UERMMMC V Laguesma
UERMMMC V Laguesma
UERMMMC V Laguesma
to the extent that they periodically make the grade, making the situation quite
unique as far as physicians undergoing post-graduate residencies and
fellowships are concerned.
Same; Same; Same; The nature of the contracts of resident physicians meets
traditional tests for determining employer-employee relationships, but because
the focus of residency is training, they are neither here nor there.While
physicians (or consultants) of specialist rank are not subject to the same
stringent evaluation procedures, specialty societies require continuing education
as a requirement for accreditation in good standing, in addition to peer review
processes based on performance, mortality and morbidity audits, feedback from
residents, interns and medical students and research output. The nature of the
contracts of resident physicians meet traditional tests for determining employeremployee relationships, but because the focus of residency is training, they are
neither here nor there. Moreover, stringent standards and requirements for
renewal of specialist-rank positions or
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Felix vs. Buenaseda
hurdling the Medical Licensure Examinations) prior to his recognition as a
specialist or sub-specialist in a given field.
Same; Same; Same; The upward movement from residency to specialist rank,
institutionalized in the residency training process, guarantees minimum
standards and skills and ensures that the physician claiming to be a specialist
will not be set loose on the community without the basic knowledge and skills of
his specialty.A physician who desires to specialize in Cardiology takes a
required three-year accredited residency in Internal Medicine (four years in DOH
hospitals) and moves on to a two or three-year fellowship or residency in
Cardiology before he is allowed to take the specialty examinations given by the
appropriate accrediting college. In a similar manner, the accredited Psychiatrist
goes through the same stepladder process which culminates in his recognition
as a fellow or diplomate (or both) of the Psychiatry Specialty Board. This upward
movement from residency to specialist rank, institutionalized in the residency
training process, guarantees minimum standards and skills and ensures that the
physician claiming to be a specialist will not be set loose on the community
without the basic knowledge and skills of his specialty. Because acceptance and
promotion requirements are stringent, competitive, and based on merit,
acceptance to a first year residency program is no guaranty that the physician
will complete the program. Attrition rates are high. Some programs are
pyramidal. Promotion to the next post-graduate year is based on merit and
performance determined by periodic evaluations and examinations of
knowledge, skills and bedside manner. Under this system, residents, specially
those in university teaching hospitals enjoy their right to security of tenure only
the fact that petitioner made no attempt to oppose earlier renewals of his
temporary Specialist I contracts in 1989 and 1990, clearly demonstrating his
acquiescence toif not his unqualified acceptance ofthe promotion (albeit of a
temporary nature) made in 1988. Whatever objections petitioner had against the
earlier change from the status of permanent senior resident physician to
temporary senior resident physician were neither pursued nor mentioned at or
after his designation as Medical Specialist I (Temporary). He is therefore
estopped from insisting upon a right or claim which he had plainly abandoned
when he, from all indications, enthusiastically accepted the promotion, His
negligence to assert his claim within a reasonable time, coupled with his failure
to
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repudiate his promotion to a temporary position, warrants a presumption, in the
words of this Court in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, that he either abandoned (his
claim) or declined to assert it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Civil Service Law; Weighty reasons of public
policy and convenience demand that any claim to any position in the civil
service, permanent, temporary or otherwise, or any claim to a violation of the
constitutional provision on security of tenure be made within a reasonable
period of time.There are weighty reasons of public policy and convenience
which demand that any claim to any position in the civil service, permanent,
temporary or otherwise, or any claim to a violation of the constitutional provision
on security of tenure be made within a reasonable period of time. An assurance
of some degree of stability in the civil service is necessary in order to avoid
needless disruptions in the conduct of public business. Delays in the statement
of a right to any position are strongly discouraged.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Laches; The essence of laches is the
failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier.In
the same token, the failure to assert a claim or the voluntary acceptance of
another position in government, obviously without reservation, leads to a
presumption that the civil servant has either given up his claim or has already
settled into the new position. This is the essence of laches which is the failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The change in designation from permanent
resident physician to temporary resident physician was necessary to rectify a
ludicrous situation whereby some government resident physicians were
erroneously being classified as permanent resident physicians in spite of the
inherently temporary nature of the designation.ln the specific case of the
5. As amended, the other provisions of Department Order No. 34/s. 1988 stands.
Petitioner was one of the hundreds of government medical specialists who would
have been adversely affected by Department Order No. 347 since he was not
yet accredited by the Psychiatry Specialty Board. Under Department Order No.
478, extension of his appointment remained subject to the guidelines set by the
said department order. On August 22, 1991, after reviewing petitioners service
record and performance, the Medical Credentials Committee of the National
Center for Mental Health recommended non-renewal of his appointment as
Medical Specialist I, informing him of its decision on August 22,1991. He was,
however, allowed to continue in the service, and receive his salary, allowances
and other benefits even after being informed of the termination of his
appointment.
On November 25, 1991, an emergency meeting of the Chiefs of Service was held
to discuss, among other matters, the petitioners case. In the said meeting Dr.
Vismindo de Grecia, petitioners immediate supervisor, pointed out petitioners
poor performance, frequent tardiness and inflexibility as among the factors
responsible for the recommendation not to renew his appointment.9 With one
exception, other department heads present in the
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9 Id., at p. 100, Annex 2.
