders. The front door of their store was knocked down by 4 men and one was holding and pointing a
machine gun. Ignacio fired but missed his target. He was knocked in the head and he pretended to be dead.
He was hogtied by one of the suspects. Afterwards, they asked for money from Casimira whom gave them
P2000.00 and 2 rings. She was also hogtied together with her sons. Then, they were covered with blanket
and were left by the 4 men. The revolver was also stolen from Ignacio. They shouted help which prompted
Councilor Almario to untie them. They reported the incident to the police. According to Chief of Police Delfin
Lapid, "they removed the adobe stone and that is the place where they passed through". In that same
morning, policeman Melquiades Samaniego reported seeing suspicious characters passing through a nearby
field and when the field was inspected, the authorities were able to locate a greasegun with 5 bullets and a
pistol with 3 bullets.
Issue: Whether or not Nicanor and others are liable for robbery under Article 294 and Article 299.
Held: Yes.
Rationale: The malefactors had used violence against Ignacio Peaflor , and intimidation against his wife,
thereby infringing Article 294 of the same Code, under conditions falling under sub-paragraph (5) of said
article, which prescribes the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its

medium period. The crime committed is more serious than that covered by the Article 299 which the CA
imposed.
The SC previously ruled that where robbery, though committed in an inhabited house, is characterized by
intimidation, this factor "supplies the controlling qualification," so that the law to apply is article 294 and not
article 299 of the Revised Penal Code. This is on the theory that "robbery which is characterized by violence
or intimidation against the person is evidently graver than ordinary robbery committed by force upon things,
because where violence or intimidation against the person is present there is greater disturbance of the order
of society and the security of the individual."
The SC agree with the proposition that robbery with "violence or intimidation against the person is evidently
graver than ordinary robbery committed by force upon things," but, precisely, for this reason, the SC cannot
accept the conclusion deduced therefrom in the cases above cited reduction of the penalty for the latter
offense owing to the concurrence of violence or intimidation which made it a more serious one. It is, to SCs
mind, more plausible to believe that Art. 294 applies only where robbery with violence against or intimidation
of person takes place without entering an inhabited house, under the conditions set forth in Art. 299 of the
Revised Penal Code. The SC deem it more logical and reasonable to hold, when the elements of both
provisions are present, that the crime is a complex one, calling for the imposition -- as provided in Art. 48 of
said Code -- of the penalty for the most serious offense, in its maximum period, which, in the case at bar, is
reclusion temporal in its maximum period.
Decision: Modified the CAs decision.
People of the Philippines vs. Biruar 130 SCRA 513
Nature: REVIEW of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao
Facts: At around 10pm in the evening, the sps. Mosende were about to sleep when the husband heard a call
from outside telling Good evening Tiyo. Thinking that they were the relatives of his wife, he led them in. Two
armed men entered and demanded the gun of the husband. When he denied, the wife called to them saying
Do not kill my husband. If you want the arm, the shotgun is here. She raised the mosquito net and pointed
the gun under the mat. The malefactor demanded money which the wife complied. When they took off, the
couple heard gunshots near the house of George Kalitas and went down to a coconut tree and saw a fire after
a few minutes within the latters house.
The inmates of George Kalitas consist of him, his wife, his two grandchildren, his nephew, his maid and the
maids son. When the maid heard the gunshots she went out to fetch her son yet she was hit in the left wrist
and was unconscious. Jessie Renopal, Georges granddaughter, was grazed by a bullet but still saw the faces
of the five armed men. Narciso, Georges nephew, went into the aparador to hide and afterwards escaped in
the kitchen window only to fall into the hands of one of the accused. He begged to them not to poured by the
kerosene for he will be burned. He was spared. The robbers destroyed the front door of the house of George
which prompted him to fire at them. One of them was shot. The robbers fired back and hit George. The
robbers entered and shouted to throw the arm at them as well as demanding the Bebot, a grandchild of
George, who got hold of the gun to surrender the gun. The child likewise complied. One of the robbers held
Mrs. Kalitas on the neck and the others ransacked the house gathering an amount of P40, 000 and a few gold
coins. Afterwards they left and burned the house. The inmates of the house rushed outside and brought the
wounded to the hospital. George died immediately before he was admitted to the hospital. As the fire spread,
the assets of George were burned down which all valued at P34,545.00. were completely destroyed.
Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of Robbery.
Held: Yes.
Ratio: The crimes committed were Robbery by band, Arson, and Robbery with Homicide and Physical
injuries. It had been positively established that the late George Kalitas had kept money in a trunk placed
under his bed which the accused took on the night in question. Jessie Renopal testified that the accused
broke open the said trunk with an axe on the night of the incident and took the money placed inside. Her
testimony is corroborated by Silvia Mingming Kalitas, the wife of George Kalitas. Silvia Mingming Kalitas
declared, however, that the money kept by her husband amounted to only P40,560.00 at the last counting.
This indicated that there was taking of personal property.

Also, in the present case, the accused, after committing the crime of robbery in band in the house of Gorgonio
Mosende, went to the neighboring house of George Kalitas where they committed the crimes of Arson and
Robbery with Homicide and Physical Injuries. The burning of the house of George Kalitas was not the means
in committing the robbery. The evidence shows that the accused gained entry into the house of George
Kalitas by breaking down the door with an axe and not by burning the same. Thus, the crime committed in the
house of Gorgonio Mosendes and the burning of the house of the late George Kalitas is independent with
each other forming separate crimes of Robbery by band and Arson.
The trial court found that the commission of the offenses charged was attended by the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime, dwelling, use of motor vehicle, use of unlicensed firearm, and with the aid of
armed men to ensure or afford impunity. The use of unlicensed firearm, however, cannot be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance in Crim. Case Nos. 9988 (Arson) and 9989 (Robbery with Homicide and Physical
Injuries) since the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm is solely applicable to
robbery in band under Art. 295 of the Revised Penal Code.
Lastly, the accused are also guilty for Robbery with Homicide and Physical injuries where the evidence
showed that the amount of P40,000.00 was taken from the house of George Kalitas by injuring some of the
inmates and by killing George Kalitas.
Decision: Judgment appealed is affirmed.
People of the Philippines vs. Astor 149 SCRA 325
Nature: An appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, finding the accusedappellants, Renato Daet and Hercules del Rosario guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of robbery
and serious illegal detention.
Facts: At 7:00 p.m. on August 27, 1979, the herein accused, led by certain Dante Astor, barged inside the
Legazpi Miki Factory with pulled handguns and grenades. Upon gaining entry, they closed the door and
threatened all the twenty one innocent and unsuspecting people caught inside, some of whom were females
and twelve were males. They also hogtied Thoi Mui Chi, the wife of the factory owner, and forcibly ordered her
to open the cash register and give them the money. Trembling in fear, and under the watchful eyes of these
armed men, she opened the drawer and gave them all its contents of P5,700.00.
Unfortunately for the accused, they failed to act with precision, facility and speed in the perpetration of this
daring offense. Before they could leave the premises after the commission of the robbery, the police
authorities were already at the scene of the crime. There was no way out for the robbers. All possible exits
were blocked. The armed men herded and detained all their twenty one victims, including the females and
children, first inside the bodega, and then transferred them in a small office where they were packed like
sardines and also detained. The armed men threatened to explode the hand grenades and kill all the
hostages. Since the accused knew, or have known, that the authorities have already cordoned the place,
Astor picked and singled out from the group an elderly woman, who is prosecution witness Francisco Astillero,
to look for a walkie talkie. Thereafter, the girl Rosario Astillero, who is the child of this woman, pleaded with
Astor if it was possible even to release her mother because she might suffer from heart attack. The plea was
rejected and Astor insisted that he should be given a walkie talkie which should be placed near the door.
Francesca shouted to the people outside to send a walkie talkie, as demanded by the armed men. Finally, a
walkie talkie was placed near the door and it was taken by one of the hostages, Chan Hoc Pin, who gave it to
Astor.
The authorities led by Mayor Gregorio Imperial, Jr., Gen. Racela and Col. Riller, negotiated with the armed
robbers for the release of the hostages. The armed men demanded for a getaway vehicle, money, a fi-ee
passage, and a guarantee from Mayor Imperial, Jr. of their safety during the escape.
Mayor Imperial offered himself to the armed men in exchange for the release of the twenty one hostages but
his offer was refused and the armed men demanded that they should be accompanied during their escape by
three barangay chairmen and others whom they already knew.
After a briefing with the police authorities, Mayor Imperial, Jr. finally acceded to the demands. Through the
help and voluntary contributions of the families of the hostages and other civic spirited citizens, he was able to
raise P10,000.00. A Toyota Land Cruise was also prepared as the getaway car. The mayor requested the
respective barangay chairmen of the places where the accused reside, as well as the mother of del Rosario
and the father of Daet, to ride with the accused in the getaway vehicle. The barangay chairmen fearlessly but

cautiously entered the factory in order to fetch the three armed men. Moments later, the three accused who
were tightly secured and surrounded by the barangay chairmen went out of the factory and boarded the
waiting getaway vehicle under the helpless eyes of the authorities.
Judgment was rendered against appellants Daet and del Rosario only, as Dante Astor escaped from
detention after their arraignment and remained at large.
Issue: Whether or not the appellants are guilty of two separate crimes, namely robbery and serious illegal
detention.
Held: Appellants should only be held guilty of robbery.
Ratio: It is evident from the above finding that were appellants themselves not trapped by the early arrival of
the police at the scene of the crime, they would have not anymore detained the people inside sine they have
already completed their job. Obviously, appellants were left with no choice but to resort to detention of these
people as security, until arrangements for their safe passage were made. This is not the crime of illegal
detention punishable under the penal laws, but an act of restraint in order to delay the pursuit of the criminals
by peace officers. Where the victims in a robbery case were detained in the course of robbery, the detention is
absorbed by the crime of robbery. In the case at bar, the detention was only incidental to the main crime of
robbery and, although in the course thereof women and children were also held that threats to kill were made,
the act should not be considered as a separate offense.
Decision: The judgment of the court a quo for robbery is AFFIRMED. The judgment for serious illegal
detention is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellants are ACQUITTED in the case for serious
illegal detention but the judgment of forfeiture is AFFIRMED.
Robbery with homicide
People of the Philippines vs. Calixtro 123 SCRA 369
Nature: Automatic Review because of the imposition of Death penalty
Facts: At around 2pm, a a jeep with seven men on board stopped in front of the Rural Bank of San Luis. Six
men alighted therefrom while one man was left behind the steering wheel of the parked jeep. Of the six who
alighted, three proceeded to the bank and the rest took positions in front of the bank. The men who stood in
front of the bank were Alberto Katigbak, Petronilo Mercado and Apolinario Martinez. the first to enter the bank
was Pio Cuevas, then Chief of Police of San Antonio, Quezon. He was followed by Juanito Calixtro and Juan
Mercado who were both in civilian attire and were armed with short firearms. As Cuevas entered, he told the
security guard of the bank, Julian Agojo, that the Lieutenant, at the same time pointing to Calixtro, was going
to apply for a loan. Agojo then instructed them to proceed to the manager of the bank. Calixtro proceeded
directly to the cashier's table. Cuevas, however, instead of following Calixtro, immediately grabbed the service
carbine of Agojo which rested on the wan near the door and poked the same at the latter shouting in a loud
voice in the vernacular, 'dapa kayo, holdup ito, mamamatay kayo.' At this juncture, Dionisio Aquino, bank
manager who saw what had transpired, ran inside the bank vault to hide. So did Modesta Punzalan, bank
cashier. Meanwhile Juan Mercado poked a gun at one of the clients of the bank. As Agojo grappled with
Cuevas for the possession of the carbine, some shots which were not fired by Cuevas or Agojo were heard
from outside and inside the bank. At this juncture, Atty. Antonio de Sagun, bank counsel, who witnessed what
transpired ran behind the vault door to hide. After the firing, both Aquino and De Sagun peeped from where
they were hiding and saw Calixtro take money from the cashier's table. They also saw Cuevas and Agojo still
grappling for the possession of the carbine. The money taken from the cashier's table amounted to P150.00.
While Agojo was grappling with Cuevas, the former was wounded on the chin, left elbow, both palms and on
his right breast. As Agojo continued to struggle with Cuevas for the carbine, Cuevas shouted to his
companions for help and another burst of shots were fired. This time Alberto Katigbak, Apolinario Martinez
and Petronilo Mercado who were deployed outside the bank were seen firing towards the direction of the
bank while Jaunito Calixtro and Juan Mercado were shooting at Agojo as he grappled with Cuevas. Cuevas,
apparently hit, jerked, loosened his hold on the carbine, enabling Agojo to wrest it from Cuevas. Cuevas, at
that time, was near the door, facing the interior of the bank with his back towards the street and was moving
backwards towards the latter. Thereupon, Cuevas ran out towards the jeep in a staggering manner, his back
smeared with blood. As Agojo tried to Chase Cuevas, the latter's companions namely, Katigbak, Martinez and
Petronilo Mercado fired at Agojo. The latter fell flat on the ground and in a supine position, exchanged shots
with the fleeing robbers. Cuevas and his companions then boarded their jeep which sped northward. The
accused was chased by Agoho and others through a Volkswagen. Later they were sighted by Agoho. As the

robbers saw the Volkswagen, they, alighting scampered in different directions leaving behind, Obrador, who
fell dead from the vehicle. Agoho fired at the jeep to attract an officers attention nearby. Eventually, the
robbers were apprehended. But later, Cuevas died in the hospital as he was brought there for treatment.
Issue: Whether or not the accused are guilty of robbery.
Held: Yes.
Rationale: Did the appellants commit robbery in band with homicide considering that Cuevas was one of them
and not a robbery victim, an innocent bystander or a stranger? The answer is Yes because Article 294 (1) of
the Revised Penal Code says so. Article 294, No. 1., of the Revised Penal Code, which defines the special,
single and indivisible crime of robbery with homicide ..., but this English version of the Code is a poor
translation of the prevailing Spanish text of said paragraph, which reads as follows:
l. Con la pena de reclusion perpetua a muerte, cuando con motivo o con ocasion del robo resultare
homicidio.'
The SC see, therefore, that in order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery with homicide it is
enough that a homicide would result by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. This High Tribunal speaking
of the accessory character of the circumstances leading to the homicide, has also held that it is immaterial
that the death would supervene by mere accident, provided that the homicide be produced by reason or on
occasion of the robbery, inasmuch as it is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the
circumstances, causes, modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime, that has to be taken
into consideration.
In the light of the foregoing, the trial court correctly held that the appellants committed robbery in band with
homicide aggravated by craft and the use of a motor vehicle which is punishable by death. However, the court
cannot impose the death penalty for lack of the necessary number of votes. Hence, they have to reduce the
penalty to reclusion perpetua.
Decision: The judgment of the trial court is modified in that the appellants shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and they shall jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of Pio Cuevas only the sum of P12,000.00,
and to pay the costs.
People of the Philippines vs. Quiones
Nature: Appeal from RTC decision of Daet, Camarines Norte.
Facts: The evidence for the prosecution established that the three victims were riding in a dark blue Mitsubishi
car at about seven o'clock in the evening of June 27 or 28, 1986, when they were intercepted along the
Maharlika Highway in the above-named barangay by the accused, who had placed sacks on the road to block
the way. The three were taken to the nearby woods where they were killed. According to his brother,
Napoleon, Alexander Sy was at that time carrying P300,000.00, representing the weekly collections of his
business, a necklace with pendant worth P20,000.00, a P10,000.00 diamond ring, and a licensed .22 caliber
handgun. All this, together with the other articles belonging to the victims, were taken by the accused, who
also used the car in fleeing to Sapang Palay, where it was recovered without the stereo and the spare tire.
Issue: Whether or not the accused are guilty of robbery?
Held: Yes.
Rationale: It is clear from the evidence on record that there was a conspiracy among the perpetrators of the
crime to rob and slay. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. This need not be established by direct evidence but may be
proven through the series of acts done by each of the accused in pursuance of the common unlawful
purpose.
Proof of conspiracy in the case at bar was supplied, paradoxically enough, mainly by defendants Quiones
and Canaba themselves. From the time they blocked the road to waylay their prey to the killing and robbing in
the woods, to the distribution of the loot and their escape in the stolen car, all the accused were acting in
concert and in accordance with their common plan.

In a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all and every one of the conspirators is guilty with the others in
equal degree. Hence, every member of the group that perpetrated the killing and robbery of the three victims
must suffer the same penalty prescribed by law even if they had different modes of participation in the
commission of the crime.
The Court finds that the accused were incorrectly charged with robbery with multiple homicide and so were
also incorrectly sentenced by the trial court. The reason is that there is no crime of robbery with multiple
homicide under the Revised Penal Code. The charge should have been for robbery with homicide only
regardless of the fact that three persons were killed in the commission of the robbery. In this special complex
crime, the number of persons killed is immaterial and does not increase the penalty prescribed in Article 294
of the said Code.
The penalty prescribed for the crime of robbery with homicide is reclusion perpetua, to be imposed only once
even if multiple killings accompanied the robbery. Furthermore, the discussion by the trial court of the
attendant circumstances was unnecessary because Article 63 of the Code provides that when the law
prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied without regard to the mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission of the crime.
Decision: The conviction of all the accused-appellants is AFFIRMED, but each of them is sentenced to only
one term of reclusion perpetua for the crime of robbery with homicide. The monetary awards are also
modified in accordance with the preceding paragraph.
Robbery with rape
People of the Philippines vs. Dinola
Nature: Appeal from the decision of Circuit Criminal Court, 13th Judicial District, Palo, Leyte.
Facts: The victim knows the accused, . . . and has known him for more than a year as the accused resides in
front of their house and had previously worked for them and they would oftentimes converse as they are
friends; that on October 21, 1977, at about 3:00 o'clock in the morning, she was at home sleeping alone in the
house of her aunt, Gertrudes Vda. de Barraza, who was then in Tacloban. She was awakened by a voice
saying: "Do not make a noise or I will kill you. If you will not accede to a carnal knowledge I will count from
one to three and I will kill you.". She noticed a small bolo pointed towards her breast and she was frightened.
The person then placed himself on top of her and placed his penis inside her vagina by push and pull; that the
first push was not successful and the person tried many times to put his penis inside her vagina until he was
able to do so and she felt pain. While the person was on top of her, she did not resist as he was big while she
is small and she cannot overcome him. After having carnal knowledge with her, the person lighted a candle
and when he saw her "Citizen" watch valued at P300.00 he grabbed it from her. After the candle was lighted,
she saw that the person was "Eme" whose full name is Emeterio Dinola. The accused left after grabbing her
watch while she stayed in bed as she was afraid and at about 4:00 o'clock in the morning she went to the
bathroom and washed her vagina as she felt dirty. At about 5:00 or 6:00 o'clock in the morning, she went to
the house of the son of her aunt in Barrio Binongtuan and they went to the Provincial Hospital in Tacloban City
to have her painful vagina treated, arriving there at about 8:00 o'clock in the morning. She was not treated
that morning as the doctor on duty was not there and they were requested to return in the afternoon. They
were given a prescription for the medicine which the son of her aunt bought while she went to school. She
went back to the hospital in the afternoon and she was physically examined by Dr. Sherlito Siao.
Issue: WON the accused is guilty of the crime of Robbery with rape.
Held: No.
Ratio: Rape was committed for having carnal knowledge to a woman by means of violence and intimidation.
Robbery was committed by taking of personal property by, in this case, of intimidation. However, it does not
appear from the record of the case that when the accused entered the house of the complainant, he already
had the intention to rob the complainant. In fact, the complainant testified that after she was raped by the
accused, the latter lit a candle, saw the watch on her wrist, threatened to kill her if she did not give it to him
and forcibly took it from her. Hence, the taking of the watch by the accused was more of an afterthought, even
accidental. If the intention of the accused was to commit robbery but rape was also committed even before
the robbery, the crime of robbery with rape is committed. However, if the original design was to commit rape
but the accused after committing rape also committed robbery because the opportunity presented itself, the
criminal acts should be viewed as two distinct offenses.

Decision: The Court hereby MODIFIES the judgment of the court a quo by finding the accused guilty of two
independent crimes of rape and robbery.
People of the Philippines vs. Moreno 220 SCRA 292
Nature: Review for the decision of RTC in the City of Manila
Facts: As can be synthesized from the evidence in the record, it appears that between 4:00 and 4:30 o'clock
in the early morning of May 31, 1985, the Spouses Mohnani Raj and Sundri Mohnani, both Indian nationals,
but residing in the Philippines, were sleeping in their house at No. 1291 Paz Street, Paco, Manila, with their
three (3) children. The couple had two maids, namely, Mary Ann Galedo and Narcisa Sumayo, who were
sleeping in another room near the sala of the house. The three (3) Accused agreed to rob the house of
Mohnani Raj and Sundri Mohnani. At first, the Accused Juan Moreno had, in mind, robbing a house in Makati
but when he saw that there were policemen in the vicinity, the house of the Indian couple became their prime
target. Seemingly, aside from the three Accused, they had another confederate, a jeepney driver, who agreed
to use his jeepney on which to load the loot taken by the Accused from the house of the couple. When the
Accused reached the vicinity of the house of the couple, the jeepney was parked nearby about four (4) meters
away from the house of the couple. The Accused Juan Moreno entered the house first by cutting the iron grills
of the window of the house. In the meanwhile, the Accused Paulino Deloria patrolled the street nearby for any
persons or tanod in the vicinity. The Accused Reynaldo Maniquez, on the other hand, acted as the look-out.
After a while, Juan Moreno emerged from the house, with a pair of scissors. The Accused Juan Moreno
handed over to the Accused Reynaldo Maniquez the pair of scissors and ordered the latter to look for Paulino
Deloria.
Thereafter, the trio entered the house together, using a flashlight. It was at that point in time that the son of the
couple, Pran, was going out of the bedroom of the couple to urinate. The spouses were awakened when the
three Accused Juan Moreno, Reynaldo Maniquez and Paulino Deloria entered their bedroom. The Accused
Paulino Deloria, who was armed with a gun covered with a towel, switched on the lights inside the bedroom of
the couple and stood by the door. The Accused Reynaldo Maniquez, on the other hand, sat on the stomach of
Mohnani Raj, at the same time, warning the latter not to shout, while poking the pair of scissors on him. The
Accused Juan Moreno posted himself beside where Sundri Mohnani Raj was lying down, while poking his
knife at her. The Accused Juan Moreno told Sundri Mohnani to remove all her belongings and her handbag
and warned her not to shout. The said Accused was able to take from her a watch, two (2) Indian bangles, two
(2) rings and P1,000.00 cash. The Accused Paulino Deloria also told Sundri Mohnani to remove her watch
and other personal belongings and asked her if she had money. Sundri Mohnani gave the said Accused her
money. The Accused Reynaldo Maniquez asked Sundri Mohnani for the wallet and the latter told the Accused
that the wallet was on top of the airconditioning unit. The Accused Paulino Deloria asked her where her maids
were and Sundri Mohnani told the Accused where their maids were sleeping. Sundri Mohnani, thereupon,
accompanied Paulino Deloria and Reynaldo Maniquez to the room of their maids, near the sala. When Sundri
Mohnani and the two (2) Accused entered the room of the maids, Sundri Mohnani instructed her maids not to
shout and to go to the room of the Spouses. However, the Accused Paulino Deloria and Reynaldo Maniquez
told the maids to go with them stead. Reynaldo Maniquez brought Mary Ann Galedo to the bathroom of the
house while Paulino Deloria brought Narcisa Sumayo to the sala. Sundri Mohnani was afraid to go out of the
bedroom. However, she peeped through the door of the bedroom which was then open. Although she could
see the bathroom, the door to the bathroom was closed. She could not, moreover, see the sala from where
she was. After about five (5) minutes, Paulino Deloria and Reynaldo Maniquez and the two (2) maids returned
to the room of the couple. Sundri Mohnani saw that the zipper of the pants of Reynaldo Maniquez was still
open. Narcisa Sumayo was crying while Mary Ann Galedo was lying in bed, quiet. The two (2) maids were
told to lie down. Sundri Mohnani asked Narcisa Sumayo why she was crying, but the latter did not respond.
The Accused Paulino Deloria told Narcisa Sumayo to stop crying. After two or three minutes, Reynaldo
Maniquez closed the zipper of his pants and went out of the bedroom and took the wallet of Mohnani Raj on
his way out. Thereupon, the Accused left the room and ransacked the house. The Accused Juan Moreno took
the television and Betamax set from the room of the couple while the Accused Reynaldo Maniquez took a
Betamax and the wallet of Sundri Mohnani Raj. The three Accused forthwith carted from the house the
belongings and things they took from the house. They waited for the jeepney to arrive. After a while, the
jeepney parked nearby came along. The three Accused thereupon loaded their loot inside the jeepney. Juan
Moreno rode in the jeepney while the Accused Reynaldo Maniquez walked home. After the Accused left the
residence of the couple, Sundri Mohnani locked their door while Mohnani Raj shouted "Nakaw, nakaw". When
the couple went out of their room, they saw their door to the house opened and the iron bars on the window
were destroyed. The couple called up the police who later responded and arrived in their house. There were
also about twenty or so people who offered succor to the couple. The police officers were told of the

