Aldovino Jr., vs.

COMELEC
G.R. No. 184836
December 23,2009
Brion, J.
Facts:

The respondent Wilfredo Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms (1998-2001,
2001-2004, and 2004-2007). In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan
preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced.This Court, however,
subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office
and finished his term.

In the 2007 election, Asilo again wanted to run for the same office (making this his 4 th consecutive term). So, the
petitioners opposed the certificate of candidacy or moved to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and
had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.

The COMELEC ruled in favor of Asilo reasoning that the three term limit rule does not apply as Asilos third term was
interrupted by the preventive suspension (90 days ra baya to). COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether Asilos preventive suspension constituted an interruption that allowed him to run for a 4th term.
Ruling: NO.
Before the legal basis, the court discussed on the following:
A. The Three Term Limit Rule (Constitutional Provision Analyzed)
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
Section 43 (b) of RA 7160 practically repeats the constitutional provision, and any difference in wording does not
assume any significance in this case.

The said constitutional provision contains two branches: (1) Fixing the term of the local official and limits his stay in
the office to no more than three consecutive terms; and (2) the express initiative to prevent any circumvention of the
limitation through voluntary severance of ties with the public office. This declaration complements the term limitation
mandated by the first branch.

FIRST BRANCH
TERM- in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer may
hold an office. According to Mechem, the term of office is the period during which an office may be held. Upon
expiration of the officers term, unless he is authorized by law to holdover, his rights, duties and authority as a public
officer must ipso facto cease. In the law of public officers, the most and natural frequent method by which a public
officer ceases to be such is by the expiration of the terms for which he was elected or appointed.
A later case, Gaminde v. Commission on Audit, reiterated that "[T]he term means the time during which the officer
may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one
another."
The "limitation" under this first branch of the provision is expressed in the negative "no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms." This formulation no more than three consecutive terms is a clear command
suggesting the existence of an inflexible rule. While it gives no exact indication of what to "serve. . . three consecutive
terms" exactly connotes, the meaning is clear reference is to the term, not to the service that a public official may
render.1awphi1 In other words, the limitation refers to the term.

SECOND BRANCH
The second branch relates to the provisions express initiative to prevent any circumvention of the limitation through
voluntary severance of ties with the public office; it expressly states that voluntary renunciation of office "shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected." This
declaration complements the term limitation mandated by the first branch.
A notable feature of the second branch is that it does not textually state that voluntary renunciation is the only actual
interruption of service that does not affect "continuity of service for a full term" for purposes of the three-term limit
rule. It is a pure declaratory statement of what does not serve as an interruption of service for a full term, but the
phrase "voluntary renunciation," by itself, is not without significance in determining constitutional intent.

Meaning of Renunciation in the Second Clause:

The word "renunciation" carries the dictionary meaning of abandonment. To renounce is to give up, abandon,
decline, or resign. It is an act that emanates from its author, as contrasted to an act that operates from the outside.
Read with the definition of a "term" in mind, renunciation, as mentioned under the second branch of the constitutional
provision, cannot but mean an act that results in cutting short the term, i.e., the loss of title to office. The descriptive
word "voluntary" linked together with "renunciation" signifies an act of surrender based on the surenderees own
freely exercised will; in other words, a loss of title to office by conscious choice. In the context of the three-term limit
rule, such loss of title is not considered an interruption because it is presumed to be purposely sought to avoid the
application of the term limitation.

The court ascertained the intent of the framers of the Constitution, and based from their deliberations was
able to adduce that the intent for the use of the phrase voluntary renunciation was to broaden the scope of
the voluntary acts to include not only abandonment and resignation, but all other acts that would interrupt
the three-term rule done voluntarily by the local officials. Based on this, the Court decided to give the said
provision a strict construction.

B. Jurisprudence on the Three-Term Limit Rule

1. Lonzanida vs. COMELEC: The local official was interrupted in his service pursuant to a writ of execution
ordered by COMELEC for him to vacate the position as he was not the entitled person to it, having lost the
election. The two requisites for the application of the rule, (1) . That the official concerned has been elected
for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and (2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms were not present. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced
term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any
length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of
service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by
voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the
COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of
service.