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meeting expressed the same opinion,10 and the overwhelming concensus was
for non-renewal. The matter was thereafter referred to the Civil Service
Commission, which on February 28, 1992 ruled that the temporary appointment
(of petitioner) as Medical Specialist I can be terminated at any time . . . and
that [a]ny renewal of such appointment is within the discretion of the
appointing authority.11 Consequently, in a memorandum dated March 25, 1992
petitioner was advised by hospital authorities to vacate his cottage since he was
no longer entitled to accommodation. Refusing to comply with said
memorandum petitioner filed a petition with the Merit System Protection Board
(MSPB) complaining about the alleged harassment by respondents and
questioning the non-renewal of his appointment. In a Decision rendered on July
29, 1992, the (MSPB) dismissed petitioners complaint for lack of merit, finding
that:
As an apparent incident of the power to appoint, the renewal of a temporary
appointment upon or after its expiration is a matter largely addressed to the
sound discretion of the appointing authority. In this case, there is no dispute that
Complainant was a temporary employee and his appointment expired on August
22, 1991. This being the case, his re-appointment to his former position or the
renewal of his temporary appointment would be determined solely by the proper
appointing authority who is the Secretary, Department of Health upon the
favorable recommendation of the Chief of Hospital III, NCMH. The Supreme Court
in the case of Central Bank vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. Nos. 8045556
dated April 10, 1989, held as follows:
The power of appointment is essentially a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.
In this light, Complainant therefore, has no basis in law to assail the non-renewal
of his expired temporary appointment much less invoke the aid of this board for
that purpose since this Board cannot substitute its judgment to that of the
appointing authority nor direct the latter to issue an appointment in the
complainants favor.
Regarding the alleged Department Order secured by the complainant from the
Department of Health (DOH), the Board finds the same inconsequential. Said
Department Order merely allowed the extension of tenure of Medical Specialist I
for a certain period but does
_______________
10 Id., at 100104.
11 CSC Resolution No. 92347, February 28, 1992.
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Felix vs. Buenaseda
not mandate the renewal of the expired appointment.
The Board likewise finds as baseless complainants allegation of harassment. It
should be noted that the subsistence, quarters and laundry benefits provided to
the Complainant were in connection with his employment with the NCMH. Now
that his employment ties with the said agency are severed, he eventually loses
his right to the said benefits. Hence, the Hospital Management has the right to
take steps to prevent him from the continuous enjoyment thereof, including the
occupancy of the said cottage, after his cessation from office.
In sum, the actuations of Dr. Buenaseda and Lt. Col. Balez are not shown to have
been tainted with any legal infirmity, thus rendering as baseless, this instant
complaint.
Said decision was appealed to the Civil Service Commission which dismissed the
same in its Resolution dated December 1, 1992. Motion for Reconsideration was
denied in CSC Resolution No. 93677 dated February 3, 1993, hence this appeal,
in which petitioner interposes the following assignments of errors:
I
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
BY SUBMITTING HIS COURTESY RESIGNATION AND ACCEPTING HIS TEMPORARY
APPOINTMENT PETITIONER HAD EFFECTIVELY DIVESTED HIMSELF OF HIS
SECURITY OF TENURE, CONSIDERING THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF SUCH COURTESY
RESIGNATION AND ACCEPTANCE OF APPOINTMENT.
II
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The nature of the contracts of resident physicians meet traditional tests for
determining employer-employee relationships, but because the focus of
residency is training, they are neither here nor there. Moreover, stringent
standards and requirements for renewal of specialist-rank positions or for
promotion to the next post-graduate residency year are necessary because lives
are ultimately at stake.
Petitioners insistence on being reverted back to the status quo prior to the
reorganizations made pursuant to Executive Order No. 119 would therefore be
akin to a college student asking to be sent back to high school and staying
there. From the position of senior resident physician, which he held at the time
of the government reorganization, the next logical step in the stepladder process
was obviously his promotion to the rank of Medical Specialist I, a position which
he apparently accepted not only because of the increase in salary and rank but
because of the prestige and status which the promotion conferred upon him in
the medical community. Such status, however, clearly carried with it certain
professional responsibilities including the responsibility of keeping up with the
minimum requirements of specialty rank, the responsibility of keeping abreast
with current knowledge in his specialty and in Medicine in general, and the
responsibility of completing board certification requirements within a reasonable
period of time. The evaluation made by petitioners peers and superiors clearly
showed that he was deficient in a lot of areas, in addition to the fact that at the
time of his non-renewal, he was not even board-certified.
It bears emphasis that at the time of petitioners promotion to the position of
Medical Specialist I (temporary) in August of 1988, no objection was raised by
him about the change of position or the temporary nature of the designation.
The pretense of objecting to the promotion to specialist rank apparently came
only as an afterthought, three years later, following the nonrenewal of his
position by the Department of Health.
We lay stress to the fact that petitioner made no attempt to oppose earlier
renewals of his temporary Specialist I contracts in 1989 and 1990, clearly
demonstrating his acquiescence toif not his unqualified acceptance ofthe
promotion (albeit of a temporary nature) made in 1988. Whatever objections
petitioner had against the earlier change from the status of permanent senior
resident
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physician to temporary senior resident physician were neither pursued nor
mentioned at or after his designation as Medical Specialist I (Temporary). He is
therefore estopped from insisting upon a right or claim which he had plainly