circumstances of the robbery-rape perpetrated by the Accused. Mohnani Raj, his brother-in-law and his son
later proceeded to the police station at about 5:45 o'clock that morning to make a formal report of the robbery.
The police investigators were furnished with a list of the belongings stolen by the Accused. Forthwith, Pat.
Rodolfo Soriano, of the Theft & Robbery Unit of the Crimes Against Property Section of the Western Police
District prepared and signed, on May 31, 1985, an Alarm Report, based on the investigation of the police
officers wherein is listed the properties stolen by the Accused, and the values thereof. It is alleged in said
Report that after the accused ransacked the house of the couple and took their appliances and belongings,
the two maids were dragged to the sala and bedroom and were sexually abused, and that the two (2) maids
will be furnished with the request for a medico legal examination of said maids.
Issue: Whether or not the accused are liable for robbery with rape.
Held: Yes except for Juan Moreno.
Rationale: The records show strong and ample evidence more than sufficient to support the conviction of all
three accused of the crime of robbery. They all conspired to rob the victim's house; they cut the iron grills of
the window for the purpose of gaining entry into the house; Moreno was armed with a .38 paltik gun and
appellant with a pair of scissors; they hogtied and intimidated Raj and Sundri Mohnani; and they carted away
in a waiting jeep everything they could get from the Mohnani household from big appliances like 21" TV
set, to several kinds of watches and jewelry, to shoes and slippers. Appellant, who was the only one of the
three accused who testified in court, practically admitted all these facts, although he tried to minimize his
share of the loot.
In the event of rape, the police medical investigation holds no evidence for rape of both maids. However as
the defense claims that the testimonies of the maids are hearsays, there are exceptions to the inadmissibility
of hearsay testimonies.
One of them are res gestae statements. Section 42 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, provides:
Sec. 42. Part of the res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place
or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in
evidence as a part of the res gestae. . . . .
Immediately after the three accused left the house where the crime was committed, and the threatening
presence of the accused was gone, both Mary Ann Galedo and Narcisa Sumayo told their employers, the
Mohnani spouses, that they were raped. The latter later testified in court as to these statements. These were
thus part of the res gestae since they were spontaneously made after their harrowing experience, as soon as
the victims had the opportunity to make them without fear for or threat to their lives.
Aside from the testimony of the victim herself, it is not often that direct evidence of rape is available. The act
of rape itself is rarely witnessed by a third party. More often than not, only circumstantial evidence can be
given. And such evidence can be the basis of conviction, provided certain requisites are present.
Section 4 of Rule 133, Rules of Court, provides:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.
Although the medical examination of Galedo was inconclusive as to whether she was raped, there are several
other circumstances tending to prove that she was, namely: the act of appellant in taking her to the bathroom,
closing the door and leaving it only after about five minutes; the fact that his fly was open when he left the
bathroom; and the spontaneous statement of Galedo to her employers that she was raped. These facts were
all part of the testimonies of witnesses who were given credence by the trial court and must thus be
considered as proven. We find no reason to question the latter's judgment as to the truth of these testimonies.
Finally, taking all these facts together, We are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of
having raped Mary Ann Galedo.
With respect to Paulino Deloria who was also found guilty by the trial court of the crime of Robbery with rape
against Narcisa Sumayo, the circumstantial evidence presented against him consists of Sumayo's statement
to Raj Mohnani that Deloria raped her, and the testimony of Sundri Mohnani to the effect that Deloria took

Sumayo to the sala. Although Sundri did not see what happened in the sala as it was out of everybody's sight,
she stated that when Deloria and Sumayo came back after about five minutes, Sumayo was crying profusely.
Raj Mohnani also testified that Sumayo was crying for some time and could not stop until she was threatened
by Deloria. It is true that the medical examination of Sumayo showed that her hymen was intact. However,
this fact alone does not necessarily signify that Sumayo was still a virgin, and does not preclude the fact that
she may have had sexual intercourse. A well-known authority on Legal Medicine has this to say on the
subject:

Although unruptured hymen is commonly mentioned as a distinguishing feature of virginity, it is not always
a sure indication of preservation of virginity.
A woman might have had previous sexual intercourse and yet the hymen remains unruptured, while
others might have experienced sexual relations, but with laceration of the hymen.

This Court has previously held that an intact hymen does not preclude rape.
The ruling of the court below as regard Pastores must be affirmed. It must be remembered that the fact that a
woman's hymen has no sign of laceration does not preclude a finding of rape. For the rupture of the hymen or
laceration of any part of the woman's genitalia is not indispensable to a conviction for rape; it is enough that
there is proof of entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum.
Thus, despite the fact that the medical examination of Sumayo showed that the hymen was still intact, it is not
inconsistent with a finding that Deloria raped her. Why did he bring her to a place where no one could see
what he intended to do? Why did Sumayo cry so violently that she could not stop until her tormentor Deloria
threatened her and ordered her to stop crying? Why did she tell her employer as soon as the three accused
left, that she was raped? We are convinced that there is only one answer to these queries: because she was
indeed violated by Deloria.
Therefore, accused Juan Moreno, who took no part in the rape, is guilty of robbery only under Article 294, No.
5 of the Revised Penal Code but as to Reynaldo Maniquez and Paulino Deloria, who are found guilty for
raping both maids are convicted with the crime of robbery with rape.
Decision: Judgment of the lower court is Affirmed.
Robbery with physical injuries
People of the Philippines vs. Salvilla 184 SCRA 671
Nature: Appeal from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Iloilo City
Facts: On 12 April 1986, a robbery was staged by the four accused at the New Iloilo Lumber Yard at about
noon time. The plan was hatched about two days before. The accused were armed. When they entered the
establishment, they met Rodita Hablero an employee thereat who was on her way out for her meal break and
announced to her that it was a hold-up. She was made to go back to the office and there Appellant Salvilla
pointed his gun at the owner, Severino Choco, and his two daughters, Mary and Mimie the latter being a
minor 15 years of age, and told the former that all they needed was money. Hearing this, Severino told his
daughter, Mary, to get a paper bag wherein he placed P20,000.00 cash (P5,000.00, according to the defense)
and handed it to Salvilla.
Thereafter, Severino pleaded with the four accused to leave the premises as they already had the money but
they paid no heed. Instead, accused Simplicio Canasares took the wallet and wristwatch of Severino after
which the latter, his two daughters, and Rodita, were herded to the office and kept there as hostages.
At about 2:00 o'clock of the same day, the hostages were allowed to eat. The four accused also took turns
eating while the others stood guard. Then, Appellant told Severino to produce P100,000.00 so he and the
other hostages could be released. Severino answered that he could not do so because it was a Saturday and
the banks were closed.
In the meantime, police and military authorities had surrounded the premises of the lumber yard. Authorities
negotiated and appealed to the 4 accused to surrender. The accused refused to surrender or to release the
hostages.
Thereafter, OIC Mayor, Rosa Caram, of Iloilo City arrived and joined the negotiations. In her dialogue with the
accused, Appellant demanded P100,000.00, a coaster, and some raincoats. She offered them P50,000.00

instead, explaining the difficulty of raising more as it was a Saturday. Later, the accused agreed to receive the
same and to release Rodita to be accompanied by Mary Choco in going out of the office. When they were out
of the door, one of the accused whose face was covered by a handkerchief, gave a key to Mayor Caram. With
this, Mayor Caram unlocked the padlocked door and handed to Rodita the P50,000.00, which the latter, in
turn, gave to one of the accused. Rodita was later set free but Mary was herded back to the office.
Finally, the police and military authorities decided to launch an offensive and assault the place. This resulted
in injuries to the girls, Mimie and Mary Choco as well as to the accused Ronaldo and Reynaldo Canasares.
Mary suffered a "macerated right lower extremity just below the knee" so that her right leg had to be
amputated. The medical certificate described her condition as "in a state of hemorrhagic shock when she was
brought in to the hospital and had to undergo several major operations during the course of her confinement
from April 13, 1986 to May 30, 1986."
Issue: Whether or not the 4 accused are guilty of robbery with serious physical injuries and serious illegal
detention.
Held: Yes.
Rationale: There is no question that in robbery, it is required that there be a taking of personal property
belonging to another. This is known as the element of asportation the essence of which is the taking of a thing
out of the possession of the owner without his privity and consent and without the animus revertendi. Unlawful
taking of personal property of another is an essential part of the crime of robbery. In the case at bar, Rodita,
the lumberyard employee, testified that upon demand by Appellant, Severino put P20,000.00 inside a paper
bag and subsequently handed it to Salvilla. In turn, accused Simplicio Canasares took the wallet and
wristwatch of Severino. In respect of the P50,000.00 from Mayor Caram, Rodita declared that the Mayor
handed the amount to her after the Mayor had opened the padlocked door and that she thereafter gave the
amount to one of the holduppers. The "taking" was, therefore, sufficiently proved. The money demanded, and
the wallet and wristwatch were within the dominion and control of Salvilla and his co-accused and completed
the taking.
With regards to the serious illegal detention, the detention in the case at bar was not only incidental to the
robbery but was a necessary means to commit the same. After the amount of P20,000.00 was handed to
Salvilla, the latter and his co-accused still refused to leave. The victims were then taken as hostages and the
demand to produce an additional P100,000.00 was made as a prerequisite for their release. The detention
was not because the accused were trapped by the police nor were the victims held as security against the
latter. The detention was not merely a matter of restraint to enable the malefactors to escape, but deliberate
as a means of extortion for an additional amount. The police and other authorities arrived only much later
after several hours of detention had already passed. And, despite appeals to appellant and his co-accused to
surrender, they adamantly refused until the amount of P100,000.00 they demanded could be turned over to
them. They even considered P50,000.00, the amount being handed to them, as inadequate.
The elements of the offense of Serious Illegal Detention are present in this case. The victims were illegally
deprived of their liberty. Two females (Mary and Minnie) and a minor (Minnie), a specified circumstance in
Article 267 (3), were among those detained. The continuing detention was also for the purpose of extorting
ransom, another listed circumstance in Article 267 (last par.) not only from the detained persons themselves
but even from the authorities who arrived to rescue them.
It follows then that as the detention in this case was not merely incidental to the robbery but a necessary
means employed to facilitate it, the penalty imposed by the Trial Court is proper.
Decision: The judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
Robbery in band
People of the Philippines vs. Apduhan 24 SCRA 798
Nature: Automatic review of the judgment rendered on August 30, 1961 by the Court of First Instance of Bohol
Facts: On 23rd day of May, 1961, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, in the Municipality of Mabini, Province
of Bohol, Philippines, the accused and five (5) other persons whose true names are not yet known (they are
presently known only with their aliases of Bernabe Miano, Rudy, Angel-Angi, Romeo and Tony) and who are
still at large, all of them armed with different unlicensed firearms, with intent to gain, entered by means of
violence, the dwelling house of the spouses Honorato Miano and Antonia Miano, which was also the dwelling

house of their children, the spouses Geronimo Miano and Herminigilda de Miano. Once inside the said
dwelling house, the above-named accused with their five (5) other companions, did attack, hack and shoot
Geronimo Miano and another person by the name of Norberto Aton, who happened to be also in the said
dwelling house, thereby inflicting upon the said two (2) persons physical injuries which caused their death and
thereafter the same accused and their five (5) other companions, did take and carry way from said dwelling
house cash money amounting to Three Hundred Twenty-two Pesos (P322.00), Philippine Currency, belonging
to Honorato Miano and Geronimo Miano, to the damage and prejudice of the said Honorato Miano and the
heirs of the deceased Geronimo Miano in the sum of Three Hundred Twenty-two Pesos (P322.00) with
respect to the amount robbed, and also to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of deceased Geronimo
Miano and Norberto Aton by reason of the death of these two persons.
Issue: Whether or not all the accused are liable for robbery by a band with homicide.
Held: No.
Rationale: The circumstance of band is therefore qualifying only in robbery punished by subdivisions 3, 4, and
5 of art. 294. Consequently, art. 295 is inapplicable to robbery with homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, and
lesiones graves resulting in insanity, imbecility, impotency or blindness. If the foregoing classes of robbery
which are described in art. 294(1) and (2) are perpetrated by a band, they would not be punishable under art.
295, but then cuadrilla would be a generic aggravating under Art. 14 of the Code. Hence, there is no crime as
"robbery with homicide in band." If robbery with homicide is committed by a band, the indictable offense would
still be denominated as "robbery with homicide" under art. 294(1), but the element of band, as stated above,
would be appreciated as an ordinary aggravating circumstance. Article 296, defines "band", creates the
special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm, and provides the criminal liability incurred by
the members of the band.
The four aggravating circumstances which accompanied the crime, are (1) band; (2) dwelling; (3) nighttime;
and (4) abuse of superior strength. The circumstance of abuse of superiority was, however, withdrawn by the
prosecution on the ground that since the offense of robbery with homicide was committed by a band, the
element of cuadrilla necessarily absorbs the circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The court believes
that said withdrawal was ill-advised since the circumstances of band and abuse of superiority are separate
and distinct legal concepts. The element of band is appreciated when the offense is committed by more than
three armed malefactors regardless of the comparative strength of the victim or victims. Hence, the
indispensable components of cuadrilla are (1) at least four malefactors and (2) all of the four malefactors are
armed. On the other hand, the gravamen of abuse of superiority is the taking advantage by the culprits of their
collective strength to overpower their relatively weaker victim or victims. Hence, in the latter aggravating
factor, what is taken into account is not the number of aggressors nor the fact that they are armed, but their
relative physical might vis-a-vis the offended party.
Decision: Since the court failed to secure the number of votes for death penalty, they imposed upon the
accused the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Robbery by the use of force upon things
People of the Philippines vs. Jaranilla 55 SCRA 563
Nature: An appeal of defendants Elias Jaranilla, Ricardo Suyo and Franco Brillantes from the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo.
Facts: Gorriceta was driving a Ford truck owned by his sister. When he was in front the Elizalde bldg., he was
hailed by Jaranilla and 2 others. Jaranilla requested that they dropped by Mandurriao for where his uncle was.
Upon reaching the place, Gorriceta parked the truck and was instructed to wait for the 3 passengers as they
stepped outside. Few minutes passed and the three immediately ran to the truck carrying with them 2
roosters. They hurriedly ordered Gorriceta to drive as they were chased. Jaranilla was sitting at the extreme
right of the truck. While the truck was traversing the detour road near the Mandurriao airport, then under
construction, Gorriceta saw in the middle of the road Patrolmen Ramonito Jabatan and Benjamin Castro
running towards them. Gorriceta slowed down the truck after Patrolman Jabatan had fired a warning shot and
was signalling with his flashlight that the truck should stop. Gorriceta stopped the truck near the policeman.
Jabatan approached the right side of the truck near Jaranilla and ordered all the occupants of the truck to go
down. They did not heed the injunction of the policeman. One of the accused aimed his revolver at the
policeman but it did not fire. Jaranilla, all of a sudden, shot Patrolman Jabatan. The shooting frightened
Gorriceta. He immediately started the motor of the truck and drove straight home to La Paz, another district of

the city. Jaranilla kept on firing towards Jabatan. Later, Jabatan was dead. Valentin Baylon, the owner of the
fighting cocks, returned home and discovered that the door of one of his cock pens or chicken coops was
broken. The feeding vessels were scattered on the ground. Upon investigation he found that six of his fighting
cocks were missing. Each coop contained six cocks. When invited by the police to identify the roosters
confiscated from all the accused, Baylon confirmed that it is one of the six fighting cocks that were missing.
Issue: Whether or not the accused is liable for robbery with homicide.
Held: No.
Rationale: Article 302. Robbery in an uninhabited place or in private building.Any robbery committed in an
uninhabited place or in a building other than those mentioned in the first paragraph of article 299, if the value
of the property exceeds 250 pesos, shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods provided that any of the following circumstances is present:
1. If the entrance has been effected through any opening not intended for entrance or egress.
2. If any wall, roof, floor or outside door or window has been broken.
3. If the entrance has been effected through the use of false keys, picklocks or other similar tools.
4. If any door, wardrobe, chest, or any sealed or closed furniture or receptacle has been broken.
5. If any closed or sealed receptacle, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, has been removed, even if
the same be broken open elsewhere.
The term "lugar no habitado" is erroneously translated. as "uninhabited place", a term which may be
confounded with the expression "uninhabited place" in articles 295 and 300 of the Revised Penal Code, which
is the translation of despoblado and which is different from the term lugarno habitado in article 302. The term
lugar no habitado is the antonym of casa habitada (inhabited house) in article 299.
One essential requisite of robbery with force upon things under Articles 299 and 302 is that the malefactor
should enter the building or dependency, where the object to be taken is found. Articles 299 and 302 clearly
contemplate that the malefactor should enter the building (casa habitada o lugar no habitado o edificio). If the
culprit did not enter the building, there would be no robbery with force upon things.
In the instant case, the chicken coop where the six roosters were taken cannot be considered a building
within the meaning of article 302. Not being a building, it cannot be said that the accused entered the same in
order to commit the robbery by means of any of the five circumstances enumerated in article 302.
Thus, the taking of the six roosters from their coop should be characterized as theft and not robbery. The
assumption is that the accused were animated by single criminal impulse. The conduct of the accused reveals
that they conspired to steal the roosters. The taking is punishable as a single offense of theft. Thus, it was
held that the taking of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion cannot give rise to two
crimes of theft.
With respect to the killing of Patrolman Jabatan, it has already been noted that the evidence for the
prosecution points to Jaranilla as the malefactor who shot that unfortunate peace officer. The killing was
homicide because it was made on the spur of the moment. The treacherous mode of attack was not
consciously or deliberately adopted by the offender. The twenty-four year old Jabatan was an agent of
authority on night duty at the time of the shooting. He was wearing his uniform. The killing should be
characterized as a direct assault (atentado) upon an agent of authority (Art. 148, Revised Penal Code)
complexed with homicide. The two offenses resulted from a single act.
Decision: Jaranilla is guilty of separate crimes of theft and the crime of Direct Assault with Homicide. As to the
two others, they are only guilty with the crime of theft.
CARNAPPING (R.A. 6539)
People of the Philippines vs. De la Cruz 183 SCRA 763
Nature: Appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Makati convicting the three accused of the
crime of carnapping with homicide, penalized under section 14 of R.A. 6539
Facts: The three accused had known one another some time before December 1984 at relatively different
periods. Before Pfc. Bactad at the police station, BELOSO and SALVADOR identified DE LA CRUZ as an

"associate" although the latter denied it. BELOSO had been hired through DE LA CRUZ to man the office at
Centrum Condominium, Perez Street, Legazpi Village, Makati.
On 4 December 1984, they had gotten together at the Kool King Restaurant at Pasong Tamo, Makati, to
discuss a "car deal" to be consummated the next day. Dantes BELOSO, masquerading for Mike Garcia, had
caused an advertisement to be published in the 28 and 29 November issues of the Bulletin Today. On the
same dates, BELOSO had rented an office space at the Centrum Condominium under the name of said
Garcia for the two days mentioned, and again on 5 December 1984 at P50.00 per hour, complete with staff
facilities. BELOSO held himself out as in the business of buying cars. The victim, ANTHONY, responded to
the ad, went to said office and offered to sell his Telstar, Model '83. Posing again as Mike Garcia, BELOSO
called ANTHONY's house at around 9:00 A.M. on 5 December 1984 and informed the latter's mother that he
was the buyer of the car. When ANTHONY went to the Centrum office, BELOSO told ANTHONY to wait for
DE LA CRUZ. Upon the latter's arrival, he had a talk with ANTHONY. DE LA ORTIZ made sure that
ANTHONY's certificate of registration, official receipt and other pertinent papers of the Telstar were in order.
ANTHONY and DE LA CRUZ then proceeded to the latter's house at Barrio Obrero, Makati.
Meanwhile, SALVADOR was instructed by DE LA CRUZ also to wait at the latter's house. When DE LA CRUZ
and ANTHONY arrived, the former told SALVADOR to take a snack somewhere while he (DE LA CRUZ) and
ANTHONY talked. It was after SALVADOR returned to the house that the killing of ANTHONY transpired
between 12:00 noon and 2:00 P.M. Later, at about 3:00 P.M., DE LA CRUZ then called for BELOSO at the
Centrum office. When BELOSO arrived, DE LA CRUZ handed him the keys to the car, which was parked
nearby. DE LA CRUZ also handed to SALVADOR a brown envelope containing papers of the Telstar with the
instruction to bring the car to a certain Hernandez, who was buying the car. Following that bidding, the two left
and looked for Hernandez. But unable to locate him, SALVADOR went on his own in a taxi. BELOSO was left
with the car at the Brunch Restaurant near UERM. After having located Hernandez, SALVADOR, Hernandez,
and a driver went back to where BELOSO was, took the car and proceeded to the Metropolitan Pawnshop
leaving BELOSO behind. At this place, the three alighted. SALVADOR introduced himself as ANTHONY
Banzon, the owner of the car and the name appearing in the car's Certificate of Registration, to Pat. Rosauro
de la Rosa, brother of the pawnshop owner who was the real buyer of the car. SALVADOR even showed the
Registration Certificate and a Residence Certificate, purportedly ANTHONY'S, as proof thereof. SALVADOR
then asked for P130,000.00 as selling price. Pat. de la Rosa agreed but asked that payment be made the
following day as banks were already closed. SALVADOR, however, insisted on payment that evening as he
was badly in need of money. This made Pat. de la Rosa suspicious that the car had been stolen, and reported
t6 the Quezon City police. Pat. de la Rosa then instructed SALVADOR to return to the pawnshop the next day.
As SALVADOR did not know how to drive he left the Telstar at the pawnshop, went to the Brunch Restaurant
near UERM, picked up BELOSO so the latter could drive the car back to DE LA CRUZ. When they returned
that night and boarded the car, elements of the Quezon City police approached them and asked them
questions. BELOSO got down from the car and started shouting that he was ANTHONY, the owner of the car.
Notwithstanding, the police brought them to the Quezon City police headquarters. Here, the investigators
recovered some documents inside BELOSO's clutch bag, among them, a residence certificate in ANTHONY's
name. In BELOSO's possession were also found a motor registration certificate in ANTHONY's name, two (2)
blank residence certificates and one residence certificate in the name of Mark Garcia.
All accused, on the other hand, profess innocence. In a nutshell, it is BELOSO and SALVADOR's position that
they were unaware of any carnapping; that they were in a regular business transaction to sell a car with
promise of a commission; that they were not in the house of DE LA CRUZ in the early afternoon of 5
December 1984 when ANTHONY was killed; that they were unaware of the killing, of ANTHONY which,
according to SALVADOR was DE LA CRUZ' own doing.
Issue: Whether or not the crime of carnapping with homicide was committed.
Held: The accuseds conviction of Carnapping with Homicide was sustained.
Rationale: Both BELOSO and SALVADOR posed as ANTHONY at one time or another during the
"negotiations." When SALVADOR offered to sell the car to Rodolfo Hernandez, he introduced himself as
ANTHONY Banzon. He even presented to Hernandez a car registration certificate and a residence certificate
all in the name of ANTHONY Banzon. Later, when Hernandez introduced SALVADOR to Pat. de la Rosa, the
former's contact, SALVADOR again introduced himself as ANTHONY Banzon. These misrepresentations are
indication that he knew the car was stolen and further bolsters the conclusion that he had a hand in the
commission of the crime and in fact when he and BELOSO were arrested by the Quezon City anti-carnapping
unit, it was now BELOSO claiming to be ANTHONY Banzon. BELOSO's claim that he was ANTHONY Banzon
and SALVADOR's silence in the face of such claim, despite the fact that he had earlier misrepresented