2. Ong vs. Alegre and Rivera vs. COMELEC: Unlike in the Lonzanida case, the officials here were only held
to be not entitled to the position after the end of the term so that they were never effectively unseated. the
Court concluded that there was nevertheless an election and service for a full term in contemplation of the
three-term rule based on the following premises: (1) the final decision that the third-termer lost the election
was without practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term of the contested
office had expired; and (2) the official assumed and continuously exercised the functions of the office from
the start to the end of the term. In the same vein, the Court in Rivera rejected the theory that the official who
finally lost the election contest was merely a "caretaker of the office" or a mere "de facto officer." The Court
obeserved that Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated and its purpose defeated when an official
fully served in the same position for three consecutive terms. Whether as "caretaker" or "de facto" officer, he
exercised the powers and enjoyed the perquisites of the office that enabled him "to stay on indefinitely."
Ong and Rivera are important rulings for purposes of the three-term limitation because of what they directly
imply. Although the election requisite was not actually present, the Court still gave full effect to the threeterm limitation because of the constitutional intent to strictly limit elective officials to service for three
terms. By so ruling, the Court signalled how zealously it guards the three-term limit rule. Effectively, these
cases teach us to strictly interpret the term limitation rule in favor of limitation rather than its exception.

3. Adormeo vs. COMELEC: Effect of Recall on the three term limit rule disqualification. The case presented
the question of whether the disqualification applies if the official lost in the regular election for the supposed
third term, but was elected in a recall election covering that term. Not elected for three terms, because for
nearly two years, the official was a private citizen; hence, the continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by
his defeat in the election for the third term.

4. Socrates vs. COMELEC: Effect of Recall. Hagedorn run for 4th term (under a recall election). Court ruled in
his favor: a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three
consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of
service.
Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three
consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as
long as the reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election midway in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate
reelection after the third term.

5. Latasa vs. COMELEC: whether a municipal mayor who had fully served for three consecutive terms could
run as city mayor in light of the intervening conversion of the municipality into a city.

The Court ruled that the conversion of the municipality into a city did not convert the office of the municipal
mayor into a local government post different from the office of the city mayor the territorial jurisdiction of
the city was the same as that of the municipality; the inhabitants were the same group of voters who elected
the municipal mayor for 3 consecutive terms; and they were the same inhabitants over whom the municipal
mayor held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years.

Latasa instructively highlights, after a review of Lonzanida, Adormeo and Socrates, that no three-term limit violation
results if a rest period or break in the service between terms or tenure in a given elective post intervened.
InLonzanida, the petitioner was a private citizen with no title to any elective office for a few months before the next
mayoral elections. Similarly, in Adormeo and Socrates, the private respondents lived as private citizens for two years
and fifteen months, respectively. Thus, these cases establish that the law contemplates a complete break from
office during which the local elective official steps down and ceases to exercise power or authority over the
inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.

6. Montebon vs. COMELEC: The common thread that identifies Montebon with the rest, however, is that the
elective official vacated the office of councilor and assumed the higher post of vice-mayor by operation of
law. Thus, for a time he ceased to be councilor an interruption that effectively placed him outside the ambit
of the three-term limit rule.

CONCLUSION:
From all the above, we conclude that the "interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the threeterm limit rule is one that involves no less than the INVOLUNTARY LOSS OF TITLE TO OFFICE. The elective
official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur.
This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an
elective officials continuous stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms, using "voluntary renunciation" as
an example and standard of what does not constitute an interruption.
Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is an effective interruption of
service within a term, as we held in Montebon. On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to
exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective
interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from
holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his
office for a reason provided by law.

An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost the right to hold on to his office, and
cannot be equated with the failure to render service. The latter occurs during an office holders term when he retains
title to the office but cannot exercise his functions for reasons established by law. Of course, the term "failure to
serve" cannot be used once the right to office is lost; without the right to hold office or to serve, then no service can
be rendered so that none is really lost.
What the constitution proscribes is the interruption of term, not the interruption of exercise of powers of the
elective position. Indeed, the law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps down from
office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local
government unit.

PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION:
Preventive suspension whether under the Local Government Code,17 the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,18or
the Ombudsman Act19 is an interim remedial measure to address the situation of an official who have been charged
administratively or criminally, where the evidence preliminarily indicates the likelihood of or potential for eventual guilt
or liability.
Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from performing the functions of his
office and does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office
is a consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.

While a temporary incapacity in the exercise of power results, no position is vacated when a public official is
preventively suspended. This was what exactly happened to Asilo.

Term limitation and preventive suspension are two vastly different aspects of an elective officials service in office and
they do not overlap. As already mentioned above, preventive suspension involves protection of the service and of the
people being served, and prevents the office holder from temporarily exercising the power of his office. Term
limitation, on the other hand, is triggered after an elective official has served his three terms in office without any
break. Its companion concept interruption of a term on the other hand, requires loss of title to office. If preventive
suspension and term limitation or interruption have any commonality at all, this common point may be with respect to
the discontinuity of service that may occur in both. But even on this point, they merely run parallel to each other and
never intersect; preventive suspension, by its nature, is a temporary incapacity to render service during an
unbroken term; in the context of term limitation, interruption of service occurs after there has been a break in the
term.

The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the
lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.

RULING:
To recapitulate, Asilos 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-imposed preventive suspension in
2005, as preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective officials term. Thus, the COMELEC refused to apply
the legal command of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution when it granted due course to Asilos certificate of
candidacy for a prohibited fourth term. By so refusing, the COMELEC effectively committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; its action was a refusal to perform a positive duty required by no less than
the Constitution and was one undertaken outside the contemplation of law.

FULL TEXT
G.R. No. 184836

December 23, 2009

SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., DANILO B. FALLER AND FERDINAND N. TALABONG, Petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND WILFREDO F. ASILO, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term of office for
purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b)
of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160, or the Local Government Code)?
The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive suspension is an
effective interruption because it renders the suspended public official unable to provide complete
service for the full term; thus, such term should not be counted for the purpose of the three-term limit
rule.
The present petition1 seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
THE ANTECEDENTS

The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive
terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or
during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in
relation with a criminal case he then faced.This Court, however, subsequently lifted the
Sandiganbayans suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and
finished his term.
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners
Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny
due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected
and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit
rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.
The COMELECs Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilos favour in its Resolution
of November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to
render complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had
ordered.
The COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider the Second Divisions ruling in its October 7, 2008
Resolution; hence, the PRESENT PETITION raising the following ISSUES:
1. Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the threeterm limit rule; and
2. Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as contemplated in
Section 43(b) of RA 7160
Thus presented, the case raises the direct issue of whether Asilos preventive suspension
constituted an interruption that allowed him to run for a 4th term.
THE COURTS RULING
We find the petition meritorious.
General Considerations
The present case is not the first before this Court on the three-term limit provision of the Constitution,
but is the first on the effect of preventive suspension on the continuity of an elective officials term. To
be sure, preventive suspension, as an interruption in the term of an elective public official, has been
mentioned as an example in Borja v. Commission on Elections.2 Doctrinally, however, Borja is not a
controlling ruling; it did not deal with preventive suspension, but with the application of the three-term
rule on the term that an elective official acquired by succession.
a. The Three-term Limit Rule:
The Constitutional Provision Analyzed
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Section 43 (b) of RA 7160 practically repeats the constitutional provision, and any difference in
wording does not assume any significance in this case.
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective
officials stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule
embodied in Section 8, Article X.
Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time three years during which an
official has title to office and can serve. Appari v. Court of Appeals,3 a Resolution promulgated on
November 28, 2007, succinctly discusses what a "term" connotes, as follows:
The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law
describes that an officer may hold an office. According to Mechem, the term of office is the period
during which an office may be held. Upon expiration of the officers term, unless he is authorized by
law to holdover, his rights, duties and authority as a public officer must ipso facto cease. In the law of
public officers, the most and natural frequent method by which a public officer ceases to be such is
by the expiration of the terms for which he was elected or appointed. [Emphasis supplied].
1avvphi1