himself as ANTHONY, all the more reveal that the two of them were one in keeping secret the true ownership
of the car.
A more perfect example of a conspiracy cannot be contrived BELOSO and SALVADOR shared the same
purpose with DE LA CRUZ in carnapping the vehicle with a view to selling it at a low price and making money
which they badly needed. They were united in its execution as may be inferred from the facts and
circumstances established by the evidence. Conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence of the
acts charged, but may and generally must be proved by a number of indefinite acts, condition and
circumstances which vary according to the purpose to be accomplished. The existence of conspiracy may be
inferred from acts tending to show a community of design or purpose.
There is no question that ANTHONY was killed "in the commission of the carnapping" (Sec. 14, RA 6539). It
was in the house of DE LA CRUZ where ANTHONY was found dead by a boarder by the name of Cynthia
Juarez at around 9:00 P.M. of the same date. DE LA CRUZ tried to camouflage the killing by ostensibly
reporting to the police that his place had been ransacked and that a person had been killed..
The denial made by BELOSO and SALVADOR that neither of them can be held culpable for ANTHONY'S
death, however, cannot prevail over the physical evidence that they were found positive for nitrates, which
means that they were within the vicinity when the gun was fired. When a paraffin or nitrate test is applied,
there appears gunpowders nitrate which are dark blue collor. These spects are nothing more or less than
minutes particles of nitrate which have blown into the skin by what might be termed the invisible backfire of
the pistol, but they do not appear unless a hand has been instrumental in pulling the trigger.
The fact that DE LA CRUZ was negative for powder burns, although he was tagged by SALVADOR as the
triggerman, can only mean that he knew how to sufficiently protect himself, a knowledge that must have been
derived from his stint as an officer of the Philippine Army.The identical claims of BELOSO and SALVADOR
that they were heavy smokers, of about 3 packs of Marlboro cigarretes a day, which accounts for the present
of nitrate in both their right and left hands, is contradicted by the testimony of the forensic chemist that nitrates
produced by cigarette smoking have different characteristics form those caused by powder burns.
In order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery with homicide, it is enough that a homicide would
result by reason or on the occasion of the robbery and it is immaterial that the death would supervene by
mere accident provided that the homicide be produced by reason or on occasion of the robbery inasmuch as
it is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes, modes or
persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration. Moreover,
conspiracy having been adequately proven, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the
extent and character of their participation because in contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all. The
degree of actual participation by each of the conspirators is immaterial. As conspirators, each is equally
responsible for the acts of their co-conspirators.
The crime committed is Carnapping with Homicide, with carnapping defined as "the taking, with intent to gain,
of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things" (Sec. 2, RA No. 6539). The penalty prescribed by the
same law reads:
Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in
Section two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment
for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when
the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by
imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the
carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and
the penalty of life imprisonment to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped motor vehicle is killed in the commission of the carnapping (Sec. 14, ibid.).
In this case, the owner of the carnapped vehicle was killed in the commission of the carnapping obviously to
gain possession of the car, its registration certificate and other pertinent papers, get the owner out of the way,
and thus facilitate its sale to a third party, in keeping with the modus operandi of the perpetrators.
Izon vs. People of the Philippines 107 SCRA 118
Nature: Petition for review of the decision of the Circuit Criminal Court, Olongapo City convicting the accused
of the crime of Robbery with Violence Against Person.

Facts: On or about the 8th day of September, 1977, in the City of Olongapo, the above-named accused stole
and carried away one (1) motorized tricycle with a total value of P11,000.00 belonging to Reynaldo Togorio.
by means of violence and intimidation applied upon the person of the latter committed by the accused Jimmy
Milla y Castillo and Pedro Divino y Batero who were armed with bladed weapon which they pointed to one
Reynaldo Togorio and used in stabbing him and the accused Amado Izon y Bartulo who helped in mauling
him thereby inflicting upon said victim physical injuries. Pleading guilty upon arraignment, petitioners were
sentenced to the penalty provided in Republic Act No. 6539 known as Anti-Car-napping Act of 1972 which
defines motor vehicle as follows:
Motor vehicle is any vehicle propelled by any power other than muscular power using the public highways, but
excepting road rollers, trolley cars, street sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, bulldozers, graders, fork-lifts
amphibian trucks, and cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles which run only on rails or tracks, and
tractors, trailers and traction engines of all kinds used exclusively for agricultural purposes. Trailers having
any number of wheels, when propelled or intended to be propelled by attachment to a motor vehicle, shall be
classified as separate motor vehicle with no power rating.
Contending that the court a quo erred in imposing the penalty prescribed in the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972
instead of that prescribed in the Revised Penal Code for simple robbery with violence, because the
information did not allege that the motorized tricycle stolen was using the public highway, so as to make it a
motor vehicle as the term is defined in the carnapping law, and therefore failed to inform them that they were
being charged under the cited statute, in violation of their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against the petitioners came to this Court with the instant petition for review.
Issue: Whether a motorized tricycle is a motor vehicle within the definition given to the term by the AntiCarnapping Act of 1972.
Held: A motorized tricycle is a motor vehicle within the definition given to the term by the Anti-Carnapping Act
of 1972.
Rationale: Highways are always public, free for the use of every person. There is nothing in the law that
requires a license to use a public highway to make the vehicle a "motor vehicle" within the definition given the
anti-carnapping law. If a vehicle uses the streets with or without the required license, same comes within the
protection of the law, for the severity of the offense is not to be measured by what kind of streets or highway
the same is used; but by the very nature of the vehicle itself and the use to which it is devoted. Otherwise,
cars using the streets but still unlicensed or unregistered as when they have just been bought from the
company, or only on test runs, may be stolen without the penal sanction of the anti-carnapping statute, but
only as simple robbery punishable under the provision of the Revised Penal Code. This obviously, could not
have been the intention of the anti-carnapping law.
Going over the enumerations of excepted vehicle, it would readily be noted that any vehicle which is
motorized using the streets which are public, not exclusively for private use, comes within the concept of
motor vehicle. A tricycle which is not included in the exception, is thus deemed to be that kind of motor vehicle
as defined in the law the stealing of which comes within its penal sanction.
In any event, it is a matter of judicial notice that motorized tricycles are running in droves along highways
admittedly public, as those going to the north like Baguio City. Those motorized tricycles certainly come within
the definition of the law, even under the restricted construction that petitioners would want given to it. If these
tricycles are "motor vehicles" then, there is no cogent reason to treat the tricycle in question differently.
The facts alleged in the information make out a case of "carnapping". This offense is defined in section 2 of
Republic Act No. 6539 as 'the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the
latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things The
information clearly specified that what was taken and carried away was "one (1) motorized tricycle." Herein
petitioners cannot claim that they were misled by the information into pleading guilty. It is not necessary for
the protection of the substantial right of the accused, nor the effective preparation of his defense, that he be
informed of the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. He must look to the facts alleged.
Highway robbery (P.D. 532)
People of the Philippines vs. Puno 219 SCRA 85

Nature: Appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City convicting the accused of the
crime of robbery with extortion committed on a highway, punishable under Presidential Decree No. 532
Facts: Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in Araneta Avenue, Quezon City called Nika
Cakes and Pastries. She has a driver of her own just as her husband does. At around 5:00 in the afternoon of
January 13, 1988, the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who
was then away in Davao purportedly on account of local election there) arrived at the bakeshop. He told Mrs.
Socorro that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency (something bad befell a child), so
Isabelo will temporary take his place. Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came and so
she got into the Mercedes Benz of her husband with Isabelo on the wheel. After the car turned right in a
corner of Araneta Avenue, it stopped. A young man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the
driver. Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of the front seat and went onto where Ma.
Socorro was seated at the rear. He poked a gun at her. Isabelo, who earlier told her that Enrique is his
nephew announced, "ma'm, you know, I want to get money from you." She said she has money inside her
bag and they may get it just so they will let her go. The bag contained P7,000.00 and was taken.
Further on, the two told her they wanted P100,000.00 more. Ma. Socorro agreed to give them that but would
they drop her at her gas station in Kamagong St., Makati where the money is. The car went about the Sta.
Mesa area. Meanwhile, Ma. Socorro clutched her Rosary and prayed. Enrique's gun was menacingly storing
at her soft bread (sic) brown, perfumed neck. He said he is an NPA and threatened her. The car sped off north
towards the North superhighway. There Isabelo, Beloy as he is called, asked Ma. Socorro to issue a check for
P100,000.00. Ma. Socorro complied. She drafted 3 checks in denominations of two for P30 thousand and one
for P40 thousand. Enrique ordered her to swallow a pill but she refused. Beloy turned the car around towards
Metro Manila. Later, he changed his mind and turned the car again towards Pampanga. Ma. Socorro,
according to her, jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other side of the superhighway and, after some
vehicles ignored her, she was finally able to flag down a fish vendors van. Her dress had blood because,
according to Ma. Socorro, she fell down on the ground and was injured when she jumped out of the car. Her
dress was torn too. On reaching Balintawak, Ma. Socorro reported the matter to CAPCOM. Both accused
were, day after, arrested. Enrique was arrested trying to encash Ma. Socorro's P40,000.00 check at PCI
Bank, Makati.
The appellants were subsequently charged with kidnapping for ransom but were convicted by the trial court
for violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974). Appellants
contended that the court a quo erred (1) in convicting them under Presidential Decree No. 532 since they
were not expressly charged with a crime therein; (2) in applying Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court since the charge under said presidential decree is not the offense proved and cannot rightly be used as
the offense proved which is necessarily included in the offense charged.
Issue: Whether or not the accused-appellants committed the felony of kidnapping for ransom under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information; or a violation of Presidential Decree No. 532
(Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974), as contended by the Solicitor General and found by the
trial court; or the offense of simple robbery punished by Paragraph 5, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code,
as claimed by the defense.
Held: The offense committed by appellants is simple robbery defined in Article 293 and punished under
Paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its medium period.
Rationale: It was worth recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law that in the determination of the crime for
which the accused should be held liable in those instances where his acts partake of the nature of variant
offenses, and the same holds true with regard to the modifying or qualifying circumstances thereof, his motive
and specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of are invaluable aids in arriving at a correct
appreciation and accurate conclusion thereon.
In the case at bar, there was no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at
the time they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of money from her
under the compulsion of threats or intimidation. This much is admitted by both appellants, without any other
esoteric qualification or dubious justification. Appellant Puno, as already stated, candidly laid the blame for his
predicament on his need for funds for, in his own testimony, "(w)hile we were along the way Mam Corina was
telling me "Beloy, I know your family very well and I know that your not a bad person, why are you doing this?"
I told her "Mam, because I need money and I had an ulcer and that I have been getting an advances from our
office but they refused to give me any bale . . . ."

With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the charge that they had kidnapped the victim, the
Court relied on the proverbial rule of ancient respectability that for this crime to exist, there must be
indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty, and
not where such restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the commission of another offense
primarily intended by the offenders.
Neither could the Court consider the amounts given to appellants as equivalent to or in the nature of ransom,
considering the immediacy of their obtention thereof from the complainant personally. Ransom, in municipal
criminal law, is the money, price or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or
persons, a payment that releases from captivity. It can hardly be assumed that when complainant readily gave
the cash and checks demanded from her at gun point, what she gave under the circumstances of this case
can be equated with or was in the concept of ransom in the law of kidnapping. These were merely amounts
involuntarily surrendered by the victim upon the occasion of a robbery or of which she was summarily
divested by appellants. Accordingly, while the Court held that the crime committed is robbery as defined in
Article 293 of the Code, it, however, reject the theory of the trial court that the same constitutes the highway
robbery contemplated in and punished by Presidential Decree No. 532.
Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General, Presidential Decree No. 532 is not a modification of Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code on kidnapping and serious illegal detention, but of Articles 306 and 307 on
brigandage. This is evident from the fact that the relevant portion thereof which treats of "highway robbery"
invariably uses this term in the alternative and synonymously with brigandage, that is, as "highway
robbery/brigandage." This is but in line with the Courts previous ruling, and which still holds sway in criminal
law, that highway robbers (ladrones) and brigands are synonymous.
The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are succinctly explained in a treatise on
the subject and are of continuing validity:
The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of robbers. The heart of the
offense consists in the formation of a band by more than three armed persons for the purpose indicated in art.
306. Such formation is sufficient to constitute a violation of art. 306. It would not be necessary to show, in a
prosecution under it, that a member or members of the band actually committed robbery or kidnapping or any
other purpose attainable by violent means. The crime is proven when the organization and purpose of the
band are shown to be such as are contemplated by art 306. On the other hand, if robbery is committed by a
band, whose members were not primarily organized for the purpose of committing robbery or kidnapping, etc.,
the crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery. Simply because robbery was committed by a band of
more than three armed persons, it would not follow that it was committed by a band of brigands. In the
Spanish text of art. 306, it is required that the band "sala a los campos para dedicarse a robar."
In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is only a
particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four armed participants.
The martial law legislator, in creating and promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532 for the objectives
announced therein, could not have been unaware of that distinction and is presumed to have adopted the
same, there being no indication to the contrary. Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or
brigandage only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on
Philippine highways as defined therein, and not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or
particular victim.
Accordingly, the Court held that appellants have indisputably acted in conspiracy as shown by their concerted
acts evidentiary of a unity of thought and community of purpose. In the determination of their respective
liabilities, the aggravating circumstances of craft shall be appreciated against both appellants and that of
abuse of confidence shall be further applied against appellant Puno, with no mitigating circumstance in favor
of either of them. At any rate, the intimidation having been made with the use of a firearm, the penalty shall be
imposed in the maximum period as decreed by Article 295 of the Code.
The Court further held that there was no procedural obstacle to the conviction of appellants of the crime of
simple robbery upon an information charging them with kidnapping for ransom, since the former offense
which has been proved is necessarily included in the latter offense with which they are charged. For the
former offense, it is sufficient that the elements of unlawful taking, with intent to gain, of personal property
through intimidation of the owner or possessor thereof shall be, as it has been, proved in the case at bar.
Intent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an information where it is charged that there was
unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by the offender of the things subject of the robbery.

Cattle Rustling (P.D. 533)

Ordonio vs. Court of Appeals 199 SCRA 873
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari from the decision and resolution of the Court Appeals affirming the
findings of the trial court convicting the accused of the crime of Cattle Rustling
Facts: On January 6, 1982, Anastacio Pajunar discovered the loss of his eleven month old cow (which he
pastured 100 meters from as house on January 5, 1982). He searched for it and asked his not too distant
neighbor, Constancio Ordonio, whether he had seen it. Ordonio allegedly denied having seen it, and when
Pajunar heard the mooing of a cow, Ordonio was quick to say that it was the cow he was tending. However,
Pajunar followed the direction of the sound and discovered that it was his own cow. Ordonio insisted that it
was his brother's cow which was entrusted to him. So Pajunar tied it near Ordonio's house and left to report
the matter to the authorities.
Pajunar went to Barangay Captain Leopoldo Enumerabellon who gave him a note for the PC. Two PC
soldiers accompanied him and went with him to the house of Barrio Councilman Leonardo Pajaron, and
together they went to Ordonio's place. He also took with him his milking cow and upon arrival at Ordonio's
place, the calf ran and approached its mother. The PC soldiers told the wife that since Ordonio was not
around, the calf had to be entrusted to the barrio official and the wife consented. The following day, the 7th of
January, 1982, they met with sub-barangay captain Enumerabellon. When asked why he, Ordonio was
claiming the cow, his answer was that it was his brother's cow entrusted to him But Ordonio's wife told her
husband thus, "Ne, let's just give the cow to the real owner and we will pay the damages.
In his defense, the accused, Constancio Ordonio, presented a different version. Ordonio declared that on
January 6, 1982, at about 6:00 o'clock A.M., Santiago Oyhoc reported to him that he saw a cow in his mongo
and corn farm. Ordonio just wanted to drive the cow out of his farm but Oyhoc suggested it be caught so that
it would not return. So, with a rope he caught the cow and tied it near his house. He claimed that he
recognized the cow to be Pajunar's and even left instructions to his wife to return it to Pajunar should he come
for it. In the meantime, he went to Calanian about 9 kilometers from his house to sell corn. When he returned
in the evening, he learned from his wife that they were accused of stealing the cow and that the two PC
soldiers who came together with Pajunar and Pajaron took the cow to place it in the custody of
Enumerabellon. That very evening too, he got a letter from Enumerabellon instructing him to go to his place.
So that on the 7th, he and as wife went to see Enumerabellon. At Enumerabellon's house were also the
complainant, Anastacio Pajunar, barrio councilman Pajaron and Pajunar's son. An investigation was
conducted with Ordonio and his wife saying that Pajunar owned the cow, so it was given back to Pajunar who
brought it home.
In a decision dated January 26, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment of conviction of Ordo of violation of
Presidential Decree No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974.
Upon motion of the accused on the ground of newly discovered evidence, and against the vigorous objection
of the prosecution, the trial court conducted a new trial. This time, the defense presented Pastor Banquerigo,
an 81-year-old barrio entertainer, who substantially corroborated the account of Constancio Ordonio. Pastor
swore that on January 6, 1982, he saw Constancio take possession of a cow and tie it near his house where it
could be easily seen by passers-by.
Unconvinced, the trial court in the Order dated August 11, 1985 5 maintained its judgment of conviction. Upon
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court, and subsequently denied the
accused's motion for reconsideration The accused faulted the decision of the respondent court for its
misapprehension of facts. That the complainant found the calf tied in the appellant's upland property does not
make him a cattle rustler. Nor does his supposed failure and/or refusal to tell the complainant where the cow
was even if he (the accused) knew where it was. And the mere stepping on the rope (granting this is true) to
which the calf was tied when complainant towed it does not constitute theft of the calf either.
Issue: Whether or not there was a misapprehension of facts by the respondent court in affirming the trial
courts decision in convicting him of the crime of violation of Presidential Decree No. 533, otherwise known as
the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974.
Held: The records showed that the respondent court, as well as the trial court, committed no such
misapprehension of facts.

Rationale: The lower courts did not convict the appellant on the basis of the missing calfs having been found
tied in the accused's premises nor on his failure and/or refusal to tell the owner the whereabouts of the calf,
nor on the accused's stepping on the rope to which the "lost" calf was tied when the complainant was towing
it. Rather, the lower courts convicted him on the basis of his actuations when the lost calf was found in his
possession. The lower courts noted the following:
1. When complainant discovered the loss of his calf, he inquired from petitioner whether he has seen the calf
but the latter denied having seen it. 10
2. When complainant queried the whereabouts of the calf for the second time, accused anew denied having
seen it.
3. When complainant eventually located the calf in accused estate the latter refused to give the calf claiming it
belonged to his brother, Agustin.
4. Complainant needed the assistance of a barangay official and two PC soldiers to dispossess accused of
that calf and eventually placed it in the custody of the Barangay Captain.
5. At the Barangay Captain's residence accused still insisted that the calf belonged to his brother, Agustin.
But independent of the admission by the accused, complainants ownership of the calf is further forfeited with
this one important circumstance. When complainant went to accused's house, accompanied by barangay
councilman, Pajunar, and two PC soldiers, the milking cow was brought along. Upon arrival, the PC soldiers
let loose the calf and the latter immediately ran to the milking cow to suck on its milk. Such conduct of the calf
manifests all the signs of the young whether human or not, on finding a lost mother.
Section 2(c) of P.D. 533, defines cattle rustling as follows:
Sec. 2(c). Cattle rustling is taking away by any means, methods or schemes, without the consent of the
owner/raiser, of any of the above mentioned animals whether or not for profit or gain, or whether committed
with or without violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon things. It includes the killing of
large cattle, or taking its meat or hide without the consent of the owner/raiser.
The phraseology of the provision - "taking away by any means, methods or schemes." Thus, intent to gain
may be inferred from the deliberate failure to deliver the lost property to the proper person, the finder knowing
that the property does not belong to him. In this case, the several circumstances enumerated earlier
constitute an unbroken chain of events which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion - which is that the
accused indeed took the calf with the intent to appropriate it. To recapitulate, the stubborn insistence of the
accused that the missing calf belonged to his brother, Agustin, knowing fully well that it belonged to the
complainant (as he later admitted in his answers to questions of the trial court), in essence, is cattle rustling.
Theft
People of the Philippines vs. Gulinao 179 SCRA 774
Nature: Appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila convicting the
accused of the crimes of .Illegal Possession of Firearm with Murder, Robbery under Art. 294 par. 5, and
Carnapping.
Facts: On March 3, 1987, at about 9:00 P.M., Dr. Chua, appellant Gulinao (driver-bodyguard of Dr. Chua),
Virgilio Caguioa (secretary of Dr. Chua), Vice Mayor Teofilo Reyes of Malabon, Dante Reyes (nephew of Vice
Mayor Reyes), Boy Salazar and other politicians were having a caucus in the house of a certain Torre in
Acacia, Malabon. After the caucus at about 11:00 P.M., the group of Dr. Chua boarded Dr. Chua's car and that
of Vice Mayor Reyes and proceeded to the Bar Disco House along McArthur Highway, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila. Upon arriving at the disco house, Gulinao, who had in his possession an Ingram machine pistol,
swapped the same with a .45 caliber pistol in possession of Dante Reyes. Gulinao then tucked the .45 caliber
pistol in his right waist. Inside the disco house, Dr. Chua, Gulinao and companions occupied 2 tables which
were joined together near the stage.Later, Gulinao went to the comfort room and cocked the .45 caliber pistol.
He then returned to his seat beside Dr. Chua. While Dr. Chua was watching the floor show, Gulinao stood up
and shot him on the head at close range with the .45 caliber pistol. When Gulinao was about to leave the

disco house, he turned back to Dr. Chua and took the latter's gold ring embedded with 12 diamonds.
Thereupon, Gulinao rushed outside the disco house to the car of Dr. Chua.
Poking the gun at Caguioa who was inside the car, Gulinao ordered the former to leave the car. While
Caguioa was getting out of the car, Gulinao fired at him but missed. On the other hand, Dante Reyes tried to
fire at Gulinao with the Ingram machine pistol, but the Ingram jammed. Gulinao drove the car towards
Monumento. However, he was constrained to leave the car and take a taxi when the car he was driving
figured in an accident in Malabon. Dr. Chua, who sustained gunshot wounds oil the head, was brought to the
nearby Our Lady of Fatima Hospital where he died on arrival.
Thereafter, Gulinao was charged and convicted by the trial court of the crimes of Illegal Possession of Firearm
with Murder, Robbery under Art. 294 par. 5, and Carnapping. Gulinao contended that the trial court gravely
erred in finding him guilty of the said crimes. It was also that the indictment for violation of Presidential Decree
No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearm) against the accused-appellant in Crim. Case No. 8016-V-87 after he
was already slapped of the same violation before the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Crim. Case No. 8752928 involving the same firearm and ammunition is a classic case of putting the accused-appellant in
jeopardy.
Issues:
1.
Whether or not Gulinao is guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearm with murder and whether
or not the indictment for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearm) against the
accused-appellant in Crim. Case No. 8016-V-87 after he was already slapped of the same violation before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila in Crim. Case No. 87-52928 involving the same firearm and ammunition would
result into double jeopardy.
2.
Whether or not Gulinao is guilty of the crime of robbery under article 294, paragraph 5.
3.
Whether or not Gulinao is guilty of the crime of carnapping.
Held: Gulinao was found guilty of the above-mentioned crimes and there was no possibility of double
jeopardy.
Rationale: The Supreme Court held that there was no possibility of double jeopardy, as the possession
thereof had taken place in two separate and distinct places and jurisdiction and the two informations state
different dates of commission.
Gulinao should have been convicted of the crime of theft under Art. 308, Revised Penal Code, not robbery
with the use of violence against or intimidation of a person under par. 5, Art. 294 Revised Penal Code. As the
trial court itself noted, on the basis of Patino's testimony, the taking of the ring of Dr. Chua was merely an
afterthought. The force employed in the killing of Dr. Chua has no bearing on the taking of his ring.
Gulinao's contention there was no proof of intent to gain in the taking of Dr. Chua's car is bereft of merit. Intent
to gain, being an internal act, is presumed from the unlawful taking of the car. This presumption was
unrebutted.
Valenzuela vs. People of the Philippines 505 SCRA 306
Nature: Petition for Review, which expressly seeks that petitioners conviction be modified to only of
Frustrated Theft.
Facts: Sometime in 1994, petitioner Valenzuela and Calderon were seen outside the Super Sale Club, a
supermarket with the ShoeMart (SM) Complex by security guard Lorenzo Lago who was manning his post at
the open parking lot in SM. He saw Valenzuela hauling a push cart with cases of Tide detergent. Valenzuela
was hauling the cases where Calderon was waiting. He returned from SM and emerged with more cartons of
the said detergent. He again unloaded these boxes in the open parking space.
Valenzuela then left the parking lot and haled a taxi. Both of them loaded the cartons inside the taxi and
boarded the same. Lago proceeded to stop the taxi as he wanted to assure the receipt of the boxes.
Valenzuela and Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow guards.
Both were apprehended at the scene and the stolen merchandise were recovered.
RTC convicted them for the crime of Theft. CA affirmed the RTCs decision.
Issue: Whether or not Valenzuela is guilty of frustrated theft only.

Held: No.
Rationale: Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but
without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of
another without the latters consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its
owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make use of
the fruits or object of the damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an inclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to
another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather cereals, or other
forest or farm products.
On the face of the definition, there is only one operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft the
taking of personal property of another. It is also clear from the provision that in order that such taking may be
qualified as theft, there must further be present the descriptive circumstances that the taking was with intent
to gain; without force upon things or violence against or intimidation of persons; and it was without the
consent of the owner of the property.
Indeed, we have long recognized the following elements of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code, namely: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another;
(3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner;
and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force
upon things.
On the critical question of whether it was consummated or frustrated theft, we are obliged to apply Article 6 of
the Revised Penal Code to ascertain the answer. Following that provision, the theft would have been
frustrated only, once the acts committed by petitioner, if ordinarily sufficient to produce theft as a
consequence, do not produce [such theft] by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There are clearly two determinative factors to consider: that the felony is not produced, and that such failure
is due to causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. The second factor ultimately depends on the
evidence at hand in each particular case. The first, however, relies primarily on a doctrinal definition attaching
to the individual felonies in the Revised Penal Code as to when a particular felony is not produced, despite
the commission of all the acts of execution.
So, in order to ascertain whether the theft is consummated or frustrated, it is necessary to inquire as to how
exactly is the felony of theft produced. Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308,
there is one apparent answer provided in the language of the law that theft is already produced upon the
tak[ing of] personal property of another without the latters consent.
The ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen is not a constitutive element of the crime of
theft. It finds no support or extension in Article 308, whether as a descriptive or operative element of theft or
as the mens rea or actus reus of the felony.
Such factor runs immaterial to the statutory definition of theft, which is the taking, with intent to gain, of
personal property of another without the latters consent. While the Dio/Flores dictum is considerate to the
mindset of the offender, the statutory definition of theft considers only the perspective of intent to gain on the
part of the offender, compounded by the deprivation of property on the part of the victim.
For the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commission in the frustrated stage, the
question is again, when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain unanimity in the position
that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with intent to
gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the felony that the offender, once having
committed all the acts of execution for theft, is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the
deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. This conclusion is reflected
in Chief Justice Aquinos commentaries, as earlier cited, that [i]n theft or robbery the crime is consummated
after the accused had material possession of the thing with intent to appropriate the same, although his act of
making use of the thing was frustrated.
It might be argued, that the ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen delves into the
concept of taking itself, in that there could be no true taking until the actor obtains such degree of control

over the stolen item. But even if this were correct, the effect would be to downgrade the crime to its
attempted, and not frustrated stage, for it would mean that not all the acts of execution have not been
completed, the taking not having been accomplished. Perhaps this point could serve as fertile ground for
future discussion, but our concern now is whether there is indeed a crime of frustrated theft, and such
consideration proves ultimately immaterial to that question. Moreover, such issue will not apply to the facts of
this particular case. SC is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the taking by the petitioner was completed
in this case. With intent to gain, he acquired physical possession of the stolen cases of detergent for a
considerable period of time that he was able to drop these off at a spot in the parking lot, and long enough to
load these onto a taxicab.
All these complications will make us lose sight of the fact that beneath all the colorful detail, the owner was
indeed deprived of property by one who intended to produce such deprivation for reasons of gain. For such
will remain the presumed fact if frustrated theft were recognized, for therein, all of the acts of execution,
including the taking, have been completed. If the facts establish the non-completion of the taking due to these
peculiar circumstances, the effect could be to downgrade the crime to the attempted stage, as not all of the
acts of execution have been performed. But once all these acts have been executed, the taking has been
completed, causing the unlawful deprivation of property, and ultimately the consummation of the theft.
SC thus conclude that under the Revised Penal Code, there is no crime of frustrated theft. As petitioner has
latched the success of his appeal on our acceptance of the Dio and Flores rulings, his petition must be
denied, for we decline to adopt said rulings in our jurisdiction. That it has taken all these years for us to
recognize that there can be no frustrated theft under the Revised Penal Code does not detract from the
correctness of this conclusion. It will take considerable amendments to our Revised Penal Code in order that
frustrated theft may be recognized.
Decision: Petition DENIED.
Illegal Fishing
Hizon et al. vs. Court of Appeals 265 SCRA 517
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Palawan in convicting petitioners of the offense of illegal fishing with the use
of obnoxious or poisonous substance penalized under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 704, the Fisheries
Decree of 1975.
Facts: In September 1992, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa City,
Palawan received reports of illegal fishing operations in the coastal waters of the city. In response to these
reports, the city mayor organized Task Force Bantay Dagat to assist the police in the detection and
apprehension of violators of the laws on fishing.
On September 30, 1992 at about 2:00 in the afternoon, the Task Force Bantay Dagat reported to the PNP
Maritime Command that a boat and several small crafts were fishing by "muro ami" within the shoreline of
Barangay San Rafael of Puerto Princesa. The police, headed by SPO3 Romulo Enriquez, and members of
the Task Force Bantay Dagat, headed by Benito Marcelo, Jr., immediately proceeded to the area and found
several men fishing in motorized sampans and a big fishing boat identified as F/B Robinson within the sevenkilometer shoreline of the city. They boarded the F/B Robinson and inspected the boat with the acquiescence
of the boat captain, Silverio Gargar. In the course of their inspection, the police saw two foreigners in the
captains deck. SPO3 Enriquez examined their passports and found them to be mere photocopies. The police
also discovered a large aquarium full of live lapu-lapu and assorted fish weighing approximately one ton at the
bottom of the boat. They checked the license of the boat and its fishermen and found them to be in order.
Nonetheless, SPO3 Enriquez brought the boat captain, the crew and the fishermen to Puerto Princesa for
further investigation. Thereafter, an Inspection/Apprehension Report was prepared and the boat, its crew and
fishermen were charged with the following violations: 1. Conducting fishing operations within Puerto Princesa
coastal waters without mayors permit; 2. Employing excess fishermen on board; 3. Two (2) Hongkong
nationals on board without original passports."
The following day, October 1, 1992, SPO3 Enriquez directed the boat captain to get random samples of fish
from the fish cage of F/B Robinson for laboratory examination. On October 7, 1992, NBI Forensic Chemist
Emilia Rosaldes conducted two tests on the fish samples and found that they contained sodium cyanide.

In light of these findings, the PNP Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa City filed the complaint at bar
against the owner and operator of the F/B Robinson, the First Fishermen Fishing Industries, Inc., represented
by herein petitioner Richard Hizon, the boat captain, Silverio Gargar, the boat engineer, Ernesto Andaya, two
other crew members, the two Hongkong nationals and 28 fishermen of the said boat.
Petitioners were arraigned and they pled not guilty to the charge. As defense, they claimed that they are
legitimate fishermen of the First Fishermen Industries, Inc., a domestic corporation licensed to engage in
fishing. They alleged that they catch fish by the hook and line method and that they had used this method for
one month and a half in the waters of Cuyo Island. The case was prosecuted against thirty-one (31) of the
thirty-five (35) accused. Richard Hizon remained at large while the whereabouts of Richard Estremos, Marlon
Camporazo and Joseph Aurelio were unknown. The trial court found the thirty one (31) petitioners guilty of the
crime of Illegal Fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance commonly known as sodium
cyanide, committed in violation of section 33 and penalized in section 38 of Presidential Decree No. 704 and
ordered the confiscation and forfeiture of the Fishing Boat (F/B) Robinson, 28 motorized fiberglass sampans,
and the live fishes in the fish cages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Hence, this petition. The petitioners, among others, contended that the presumption of guilt under the
Fisheries Decree violates the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the presumption of guilt as stated under paragraph 3 of section of P.D. 704 stands
unrebutted, thus warranting the petitioners conviction of the offense of illegal fishing with the use of
poisonous substances.
Held: The petitioners have successfully rebutted the said presumption of guilt and thus are not guilty of the
above-mentioned offense.
Rationale: Paragraph 3 of section 33 of P.D. 704 states that:
The discovery of dynamite, other explosives and chemical compounds containing combustible elements, or
obnoxious or poisonous substance, or equipment or device for electric fishing in any fishing boat or in the
possession of a fisherman shall constitute a presumption that the same were used for fishing in violation of
this Decree, and the discovery in any fishing boat of fish caught or killed by the use of explosives, obnoxious
or poisonous substance or by electricity shall constitute a presumption that the owner, operator or fisherman
were fishing with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance or electricity."
The offense of illegal fishing is committed when a person catches, takes or gathers or causes to be caught,
taken or gathered fish, fishery or aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives, electricity,
obnoxious or poisonous substances. The law creates a presumption that illegal fishing has been committed
when: (a) explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substances or equipment or device for electric fishing are found
in a fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman; or (b) when fish caught or killed with the use of
explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substances or by electricity are found in a fishing boat. Under these
instances, the boat owner, operator or fishermen are presumed to have engaged in illegal fishing.
The third paragraph of section 33 of P.D. 704 creates a presumption of guilt based on facts proved and hence
is not constitutionally impermissible. It makes the discovery of obnoxious or poisonous substances,
explosives, or devices for electric fishing, or of fish caught or killed with the use of obnoxious and poisonous
substances, explosives or electricity in any fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman evidence that the
owner and operator of the fishing boat or the fisherman had used such substances in catching fish. The
ultimate fact presumed is that the owner and operator of the boat or the fisherman were engaged in illegal
fishing and this presumption was made to arise from the discovery of the substances and the contaminated
fish in the possession of the fisherman in the fishing boat. The fact presumed is a natural inference from the
fact proved.
. The facts show that on November 13, 1992, after the information was filed in court and petitioners granted
bail, petitioners moved that the fish specimens taken from the F/B Robinson be reexamined. The trial court
granted the motion. As prayed for, a member of the PNP Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa, in the
presence of authorized representatives of the F/B Robinson, the NBI and the local Fisheries Office, took at
random five (5) live lapu-lapu from the fish cage of the boat. The specimens were packed in the usual manner
of transporting live fish, taken aboard a commercial flight and delivered by the same representatives to the
NBI Head Office in Manila for chemical analysis. On November 23, 1992, Salud Rosales, another forensic
chemist of the NBI in Manila conducted three (3) tests on the specimens and found the fish negative for the
presence of sodium cyanide. The prosecution failed to explain the contradictory findings on the fish samples

and this omission raised a reasonable doubt that the one ton of fishes in the cage was caught with the use of
sodium cyanide.
The absence of cyanide in the second set of fish specimens supported petitioners claim that they did not use
the poison in fishing. According to them, they caught the fishes by the ordinary and legal way. This claim is
buttressed by the prosecution evidence itself. The apprehending officers saw petitioners fishing by hook and
line when they came upon them in the waters of Barangay San Rafael. The apprehending officers who
boarded and searched the boat did not find any sodium cyanide nor any poisonous or obnoxious substance.
Neither did they find any trace of the poison in the possession of the fishermen or in the fish cage itself.
The apprehending officers found in the boat assorted hooks and lines for catching fish. For this obvious
reason, the Inspection/Apprehension Report prepared by the apprehending officers immediately after the
search did not charge petitioners with illegal fishing, much less illegal fishing with the use of poison or any
obnoxious substance. The only basis for the charge of fishing with poisonous substance is the result of the
first NBI laboratory test on the four fish specimens. Under the circumstances of the case, however, this finding
does not warrant the infallible conclusion that the fishes in the F/B Robinson, or even the same four
specimens, were caught with the use of sodium cyanide.
Apparently, the members of the PNP Maritime Command and the Task Force Bantay Dagat were the ones
engaged in an illegal fishing expedition. As sharply observed by the Solicitor General, the report received by
the Task Force Bantay Dagat was that a fishing boat was fishing illegally through "muro ami" on the waters of
San Rafael. "Muro ami" according to SPO1 Saballuca is made with "the use of a big net with sinkers to make
the net submerge in the water with the fishermen surrounding the net."
This method of fishing needs approximately two hundred (200) fishermen to execute. What the apprehending
officers instead discovered were twenty eight (28) fishermen in their discovered were twenty eight (28)
fishermen in their sampans fishing by hook and line. The authorities found nothing on the boat that would
have indicated any form of illegal fishing. All the documents of the boat and the fishermen were in order. It
was only after the fish specimens were tested, albeit under suspicious circumstances, that petitioners were
charged with illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances.
Qualified Theft
Empelis vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 132 SCRA 398
Nature: Petition to review the judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming in toto the judgment of
the Municipal Circuit Court of Dimasalang-Palanan-Uson, Masbate which convicted the accused of the crime
of qualified theft of fifty coconuts valued at P50.00, particularly seeking to reduce the penalty imposed which
is an indeterminate penalty of from four (4) to eight (8) years and one (1) day, to restore to the owner of the
stolen coconuts, Guillermo Catarining the sum of P50.00 and to pay the costs.
Facts: Prior to June 10, 1979, Guillermo Catarining owner of a coconut plantation in Sitio Tambangan,
Dapdap, Uson, Masbate, was frequently losing coconuts in his plantation due to thievery. Thus, on the early
morning of June 10, 1979, while he stayed in his plantation to keep watch, he saw four (4) persons within the
premises of his plantation gathering and tying some coconuts. He then went home, fetched his neighbors
Anastacio Andales and Teodomero Garay and took along a flashlight. Upon reaching the coconut plantation
with his companions, Catarining beamed his flashlight on the four persons who, turned out to be the herein
appellants. Elpidio Empelis and Emilio Carbungco were seen carrying coconuts on a piece of wood on their
shoulders while Salvad and Mamerto Carbungco were espied carrying coconuts with their bare hands. As the
four persons noticed the presence of Catarining and the latter's companions, they dropped the coconuts they
were carrying and fled leaving behind about 50 pieces of coconuts valued at P50.00 and two poles, one made
of bamboo and the other of wood. Catarining invited the barangay tanod to witness the counting of the
coconuts abandoned by the four men. Upon the advice of said tanod, Catarining reported the incident to the
barangay captain who accompanied him and his companions to the police station at Uson, Masbate where
Catarining filed his complaint.
The petitioners were subsequently convicted by the Municipal Circuit Court of qualified theft of 50 coconuts.
On appeal, the respondent intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the Municipal Circuit Courts judgment in
toto. The petitioners contended that the crime committed, if at all is simple and not qualified theft as found by
respondent court.
Issue: Whether or not the crime committed by the petitioners is qualified theft.

Held: The petitioners were found guilty of the crime of qualified theft. The judgment of conviction was
therefore affirmed but was modified in the sense that the crime committed was found to be only frustrated
qualified theft and petitioners were each sentenced to suffer a reduced indeterminate penalty of two (2)
months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years and four (4) months and one (1) day,
of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay the costs.
Rationale: Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code states that the crime of theft shall "be punished by the
penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively expressed in the next preceding article ... if the
property stolen ... consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, ... ." Thus, the stealing of
coconuts when they are still in the tree or deposited on the ground within the premises is qualified theft. When
the coconuts are stolen in any other place, it is simple theft. Stated differently, if the coconuts were taken in
front of a house along the highway outside the coconut plantation, it would be simple theft
In the case at bar, petitioners were seen arriving away fifty coconuts while they were still in the premises of
the plantation. They would therefore come within the definition of qualified theft because the property stolen
consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation.
However, the crime committed is only frustrated qualified theft because petitioners were not able to perform
all the acts of execution which should have produced the felony as a consequence. They were not able to
carry the coconuts away from the plantation due to the timely arrival of the owner.
Illegal Logging
Mustang Lumber Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 104988. June 18, 1996
People of the Philippines vs. Presiding Judge, RTC NCR
G.R. No. 106424. June 18, 1996
Mustang Lumber Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 123784. June 18, 1996
Nature: The first and third cases were originally assigned to the Second and Third Divisions of the Court,
respectively. They were subsequently consolidated with the second, a case of the Court en banc. The second
case involves a petition for Certiorari assailing the order of respondent Teresita Dizon-Capulong which
granted the motion to quash and dismissed the case on the ground that "possession of lumber without the
legal documents required by forest laws and regulations is not a crime."
Facts: On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were
seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the Special Actions and Investigation
Division (SAID) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) organized a team of
foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course thereof, the
team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck loaded with lauan and almaciga
lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and
transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR
compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City. The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because of
the refusal of the owner.
On 3 April 1990, by virtue of a search warrant, the team seized from the petitioners lumberyard four
truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately
200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa. On 4 April 1990, the
team returned to the premises of the petitioner 's lumberyard in Valenzuela and placed under administrative
seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of 311,000 board feet
because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary
invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the
legitimacy of their source and origin.
On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to Robles requesting an extension of fifteen days
from 14 April 1990 to produce the required documents covering the seized articles because some of them,
particularly the certificate of lumber origin, were allegedly in the Province of Quirino. Robles denied the motion

on the ground that the documents being required from the petitioner must accompany the lumber or forest
products placed under seizure.
On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran, upon the recommendation of Robles, issued an order suspending
immediately the petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit No. NRD-4-092590-0469 and directing the petitioner to
explain in writing within fifteen days why its lumber-dealer's permit should not be cancelled. On the same
date, counsel for the petitioner sent another letter to Robles informing the latter that the petitioner had already
secured the required documents and was ready to submit them. None, however, was submitted. On 3 May
1990, Secretary Factoran issued another order wherein he ordered "CONFISCATED in favor of the
government to be disposed of in accordance with law" the approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa,
and almaciga lumber, shorts, and sticks found inside the petitioner's lumberyard.
In response to reports that violations of P.D. No. 705 (The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines), as
amended, were committed and acting upon instruction of Robles and under Special Order No. 897, series of
1990, a team of DENR agents went to the business premises of the petitioner located at No. 1352 Juan Luna
Street, Tondo, Manila. The team caught the petitioner operating as a lumber dealer although its lumberdealer's permit had already been suspended on 23 April 1990. Since the gate of the petitioner's lumberyard
was open, the team went inside and saw an owner-type jeep with a trailer loaded with lumber. Upon
investigation, the team was informed that the lumber loaded on the trailer was to be delivered to the
petitioner's customer. It also came upon the sales invoice covering the transaction. The members of the team
then introduced themselves to the caretaker, one Ms. Chua, who turned out to be the wife of the petitioner's
president and general manager, Mr. Ri Chuy Po, who was then out of town. The team's photographer was
able to take photographs of the stockpiles of lumber including newly cut ones, fresh dust around sawing or
cutting machineries and equipment, and the transport vehicles loaded with lumber. The team thereupon
effected a constructive seizure of approximately 20,000 board feet of lauan lumber in assorted sizes
stockpiled in the premises by issuing a receipt therefor.
Thereafter, an information was filed on 5 June 1991 by the DOJ with Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela,
charging Ri Chuy Po with the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended. On 7 July 1991, accused
Ri Chuy Po filed in the CRIMINAL CASE a Motion to Quash and/or to Suspend Proceedings alleging, among
others, that the information did not charge an offense, for possession of lumber, as opposed to timber, is not
penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong granted the motion to
quash and dismissed the case on the ground that "possession of lumber without the legal documents required
by forest laws and regulations is not a crime." Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, the People
filed a petition for certiorari with this Court.
Issue: Whether or not possession of lumber without the legal documents required by forest laws is penalized
under P.D. No. 705.
Held: The possession of lumber without the legal documents required by forest laws is penalized under P.D.
No. 705.
Rationale: Respondent Ri Chuy Po is charged with the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by
E.O. No. 277, which provides:
SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. Any person
who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other
forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be
punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in
the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be
deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
Punished then in this section are (1) the from the places therein mentioned without any authority; and (b)
possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest
laws and regulations.
A cursory reading of the information readily leads us to an infallible conclusion that lumber is not solely its
subject matter. It is evident therefrom that what are alleged to be in the possession of the private respondent,
without the required legal documents, are truckloads of
(1) almaciga and lauan; and

(2) approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa.
The "almaciga and lauan" specifically mentioned in no. (1) are not described as lumber." They cannot refer to
the "lumber" in no. (2) because they are separated by the words "approximately 200,000 bd. ft." with the
conjunction "and," and not with the preposition "of." They must then be raw forest products or, more
specifically, timbers under Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which reads:
SEC. 3. Definitions.
xxx xxx xxx
(q) Forest product means timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil, honey, beeswax,
nipa, rattan, or other forest growth such as grass, shrub, and flowering plant, the associated water, fish,
game, scenic, historical, recreational and geological resources in forest lands.
It follows then that lumber is only one of the items covered by the information. The public and the private
respondents obviously miscomprehended the averments in the information. Accordingly, even if lumber is not
included in Section 68, the other items therein as noted above fall within the ambit of the said section, and as
to them, the information validly charged an offense.
Further, the Supreme Court ruled that such possession is penalized in the said section because lumber is
included in the term timber. The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber.
While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in
paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant;" which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the processing
of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, block-board, paper board,
pulp, paper or other finished wood products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses
the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage.
Estafa through unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence
Saddul vs. Court of Appeals 192 SCRA 277
Nature: Second Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner, Jose A. Saddul, Jr., praying that we set
aside our resolution of April 16, 1990 denying his petition for review of the decision promulgated on
September 1, 1989 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 06234, entitled: "The People of the
Philippines, ...Plaintiff-Appellee vs. Jose A. Saddul, Jr., Accused-Appellant" which affirmed on appeal the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, finding him guilty of estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code
Facts: In 1973, the petitioner became a vice-president and director of Amalgamated Motors (Phils.) Inc.
(AMPI for brevity). AMPI was then a wholly-owned subsidiary of British Leyland. It was the sole distributor in
the Philippines of British and Japanese heavy equipment, trucks, farm implements, spare parts, and other
automotive products and machines manufactured by Leyland International, Land Rover Ltd. (LAND ROVER
for brevity), Avelyn Barfourd, Mitsubishi, and Furokawa Since 1980, Felimon R. Cuevas had been a dealer of
AMPI for government sales. In 1981, he bought into the company and became its majority stockholder and
president.
Upon Cuevas' ascendancy in the corporation, Saddul was made a director as well as Executive VicePresident and General Manager. As such, he was in charge of the operations of the company and was
"delegated" to make sales of some units and spare parts.
As distributor not only of British but also Japanese automotive products, AMPI carried an inventory of some
P15 to P20 million worth of spare parts of the companies it represented in the Philippines.
In 1985, LAND ROVER supplied P1.5 million worth of spare parts to the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) through AMPI, but the merchandise were returned to AMPI because they were not the correct items
needed by the AFP. The parts were kept by AMPI pending disposal instructions from LAND ROVER.