A later case, Gaminde v. Commission on Audit,4 reiterated that "[T]he term means the time during
which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several
incumbents shall succeed one another."
The "limitation" under this first branch of the provision is expressed in the negative "no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms." This formulation no more than three
consecutive terms is a clear command suggesting the existence of an inflexible rule. While it gives
no exact indication of what to "serve. . . three consecutive terms" exactly connotes, the meaning is
clear reference is to the term, not to the service that a public official may render. In other words,
the limitation refers to the term.
1awphi1

The second branch relates to the provisions express initiative to prevent any circumvention of the
limitation through voluntary severance of ties with the public office; it expressly states that voluntary
renunciation of office "shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected." This declaration complements the term limitation mandated
by the first branch.
A notable feature of the second branch is that it does not textually state that voluntary renunciation is
the only actual interruption of service that does not affect "continuity of service for a full term" for
purposes of the three-term limit rule. It is a pure declaratory statement of what does not serve as an
interruption of service for a full term, but the phrase "voluntary renunciation," by itself, is not without
significance in determining constitutional intent.
The word "renunciation" carries the dictionary meaning of abandonment. To renounce is to give up,
abandon, decline, or resign.5 It is an act that emanates from its author, as contrasted to an act that
operates from the outside. Read with the definition of a "term" in mind, renunciation, as mentioned

under the second branch of the constitutional provision, cannot but mean an act that results in
cutting short the term, i.e., the loss of title to office. The descriptive word "voluntary" linked together
with "renunciation" signifies an act of surrender based on the surenderees own freely exercised will;
in other words, a loss of title to office by conscious choice. In the context of the three-term limit rule,
such loss of title is not considered an interruption because it is presumed to be purposely sought to
avoid the application of the term limitation.
The following exchanges in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the term
"voluntary renunciation" shed further light on the extent of the term "voluntary renunciation":
MR. MAAMBONG. Could I address the clarificatory question to the Committee? This term "voluntary
renunciation" does not appear in Section 3 [of Article VI]; it also appears in Section 6 [of Article VI].
MR DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG. It is also a recurring phrase all over the Constitution. Could the Committee
please enlighten us exactly what "voluntary renunciation" mean? Is this akin to abandonment?
MR. DAVIDE. Abandonment is voluntary. In other words, he cannot circumvent the restriction by
merely resigning at any given time on the second term.
MR. MAAMBONG. Is the Committee saying that the term "voluntary renunciation" is more general
than abandonment and resignation?
MR. DAVIDE. It is more general, more embracing.6
From this exchange and Commissioner Davides expansive interpretation of the term "voluntary
renunciation," the framers intent apparently was to close all gaps that an elective official may seize
to defeat the three-term limit rule, in the way that voluntary renunciation has been rendered
unavailable as a mode of defeating the three-term limit rule. Harking back to the text of the
constitutional provision, we note further that Commissioner Davides view is consistent with the
negative formulation of the first branch of the provision and the inflexible interpretation that it
suggests.
This examination of the wording of the constitutional provision and of the circumstances surrounding
its formulation impresses upon us the clear intent to make term limitation a high priority constitutional
objective whose terms must be strictly construed and which cannot be defeated by, nor sacrificed
for, values of less than equal constitutional worth. We view preventive suspension vis--vis term
limitation with this firm mindset.
b. Relevant Jurisprudence on the
Three-term Limit Rule
Other than the above-cited materials, jurisprudence best gives us a lead into the concepts within the
provisions contemplation, particularly on the "interruption in the continuity of service for the full term"
that it speaks of.

Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections7 presented the question of whether the disqualification on the
basis of the three-term limit applies if the election of the public official (to be strictly accurate, the
proclamation as winner of the public official) for his supposedly third term had been declared invalid
in a final and executory judgment. We ruled that the two requisites for the application of the
disqualification (viz., 1. that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in
the same local government post; and 2. that he has fully served three consecutive terms) were not
present. In so ruling, we said:
The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term
limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peoples choice and grant
their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term
does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely,
involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months
before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal
process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from
office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 19951998 mayoral term. [Emphasis supplied]
Our intended meaning under this ruling is clear: it is severance from office, or to be exact, loss of
title, that renders the three-term limit rule inapplicable.
Ong v. Alegre8 and Rivera v. COMELEC,9 like Lonzanida, also involved the issue of whether there
had been a completed term for purposes of the three-term limit disqualification. These cases,
however, presented an interesting twist, as their final judgments in the electoral contest came after
the term of the contested office had expired so that the elective officials in these cases were never
effectively unseated.
Despite the ruling that Ong was never entitled to the office (and thus was never validly elected), the
Court concluded that there was nevertheless an election and service for a full term in contemplation
of the three-term rule based on the following premises: (1) the final decision that the third-termer lost
the election was without practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term
of the contested office had expired; and (2) the official assumed and continuously exercised the
functions of the office from the start to the end of the term. The Court noted in Ong the absurdity and
the deleterious effect of a contrary view that the official (referring to the winner in the election
protest) would, under the three-term rule, be considered to have served a term by virtue of a
veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually served the term pursuant to a
proclamation made in due course after an election. This factual variation led the Court to rule
differently from Lonzanida.
In the same vein, the Court in Rivera rejected the theory that the official who finally lost the election
contest was merely a "caretaker of the office" or a mere "de facto officer." The Court obeserved that
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated and its purpose defeated when an official fully
served in the same position for three consecutive terms. Whether as "caretaker" or "de facto" officer,
he exercised the powers and enjoyed the perquisites of the office that enabled him "to stay on
indefinitely."
Ong and Rivera are important rulings for purposes of the three-term limitation because of what they
directly imply. Although the election requisite was not actually present, the Court still gave full effect

to the three-term limitation because of the constitutional intent to strictly limit elective officials to
service for three terms. By so ruling, the Court signalled how zealously it guards the three-term limit
rule. Effectively, these cases teach us to strictly interpret the term limitation rule in favor of limitation
rather than its exception.
Adormeo v. Commission on Elections10 dealt with the effect of recall on the three-term limit
disqualification. The case presented the question of whether the disqualification applies if the official
lost in the regular election for the supposed third term, but was elected in a recall election covering
that term. The Court upheld the COMELECs ruling that the official was not elected for three (3)
consecutive terms. The Court reasoned out that for nearly two years, the official was a private
citizen; hence, the continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the election for the third
term.
Socrates v. Commission on Elections11 also tackled recall vis--vis the three-term limit
disqualification. Edward Hagedorn served three full terms as mayor. As he was disqualified to run for
a fourth term, he did not participate in the election that immediately followed his third term. In this
election, the petitioner Victorino Dennis M. Socrates was elected mayor. Less than 1 years after
Mayor Socrates assumed the functions of the office, recall proceedings were initiated against him,
leading to the call for a recall election. Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the
recall election, but Socrates sought his disqualification on the ground that he (Hagedorn) had fully
served three terms prior to the recall election and was therefore disqualified to run because of the
three-term limit rule. We decided in Hagedorns favor, ruling that:
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth
term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end
of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by
the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an
immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an
involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term limit of elective local officials, the question
asked was whether there would be no further election after three terms, or whether there would be
"no immediate reelection" after three terms.
xxxx
Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three
consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth
term as long as the reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall
election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an
immediate reelection after the third term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to run in any
other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a
consecutive fourth term.12
Latasa v. Commission on Elections13 presented the novel question of whether a municipal mayor
who had fully served for three consecutive terms could run as city mayor in light of the intervening
conversion of the municipality into a city. During the third term, the municipality was converted into a