On March 4, 1985, Erwin Lyndsay, LAND ROVER's area manager for Southeast Asia, sent the following letter
to Saddul, Executive Vice-President and General Manager of AMPI, regarding the spare parts rejected by the
AFP:
Saddul sold some of the spare parts (worth P143,085.00) to Rover Motor Parts (a different entity from LAND
ROVER) whose president was Jose P. Garcia. The sales were evidenced by AMPI Sales Invoices and
summarized in the Statement of Accounts dated June 9, 1986 sent by AMPI to Rover Motor Parts. Payments
were made by the buyer to Saddul. AMPI's 20% handling commission on the sale amounted to P28,617.
Pursuant to LAND ROVER's directive that sale value of these spare parts be "placed into a separate client
account which will be available to LRPE or any other party authorized by LRPE" , Saddul did not deposit the
proceeds of the sales in AMPI's account but held them in trust for LAND ROVER. "
Saddul was "terminated" by AMPI in the early part of 1986 for cause or causes that Cuevas did not disclose,
but, according to Edgar Guilatco, a prosecution witness, Saddul "left the company" . He thereupon formed his
own outfit which he named "Multipart Motors International, Inc." What appears in the record is that on May 30,
1986, Lyndsay wrote a letter to Saddul enclosing "a note which effectively authorizes you to act as our
distributor" .
On November 10, 1986, Lyndsay wrote a letter to Cuevas requesting for a statement on AMPI's inventory of
British Leyland spare parts. Cuevas replied by telex that some of those spare parts had been sold by Saddul
who did not turn over the proceeds to AMPI, and that he (Cuevas) filed a criminal case against Saddul "to
recover the money so I can remit immediately. On March 26, 1987, Lyndsay sent a reply-telex requesting
information as to "which items have been sold and at what price and which items remain in stock" and sought
"a reconciliation of this stock"
On June 3, 1987, based on Cuevas' complaint, an information for estafa in the amount of P143,085.00 (I.S.
No. 86-20607) was filed against Saddul in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Despite the advice from Land Rover, AMPI prosecuted the criminal case against Saddul. On August 29, 1988,
the trial court rendered a decision finding him guilty of estafa with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence (Art.
315, subpar. 1-b, Rev. Penal Code).
Saddul appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CR No. 06234.) On September 1, 1989, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence, this petition for review.
Held: One of the ways of committing the crime of estafa with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence is:
"(b) By misappropriating or converting to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal
property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally
or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property." (Art.
315, par. 1 subpar. b, Rev. Penal Code.).
The appropriation or conversion of money or property received, to the prejudice of the owner thereof, is the
essence of estafa through misappropriation (Ramirez, 9 Phil. 67). The words "convert" and "misappropriate"
connote an act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own, or of devoting it to a
purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate to one's own use includes, not only
conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without
right.
Conversion is an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal
chattels belonging to another, resulting in the alteration of their condition or the exclusion of the owner's rights.
It takes place when a person actually appropriates the property of another to his own benefit, use, and
enjoyment (Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, 53 OG 731 citing Bouvier's Law Dictionary).
The elements of the crime of embezzlement or estafa with abuse of confidence are:
(a) that personal property is received in trust, on commission, for administration or under any other
circumstance involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though the obligation is
guaranteed by a bond;
(b) that there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person who has so received it or a denial on
his part that he received it;

(c) that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another, and
(d) that there be demand for the return of the property,
The first element of the crime does not exist in this case because Saddul did not receive the Leyland
Automotive spare parts from Cuevas or AMPI in trust, on commission, for administration, or under a duty to
make delivery of, or return the same. Saddul received the Leyland spare parts from the AFP in trust for LAND
ROVER which authorized him to sell them ("we now authorize you to undertake the disposal of the parts at
the best possible prices available from your local market"
Since Saddul did not convert or divert the property (he sold them in accordance with the authority given to him
by Land Rover) nor did he deny that he received them, the second element of the crime was also not present.
Saddul's failure to deliver the proceeds of the sale of the spare parts to AMPI or Cuevas did not constitute a
conversion or diversion to the injury of the latter who, not being the owner of the property, incurred no loss
and suffered no injury on account of Saddul's retention of the said proceeds while awaiting Land Rover's
instructions regarding the special account where he should deposit them. Saddul simply complied with the
directive in Land Rover's letter of March 4, 1985 that the proceeds be "placed into a separate client account
which will be available to LRPE or any other party authorized by LRPE" (Exh. 1 or F). Implicit in this directive
was an injunction not to deliver the proceeds to AMPI. The third element of the crime charged is absent.
The fourth and final element of demand for the return of the property is also lacking. AMPI or Cuevas made
no demand for the return of the spare parts sold by Saddul because Cuevas knew that those spare parts
were to be sold for the account of Land Rover.
While it is true that under Lyndsay's letter of March 4, 1985 (Exh. 1 or F) AMPI was entitled to a handling
commission of 20% of the sale value of the spare parts (equivalent to P28,617.00) which Saddul failed to
deliver to AMPI, Saddul explained that he subsequently received instructions from Land Rover to hold the
20% commission until AMPI shall have given an accounting of the remaining Leyland spare parts (worth P1.2
million) still held by AMPI. (pp. 10, 23-28, tsn, February 15, 1988.)
That testimony of Saddul was not controverted by the complainant. On the contrary, it was confirmed by
Lyndsay's letter dated August 6, 1987 to AMPI or Cuevas (Exh. 2) asking for an accounting of "balance of the
parts held by you . . . upon receipt (of which) ** we will settle your handling charges at 20% of sales as
agreed."
By obeying the instructions of Land Rover to withhold payment of AMPI's 20% handling charge (P28,617.00)
Saddul did not become liable for embezzlement to AMPI for he did not receive that sum from AMPI. It was
part of the price he received from Rover Motor Parts, the buyer of the spare parts.
Decision: WHEREFORE, the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated April 16, 1990 is
granted. The decision dated September 1, 1989, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 06234 is hereby
reversed and set aside. The petitioner is acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de oficio.
Trust receipts (P.D. 115)
Allied Banking Corp. vs. Ordonez 192 SCRA 246
Nature: This is a special civil action for Certiorari assailing the interpretation by the Department of Justice of
the penal provision of PD 115, the Trust Receipts Law.
Facts: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM, for short) thru its duly authorized officer, private respondent Alfredo
Ching, entered into a Trust Receipt Agreement with Allied Bank whereby the latter as the entruster releases
the Dolomites and one Lot High Fired Refractory Sliding Nozzle Brick to the possession of PBM, the
entrustee, for it to sell with the obligation turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods, if sold, or to return
the same, if unsold within the stated period.
Out of the said obligation resulted an overdue amount of P1,475,274.09. Despite repeated demands, PBM
failed and refused to either turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods or to return the same.
Petitioner filed a criminal complaint against private respondent for violation of PD 115 before the office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. After preliminary investigation, the Fiscal found a prima facie case for violation of
PD 115 on four (4) counts and filed the corresponding information in court. Private respondent appealed the

Fiscal's resolution to the Department of Justice but the efforts proved to be futile, hence, the case now was
brought before the Supreme Court.
Private respondent claimed that PD 115 covers goods which are ultimately destined for sale and not goods for
use in manufacture; that at the time of PBM's application for the issuance of the LC's, it was not represented
to the petitioner that the items were intended for sale, hence, there was no deceit resulting in a violation of the
trust receipts which would constitute a criminal liability.
Issue: Does the penal provision of PD 115 (Trust Receipts Law) apply when the goods covered by a Trust
Receipt do not form part of the finished products which are ultimately sold but are instead, utilized/used up in
the operation of the equipment and machineries of the entrustee-manufacturer?
Held: Yes.
Rationale: Section 4 of said PD 115 says in part:
"Sec. 4. What constitutes a trust receipt transaction. A trust receipt transaction, within the meaning of this
Decree, is any transaction by and between a person referred to in this Decree as the entrustee, and another
person referred to in this Decree as the entrustee, whereby the entruster, who owns or holds absolute title or
security interests over certain specified goods, documents or instruments, releases the same to the
possession of the entrustee upon the latter's execution and delivery to the entruster of a signed document
called a 'trust receipt' wherein the entrustee binds himself to hold the designated goods, documents or
instruments in trust for the entruster and to sell or otherwise dispose of the goods, documents or instruments
with the obligation to turn over to the entruster the proceeds thereof to the extent of the amount owing to the
entruster or as appears in the trust receipt or the goods, documents or instruments themselves, if they are
unsold or not otherwise disposed of, in accordance with the terms and conditions specified in the trust receipt,
. . ."
The trust receipts, there is an obligation to repay the entruster. Their terms are to be interpreted in accordance
with the general rules on contracts, the law being alert in all cases to prevent fraud on the part of either party
to the transaction. The entrustee binds himself to sell or otherwise dispose of the entrusted goods with the
obligation to turn over to the entruster the proceeds if sold, or return the goods if unsold or not otherwise
disposed of, in accordance with the terms and conditions specified in the trust receipt. A violation of this
undertaking constitutes estafa under Sec. 13, PD 115.
The non-payment of the amount covered by a trust receipt is an act violative of the entrustee's obligation to
pay. There is no reason why the law should not apply to all transactions covered by trust receipts, except
those expressly excluded.
Decision: The petition was granted.
Lee vs. Rodil 175 SCRA 100
Nature: this is a petition to reconsider the motion to quash the information charging the accused of Estafa
which was denied twice by the Manila RTC Branch 10.
Facts: the accused in this case was the duly authorized representative of C.S. Lee Enterprises, Inc..She
opened a letter of credit with the Philippine Bank of Communications to purchase certain merchandise
consisting of 23 ctns. Lab. Culture Media in favor of said bank, and right after, they executed a trust receipt for
the aforesaid merchandise. By virtue of which, the said accused obligated herself to hold said merchandise in
trust with liberty to sell the same in cash for the account of the said bank and to account for the proceeds of
the sale thereof, if sold or of returning the said merchandise to said bank in case of failure to sell the same, on
or before October 24, 1982. But the accused, once in possession of the said merchandise, failed to comply
with her aforesaid obligation despite the lapse of a long period of time and repeated demands made upon her
to that effect. Hence, information was filed against her for the crime of Estafa.
She moved to quash the information however it was denied as well as the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner alleged that the violation of a trust receipt agreement does not constitute Estafa notwithstanding an
express provision in the "Trust Receipts Law" (P.D. 115) characterizing such violation. She attacks P. D. 115
for being unconstitutional. She contends that it is violative of the constitutional right that "No person shall be
imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax

Issue: whether or not the violation of a trust receipt agreement constitutes the crime of Estafa.
Held: YES.
Rationale: The criminal liability springs from the violation of the trust receipt.
Supreme Court pronounced in the Vintola cases that:
... A letter of credit-trust receipt arrangement is endorsed with its own distinctive features and
characteristics. Under that set-up, a bank extends a loan covered by the letter of credit, with
the trust receipt as a security for the loan. In other words, the transaction involves a loan
feature represented by the letter of credit, and a security feature which is in the covering trust
receipt.
Therefore, the loan feature is separate and distinct from the trust receipt. The violation of a trust receipt
committed by disposing of the goods covered thereby and failing to deliver the proceeds of such sale has
been squarely made to fall under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
... Swindling (estafa).-Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
herein below shall be punished by:
xxx xxx xxx
a. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxx xxx xxx
b. By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even
though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having
received such money, goods, or other property.
The fact that the bank does not become the factual owner of the goods does not make the law
unconstitutional. The language of the above- mentioned penal provision has been clarified by P.D. 115. The
person who is prejudiced through the misappropriation or conversion of the goods need not be the owner,
thereof; if such had been the intention of the authors of the Code, the phrase "to the prejudice of another"
would have read "to the prejudice of the owner.
Verily, P.D. 115 is a declaration by the legislative authority that, as a matter of public policy, the failure of a
person to turn over the proceeds of the sale of goods covered by a trust receipt or to return said goods if not
sold is a public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions. As held in Lozano vs. Martinez,
(146 SCRA 323,338):
... certainly it is within the authority of the lawmaking body to prescribe
certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se
are not the only acts that the law can punish. An act may not be considered
by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the
harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally
punished as malum prohibitum. The State can do this in the exercise of its
police power.
In fine, P.D. 115 is a valid exercise of police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional provision on nonimprisonment for non-payment of debt.
Decision: The trial court's orders were AFFIRMED and the case was remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.
Estafa through false pretenses, fraudulent acts or means
People of the Philippines vs. Ong 204 SCRA 942

Nature: an appeal from the decision of the RTC convicting the accused Ong for the crime of Estafa and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
Facts: Accused Dick Ong was one of the depositors of the Home Savings Bank and Trust Company. On
separate dates, the accused made several deposits to his account. However, before these checks were
cleared, he was allowed to withdraw from his account with the bank. The corresponding withdrawal slip was
signed and approved by Lino Morfe, then the Branch Manager, and accused Lucila Talabis, the Branch
Cashier. Because of that, the four accused were charged of Estafa defined under No. 2 (d) of Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code.
RTC found Ong guilty of the crime charged on which he appealed directly with the Supreme Court. The three
others were acquitted.
Tthe accused-appellant alleges that based on the testimonies of co-accused Lucila Talabis and Ricardo
Villaran, he did not employ any deceit or fraud on the Bank because the practice of deposit and withdrawal
against uncleared checks and uncollected deposits was tolerated by it. As soon as he learned of the dishonor
of the subject checks, he offered to pay the amounts thereof and put up as security his property. The subject
checks were not in payment of an obligation but were deposited in his savings account. He was merely a
general indorser of the subject checks and this being the case, his obligations as such, if any, should be
governed by Section 66 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. The subject checks were issued or drawn by his
customers and paid to him. He could not have had any knowledge as to the sufficiency of their funds in the
drawee banks.
These allegation were all contradicted by the Solicitor General.
Issue: whether or not the accused was guilty of the crime charged.
Held: NO.
Rationale: All the elements of Estafa under No. 2 (d) was not sufficiently proven except the first part of the first
element.
The following are the elements of this kind of estafa: (1) postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an
obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check;
and (3) damage to the payee thereof.
The first element has two parts namely, postdating or issuance of a check and in payment of an obligation
contracted at the time the check was issued." On this subject matter, Fernando Esguerra, Intemal Auditor of
the Bank and a witness for the prosecution, testified that two of those checks deposited were actually coming
from the Ongs account upon which he signed as the drawee. Thus, the fact established by the prosecution
and adopted by the trial court is that the subject checks were either issued or indorsed by the accusedappellant.
Regarding the second part of the first element of Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, the
accused-appellant alleged that when he deposited the subject checks in his savings account, it was clearly
not in payment of an obligation to the Bank. This single argument of the accused-appellant spells tilting the
scale to his advantage. In several cases, We were categorical that bank deposits are in the nature of irregular
deposits. They are really loans because they earn interest. All kinds of bank deposits, whether fixed, savings,
or current are to be treated loans and are to be covered by the law on loans. Current and savings deposits
are loans to a bank because it can use the same.
The evidence for the prosecution proved that the Bank on its own accorded him a drawn against uncollected
deposit (DAUD) privilege without need of any pretensions on his part. Moreover, this privilege was not only for
the subject checks, but for other past transactions. Fernando Esguerra and Felix Hocson even testified that in
some instances prior to July 1, 1980, especially where the depositor is an important client, the Bank relaxed
its rule and internal policy against uncleared checks and uncollected deposits, and allowed such depositor to
withdraw against his uncleared checks and uncollected deposits. Admittedly, the accused-appellant was one
of the important depositors of the Bank. Granting, in gratia argumenti, that he had in fact acted fraudulently,
he could not have done so without the active cooperation of the Banks employees. Therefore, since Lucila
Talabis and Ricardo Villaran were declared innocent of the crimes charged against them, the same should be
said for the accused-appellant. True it is that the Bank suffered damage in the amount of P575,504.00 but the
accused-appellant's liability thereon is only civil.

Decision: The accused-appellant is acquitted of the crime charged against him but ordered to pay the
aforementioned amount.
Bouncing checks (B.P. 22)
Nierras vs Dacuycuy 181 SCRA 1
Nature: this is a petition for certiorari assailing the dismissal of the motion to quash the information.
Facts: It appears that petitioner, a customer of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, purchased oil products
from it. Simultaneous with the delivery of the products, he issued nine (9) checks in payment thereof. Upon
presentation to the Philippine National Bank at Naval, Leyte, said checks were dishonored for the reason that
his account was already closed. Thereafter, Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation repeatedly demanded of
petitioner either to deposit funds for his checks or pay for the oil products he had purchased but he failed and
refused to do either. Because of this Shell Corporation filed two charges against him namely Estafa and
violation of BP Blg 22.
Petitioner argues that he would be placed in double jeopardy as all the elements of estafa under Article 315
(2-d) of the Revised Penal Code are also present in that crime punishable under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
namely (1) "the postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check
was issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check and (3) damage to the payee thereof."
Issue: can petitioner be held liable for the nine criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and
separately also be held liable for the crime of estafa under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code for the
issuance of the same bouncing checks?
Held: YES.
Rationale: Petitioner is charged with two distinct and separate offenses. What petitioner failed to mention in
his argument is the fact that deceit and damage are essential elements in Article 315 (2-d) Revised Penal
Code, but are not required in Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Under the latter law, mere issuance of a check that
is dishonored gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the same
without sufficient funds and hence punishable which is not so under the Penal Code.
While the filing of the two sets of Information under the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and under
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, on estafa, may refer to identical acts committed by
petitioner, the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense, because a single criminal act may give
rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is variance or differences between the elements of an offense
in one law and another law as in the case at bar there will be no double jeopardy because what the rule on
double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated prosecution
for the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense. Hence, the mere
filing of the two (2) sets of information does not itself give rise to double jeopardy.
Decision: Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
Lao vs Court of Appeals G.R. No. 119178 June 20, 1997
Nature: This case is a petition assailing the Decision of Respondent Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal of
petitioner and affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33 convicting her for two
counts of violation of the Bouncing Checks Law.
Facts: Petitioner, Lina Lim Lao was a junior officer of Premiere Investment House (Premiere) in its Binondo
Branch. As such officer, she was authorized to sign checks for and in behalf of the corporation. In the course
of the business, she met complainant Father Artelijo Pelijo, the provincial treasurer of the Society of the Divine
Word through Mrs. Rosemarie Lachenal, a trader for Premiere. Father Palijo was authorized to invest
donations to the society and had been investing the society's money with Premiere. Father Palijo had
invested a total of P514,484.04. And with this he received some checks in payment of interests as a return
from such investment. However , upon presentation for encashment, the same were dishonored for the
reason "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds" (DAIF).
Father Palijo immediately made demands on premiere to pay him the necessary amounts. He first went to the
Binondo Branch but was referred to the Cubao Main Branch where he was able to talk with the President, Mr.

Cario. For his efforts, he was paid P5,000.00. Since no other payments followed, Father Palijo wrote
Premiere a formal letter of demand subsequently; Premiere was placed under receivership and was not able
to pay. Private Complainant Palijo filed an affidavit-complaint against Petitioner Lina Lim Lao and Teodulo
Asprec for violation of B.P. 22. After preliminary investigation, three Informations charging Lao and Asprec
with the offense defined in the first paragraph of Section 1, B.P. 22.
In her defense, she contended that had no actual knowledge of whether such checks were funded as she was
just doing her regular duties by signing blank checks with the name of the payee and the amount drawn to be
filled later by another signatory. Also, when checks so signed are dishonored due to insufficiency of funds, the
notice of dishonor was sent to the main office of the corporation. According to her, that does not constitute a
valid notice to her who holds office in a separate branch and who had no actual knowledge thereof.
Issues:

1. May an employee who, as part of her regular duties, signs blank corporate checks with the name
of the payee and the amount drawn to be filled later by another signatory and, therefore, does so
without actual knowledge of whether such checks are funded, be held criminally liable for violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22), when checks so signed are dishonored due to insufficiency of
funds?
2. Does a notice of dishonor sent to the main office of the corporation constitute a valid notice to the said
employee who holds office in a separate branch and who had no actual knowledge thereof? In other
words, is constructive knowledge of the corporation, but not of the signatory-employee, sufficient?
Held 1: After a thorough review of the case at bar, the Court found that Petitioner Lina Lim Lao did not have
actual knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in the corporate accounts at the time she affixed her signature
to the checks involved in this case, at the time the same were issued, and even at the time the checks were
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank.
The scope of petitioner's duties and responsibilities did not encompass the funding of the corporation's
checks; her duties were limited to the marketing department of the Binondo branch. Under the organizational
structure of Premiere Financing Corporation, funding of checks was the sole responsibility of the Treasury
Department. Furthermore, the Regional Trial Court itself found that, since Petitioner Lina Lim Lao was often
out in the field taking charge of the marketing department of the Binondo branch, she signed the checks in
blank as to name of the payee and the amount to be drawn, and without knowledge of the transaction for
which they were issued. As a matter of company practice, her signature was required in addition to that of
Teodulo Asprec, who alone placed the name of the payee and the amount to be drawn thereon.
Since Petitioner Lina Lim Lao signed the checks without knowledge of the insufficiency of funds, knowledge
she was not expected or obliged to possess under the organizational structure of the corporation, she may
not be held liable under B.P. 22. For in the final analysis, penal statutes such as B.P. 22 "must be construed
with such strictness as to carefully safeguard the rights of the defendant . . ." The element of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds having been proven to be absent, petitioner is therefore entitled to an acquittal.
There can be no prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficiency of funds in the instant case because no
notice of dishonor was actually sent to or received by the petitioner.
Held 2: The notice of dishonor may be sent by the offended party or the drawee bank. The trial court itself
found absent a personal notice of dishonor to Petitioner Lina Lim Lao by the drawee bank based on the
unrebutted testimony of Ocampo "(t)hat the checks bounced when presented with the drawee bank but she
did not inform anymore the Binondo branch and Lina Lim Lao as there was no need to inform them as the
corporation was in distress." The Court of Appeals affirmed this factual finding. Pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence, this finding is binding on this Court.
Indeed, this factual matter is borne by the records. The records show that the notice of dishonor was
addressed to Premiere Financing Corporation and sent to its main office in Cubao, Quezon City. Furthermore,
the same had not been transmitted to Premiere's Binondo Office where petitioner had been holding office.
Likewise no notice of dishonor from the offended party was actually sent to or received by Petitioner Lao.
Because no notice of dishonor was actually sent to and received by the petitioner, the prima
facie presumption that she knew about the insufficiency of funds cannot apply. Section 2 of B.P. 22 clearly
provides that this presumption arises not from the mere fact of drawing, making and issuing a bum check;
there must also be a showing that, within five banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, such maker
or drawer failed to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for its
payment in full by the drawee of such check.

Decision: The accused was acquitted.

Other deceits
Villaflor vs. Court of appeals 192 SCRA 680
Nature: the case was a petition to review on Certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming with
modification the judgment of the trial court convicting the petitioner for the crime of Estafa under Article 318 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Facts: Complainant Mariano Locsin is a businessman and deals in real estate transactions. He has known
appellant Ricardo Villaflor for some time and on two occasions he had extended small loans to him.
Sometime on June 1967, the accused borrowed one thousand pesos from the complainant and executed a
chattel mortgage on his Opel car which it turned out to be also mortgaged with Northern Motors. The accused
failed to pay the loan on the due date despite repeated demands, hence a charge for Estafa under Article 318
of the RPC was filed against him. Before the trial continued, the complainant agreed to have in his possession
two sewing machines as another security for the loan. But still it remained unpaid.
The accused pointed out that there was no deceit employed by him because the mortgage was executed at
the instance of the complainant. He also alleged that the receipt of the sewing machines amounts to payment
of the loan.
Issue:
1. Whether or not accused employed false representations and false pretenses in obtaining the loan
from the complainant.
2. Whether or not the receipt of the sewing machines by the complainant amounts to the payment of
loan, thus extinguishing the obligation.
Held 1: The assurance made by the accused that the car offered as a security had never been encumbered
and his failure to disclose to Locsin that said car was previously mortgaged to the Northern Motors, Co.,
constitute deception.
Held 2: The allegation of the accused was bereft of merit because a debt is not to be understood to have been
paid unless the thing or service in which the obligation consists has been paid completely delivered or
rendered, as the case may be.
Decision: The assailed judgment was affirmed.
Veloso vs Sandiganbayan 187 SCRA 504
Nature: This is a petition to review the decision of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Crim Cases
Nos. 2073-2095 and 33233345 insofar as it finds petitioner Jose R. Veloso guilty as co-principal in the
complex crimes of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents, as defined and penalized under Article
318 and 171, paragraph 4, in relation to Article 48, of the Revised Penal Code.
Facts: an audit was conducted by the Commission on Audit and it found out that there were anomalies in the
Siquijor Highway Engineering District (SHED) and conspiracy between the suppliers and certain government
officials and employees. Because of this, he and other officials and employees were charged with forty-six
(46) counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents.
Petitioner denied being a co-conspirator alleging his non- participation in the conspiracy and his good faith in
attaching his signature to the documents involved. He contends that it has not been shown that he falsified
any of the documents which the Sandiganbayan found to be falsifications. Thus, while he admits that he
signed the general vouchers, he claims that his act of doing so was merely ministerial considering that all the
supporting papers and documents were submitted and attached to the vouchers. He continues that he could
not question the veracity of the prepared Letters of Advice of Allotments (LAA) and Sub-Advices of Cash
Disbursement Ceiling (SACDC) since these documents, with the program of work accompanying them and
other inspection reports, gave him the go-signal to pass them in audit. Thus, he claims that the vouchers
would have been cleared even without his signature as they were supported by the required documents and
certifications.

Issue: whether or not petitioner's participation in the criminal conspiracy has been established beyond
reasonable doubt.
Held: YES.
Rationale: None of the accused regional and district officials can claim good faith or reliance on the regularity
of the documents processed and signed by them or on the presumption that their subordinates and/or
superiors have acted regularly, since by the very nature of their duties, they should have known or realized by
mere scrutiny of the documents or by the exercise of ordinary diligence that there were irregularities or
anomalies reflected on their very faces. This is simplified by several circumstances patent on said documents,
to wit, the irregular funding of the LAAs the improper charging to prior year's obligations; the unauthorized
and/or improper action by officials on the supporting documents; the lack or incompleteness of supporting
documents, and the splitting of payments. Neither can the accused-contractors claim good faith likewise and
reliance on the actuations of their co-accused public officials since they knew fully well that their participation
in the transactions under question were only make believe or a farce and that their names, business standing
and signatures were only utilized, with their whole-hearted cooperation, in seeking the consummation of their
plans to defraud the government.
Petitioner, as resident auditor of the SHED was tasked with ensuring the regularity of all transactions that are
subject to his review. In these cases, he had before him, for his signature, vouchers that were patently
irregular, supported by similarly irregularly issued documents, which he should not have passed in audit.
Instead of refusing to affix his signature and reporting the irregularities to his superiors, as he was duty bound
to do, he turned a blind eye and signed the documents, completing the process that led to the consummation
of the crime.
He can not rely on the excuse that his subordinates have already initialed the documents for his signature
because his function, as their superior, is to check on their work and to ensure that they do it correctly.
Otherwise, if his signature was a superfluity, petitioner would be serving no useful purpose in occupying his
position of resident auditor.
Petitioner does not dispute the finding that there were anomalies in Neither does he dispute the existence of a
conspiracy between the suppliers and certain government officials and employees. What he vehemently
denies is the Sandiganbayan's finding that he was a conspirator.
Clearly, given his acts and omissions in auditing the documents, which related not only to one but to several
transactions, petitioner's participation in the conspiracy to defraud the Government has been established
beyond reasonable doubt. It is well-settled that there need not be direct evidence of the existence and details
of the conspiracy. Like the guilt of the individual offender, the existence of a conspiracy and a conspirator's
participation may be established through circumstantial evidence
Decision: The petition was denied.
Malicious mischief
Caballes vs Department of Agrarian Reform 168 SCRA 247
Nature: the case was a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of an Order issued by the public
respondent Ministry of Agrarian Reform, now the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through its then
Minister, the Hon. Heherson Alvarez, finding the existence of a tenancy relationship between the herein
petitioner and the private respondent and certifying the criminal case for malicious mischief filed by the
petitioner against the private respondent as not proper for trial.
Facts: In 1975, before the sale in favor of the Caballes spouses, private respondent Bienvenido Abajon
constructed his house on a portion of the said landholding, paying a monthly rental of P2.00 to the owner,
Andrea Millenes. The landowner likewise allowed Abajon to plant on a portion of the land, agreeing that the
produce thereof would be shared by both on a fitfy-fifty basis. From 1975-1977, Abajon planted corn and
bananas on the landholding. In 1978, he stopped planting corn but continued to plant bananas and camote.
During those four years, he paid the P2.00 rental for the lot occupied by his house, and delivered 50% of the
produce to Andrea Millenes.
Sometime in March 1979, after the property was sold, the new owners, Arturo and Yolanda Caballes, told
Abajon that the poultry they intended to build would be close to his house and pursuaded him to transfer his

dwelling to the opposite or southern portion of the landholding. Abajon offered to pay the new owners rental
on the land occupied by his house, but his offer was not accepted. Later, the new owners asked Abajon to
vacate the premises, saying that they needed the property. But Abajon refused to leave. The parties had a
confrontation before the Barangay Captain of Lawaan in Talisay, Cebu but failed to reach an agreement. All
the efforts exerted by the landowners to oust Abajon from the landholding were in vain as the latter simply
refused to budge.
On April 1, 1982, the landowner, Yolanda Caballes, executed an Affidavit stating that immediately after she
reprimanded Abajon for harvesting bananas and jackfruit from the property without her knowledge, the latter,
with malicious and ill intent, cut down the banana plants on the property worth about P50.00. A criminal case
for malicious mischief was filed against Abajon and which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 4003.
Obviously, all the planting on the property, including that of the banana plants, had been done by Abajon. On
September 30, 1982, upon motion of the defense in open court pursuant to PD 1038, the trial court ordered
the referral of the case to the Regional Office No. VII of the then MAR for a preliminary determination of the
relationship between the parties. As a result, the Regional Director of MAR Regional VII, issued a
certification 1 dated January 24, 1 983, stating that said Criminal Case No. 4003 was not proper for hearing on
the bases of the following findings:
That herein accused is a bona-fide tenant of the land owned by the complaining witness,
which is devoted to bananas;
That thin case is filed patently to harass and/or eject the tenant from his farmholding, which
act is prohibited by law; and
That this arose out of or is connected with agrarian relations.
From these factual findings, the DAR concluded that Abajon was a tenant of Andrea Millenes, the former
owner, who had testified that she shared the produce of the land with Abajon as truer thereof. Thus, invoking
Sec. 10 of RA 3844, as amended, which provides that "[T]he agricultural leasehold relation under this Code
shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale,
alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding"; and that "(I)n case the agricultural lessor
sells, alienates or transfers the legal possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall
be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor ," the MAR ruled that
'the new owners are legally bound to respect the tenancy, notwithstanding their claim that the portion tilled by
Abajon was small, consisting merely of three (3) meters wide and twenty (20) meters long, or a total of sixty
(60) square meters.
Issues: Whether or not the accused is liable for malicious mischief.
Held: The elements of the crime of malicious mischief are:
1. The offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another;
2. The damage caused did not constitute arson or crimes involving destruction;
3. The damage was caused maliciously by the offender.
The private respondent can not be held criminally liable for malicious mischief in cutting the banana trees
because, as an authorized occupant or possessor of the land, and as planter of the banana trees, he owns
said crops including the fruits thereof The private respondent's possession of the land is not illegal or in bad
faith because he was snowed by the previous owners to enter and occupy the premises. In other words, the
private respondent worked the land in dispute with the consent of the previous and present owners.
Consequently, whatever the private respondent planted and cultivated on that piece of property belonged to
him and not to the landowner. Thus, an essential element of the crime of malicious mischief, which is
"damage deliberately caused to the property of another," is absent because the private respondent merely cut
down his own plantings.
Decision: The assailed resolution was set aside and the criminal case was dismissed.
C. Crimes Against Chastity
Acts of lasciviousness
People of the Philippines vs. Famularcano 43 OG 1721

Facts: Accused, a driver in the Camph John Hay Motor pool,has as one of his duties to take home in a truck
the employees thereof, one of whom was the offended party, Dionisia Navarro. Around 10PM, accused
stopped the carrier telling her that it was out of gas so the lady alighted and the acused followed. He held and
hugged her to his breast. She struggled. Her dress was torn from the collar to the waist line on the front part
when he made effort to touch her breast. She was able to extricate herself and moved away. The accused did
not follow her any more. The accused contends that he was motivated not by lewdness but by a desire to
avenge the fact that her father committed a criminal attack on his wife during the Japanese occupation.
The theory of the defense counsel is that the crime committed is not the frustrated acts of lasciviousness for
which the accused was convicted for by the lower court, but at most unjust vexation.
Issue:
WON the crime committed was acts of lasciviousness
WON there is a frustrated commission of the same
Held:
Yes, the accused committed the crime of acts of lasciviousness.
No, there can be no crime of frustrated acts of lasciviousness
Ratio: In cases of acts of lasciviousness, as in all cases of crimes against chastity, like adultery and rape,
from the moment the offender performs all the elements necessary for the existence of the felony, he actually
attains his purpose and from that moment, all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished.
Form the standpoint of the law, there can be no frustration of acts of lascviousness of rape or of adultery,
because no matter how far the offender may have gone towards the realization of his purpose, if his
participation amounts to performing all the acts of execution, the felony is necessarily produced as a
consequence thereof. The cirm committed was consummated acts of lasciviousness.
The act of taking the offended party by the waist, of holding her to his breat and hugging her with intention of
kissing her and touching her breast and private parts, which appellant did by froce and against the will of the
complainant, are themselves an abuse directed against her chastity.
Decision: the crime committed is acts of lasciviousness, the same to be consummated.
Qualified seduction
Babanto vs. Zosa 120 SCRA 834
Nature: Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental
Facts: Here petitioner is charged with rape. The records of the case show that petitioner Eusebio Babanto is a
police officer and that the RTC found him guilty of the lesser offense of qualified seduction because the sexual
intercourse that was committed against the complainant, Leonida Dagohoy, was not committed thru violence
or intimidation. The petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration but was denied, hence this appeal. The SC
shares the view of the OSG that petitioner could not be legally convicted of qualified seduction. The facts
surrounding the case show that Dagohoy is a 13year old girl who is of considerable low mentality and had a
peculiar trait of going out at night without her parents consent. Accroding to the victim the incident happened
at dawn of Oct. 24,1969 where the petitioner approached her while she was seated in the market and told her
that they would be going to the municipal building. However she was brought to the ABC Hall (annexed by the
municipal building) where Babanto made her lie down face upward and lifter her dress and pulled down her
pantie. She felt pain in her vagina when his penis penetrated her sexual organ. She cried and did not shout
because he held her mouth.. He completed the act, stood up and left her; told her that if she tells her parents,
he will shoot her. Eusebio Babanto was in uniform and with a side arm. The victim did not tell her parents
what happened but ultimately confessed later.
Issue: W/N petitioner can be legally convicted of qualified seduction.
Ruling: Yes, Petitioner is liable for rape.
There is no allegation that the complainant was a virgin. According to Article 337 of the Revised Penal Code,
the elements of qualified seduction are: (1) the offended party is a virgin; (2) she must be over 12 and under

18 years of age; (3) the offender has sexual intercourse with her; and (4) the offender is a person in public
authority, priest, house servant, domestic, guardian, teacher, one entrusted with the education or custody of
the offended party, or a brother or ascendant of the latter. It is presumed that a girl over 12 and less than 18
years old, who is unmarried and of good reputation is a virgin. The complainant here is not presumed to be a
virgin because of her habit of going out at night without her parents consent and returning the next day. The
element of virginity is essential to the crime of qualified seduction and must be alleged in the complaint. If the
conviction was for qualified seduction without this element then it would violate the petitioners right to be
informed of the nature of the case against him. The evidence also showed that the victim became pregnant
and as a last ditch effort to save himself, petitioner alleged that he was castrated. However, he could not get
sufficient evidence to back this claim.
Perez vs. Court of Appeals 168 SCRA 236
Nature: Petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals
Facts: Here Petitioner was charged with consented abduction and pleaded not guilty. With promises of
marriage, appellant succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her, twice, that night before they returned.
She was seduced by appellant, as it turned out that he made those promises just to accomplish his lewd
designs That was "seduction and not abduction. On appeal the CA acquitted Perez of the crime but the
complainant, Yolanda Mendoza, filed a subsequent criminal complaint against petitioner for qualified
seduction. The records show that Perez file a petition for certiorari with the SC but was later referred to the
Intermediate Appellate Court which dismissed it without prejudice to its refilling in the proper RTC. The
petitioner then filed his appeal to the RTC which dismissed the same then made his appeal to the CA. The CA
denied his petition for being inappropriate for because the judgement had been final and executory.
The petitioner invoked double jeopardy as his defence for the information of qualified seduction as he has
already been acquitted with the crime of consented abduction because the same set of facts will be used to
charge him with the 2 offenses.
Issue: W/N petitioner can be convicted of qualified seduction.
Ruling: Yes, the SC affirms the decision of the CA
Petitioner cannot claim double jeopardy in this instance because, although similar, the elements of consented
abduction and qualified seduction are different and each is a separate offense. There are similar elements
between Consented Abduction and Qualified Seduction, namely: (1) that the offended party is a virgin, and,
(2) that she must be over twelve (12) and under eighteen (18) years of age. However, two elements
differentiate the two crimes. Consented Abduction, in addition to the two common elements, requires that: (1)
the taking away of the offended party must be with her consent, after solicitation or cajolery from the offender,
and, (2) the taking away of the offended party must be with lewd designs. On the other hand, an information
for Qualified Seduction also requires that: (1) the crime be committed by abuse of authority, confidence or
relationship, and, (2) the offender has sexual intercourse with the woman.
Abduction, forcible abduction with rape
People of the Philippines vs. Alburo 184 SCRA 655
Nature: Appeal from the judgment of the RTC of Cebu.
Facts: Petitioner is charge with the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. The records show that
Evelyn Cantina and her friends were going home from Abellana National High School. The driver, Ronilo
Alburo the accused, invited the three girls to board his jeepney. Initially they declined but they boarded soon
after with Evelyn taking the front seat. When they reached the corner of Jones Avenue and Colon Street,
Evelyn was about to alight but was prevented from doing so because Alburo threatened to raise her skirt. Her
two friends were trying to pull her out but the green light turned on and the jeepney sped off. In another
corner, they then attempted to alight but Evelyn was prevented from doing so when Zaldy Rodriguez placed
his leg as a barricade. Her two friends realized that Evelyn was being prevented from leaving attempted to
pull her out but did not succeed. Later Rodriguez and Sumalinog got off the jeepney. Evelyn then begged
Alburo that she be allowed to disembark. Alburo did not heed Evelyn's plea. Instead, he pulled a knife and

threatened to slash her side if she would disembark. Evelyns friend hoped that she was able to go home and
they went to her house to get their notebook from here but upon learning that she was not there, they realized
that she was in trouble and told her mother what happened.
The family of Evelyn asked their neighbour Ester Dakay for help. Alburo stopped the jeepney. Holding the
knife, he went down from the jeepney and threateningly came close to Evelyn. He then pointed the knife at
her and told her that at something would happen to her if she would shout. Then he pushed Evelyn's head
against the steering wheel which rendered the latter unconscious. When Evelyn regained her senses she
found herself without her panty anymore. Blood was on her vagina and she felt pain on her stomach and she
saw Ronilo Alburo with his face close to hers, getting up from her then raising his pants. She cried and asked
Alburo what he had done to her. He did not answer her inquiries. Later as they were returning to the city, the
mother of Evelyn and Ester say her in the jeepney, and as she got off mother Lourdes Cantina. As she was
embraced by Ester, she whispered to Ester that Alburo should not be allowed to abscond because he had
raped her. Ester and Evelyn reported to the police the abduction and submitted the knife (which Evelyn was
able to get). Evelyn filed a complaint for abduction with rape after they went to the hospital to get a medical
certificate. Accused on the other hand said that he and Evelyn were sweethearts and tired to convey that it
was public knowledge in the neighbourhood that the 2 of them were lovers. The trial court did not believe this
defence and found the appellant guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. Hence this
petition.
Issue: W/N the petitioner is guilty of the crime of focible abduction with rape.
Ruling: Yes
The SC is not persuaded by the theory that Appellant and Evelyn were sweethearts. If they were, surely,
Evelyn would not have jeopardized their relationship by accusing him of having deflowered her and, on top of
it all, filing a criminal charge against him. Her normal reaction would have been to cover-up for the man she
loved and had a clandestine affair with. But, on the contrary, Evelyn lost no time in denouncing Appellant and
exposing to her family and the authorities the disgrace that had befallen her. In reviewing the evidence
adduced by the prosecution for this crime of Rape, we have likewise been guided by three well-known
principles, namely, (1) that an accusation of rape can be made with facility, is difficult to prove, but more
difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the
crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weaknesses of the evidence for the defense. The SC
finds that Appellant had taken Evelyn away against her will, with lewd designs, subsequently forced her to
submit to his lust and rendering her unconscious in the process, thereby justifying his conviction for the
complex crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape
People of the Philippines vs. Godines 196 SCRA 765
Nature: Appeal from the judgment of the RTC of Masbate.
Facts: Petitioner Godines and Moreno were charged with the crime of forcible abduction with rape and
pleaded not guilty. The facts state that the victim Estehr Ancajas, was sleeping/staying at one of the houses of
Alejandro Vilaksia and she was awakened by a commotion from one of the adjacent room which were
occupied by Vilaksi and his wife Milagros. She saw the accused talk to the couple and Godines hacked
Milagros and took some money from them while co-accused Moreno stood by as look out. Complainant
attempted to escape with her small child but the defendants caught her. They dragged her outside and as
they forcibly brought her to a vacant lot they simultaneously fondled her private parts. When they arrived at
the vacant lot, they took turns in having carnal knowledge with her while the other one was holding the small
child. The two were apparently armed and after they were finished they threatened her not to reveal tell
anyone or else they would kill her because they thought that she recognized them. After this, the complainant
took refuge in their neighbours house and fell unconscious. When she woke up, she narrated what happened
to her. She later reported the matter to the police.
For their defense, defendants had an alibi that they were at their friends house spending the night. The house
was a few kilometres away from the scene of the crime. And allegedly Godines was feeling ill that night. The
trial court did not appreciate their story as there were inconsistencies in the testimonies. Alibi is an easily
made up defense and cannot prevail over positive identification by a credible witness. So the trial court found
them guilty, hence this appeal.

Issue: W/N the crime of rape was committed.

Ruling: Yes, the defendants committed rape and each is charged with 2 counts of rape.
The SC finds no reason to disturb the ruling of the lower court. The complainant had no ill will against the
defendant as both parties said that they knew each other when they were younger. The Court reiterates its
oft-mentioned observation that it is very difficult to believe that a woman would be willing to undergo the
expense, trouble, inconvenience and scandal of a public prosecution for rape, as well as an examination of
the private parts of her anatomy, if her intention is not to bring her rapists to justice.
The appellants insist that there are no conclusive medical findings that the complainant had indeed been
raped. This assertion is untenable. A medical examination is not an indispensable element in a prosecution for
rape. At any rate, the medical evidence discloses that the private complainant suffered abrasions on her body
thereby confirming that she had been physically violated through the use of force. An alibi for it to be effective
must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. As to the crime committed by the appellants, the trial
court correctly held that forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the main objective of the
appellant is to rape the victim. The appellants are charged of conspiring and confederating with each other in
the commission of the offense charged and each is charged two (2) rapes. In a conspiracy the act of one is
the act of all.
Prosecution of private offenses
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera 174 SCRA 653
Nature: A special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order,
seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying petitioners motion to quash.
Facts: The facts state that petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent
Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married. After about three and a half years of marriage,
such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner
in Germany. On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private
respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to
said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another
man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order
of the lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is
without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be
prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended
spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint.".
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case
Issue: W/N it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds
between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the
action by the former against the latter.
Ruling: YES, at the time of the commencement of the action the marital bonds must remain.
The crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a
sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering
consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. The law
specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the
complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. "Private crimes" or those which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes
a more predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter
exclusively within his power and option. It is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to
commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must
indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action
would be determined by his status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity
or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the
institution of the case. The private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner by virtue of the

divorce he filed in Germany, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that
he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit. The allegation of private respondent that he could not
have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal
significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he
obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the
marriage is decreed.
D. Crimes Against the Civil Status of Persons
Simulation of births
People of the Philippines vs. Sangalang 74 OG 5977
NATURE: This is an appeal from the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch IV
finding appellant Venancio Ramilo y Sangalang guilty beyond... reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the offended party, Hilaria V.
Sangalang, the sum of P12,000.00.
FACTS: That on or about the 11th day of October, 1975 at about 1:30 am, in Barrio Quiling, Municipality of
Talisay, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, armed with a short firearm, by using force, threats and intimidation, did then, and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie with and have carnal knowledge of the said Hilaria V. Sangalang,
against her will and consent. She and her uncle proceeded to the Police Station of Talisay, Batangas, and
reported the matter to the Chief of Police. The appellant contends that the lower court erred in its appreciation
of the prosecution evidence as the complainant's testimony is incredible being fraught with several
inconsistencies.
ISSUE:
Whether an alibi established mainly by the accused himself and his relatives could support the tendered alibi.
HELD:
The alibi in this case is made more dubious and weak because it is established mainly by the accused himself
and his relative-his cousin, and not by credible person who would in the natural order of things be best
situated to support the tendered alibi . From the records, we find that the complainant has no motive other
than to bring to justice the culprit who grievously had wronged her. It has long been held that no young
Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit that she had been criminally abused and ravished unless that is
the truth. It is her natural instinct to protect her honor.
Bigamy
People of the Philippines vs. Aragon 100 Phil 1033
Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding appellant guilty of bigamy. The
facts are not disputed and, as found by the trial court, are as follows:
Facts: On September 28, 1925, the accused, under the name of Proceso Rosima, contracted marriage with a
certain Maria Gorrea in the Philippine Independent Church in Cebu. While his marriage with Maria Gorrea
was subsisting, the accused under the name of Proceso Aragon, contracted a canonical marriage with Maria
Faicol on August 27, 1934, in the Santa Teresita Church in Iloilo City.
The sponsors of the accused and Maria Faicol were Eulogio Giroy, who was then an employee of the Office of
the Municipal Treasurer of Iloilo, and a certain Emilio Tomesa, a clerk in the said office After the said marriage,
the accused and Maria Faicol established residence in Iloilo. As the accused was then a traveling salesman,
he commuted between Iloilo where he maintained Maria Faicol, and Cebu where he maintained his first wife,
Maria Gorrea died in Cebu City on August 5, 1939 (Exhibit "2"). After Maria Gorrea's death, and seeing that
the coast was dear in Cebu, the accused brought Maria Faicol to Cebu City in 1940, where she worked as a
teacher-nurse.
It would seem that the accused and Maria Faicol did not live a happy marital life in Cebu, for it appears that in
1949 and 1950, Maria Faicol suffered injuries to her eyes because of physical maltreatment in the hands of
the accused. On January 22, 1953, the accused sent Maria Faicol to Iloilo, allegedly for the purpose of
undergoing treatment of her eyesight. During her absence, the accused contracted a third marriage with a
certain Jesusa C. Maglasang on October 3, 1953, in Sibonga, Cebu.

The accused admitted having contracted marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasangin Sibonga, Cebu, on October 3,
1953, Although the accused made an attempt to deny his previous marriage with Maria Faicol, the Court,
however, believes that the attempt is futile for the fact of the said second marriage was fully established not
only by the certificate of the said marriage, but also by the testimony of Maria Faicol and of Eulogio Giroy, one
of the sponsors of the wedding, and the identification of the accused made by Maria Faicol.
The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in the absence of an express provision in Act No. 3613
authorizing the filing of an action for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab initio, defendant could
not legally contract marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang without the dissolution of his marriage to Maria
Faicol, either by the death of the latter or by the judicial declaration of the nullity of such marriage, at the
instance of the latter
Appellant in this Court relies on the case of People vs. Mendoza, In this case the majority of this Court
declared:
The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act No. 3613) plainly makes a subsequent
marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance,
and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annullable
marriages. There is here no pretense that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the
belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, had been absent for seven consecutive years or generally
considered as dead, so as to render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a subsequent court.
Held: We are of the very weighty reasons by Justice Alex Reyes in the dissent in the case above-quoted But
this weighty reasons notwithstanding, the very fundamental principle of strict construction of penal laws in
favor of the accused, which principle we may not ignore, seems to justify our stand in the above-cited case of
People vs. Mendoza. Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and had the rule enunciated in Spain
and in America requiring judicial declaration of nullity of ab initio void marriages been within the contemplation
of the legislature, an express provision to that effect would or should have been inserted in the law. In its
absence, we are bound by said rule of strict interpretation already adverted to.
It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose marriage with the
appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into.
Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and appellant's prosecution for contracting this marriage can not
prosper.
Decision: For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the
defendant-appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio, without prejudice to his prosecution for having contracted
the second bigamous marriage.
E. Crimes Against Honor
Libel
Mercado vs. Court of First Instance 166 SCRA 93
NATURE: Petition for Certiorari, mandamus and prohibition to review the decision of CFI which denied the
motion to quash and dismiss the libel case against the petitioners.
FACTS: Mr. Rafael Mercado was charged with libel for imputing to the private respondent, Mrs. Virginia
Mercado of Public Service Commission, some acts constituting enrichment through corrupt practices.
These allegations were written and done through a telegram addressed to the Secretary of Department of
Public Works and Commission in response to President Marcos appeal to give information on undesirable
employees in the government service to achieve the objectives of New Society,
Subsequently, Mrs. Mercado filed a libel case against him. The petitioners now moved to dismiss the case on
the ground that the telegram being a privileged communication but was denied by lower court.
Again, petitioner moved to quash alleging that facts do not constitute an offence, but was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON there was malice in the petitioners part and the communication is privileged.

HELD: SC held that qualified privilege may be lost by proof of malice. What cast doubt on the good faith of the
petitioner is a summary of his conduct against the private respondent in which he;
1. Made a letter complaint alleging violation of RA 2260 and civil service rules
2. 14 days later, he sent the above mentioned telegram
3. Filed an amended administrative complaint against private respondent charging dishonesty, and corrupt
practices, discourtesy and misconduct
4. Filed with Constabulary Highway Patrol Group a complaint alleging that private respondent and husband
was selling carnapped vehicle.
5. Filed with Criminal Investigation Service of private respondent for corrupt practices.
Qualified privilege is a complaint made in good faith without malice in regard to character or conduct of a
public official when addressed to an officer or a board having some interest or duty in the matter. But
statements must be made under honest sense of duty; a self eking motive is destructive.
Newsweek vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 142 SCRA 171
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction, seeks to annul the decision of
the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bacolod City which
denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the complaint for libel filed by private respondents
Facts: March 5, 1981, private respondents, incorporated associations of sugarcane planters in Negros
Occidental claiming to have 8,500 members and several individual sugar planters, filed Civil Case No. 15812
in their own behalf and/or as a class suit in behalf of all sugarcane planters against petitioner and two of
petitioners' non-resident correspondents/reporters Fred Bruning and Barry Came alleging that petitioner and
the other defendants committed libel against them by the publication of the article "An Island of Fear".
Complainants therein alleged that said article showed a deliberate and malicious use of falsehood, slanted
presentation and/or misrepresentation of facts intended to put them in bad light, expose them to public
ridicule, discredit and humiliation here in the Philippines and abroad, and make them objects of hatred,
contempt and hostility of their agricultural workers and of the public in general.
Issue: Whether statement must be sufficiently sweeping as to apply to every individual in a group or class to
be libelous?
Held: NO.
Rationale: The article was not actionable since the complainants consisting of an association with 8,500
members are not sufficiently identifiable. To be libelous, it is essential that the statement must be so
sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that group or class, or sufficiently specific so that
each individual in he class or group can prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so
that he can bring the action separately, if needed.
Decision: The decision of the Court of First Instance was reversed.
Bulletin Publishing vs. Noel 167 SCRA 692
Nature: Petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Facts: July 3, 1986 the 21 private respondents claiming to be the nearest relatives of the late Amir Mindalano,
suing on their own behalf and on behalf of the entire Mindalano clan of Mindanao, filed a Complaint for
damages before Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court of Marawi City charging petitioners with libel. Private
respondents' action was anchored on a feature article written by Jamil Maidan Flores entitled "A Changing of
the Guard," which appeared in the 22 June 1986 issue of Philippine Panorama, a publication of petitioner
Bulletin Publishing Corporation. In particular, exception was taken to the following excerpt:
The division of Lanao into Sur and Norte in 1959 only emphasized the feudal nature of
Maranaw politics. Talk of Lanao politics and you find yourself confined to a small circle of the

Alonto, Dimaporo, Dimakuta, Dianalan, Lucman families and a few more. These are big, royal
families. If you are a Maranaw with aspirations for political leadership, you better be a
certified bona fide member of one or several of these clans.
xxx xxx xxx
About the only time that one who was not of any royal house became a leader of
consequence in the province was during the American era when the late Amir Mindalano held
some sway. That was because Mindalano had the advantage of having lived with an
American family and was therefore fluent and literate in English. But as soon as the datus
woke up to the blessings of the transplanted American public school system, as soon as they
could speak and read and write in English, political leadership again became virtually their
exclusive domain. There must be some irony in that.
Private respondents alleged in their complaint that, contrary to the above portion of the article, the Mindalanos
"belong to no less than four of the 16 Royal Houses of Lanao del Sur." Private respondents likewise objected
to the statement that the late Amir Mindalano, grand patriarch of the Mindalano clan, had lived with an
American family, a statement which, they alleged, apart from being absolutely false, "has a distinct repugnant
connotation in Maranao society."
Issue: Was libel committed?
Held: NO.
Rationale: Assuming for present purposes only the falsity (in the sense of being inaccurate or non-factual) of
the description in the Panorama article of Amir Mindalano as not belonging to a royal house, we believe that
such a description cannot in this day and age be regarded as defamatory, as an imputation of "a vice or
defect," or as tending to cause "dishonor, discredit or contempt," or to "blacken the memory of one who is
dead" in the eyes of an average person in our community. The above excerpts complained of do not
disparage or deprecate Maranao titles of royalty or nobility, neither do they hold up to scorn and disrespect
those who, Maranao or not, are commoners. There is here no visible effort on the part of petitioners to cast
contempt and ridicule upon an institution or tradition of members of a cultural or ethnic minority group, an
"indigenous cultural community" in the language of the Constitution, whose traditions and institutions the
State is required to respect and protect. What private respondents assert is defamatory is the simple failure to
ascribe to the late Amir membership in a Maranao royal house, the ascription, in other words, to him of a
factual condition shared by the overwhelming majority of the population of this country, both Maranao and
non-Maranao, Muslim and non-Muslim. In a community like ours which is by constitutional principle both
republican in character and egalitarian in inspiration, such an ascription, whether correct or not, cannot be
defamatory.
The Court is similarly unable to see anything defamatory in a statement (even if inaccurate) that private
respondents' patriarch once lived with an American family. Since the early decades of this century a great
many young Filipinos (including Muslim Filipinos) have been going abroad for study and many of them share
the experience of staying with a foreign family, improving their language skills and learning something about
the culture and mores of the people. Once more, from the viewpoint of the average person in our present day
community, the statement complained of is not defamatory.
Decision: Petition granted. Civil case for damages filed against petitioners dismissed.
Santos vs. Court of Appeals 203 SCRA 110
Nature: Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
Facts: On February 23, 1970, Nanerico santos as a columnist of the Manila Daily Bulletin wrote and published
in his weekly column an article entitled Charges against CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc.which article was quoted
verbatim from an unverified complaint filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on February 13,
1970 by Rosario Sison Sandejas and her daughters charging CMS Stock Brokerage Inc., particularly its board
chairman and controlling stockholders Carlos Moran Sison and its president-general manager Luis F. Sison,
of engaging in fraudulent practices in the stock market. On the very day that the news item appeared, Carlos
Moran sison sought a meeting with petitioner Santos so that he could submit to the columnist his reply which
he wanted to published the vey next dayand in the same column. They met at about 6:15 in the evening at
the Andres-soriano Executive Center in Makati, Rizal where petitioner promised Sison that he would have the
reply published, not on the next day, but on February 25, 1970 issue of the Manila Daily Bulletin because t
was already past the deadline for the next days issue.

The reply was not published on February 25, 1970 as petitioner had promised and so Carlos Moran Sison
called petitioner by phone to tell him not to publish the reply anymore as it would only rekindle the talks. Sison
also informed petitioner that he would be sued for libel, to which statement petitioner retorted: Well, sue me
for libel.About a week later when Carlos Moran Sison chanced upon petitioner at the Hotel Intercontinetal
lobby, the latter asked Sison, When will you sue me? Petitioner received his answer on March 4, 1970 when
the appropriate complaint for libel was lodged against him by Carlos Moran Sison and Luis F. Sison before the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. Charged together with petitioner were Mariano B. Quimson Jr., Hans
M. Menzi, M.M de los Reyes, Felix G. Gozales and ben Rodriguez, also the Manila Daily Bulletin.
Subsequently, the corresponding information was filed before the Court of first Instance of Rizal (Pasig) on
November 16, 1970. It is interesting to note that a few weeks following the publication of the complaint
Santos weekly column was stopped ostensibly in cut down on overhead expenses brought about by the
adoption of the floating rate in foreign exchange.
On January 26, 1971, upon motion of the trial fiscal and with the conformity of the offended parties the lower
court dismissed the case against all the accused with the exception of petitioner Nanerico D. Santos. In due
time, the trial court rendered its judgment of conviction. In affirming the decision, respondent Appellate Court
declared that the article in question is not privileged communication. At the time the complaint filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission was published in the column of the accused there was as yet no
proceeding at which both parties had an opportunity to be present and to be heard. Publishing an article
based upon a complaint filed in a Court of first Instance before any judicial action is taken thereon is not
privileged as a report of a judicial proceeding. The article in question is libelous. It imputes a crime to the
private offended parties, that of willful violation of the provisions of the Securities Act and the implementing
Rules and Regulations issued by the commission which is penalized by imprisonment or fine or both and said
published article of the accused imputes to the private offended parties, as a stockholders, fraudulent acts
and illegal purchases/ sales and manipulations of securities to the prejudice of their customers and the
general investing public, which acts actually caused the dishonor, discredit or contempt of the private offended
parties.
Issue: Whether or not the publication of a complaint filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
before any judicial action is taken thereon is privileged as a report of a judicial proceeding.
Held: Yes.
Rationale: The applicable provision of law is Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code. Generally, malice is
presumed (malice in law) in every defamatory imputation. This presumption, however, does not arise if the
commission is privileged under Article 354. Paragraph 1 and 2 of article 354 refer to qualifiedly privileged
communications .The character of the privilege is a matter of defense which may be lost by positive proof of
express malice. In other words, the onus of providing actual malice is place on the plaintiff who must then
convince the court that the offender was prompted by malice or ill will. Once this is accomplished, the defense
of privilege is unavailing. Thus, under Article 362 of the Revised Penal Code, it is provided that: Libelous
remarks or comments connected with the matter privileged under the provisions of Article 354, if made with
malice, shall not exempt the author nor the editor or managing editor of a newspaper from criminal liability.
It is plainly evident from a reading of the published article itself that it is but a faithful reproduction of a
pleading filed before a quasi-judicial body, without any embellishment, wild imputations, distortions, or
defamatory comments calculated to damage the reputation of the offended parties and expose them to public
contempt. Generally, malice is presumed in every defamatory imputation but such presumption does not arise
if the communication is qualified privileged under par. 2 of article 354. What petitioner has done was to simply
furnish the readers with the information that a complaint has been filed against a brokerage firm. Then he
proceeded to reproduce that pleading verbatim in his column. Now, this is decidedly part and parcel of
petitioners job as a columnist whose beat happens to be the stock market. He was obligated to keep the
public abreast of the current news in their particular field. On this crucial point, the Court was inclined to
resolve all doubts in favor of petitioner and declare that there is no libel. It may be well for us to keep in mind
that the rule on privileged communications in defamation cases developed because public policy, the welfare
of society and the orderly administration of justice have demanded protection for public opinion. Therefore,
they should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice and falsehood. Such
excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged communications.
The controversial publication being a fair and true report of a judicial proceeding and made without malice, the
court found the author entitled to the protection and immunity of the rule of privileged matters under Article
354 (2). It follows that he cannot be held criminally liable for libel.

Borjal vs. Court of Appeals

NATURE: Petition for review of a decision of the CA which found the petitioners, Arturo Borjal and Maximo
Soliven liable for damages for writing and publishing articles claimed to be derogatory and offensive to Private
Respondent Wenceslao.
FACTS: Petitioner Borjal and Soliven were incorporators of Philippine Today, Incorporated (Philippine Star
Newspaper) and Borjal runs the column Jaywalker. On the other hand, the private respondent, Francisco
Wenceslao is a businessman who served as Technical Adviser of Congressman Fabian Sison, the Chairman
of the House of Representative on Industrial Policy in 1988.
In September 1988, during Congressional hearings on transport crisis, those who attended agreed to
organize the First National Conference on Land Transportation (FNCLT) to be participated by private sectors
and government agency in transport industry, to find ways and means to solve transport crisis. The
conference was estimated to cost around 1.8 Million pesos which will be funded thru solicitations from both
government and private organization.
Mr. Wenceslao was elected as the executive Director in 1989 for the said conference, thus he wrote
numerous solicitation letters to business community for that purpose. Between May and July 1989, a series of
articles were written by petitioner Borjal on his column Jaywalker. These articles dealt with alleged anomalous
activities of an organizer of a conference without naming or identifying the private respondent.
Some excerpts included xxx another self proclaimed hero of DSA Revolution goes around organizing
seminars and conferences fro huge fee xxx and xxx conference should be unmasked as money making
gimmick xxx.
Private respondent reacted to the article insisting that he was the organizer alluded to or referred to in
Borjals column. He filed a complaint with the National Press Club for Borjals unethical conduct and accused
him of using his column for character assassination.
Wenceslao filed a criminal case for libel against Borjal and Soliven but was dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence. He later on filed a civil action for damages based on the libel subject of the case.
Trial court rendered a favorable decision for the private respondent and CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or Not CA erred in ruling that Wenceslao was sufficiently identified by Borjal? In ruling that
subject articles do not constitute privilege communication? In ruling that Wenceslao has a valid cause of libel
against petitioners though he failed to prove actual malice on their part.
HELD: The Supreme Court reversed RTC and CA decision and acquitted Borjal, in relation to the 3 elements
of libel. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although not necessarily be
named. In this case, the victim was not sufficiently identified that even Wenceslao is not certain whether it was
he whom Borjal is referring to, had he not identified himself in public, the public would have remained
blissfully ignorant of his identity.
There was no malice in fact which requires that articles be published with knowledge that they are false, or in
utter disregard of whether they are false or not. Borjals article had factual basis especially on President
Aquino and Secretary Reyes declining to be included in the project.
There was publication but such publication was privileged, not libelous. It includes exception to libel that if
publication involves fair comment on matters involving public interest, they are privileged and constitute a
valid defense in an action for libel or slander.
Slander
Reyes vs. People of the Philippines Supra.
Held: The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the words, "Agustin, putang ina mo". This
is a common enough expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to
express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a
reflection on the virtues of a mother. In the instant case, it should be viewed as part of the threats voiced by
appellant against Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same more emphatic.

Decision: Reyes was acquitted for the crime of oral defamation.

Victorio vs. Court of Appeals 173 SCRA 645
Nature: This is a petition for review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the lower
court's judgment of conviction of the petitioners for grave oral defamation.
Facts: Atty. Vivencio Ruiz has been the attorney of petitioner Exequiel Victorio in certain civil cases from 1953
until 1963 when petitioner decided to hire the services of another lawyer, Atty. L. Castillo in place of Atty. Ruiz
and his collaborator Judge Alfredo Guiang, then Municipal Judge of Guimba, Nueva Ecija. Exequiel Victorio
and his wife afterwards filed an administrative charge against Judge Guiang which was assigned to Judge
Ramon Avancena, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, for investigation and
disbarment proceedings against Atty. Ruiz, then pending in the Office of the Solicitor General. Atty. Castillo,
counsel of the Victorios, presented an urgent motion to disqualify Judge Avancea to hear the administrative
case, who apparently taken aback, called down Atty. Castillo and gave him a lecture, while Atty. Ruiz, as
counsel for respondent Judge Guiang in the administrative case, moved that Atty. Castillo be cited for
contempt of court. Petitioners were overheard by Emiliano Manuzon, a policeman of Cabanatuan City and
one of the witnesses for the prosecution, to have uttered the defamatory words:
Daniel: "Kayabang ng putang-inang abogadong Ruiz na iyan, tunaw naman ang utak, suwapang at
estapador."
Exequiel: "Lastog ta ukinnanata abogado Ruiz, suwapang, estapador, paltogak ta ukinana ta abogado Ruiz,
suwapang ken estapador." (Translated in Tagalog as, Mayabang yang putang-inang abogado Ruiz na iyan,
babarilin ko ang putang inang iyan, suwapang at estapador.")
Both the accused were convicted of grave oral defamation.
Issue: Whether or not the defamatory words constitute serious oral defamation or simply slight oral
defamation.
Held: YES.
Rationale: Defamatory words uttered specifically against a lawyer when touching on his profession are
libelous per se. Thus, in Kleeberg v. Sipser, it was held that "where statements concerning plaintiff in his
professional capacity as attorney are susceptible, in their ordinary meaning, of such construction as would
tend to injure him in that capacity, they are libelous per se and (the) complaint, even in the absence of
allegation of special damage, states cause of action." Oral statements that a certain lawyer is 'unethical,' or a
false charge, dealing with office, trade, occupation, business or profession of a person charged, are
slanderous per se.
In the instant case, appellant-petitioner imputed the crime of estafa against a prominent lawyer one-time
Justice of the Peace and member of the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, a professor of law and for sometime
a president of the Nueva Ecija Bar Association. As the scurrilous imputation strikes deep into the character of
the victim, no special circumstance need be shown for the defamatory words uttered to be considered grave
oral defamation. In addition, the fact that the offended party is a lawyer, the totality of such words as
"kayabang", "tunaw ang utak", "swapang at estapador", imputed against him has the import of charging him
with dishonesty or improper practice in the performance of his duties, hence, actionable per se.
Decision: The decision was affirmed in toto.
People of the Philippines vs. Judge Orcullo 111 SCRA 609
Nature: petition for certiorari to review the order of the City Court of Cagayan de Oro.
Facts: On September 4, 1978, a special counsel in the Office of the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro filed an
information for Oral Defamation against private respondent for the derogatory remarks stated against Lydia
Flores in the presence and within the hearing of many people to wit: a hostess and a paramour, any kind of
penis had penetrated your vagina. After a plea of not guilty, private respondent filed a motion to squash
alleging that since the words uttered imputed to the offended party the crime of adultery, she being a married
woman, the crime can not be prosecuted de oficio but must be brought by complaint of the offended party as
provided in paragraph 5, Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code.

Respondent Judge dismissed the case. The City Fiscal filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied.
Issue: Whether or not the derogatory remarks- a hostess and a paramour, any kind of penis had penetrated
your vagina- imputes adultery or prostitution.
Held: The words quoted in the information did not impute adultery but prostitution which is public crime that
can be prosecuted de oficio.
Rationale: It must be pointed out that since the information does not allege the civil status of complainant as
married, she should be presumed to be single, and therefore the remarks must be understood as imputing
prostitution, and not adultery. Assuming arguendo that complainant is married and that the remarks, while
imputing acts of prostitution to her and in effect charged her with adultery, the information can still be filed
without her complaint.
It appearing from the recital of the information that the alleged defamatory remark by the accused specifically
imputed upon the offended party the commission of prostitution, which is a public crime that can be
prosecuted de oficio, the Information filed under the signature of the Assistant City Fiscal duly conferred
jurisdiction upon the lower court to try the case.
Still, for another reason, assuming arguendo that the adultery which is a private crime and prostitution which
is a public crime, are both imputed to complainant, criminal action may still be instituted without her complaint
because public interest, which is always paramount to private interest, so requires.
It must be noted that it is only when the derogatory remarks clearly and categorically reflect the elements
constituting adultery would the complaint for libel by the offended party be necessary to commence
prosecution. In this case, however, the derogatory remarks of accused-respondent, not only do not clearly
show the elements of adultery but on the contrary, such remarks indubitably impute the crimes of prostitution.
Therefore, the information for libel can be filed without the complaint of the offended party.
Decision: The petition is granted, the order dismissing Criminal Case No. 40117 of the City of Court of
Cagayan de Oro City is set aside and the respondent judge, Hon. Antonio Orcullo is ordered to reinstate said
criminal case and to try the same on the merits.
Slander by deed
People of the Philippines vs. Motita 59 OG 3020
Held: The common denominator present to unjust vexation, slander by deed and act of lasciviousness is
irritation or annoyance. Without any other concurring factor, the offense would be merely unjust vexation
because unjust vexation is equaled with anything that annoys or irritates another without justification. If in
addition to the irritation or annoyance, there was attendant publicity and dishonor or contempt, the offense
would be slander by deed. However, if in addition to the annoyance or irritation, there was presented any of
the circumstances provided for in article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, on rape, i.e., use of force or
intimidation, depravation of reason or otherwise rendering the offended party unconscious, or if the offended
party was under twelve years of age, together with lewd designs the crime would be act of lasciviousness.
Incriminating an innocent person
People of the Philippines vs. Alagao 16 SCRA 879
Nature: An appeal by the City Fiscal of Manila from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila sustaining
the motion to quash the information in its Criminal Case No. 66655 charging them of having committed the
complex crime of incriminatory machinations through unlawful arrest.
Facts: February 28, 1961, the said accused, being then members of the Manila Police Department,
incriminate or impute to one Marcial Apolonio y Santos the commission of the crime of bribery through
unlawful arrest, and while the latter was supposedly being investigated by the said accused, the said accused
did then and there place or commingle a marked P1.00 bill together with the money taken from said Marcial
Apolonio y Santos, supposedly given to the latter by one Emerita Calupas de Aresa, so that he, then an
employee of the Local Civil Registrar's Office of Manila, would appear to have agreed to perform an act not

constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of his duties, which was to expedite the issuance of a
birth certificate, thereby directly incriminating or imputing to Marcial Apolonio y Santos the commission of the
crime bribery. On October 25, 1962 the defendants, through counsel, moved to quash the information against
them
Issue: Were the accused guilty of incriminatory machinations through unlawful arrest?
HELD: YES.
Rationale: It is very apparent that by the use of the phrase "through unlawful arrest" in the information an idea
is conveyed that the unlawful arrest was resorted to as a necessary means to plant evidence in the person of
the offended party, thereby incriminating him. From a reading of the information we find a close connection
between the act of the accused in first unlawfully arresting the offended party and then investigating him; and
it was during that investigation that they planted incriminatory evidence against him. We agree with the
Solicitor General in his contention that the accused first had to resort to unlawful arrest in order to be able to
plant the P1.00 bill among the money taken from the offended party. We find merit in the following argument,
as stated in the brief of the Solicitor General:
Under the circumstances of the case, the accused had to arrest Marcial because it was the only way
that they could with facility detain him and, more importantly, search his person or effects and, in the
process, commingle therewith the marked peso bill. It should be observed that without detaining,
investigating and searching Marcial it would have been impossible, if not difficult, for the accused to
plant the marked one peso bill, because then they could not have simply held Marcial and placed the
marked one peso bill in his pocket, without the latter vigoriously protesting the act. Besides, if the
accused simply held Marcial and planted in his pockets the marked one peso bill without arresting
him, they could not have possibly accomplished their purpose, because Marcial would have surely
and easily discovered what they were up to. Indeed, the accused had to arrest Marcial, even in the
absence of a valid reason, so that under the semblance of a police investigation, they could get
whatever money was inside his pockets and include in it the marked one peso bill. In short, the
accused had to arrest Marcial so that he could be detained and pretending to investigate him, search
his person and thereby have the opportunity of planting the marked one peso bill among his
belongings.
In declaring that the information did not allege a complex crime the trial court expressed the view that the
alleged planting of evidence took place while the victim was already under investigation, "long after the
consummation of the alleged unlawful arrest." This observation of the trial court does not find support in the
allegations contained in the information in question. The statement in the information that the offended party
was investigated "after" the unlawful arrest does not necessarily convey the idea that the investigation took
place "long after" the arrest had been effected. It should be a matter of evidence first, before any conclusion is
arrived at: that the investigation, during which the incriminating evidence was planted, had taken place
immediately after the arrest or long after the arrest. The allegation in the information that the accused
committed the complex crime of incriminatory machinations thru unlawful arrest, and also the allegation that
the act of planting the incriminatory evidence took place during the supposed investigation after the unlawful
arrest, are basis for the logical assumption, in the absence of evidence, that the two acts imputed to the
accused that of unlawfully arresting and that of planting incriminatory evidence had closely followed
each other, and that the former was a necessary means to commit the latter.
Decision: The order appealed from was reversed and set aside, and this case was remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings.
Wiretapping (R.A. 4200)
Ganaan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 145 SCRA 112
Nature: Petition to review the decision of the Intermediate Appellate court
Facts: In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were
in the living room of complainants residence discussing theterms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct
assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had
decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico.

That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer to come to his office and advise him on
the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business
trip. According to the request, appellant went to the office of Laconico where he was briefed about the
problem. When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone
conversation through a telephone extension so as to heat personally the proposed conditions for the
settlement. Appellant heard complainant enumerate the conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct
assault. Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the
conditions. Laconico answered Yes. Complainant then told LAconico to wait for instructions on where to
deliver the money. Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the
office of the Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Col. Zuleta of the Criminal
Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the
money. When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents by agents
of the Philippine Constabulary.
Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P 8,000.00 for
the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for
robbery/ extortion which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation
without complainants consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the AntiWiretapping Act. After trial on the merits, the lower court, in a decision dated November 22, 1982, found both
Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic act No. 4200. The Intermediate Appellate Court
affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the communication between the complainant and accused
Laconico was private in nature and, therefore, covered by RA 4200; that the petitioner overheard such
communication without the knowledge and consent of the complainant and the extension telephone which
was used by the petitioner to overhear the telephone conversation between complainant and Laconico is
covered in the term device as provided in RA 4200.
Issue: Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the
Wiretapping Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of
communications between the two parties using a telephone line.
Held: No.
Rationale: Affirmance of the criminal conviction would, in effect, mean that a caller by merely using a
telephone line can force the listener to secrecy no matter how obscene, criminal, or annoying the call may be.
It would be the word of the caller against the listeners. Because of the technical problems caused by the
sensitive nature of electronic equipment and the extra heavy loads which telephone cables are made to carry
in certain areas, telephone users often encounter what are called crossed lines. An unwary citizen who
happens to pick up his telephone and who overhears the details of a crime might hesitate to inform police
authorities if he knows that he could be accused under RA 4200 of using his own telephone to secretly
overhear the private communications of the would be criminals. Surely the law was never intended for such
mischievous results.
The law refers to a tap of a wire or cable or the use of a device or arrangement for the purpose of secretly
overhearing, intercepting or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interception
through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or
record the spoken words. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a Dictaphone,
dictograph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered
as tapping the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for
that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.
Hence, the phrase device or arrangement in section 1 of RA 4200, although not exclusive to that
enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is,
instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to
instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard
because by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping,
intercepting or recoding a telephone conversation. An extension telephone is an instrument which is very
common especially now when the extended unit does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone
but can be moved from place to place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely presume
that the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension telephone and he runs the
risk of a third party listening as in the case of a party line or a telephone unit which shares its line with
another.

It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as
government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather
evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone
users. Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must be with the use of the
enumerated devices in RA 4200 or other similar nature. The court held that an extension telephone is not
among such devices or arrangements.
Decision: Petitioner was acquitted of the crime of violation of RA 4200 known as Anti-wiretapping Act.
Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals 248 SCRA 590
Facts: A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office,
allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to
petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy."
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages,
attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests
and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was
culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related
violations of private communication, and other purposes."
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" that the applicable provision of Republic Act
4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She
contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other
than those involved in the communication. In relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of
the conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a
violation of R.A. 4200. Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private
communication," not a "private conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her
conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act.
Issue: Was there a violation of R.A. 4200?
Held: YES.
Rationale: Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device
or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken
word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the
parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder.
The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party
other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all
persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently,
as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records
his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" under this
provision of R.A. 4200.
What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a
secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an
offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.

Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not
include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of
absurdity. The word communicate comes from the Latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart."
In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the "process by
which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as
language signs or gestures)". These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or
expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged
exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's
office.
Decision: The accused violated R.A. 4200.
Quasi-offenses
Carillo vs. People of the Philippines 229 SCRA 590
Nature: A review from the decision of the CA affirming the RTCs decision finding petitioner guilty of simple
negligence resulting in homicide.
Facts: Catherine Acosta, 13 years old, was suffering from acute pain in the lower part of her abdomen. It was
appendicitis. Dr. Madrid, a surgeon, operated on the girl while Dr. Carillo assisted him. Dr. Carillo, contrary to
SOP, did not weigh the girl before administering the anesthesia to her. Apparently the child suffered from an
overdose of Nubain. The child later went on a coma and died after three days.
RTC and CA found Dr. Carillo guilty of simple negligence resulting in homicide.
Issue: Was the conviction correct?
Held: YES.
Rationale: Simple imprudence is defined as mere lack of precaution in a situation where either the
threatened harm is not immediate or the danger not openly visible. Put in another way, the gravamen of the
offense of simple imprudence is the failure to exercise the due diligence called for by the situation which was
not immediately life-destructive, but which culminated in the present case in the death of a human being, in
this case the victim Catherine.
Decision: Decision of CA and RTC affirmed with modification as to the amount of damages.
Other cases:
Lozano v. Martinez G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986
Nature: Petitions to declare BP# 22 unconstitutional.
Facts: Petitioners, charged with Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22), popularly known as the Bouncing Check
Law, assailed the law's constitutionality.
BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the
time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said
check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency
of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." The penalty prescribed for the offense is imprisonment of not less
than 30 days nor more than one year or a fine or not less than the amount of the check nor more than double
said amount, but in no case to exceed P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of
the court.
The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain
a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date
appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the

insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment. Since this
involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption of such
knowledge where payment of the check "is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit
with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check. To mitigate the harshness
of the law in its application, the statute provides that such presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking
days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of the
check by the bank or pays the holder the amount of the check.
Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of evidence, provides that the introduction in
evidence of the unpaid and dishonored check with the drawee bank's refusal to pay "stamped or written
thereon or attached thereto, giving the reason therefor, "shall constitute prima facie proof of "the making or
issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof ... for
the reason written, stamped or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check."
The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of course to present proof to the
contrary to overcome the said presumptions.
Issues:
1. Whether or not BP 22 violates the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt.
2. Whether or not BP 22 impairs the freedom to contract.
3. Whether or not it violates the equal protection clause.
Held 1: No.
Rationale: The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an
obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The
thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them
in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly
involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not
only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.
The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and
issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.
Held 2: No.
Rationale: The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful"
contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks
can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age,
has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely
free from the regulatory power of the state.
Held 3: No.
Rationale: Petitioners contended that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the
check, since without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would
be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both
the swindler and the swindled. Moreover, the clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may
be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is no unreasonable or arbitrary.
Decision: Petitions were dismissed. The constitutionality of BP# 22 was upheld.
Vaca vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 131714 November 16, 1998

Nature: Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the petitioners conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 100) for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as the
"Bouncing Checks Law."
Facts: Petitioner Eduardo R. Vaca is the president and owner of Ervine International, Inc. (Ervine), which is
engaged in the manufacture and sale of refrigeration equipment, while his son-in-law, petitioner Fernando
Nieto, is the firm's purchasing manager. On March 10, 1988, petitioners issued a check for P10,000.00 to the
General Agency for Reconnaissance, Detection, and Security, Inc. (GARDS) in partial payment of the security
services rendered by GARDS to Ervine. The check was drawn on the China Banking Corporation (CBC).
When deposited in the Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIBank) branch at Shaw Boulevard,
Mandaluyong, the check was dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
On March 29, 1988, GARDS wrote Ervine a letter in which it demanded payment in cash of the amount of the
check within seven days from notice. The letter was received by Ervine on the same day, but petitioners did
not pay within the time given.
On April 13, 1988, petitioners issued a check for P19,860.16 to GARDS. The check was drawn on the
Associated Bank. The voucher accompanying it stated that the check was to replace the dishonored check,
the P9,860.16 balance being partial payment for Ervine's outstanding account. The check and the voucher
were received by a GARDS messenger, Nolan C. Pena, on April 15, 1988, but GARDS did not return the
dishonored check.
On April 14, 1988, GARDS Operations Manager Jovito C. Cabusara filed a criminal complaint against
petitioners for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. However, the case was dismissed by the court on the ground that
Ervine had already paid the amount of the check.
On September 18, 1989, GARDS, through its Acting Operations Manager Eduardo B. Alindaya, filed another
complaint for violation of B.P. Bldg. 22 against petitioners. This resulted in the filing of an information against
petitioners in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 100). After trial, petitioners were found guilty of
the charge and each was sentenced to suffer one (1) year imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000.00 and
the costs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition. Petitioners prayed that
the case against them be dismissed or, in the alternative, that the decision of the trial court be modified by
sentencing each to an increased fine but without imprisonment. They also submitted an affidavit of desistance
executed by GARDS president Dominador R. Santiago which states that the case arose from a mere
"accounting difference" between petitioners and GARDS, that the latter had not really suffered any damage as
a result of the issuance of the check in question and, that GARDS was no longer interested in prosecuting the
case. Petitioners also invoked the recent decision in Lao v. Court of Appeals, 3 in which this Court reversed a
conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 upon a showing that the accused had no knowledge of the insufficiency
of funds.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the ruling of Lao vs. Court of Appeals is applicable in this case.
2. Whether or not the petitioners contention that the case arose from a mere "accounting difference" between
petitioners and GARDS, that the latter had not really suffered any damage as a result of the issuance of the
check in question and, that GARDS was no longer interested in prosecuting the case is tenable.
3. Whether or not petitioners prayer that the penalty be modified by deleting the sentence of imprisonment
and, in lieu thereof a fine in an increased amount be imposed on them should be granted.
Held 1: No.
Rationale: The elements of the offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22 are: (1) making, drawing, and issuance
of any check to apply to account or for value; (2) knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of
issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full
upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit, or dishonor of the check for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered
the bank to stop paymnent. 4 The maker's knowledge is presumed from the dishonor of the check for
insufficiency of funds. 5 Thus, 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 expressly provides:
Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making, drawing and issuance of a check

payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when
presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of
such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due
thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days
after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
In this case, after being notified on March 29, 1988 of the dishonor of their previous check, petitioners gave
GARDS a check for P19,860.16. They claimed that this check had been intended by them to replace the bad
check they had previously issued to the GARDS. Based on the testimony of a GARDS accountant, however,
the Court of Appeals found that the check was actually payment for two bills, one for the period of January 16
to January 31, 1988 in the amount of P9,930.08 and another one for the period of March 16 to March 31,
1988 in the same amount. But even if such check was intended to replace the bad one, its issuance on April
13, 1988 15 days after petitioners had been notified on March 29, 1988 of the dishonor of their previous
check cannot negate the presumption that petitioners knew of the insufficiency of funds to cover the
amount of their previous check. Sec. 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 requires that such check be given within five (5) days
from the notice of dishonor to them.
Petitioners contend that, in accordance with the ruling in Lao v. Court of Appeals, 6 they should be acquitted
because the preparation of checks is the responsibility of the company accountant and all they do is sign the
checks. They claim that they rely on the word of the accountant that there are sufficient funds in the bank to
pay for the checks. In the Lao case, the accused had merely been made by her employer, Premiere
Investment House, to countersign checks in bank. The accused was a mere employee who did not have
anything to do with the issuance of checks for the company. Moreover, no notice of dishonor was given to her
as required by B.P. Blg. 22 2.
Petitioners in this case cannot pretend ignorance of the insufficiency of funds. While it may be true that it was
the company's accountant who actually prepared the rubber check, the fact remains that petitioners are the
owners and officers of the company. Sec. 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides that "Where the check is drawn by a
corporation, company, or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer
shall be liable under this Act. In fact, petitioner Nieto testified that after the check in question was dishonored,
he instructed their company accountant to prepare a replacement check. This belied petitioners' claim that
they had no hand in the preparation of checks and shows that petitioners were in control of the finances of the
company.
Held 2: No.
Rationale: After prosecuting the case below with tenacity, complainants going so far as to file another
complaint after their first one had been dismissed, it is trifling with this Court for complainants to now assert
that the filing of their case was simply a mistake. It is for reasons such as this the affidavit of desistance, like
retractions, are generally disfavored. 9 The affidavit in this case, which was made after petitioners' conviction,
is nothing but a last-minute attempt to save them from punishment. Even if the payee suffered no damage as
a result of the issuance of the bouncing check, the damage to the integrity of the banking system cannot be
denied. Damage to the payee is not an element of the crime punished in B.P. Blg. 22.
Held 3: Yes.
Rationale: B.P. Blg. 22, 1, par. 1 provides a penalty of "imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more
than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than, but not more than double, the amount of the check which fine
shall in no case esceed two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of
the Court." Petitioners are first-time offenders. They are Filipino entrepreneurs who presumably contribute to
the national economy. Apparently, they brought this appeal, believing in all good faith, although mistakenly,
that they had not committed a violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise, they could simply have accepted the
judgment of the trial court and applied for probation to evade a prison term. It would best serve the ends of
criminal justice if in fixing the penalty within the range of discretion allowed by 1, par. 1, the same philosophy
underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed, namely, that of redeeming valuable human material
and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the
protection of the social order.
Decision: the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modification that the sentence of
imprisonment is deleted and petitioners are each ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 equivalent to double the
amount of the check.

People vs. Cora Abella Ojeda G.R. Nos. 104238-58. June 3, 2004
Nature: Petition for review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 38 convicting Cora
Abella Ojeda of the crime of Estafa as defined and penalized under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act 4885.
Facts: Appellant Cora Abella Ojeda used to buy fabrics (telas) from complainant Ruby Chua. For the three
years approximately she transacted business with Chua, appellant used postdated checks to pay for the
fabrics she bought. On November 5, 1983, appellant purchased from Chua various fabrics and textile
materials worth P228,306 for which she issued 22 postdated checks bearing different dates and amounts.
Chua later presented to the bank for payment check no. 033550 dated November 5, 1983 in the amount of
P17,1003 but it was dishonored due to "Account Closed." On April 10, 1984, Chua deposited the rest of the
checks but all were dishonored for the same reason. Demands were allegedly made on the appellant to make
good the dishonored checks, to no avail.
Estafa and BP 22 charges were thereafter filed against appellant. On the whole, appellants defense was
grounded on good faith or absence of deceit, lack of notice of dishonor and full payment of the total amount of
the checks.
With the exception of six checks which did not bear her signature, appellant admitted that she issued the
postdated checks which were the subject of the criminal cases against her. She, however, alleged that she
told Chua not to deposit the postdated checks on maturity as they were not yet sufficiently funded. Appellant
also claimed that she made partial payments to Chua in the form of finished garments worth P50,000. This
was not rebutted by the prosecution.
The trial court convicted appellant of the crime of estafa as defined and penalized under paragraph 2(d) of
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and sentenced her to reclusion perpetua. The trial court also
convicted appellant of violation of BP 22 for issuing bouncing checks. However, the court a quo held her guilty
of only 14 counts out of the 22 bouncing checks issued since out of of the 22 checks, two of them were not
covered by the indictment while the six checks were not signed by the accused but by the latters husband.
The accused should not be liable for the issuance of the 6 checks in the absence of any showing of
conspiracy.
Appellant appealed to this Court, seeking acquittal. She contended that the element of deceit thru abuse of
confidence or false pretenses was not present. She asserted that good faith on her part was a valid defense
to rebut the prima facie presumption of deceit when she issued the checks that subsequently bounced.
Further, Appellant also denied that she received any notice of dishonor of the checks. She was not even
aware that cases had already been filed against her for violation of BP 22. Since there was allegedly no proof
of notice of the dishonor of the checks, appellant claimed that she cannot be convicted of violation of BP 22.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the element of deceit thru abuse of confidence or false pretenses was present.
2. Whether or not there was lack of notice of dishonor.
Held 1: No, the element of deceit was not present in the case.
Rationale: Under paragraph 2 (d) of Article 315 of the RPC, as amended by RA 4885,20 the elements of
estafa are: (1) a check is postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the time it is issued;
(2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; (3) damage to the payee thereof. Deceit and damage are
essential elements of the offense and must be established by satisfactory proof to warrant conviction. Thus,
the drawer of the dishonored check is given three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor to cover the
amount of the check. Otherwise a prima facie presumption of deceit arises.
The prosecution failed to prove deceit in this case. The prima facie presumption of deceit was successfully
rebutted by appellants evidence of good faith, a defense in estafa by postdating a check. Good faith may be
demonstrated, for instance, by a debtors offer to arrange a payment scheme with his creditor. In this case,
the debtor not only made arrangements for payment; as complainant herself categorically stated, the debtorappellant fully paid the entire amount of the dishonored checks.
Held 2: Yes, there was lack of notice of dishonor.

Rationale:The prosecution claimed that the demand letter was sent by registered mail. To prove this, it
presented a copy of the demand letter as well as the registry return receipt bearing a signature which was,
however, not even authenticated or identified. A registry receipt alone is insufficient as proof of mailing.26
"Receipts for registered letters and return receipts do not prove themselves; they must be properly
authenticated in order to serve as proof of receipt of the letters."27
It is clear from the foregoing that complainant merely presumed that appellant received the demand letter
prepared and sent by her lawyer. She was not certain if appellant indeed received the notice of dishonor of
the checks. All she knew was that a demand letter was sent by her lawyer to the appellant. In fact, right after
complainant made that presumption, her lawyer filed the criminal cases against appellant at the Fiscals
office28 without any confirmation that the demand letter supposedly sent through registered mail was actually
received by appellant.
With the evident lack of notice of dishonor of the checks, appellant cannot be held guilty of violation of BP 22.
The lack of such notice violated appellants right to procedural due process. "It is a general rule that when
service of notice is an issue, the person alleging that the notice was served must prove the fact of service."29
The burden of proving receipt of notice rests upon the party asserting it and the quantum of proof required for
conviction in this criminal case is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
When, during the trial, appellant denied having received the demand letter, it became incumbent upon the
prosecution to prove that the demand letter was indeed sent through registered mail and that the same was
received by appellant. But it did not. Obviously, it relied merely on the weakness of the evidence of the
defense.
The responsibility under BP 22 was personal to appellant; hence, personal knowledge of the notice of
dishonor was necessary. Consequently, while there may have been constructive notice to appellant regarding
the insufficiency of her funds in the bank, it was not enough to satisfy the requirements of procedural due
process.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that notice of dishonor is required under both par. 2(d) Art. 315 of the RPC and
Sec. 2 of BP 22. While the RPC prescribes that the drawer of the check must deposit the amount needed to
cover his check within three days from receipt of notice of dishonor, BP 22, on the other hand, requires the
maker or drawer to pay the amount of the check within five days from receipt of notice of dishonor. Under both
laws, notice of dishonor is necessary for prosecution (for estafa and violation of BP 22). Without proof of
notice of dishonor, knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot be presumed and no crime (whether estafa or
violation of BP 22) can be deemed to exist.
Decision: The decision of the trial court was REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Cora Abella Ojeda was
ACQUITTED.
Decision: The decision of the trial court was REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Cora Abella Ojeda was
ACQUITTED.