city; the cityhood charter provided that the elective officials of the municipality shall, in a holdover
capacity, continue to exercise their powers and functions until elections were held for the new city
officials. The Court ruled that the conversion of the municipality into a city did not convert the office
of the municipal mayor into a local government post different from the office of the city mayor the
territorial jurisdiction of the city was the same as that of the municipality; the inhabitants were the
same group of voters who elected the municipal mayor for 3 consecutive terms; and they were the
same inhabitants over whom the municipal mayor held power and authority as their chief executive
for nine years. The Court said:
This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the
peoples freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person
accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay
in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served
for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the
framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as
mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over
the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the
very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it. 14
Latasa instructively highlights, after a review of Lonzanida, Adormeo and Socrates, that no threeterm limit violation results if a rest period or break in the service between terms or tenure in a given
elective post intervened. InLonzanida, the petitioner was a private citizen with no title to any elective
office for a few months before the next mayoral elections. Similarly, in Adormeo and Socrates, the
private respondents lived as private citizens for two years and fifteen months, respectively. Thus,
these cases establish that the law contemplates a complete break from office during which the local
elective official steps down and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the
territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.
Seemingly differing from these results is the case of Montebon v. Commission on Elections, 15 where
the highest-ranking municipal councilor succeeded to the position of vice-mayor by operation of law.
The question posed when he subsequently ran for councilor was whether his assumption as vicemayor was an interruption of his term as councilor that would place him outside the operation of the
three-term limit rule. We ruled that an interruption had intervened so that he could again run as
councilor. This result seemingly deviates from the results in the cases heretofore discussed since the
elective official continued to hold public office and did not become a private citizen during the interim.
The common thread that identifies Montebon with the rest, however, is that the elective official
vacated the office of councilor and assumed the higher post of vice-mayor by operation of law. Thus,
for a time he ceased to be councilor an interruption that effectively placed him outside the ambit of
the three-term limit rule.
c. Conclusion Based on Law and Jurisprudence
From all the above, we conclude that the "interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from
the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The
elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an
effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict
intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective officials continuous stay in office to no more
than three consecutive terms, using "voluntary renunciation" as an example and standard of what
does not constitute an interruption.

Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is an effective
interruption of service within a term, as we held in Montebon. On the other hand, temporary inability
or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be
considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or
at least an effective break from holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred
from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by law.
An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost the right to hold on to
his office, and cannot be equated with the failure to render service. The latter occurs during an office
holders term when he retains title to the office but cannot exercise his functions for reasons
established by law. Of course, the term "failure to serve" cannot be used once the right to office is
lost; without the right to hold office or to serve, then no service can be rendered so that none is really
lost.
To put it differently although at the risk of repetition, Section 8, Article X both by structure and
substance fixes an elective officials term of office and limits his stay in office to three consecutive
terms as an inflexible rule that is stressed, no less, by citing voluntary renunciation as an example of
a circumvention. The provision should be read in the context of interruption of term, not in the
context of interrupting the full continuity of the exercise of the powers of the elective position. The
"voluntary renunciation" it speaks of refers only to the elective officials voluntary relinquishment of
office and loss of title to this office. It does not speak of the temporary "cessation of the exercise of
power or authority" that may occur for various reasons, with preventive suspension being only one of
them. To quote Latasa v. Comelec:16
Indeed, [T]he law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps down from
office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a
particular local government unit. [Emphasis supplied].
Preventive Suspension and the Three-Term Limit Rule
a. Nature of Preventive Suspension
Preventive suspension whether under the Local Government Code, 17 the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act,18or the Ombudsman Act19 is an interim remedial measure to address the situation of
an official who have been charged administratively or criminally, where the evidence preliminarily
indicates the likelihood of or potential for eventual guilt or liability.
Preventive suspension is imposed under the Local Government Code "when the evidence of guilt is
strong and given the gravity of the offense, there is a possibility that the continuance in office of the
respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records
and other evidence." Under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, it is imposed after a valid
information (that requires a finding of probable cause) has been filed in court, while under the
Ombudsman Act, it is imposed when, in the judgment of the Ombudsman, the evidence of guilt is
strong; and (a) the charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; or (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the
respondents continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from performing the
functions of his office and does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose

title to his office; loss of office is a consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or
liability.
Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that operates under closely-controlled conditions and
gives a premium to the protection of the service rather than to the interests of the individual office
holder. Even then, protection of the service goes only as far as a temporary prohibition on the
exercise of the functions of the officials office; the official is reinstated to the exercise of his position
as soon as the preventive suspension is lifted. Thus, while a temporary incapacity in the exercise of
power results, no position is vacated when a public official is preventively suspended. This was what
exactly happened to Asilo.
That the imposition of preventive suspension can be abused is a reality that is true in the exercise of
all powers and prerogative under the Constitution and the laws. The imposition of preventive
suspension, however, is not an unlimited power; there are limitations built into the laws 20 themselves
that the courts can enforce when these limitations are transgressed, particularly when grave abuse
of discretion is present. In light of this well-defined parameters in the imposition of preventive
suspension, we should not view preventive suspension from the extreme situation that it can totally
deprive an elective office holder of the prerogative to serve and is thus an effective interruption of an
election officials term.
Term limitation and preventive suspension are two vastly different aspects of an elective officials
service in office and they do not overlap. As already mentioned above, preventive suspension
involves protection of the service and of the people being served, and prevents the office holder from
temporarily exercising the power of his office. Term limitation, on the other hand, is triggered after an
elective official has served his three terms in office without any break. Its companion concept
interruption of a term on the other hand, requires loss of title to office. If preventive suspension and
term limitation or interruption have any commonality at all, this common point may be with respect to
the discontinuity of service that may occur in both. But even on this point, they merely run parallel to
each other and never intersect; preventive suspension, by its nature, is a temporary incapacity to
render service during an unbroken term; in the context of term limitation, interruption of service
occurs after there has been a break in the term.
b. Preventive Suspension and the Intent of the Three-Term Limit Rule
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should
not be considered an interruption that allows an elective officials stay in office beyond three terms. A
preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official
continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the
office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office
is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no
vacancy exists.
To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for a fourth and prohibited term is to close
our eyes to this reality and to allow a constitutional violation through sophistry by equating the
temporary inability to discharge the functions of office with the interruption of term that the
constitutional provision contemplates. To be sure, many reasons exist, voluntary or involuntary
some of them personal and some of them by operation of law that may temporarily prevent an
elective office holder from exercising the functions of his office in the way that preventive suspension
does. A serious extended illness, inability through force majeure, or the enforcement of a suspension

as a penalty, to cite some involuntary examples, may prevent an office holder from exercising the
functions of his office for a time without forfeiting title to office. Preventive suspension is no different
because it disrupts actual delivery of service for a time within a term. Adopting such interruption of
actual service as the standard to determine effective interruption of term under the three-term rule
raises at least the possibility of confusion in implementing this rule, given the many modes and
occasions when actual service may be interrupted in the course of serving a term of office. The
standard may reduce the enforcement of the three-term limit rule to a case-to-case and possibly
see-sawing determination of what an effective interruption is.
c. Preventive Suspension and Voluntary Renunciation
Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by operation of law, does not involve a voluntary act
on the part of the suspended official, except in the indirect sense that he may have voluntarily
committed the act that became the basis of the charge against him. From this perspective,
preventive suspension does not have the element of voluntariness that voluntary renunciation
embodies. Neither does it contain the element of renunciation or loss of title to office as it merely
involves the temporary incapacity to perform the service that an elective office demands. Thus
viewed, preventive suspension is by its very nature the exact opposite of voluntary renunciation;
it is involuntary and temporary, and involves only the actual delivery of service, not the title to the
office. The easy conclusion therefore is that they are, by nature, different and non-comparable.
But beyond the obvious comparison of their respective natures is the more important consideration
of how they affect the three-term limit rule.
Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the total incapacity to render service, is
disallowed by the Constitution as an effective interruption of a term. It is therefore not allowed as a
mode of circumventing the three-term limit rule.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of a term and should
therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation. It can pose as a threat, however, if we
shall disregard its nature and consider it an effective interruption of a term. Let it be noted that a
preventive suspension is easier to undertake than voluntary renunciation, as it does not require
relinquishment or loss of office even for the briefest time. It merely requires an easily fabricated
administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has been imposed.
In this sense, recognizing preventive suspension as an effective interruption of a term can serve as a
circumvention more potent than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution expressly disallows
as an interruption.
Conclusion
To recapitulate, Asilos 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-imposed
preventive suspension in 2005, as preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective officials
term. Thus, the COMELEC refused to apply the legal command of Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution when it granted due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy for a prohibited fourth
term. By so refusing, the COMELEC effectively committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction; its action was a refusal to perform a positive duty required by no less
than the Constitution and was one undertaken outside the contemplation of law.21

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly NULLIFY the assailed
COMELEC rulings. The private respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo is declared DISQUALIFIED to run, and
perforce to serve, as Councilor of Lucena City for a prohibited fourth term. Costs against private
respondent Asilo.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR: